Pip Pom 1 PDF

Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection, Repairs, Alterations and Abandonment Core
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Why is this Module Important?
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© PetroSkills, LLC. All rights reserved. 1
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Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection,

Repairs, Alterations, and
Abandonment Core
Overview of Pipeline Systems
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Learning Objectives
This section will cover the following learning objectives:

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 Define key considerations, daily operations and maintenance of pipeline systems

 Describe similarities and differences between pipeline systems in differing services
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Pipelines and Their Uses

 Pipelines provide:
• Point to point transportation
• Continuous flow at constant
flowrate
• Primary means of moving:
– Oil, Gas, Refined Products,
Chemicals
– Water, Wastewater
 Where are pipelines used?

• Usually NOT on company
property
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• Geographically everywhere
• Onshore and offshore – any
terrain condition
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Pipeline General Uses

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Gathering systems
Transport to storage facilities

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Transport to process facilities
Transport product to market/further processing
Transfer finished products to buyer
Support production (water/CO2 injection)
Disposal of waste/non-commercial fluids
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Pipeline Typical Uses

Onshore versus offshore
Liquid versus Natural Gas versus Dense Phase Fluids

• Liquids
• Crude oils
• Refined products (gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel)
• High Volatility Liquids (HVLs – ethane, propane, butane, natural gasoline)
• Water injection
• Natural Gas
• “Wet” gas
• “Pipeline–quality” gas
• Dense Phase Fluids
• Carbon dioxide
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• Ethylene
• Propylene
• Natural gas (potentially)
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Safety regulated versus non-regulated
Common carrier versus proprietary
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Common Operating Philosophies
 Priority of public safety and line integrity
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 Importance of communication with public

along the pipeline route
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Image Source: Creative Commons
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 Centralized control of entire pipeline
system through Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA)
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 Importance of making pipeline piggable
for operations and for internal inspection
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 Emphasis on preventing corrosion of
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pipeline
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pipeline
 Long service life ~50+ years
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pipeline
 Long service life ~50+ years
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 Importance of power optimization,
measurement, and quality control

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Comparative Cost of Land Transportation Modes

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Pipelines versus Other Facilities

 Most oil and gas facilities, including “pipelines” involve pipe, fittings,
pumps/compressors, flanges, valves, storage and process vessels, heat
transfer equipment, instrumentation, and controls
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Pipelines versus Other Facilities

 Most oil and gas facilities, including “pipelines” involve pipe, fittings,
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pumps/compressors, flanges, valves, storage and process vessels, heat

transfer equipment, instrumentation, and controls
 Economics and large-scale transportation system needs by multiple
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companies, may lead to the formation of a consortium that designs, builds

and operates the pipeline. Often such pipeline crosses public land and it
becomes a “common carrier” charging a fee or a “tariff” for the transportation
service. The “tariff” is regulated by the government and may be compared to
tariffs on any public utilities, bus or train services
 Pipelines differ because they:
• Provide transportation only with no processing
• Are Outside the fence or off the platform
• Represent the major capital cost element of line pipe
• Present energy cost as the second-largest cost element in the system
• Create natural monopolies because of economies of scale, leading to regulation
of rates
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Regulatory and Code Driven Factors

 Environmental and regulatory requirements
 Routing and facility location considerations
 Design strength requirements for construction and operations
 Materials and coatings selection
 Construction and inspection methods, with the emphasis on
critical public safety and environmental aspects
 Operating and maintenance philosophies and requirements
 Other considerations critical to efficient “pipeline” operations:
• Importance of pipeline hydraulics
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• Eliminating or controlling “processing” in pipelines (Flow
Assurance)
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• Reality or potential of revenue regulation

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Regulatory Impact on Operating Philosophy

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 Pipelines regulated for public safety and environmental issues must focus on compliance
and record keeping processes
 Those regulated for rates and ship requirements need to emphasize accurate
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measurement, quality assurance, product accounting, and nondiscriminatory dealing with

all shippers
Image Source: PetroSkills Widen
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Pipelines from the Caspian Sea
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Key Learning Points
• Pipeline is an effective means of transportation for liquid, gas, dense phase, and multi-
phase commodities
• The longer the pipeline and the larger the required capacity, the more efficient the means
of transportation
• Pipelines cross private property lines, city lines, state lines and sometimes international
borders
• Pipelines are designed for long life (~50 years and more), and with proper maintenance
and integrity management its life can be extended for many more years
• Differences among pipelines may be dictated by the commodity transported, the
environment where the pipeline is running through, the line pipe materials, applicable
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regulations, and more
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Learning Objectives
This section has covered the following learning objectives:

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 Define key considerations, daily operations and maintenance of pipeline systems

 Describe similarities and differences between pipeline systems in differing services
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Abandonment Core
Pipeline Monitoring and Leak Detection
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Learning Objectives

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 Identify the reasons for monitoring and leak detection

 Describe the risks and consequences of pipeline incidents by type of service and location
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 Define High Consequence Area [HCA] and list the impacts on pipeline design and
operation
 Describe the strengths and weaknesses of monitoring leak detection systems
 List the key actions and components on a pipeline emergency response program
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Why Monitor? Public Safety and Environmental Protection
 Pipeline safety record better than any other form of transport

 Pipeline accidents can be dramatic
 Incidents and effects very public because of being outside the fence and rare
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Image Source: San Bruno SF Examiner
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Dramatic Effects and Real Costs

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Cleburne, Texas
Image Source: San Bruno SF Examiner
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Typical Response to Pipeline Accidents
 Responses to pipeline
incidents are usually the Example
same everywhere
San Bruno, California natural gas line explosion in
 Additional regulations 2010 triggers H.R.2845 Pipeline Safety, Regulatory
 Increasing property Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011. (US)
damage cost
This act requires study of pipeline leak detection
 Damage to corporate and regulations, additional regulations on CO2 lines,
industry image additional requirements to pipelines to prepare
 Increased public scrutiny emergency response, strengthening fine and
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enforcement system.
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Pipeline Risk Reduction

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 API 1160:
• Provides a comprehensive and integrated means for examining and comparing the spectrum
of risks and risk reduction activities available
• Provides a structured, easily communicated means for selecting and implementing risk
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reduction activities, and

• Establishes and tracks system performance with the goal of improving that performance
“The goal of the operator of any pipeline is to operate the pipeline so that there are no
adverse effects on public/employees, the environment, or customers. The goal is error-free,
spill-free, and incident-free operation of the pipeline.” – API RP 1160
 Data in US indicates risk is increasing even with “good safety record”

 Risk = Probability of occurrence of incident x Consequences of the incident.
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Pipeline Risk Reduction
• 49 CFR 195.452 – Require

operators to develop and
implement ongoing risk
reduction programs for
Hazardous Liquid pipelines in
US
• API RP -1160 – Published to
support operator compliance
with the requirement
• 49 CFR 192.9 – Natural gas
transmission line operator
requirements
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• ASME 31.8S – Provides
transmission line operators
similar support
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• Canadian Standard Z662-11.3.2
and Annex N – Provide similar
requirement as above
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Risks and Impact
 Increasing volatility increases risk of fire /

explosion
 Types of products ranked based on
decreasing volatility
• High Volatility Liquids (HVLs)
• Natural gas
• Dense phase
• Refined products
• Crude petroleum
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 Toxicity in soil and water increases the risk
of environmental damage
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• Refined products
• Crude petroleum
• Injection water Image Source: PetroSkills Widen
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Risk: Leak from Pipeline, Crude Oil Release in Utah

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A pipeline leak sent oil spilling

into a Salt Lake City creek,
coating ducks and geese,
and closing a park.
Image Source: Matt Gillis / AP
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The underground pipeline

flows to Salt Lake City from
Colorado and feeds the city's
oil and gas refineries.
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At least 400 to 500 barrels of

oil spewed into Red Butte
Creek before crews capped
the leak site. Nearly 50
gallons of crude oil per
minute initially had spilled
into the creek.
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Crews used absorbent booms

and created dams to contain
the spill, but some oil had
flowed as far as four miles to
the Jordan River, and into a
pond in the city's Liberty Park,
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near where residents reported
dead fish.
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Health Risk Impact on Operating Philosophy

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 Carbon dioxide pipeline

emergency response based on
risks of asphyxiation and
release of greenhouse gases
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 Toxicity to humans sets

philosophy on crude oil and
natural gas lines containing
hydrogen sulfide or other toxic
materials
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Financial / Commercial Impact on Operating Philosophy
 Offshore pipeline operations and

repair cost significantly higher than
onshore cost, increasingly so with
increased depth
• Need for new specialized tools,
methods, and technology
• Repair equipment often developed
for specific project
 Gathering lines, particularly offshore,
is increasingly driven by need for
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flow assurance to manage lines to
control slugging, hydrate formation,
wax formation, asphaltene
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deposition, and other deposition on
interior pipeline walls Image Source: Creative Commons
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High Consequence Area [HCA]
Areas where the potential

consequences of a gas pipeline
accident may be significant or
may do considerable harm to
people and their property.
Class 3 and 4 locations; facilities with

High persons who are mobility-impaired,
Consequence confined, or hard to evacuate, and
places where people gather for
Area recreational and other purposes.
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For Class 3 and 4 locations, the corridor
of protection from the pipeline is 300 feet,
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660 feet or 1000 feet depending on the
pipeline's diameter and operating
pressure.
Images Source: Creative Commons

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High Consequence Area [HCA] – For Class 3 and 4 Locations

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The corridor of protection is a direct result of the “impact circle” calculation based on the
equation:
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𝑟 0.69 𝑑 𝑝0.5
where:
d = outside diameter of the pipeline, in.
p = pipeline segment’s maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP), psig
r = radius of the impact circle, ft
Text Reference: ASME B3.8S
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Pipeline Control Systems
Remote control of pipelines requires the

following:
• Pump/compressor start/stop and control
Pipeline structure • Pressure indication and control
All pipelines • Flow rate indication and control
is determined by
require pressure • Temperature indication (and control on most heated
size, length, and
control – gathering lines)
system
and flow line • Block valve open/close control and indication – inlet
complexity and outlet
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• Gravity / density indication
• Programmable Logic Controller (PLCs)
• Robust and redundant communications
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• Trained and responsive
controller / operator
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Pipeline Leak Detection

 Pipelines will experience leaks in public places
 Need effective leak detection systems to:
• Reduce consequence of failure
• Reassure public in the safety of the technology
• Comply with safety regulations
 THREE BIG Questions:
• Do I have a leak?
• How big is the leak?
• Where is the leak?
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 The keys to leak prevention and minimizing impacts are:
• Correct design
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• Proper installation
• Consistent inspection and monitoring
• Leak detection
• Quick response
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Leak Detection Systems Methods
Static Pressure Tests
Static pressure tests can include hydrotests where the line test medium is usually water and the
line is tested above MAOP, or simple tests where the line is shut down with product under
pressure and monitored. These methods can be very effective on lines or segments periodically
idled, particularly liquid lines. The lines are monitored for changes in pressure (compensated for
temperature change).
Experienced Operator or Controller Leak Detection
Operators conduct periodic inspections to detect leaks. These may include aerial patrols,
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surface patrols, station walk-throughs, etc., and personnel looking for dead vegetation, stained
areas, pooled or free-flowing product, vapor or vapor clouds, ground frost, hissing sounds,
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and/or odors.
Volume Balance
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One of the oldest techniques involves comparing the mass of fluid put into the pipeline with the
mass of fluid coming out at the other end. The comparison should be made over a period such
as one hour or longer to eliminate the effects of transients (i.e. its application assumes that the
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flow is steady state). The method does not locate the leak. Errors in measurement, metering, or
temperature can limit success.
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Dynamic Flow Modeling
Dynamic flow modeling involves simulating the operating conditions of the pipeline through
hydraulic calculations based on flow rate, temperature, pipeline profile, and fluid properties. The
calculated conditions are then compared to real time data acquired from various measurement
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points along the pipeline. Deviations are evaluated against alarm set points. The alarm set
points should be selected to find the smallest leak that is distinguishable from background noise
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so as to minimize false alarms. The size of leak that can be found will be a certain percentage of
the volume of fluid in the system. The software models for this purpose are normally integrated
into the pipeline SCADA system. Leak location information is not provided automatically, but
analysis of transients can be used to locate a leak. A pipeline operator may find it useful to
consult API 1149 and API 1130 in conjunction with employing a dynamic flow model leak
detection system.
Tracer Chemical
This approach to leak detection requires mixing a small amount of a specific volatile chemical
tracer with the contents of a pipeline. The chemical tracer is not a component of the pipeline
contents and does not occur naturally in soil. After the chemical is injected into the pipeline, soil
vapor samples are obtained from probes or other devices installed intermittently along the
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pipeline. The vapor samples are analyzed by a gas chromatograph for the specific tracer
chemical. Presence of the chemical in the sample can only occur through pipeline leaks. This
method can be used periodically or continuously to examine for leakage. Since the locations of
the samples are known, it is possible to locate the leak within the limits of distances between
sample points.
One limitation of this method is that you need to restart a line with a suspected leak for tracer
chemicals to work.
Release Detection Cable
Leak-detection-sensing cables can be installed in the pipeline trench over, under, or along-side
the pipeline. Typically, the cable is installed within a continuous perforated plastic tube. The
presence of a hydrocarbon creates a circuit between to sensing wires within the cable, sending
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a signal of the leak and the location to the pipeline control center. This kind of system most
likely can only be installed as the pipeline is being constructed. Retrofitting an existing pipeline
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would be prohibitively expensive. One limitation of detection cables is that they can be defeated
by previously existing contamination.
Shut-in Leak Detection

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Shut-in leak detection, also known as a “stand-up test” consists of shutting off flow in a pipeline
and closing the valves to hold the pressure constant. The pressure will remain constant except
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for changes due to temperature variations unless a leak exists. The rate of pressure decay in
the event of a leak is indicative of the size of the leak. It should be noted that valve leaks, if it
occurs, will confound the ability to judge whether or not a leak exists. Also, no information on the
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location of the leak is provided by this type of test.
Pressure Point Analysis Leak Detection Software
This software examines pressure data acquired at high sampling rates from discreet locations
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and it calculates mass balance in real time. Pattern recognition algorithms are used to
distinguish leak events from normal operations. Since the locations of the pressure point
samples are known, it is possible to locate the leak within the limits of distances between
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sample points.
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Leak Detection Methods – Historical and Current
 These methods continue to be important:

• ASME B31.4 Section 451.5 provides a set of requirements for patrolling
• ASME B31.8 Section 850.4.4 provides a set of requirements for educational programs
• ASME B31.8 Section 851.2 provides a set of requirements for pipeline patrolling
 SCADA computers leads; computer analysis of pipeline hydraulics to detect leaks
 External technologies used to find leaks
• Continuous basis
• Spot checks
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 Expectations increasing these developments within the industry, with regulators
and general public
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Kalamazoo River Spill
 Crude pipeline oil spill in July 2010 brought focus to

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leak detection and emergency response planning

 Final cleanup cost estimated over half-billion dollars
 Leads to passage of U.S.H.R. 2845
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Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job

Creation Act of 2011
 Section 8. Leak Detection
• “... a report on leak detection systems used by
operators of hazardous liquid pipeline facilities and
transportation-related flow lines...and the safety
benefits and adverse consequences of requiring
operators to use leak detection systems.”
 80% of estimated 20,000 barrels pumped into river

after Control Center detected the leak (17 hours)
 Questionable emergency response
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Key Performance Metrics for Leak Detection Systems
Robustness
Accuracy Capital Cost
Operating
Reliability
Cost
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Sensitivity
Performance Maintenance
Metrics for Cost
LDS
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Key Performance Metrics for Leak Detection Systems
Leak sensitivity and reliability
It is feasible for the fiber optic cable type of systems to detect leaks down to 0.1% within
seconds. The negative pressure type can detect leaks within minutes. These two types of
systems have the same detection time for all the leak sizes. The statistical systems are more
sensitive than RTTM (Real Time Transient model) but both types require longer detection time
for smaller leaks. While highly sensitive, the fiber optic and negative pressure systems are
subject to a high level of false alarms. The most reliable one is the statistical system.
Location accuracy and cost
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Similar to leak sensitivity, the fiber optic and negative pressure type have the same accuracy for
all the leak sizes. The location accuracy changes from tens of meters (fiber optic), to hundreds
of meters (negative pressure), thousands of meters (statistical analysis) and ten thousands of
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meters (RTTM). The installation cost of a fiber optic system is the highest followed by the
RTTM, statistical system and negative pressure if no field instruments exist. The cost of RTTM
sensors are in place.
Leak size estimate and robustness

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and statistical systems can be reduced if field instruments, such as flow meters and pressure
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Both the statistical and RTTM systems can provide accurate leak size estimates, but the fiber
optic systems cannot tell how big a leak is. The negative pressure systems estimate leak sizes
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based on pressure drop, thus they are only accurate after calibration leak tests. The statistical
system is more robust than RTTM and negative pressure, but the fiber optic systems are the
least robust as no leak detection is available if the cable is cut.
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Leak Detection Systems Sensitivity
 Volume spilled = “leak rate” x “time to detect”

 Detecting a “1% of the flow” leak in 30 minutes
is pretty good, but what if the system
fails to detect a:
• 0.5% leak in 1 hour
• 0.1% leak in 10 hours
• 0.01% leak in 10 days
Which results in the biggest spill?
Answer:
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 0.5% for 1 hr = 1% for 30 min
 0.1% for 10 hr = 2 x (1% for 30 min)
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 0.01% for 10 days = 4.8 x (1% for 30 min)

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Internal Leak Detection Systems
Negative
Volume or Mass
pressure wave Monitoring of
balance (with or
method Operational Data
without line pack • Governed for Liquid Pipelines
(Pressure point by Controllers
correction) by API RP1130
analysis – PPA)
• All except PPA depend on
SCADA system for input data
and alarm output
• All systems can work with
natural gas but are more
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Real time complex
Rate of pressure Statistical pattern
transient • All these techniques apply
/ flow change recognition equally well to gas pipelines
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modeling (RTTM)
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Pressure Point Analysis (PPA)

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Uses high frequency (60 hertz) pressure measurement at

both end of line segment – can be 100 km long
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Records instant pressure drop when leak occurs
Determines location by comparing time to each

segment end
Is a stand-alone system, which can be used with short

systems
Can handle all types of fluids including multiphase
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PPA Advantages – Disadvantages
• Quick response • One-shot at catching leak

• Mature technology • Slow developing leaks hard to
• Can detect less than 1% leak detect
• Does not require SCADA system • Requires custom hardware for
• Only internal system known to high-speed sampling and
work with multiphase fluid communication
• Can accurately locate a leak • False alarms if not tuned properly
• Unaffected by abnormal ambient • Pipeline equipment “noise” can
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conditions require higher leak thresholds
• Can be coupled with flow balance • Limited segment length for one
software and hardware standalone system
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SCADA Based Internal LDS Methods – Pipeline Controller Recognition

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 Detected by pipeline controller

• Properly trained controller still very
good LDS
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– The Kiefner study found that 10 out

of 31 liquid line leaks are attributed
to pipeline controller; 1 out of 22 in
natural gas
• API has issued the following

recommended practices:
– API RP 1161
– API RP 1167
– API RP 1168

Recommended practice – pipeline controller has
authority to shut down pipeline immediately
anytime he or she suspects a leak
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Volume (Mass) Based Leak Detection

Based on metering in and out and ensuring balance at
all entry and exit points
Sensitivity set by meter accuracy
Generally works within or in conjunction with SCADA

system For API 33, gravity
crude oil with 1° F
[0.56° C] temperature
Temperature change will change liquid volume change will change
volume by 0.05%
Alarm thresholds set to compensate for changes in
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linepack
Algorithms to correct for line pack changes to improve

performance
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Most widely used CPM on long haul pipelines
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Volume (Mass) Balance LDS

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Advantages
• Low cost particularly if SCADA and related
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instruments already installed

• Can detect 5% leak in minutes or hours Disadvantages
• Easy to learn and use
• Configurable to many pipeline configurations, • Small leaks have long detection times
existing or new • Leaks difficult to detect during transient
• Testing and maintenance easy conditions
• Leaks cannot be detected on slack line conditions
• Leaks cannot be detected during shut-in
conditions
• Leak location not identified
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Volume Balance LDS with Line Pack Correction

Advantages
 Low cost particularly if SCADA and related instruments already

installed
 Can detect 1% leak in minutes
 Easy to learn and use
 Configurable to many pipeline configurations, existing or new
 Testing easy
 Can detect leaks during shut in and during transient conditions
 Can detect existing leaks
Disadvantages
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 Installation of additional instruments and communications can be
difficult/expensive
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 Leaks cannot be detected during slack line conditions
 Leak location not identified
 Instrument calibration adds maintenance costs
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Rate of Pressure / Flow Change CPM LDS

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 Pressure/Flow Monitoring CPM:

• Continuously monitors pressure and flow
sensors output
• Applies an algorithm to detect if they Do not confuse with
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indicate a flow anomaly simpler rate of

change methods that
 Technique usually requires signature alarm with the rapid
recognition software changes of a single
hydraulic variable
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Rate of Pressure / Flow Change

CPM LDS
Advantages
 Detects leaks during shut-in conditions
 Can help estimate volume and location of
large leaks
 Can detect 5% leak in minutes
 Easy to install or retrofit and maintain
instrumentation
Disadvantages
 Small, slack line, and existing leaks cannot be
detected
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 High potential for false alarms during transient
conditions
 System can be difficult to learn
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 Robustness diminished by dependence on
small number of signals
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Real-Time Transient Model (RTTM) LDS

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 Hydraulic simulation and analysis of differences between measured and calculated

values
 Requires development of detailed hydraulic model configured for:
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• Physical pipeline itself

• Commodity characteristics
• Pipeline station control logic
 Model calculated values compared continuously against field instrument readings;
discrepancies checked for leak indication
 Measurements of ambient line temperature, density, or gas composition in addition to
flow, pressure, and temperature are needed
 Very much pipeline system specific
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RTTM LDS Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages
 Can detect 1% leak in seconds
 Can estimate leak flow rate and location
 Leaks can be detected under shut in, slack line, and transient conditions
Disadvantages
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 Model must be customized and tuned for each pipeline configuration
 Installation, implementation, fine tuning, maintenance, and testing can be difficult
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 Existing leaks cannot be detected
 Model creation relative expensive; exercise usually performed by outside expertise
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Statistical Analysis CPM

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 A variety of statistical methods used to look at data, particularly pressure and/or flow to
determine real-time probability that a leak is occurring
 Typically does not require large database describing pipeline itself
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 Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) method often used to generate a ratio test
based on compensated volume inventory balances
 Different detection times applied depending on steady-state, transient, or non-flowing
conditions
 Performance varies with the technology employed and a variety of vendors offer
Statistical Analysis CRM methods
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Statistical Analysis CPM LDS
Disadvantages
Advantages
 Dependent quality of flow
 Cost effective to install measurement, the
because it uses communications system
existing SCADA or PLC and SCADA
based flow, pressure,
 Small leaks location
and temperature data
accuracy poor
 Low false alarm rate
 Not real effective on
 Can work effectively large gas pipeline
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through transients networks with few
 Leak location and instruments
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volume can be
estimated
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External LDS – Promise and Confusion
 External leak detection is dominated by variety of vendors, designs, installation

procedures, operational setups, and operating specifications
 Currently API RP 1175 provides a framework for the development of a pipeline leak
detection program as required by DOT/PHMSA
 The Engineer is dependent on work with vendors to establish a proper specification for
installation and performance
 Many external leak detection sensors have more experience in the laboratory than in the
field and the engineering and execution of their deployment is critical
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 They can rely on equipment permanently installed and monitored either continuously or
periodically, or equipment deployed periodically or as needed
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Methods of Deploying External LDS Technology

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Personnel or
Instrumentation Continuous Smart pig
Point vehicle
attached to the cable mounted
pipeline sensors carried instrumentation
sensors
instruments
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External LDS – Seven Physical Principles
External leak detection relies on one of seven physical principles:

1. Detecting acoustic signal of a leak
2. Leaking liquid detected because of a change of refractive index of a fiber-optic cable
3. Strain and/or temperature change to fiber-optic cable function
4. Resistance and/or AC impedance change to hydrocarbon wetted electrical conductor
cable
5. Permeable tubes collect hydrocarbon vapors and sweep them with gas to detector
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6. Detecting hydrocarbon vapors with chemical analyzers
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7. Atmospheric optical methods
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Satellite
Acoustical Leak Detection
 Fluid rushing through a hole or crack in

the pipeline emits sound waves
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Host Computer
 Acoustic emission hardware detects the

signals at both ends of the segment GPS
where the leak takes place
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Receiver
MasterComm VII
WaveAlert
 Works best on high pressure low flow VII S1
rate systems
 Must be able to minimize effects of WaveAlert

external noise and normal pipeline VII D2
noises
 Leak size can be estimated from the

amplitude of the acoustic wave
 Acoustic Systems Incorporated is one

provider of this technology
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Acoustic Leak Detection Methods
Advantages Disadvantages
 Can determine location of leak  Noisy flow conditions can mask
noises
 Can estimate size of leak
 Minimally affected by changes in  Many sensors required for long
flow conditions lines
 Can be installed on new line or  Very high cost

retrofitted to existing with sensors
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and mount externally
 Real-time response to leaks
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Fiber-Optic Cables
Hydrocarbon detection and temperature change/stress detection

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 Hydrocarbons change refractive index of a patented fiber-optic cable coating, permitting use as
leak detection cable
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 Can also be installed with:

• Distributed Strain and Temperature Sensor DSTS
• Distributed Vibration Sensor DVS
• Distributed Temperature Sensor DTS
 The DSTS can detect strain caused by seismic, mass wasting, or subsidence events and leaks
that cause a temperature change due to elevated liquid temperatures or Joule-Thompson affect
related to gas releases
 DVS can detect vibrations caused by heavy equipment near the pipeline or seismic
 DTS looks purely for the temperature change related to leaks
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The LDS Challenge
 Internal LDS systems have the capacity to quickly detect major leaks down to 1% of flow
in minutes
 Traditional surveillance methods, augmented by heightened public awareness, can catch
the very smallest leaks over time before huge volumes are lost
 Hard part is justifying the economic cost on a risk reduction basis for the entire pipeline
system
 Some LDS systems may well be justified over small section of environment or public
safety high consequence areas (HCAs)
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The LDS Challenge
From a 2011 study for the US DOT by Kiefner and

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Associates:
External LDS
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 Only three external leak detection technologies were in

active use, and all operators referred to these
implementations as “pilots” or “experimental”
 Floating hydrocarbon sensors – used at river crossings
– 2 operators
 Fiber optic sensors, DTS and DAS – 1 operator
 Acoustic sensors – 4 operators: 2 liquids, 2 gas
transmission
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The LDS Challenge From a 2011 study for the US DOT by Kiefner and
Associates:
Dominant LDS
 The most widespread actual current leak detection is
by Pressure/Flow Monitoring. For gas transmission
pipelines, this is in fact pressure monitoring since flow
measurement is widely spaced
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Associates:
Dominant LDS
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 For gas distribution at intermediate pressure, this

normally means flow measurement since
pressures are rarely monitored. In addition, nearly
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all the liquids pipeline operators also implement a

Volume Balance CPM
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Associates:
Dominant LDS
 This is in part because the operators require
SCADA for operational purposes, and/or were
regulated by the US DOT under 49 CFR 195
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Associates:
Dominant LDS
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 Where ASVs are in use by gas pipeline operators,

the only leak detection principle used is pressure
measurement
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Emergency Response – Key Considerations
 Pipelines are in the public arena

 Long distances to worry about
 Pre-procure and position
response supplies
 Leverage through response co-
operatives
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 Develop response plans
 Drill, preferably with emergency
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response agencies and
regulators

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Practical Actions
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 Emergency response manual with

defined procedures
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 People, materials, and equipment

identified and in-place
 Procedures rigorously reviewed
periodically and updated
 Practices / lessons learned / corrective
actions
 Company, contractor, public and
alliance resources
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Importance of Drills
 Table-top to actual equipment

deployment
 Best when practiced with
responding organizations
• National, state, local, co-ops,
tribes
 Benefits learn:
• Plan strengths and
weaknesses
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• People
• Incident Command Structure
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(ICS) in USA particularly
 Document the lessons learned
and corrective actions

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Key Learning Points
 Leak detection and emergency response are important elements in pipeline risk
reduction and pipeline integrity management
 Each pipeline has a unique set of leak detection challenges
 Multi-tiered approach to leak detection is recommended
 Leak detection needs will vary along the length of a system
 Field crews will be impacted by a need for more instrument maintenance
 Controllers need to know expected performance of detection system, followed by
verification and response
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 Emergency response planning is vital to pipelines because of regulations
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Learning Objectives

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 Identify the reasons for monitoring and leak detection

 Describe the risks and consequences of pipeline incidents by type of service and location
 Define High Consequence Area [HCA] and list the impacts on pipeline design and
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operation
 Describe the strengths and weaknesses of monitoring leak detection systems
 List the key actions and components on a pipeline emergency response program
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Abandonment Core
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Pipeline Repairs and De-bottlenecking
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Learning Objectives

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 Define the primary methods to debottleneck a pipeline system

 Describe the code requirements for asset integrity management and their relationship to
planned preventative, reactive (non-emergency), and emergency repair
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 Describe primary onshore and offshore pipeline repair methods

 List the primary pipeline defects and the required repair methods for each
 List the specialized materials, supplies, and equipment that may be required for
emergency repairs
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De-bottlenecking and Pipeline Integrity
Process of increasing throughput capacity of existing facilities via

Pipeline De-
modification of existing equipment to remove restrictions bottlenecking
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Pipeline
Integrity or
Efforts to reduce risk of operating a pipeline to zero incidents
Asset
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Integrity
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De-bottlenecking and Pipeline Integrity

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C
 Common skills, equipment,  Economics and customer  Industry initiative, company

and materials but differing satisfaction drive policy, regulatory
economic justification for debottlenecking projects compliance, and
the work defines: economics drive Pipeline
• Debottlenecking Integrity
• Pipeline integrity
Images source: Creative Commons
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Pipeline Bottlenecks: Major Factors
Hydraulic limitations on flow rate from:
• Pipe inside diameter

• Pressure differential
• Pressure limitations
• Viscosity
• Pipe roughness
• Length
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Equipment limitations:
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• Pressure
• Capacity/head
• Controllers
•
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Driver speed control
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Hydraulic Limitations on Flow Rate

Pipe Diameter Allowable Drag Reducing
Pipe Length Viscosity
Options Pressure Agents (DRA)
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Increasing Inside Pipe Diameter Options:

• Replace all or part of pipeline with larger inside diameter
• Ability to run pigs in all sections
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• Pipe replacement can also reduce risk

• Install pipe segment in parallel with existing (looping)
• Popular with natural gas transmission line debottlenecking
• Requires single product (like natural gas)
• Ability to run pigs in all sections (consideration)
• Remove wall thickness robbing deposits and take steps to keep pipeline clean of:
• Asphaltenes
• Paraffin
• Scale
Image Source: Courtesy of Solutions Flow Assurance Management
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Increase Allowable Pressure

 Increasing MAOP (Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure) may require:
• New hydro-test
• Pipe or pipe section replacement with higher strength or thicker pipe walls
• Replacement of flanges, valves, or fittings not rated for higher pressure
 Adding pump or compressor horsepower:
• Larger impellers or change liners (PD units)
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• Increase speed
• May require larger driver
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 Adding intermediate pump or compressor horsepower
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Reduce Roughness or Pipe Length

 Replace internally heavily-corroded and pitted pipe with new pipe
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 Replace carbon steel pipe with smoother FRP or plastic piping

 Internally coat pipeline (in situ methods)
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Lower Viscosity
 Add heat to liquid lines
 Cool inlet for gas lines
 Add insulation to conserve heat or cool
 Blend with diluent
 Break emulsions
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Drag Reducing Agents (DRA)
 DRAs are polymers injected into liquid pipelines

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in very low doses that “magically” reduce

viscosity and thus the driving pressure
 Can increase throughput up to 15% in relatively
low viscosity and high velocity crude oil, gasoline,
diesel, and water injection flows
 Two main US producers are Conoco-Phillips and DRA polymer before injection
Baker-Hughes
 Creates long chain polymers in flow; which must
be reinjected after running through centrifugal
pump
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Drag Reducing Agents (DRA)

 DRAs do not necessarily reduce viscosity but they
do reduce turbulence
 The disadvantage can be that reduced turbulence
can increase the friction factor if flow is not in the
fully turbulent region
 Some operators have stopped using DRAs
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because of this DRA polymer before injection
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The following case study is an excerpt from Nelson, J. 2003, Offshore Engineering, October
2003: “Optimising Production Using Drag Reducing Agents in Water Injection Wells”.
Case Study: ChevronTexaco Galley
The Galley field is situated 145km east-north-east of Peterhead, Scotland, in block 15/23a of the
UK sector of the North Sea. The field is operated by Petrofac (UK) Ltd. using the Northern
Producer floating production facility.
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The Galley reservoir has an estimated 57.5 million barrels and 80.4Bcf in place and recoverable
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reserves of 28mmbbl and 40.2Bcf. The field is Upper Jurassic age sandstone and the API
gravity of the crude is 44°.
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Oil is exported via pipeline to the Flotta Terminal, while the gas is piped to St Fergus Frigg
processing plant, both onshore Scotland. Field production began in 1998 and peak production
of 43,000boe/day was reached in 2000.
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The water injection system consists of approximately 2.2km of 6-inch tubing from the platform to
the sub-sea manifold, situated 150m below the platform. The injection tubing from the sub-sea
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manifold to the injection well has an ID of 4.8-inch and a measured depth of 5500 metres. The
bottom hole flowing pressure is 430bar and the injectivity index is 73.8m3/d/bar.
Seawater is injected at a baseline flow rate, without Flow Improvers, of around 29,000b/d. At
this water injection rate, the average oil production rate is 39,000b/d.
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In late 2000, the pressure in the Galley reservoir was seen to be falling, resulting in reduced oil
production rates. To maintain oil production rates, the reservoir needed to be re-pressurised. To
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achieve this, it was decided to increase the water injection rates. It was estimated that by
increasing the water injection rate to 40,000b/d, re-pressurisation could be achieved. Galley
personnel chose to investigate the use of drag reducing agents (DRA(s)) to increase the water
injection rate as follows:
Predictive performance calculations
Based on information provided on the characteristics of the injection system and water, it was
possible to complete hydraulic simulations using ConocoPhillips’ in-house simulation model to
give an indication of the likely performance of drag reducing agents in the Galley water injection
system.
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The results of the predictive performance calculations showed that it would be possible to
achieve the required 40,000b/d water injection rate by injecting approximately 45ppmv, or
75USG/d, of drag reducing agent. It was also shown that the water injection rate could be
further increased to about 45,000b/d by increasing the DRA injection rate.
Final implementation
ChevronTexaco decided that DRA was the preferred option to increase the water injection rate
in the Galley field. A permanent DRA injection installation was provided, similar to that used for
the test, and installed immediately. Since its introduction in 2000, ChevronTexaco has continued
to use DRA to operate the Galley field.
As a result of the increased water injection rate, ChevronTexaco was able to re-pressurise the
reservoir and to continue operation of 39,000b/d.
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In addition, the expected life of the reservoir has been extended by three years and the total
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amount of recoverable reserves is now estimated to be 29.5 million barrels, 1.5 million barrels
above the initial estimate of 28 million barrels. This increase in recoverable reserves equates to
a $16.5 million net present value (NPV) over the anticipated production life of the Galley field.
Other benefits
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The use of these chemicals over time has shown a number of additional benefits, such as:
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 Extensive testing has shown that DRA has no souring effect on crude oil.
 DRA reduces the effect of corrosion by up to 30%.
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 DRA is a good reservoir management tool for optimal distribution of the water injected.
 Produced water contains small quantities of oil and traces of heavy metals that may be
potentially harmful to the sea. By re-injecting this water, discharges to the environment
can be kept to the strict minimum.

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By using DRA, less energy is required to drive the water injection system.
 By reducing the energy consumption needed for water injection, DRA reduces the CO2
and NOx emissions to air.
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 DRA reduces the number of water injection wells needed.
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Equipment Limitations
 Pump / Compressor:
• Head/capacity limits
– Change equipment
– Add units parallel (capacity) or
series (head)
– Modify internals
• Speed control/flow control
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– Change to VFD for motors
– Modify valve controllers
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Images source: Creative Commons IG
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Regulations Requiring Pipeline Assets Integrity Management Programs
 Pipeline integrity management in the US is regulated by the DOT in the following federal
regulations:
• Gas Transmission Integrity Management (GT-IM) – 49 CFR 192, Subpart O
• Hazardous Liquids Integrity Management (HL-IM) – 49 CFR 195, Sections 195.450 & 195.452
 In the UK, regulations require that in the “Major Accident Prevention Document”:
• All hazards must be identified
• Risks must be continually evaluated
• Safety management system developed from probabilistic assessments then implemented
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API RP – 1160 IMP Process Flow Diagram P11
(Adopted to help members comply with 49 CFR 195.452)
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As implied by the feedback loop in the spreadsheet taken from API RP 1160, an integrity
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management program involves a continuous cycle of monitoring pipeline condition, identifying

and assessing risks, and taking action to minimize the most significant risk.
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ASME B.31‐G Repair Requirements for Corrosion
VALUES OF L FOR PIPE SIZES > NPS 6 AND < NPS 10
Depth, d, in. Wall Thickness, t, in.
0.083 0.125 0.156 0.188 0.203 0.219 0.250 0.312
0.010 3 5/16
0.020 1 1/2 4 1/16 4 9/16 5
0.030 7/8 1 7/8 3 3/8 5 5 3/16 5 3/8 5 3/4
0.040 5/8 1 1/4 1 7/8 2 15/16 3 5/8 4 5/8 5 3/4 6 7/16
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0.050 ½ 15/16 1 3/8 1 15/16 2 5/16 2 3/4 3 7/8 6 7/16
0.060 7/16 13/16 1 1/8 1 9/161 1 3/4 2 1/16 2 11/16 4 3/4
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0.070 11/16 15/16 1 5/16 1 7/16 1 11/16 2 1/8 3 3/8
0.080 9/16 13/16 1 1/8 1 1/4 1 7/16 1 3/4 2 11/16
0.090
0.100
1/2
7/16
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3/4
11/16 7/8
1 1 1/8
1
1 1/4
1 1/8
1 9/16
1 3/8
2 1/4
2
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0.110 9/16 13/16 7/8 1 1 1/4 1 3/4
0.120 9/16 3/4 13/16 15/16 1 1/8 1 5/8
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0.130 11/16 3/4 7/8 1 1/16 1 7/16
0.140 5/8 11/16 13/16 15/16 1 3/8
0.150 9/16 5/8 3/4 7/8 1 1/4

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0.160 9/16 11/16 13/16 1 3/16

0.170 5/8 3/4 1 1/8
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0.180 3/4 1 1/16
0.190 11/16 1
0.200 5/8 15/16
0.210 7/8
0.220 13/16
0.230 13/16
0.240 3/4
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Pipeline Repairs and Modifications
Should evolve from integrity management programs as

mitigation and/or repair steps
• The ASME B31.8S identifies 22 hazards broken into:
• Time-dependent (Conditions worsen over time)
• Stable (Other conditions have to change to cause
failure)
• Time-independent that randomly happen
• API – 1160 modifies this list slightly and suggests that
hazards in italics can be assessed and monitored using
four basic integrity assessment methods
• The pipeline industry through the Pipeline R esearch
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Council International (PR CI) has classified pipeline
incidents into 22 categories, each of which represents a
threat to pipeline integrity. Pipeline integrity
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management entails addressing each of these 22
threats and taking appropriate measures to mitigate
those that are found relevant to any particular
pipeline segment.
Image source: Creative Commons IG
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ASME B31.8S – 22 Hazards

1. External corrosion 13. Miscellaneous (failure of valve or other
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component)
2. Internal corrosion
14. Damage inflicted by first, second, or third
3. SCC
parties instantaneous/immediate failure)
4. Defective pipe seam
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15. Previously damaged pipe such as dents and/or

5. Defective pipe gouges (delayed failure)
6. Defective pipe girth weld (circumferential 16. Vandalism
including branch and T joints)
17. Incorrect operational procedure
7. Defective fabrication weld
18. Cold weather
8. Wrinkle bend or buckle
19. Lightning
9. Stripped threads/broken pipe/coupling failure
20. Heavy rains and floods
10. Gasket or O-ring failure
21. Earth movement
11. Control/relief equipment malfunction
22. Unknown (root cause of failure was not
12. Seal/pump packing failure determined)
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API 1160 and ASME B31.8S Pipeline Threats
Time-dependent Threats
 External corrosion
 Internal corrosion
 Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
 Selective seam corrosion
 Third-party/mechanical damage threats (immediate failure)
 Previously damaged pipe; (delayed failure)
 Vandalism
 Incorrect operational procedure
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 Weather-related (cold weather, lightning, heavy rains, or floods)
 Earth movement (API 1160 considers it time independent)
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Stable Threats


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Defective pipe (seams and pipe wall)
Defective girth and fabrications welds
 Wrinkle bends
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 Buckles
 Defective secondary piping
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 Gasket or O-ring failure

 Control/relief equipment malfunction
 Seal/pump packing failure
 Growth of innocuous anomaly into an injurious one by pressure – cycle – fatigue
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Repairs and Modifications
 Pipeline repairs and modifications are in response to or working to reduce the risk of
pipeline leaks or ruptures
 Emergency repairs
• Stop active leaks
– Stop operations
– Depressure if necessary
– Clamp type pipeline repairs (onshore or offshore)
– Final repairs may come after emergency is over
 Materials required for emergency repairs
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– Hydro tested linepipe
– Pipeline clamps in required sizes
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Integrity Assessment Methods

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 Internal inspection tools (Smart pig)

 Hydrostatic test
 Direct assessment
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 Other (new technology)
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Types of Internal Inspection Tools

 Metal loss inspection tools:
• Magnetic flux leakage (standard and
high-resolution type)
– This tool induces a magnetic flux into MFL Tool Sensor Bar
the pipe wall between the north and
south magnetic poles of onboard
magnets (primarily axial to the pipe)
– In case the inspected steel pipe wall is
homogeneous with no defects, a N S Corrosion
homogeneous magnetic flux distribution Onboard Magnet
will be induced in the pipe wall
– Any anomaly, i.e., metal loss (or gain)
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associated with the steel wall, results in
a change in the magnetic flux Flux Distribution
distribution
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– If the pipe wall is magnetically
saturated, excess magnetic flux leaks
out of the pipe wall and is measurable
by onboard sensors
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• Magnetic flux leakage (standard and

high-resolution type)
– This tool induces a magnetic flux into
the pipe wall between the north and
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south magnetic poles of onboard

magnets (primarily axial to the pipe)
– In case the inspected steel pipe wall is
homogeneous with no defects, a N S
homogeneous magnetic flux distribution
will be induced in the pipe wall
– Any anomaly, i.e., metal loss (or gain)
associated with the steel wall, results in
a change in the magnetic flux
distribution Change in the
– If the pipe wall is magnetically Flux Distribution
saturated, excess magnetic flux leaks
out of the pipe wall and is measurable
by onboard sensors
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 Crack detection tools

• Transverse MFL
– Essentially based on the same principle
as MFL except that the magnetic field is
circumferentially oriented, wrapping
completely around the circumference of
the pipe
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• Ultrasonic (compression wave)

– These tools are equipped with
transducers that emit ultrasonic signals
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perpendicular to the surface of the pipe
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 Crack detection tools

• Ultrasonic (shear wave)
– NDE technique that most reliably
detects longitudinal cracks, longitudinal
weld defects, and crack-like defects
(such as stress corrosion cracking)
 Caliper (dents and buckles)

 Route surveying
 Free span detection
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 Leak detection (Sonic)
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Smart Pig Requirements

 Constant pipe diameter
• Pigs have been developed to negotiate multiple
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line sizes
 May require interruption
 May require barred tees
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 Sized launchers and receivers

 3R or longer radius bends
 Full opening valves (constant bore)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Unpiggable Pipelines – Typical Challenges
 Large bore tees and branches

 Bore restrictions
 Small bore valves
 Valves partially closed
 Large dents or buckles
 Backing rings at girth welds
 Sharp bends (radius shorter that 3 to 5 pipe diameters); miter bends
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 Excessive line debris (wall buildup)
 Always run sizing pigs and then caliper pig in line; never run a smart pig without running
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the sizing pig and caliper pig first
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═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
CFR 195.452
Operator must act within 180 days after integrity assessment to determine nature of conditions.
Immediate repair conditions (similar to API list) require shutdown of pipeline or reduction of
operating pressure using the formula in section 451.6 .2 .2 (b) of ANSI B 31.4.
Establishes a 60-day action requirement for:
 A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above the 4 and 8 o'clock positions) with a
depth greater than 3% of the pipeline diameter (greater than 0.250 inches in depth for a
pipeline diameter less than Nominal Pipe Size (NPS) 12)
 A dent located on the bottom of the pipeline that has any indication of metal loss,
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cracking, or a stress riser
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Establishes a 180 day action period for:
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 A dent with a depth > 2% of the pipeline's diameter (0.250 inches in depth size < NPS 12)
that affects pipe curvature at a girth weld or a longitudinal seam weld
 A dent located on the top of the pipeline (above 4 and 8 o'clock positions) with a depth
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> 2% of the pipeline's diameter (0.250 inches in depth for a pipeline diameter less than
NPS 12)
 A dent located on the bottom of the pipeline with a depth > 6% of the pipeline's diameter
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 Calculated remaining strength of the pipe shows an operating pressure that < current
MOP at the location of the anomaly (ASME/ANSI B31G or AGA PR-3-805)
 Any area of general corrosion with a predicted metal loss > 50% of nominal wall
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 Predicted metal loss > 50% of nominal wall that is located at:
o A crossing of another pipeline, or
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o An area with widespread circumferential corrosion, or

o An area that could affect a girth weld
 A potential crack indication that when excavated is determined to be a crack

 Corrosion of or along a longitudinal seam weld
 A gouge or groove > 12.5% of nominal wall
 Other conditions discovered by integrity assessment that could impair integrity of the
pipeline
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Pressure Testing
 Requires taking pipeline out of service

 Dehydrating can be difficult
 Water disposal can be difficult
 Water can promote internal corrosion
 Pressure testing can grow subcritical flaws into critical flaws
 Pressure test provides limited information and limited evaluation of future performance
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Code Comparison
ASME B31.3 ASME B31.4 ASME B31.8

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Mill Tolerance To be added Included Included

Code Temperature -425°F to +1500°F -20°F to +250°F -20°F to +450°F
Range (-253°C to 815°C) (-28°C to 121°C) (-28°C to 232°C)
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Code Allowable Stress The smaller of 0.33*UTS 0.72*SMYS 1.0*SMYS

(S) [at Design and 0.66*SMYS
Temperature]
Design Factor Included in the Code 0.72 0.4 – 0.8
Allowable Stress
Hydrostatic Test 1.5*DP*(St/S) 1.25*DP Varies in the range of
Pressure (min) 1.25*MAOP and
1.4*MAOP
UTS = Ultimate Tensile Stress A good example of a hydrostatic test
SMYS = Specified Minimum Yield Strength
DP = Design Pressure procedure is PIP PLCS0021 – Pressure
MAOP = Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure Testing of ASME B31.8 Metallic Piping
St = Code Allowable Stress at Hydrostatic Test Temperature
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
API 1160 Acceptable Repair Methods
Repair Methods
Type A Type B Type C Type D Type E

Steel Steel Steel Steel Steel
Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve Sleeve
Type of Anomaly (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) (Note 4) (Note 5)
External corrosion, depth ≤
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
80% of wall
External corrosion, depth ≥
No Yes No Yes No
80% of wall
Internal corrosion, depth ≥
No Yes No Yes No
80% of wall
Internal corrosion, depth >
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No Yes No Yes No
80% of wall
Selective seam corrosion, LF-
No Yes No Yes No
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ERW or DC-ERW or FW
Any leaking defect (Note 6)
No Yes No Yes No
Girth weld defect
Dent with gouge or other

stress concentrator
Plain dent
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No
Yes with filler

Yes
Yes
No
Yes with filler

Yes
Yes
Yes (Note 7)
No
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Yes with filler Yes Yes with filler Yes No
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Mechanical Clamps Used Offshore and Onshore
Note 1 Type A steel sleeves are comprised of two half-sleeves joined by means of an
axial weld on both sides. The ends of the sleeve are not welded to the pipe, and
hence, a Type A sleeve may not be used to repair a leak. These sleeves function
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as reinforcement to a defective pipe, and they do not need to carry much of the
hoop stress to be effective. It is essential to have the sleeve in intimate contact
with the pipe at the area of the defect to prevent it from bulging outward and
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perhaps failing. Any gap that exists at that location should be filled with
hardenable filler such as epoxy or polyester material.
Note 2 Type B steel sleeves are comprised of two half-sleeves joined by an axial weld on
both sides. The ends are fillet welded to the pipe so as to make the sleeve
capable of containing the pressure in the event that the defect leaks. These
sleeves should be designed to carry the full MOP of the pipeline. The side seams
should be full-penetration V-butt welds.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Note 3 Composite wrap repairs come in a variety of forms and are comprised of a variety
of materials. All are patented devices offered by vendors who may perform the
installations or provide training for the operator’s personnel to install the wraps.
Basically, they consist of a fiber reinforced matrix. The known types of fibers used
are carbon fibers and glass fibers. The matrix materials are usually either a
polyester material or an epoxy material. One type of wrap consists of a preformed
composite. Layers of the composite are successively wrapped around the pipe as
they are coated with an adhesive to create a solid composite sleeve upon curing.
Another type of wrap consists of laying up the composite in a “wet” matrix so that
the final wrap becomes a solid composite upon curing. Composite wrap repairs
reinforce a defective pipe in much the same manner as a Type A steel sleeve.
Therefore, using a hardenable filler to achieve continuity at the defect is
necessary. Composite wrap repairs cannot be used to repair leaking defects.
Some composite wrap materials may be not compatible with all environments
(such as contaminated soil). Operators should carefully follow the manufacturer’s
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instructions during installation.
Note 4 Mechanical clamps consist of two half-circumference steel forgings that are
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placed around a defective segment of pipe and bolted together via axial flanges
on both sides. The camps halves are equipped with elastomeric seals along the
sides and at both ends, which upon tightening of the bolts, seal the internal
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annular space between the pipe and the clamp. The clamp is capable of carrying
the full MOP of the pipeline. The compatibility of this seal material should be
checked against the product within the pipeline. Before installation, seal materials
should be inspected as some of them have limited shelf lives.
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Note 5 Deposited weld metal repairs involve depositing weld metal over a defect to
replace missing metal. The technique is applicable only to metal loss defects or
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areas where any other type of defect has been removed by grinding to create an
open pit-like area for deposition of weld metal. Associated with the technique is
the inherent risk of burning through the remaining wall thickness. Therefore, a
minimum wall thickness of at least 0.125 inches (3 mm) should be present if this
type of repair is contemplated for an in-service pipeline.
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Note 6 Leaking defects should be stopped before attempting a repair by use of a Type B
sleeve.
Note 7 The welding procedure specification should define minimum remaining wall
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thickness in the area to be repaired and maximum level of internal pressure

during repair. A low-hydrogen welding process should be used.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Type A and Type B Sleeve Repair
Type A Sleeve Type B Sleeve

End fillet
Sleeve weld
Side Seam Sleeve

Carrier Pipe
(see below End fillet
for details) weld
Side Seam
(butt weld only,
overlapping side
Fillet Welds strip not
recommended)
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Overlapping Backing strip Backing strip No backing
side strip with no relief and relief strip
groove groove
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Single V Butt Weld
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Sleeve Repair
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Composite Wrap Repairs
USDOT approved for:
1. Pipeline with external

damage (corrosive or
mechanical) with defect
depth up to 80% of pipe
wall thickness.
2. Dents of depth up to 6%
of pipe diameter.
3. Corrosive defects in girth
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weld area (two/three
sleeves are used.
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 The known types of fibers

used are carbon fibers and
glass fibers
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 One style of wrap consists

of a preformed composite
 Layers of the composite
are successively wrapped
around the pipe as they
are coated with an
adhesive to create a solid
composite sleeve upon
curing
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 Another style of wrap

consists of laying up the
composite in a “wet” matrix
so that the final wrap
becomes a solid
composite upon curing
 Composite wrap repairs
reinforce a defective pipe
in much the same manner
as a Type A steel sleeve;
therefore, using a
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hardening filler to achieve
continuity at the defect is
necessary
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 Composite wrap repairs
cannot be used to repair
leaking defects
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Oceaneering's Subsea Hot Tap Machine

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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Pipe Replacement Repairs
The table presents the features included in the Pipe Replacement Program.
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═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Offshore Maintenance Work
 Non-critical intervention work can be

planned as preventative steps such as:
• Weight coating repair
• Retrofitting with anode sleds
Deepwater Corrosion Services – RetroBuoy 500 amp

ICCP – Anode Sled (Shell Leman Alpha Project)
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Image source: Creative Commons
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planned as preventative steps such as:
• Weight coating repair
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• Rock dumping
Crushed Rock Dumping as a method of achieving

on-bottom stability for a subsea pipeline
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Offshore Maintenance Work Free Span of a Subsea Pipeline

(Unsupported section of a subsea pipeline)

planned as preventative steps such as: Gap / Span
Span Span
• Weight coating repair Length Height
Shoulder
• Rock dumping
• Corrosion coating replacement
• Cathodic protection repair
• Free span correction
 Localized repair of nonleaking pipeline damage; repair clamps can be used without an
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emergency shutdown of the pipeline system
 Major pipeline damage resulting in product leaks – immediate production shutdown and
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depressurization required until damaged pipe replaced

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 Repair internal corrosion damage

• Damage tends to be in low spots
• Can be associated with internal erosion, often at bends, tees and valves
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 External damage offshore:

• Objects dropped off platform
• Abrasion between cable or chain and the pipe
• Direct hit or scraping due to anchoring
• Damage caused by construction operations, shipping operations, fishing operations
 Environmental Damage
• Severe storms and excessive hydrodynamic loads
• Seismic and seabed liquefaction
• Landslides and turbidity currents
• Iceberg scour
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Key Learning Points
Debottlenecking is the process of increasing throughput capacity of existing

facilities via modification of existing equipment to remove restrictions
Efforts to reduce risk of operating a pipeline to zero incidents is pipeline
integrity management and is regulated by code of federal regulations (CFR)
A pipeline may experience reduction in flow rate due to either hydraulic
limitations or equipment performance limitations
API 1160 covers a variety of acceptable repair methods for different anomaly
types and sizes
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Pipelines may be repaired using sleeves, clamps, and composite wraps
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Learning Objectives

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 Define the primary methods to debottleneck a pipeline system

 Describe the code requirements for asset integrity management and their relationship to
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planned preventative, reactive (non-emergency), and emergency repair

 Describe primary onshore and offshore pipeline repair methods
 List the primary pipeline defects and the required repair methods for each
 List the specialized materials, supplies, and equipment that may be required for
emergency repairs
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

Abandonment Core
Pipelines SIMOPS, Decommissioning, and
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Abandonment
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Learning Objectives

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 Describe the general principles behind SIMOPS procedures

 Identify when SIMOPS procedures are required for pipeline projects
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 Explain the variety of definitions for decommissioning, idling, and abandoning pipeline
facilities
 Describe the concerns that must be addressed when decommissioning a pipeline
 Define issues that must be addressed when reactivating an idled pipeline
 List the requirements to correctly abandon a pipeline
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SIMOPS – Definition, Purpose and Objective
 Represents locally established

requirements for how simultaneous
operations are coordinated, controlled,
and performed
 Ensure safety of simultaneous
operations on company facilities
 Ensure conflicts, risks, and/or hazards
identified and assessed before
performing concurrent operations
 Applicable to both onshore and
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offshore operations
 Same principles and needs exist
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onshore as well on pipelines and in
facilities
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SIMOPS – Definition, Purpose and Objective

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 Represents locally established

requirements for how simultaneous
operations are coordinated, controlled,
and performed
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 Ensure safety of simultaneous Includes items such as:

operations on company facilities • Medications maintained for
 Ensure conflicts, risks, and/or hazards all personnel performing work
identified and assessed before
• SIMOPS discussed daily at
performing concurrent operations
shift/tour change meetings
 Applicable to both onshore and
offshore operations • Documenting SIMOPS on
daily logs
 Same principles and needs exist
onshore as well on pipelines and in
facilities
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Triggers for SIMOPS Requirements
1 HZ &RQVWUXFWLRQLQFOXGLQJ, (
Production
Aircraft Landing/
' HUULFN% DUJHV

2 SHUDWLRQVRI
(P HUJHQF\
Operations
Takeoff 6SLOO
5 HVSRQVH
Anchoring
DIVING Testing and Inspection
OPERATIONS
Shared RIG + HDY\
Vessel
OPERATIONS/
use of /LIWV
MOVEMENTS
Seismic /
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roads
Geotechnical EQUIPMENT
Operations REPAIRS MOBILIZATION AND
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DEMOBILIZATION
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═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SIMOPS Concerns for Pipelines
Any Construction
 Rig movements
 Vessel anchoring
o 500/1000′ rule applies (no anchoring within 500 feet or within 1000 feet in the
direction of the anchor drag of a pipeline)
 Mobilization/demobilization of equipment
 Heavy lifts
 Diving activities
 Inspection / Testing
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Production Operations
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 Specific drilling activities
 Vessel anchoring




Heavy lifts
Diving activities
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Mobilization/demobilization of equipment
Emergency/Spill response (after initial emergency response complete and Incident

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Commands System stood down)
 Seismic or geotechnical operations
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Key Elements of SIMOPS
Risk Single-Point
Communications Control Coordination
Assessment Contact
All activities
Vital that clear, Defined authority
coordinated
continuous Identification from rested with the Each activity
through the
communications the beginning of representatives of designates a
SIMOPS
be maintained the hazards each each working SIMOPS
representatives on
between all activity holds for group with final representative
a daily or hourly
working groups the others, and authority responsible for
basis is required,
and documented plans to reduce designated to the updating and
and written plans
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daily in the the risk overall SIMOPS communicating
for mitigation of
SIMOPS log controller
hazards shared
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SIMOPS Principles for Onshore Pipelines

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Pipeline operations
Major third-party
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New pipeline or facility

construction activities
construction
near pipeline
SIMOPS
Processes
Major pipeline repairs
Pipeline lowering particularly those
activities involving tie-ins or other
hot work
Installation of new
instrumentation or
communications
systems
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Pipeline Decommissioning and Abandonment
 Pipeline infrastructure may become redundant or uneconomical as production fields

decline or facilities shut down, or markets shift
 Asset becomes an economic liability
 Terminology becomes somewhat confused with decommissioning, retirement, idling, and
abandonment (all terms for the steps taken to reduce the liability of an asset)
 Definitions for each term could vary among regulatory agencies, among the regulations
of the same agency (PHMSA for example), among companies, and within regions
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Working Definitions of Decommissioning, Abandonment, and Reactivation
Decommissioning: The physical steps taken to Note that these definitions are arbitrary and may not
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reduce the risk of ceasing operation of a pipeline match any corporate or regulatory definition.
system to the owner and society
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Abandonment: The legal steps taken to satisfy

government regulations, all necessary original
permits, and the terms of pipeline easements and
other right-of-way documents for an owner to
take a pipeline out of service
Reactivation: The physical and legal steps

required to return an idled pipeline to service
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Decommissioning a Pipeline
Questions to Ask
 Alternate uses?
 Shipper or users consulted?
 Regulatory requirements required?
 How to isolate and clean pipeline?
 Right-of-way agreements and permits required?
 Risks of the physical presence of the pipeline?
 Environmental sensitivity?
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 Scrap or recycle value?
 Pipeline burial depth?
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 Current and future land-use along the pipeline?
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Decommissioning – the Extremes

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Pipeline likely to find new use in 5- or Pipeline likely never to be operated

10-years decommissioning might again or used in any fashion with high
involve: cost of continuing ownership has
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 Physically disconnecting the pipe from several possibilities:

sources  Recover all pipe for reuse or scrap
 Displacing contents completely and including dig and cut up, reverse reeling
cleaning (offshore), reverse S-lay (offshore), cut
and lift (offshore)
 Filling with inert materials
 Leave ‘in situ’ and fill with concrete,
 Maintaining the pipeline as if it were still epoxy, or water
active
 Offshore additional trenching if too
shallow or even rock bedding to provide
long term security for the pipeline
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Abandonment
 In the UK and Norway, the decommissioning of oil and gas-related pipelines is

considered on a case-by-case basis
 Comparative Assessment (CA) process is used to determine the best option for
decommissioning considering:
• Safety
• Environmental impact
• Cost
• Technical feasibility
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 Jurisdictions are requiring approval of any decommissioning activity as part of the
abandonment process
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• This may include an environmental impact assessment or a comparative assessment
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Abandonment Offshore
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 Underwater noise (assess in EIA

process)
 Physical disturbances to the seabed
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(assess in EIA process)

 Waste and NORM
 Metals (Zinc or Al-Zn-indium anodes)
 Potential need to remove concrete
pillows at pipeline crossings
 Crossings (over and under) of cables
and pipelines
 Potential damage to surface and
subsea facilities Image source: Creative Commons
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Abandonment Onshore
 Environmental impacts
 Resolving long-term land, property, and liability ownership issues
 What happens to easement at abandonment?
• Depends on easement language
 Property taxes/fees still due?
 Permits, franchises and other government granted rights when pipeline is abandoned?
 Reporting requirements and fees still due?
 Many regulatory agencies require accurate mapping in regulatory GIS of all aspects of
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abandoned pipeline facilities
 Liability for clean-up of spills, PCBs, NORMS, and heavy metal contamination (anodes)
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from operations
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Pipelines Reactivation
 NEB (Canada) requires application for reactivation of any pipeline out of service for
more than 12 months
 Out of service pipelines are at higher risk for damage
 Depending on regulatory environment, length of time out of service, previous integrity
history, new operating conditions (pressure), and material being transported reactivation
will dictate exactly what is required for reactivation pipeline system
 Steps for reactivation could include:
• New hydrostatic test at least at 125% of the new operating pressure
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• Recent Smart pig investigation including MLF metal loss and caliper geometry runs
• Running of crack detection tool cases pipeline conditions susceptible to SCC
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• Full cathodic protection survey
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Pipeline Reactivation
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Changing service will involve rigorous testing and

inspection down to parts level
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Where approval to reactivate or change service of

pipeline is mandated by regulation or post accident
findings, additional:
• Block valves may be required

• Safety release systems may be required
• Emergency response equipment prepositioning
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Reactivation
Industry opponents
called for reactivation
review by PHMSA
before ExxonMobil
Pipeline is restarted
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Picture by
Jacob Slaton/Reuters
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Case Study Pipeline Retirement:

Chevron Retirement of Pipelines in Morro Bay, California – 2013
 Initial actions included:

• Determine pipeline condition
• Remove sea water in lines
• Locate and determine depth of line
• Determine sediment condition along line
 Permit requirements and restrictions just to PLAN to decommission the pipelines
included:
• Restrictions on working on the beach
• Restrictions on underwater sampling
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• No anchoring boats on the hard-bottom habitats
• No activities within 100 ft [30.5 m] of Toro Creek because of the sensitivity of the habitat for
the tidewater goby (Eucyclogobius newberryi) and the California coast steelhead run
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• No construction activities in the dune or foredune areas
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Morro Bay Removal

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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Permit Drawings
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Produced by Longitude 123, Inc.
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Key Learning Points
SIMOPS is defined as anytime two or more high consequence activities are too close
to each other to have an impact on one another or may interact with one another
The objective of SIMOPS is to ensure conflicts, risks, and/or hazards are identified
and assessed before performing concurrent operations
A pipeline that has reached its end of life has to be decommissioned, i.e., physical
steps must be taken to reduce the risk of ceasing operation of the pipeline system to
the owner and society
If a decision is made to reactivate a pipeline, it will have to be hydrostatically tested
at least at 125% of the new operating pressure, it will have to be ILI pigged for geometry and
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metal loss and its cathodic protection will have to be surveyed
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Learning Objectives

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 Describe the general principles behind SIMOPS procedures

 Identify when SIMOPS procedures are required for pipeline projects
C
 Explain the variety of definitions for decommissioning, idling, and abandoning pipeline
facilities
 Describe the concerns that must be addressed when decommissioning a pipeline
 Define issues that must be addressed when reactivating an idled pipeline
 List the requirements to correctly abandon a pipeline
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
Pipeline Engineering
 Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection, Repairs, Alterations and Abandonment Core
 Pipeline Routing and Geomatics Core
 Compliance and Pollution Events and Environmental Impacts and Assessments Core
(U.S Focus)
 Pipeline Hydraulics and Flow Assurance Core
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 Pipeline Strength, Stability and Environmental Considerations Core
 Pipeline Pump and Compressor Stations and Terminals Core
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 Pipeline Construction Core
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________

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Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection, Repairs, Alterations and Abandonment Core

Why is this Module Important?

Why is this Module Important?

Why is this Module Important?

Why is this Module Important?

Why is this Module Important?

Why is this Module Important?

Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection,

This section will cover the following learning objectives:

 Define key considerations, daily operations and maintenance of pipeline systems

Pipelines and Their Uses

 Where are pipelines used?

Pipeline General Uses

Transport to storage facilities

Transport to process facilities

Transport product to market/further processing

Transfer finished products to buyer

Support production (water/CO2 injection)

Disposal of waste/non-commercial fluids

Pipeline Typical Uses

Liquid versus Natural Gas versus Dense Phase Fluids

Common carrier versus proprietary

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

 Importance of communication with public

Image Source: Creative Commons

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

 Importance of communication with public

 Centralized control of entire pipeline

Image Source: Creative Commons

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

 Importance of communication with public

 Centralized control of entire pipeline

Image Source: Creative Commons

Common Operating Philosophies

 Priority of public safety and line integrity

Image Source: Creative Commons IG

Comparative Cost of Land Transportation Modes

Pipelines versus Other Facilities

Pipelines versus Other Facilities

pumps/compressors, flanges, valves, storage and process vessels, heat

companies, may lead to the formation of a consortium that designs, builds

Regulatory and Code Driven Factors

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Regulatory Impact on Operating Philosophy

measurement, quality assurance, product accounting, and nondiscriminatory dealing with

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Pipelines from the Caspian Sea

Key Learning Points

This section has covered the following learning objectives:

 Define key considerations, daily operations and maintenance of pipeline systems

Pipeline O&M, Leak Detection,

This section will cover the following learning objectives:

 Identify the reasons for monitoring and leak detection

Why Monitor? Public Safety and Environmental Protection