1F2019 | Constitutional Law 1 | Prof Dan Gatmaytan | LLSM

Labo v Comelec (01 Aug 1989)

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents

Outline : [04.B.01.10] Territory, People, and Government; People; Citizenship

Docket No. : G.R. No. 86564
Ponente : Cruz, J.

FACTS – On 20 Jan 1988, petitioner Ramon Labo, Jr. was proclaimed mayorelect of Baguio City. Private
respondent Luis Lardizabal got the second highest number of votes. Lardizabal contested the proclamation
on the ground that Labo was no longer a Philippine citizen as a result of his naturalization as an Australian
citizen and his swearing allegiance to the Queen of Australia.

In the instant petition, petitioner Labo contends that private respondent Lardizabal’s petition for quo
warranto was not filed on time, and therefore public respondent Comelec has no jurisdiction in conducting
an inquiry into his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City.

PETITIONER Labo argues: PRIVATE RESPONDENT Lardizabal argues:

[x] Sec 253 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within
10 days after the proclamation of the election result.
[x] Rule 36 Sec 5 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure provides that a petition for quo warranto
will not be given due course without the payment of
a filing fee
[x] Manchester v CA held that the payment of the
filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filing of
the petition itself.
[x] Comelec Res 1996 promulgated 12 Jan 1988
requires the payment of filing fees.
[√] Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that filing a petition to annul a candidate’s
proclamation will suspend the running period to file
an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.
[√] Rule 36 Sec 5 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure became effective only on 15 Nov 1988,
seven days after publication in the Official Gazette.
The Rules cannot retroact to 26 Jan 1988 when the
petition for quo warranto was filed.
[√] The filing fee was filed ahead of time,
considering:
(1) On 26 Jan 1988, private respondent filed the
‘Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for
Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and
Restraining Order or Injunction’.
(2) Comelec treated it as a preproclamation
controversy and docketed it as SPC Case
No. 88288.
(3) No docket fee was collected although it was
offered.
(4) On 08 Feb 1988, the COMELEC decided to
treat his petition as solely for quo warranto
and redocketed it as EPC Case No. 8819.
(5) Comelec served notice to private respondent
on 10 Feb 1988, or 21 days after petitioner’s
proclamation.
(6) Private respondent immediately paid the
filing fee on that date, 10 Feb 1988.
[√] Comelec Res 1996 took effect only on 03 Mar
1988.

RA 6646 the Electoral Reform Law of 1987 became

effective on 05 Jan 1988. Sec 30 provides that
Comelec rules and regulations will take effect on the
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seventh day after publication in the Official Gazette

[x] Even before Comelec Res 1996, Comelec Res
No 1450 promulgated 26 Feb 1980 also requires the
payment of filing fees.
or at least (2) daily newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
[√] Comelec Res 1450 was intended for the local
elections held on 30 Jan 1980, and does not apply
to the 1988 local elections.

DISCUSSION

ISSUE HELD RULING

Was the petition Yes. Ten-day period extended
for quo warranto The fee was paid during the ten-day period. When Comelec treated the
filed on time? petition as a preproclamation proceeding which did not require payment of a
filing fee, the ten-day period was extended by the pendency of the petition.

Question whether fees requirement was already effective

In addition, the previous conclusion is reached on the assumption that the
requirement for the payment of fees had already taken effect. However:
(1) There is no record that Comelec Res 1450 was even published.
(2) Comelec Res 1996 was only published on 25 Feb 1988, and took
effect on 03 Mar 1988, or after the petition was filed.

Tañada v Tuvera
Resolutions do not become effective "immediately upon approval" simply
because it was so provided. Publication is still necessary so as not to violate
due process.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd v Asuncion

Whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondent’s fault or neglect. Taking into account the circumstances of the
case, the court may allow the payment of the filing fee within a reasonable
time.

Rule 42 Sec 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure

If the prescribed fees are not paid, Comelec may refuse to take action until
they are paid and may dismiss the action or proceeding.
MAIN ISSUE – No. Earlier Comelec decision is rejected
Was petitioner On 12 May 1982, Comelec found petitioner Labo to be a citizen of the
Labo a citizen Philippines, without prejudice to the issue being raised anew in a proper
of the case. The SC rejects this ruling as totally baseless for dismissing as
Philippines on ‘mistakes’ the following acts of petitioner Labo:
the day of the (1) He obtained an Australian passport.
local elections? (2) He declared before immigration authorities that he was a registered
alien.
(3) He asked for a change of status from immigrant to returning former
Philippine citizen.
(4) He categorically declared that he was an Australian citizen in several
sworn statements.
(5) He sought to avoid barangay court jurisdiction on the ground that he
was a foreigner. Bwiset.

Res judicata does not apply

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The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship, as

held in Soria v. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213;; Lee v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561;; Sia Reyes v. Deportation
Board. It was not properly pleaded, having only been invoked in reply to
private respondent’s comment. Identity of parties, one requisite for res
judicata, is not present in the instant case.

CID decision is persuasive

On 13 Sep 1988, the Commission on Integration and Deportation, chaired
by Miriam Defensor Santiago, held that petitioner Labo was not a citizen of
the Philippines. The CID decision took into account Australian Consul
Graham Colin West’s official statement and DFA’s letter, both of which
confirmed that petitioner Labo was granted Australian citizenship on 28 Jul
1976, and that a requirement for said citizenship was a renunciation of ‘all
other allegiance’.

Not because of his marriage to an alien

There is no claim or finding that petitioner Labo automatically ceased to be a
Filipino because of his marriage to an Australian. He became an Australian
citizen through the naturalization process that he underwent, for which one
condition is the renunciation of all other allegiance.

Loss of Philippine citizenship

CA 63 enumerates modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:
(1) naturalization in a foreign country
(2) express renunciation of citizenship
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country

Dual allegiance
Art IV Sec 5 of the Constitution provides that ‘dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.’

Loss of alien citizenship does not restore Philippine citizenship

Even if petitioner Labo’s naturalization was annulled because his marriage
to the Australian was bigamous, it does not mean he was automatically
reinstated as a Philippine citizen.

Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

CA 63 as amended by PD 725 provides that Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by
(1) direct act of Congress
(2) naturalization
(3) repatriation

Under repatriation, natural-born Filipinos who have lost Philippine citizenship

may apply for reacquisition. Upon approval of their application, they must
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.

Qualification for office

Sec 42 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines. The electorate does not have the power
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to permit an individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines

to preside as mayor.
Can respondent No. Latest ruling reversed
Lardizabal The SC reverses Santos v Comelec, which held that the candidate who
replace the placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for the disqualified
petitioner as winner were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by
mayor? default.

Topacio v Paredes
It is repugnant to the constitutional right to suffrage if a candidate who did
not get the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed the winner. The
majority positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose
him. No one can be declared elected unless he receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

As private respondent Lardizabal obtained only the second highest number

of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio.

JUDGMENT – Petition denied. Petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE
his office and surrender the same to the ViceMayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and
executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

VOTING
15-0 denying the petition.

OPINIONS
Separate concurring – Gutierrez, Jr, J.
My concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of the many
other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion [in Frivaldo v Comelec].

NOTES
Quo warranto, ‘by what warrant’ – A writ requiring a person to show by what authority he holds, claims, or
exercises his office or franchise.
Res judicata, ‘judged matter’ – An issue that has been ruled upon by a competent court may not be
pursued further by the same parties.