GROUP 1: ABDULLAH, ACAL, BROZO, CRISTOBAL,

PALE (ATTY. LAJA-OTTO) TH 5:30PM-8:30PM

JAMERO, TECSON, YUSON.

Assigned Cases for January 31, 2019

CASE NO. 1

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA v. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE

A.C. No. 7269; November 23, 2011
Carpio, J.:

FACTS:

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was
the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale
over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of
an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No.
9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed
against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting
herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in
Civil Case No. 9284 nine times. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but DelaRosa was able
to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help
of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-
Lacsamana was forged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

HELD:

YES. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: “A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.” The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not
to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires
that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.

The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
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As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in
2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulasountil 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent
to Busmentes office until 2005.

It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files
in Busmentes office. (Case digest by: Angelica Yuson)

CASE NO. 2

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC; August 19, 2009
Brion, J.:

FACTS:

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008.
Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she
engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-
Branch 81 of Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an
incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this
practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is
prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for
a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Karen Silverio-Buffe may appear as private counsel before RTC-Branch 81
of Romblon within the 1 year prohibition.

HELD:

NO. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of
public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized
by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or
her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee's resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year prohibition
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period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any
matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between
a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors.
The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed
office hours to serve the public.

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately
after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the
other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she
used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where
specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists.
This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.

By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

CANON 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Thus, we found her guilty of professional misconduct. (Case digest by: Nishar Abdullah)

CASE NO. 3

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v. EDWIN L. RANA

B.M. No. 1036; June 10, 2003
Carpio, J:

FACTS:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. Before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) led against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation. Complainant alleged that respondent, while
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JAMERO, TECSON, YUSON.

not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Subsequent actions by the respondent
involved signing pleadings in the proceeding as counsel for George Bunan. Respondent admitted signing
the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explained,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading. On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath
but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. The
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel
for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent engaged in unauthorized practice of law and should be denied
admission to the Bar.

HELD:

YES. The Court agreed with the findings of the OBC that respondent indeed engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, evidenced by the minutes of the MBEC proceedings which showed that
respondent actively participated in said proceedings, and should be denied admission to the Bar. Further,
respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer's oath on 22 May 2001.
To practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill;
respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and led various pleadings, without license to do so. The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the
bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. Furthermore, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-edged lawyer.

Therefore, respondent engaged in unauthorized practice of law and was denied admission to the
bar. (Case digest by: Gari Jamero)

CASE NO. 4

IN RE: ELMO ABAD

A. M. No. 139; March 28, 1983
Abad Santos, J.:

FACTS:

Elmo Abad was charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers
Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, which
the former could not deny and had to admit the practice.
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In Mr. Abad’s explanation, it was stated that prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of
the Bar, he paid his Bar Association Fee, Certification Fee, and Membership Dues for 1979-1980 to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On July 26, 1979, while waiting for his turn to take the Oath as a member
of the Bar, he was made to sign his Lawyer’s Oath. The then Clerk of Court informed him that the then
Chief of Justice Fernando wants to talk to him regarding the reply of one Mr. Jorge Uy to hi s answer to
his complaint and told him that he had to answer the Reply for which reason the taking and his Reply to
Mr. Uy’s Answer, the Court not ordering for the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys with IBP, thus
making him a Member in Good Standing with the QC Chapter of the IBP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. Abad is a member of the Philippine Bar.

HELD:

NO. In the March 1983 ruling, the Court stated that Mr. Abad should know that the circumstances
which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the Bar and the right to practice law thereafter.
The two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: (1) his lawyer’s
oath to be administered by the Court, and (2) his signature in the Roll of Attorneys (Rule 138, Secs. 17
and 19, Rule of Court). The charged against Mr. Abad constitutes contempt of court and the Court further
fined him Php500.00 payable within 10 days from notice, failing which he shall serve 25 days
imprisonment. (Case digest by: Ayla Cristobal)

CASE NO. 5

LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP

DUES
B.M. No. 1370; May 9, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues contending after admission from the Bar
in 1961, he worked in the Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986 and in the USA from 1983 until his
retirement in 2003. Thus, he cannot be assessed with dues since the Civil Service Law prohibits the
practice of one’s profession while in government service and that he was in the USA.

IBP commented that the membership is not based on the actual practice of law and that
membership in the Roll of Attorneys continues as long as he is still a member and one of its obligations
is the payment of annual dues.

Petitioner contended in his reply that what he is questioning is the non-exemption regardless of
their active or inactive practice of the profession. Also, the non-exemption suffers constitutional infirmities,
particularly the due protection and equal protection clause. He added that his removal from non-payment
of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property rights without due process.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during his inactive
practice of law.

HELD:

NO. IBP is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members, therefore,
are subject to all rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including payment of annual dues.

The IBP requires membership and financial support of every attorney as a condition sine qua non
to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys. Moreover, there is nothing in
the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar which power
required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives
and purposes of integration.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one
is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member
is engaged in.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the
loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move. (Case digest by: Mark James
Brozo)

CASE NO. 6

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, MICHAEL A. MEDADO.

B.M. No. 2540; September 24, 2013
Sereno, C.J.:

FACTS:

Medado graduated from UP Law in 1979 and passed the same year’s Bar examination. He took
the lawyer’s oath on May 7 1980 and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys on May 13 of the same
year but failed to do so for the reason that he allegedly lost his Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given
by the Bar Office when he went home to the province.

Several years after, Medado found the said notice and only then realized that he had not signed
the roll itself but rather just the attendance record for the oath-taking. At that time, Medado was already
engaged in corporate and taxation work but not active in litigation. He claimed that he operated “under
the mistaken belief that since he already took the oath, signing the Roll of Attorneys is not a matter of
urgency nor is crucial to his status in the legal profession”.
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In 2005, he attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education where his roll number was asked for
in order to credit such requirement but failed to do so for not having signed the roll.

On February 6 2012, 7 years after, he finally filed for the instant petition praying that he be allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Medado be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

2. Whether or not Medado violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Conduct.

HELD:

1. YES. The SC granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law

Disallowing Medado to sign the Roll of Attorneys would be tantamount to his disbarment wherein
which such action is not warranted. The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith
in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years, show that he
possesses the character required of member of the Philippine Bar; and that he appears to be a
competent and able practitioner for having held various positions at different firms and companies.
However, he is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.

A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification because everyone is presumed to

know the law and its consequences. Medado should have acted promptly upon finding out that
he lacks the vital requirement in practicing law. In spite of this knowledge, he willfully engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law which transgresses Canon 9.

Medado cannot be suspended since he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer thus he Court imposed
upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign the Roll of Attorneys a year after
receipt of the resolution, plus fines.

2. YES. Even though Medado was not yet a full-fledged lawyer, he already violated Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Conduct, which states: “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.” While it appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed
under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession. (Case digest by: Ma. Concepcion Tecson)

CASE NO. 7

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN, and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN v. BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA

G.R. No. 169517; March 14, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
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FACTS:

The petitioners filed an original petition for contempt against respondent Benedicto Balajadia. It
appears that on May 8, 2005, Balajadia filed a criminal case against the petitioners for usurpation of
authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking
fees by the said petitioners. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit by Balajadia, he asserted that among
others things that he is a “practicing lawyer based in Baguio City”, however, upon confirm ation of the
matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it showed that Balajadia
has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. With this the petitioners claim that Balajadia should be
liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In Balajadia’s defense, he averred that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a lawyer

and that it was an honest mistake. It was the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino who prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was apparently patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit since the latter
also previously filed a complaint-affidavit against the petitioners involving the same subject matter. The
secretary apparently copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit to Balajadia’s
complaint-affidavit hence, it was inadvertently alleged that he is a practicing lawyer. Regarding the matter,
Liza Laconsay, the secretary executed an affidavit admitting the mistake.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71 Sec. 3 (e).

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court held that the liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Rule 71
Sec. 3 (e) of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and in determining liability for criminal
contempt, it is a well-settled rule that intent is a necessary element which must be shown by clear
evidence. It is punished because it is a disrespect to the dignity and authority of the court and it obstructs
the orderly administration of justice.

In this case, the records support Balajadia’s claim that he never intended to project himself as a
lawyer to the public and that the matter was a clear oversight on the part of his lawyer’s secretary.
Furthermore, in cases where the court found a party liable for unauthorized practice of law, the offender
is always guilty of some overt act like signing a pleading or appearing before court hearings, a matter
which is absent in the case at bar. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. (Case digest by:
Rachel Andrelee Acal)