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PENINSULA &
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ACIG Database Kuwait Emergency, 1961 Email this article DATABASE
By Tom Cooper & Stefan Kuhn  Printer friendly page
ACIG Books, Articles & Media Sep 9, 2003, 05:48 US-Related News from Iraq
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Forces; Part 2
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Iranian Nuclear Programmes
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With the 7th Field Hospital in
Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Basrah, Part 2
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Indian-Subcontinent Database
Iraqi Super-Bases
Indochina Database In 1899 - long before the huge natural oil resources were discovered in Kuwait - the government of Her Majesty and the Ruler of Kuwait signed an agreement about the defence of the small country. Kuwait remained
under nominal control of the Ottoman Empire until 1918, but was subsequently granted the status of an independent sheikhdom, ruled by the al-Sabah family, with the UK handling its foreign affairs. After further Exhumating the Dead Iraqi Air
Force
Korean War Database negotiations in June 1961 a new treaty was signed, with which the British released Kuwait into independence, but also including an agreement that British forces would assist the Emir al-Sabah, Kuwaiti ruler, if
requested. Second Death of IrAF
Far-East Database 22 September 2003: Iranian
On 25th June 1961 the then Iraqi dictator Abd al-Qarim Qassem unilaterally announced that Kuwait was to be considered Iraqi territory and offered “to liberate the inhabitants of Kuwait”. On the following day some Military Parade
LCIG & NCIG Section Iraqi forces began massing along the border to Kuwait. However the Iraqi military was by far nowhere near the strength it would reach in later years and most of the troops had to make a long march from Baghdad IRIAF Since 1988
down to the southern border of the country. Therefore the Iraqi built-up was very slow. There were several reasons for this situation - most of which can be easily illustrated on the example of the Iraqi Air Force's
ACIG Modeler's Corner condition at the time. US Air-to-Air Victories during
the Operation Desert Storm
Kuwaiti Air-to-Air Victories in
Search Iraqi Air Force in 1961 1990
Go The Iraqi Air Force of the time was in a state of transition. After the bloody al-Rashid coup d’état undertaken on 14 July 1958, during which the young King Feisal III and Crown Prince Abdul Illah of Iraq, together with Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait; 1990
the Iraqi Minister of Defence and a former Prime Minister of Jordan, were assassinated in Baghdad by the elements of the Iraqi military, many officers of the former Royal Iraqi Air Force were imprisoned and normal Persian 'Cats
All Categories
peace-time training schedules – conducted to full RAF-standard - discontinued. Commander of RIrAF at Habbaniyah, Wg.Cdr. Abdul-Razzak, for example, languished in prison from 1958 until 1962. Many other pilots Iraqi Air-to-Air Victories since
Advanced Search have left the country and would never return. 1967
Iranian Air-to-Air Victories
The RIrAF of the 1950s was a well-trained force, operating 12 Vampire FB.Mk.52s, six Vampire T.Mk.55s, and 19 Venom FB.Mk.1s and FB.Mk.50s, as well as 15 Hunter F.Mk.6s. The Hunters were supplied with US
Contributors Log-in financial help in two batches, the first of which – consisting of five aircraft – was delivered in April 1957. The second batch, consisting of ten aircraft, arrived in December 1957. Shortly before the coup in 1958 the
since 1976
USA also supplied five North American F-86F Sabres to Iraq; yet, while the Hunters entered service with the No.1 Sqn, based at Tahmouz/Habbaniyah AB, the Sabres were never to see service in Iraq: they were parked Tanker War, 1980-1988
inside a hangar at al-Rashid AB, and left there for some time before being returned to USA. Iraqi Air Force since 1948, Part
2
Iraqi Air Force Since 1948, Part
1
Fire in the Hills: Iranian and
Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982
I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi
Invasion of Iran, September
1980
I Persian Gulf War, 1980-1988
Kuwait Emergency, 1961
Oman (and Dhofar) 1952-
1979
South Arabia and Yemen,
1945-1995

The Iraqi Air Force was a well-trained and highly capable force in the 1950s thanks to acquisition of modern fighters from the UK. In 1953 it received the
first out of 12 deHavilland Vampire FB.Mk.52s, which entered service with the No.5 Squadron, then based at Moascar al-Rashid AB, near Baghdad. (all
artworks by Tom Cooper)

In 1954 and 1956 the then RIrAF was reinforced by acquisition of 19 deHavilland Venom FB.Mk.1s and FB.Mk.5s, which entered service with the No.6
Squadron. The unit was based at Habbaniyah AB (named "Tahmouz" by the Iraqis), and shared this facility with the RAF until 1958, by when also the No.5
Squadron was based there.

Abd al-Qarim Qassem was neither a Ba’athist (the Iraqi nationalist and socialist Ba’ath Party was similar in basic ideology to the Syrian Ba’ath Party, but different in too many details to be described as “same”), but he
was a staunch supporter of the pro-Soviet United Arab Republic. Consequently he was swift to immediately request military assistance from the USSR. In 1958 the first 14 MiG-17Fs as well as some other aircraft were
supplied.
The arrival of the MiG-17s and re-equipment of the No.5 Sqn IrAF with them resulted in a whole “cascade” of re-equipments within the force. The No.1 Sqn was still flying Fury FB.11s, but the No.3 Transport
Squadron was already reformed into three Flights, of which the A-Flight was flying newly-received, Soviet-built Ilushin Il-14 transports, B-Flight the Mi-1 and Mi-4 helicopters, and C-flight British-supplied
Dragonflies. The No.4 Squadron continued flying Hunter F.Mk.6s, while the former mounts of the No.5 Squadron - Venoms - were given to No.6 Squadron after that unit re-equipped with MiG-17Fs. In turn the No.7
Squadron - which was mainly involved in fighting Kurds in the north of the country - was re-equipped with Vampires taken over from the No.6 Squadron. The IrAF thus had to re-train no less but three main fighting
and one transport unit in the period between 1958 and 1961.
Due to being in process of re-qualifying a large number of flying- and ground-crews, and uncertain situation regarding spares supply for its British-built jets, by 1961 the IrAF were therefore not ready for large-scale
operations. The Iraqi Army was in no better condition, then even if it was faster in converting some of its units to Soviet-supplied hardware it lacked training in conduct of large-scale mechanized operations.

This Hunter F.Mk.6 (IrAF serial "403", ex-XK146) was one of 14 ex-RAF aircraft purchased by Iraq with US funding in late 1957. It is seen here already
wearing the fin flash introduced after the coup in 1958.

This MiG-17F was one of the first delivered to Iraq, in late 1958. It is seen here wearing the fin flash that was used by the IrAF only between that year and
the next coup in Baghdad, in 1963. Iraq never received as many as 10 MiG-17s as usually reported: in fact, the No.5 Squadron was the only combat unit
known to have ever operated the type, even if a small number of MiG-17Fs and MiG-15UTIs was also in service with the Flying Academy (based at al-
Rashid AB in the early 1960s).

British Intervention
On the contrary, the British reaction was very swift. Under the codename “Vantage” the British had been planning for an intervention in such a situation. This plan included the deployment of additional forces from
the UK, Cyprus and Germany. Technically the UK was well prepared to come to the aid of Kuwait, the problem however was that they could not gain overflight rights from many countries on route, so that a direct
route to the area was not open for the deployment of troops. Already on the next day all British forces in the region were placed on alert. The Centaur-class commando carrier HMS Bulwark (with the 42nd Commando
Battalion embarked) and its escort of three frigates were making a port visit in Karachi, Pakistan. A unit of Royal Marines was already in Bahrain, together with some Army troops, while other units were available in
Bahrain, Sharyah, Aden, Kenya and Cyprus. The RAF had two squadrons of Hawker Hunters in Aden and Nairobi. Heavy transports, light transports and liaison planes in Aden. Additional reserves were based in
Bahrain and Kenya. Facilities in Kuwait were very austere: although one airfield was existent, its installations were very poor and there was no radar. Equally, the port facilities could accept only smaller ships.
Although on the first look the available forces were scattered over a huge area, already on 29th June the British began setting them in motion. HMS Bulwark and her escorts left Karachi and headed for the Persian Gulf
at their best speed. Supply depots in Bahrain were opened and two Hunter Sqns (No.8 208 Sqn) prepared to deploy to Bahrain.

HMS Bulwark, as seen in Naval Base Singapore, few years after the Kuwait Emergency of 1961. (Fleet Air Arm Museum)

On 30th June Kuwait officially appealed for help and a squadron of Hunters was deployed from Eastleigh to Khormaksar, even if Turkey and Sudan refused to grant overflight rights. Already in Bahrain were two
Shackletons MR.2 from No.37 Sqn, and the first planes from No.88 Sqn deployed from RAFG Wildenrath. The staff of the 24th Infantry brigade was flown-in from Kenya using Argonaut and Comet transport planes.
The No.3 Sqn Royal Rhodesian Air Force provided some airlift as well.

RAF Station Sharyah was one of the most important British assets in the Middle East during the 1950s and early 1960s. Seen here on the ramp are (from left
to right): No. 30 Sqn's Beverley, No.152 Sqn's Twin Pioneer, and No.37 Sqn's Shackleton. (Photo: Born in Battle)

On 1st July HMS Bulwark was already deep in the Persian Gulf and the embarked Whirlwind helicopters of 848 NAS began deploying soldiers from 42 Commando to Kuwait. The Hunter fighter-bombers were
deployed to “Kuwait New” airfield, near Farwania, while Britannia transports of No.99 and 511 Squadrons brought troops from 45 Commando Royal Marines and 11th Hussars regiment out of Aden.
In the next days additional units arrived in the area. Four Canberras from No.88 Sqn and eight planes from 213 Sqn landed at Bahrain, while RAF transports flew-in more troops. Until the 4th of July Comets of 216
Sqn and Britannia transports flew in elements of the 2nd Airborne Battalion, while Hastings and Beverly transports hurried to bring in the heavy equipment of the deploying forces. From Kenya the 1st Battalion of the
Royal Inniskillings was also transported to the scene. Also deployed were Canberra PR.7 recce birds. When those forces arrived the first troops had already started to move into Kuwait, so that the pressure on the
installations in Bahrain was reduced.
For the troops in Kuwait however the situation was far from pleasant. After taking position along the Mittla ridge - in the Northwest of the country – they had to cope with temperatures of up to 50°C and sandstorms
that reduced the visibility to less than 300m. A Hunter from No.208 Sqn crashed in this area under such circumstances, killing the pilot. However, most of the deployed forces were accustomed to such circumstances
and eventually there were fewer problems than could be expected. Nevertheless, the British took great care the deployed troops to be constantly rotated between Kuwait and HMS Bulwark, so to get some rest. The
carrier was also acting as a forward deployed station, then it carried a radar with 150km detection range and acted as a communications centre. Especially the last function was critical, as the headquarters of the
operation remained in Bahrain, more than 550km away from Kuwait.
Vast distances also forced the British to improvise with radio communications: when no other solution was found for handling theatre-wide communications signals were relayed by Canberra-bombers between Aden
and Bahrain, while RAF Pembrokes from A-Flight No.152 Squadron were used for liaison duties between Bahrain, Sharyah and Aden. An additional problem was that the RAF planes were using VHF-communications,
while Royal Navy used UHF, so that here also some improvisation was needed in order to enable mutual communication.
Only with the arrival of the larger Illustrious-class carrier HMS Victorious improved the situation considerably. Equipped with Gannet AEW planes and Sea Vixen all-weather interceptors the British forces then gained
a big improvement in situational awareness. This was also added by the 270km-range radar on board the ship, which was further increased by the Gannets.
Finally, on 18th July the RAF was able to put up the first ground-based radar in Kuwait. The SC 787 type could not measure the height of an aircraft, but it did help to improve air traffic control in the region.

Observation party of the 29 Field Regiment Royal Artillery seen while disembarking from an LCT in Kuwait, in 1961. (Photo: IDR via Born in Battle)

After the Iraqi national holiday, on 14th July, passed without any action, the British started feeling more secure and the chance of an armed conflict began to decrease. No Iraqi troop movements south of Basrah had
been noticed. Thus, on 20th July 42 Commando and 2 Para were withdrawn back to Bahrain, while 45 Commando was returning back home to Aden. The Hunters from No.208 Sqn also redeployed to Bahrain.
Remaining British forces withdrew from Kuwait by the end of September.

By late July 1961 HMS Victorious was replaced by HMS Centaur. All transport aircraft had left the area until the beginning of August, and by October 1961 there was barely a trace of the British intervention left. The
last troops left on the 19th October. In the mean time troops from the Arab League had been replacing the British forces to safeguard the freedom and independence of Kuwait. Namely, the Arab League rapidly
countered the British intervention by deploying own forces, intended to guarantee Kuwait's independence of both - Iraq and Great Britain. This Arab League contingent withdrew from Kuwait only following the
overthrow of Iraq's Qassem regime, in February 1963.

Gannet AEW.Mk.3 of NAS 849 A-Flight seen while launching from HMS Victorious. Gannets proved of immense value as early warning aircraft over the
British Task Force in the Persian Gulf and the British forces in Kuwait. (Fleet Air Arm Museum)

Conclusions
Up until today it remains unclear whether the Iraqis were really planning to invade Kuwait, like they had been threatening for decades, or if it was just another threat. The fast British reaction however helped to
stabilise the situation. The British and the Americans did learn a lot about deploying forces over long distances, the associated communications problems and the prearrangement of supplies.
Especially the forward based supply depots in the region proved extremely valuable for the success of the operation and allowed the British to deploy and support large forces over long distances. Especially the US
should use a comparable solution, when Ira invaded Kuwait in 1990.

Another outcome of that crisis was the formation of the Armed forces of Kuwait. More details about this process can be found in the article about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in 1990.

For their part, in the aftermath of the crisis the Iraqis immediately started purchasing additional military equipment from the USSR. For example, in 1962 the first out of eventual 40 MiG-19s arrived, followed by the
first 12 MiG-21F-13s and then also a batch of at least 12 Ilushin Il-28 bombers. If these acquisitions indeed came in reaction to the confrontation with the UK over Kuwait, in summer 1961, then it is obvious that the
Iraqis concluded that their available military power at the time was insufficient for an operation in this style. However, in hindsight it must be said that Iraq was never again in a better military or diplomatic position to
take on Kuwait.

Remarks
The team of ACIG.org and several of its correspondents are currently involved in research about the history of the Iraqi Air Force, so also at the times of this emergency. We are therefore certain that sometimes within
2005 we will be able to present a much updated - if not complete - picture of Iraqi intentions and capabilities at the time.

Sources and Bibliography

Except for own research, additional information for this article was kindly provided by Mr. Tom N. Following sources of reference were used as well:

- "AIR WARS AND AIRCRAFT; A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present", by Victor Flintham, Arms and Armour Press, 1989 (ISBN: 0-85368-779-X)
- Born in Battle Magazine No.3, 1979

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