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Mirage F.1EQ built for the IrAF, as seen before delivery, during testing in France, in 1980. The type - and even more so its
weapons, manuals and French instructors – brought the IrAF pilots into the world of modern air warfare, equipping them with
a potent and far reaching attack platform, but also a reasonable high-level interceptor. Mirages saw extensive use, but losses
were heavy, and by the end of the war none of a total of six units equipped with them was left with more than eight airframes.
(Dassault, via Authors)
The IrAF had also some limited combat experiences from a few wars against Israel, and the continuous low intensity fighting against the Kurdish insurgency. The Iraqis barely learned any important lessons from the
war in 1967, but very closely observed the October War of 1973, in which several IrAF squadrons took part as well. The Iraqis understood very well that under given circumstances, they did not have any choice but to
form an air defense command along the Soviet lines, equipped with almost 100 Mikoyan MiG-21s, over two hundred SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 SAM sites, and a large number of anti aircraft guns. Despite the size of their
country, and the long borders with their neighbors, however, the Iraqis could merely concentrate their SAM sites and point defense interceptors around the vital installations: between such areas, over 90% of the Iraqi
airspace was not permanently defended. The rest of the air force, was equipped with MiG-23s – which were a huge disappointment for the Iraqis – limited-capability Sukhoi Su-7s (mainly used for training) and Su-
20/-22 attack planes, while a single bomber wing flew Ilyushin Il-28s, and Tupolev Tu-16s and Tu-22s.
Thus, while by 1979 the IIAF was an excellent force on the verge of becoming a power of strategic proportions equipped with first-class weapons and systems, the IrAF was still a small tactical asset, the most modern
combat aircraft of which was MiG-23.
Tu-22Bs, delivered in mid-1970s, and operated by two squadrons of the IrAF were the most potent bombers in the
Iraqi arsenal early during the war, and were used intensively for striking targets deep inside Iran. The type proved
exceptionally complex to maintain and operate, and the units equipped with it had to cease operations several
times during the war. Nevertheless, they proved very precise in bombing and were used time and again: in their
last combat sortie, Iraqi Tu-22s flew as part of a huge strike package which hit Iranian tankers at Khark very hard,
on March 18, 1988, but one was shot down by Iranian interceptors during that operation. (via Tom Cooper)
A reconnaissance photograph of the Iraqi al-Hurriyah AB, near Kirkuk, taken on September 25, 1980, by an IRIAF recon jet,
minutes after the airfield was attacked by Iranian Phantoms. Note the bomb crater on the top of the HAS: the hit cracked the
concrete, but the two Iraqi MiG-21s seem to have escaped any serious damage. Iranian RF-4Es and RF-5Es, flown by some of
the best Iranian pilots, flew hundreds of extremely dangerous reconnaissance missions deep into Iraq. (Authors’ collection)
When the IrAF tried to attack deep into Iran, even if flying along „blind spots“ of the Iranian early warning radar system - the Iraqi formations were frequently intercepted, and several times shot down to the last plane.
Especially units equipped with the MiG-23s suffered severely.
After almost a week of intensive attacks against Iraqi targets, the IRIAF had to change its strategy, as the Iraqi Army was now driving almost 60km deep into southern Iran putting several Iranian cities and important air
bases under threat, while the list of the targets in Iraq was almost exhausted, and bad weather hampered many of the operations. Consequently, the Iranians threw the whole power of their air force to stop the Iraqis.
This task was completed by late October 1980, albeit at a very heavy price, as a lack of proper EW systems, and even chaff and flare dispensers, became evident. The Iraqi invasion, however, saved the lives of numerous
Iranian unattached officers, who were released from Islamic regime’s prisons, in order to help in the fighting. Together with other skilled personnel, these pilots were to become the most important asset at the hands of
the IRIAF for the rest of the war.
F-4E Phantom II in colors of the Iranian Air Force and armed with four Hunting BL.755 CBUs, photographed from a Boeing
707-3J9C tanker, seconds after ending an in-flight refueling operation on the start of another frantic mission into Iraq. Fast
and powerful, the Phantom II was used by Iranians for every possible task, and was frequently flown far beyond deeming
possible. Surprisingly vital, the type remained effective throughout the war, and also successful in air-to-air combat, scoring
victories against much more modern types as late as May 1988. (Authors’ collection)
A stunningly close shot of the Iraqi National Assembly (Majless ol-Vattani) in Baghdad, taken by an IRIAF RF-4E early in the
war. (Authors’ collection)
The Iraqi Air Force kept the IRIAF and IRIAA under constant pressure during the whole war, frequently raiding airfields and
helicopter bases in western and southern Iran. Most of them, however, were not especially effective, as Iranian air bases were
huge and excellently hardened, but time and again some Iranian aircraft, including few F-4s and F-5s, were destroyed. (via
Authors)
By 1984, the Iranian ground forces were reorganised well enough for the IRGC to start its first strategic offensive – the Operation Kheibar – which included a swift crossing of the Howeizeh marshes with the large-
scale help of IRIAA helicopters, and the capture of the Majnoon Islets, with the eventual target of severing the communication lines between Baghdad and the second largest Iraqi city, Basrah. Despite increasing
problems with the maintenance of its aircraft – foremost caused not by the lack of spare parts, but by intensive operations which precluded usual maintenance schedules – the IRIAF supported these operations by at lest
100 combat sorties per day on average, which was simply not enough. On the other side, as the Iranian battlefield air defences were not effectively developed and repaired, the IrAF and the IrAAC had their field days
hunting Iranian troop concentrations in the barren terrain of the southern front.
An F-5E from the TFB.4 (Vahdati AB, near Dezful) seen in flight at low level over the Karkheh River, in Khuzestan Province,
Iran. The Tiger IIs flew the highest number of sorties of all IRIAF aircraft during the war. Both the F-5E and the F-5Fs were
used intensively for all kinds of tasks, including close air support, battlefield interdiction, interdiction strike deep into Iraq,
reconnaissance, and even CAP. Despite some weaknesses, they also scored a number of aerial victories, even against much
more modern and powerful aircraft. (Authors’ collection)
The same year saw also an intensification and internationalization of the so-called Tanker War, which was going on at a slow pace already since autumn 1981. It now saw both sides attacking Persian Gulf shipping.
This development was one of the most brilliant Iraqi strategic moves during the war. Even if the Iraqi attacks against the Iranian shipping were very costly – both in terms of expensive equipment required, and
immense technical and tactical problems, which caused suffering losses for hardly any results – and never totally successful, it internationalized the conflict which could only be to Iraqi advantage. Namely, by ordering
their anti-shipping weapons from France, and later by gaining support for such operations from the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (as well as Bahrain and Qatar, which permitted Iraqis to use their airspace),
the Iraqis were to assure not only more help and support for them, but also to cause direct confrontation between Iran and the US – which was one that Iran had no winning chance. In addition, it forced Iranians to
concentrate a considerable amount of their high value assets – much-needed to support the land offensives – on defending shipping and offshore oil facilities.
The weapon of choice in the Tanker War: Mirage F.1EQ-5, designed and built specially for the IrAF, launching an AM.39
Exocet during the trials in the Gulf of Biscay, in 1982. The IrAF started using the Exocet already in October 1981, six months
before the Falklands War – and with slightly more success than the Argentineans. But, with the time and for a number of
reasons – including the improved construction of modern merchant ships, introduction of improved countermeasures by
Iranians, a highly effective convoy system, and poor Iraqi targeting procedures – this expensive weapon remained relatively
ineffective, and could never seriously threat the flow of Iranian oil exports. Out of over 400 strikes in which some 600 Exocets
were expended, some 250 hits were scored, causing a loss of 115 ships (less than 1% of all the ships which were underway
through the Iranian side of the northern Persian Gulf between October 1981 and June 1988). (Dassault, via Authors)
The carnage on Iraqi-Iranian battlefields was massive, as the war could at best be described as a catalog of
many major campaigns, each similar in intensity and size to the 1973 war between Israel and the Arabs.
Iranian authorities documented wreckages of several hundreds Iraqi fighters and helicopters found behind
Iranian lines. This is a Su-22M, shot down by an Iranian MIM-23 HAWK SAM near the city of Faw, on
February 16, 1986. The pilot did not manage to eject. After the great disappointment with MiG-23BN, the
Su-20/-22 became the next Iraqi hope, and with the time it developed into the most important Iraqi strike
asset. The losses were heavy and less than 50% of all the 160 examples delivered between 1974 and 1986
survived the war. (Authors’ collection).
For the rest of 1986, and until the Spring of 1988, the IRIAF’s efficiency in air defense constantly increased, as not only new or repaired weapons, but also new and more innovative tactical methods were brought to
bear. For example, the Iranians would integrate – loosely – their SAM sites and interceptors to create true “killing fields,” to which dozens of Iraqi planes would be lost (which in turn caused reports in the West, about
the IRIAF using F-14s as “mini-AWACS”). The IrAF reacted by increasing the sophistication of its equipment, incorporating a massive use of modern ECM pods, chaff, ARMs – and chemical weapons.
Iranian P-3Fs, operated by the IRIAF but in very close coordination with the Iranian Navy (IRIN), also remained operational.
They were usually stationed at Bandar Abbas – with their main maintenance base at Shiraz – and were used extensively for
patrolling the Persian Gulf. Their activities were instrumental for Iranian capability to track the international shipping but also
avoid confrontations with the USN. (via Authors)
By that time, it became clear to the IRIAF that it could not win the war, despite its sophisticated equipment, as it lacked enough equipment and personnel to sustain a war of attrition that developed, and would not be
permitted to lead an outright onslaught against Iraq. The IrAF, to the contrary, lacked truly modern equipment and experienced pilots. This was now to change, as after pleads from the Iraqi military structure, Iraqi
dictator finally decreased the political influence on every-day operations, and left the fighting of the war to his combatants. In addition, the Soviets – due to their own financial problems – started delivering more
advanced aircraft and weapons to Iraq, while the French considerably improved the training of the flying crews and technical personnel, and continuously introduced new methods for countering Iranian weapons and
tactics. The results of such change were increasingly felt by the Iranians from late 1986, through the whole 1987, and until the end of the war, as the IrAF moved on a comprehensive campaign against the Iranian
economic infrastructure. The main Iraqi target now was the destruction of Iranian war fighting capability, and the IrAF – much reinforced by more modern weapons and equipment delivered from France, USSR, and
even the US – was to succeed in this task, regardless of immense losses it suffered in exchange. By late 1987, the IrAF could count on direct US support for the conduct of its long-range operations against Iranian
infrastructural targets, and oil installations deep into the Persian Gulf. USN ships actively tracked any movements of Iranian shipping and defenses, and reported them to Iraqis. This tendency went so far that in
February and March 1988, in several occasions when the USN did supply targeting information to the Iraqi air force, but did not warn their aircraft of Iranian interceptors’ presence, the Iraqis would each time suffer
considerable losses. A good example for such events was the massive IrAF strike against Khark island, flown on March 18, 1988, in which the Iraqis destroyed two supertankers, causing immense loss of lives, but also
themselves losing five aircraft to Iranian F-14 Tomcats, including two Tupolev Tu-22Bs, and one Mikoyan MiG-25RB.
Deemed "written off" by all Western sources, Iranian fleet of F-14As remained fully operational and played the most
prominent role in the air defense of strategically important installations during all eight years of the air war between Iraq
and Iran. The type not only scored dozens of kills, but was even more influential due to its sheer firepower: the Iraqis so
feared the F-14 and its AIM-54A missiles that their pilots were instructed to avoid engagements with Tomcats at any price.
Therefore, almost 60% of engagements between Iranian F-14s and Iraqi aircraft ended without even a bullet being fired –
but with Iraqis retreating at high speed. Those which failed to recognize the threat, or decided to continue, usually suffered
extremely heavy losses as Iranian Tomcats scored repeatedly using all available weapons. Never before in the history of
modern air warfare could any interceptor claim such effectiveness. (Author's collection)
After this catastrophe, the IrAF never again flew any large-scale raids into the Persian Gulf; however, such tactics were no more necessary, as now the USN was to directly confront the Iranians – a move important also
because it forced the IRIAF to re-deploy considerable assets from fighting Iraq, as well as from defending important economic assets, to the Strait of Hormuz area. This could also be seen by the clerical leadership, who
had sent the IRGC to attack heavily defended Iraqi positions around Basrah, in February and December 1987, resulting in immense losses, as a face-saving opportunity.
The simultaneous end of the clandestine US support for Iran coincided with the increasing pressure by the IrAF against the Iranian economy. Iran, was now rapidly running out of economic strength and will to fight. In
that sense, the American Operation Praying Mantis, undertaken on April 18 1988 simultaneously with the Iraqi offensive, which liberated the Faw Peninsula from Iranian occupation, not only badly mauled the Iranian
Navy, but also made it clear to the leadership in Tehran that the conflict had to be ended sooner rather than later. The downing of the Iran Air Airbus A300, on July 3, 1988, heavy losses of the IRIAA during the fighting
on the central front, and the downing of two F-14As by Iraqi Mirage F.1EQ-6s, on July 19, were in that sense only some of the last acts in a war, which was indeed lost and won – if the fact that the Iraqi regime
survived a war determined to be ended with its demise, can be considered as a victory – by air power, or lack of the same.
USN A-6E from VA-95 “Green Lizards” dropping CBUs on Iranian warships and speedboats during the Operation Praying Mantis, on
April 18, 1988. Praying Mantis almost broke the back of the Iranian Navy, decreased its capability to escort convoys of oil tankers
between the Khark Island and the Hormuz, and almost crushed the superiority it had enjoyed in the war against Iraq so far.
Nevertheless, for the Iraqis, this operation came too late, as by that time they had given up trying to stop the Iranian oil exports via
Khark. (USN photo)
Unrecognized Lessons
The experiences from the use of airpower during the Iran-Iraq War are of immense importance, yet completely ignored. It was the first war in which both sides used a large number of medium-range air-to-air
missiles (MRAAMs). Even more so, it was the first war in which long-range air-to-air missiles (LRAAMs) – precisely, the AIM-54A Phoenix – were used, with huge success – to engage tactical fighters. It was also the
first war, in which an air force – the Iraqi – started to fly in small formations at medium levels and deploy stand-off weapons in huge numbers in order to evade ground-based air defenses, instead of penetrating at very
low levels. The Iran-Iraq War was also the first war in which both fighting sides attacked each other’s nuclear reactors, and in which the surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) were introduced by both sides as weapons of
terror. It was an air war in which both sides made extensive use of all possible means of the electronic warfare; by 1988, the use of ECM – or the lack thereof – was decisive factor and a matter of life and death of
many fliers on both sides. The First Persian Gulf War was also the first conflict in which armed UAVs were deployed – by Iran – to attack land targets. And, finally, for the first time in anger, very-high-flying aircraft
were shot down at their maximum operating altitude using LRAAMs.
Despite all, the air war between Iraq and Iran was so far one of the least known, worst researched, and most ignored and misunderstood air wars ever. The most likely reason for this fact is that the war was used as a
testing ground for a huge number of diverse weapons systems, many of which debuted nowhere near as expected or advertised by their manufacturers, as well as the fact that both the West and the former Soviet Union
completely underestimated the capabilities of the two invloved sides to wage a high-tech war, instead prferring to concentrate on some of the best known and most successful propaganda-campaigns of the 20th
Century.
Iranian Army Aviation Augusta-Bell AB.205 and Bell 214 Huey medium transport helicopters were true workhorses
of the Iranian war machine. Here five AB.205 Hueys carry troops and equipment at low altitude to a designated LZ
in northeastern Iranian border. (Authors' collection)