z v NCIP customary law which traces its origin to native

title.
-SECTION 22. The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national
-JUSTICE VITUG. On the other hand, Justice
unity and development.
Vitug would grant the petition, saying that
Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of Cariño cannot override the collective will of the
indigenous and customary laws in the country people expressed in the Constitution. It is in
and affirm their co-existence with the land laws them that sovereignty resides and from them
in our national legal system. that all government authority emanates. The
"due process clause," as I so understand it in
-Petitioners in the Cruz case challenged the
Tanada vs. Tuvera would require an apt
constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise
publication of a legislative enactment before it
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
is permitted to take force and effect. So, also,
1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to
customary laws, when specifically enacted to
an unlawful deprivation of the
become part of statutory law, must first
State’s ownership over lands of the public
undergo that publication to render them
domain and all other natural resources therein,
correspondingly binding and effective as such.
by recognizing the right of ownership of
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains
-JUSTICE PANGANIBAN. Justice Panganiban was
and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.
more forthright when he stated that all
Customary rights
Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject
-unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership to the Constitution, and that no one is exempt
over lands of the public domain as well as from its all-encompassing provisions.
minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: (1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and
coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
-Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition,
stated that the Regalian theory does not negate
native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial, adverting to the
landmark case of Cariño v. Insular Government, "(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which
provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources found within
Puno: The IPRA recognizes the existence of
ancestral domains are private but community
ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in Philippine society.
property of the indigenous peoples;
It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these
lands and domains. The ownership given is the
indigenous concept of ownership under
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b)
which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates
the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates
the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights
of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the
areas claimed to be their ancestral domains,
and the right to enter into agreements with
nonindigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous
peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop,
protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover or reforestatio
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and
these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural
resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among
members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the
community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not
exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the
transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is
tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if
the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously
lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory.
occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. 
Laws were either customary or written.
Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the
bulk of the laws of the barangay.
Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56
hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal
areas, and natural resources therein, held under
a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their not part of the lands of the public domain. They
ancestors, communally or individually since are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs
time immemorial, continuously to the present.

 The right of ownership and possession by the

) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,
refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized
by individuals, families and clans who are
members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present.
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
Communal rights to the land are held not only
by the present possessors of the land but
extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past,
present and future, to the domain

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral

Lands: How Acquired Ancestral lands are also held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
communal. These lands, however, may be
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in
transferred subject to the following limitations:
two modes: (1) by native title over both
(a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs;
ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens
(b) in accord with customary laws and
title under the Public Land Act and the Land
traditions; and (c) subject to the right of
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands
redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15
only.
years if the land was transferred to a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs

-Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest

rights to lands and domains held under a claim
Customary law is a primary, not secondary,
of private ownership as far back as memory
source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely
reaches
applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not
depend on the absence of a specific provision in
the civil law.
-torrens - lands. For purposes of registration
under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7
ancestral land into public agricultural land
(a) does not cover
which may be disposed of by the State. The
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
necessary implication is that ancestral land is
mineral oils, all forces of
private. It, however, has to be first converted to
potentialenergy, fisheries, forests or timber, wil
public agricultural land simply for registration
dlife, flora and fauna and all other natural
purposes. 
resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the
State.
The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources
In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution
SEC OF DENR V MAYOR JOSE YAP
AND
DR ORLANDO SACAY V DENR
-the right of the present occupants of Boracay
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
YAP: certiorari. granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap,
SACAY: prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
of Proclamatioj issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into
reserved forest and agricultural land.
(DENR) approved the National Reservation
Survey of Boracay
Island, which identified several lots as being
occupied or claimed by named person
-President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay
Island, among other islands, caves and
peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones
and marine reserves under the administration
of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA
- respondents-claimants alleged that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that
they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was
classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of
private ownership.
-The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as
"public forest," which was not available for
disposition - Revised Forestry Code
-Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession
they had cannot ripen into ownership.
RTC and CA- favor of the claimants
-----
SACAY:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay
Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and
six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided
for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
-They allege that the Proclamation infringed on
their "prior vested rights" over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay
since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos
-Petitioners-claimants contended that there is
no need for a proclamation reclassifying
Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified
as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known
as the first Public Land Act.
-Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that
petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right
over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land
pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being
public forest, the claimed portions of the island
are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect
*CONSOLIDATED CASES
-the main issue is whether private claimants
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and
petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a
right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.
-Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and
executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act
No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation
No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos;
and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo...
A. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the
1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks.43 Of
these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of
May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain..
Regalian doctrine
-Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of
the public domain in the Philippine Islands were
classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others,
the disposal of mineral lands by means of
absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).62 It also provided the
definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands." agricultural land" as used in Act No.
926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands
-Philippine Commission passed Act
No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act.
The Act introduced the homestead system and
made provisions for judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale
or lease of public lands.
-November 29, 1919, Act No. 926
was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act.
-CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. 
-The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,73 which now provides for possession and
occupation of the land applied for since June 12,
1945, or earlier
-was amended and updated by PD No. 1529,
known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative
to registration of property
-A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required
-To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
-the case at bar, no such proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the
Court.
-Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely
provided the manner through which land
registration courts would classify lands of the
public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural
depended on proof presented in each case.
-Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time
when the President of the Philippines had no
power to classify lands of the public domain
into mineral, timber, and agricultural
-We accept the position of private claimants,
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
would have automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already classified as
timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable
lands. That would take these lands out of State
ownership and worse, would be utterly
inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the
long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
-Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay
Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years
under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the
island into private ownership. under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the
lands are alienable and disposable.
-PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos
categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest.
-occupants of Boracay have built multi-million
peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the
island has already been stripped of its forest
cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s
tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.
-There is a big difference between "forest" as
defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber
land" as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while
the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.
-Court is tasked to determine the legal status of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not
been automatically converted from public
forest to alienable agricultural land.
-Marcos Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular
No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the
law or the Circular which made Boracay Island
an agricultural land.
 Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the
areas’ alienability.
-More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801
covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands
in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro,
Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron
Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in
Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro,
and Misamis Oriental
GMA: was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which
positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership
-nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of
Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her
authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
-Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. All
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law,
the specific limits of the public domain.
-Boracay Island still remained an unclassified
land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
-Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL
applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the
land had never been previously classified, as in
the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law.
-Private claimants are not entitled to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said
law. There are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
-This is clear from the wording of the law
itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter
how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.
-We note that the earliest of the tax
declarations in the name of private claimants
were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the
tax declarations are not sufficient to convince
this Court that the period of possession and
occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
-this does not denote their automatic ouster
from the residential, commercial, and other
areas they possess now classified as
agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of
their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
-with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps
to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as
by homestead or sales patent, subject to the
conditions imposed by law.
-That the island is no longer overrun by trees,
however, does not becloud the vision to protect
its remaining forest cover and to strike a
healthy balance between progress and ecology.
Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
Yap: -1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE.
Sacay: 2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Republic v Gomez
REPUBLIC v. LUCIA M. GOMEZ +
DECISION
-430-square meter property situated
in Barangay Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan i
-father of respondent herein, bought the lot in a
public auction and declared it under the name
of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez.
-1945, the lot was declared for taxation
purposes and was issued Tax Declaration (TD)
No. 2234.  In 1955, Emilio declared part of
Lot      No. 2872 under his name. When he died
in 1969, his surviving spouse and children
allegedly took continuous possession and
occupancy
-29 December 1986, the lot was allegedly
partitioned by Emilio's heirs when they
executed a Deed of Adjudication with
Consolidation
-15 December 1999, respondent filed an
Application for registration of title with regard
to her part
-petitioner filed its Opposition to the
Application on the following grounds:
1. That neither the [respondent] nor [her]
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior
-That the muniments of title and/or the tax
declaration/s and tax payment/s (sic) receipts of
[respondent] does (sic) not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide
acquisition of lands applied for;
-That the claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed
to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6) months
from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No.
892.[3] From the records, it appears that the
instant application was filed on April 21, 1998
-That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private
appropriation
On appeal, petitioner alleged that respondent
failed to prove that the subject lot was alienable
and disposable
-Subsequently, the CA dismissed the appeal. It
held that the Certification made by Geodetic
Engineer Rafael Escabarte that the land was
alienable and disposable was sufficient. The
Certification
Appeal: SC: The Petition is meritorious.
-2 certs: The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that
"lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre
situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116
square meters falls within the alienable zone
and denrr tech
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30
May 1988, delineated the functions and
authorities of the offices within the DENR.
-this case, respondent applied for registration of
Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is
over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705
with an area of 596,116 square meters which,
as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable.
-Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no
authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue
certificates of land classification.
-Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable
-respondent was not able to comply with Sec.
14(1) of P.D. 1529, or the Property
Registration Decree
*possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain
-Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 79088 is
hereby SET ASIDE.  The application for
registration filed by Lucia M. Gomez is DENIED.
Republic v Naguit
TRANSCRIPT
REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration
of title which seeks judicial confirmation of her
imperfect title over aparcel of land in Nabas,
Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land
openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the
government until shefiled her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision
confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon
failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial
after filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic
of the Philippines, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the
property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
claim of ownership since the subject land was
declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be firstclassified as alienable and
disposable before the applicants possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of
title, (1) that the subject property is alienable
and disposable; (2) thatthe applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, and exclusive possession and
occupation,and; (3) that the possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.
There must be a positive act of the government
through a statute or proclamation stating the
intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property, thus, declaring
the land as alienable and disposable. However,
if there
has been none, it is presumed that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property and the possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into
ownership through acquisitive prescription.
To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the
construction of Section 14 (1) would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for
it would mean that all lands of public domain
which were not declared as alienable and
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government
from enforcing the said provision as it decides
to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.
The land in question was found to be cocal in
nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old. The inherent
nature of the land but confirms its certification
in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit
had the right to apply forregistration owing to
the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
Heirs of Malabana v Republic
-denying the application of the petitioners for
the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree).
-On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario
Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for
land registration covering the property in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part
of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years,  land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982,
-certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO)
-verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982
-RTC: granted
his part and on the part of his predecessors-in
interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
-Petition for reconsiderarion
-Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the
the time when the land was declared alienable
and disposable by the State.
Land
Land, which is an immovable property, may be
classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership
-Regalian Doctrine.  means that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of
land, and is charged with the conservation of
such patrimon

-Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed

the judgment to the CA -1987 Constitution adopted the classification
under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
- period of possession prior to the classification
forest or timber, and mineral, but added
of the land as alienable and disposable was
national parks
inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession.  -only agricultural lands of the public domain
may be alienated; all other natural resources
Mario died: his heirs elevated the CA’s decision
may not be.
of February 23, 2007
-Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall
-Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural
into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
land prior to its declaration as alienable and
of the State, or those classified as lands of
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
the period of possession to perfect title under
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
public domain, or the public lands as provided
141) and the Property Registration Decree
by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural

- failed to establish by sufficient evidence

possession and occupation of the property on
-to enable such reclassification,25 and the and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under the provisions of this chapter.
under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, 
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and
-If, however, public land will be classified as
lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act
national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of -Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
public dominion, a declaration of such 1. The applicant, by himself or through his
conversion must be made in the form of a law predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential and occupation of the property subject of the
proclamation application;

2. The possession and occupation must be

-Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
purposes can be disposed of only as follows, 3. The possession and occupation must be
and not otherwise: under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
(1) For homestead settlement; ownership;

(2) By sale; 4. The possession and occupation must have

taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
(3) By lease; and
5. The property subject of the application must
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete be an agricultural land of the public domain.
titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

-land subject of the application for registration
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the
provision to apply
SEC 48 B Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious -absent proof that the land is already classified
possession and occupation of alienable and as agricultural land of the public domain, the
disposable lands of the public domain, under a Regalian Doctrine applies
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant
-classification or reclassification of the land as
alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12,
1945 or earlier, because any possession of the
land prior to such classification or
reclassification produced no legal effects.
-date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court
should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
-corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the
requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Ac
-Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No.
10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent
requirements and procedures in the
adjudication of alienable public land to qualified
applicants, particularly residential lands, subject
to area limitations
-converting such land into patrimonial or
private land of the State, the applicable
provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can
now run against the State.
-the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot
be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State.
1. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No.
179987, September 3, 2013)
Doctrine:
In Naguit:
CA 141 Sec 48(b) laid down the requirements
for confirmation of imperfect title
1. Applicant or through predecessors in interest
is in possession and occupation
2. That the possession and occupation is open,
continuous exclusive and notorious
3. There is a bonifide claim of ownership on or
before June 12, 1945
4. That the land is alienable and disposable
However if it is PD 1529 is the mode of
confirmation of imperfect title in includes
another requisite which is:
5. The land must be declared as patrimonial
property
6. The land is claimed through acquisitive
prescription period of 30 years
IGNACIO PALOMO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
No. 95608 January 21, 1997 Facts Governor
General William Cameron Forbes issued
Executive Order No. 40 on June 13, 1913 which
reserved some square meters of land in Barrio
Naga, Albay for provincial park purposes. On
December 9, 1916, The CFI of Albay ordered the
registration of 15 parcels of land covered by
E.O. No. 40 to Diego Palomo. Two months
before his death, Diego Palomo donated these
parcels of land to his heir, Ignacion Palomo and
Carmen Palomo which was allegedly covered by
an Original Certificate of Title. President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced in E.O No. 40 into
“Tiwi Hot Spring National Parks and Wildlife.
The area was never released as alienable and
disposable portion of public domain and
therefore is neither susceptible to disposition
nor registrable. The Palomos, however
continued in possession of the property and
paid real estate taxes and introduced
improvements by planting banana, pandan and
coconuts. On May 7, 1974 petitioners filed a
civil case against private respondents who are
all employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who entered their land and cut
down bamboos. The Republic of the Philippines
also filed a Civil Case for the annulment and
cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving
the 15 parcels of land. RTC ad CA ruled against
the Palomos.
Issue Whether or not the lands claimed by the
Palomos are alienable lands of the public
domain which may be acquired by adverse
possession? Held No. The lands in the case at
bar were not alienable lands of the public
domain. There was no proof that the
petitioners’ predecessors in interest derived
title from an old Spanish grant. The “decisions”
of the CFI were not signed by the judge but
merely certified true copies of notification to
Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk
of court. It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registrable
and possession thereof no matter how lengthly,
cannot be converted into private property
unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable. CA’s
decision was affirmed
Citation preview
REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE G.R. No. L-40402
March 16, 1987; Paras, J.: FACTS: Lot No. 622 of
the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land
in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No.
1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated
from the forest zone and released and certified
by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural
Land for disposition under the Public Land Act.
On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI
of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case
No. 19 to perfect their rights and register their
titles to said lots. They alleged that they
acquired ownership and possession of said
parcels of land by purchase from the original
owners thereof, whose possession of the same
including that of the herein respondents, has
always been continuous, open, active, exclusive,
public, adverse and in the concept of owners for
more than 30 years. The Director of Forestry
filed an opposition to the above petition but
later withdrew the same upon verification of
findings that this portion of the timberland had
already been released from the mass of the
public forests. Subsequently, the Acting Prov.
Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of the
Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging
that the land is STILL Public Land and as such
cannot be the subject of a land registration
proceeding under Act 496. The lower court
adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes,
finding that the latter have complied with all the
terms and conditions entitling them to a grant.
This decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued the
corresponding decrees of registration. On the
other hand, petitioner DL through the Solicitor
Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for
Review, adding: that respondents executed
simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of
the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious
considerations in order to remove the same
from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in
truth, buyers are mere dummies of petitioners;
hence, not purchasers for value. The CFI denied
this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the
questioned decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of
merit; hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON THE
LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD
LEGALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48 (b) OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDED BY
R.A. 1942. HELD: NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court
ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to public lands. Forest lands
or areas covered with forests are excluded.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long
cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at
all possible, private respondents have not
qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA
141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9
mos. and 20 days of possession and occupation
of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965
when the lots involved had been segregated
from the forest zone and released by the BOF as
an agricultural land for disposition under the
Public Land Act. As such, respondents and their
predecessors in interest could not have
possessed the lots for the required period of 30
years as disposable agricultural land