a. REPUBLIC v. CA, GR NO.

144057, 2005-01-17 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980,
thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land. Considering that the possession of the
Facts: subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest
which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt
that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens
Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a
system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated.
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her
right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
The administrator introduced improvements and planted trees and paid the corresponding taxes due
on the subject land. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration.

MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.

The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Issue:

Whether under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first
classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant's possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.

Ruling:

Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable.

The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12,
1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.
b. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. BANAL NA PAG-AARAL, PHIL., INC.,
G.R. No. 193305, January 27, 2021
FACTS:
Respondents claimed ownership of Lot Nos. 2304 and 2312 with an area of 57,989 square
meters situated in Cavite. They filed an Amended Application for registration of the subject land.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land subject of the application. Actual possession consists in the manifestation
of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.
Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b)
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.

Respondent claimed ownership and actual possession of the subject lot on the ground of its
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner long
before World War II, reckoned from the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, the Heirs of
Hermogenes Bayot (vendors), who executed an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale dated September 4, 1997 (document of sale) conveying the same in favor Republic v Banal.

Banal na Pag-aaral presented claims that the subject lot formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain. A certification from DENR, CENRO stating that the subject lot is not
covered by any public land application and approved Consolidated Plan CCn-04-000320-D in the
names of the vendors bearing the notation that the survey over the subject lot was done “inside”
alienable and disposable area.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent has possessed the subject lot for the length of time required by law and
proven a registrable title thereto.

RULING:

Section 14 (1)41 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,42 otherwise known as the "Property
Registration Decree," has three requisites for registration of title, viz.: (a) that the property in question
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The subject lot need not be alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier for the applicant
for registration to secure the judicial confirmation of its title. Registration under Section 14 (1) of PD
1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain since June 12, 1945, without regard as to whether the land was susceptible to private
ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to show that the land has already been declared
alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for registration, which
respondent was able to do.
c. CARLOS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164823 August 31, 2005
On December 19, 2001, petitioner Maria Carlos, represented by her daughter, Teresita Carlos
Victoria, filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land with an area
of 3,975 square meters located at Taguig covered by Plan Psu-244418.
Petitioner alleged, among others, that she is the owner of said parcel of land which she openly,
exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied since July 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide
claim of ownership; that there is no mortgage or encumbrance affecting said property, nor is it part of
any military or naval reservation; that the property is being used for industrial purposes; and that there
are no tenants or lessees on the property. Petitioner further claimed that she has been in possession
of the subject land in the concept of an owner; that her possession has been peaceful, public,
uninterrupted and continuous since 1948 or earlier; and tacking her possession with that of her
predecessors-in-interest, petitioner has been in possession of the land for more than 50 years.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction
["]and["], the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
It is clear in the case at bar that the applicant, Maria Carlos, no longer had possession of the property
at the time of the application for the issuance of a certificate of title.
Nonetheless, even if it were true that it was petitioner who had actual possession of the land at that
time, such possession was no longer in the concept of an owner.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to
petitioner’s application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It noted that:

In the instant case, the applicant at the time she filed her application for registration of title was no
longer in possession and occupation of the land in question since on October 16, 1996, the
applicant’s mother and predecessor-in-interest sold the subject land to Ususan Development
Corporation. This was admitted by witness Teresita Carlos Victoria x x x

Clearly, as early as 1996, possession and occupation of the land in question pertains not to the
applicant but to Ususan Development Corporation, thus it can be said that the applicant has no
registrable title over the land in question.11

Ruling:

We affirm the findings of the appellate court.

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner has met the first requirement but not the second.

The Court held in Republic vs. Alconaba13 that the applicant must show that he is in actual
possession of the property at the time of the application, thus:

d. REPUBLIC v. ASUNCION
G.R. No. 200772, February 17, 2021
The spouses Asuncion were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan. The parcel, which is
located on the banks of the Wawang Dapdap River, has an area of 273,819 square meters
On December 29, 1976, Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion (Paciencia) and her children5 filed an
application for original registration of title over nine parcels of land with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. They claimed fee simple ownership of the aforementioned lands by inheritance, accretion,
and open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under color of title for at least 30 years.
The application was opposed by petitioner represented by the Solicitor General, on the ground that
the lands covered by the application were unclassified forest lands within the public domain;
and by Juanita M. Enriquez, Antonio M. Enriquez, Vicente M. Enriquez, Ignacio M. Enriquez, Juan M.
Enriquez, Asuncion M. Enriquez, Jacinto C. Molina II, Juan C. Molina, Jr., and Josefina C. Molina
(collectively referred to as the Molina- Enriquez group), on the ground that certain parts of the lands
covered by the application belong to them and their predecessors-in-interest.
Issue:
These errors boil down to a single issue: can the parcels of land in question be registered in favor of
the Asuncions?
II.
As earlier mentioned, the Republic failed to submit any evidence whatsoever to support its allegation
that the disputed parcels are unclassified forest lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the
Asuncions submitted testimonies, photographs, and maps to prove that the disputed lands were
formed through accretion.
The foregoing maps show that the Wawang Dapdap River flows to the west, and then turns
southwest into Manila Bay. Both the mother property and the disputed lands are located on the north
bank of the river. The mother property is the easternmost parcel, and hence farthest from Manila Bay.
The disputed parcels lie southwest of the mother property, all located shoreward along the north bank
of the Wawang Dapdap River.
Based on their location relative to the mother property and the shoreline of Manila Bay, the disputed
lots can be divided into four groups:
Group 1, composed of Lot 1 of Psd-121255 (the portions allotted to the Asuncions under their
compromise agreement with the Molina-Enriquez group), Lot 1 of Psu-115616, and Lot 1 of Psu-
115369, which are bounded on the west southwest by the mother property;
Group 2, composed of Lot 2 of Psd-121255, Lot 2 of Psu-115616, and Lot 2 of Psu-115369, which
are located west southwest of and immediately adjacent to the Group 1 lots, with Lot 2 of Psu-115369
forming part of the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River;
Group 3, composed of Lot 3 of Psu-121255, Psu-115615 (2 lots), and a lot labelled in the Broad Map
as Lot 5478-B, which are which are located west southwest of and immediately adjacent to the Group
2 lots, with Psu-115615 forming part of the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River; and
Group 4, composed of Psu-118984 and Psu-118336, with Psu-118984 forming part of the north bank
and mouth of the Wawang Dapdap River, where it meets Manila Bay. Accordingly, the southwestern
boundary of Psu-118984 is Manila Bay itself.
Alluvial accretions are governed by paragraph (3), Article 457 of the Civil Code. That provision vests
ownership of the accretion gradually received by lands adjoining the banks of rivers in the owners of
such lands. Consequently, the riparian owner whose land receives the accretion does not need to
make an express act of possession, because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong
to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest. However, while the alluvium automatically becomes the property of the adjoining riparian
owner, it does not automatically become registered land, even if the land which received the accretion
is registered.Thus, such accretion may still be acquired through prescription by a third person if the
riparian owner fails to register the same within the period provided for by law.
From the principle of automatic ownership of alluvial accretion, it also follows that if the riparian
owner applies for registration of the accretion, they need not prove the alienable and disposable
status of the land, for it was never part of the public domain in the first place, being private, albeit
unregistered, land. However, in order to qualify under paragraph (3), the riparian owner must prove
the fact of alluvial accretion. Based on Article 457 of the Civil Code and as explained by
jurisprudence, alluvial accretion has three requisites: first, the accretion must be gradual and
imperceptible; second, the accretion must be made through the effects of the current of the
water; and third, the land where accretion takes place must be adjacent to a riverbank .
Article 457 of the Civil Code only contemplates accretions received by "banks of rivers". If the
alluvion, despite being carried by the flow of a river, be deposited (or as the Code puts it, "received")
along the seashore as the river merges into the sea, such alluvion cannot be considered an accretion
under the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the accretion formed shoreward, in the southwestern direction, along the course of
the Wawang Dapdap River as its mouth shifted in the same direction. Consequently, the only logical
conclusion is that the alluvion was carried by the action of the Wawang Dapdap River but the same
was deposited not only along its banks, but also on the seashore forming its mouth, as it exited into
Manila Bay. If the accretion were deposited on the bank of the mother property alone, the change in
the course of the Wawang Dapdap River would not have been the gradual southwest shift seen on
the maps submitted by the Asuncions, but a more abrupt turn southward or a branching out, since the
accretion on the banks of the mother property would have blocked or impeded its continued
southwesterly flow.

Conversely, if the accretion were attributable to the sea alone as claimed by the Solicitor General, the
Wawang Dapdap River should not have changed course, as the deposits would accumulate on the
shore alone (as in Heirs of Navarro), without significantly affecting the course of the river, considering
that the river makes its southwest turn immediately after passing Lot 1 of Psu-115369 (which was the
location of its mouth in 1938). However, the maps reveal that the river does not make an abrupt turn
or branch out below Lot 1 of Psu-115369; but instead continues gradually along a southwesterly
direction, indicating that the alluvion was being deposited on both the riverbank and the shore.

Consequently, the Asuncions can only claim the rights under Article 457 with respect to Psu-115369
and to Psu-115615, since these are the only lots which are adjacent to the north bank of the
Wawang Dapdap River as shown on the 1999 Broad Map and the survey plans.

Being located along the riverbank, these are the only areas which can be safely presumed to have
been formed through the accretion received by the banks of the mother property. Likewise, the other
parcels which are not located along the riverbank, or bordering the shoreline of Manila Bay, cannot be
registered, since the source of the accretion from these areas cannot be established with certainty;
and in accordance with Article 4 of the 1866 Law on Waters,113 the Constitution, and our earlier
findings, these must be presumed to be part of the public domain, either as foreshore lands or
unclassified lands.