CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
immovables. Therefore, the condition of the property as movables or
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
PROPERTY, RIGHT TO PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP
A. Property – is an economic concept (mass of things or objects
useful to human activity) and necessary to life.
B. Right to Property – is the juridical tie by virtue of which a person
has the exclusive power to receive or obtain all the benefits from a
thing, except those prohibited or restricted by law or by the rights
of others.
C. Ownership – is the mass of rights over a thing.
Note: The distinction between right to property (vinculum between a
man and the thing) and ownership (mass of rights over the thing) is
more historical than actual.
CONCEPT OF THINGS AND PROPERTY
A. Things – are all objects that exist, and can be of some use to man.
This include both objects which are already owned or possessed
and those susceptible of appropriation. This is more generic and
extensive.
B. Property – are all those that are already appropriated or are in
the possession of man.
Note: The two terms are used interchangeably in the Civil Code.
However, thing is broader in scope because it includes both appropriable
and non-appropriable objects.
REQUISITES
To be juridically considered as a thing or property, an object must have
the following requisites:
1. Utility – capacity to satisfy human wants (e.g. food, clothing)
2. Individuality – quality of having a separate and autonomous
existence. (e.g. diamond stone and a ring, human body parts)
3. Appropriability – susceptibility of being possessed by man;
equivalent to occupation, which is the willful apprehension of a
corporeal object which has no owner, with intent to acquire its
ownership.
Important: Things which, as a whole mass, are not susceptible
of appropriation, e.g. sun, stars, the core of the earth, the sea,
and other called common things, are not things or property in the
juridical concept.
TWO KINDS OF PROPERTY
All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are either:
1. Immovable or real property
2. Movable or personal property (Art. 414)
Note: The basis of classification is on nature of the thing itself, that is
mobility or immobility.
Important: The classification is the most important in the law of
property because different provisions of the law govern the acquisition,
possession, disposition, loss and registration of movables and
1|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
immovables have various legal consequences.
Differences in regime between movable and immovables
A. Solemnity is greater in acts relative to immovable, e.g. donations
B. Adverse possession is longer for immovable
C. Publicity and recording are more important for immovable re:
double sale, mortgage of properties
D. Capacity to alienate, greater capacity is usually required for
immovable
E. Venue is usually determined by the location of the immovable
IMMOVABLEAND MOVABALE PROPERTY
IMMOVALE PROPERTY
Relevant provision: Art. 415 (Chapter 1)
Immovable property, defined
Those enumerated in Article 415 (things that are permanently or
intended to be permanently attached to another thing and cannot be
transferred without injury or damage to the immovable to which they
are attached)
CLASSES OF IMMOVABLES
1. Immovable by nature – Cannot be carried from place to place,
like lands, roads, and trees (pars. 1 and 2, Art. 415)
2. Immovable by incorporation – Attached to an immovable in a
fixed manner to be an integral part thereof e.g. buildings, walls,
fences, trees, statues, animal houses (pars. 1,2,3,4,6)
3. Immovable by destination – Placed in an immovable for the
utility it gives to the activity carried thereon, such as machinery
installed in a building to meet the needs of an industry in the
building and docks on a river (pars. 4,5,6,7,9)
4. Immovable by analogy or by law – So classified by express
provision of the law because it is regarded as united to the
immovable property.
LIST OF IMMOVABLES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil.
Separate treatment by the parties of building from the land on
which it stands does not change the immovable character of
the building.
Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery
While the building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning
machinery was installed by the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" was real
property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed
its character as real property.
Neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the
instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the
machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in that registry of the
sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the
building was concerned.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Note:
In this case, a third party assailed the validity of the deed of chattel
mortgage, not one of the parties to the contract. (This is important
because as will be discussed later, the parties to the contract may validly
stipulate to treat a real property as personal or vice-versa. Third parties,
however, are not affected by such stipulation)
Antonio Punzalan v. Lacsamana
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of a land situated in Tarlac which he mortgaged
to PNB in 1963. This property was foreclosed. While the land was still in
possession of the petitioner, he was allowed by PNB to construct a
warehouse. In 1978, deed of sale was executed between PNB and herein
respondent Lacsamana.
Petitioner filed a suit impugning the validity of the sale of the building in
the CFI of Rizal. Respondent PNB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue because the suit involves a real property.
Ruling:
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or
real property as provided in Article 415 (1) of the Civil Code. Buildings
are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately
from the land on which it stood is immovable property and the mere fact
that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and
apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character
as immovable property.
Buildings on rented land
There are authorities that buildings or constructions placed on land by
lessee do not become immovable, where agreement gives the lessee
the right to remove the building and improvements.
Building or house sold to be demolished immediately
French court held the sale to be involving movable property.
Duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial
Standard Oil v. Jaranillo
Facts:
Gervaci de la Rosa, a lessee of certain land in Manila and the owner of
a house built on that land, executed in favor of Standard Oil, a chattel
mortgage on both the leasehold interest and the building that stands
thereon. Petitioner then went to the Register of Deeds of Manila to have
the same recorded in the book of chattel mortgages. RD refused on the
ground that the properties were not personal properties within the
meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Petition for mandamus was filed.
Issue:
Whether the RD was correct in refusing registration of the property in
the Chattel Mortgage Registry.
Ruling:
No. The duties of a Register of Deeds in respect to the registration of
chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial character. He has no power
to determine whether or not the property is real or personal. In refusing
the registration of a chattel mortgage on the ground that the property
is not a personal property, the RD is engaging in the interpretation of
the law, which is the exclusive province of the courts.
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached
to the land or form an integral part of an immovable.
Note: Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered fruits have the
nature of personal property.
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(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in
such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
Notes:
 “Rex Vinta” (Roman law)
 Otherwise known as “Immovable by Incorporation”
 Under this kind, ownership of the thing is attached, whether it is
the owner who placed it there or not, is immaterial.
The construction must be attached permanently to the land.
Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric
The 40 steel towers are removable and are merely attached to a square
metal frame by means of bolts. They are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the
material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are
attached. As such, they are not subject to real estate tax.
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or
ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of
the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to
attach them permanently to the tenements.
The objects must be placed by the owner of the immovable or
by his agent.
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo
A. Objects become immobilized only when placed in the tenement by
the owner of the tenement.
B. When placed by a mere holder, e.g. tenant, usufructuary, or one
with a temporary right over the immovable, objects do not become
immovable property, unless the person acts as agent of the owner.
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works.
Note:
These are known as “Real Properties by Destination”
Immovable by destination depends upon their being destined
for use in the industry or work in the tenement.
Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng
Additional machinery installed by the owner of a sugar central to
improve milling capacity is realty.
Ago v. Court of Appeals
By the installation of the sawmill machineries in the building of the
sawmill company, for the use of sawing of logs carried on in said
building, the same became a necessary and permanent party of the
building or real estate on which the same was constructed, converting
the said machineries and equipment into real estate, within the meaning
of the Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. City of New York
A power company brought an action to review property tax assessment.
On the city’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held
that the barges on which were mounted gas turbine power plants
designated to generate electrical power, the fuel oil barges which
supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the accessory equipment
mounted on the barges, were subject to real property taxation.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and
structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and
object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast” are considered
immovable property.
Thus, the power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements
intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on
in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of said industry or work.
The machinery, etc. must be placed by the owner of the
immovable or by his agent.
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo
Machinery which is movable in nature, only becomes immobilized when
placed on a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when
placed by a tenant.
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff
Machinery, though in fact bolted to the ground, remains movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant, where its owner
is not the owner of the land and/or building on which it was placed.
[NOTE: OTHER ITEMS UNDER ARTICLE 415 NOT DISCUSSED]
XXXXX
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
The parties to a contract may, by agreement, treat as personal
property that which by nature would be real property, subject
to the following principles:
A. Such treatment is good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. It does not apply to third parties.
B. The parties, after agreeing to such treatment, are then
estopped from claiming otherwise.
Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance
Facts:
Serj Products and PCI Leasing entered into a lease agreement providing
that the machines in question were to be considered as personal
property, although they were essential and principal elements in the
chocolate-making business of SPI. PCI then filed a complaint against SPI
for sum of money with an application of a writ of replevin (an action to
recover a personal property). SPI contended that the machines were
real property having become immobilized by destination.
Issue:
Whether parties to a contract can validly stipulate to treat a real property
as personal or vice-versa.
Ruling:
Yes. The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the
truth of any material fact found therein.
It should be stressed, however, that said treatment is good only insofar
as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are
bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not
affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as
personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party
would be adversely affected.
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Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above
Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the
contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby,
there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its
nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may
not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so
agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
Classification made under Article 415 of the Civil Code is used
as basis to determine whether there is liability to realty tax
Mindanao Bus Company v. City Assessor
No realty tax is due on machineries of a transportation company, such
as welder, boring machine, lathe machine, etc. sitting on a cement or
wooden platform, because they are not absolutely essential to its
transportation business which is not carried on in a building or specified
land.
Cases where the Civil Code was not applied for purposes of
determining liability to real property tax
Caltex v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
Facts:
The machinery and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas stations on
leased lands were subjected to realty tax. The machines included
elevated tanks, underground tanks, water pumps, air compressors, etc
– all of which are used in the pursuance of the gasoline service station.
These machines were loaned to various gas stations operators by Caltex
under a lease agreement. The city assessor of Pasay city characterized
the said machines as taxable realty.
Issue:
Whether the machines are real property subject to realty tax.
Ruling:
Yes, they are considered as real property for they are necessary to the
operation of the gas station because without them, the gas stations
would be useless. Further, hey have been attached permanently to the
gas station site. Hence they are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax
Code.
Manila Electric Company v. CBAA
Facts:
Sought to be taxed are two storage tanks installed by MERALCO on a
lot it leased (from Caltex). MERALCO contends that tanks are not real
property under Article 415 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Used in resolving the issue is the Assessment Law and the Real Property
Code: “while two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they are
considered improvements that enhance utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

MOVABLE PROPERTY
Relevant provisions: Arts. 416-418 (Chapter 2)
General test of movable character
1. Whether it can be carried from place to place
2. Whether the change of location can be affected without injury to
an immovable to which the object may be attached
3. Whether the object is not included in any of the ten paragraphs of
Article 415
LIST OF MOVABLES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not
included in the preceding article.
(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is
considered as personal property.
Example: Act No. 1508 recognizes that growing crops are personal
property and may be the object of chattel mortgage.
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by
science.
Example: Electricity, gas, oxygen, light, rays
Laurel v. Abrogar
Facts:
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly
taking, stealing, and using PLDT’s international long distance calls by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) – a method of outing and
completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined.
PLDT alleges that:
1. International calls and the business of providing telecommunication
or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
2. Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil
Code’s definition of real and personal property. The enumeration
of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such
that all those not included therein are personal properties. Since
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words “personal
property” without qualification, it follows that all “personal
properties” as understood in the context of the Civil Code, may be
the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Ruling:
Article 308 of the RPC provides that theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.
The term “personal property” as used in the RPC should be interpreted
in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal property.
Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal
or incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft, so
long as the same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties
under the Civil Code.
Furthermore, the Civil Code deems “Forces of Nature” which are brought
under the control of science, as personal property. The appropriation of
forces of nature which are brought under control by science can be
achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or
measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such forces of
nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain
such forces of nature. In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR
operations by illegally connecting various equipment or apparatus to
PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able to resell or
re-route international long distance calls using PLDT’s facilities
constitute Subtraction.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal property which can be the object of theft under Art.
308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of “subtraction”
penalized under the said article.
Caveat: However, while international long-distance calls take the form
of electrical energy and may be considered as personal property, the
said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have
acquired ownership over such calls.
PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not
validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities
without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the
telephone services and businesses.
U.S. v. Carlos
It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by
electricians as a fluid, but its manifestations and effects, like those of
gas, may be seen and felt. The true test of what is a proper subject of
larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal,
but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought
and sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by
another.
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place
to place without impairment of the real property to which they
are fixed.
(5) Obligations and actions which have for their object
movables or demandable sums.
(7) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial
entities, although they may have real estate.
CONSUMABLE AND NON-CONSUMABLE
A movable property is either consumable or non-consumable. The basis
of the classification s the very nature of the corporeal object itself.
A. Consumable – movables which cannot be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without being consumed. (e.g. food,
money)
B. Non-consumable - movables which can be used in a manner
appropriate to their nature without being consumed. (e.g. table)

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

FUNGIBLE V. NON FUNGIBLE PROPERTIES OF SIMILAR CHARACTER

The basis of the classification is simply the intention of the parties. 1. Public streams, river channels, creeks, river beds
2. Accretions to the shores of the sea by action of the water
A. Fungible – capable of being substituted by others of the same 3. Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them
kind if intended by the parties. (e.g. 10 heads of cattle, 100 copies 4. Lands that disappeared into the sea by natural erosion due to the
of a newspaper of a given date) ebb and flow of the tide
5. Canals constructed on private lands
B. Non-fungibles – those which have their own individuality and do 6. Foreshore lands when the sea moved toward and estate and the
not admit of substitution, if intended by the parties. (e.g. 10 bottles tide invaded it
of wine in my room) 7. Lot on which stairways were built for the use of people as
passageway to the highway
PROPERTY IN RELATION TO WHOM IT BELONGS
Land formed by the action of the sea through accretion
Relevant provisions: Arts. 419-425 (Chapter 3)
Ignacio v. Director of Lands
PROPERTY ACCORDING TO OWNERSHIP
Facts:
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of
A. Public dominion – property which pertain to the State or its
a parcel of land (mangrove). Later, he amended his application by
political subdivisions; held by them in their public or sovereign
alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of
capacity and intended for public use and not for proprietary
accretion, citing Art. 457 of the Civil Code. 1 The Director of Lands
purposes. (See Art. 420)
opposed, claiming that the subject land is a property of public domain.
Important:
Ruling:
The article cited is inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits
a) Public dominion does not carry the idea of ownership. It is not
on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was
owned by the State, but simply under its jurisdiction and
caused by action of the Manila Bay.
administration for everyone’s enjoyment. It pertains to the
State, which as territorial sovereign exercises certain juridical
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government,
prerogatives over such property.
through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that
the land in question is no longer needed for public us, they continue to
b) The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person,
be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
but the citizens. It is intended for the common and public
ownership.
welfare.
Foreshore Lands
B. Private ownership– property owned by:
1. The State in its private capacity (patrimonial property)
Chavez v. PEA
2. Private persons, either individually or collectively
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public
PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION domain, waters xxx and other natural resources" and consequently
"owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall
KINDS OF PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION
not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the
public domain.
1. Property intended for public use.
(e.g. roads, canals, rivers, ports and bridges constructed by the
The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these
State, banks, shores, and others of similar character. – can be
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable
used by everyone)
lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or
MIAA v. CA
disposable and open to disposition or concession.
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned
in Article 420 are owned by the State. The term “ports” include
Creeks
seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings
constitute “port” constructed by the State. As such, they are
Maneclang v. IAC
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State.
A creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to
2. Property not intended for public use but intended for
the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and
some specific public service.
acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be registered
(e.g. government buildings and vehicles – can be used only by
under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
duly authorized persons)
Neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
3. Property not for public use or public service but intended
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and
for the development of the national wealth.
out of the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or
(e.g. minerals, coals, forest and other natural resources)
change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain.

1
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
The Compromise Agreement is null and void and of no legal effect, the
same being contrary to law and public policy.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
A. Outside the commerce of man
B. Cannot be acquired by prescription
C. Cannot be registered
D. Cannot be subject to attachment and execution
E. Cannot be burdened with easements
A. Outside the commerce of man – cannot be alienated or
leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts.
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas
Plaza Soledad, being a promenade for public use, the municipal council
of Cavite could not withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof
in order to lease it for the sole benefit of a private individual. In leasing
a portion of said plaza or public place for private use, the plaintiff
municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by
executing a contract over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it
empowered so to do.
Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozoprubio
There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for
the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town plazas are properties of public dominion. They are beyond the
commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking. This is elementary.
Laurel v. Garcia
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly
spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement
and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the
Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the
respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to
the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens;
it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation.
B. Cannot be acquired by prescription against the State
regardless of the duration of the possession
DENR v. Mayor Yap
Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land,
no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. RP
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code.
6|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
It is only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
Exception: Equitable Estoppel
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of public domain
is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by laches or estoppel.
Estate of Yujuico v. RP
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in
this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and
the government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an
unreasonable length of time.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in
1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed before the action for
reversion was filed, then said action is now barred by laches.
Republic v. CA
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where the title of an innocent purchaser
for value who relied on the clean certificates of the title was sought to
be cancelled and the excess land to be reverted to the Government, we
ruled that [i]t is only fair and reasonable to apply the equitable principle
of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to
innocent purchasers for value.
Republic v. Umali
Where, in a reversion case, even if the original grantee of a patent and
title has obtained the same through fraud, reversion will no longer
prosper as the land had become private land and the fraudulent
acquisition cannot affect the titles of innocent purchasers for value.
C. Cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and
be subject of a Torrens title
LBP v. RP
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable.
It is well-settled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property
of public domain classified as forest or timber or mineral land.
D. Not subject to attachment and execution
Vda. De Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for
governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at public auction
to satisfy a judgment against the municipality.
The auto trucks used by a municipality in sprinkling its streets, its police
patrol automobile, police stations, and public markets, together with the
land on which they stand, are thus exempt from execution.
Philippine Fisheries Dev’t Authority v. CA
The real property tax assessments issued by the City of Iloilo should be
upheld only with respect to the portions leased to private persons. In
case the Authority fails to pay the real property taxes due thereon, said
portions cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority it was held that reclaimed lands
are lands of the public domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat,
be subject of a sale, public or private, thus:
The salient provisions of CA No. 141 on government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain are as follows:
Section 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified
as follows:
a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling
or other means
b) Foreshore
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers
d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes
MIAA v. CA
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the
“principal airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic
air traffic,” are properties of public dominion because they are intended
for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong
to the State or the Republic of the Philippines. As such, they cannot be
the subject of an auction sale.
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego
Funds pertaining to government instrumentalities are exempt from
attachment, garnishment and execution.
Professional Video Inc. v. TESDA
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with
PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds
are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ
of garnishment or attachment.
Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriation Act. Hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the
Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its
departments, in the hands of public officials.
Exception: If appropriation ordinance has already been enacted
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego
As a rule, all government funds deposited with the Philippine National
Bank by any agency of instrumentality of the government, whether by
way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may
not be subject to garnishment or levy. But inasmuch as an ordinance
has already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of
P613,096.00 of payment, then the herein case is covered by the
exception to the general rule.
PNB v. Pabalan
Public funds of government-owned corporations are not exempt from
execution.
E. Cannot be burdened with easements
Villarico v. Sarmiento
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a
property of public dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary
easement of right of way in favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by
the public is by mere tolerance of the government through the DPWH.
Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself.
PROPERTY OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
A. Property owned by the State in its private or proprietary capacity
B. Property not intended for public use, or for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth
C. Property which the State has the same rights, and of which it
may dispose, to the same extent as private individual
Examples:
1. Incomes or rents of the State
2. Property acquired in execution and tax sales
3. Property donated to the government
4. Cemeteries
7|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Characteristics
A. May be acquired by private individuals or juridical persons
through prescription
B. May be the object of an ordinary contract
Conversion of public dominion to patrimonial property
A. Property of the National Government
There must be a formal declaration by the executive or legislative
department of the Government that the property is no longer
needed for public use or public service.
Note: All lands of the public domain belong to the State and lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.
Laurel v. Garcia
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time
for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.
Abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422
of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be inferred
from the non-use alone especially if the non-use was attributable
not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to
a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property.
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct
legal premises.
B. Property of political subdivisions
The conversion must be authorized by law.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles
Under its Charter (RA 3857), the City of Cebu is empowered to
close a city road or street. Since the portion of the city street
subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion
becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
Makasiano v. Diokno
The legal provision (Chapter II, Section 10 of the LGC) which gives
authority to local government units to close roads and other similar
public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law. These basic principles
have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424
NCC lays down the basic principle that properties of public
dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in
general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed
of or leased by the local government unit to private persons.
PRIVATE PROPERTY
Property belong to private persons, either individually or collectively.
XXXXX
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
Subdivision roads before its donation to the LGU, is still
private in character, even if used by the general public.
Woodridge School v. ARB Construction
The road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the
local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or
expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road. Otherwise, they
remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
The use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it
of its private character. The road is not converted into public property
by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage
through it. To repeat, the local government should first acquire them by
donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public
road.
When alienable lands of public domain become private or
patrimonial lands.
Chavez v. PEA
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with
Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands
of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands.
The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public
lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands.
Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can
declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the
hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This
will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government
agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly
public lands.
To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person
or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public
domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a
private corporation. This is because PEA is tasked to hold and dispose
of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is transferred
to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property.
On the other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to
dispose of public lands. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by
law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands.
The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically
converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to
Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted
to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to
transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of
public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes
and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
Warehouse located within a port is not a property of public
dominion.
Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo
Concededly, "ports constructed by the State" are properties of the public
dominion, as Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates these as
properties "intended for public use." It must be stressed however that
what is being taxed in the present case is petitioner’s warehouse, which,
although located within the port, is distinct from the port itself.
8|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
The function of administering and disposing of lands of the
public domain is entrusted to executive officials.
Republic v. Mendoza (Silot Bay)
It should be stressed that the function of administering and disposing of
lands of the public domain in the manner prescribed by law is not
entrusted to the courts but to executive officials. And as such, courts
should refrain from looking into the underlying reasons or grounds which
impelled the classification and declaration of Silot Bay as timberland and
its subsequent release as alienable and disposable land.
From the facts of the case, it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry
released Silot Bay as alienable and disposable by virtue of the
Memorandum issued by then President Marcos on 16 January 1967
which clearly empowered said bureau to identify and locate the 700,000
hectares of fishpond areas and to release said areas as alienable and
disposable.
Hence, the courts, in view of the clear legal directive by which said area
was released as alienable and disposable, will refrain from questioning
the wisdom of such classification or declaration.
Requirements for registration of title.
Republic v. Cortez
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48
(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073.
Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish:
1. That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain.
2. That the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same.
3. That it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey plan prepared by a
Geodetic Engineer and certified by the Lands Management Bureau of
the DENR. The said survey plan contained the following annotation:
“This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified
as alienable & disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on
Jan. 3, 1968.:
However, Cortez’ reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan
is amiss; it does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome
the presumption that the subject property remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
In RP v. Tri-Plus Corporation, the Court clarified that, the applicant must
at the very least submit a certification from the proper government
agency stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for
registration is indeed alienable and disposable.
Republic v. Vda. de Jason
This doctrine unavoidably means that the mere certification issued by
the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application for
registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the
original classification of the land as alienable and disposable as approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

Town plazas may be occupied temporarily by private RIGHTS OF AN OWNER

individuals in case of war or during an emergency.
1. Right to enjoy
Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio
a. Right to possess
While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be
b. Right to use
occupied temporarily by private individuals, as was done and as was
c. Right to the fruits
tolerated by the Municipality of Pozoruubio, when the emergency has
ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town
2. Right to dispose
officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open
a. Right to consume
to the public and free from encumbrances or illegal private
b. Right to destroy or abuse
constructions.
c. Right to encumber or alienate
Rule when properties belonging to a former province are
3. Right to recover or vindicate
transferred under a law free of charge in favor of a city.
Actions to recover:
Province of Zamboanga v. City of Zamboanga
a. For personal property – Replevin
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots
b. For real property:
and buildings thereon in question. For the matter involved here is the
 Forcible entry
extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal
 Unlawful detainer
corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple:
 Accion Publiciana
 Accion Reinvindicatoria
A. If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has
Rights under Roman law
absolute control over it.
1. Jus possidendi – right to possess
2. Jus utendi- right to use
B. If the property is owned by the municipality in its private or
3. Jus fruendi- right to the fruits (natural, industrial, and civil)
proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
4. Jus abutendi- right to consume
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without
5. Jus disponendi- right to dispose
due process and payment of just compensation.2
6. Jus vindicandi- right to recover

OWNERSHIP
ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO RECOVER PROPERTY
OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
Note: The form of actions available to the owner to judicially recover
Relevant provisions: Arts. 427-439
his property depends on whether the property is real or personal, and
whether the purpose of the action is merely to recover possession or
OWNERSHIP, DEFINED
ownership, or both.
A. The independent and general power of a person over a thing for
PERSONAL PROPERTY
purposes recognized by law and within the limits established
thereby.
1. Replevin – action or provisional remedy where the complainant
prays for the recovery of possession of the personal property.
B. A relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in everything not
Important: Wrongful detention by the defendant of the property
prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the rights of
sought in the action must be satisfactorily established.
another.
Not applicable to:
KINDS OF OWNERSHIP
A. Movables distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to the law
1. Beneficial ownership – recognized by law and capable of being
B. Those under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment
enforced in court; right to its enjoyment in one person where the
C. Those under custodia legis
legal title is in another.
REAL PROPERTY
2. Legal ownership
1. Forcible Entry
3. Naked ownership – enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges
of ownership as against the bare title to property.
Summary action to recover material or physical possession of real
property when a person originally in possession was deprived
thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth (FISTS).

A. Where to file – MTC

B. Prescription

2
Note: The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
— State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold detriment of the local community.
that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary
private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied

9|U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
 When through FIT (force, intimidation, threat) – 1 year
from dispossession
 When through SS (Stealth, strategy) – 1 year from
discovery.
C. Issues involved – Material or physical possession of real
property (possession de facto)
2. Unlawful Detainer
Summary action to recover material or physical possession of real
property when a person against whom the possession of any land
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
A. Where to file – MTC
B. Prescription – 1 year from the time possession became
unlawful or date of last demand to vacate.
C. Issues involved – Material or physical possession of real
property (possession de facto)
Important: In both, the only issue is physical or material
possession. Ownership is not an issue, however, it may be decided
provisionally to determine issues on priority of possession.
Villa v. Heirs of Altavas
As to respondents’ ownership and right of possession of the subject
properties, records show that the MCTC based its decision not only
on the Position paper of respondents but also on the pieces of
evidence submitted by them. Respondents attached, as annexes to
their complaint, the original certificates of Title in the name of
Enrique, covering the subject lots, as evidence of their ownership
and right to possess the disputed properties.
Moreover, being a mere lessee, petitioner steps into the shoes of
her lessor, Virginia. However, Virginia’s claim of ownership was not
sustained by the MCTC which instead found that she was not the
owner of and had no right to possess the disputed property or to
transfer possession of the same, through lease, in favour of
another person. Virginia later withdrew her appeal filed with the
RTC. By reason of such withdrawal, she is bound by the findings of
the MCTC.
Estate of Manantan v. Somera
It appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the
respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at
the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot
family.
It was only after the conduct of a relocation survey, which
supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the
subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of
ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent.
Clearly respondent’s possession of the disputed portion was not
pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and
resultantly, respondent’s right of possession over the disputed
portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point can
it be said that respondent’s possession of the disputed portion
ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the
property from Manantan.
10 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
3. Accion Publiciana
Ordinary civil proceeding to recover the better right of possession
of realty independently of title. The issue is possession de jure. This
is also used to refer to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration
of one year from the occurrence of the cause of action or year from
the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
A. Where to file
a) Assessed value P20,000 and below – MTC
b) Assessed value is more than P20,000 – RTC
B. Prescription – 10 years
C. Issues involved – Juridical or civil possession (possession de
jure)
4. Accion Reinvindicatoria
An action to recover possession based on ownership. He, the issue
involved is ownership which ordinarily includes possession. Thus,
the delivery of the possession of a parcel of land should be included
in the decision adjudicating ownership.
A. Where to file – RTC where the real property is situated.
B. Prescription – 10 years
C. Issues involved – Ownership
XXXXX
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
An Accion Reinvindicatoria can be filed even if the plaintiff is in
actual possession of the property
Iglesio ni Cristo v. Hon. Ponferrada
Facts:
In October 2001, respondents Enrique Santos et.al filed a complaint for
quieting of title and/or accion reivindincatoria against petitioner Iglesia
ni Cristo. They alleged that they are owners of a parcel of land which
they inherited from Enrique Sr.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that the action has
prescribed. Petitioner avers that the action of respondents is one to quiet
title and/or accion reinvindicatoria, and that respondents asserted
ownership over the property and sought the recovery of possession of
the subject parcel of land. It insists that the very nature of the action
presupposes that respondents had not been in actual and material
possession of the property, and that it was petitioner which had been in
possession of the property since 1984 when it acquired title thereon.
As such, according to petitioner, the action of respondent prescribed in
10 years from 1984 when petitioner allegedly dispossessed respondents,
in accordance with Article 555 (4) of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
Petitioner’s claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the
property since 1984 when a TCT was issued in its favor is belied by the
allegations in the complaint that respondents had been in actual and
material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time they filed
their complaint on October 24, 2001.
Accion reinvindicatoria as a remedy, is not limited to recovery
of possession, but includes all other aspects of ownership, i.e.
right to use, fruits, etc.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory
action against petitioner. An accion reinvindicatoria does not necessarily
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
presuppose that the actual and material possession of the property is
on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession
from defendant.
It bears stressing that an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the
recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus utendi, and jus
fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over
a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. Thus, the
owner of real property in actual and material possession thereof may
file an accion reinvindicatoria against another seeking ownership over a
parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants
from the possession thereof.
In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action
claiming ownership over the property and the cancellation of the TCT
under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought to enforce their jus
utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and
prevented them from fencing the property.
The prescriptive period does not run when one who files a
reinvindicatory action is in actual possession of the property
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property
when they filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001,
the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even
commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure a TCT over the
property in 1984.
The reason for this is that: one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him
a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.
REQUISITES IN AN ACTION TO REOVER
In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the
defendant’s claim. (Art. 434)
1. Identity of property
Notes:
a. When there is a conflict between the area and the boundaries
of a land, the latter prevails. (Contrera v. Director of Lands)
b. An area delimited by boundaries properly identifies the land.
2. Plaintiff shall rely on his title’s strength
Notes:
a. Presumption of sufficient title.
b. Evidence to prove ownership:
 Torrens title
 Patent duly registered in the Registry of Property
 Titles from the Spanish Government
 Payment of land tax coupled with actual possession
11 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP
1. Limitations imposed for the benefit of the State
a. Police power (‘General Welfare Clause’, Sec. 16 RA7160)
b. Eminent domain
c. Taxation
2. Limitations imposed by law
a. Legal easement of waters (e.g. Art. 637)
b. Legal easement of right of way (e.g. Art. 649)
3. Limitations by the co-owner
e.g. lease or pledge
4. Limitations imposed by the grantor
e.g. Donor may prohibit partition (Art. 1083)
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA
Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of
donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy.
The condition imposed in the deed of donation in the case
constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue restriction on the
right of the donee to dispose of the property donated, which right
is an indispensable attribute of ownership. Such a prohibition
against alienation, in order to be valid, must not be perpetual or
for an unreasonable period of time.
Cases involving Property Rights v. Inherent Powers of the State
Police Power.
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
Ordinance requiring private cemeteries to set aside 6% of their total
area for charity burial grounds of the city’s paupers invalid. It is not mere
police power measure, but an outright confiscation without due process
of law.
City of Manila v. Laguio
The ordinance banning the establishment of motels in the Malate area
is an invalid exercise of police power.
Office of the Sol Gen v. Ayala Land
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police
power to justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials, of privately owned parking
facilities, including the collection by the owners/operators of such
facilities of parking fees from the public for the use thereof. The Court
finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of police power.
Eminent Domain.
Former Rule:
Air Transportation Officer v. Gopuco
The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title
acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a
municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property
under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is
expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former
owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned
the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Current Rule:
MIAA v. Lozada
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of
private property, consequent to the Government’s exercise of its power
of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the property
be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if
they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the
return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case,
the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become improper for
lack of the required factual justification.
DOCTRINE OF SELF HELP
Relevant provision: Art. 429
CONCEPT
A. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.
B. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
Important: This is a qualification to the rule that a person should not
take the law in his own hands. Here, it is lawful to repel force by force.
Actual invasion of property may consist of a mere disturbance
of possession, or a real dispossession.
A. If mere disturbance of possession – force may be used against it
at any time as long as it continues, even beyond the prescriptive
period for an action of forcible entry (e.g. if a ditch is opened by
Pedro in the land of Juan, Juan may close it or cover it by force any
time)
B. If invasion consists of real dispossession – force to regain
possession can be used only immediately after the dispossession.
In other words, once the usurper’s possession has become firm by
the lapse of time, the lawful possessor must resort to the
competent authority to recover his property.
Who may use force
The right to use force to defend property is given only to the immediate
possessor.
Nature of Aggression
A. There must be a real aggression, an imminent violation of law.
Preventive force to forestall aggression is not authorized.
B. The aggression must be illicit or unlawful. Thus, it cannot be
exercised against the lawful exercise of the function of a public
official, such as a sheriff attaching property.
Self-help may only be exercised at the time of an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion of property.
German Management & Services, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Private respondents, claiming to be mountainside farmers and members
of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association, alleged that petitioner
deprived them of their property without due process of law by:
12 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
1. Forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice;
2. Bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation,
in violation of PD 1038 and
3. Trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation
of PD Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.
Ruling:
It is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof.
There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of
the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable
possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn
and fruit bearing trees 12-15 years prior to petitioner's act of destroying
their crops.
The lower courts have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis
of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil
Code. Such justification however is unavailing because the doctrine of
self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the
Civil Code which states, "In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto.
He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the
holder should refuse to deliver the things.
ACTS IN A STATE OF NECESSITY
Relevant provision: Art. 432
CONCEPT
A. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of
another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an
imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater.
B. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for
the damage to him.
Elements:
1. The interference must be necessary to avert an imminent danger
2. The imminent danger or threatening damage must be much
greater compared to the damage arising to the owner from the
interference.
Note: The owner may demand indemnity from the person benefited (this
right exists only when another’s property is damaged by an act in a state
of necessity).
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner go without
encroaching on each other’s rights? Where is the dividing line between
the surface and the sub-surface rights?
Relevant provision: Art. 437
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the
SURFACE RIGHTS
land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification
The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
completely agricultural.
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without
detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
Republic (Director of Forest Development) v. De La Rosa
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be
half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical;
Note: Is an ancient maxim of the common law that land, in its legal
the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
signification, extends from the surface downwards to the center of the
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
earth and upwards indefinitely to the skies, so whatever is in a direct
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
line between the surface of any land and the center of the earth belongs
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected.
to the owner of the surface.

EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP HIDDEN TREASURE

Relevant provisions: Arts. 438-439

A. Horizontally, ownership extends up to the boundaries.
Concept of Hidden Treasure
B. Vertically, extends below the surface and above it to the extent
required by the economic interest or utility to the owner, in relation
A. Consist of money, jewels, or precious objects (movables only –
to the exploitation that may be made of the property. ( e.g. land
Tolentino e.g. prehistoric tomb excluded except the movables
traversed by power lines)
found therein), and
LIMITATIONS
B. They are hidden and unknown, such that their finding is a real
1. Servitudes or easements
discovery. (Owner unknown, e.g. only if the thing has been
2. Special Laws
considered lost and the owner has already abandoned it)
3. Ordinances
4. Reasonable requirements of aerial navigation
Who are “strangers”?
5. Principles of human relations (Article 19 of the New Civil Code)
Anyone who has absolutely no right over the immovable or the thing
in which the treasure is found but includes also lessee, usufructuary,
Regalian doctrine
or a paid laborer working for the owner of the land, provided he has
The term “special laws” is all embracing. It includes the Constitution
not been engaged precisely to look for hidden treasure.
which adopts the regalian doctrine that all minerals and other natural
resources found either in public or private lands are owned by the State.
Finder entitled to share
A finder is entitled to one-half (1/2), provided:
National Power Corporation v. Lucman Ibrahim et.al.
Facts: 1. Finding is by chance (not purposely sought).
The Court of Appeals ruled that there is “no conflict of interest” between
the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface Note: See however: Opinion of Jurado where finding by chance
rights. It classified the land as mineral underneath and agricultural on may also include cases “by a stroke of good fortune”.
the surface, subject to separate claims of title.
Important: A finder ordered by the landowner to search is not
Ruling: entitled.
The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also
to everything underneath and the airspace above it. The rights are 2. Finder is not a co-owner of the property where it is found.
indivisible, and consequently, require a definitive and categorical
classification. 3. Finder not a trespasser

This doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeals is rather strange for it 4. Finder not an agent of the landowner
is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not
only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace 5. Finder not married under the absolute community or conjugal
above it up to a reasonable height. partnership, otherwise his share belongs to the community.3

Classifying the land as mineral underneath and agricultural on the

surface is difficult to understand, especially in its practical application. XXXXX

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be
planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with
the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroy the crops above.

3
Article 117 (4), Family Code: The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law
awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found formed part of
conjugal partnership properties.

13 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
Knights of Rizal v. DCMI Homes, Inc
Facts:
DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Condominium, after it was
issued Building permit by the City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a
49-storey with Basement & 2 penthouse Level Residential Condominium.
However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining
the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building
Permit of DMC citing among others, that “the Torre de Manila
Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will
rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf
the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly
ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard
vantage point.
Ruling:
While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned property
that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National
Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-
beyond” the Rizal Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena
I. Diokno.62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been
designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark
or even a national treasure.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining
the background sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part
of the “physical integrity” of the Rizal Monument. How far should a
building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument- one, two,
three, four, or five kilometers?
Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral Arguments, conceded that
the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is
there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether a construction
that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected
area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument’s physical integrity,
except only to say “when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument,
there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired.”
This kind of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline
or a construction as far as the human eyes can see when standing in
front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a
subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property
rights several kilometers away from a historical sight or facility.
14 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
RIGHT OF ACCESSION
Relevant provisions: Arts. 440-475
ACCESSION
Accession is the right of a property owner to everything which is:
A. Produced thereby (Accession discreta)
B. Incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially
(Accession continua)
a) Accession natural – alluvion, avulsion, change of course of
rivers, formative of lands
b) Accession industrial – building, planting, sowing
Important: Accession is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is
merely a consequence or incidence of ownership. Accession
presupposes a pre-existing right of ownership.
CLASSIFICATION OF ACCESSION
A. Accession Discreta
The extension of the right of ownership of a person to the products
of a thing. (natural, industrial, and civil fruits)
Basis: Based on principles of justice. It is only “just” that the owner
of a thing should also own whatever it produces, unless there is
some special reason for a contrary resolution.
B. Accession Continua
The extension of the right of ownership of a person to what which
is incorporated or attached to a thing.
Note: Accession Continua may refer to immovables or movables:
a) Immovables – accession natural and accession industrial
b) Movables – conjunction or adjunction, specification, and
commixtion
Basis: Based on necessity and utility, it being practical that the
owner of the principal thing should own the new things instead of
a co-ownership being established (e.g. giving riparian the right to
own accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters)
Basic principles governing the doctrine of accession
A. The owner of a thing belongs the extension or increase of such
thing.
B. This extension of the right of ownership is realized, as a general
rule, under the juridical principle that the accessory follows the
principal.
C. This incorporation of the accessory with the principal, saving the
exceptions provided by law, is effected only when two things are
so united that they cannot be separated without injuring or
destroying the juridical nature of one of them.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

Right of accession with respect to what B. Bad faith – may give rise to dire consequences; has no rights
is produced thereby [Accession Discreta] as a general rule and may be held liable for damages.

ACCESSION DISCRETA Note: Whether in good faith or bad faith, he is entitled to

reimbursement for necessary expenses of preservation, cultivation
and gathering.
Relevant provision: Art. 441
4. Effect where both parties are in bad faith – bad faith of one
General rule: All fruits belong to the owner of a thing.
neutralizes the bad faith of the other. They shall be considered as
being in good faith.
Exceptions:
1. Possession in good faith by another
5. Principle of unjust enrichment – right of the owner of land to
2. Usufruct
acquire what is built, planted or sown with the materials of another
3. Lease of rural lands
is subject to the obligation to pay their value.
4. Pledge
5. Antichresis4
ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL
Note: In the above exceptions, a person, other than the owner of the
property, owns the fruits thereof. IMPROVEMENTS BELONG TO THE LANDOWNER

FRUITS Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and
All products of or income from a thing, in accordance with its economic the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the
purpose, so long as they do not bring about any essential alteration land.
thereof.
GR: Accessory follows the principal. Land is the principal and what is
Different kinds of fruits: built is the accessory.

1. Natural Fruits – spontaneous products of the soil, young, and XPN: Art 120 of the Family Code – ownership of improvements made
other products of animals. on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership shall pertain to the conjugal partnership.
2. Industrial Fruits – produced by lands of any kind through
cultivation or labor. Important: Owner of the land must be known. Otherwise, no decision
can be rendered on the ownership of the things planted, built, etc.
Q. How about “cultivated trees”?
Strictly speaking, they are not fruits for they are really immovables Q. Is recourse to the rules of accession necessary where builder
as long as they are attached to the land, and they may produce and owner of land and materials are the same person?
fruits in themselves. But they may be considered as “fruits” when
they are expressly cultivated or exploited to carry on an industry ANS: No. The landowner would necessarily own the building because he
(Paras, citing Manresa). paid for the materials and labor in constructing it. Hence, recourse to
the rules of accession is totally uneccessary.
3. Civil Fruits – rents on buildings, price of leases of lands, other
property and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other PRESUMPTIONS AS TO IMPROVEMENTS
similar income.
446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed made by the owner
Right of accession with respect and at his expense, unless the contrary is proved.
RIGHT OFto
ACCESSION
immovableWITH RESPECT
property TO IMMOVABLES
[Accession Continua]
Two disputable presumptions:
TWO KINDS
1. The works, sowing and planting were made by the owner – based
1. Accession industrial (planting, sowing, building) on positive law; a land naturally has an owner and the law
presumes that he made the works, sowing or planting.
2. Accession natural (alluvium, avulsion, change in the course of
rivers, formation of islands) 2. They were made at the owner’s expense – no one will build, sow
or plant on another’s land at his expense but for the benefit of the
BASIC PRINCIPLES owner. Therefore, it is presumed that what is built, etc. is done at
the owner’s expense, even if done by a third person. (third person
1. Accession follows the principal – owner of the principal may only be acting as the agent)
acquires the ownership of the fruits. Land is usually the principal.
Note: He who alleges the contrary of the presumptions has the burden
2. Incorporation or union must be intimate – such that the of proof.
removal or separation cannot be effected without substantial injury
to either or both.

3. Effect of good faith and bad faith

A. Good faith – exonerates a person from punitive liability.

4
Art. 2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of
an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if
owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.

15 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
WHEN LAND AND MATERIALS BELONG TO DIFF OWNERS
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or
through another, plantings, constructions or works with the materials
of another, shall pay their value. If he acted in bad faith, he shall be
obliged to the reparation of damages.
The owner of the materials shall have the right to remove them only
in case he can do so without injury to the work constructed, or without
the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove
them in any event, with a right to be indemnified for damages.
Application of the Article
This provision applies when the owner of the property builds, plants or
sows on his own land using the materials of another.
Notes:
1. Owner of the materials (OM) used by another does not become a
part owner of the thing constructed with his materials. He is only
entitled to recover their value.
2. According to Tolentino, the landowner (LO) cannot return the
materials instead of paying their value.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
A. Both in good faith
 LO to pay value of the materials
 OM has the right to remove the materials, provided no injury
is caused
B. Both in bad faith
Bad faith of one neutralizes that of the other. Both shall thus be
treated to have acted in good faith. Rule above applies.
C. LO in bad faith, OM in good faith
 LO to pay value of the materials plus damages
 OM has the right to remove the materials with or without
injury
D. LO in good faith, OM in bad faith
 LO to pay value of the materials
 OM has no right to remove the materials and is liable for
consequential damages
Q. What is the recourse of the OM when property is alienated?
When property is alienated and the improvements thereon, the action
of owner of materials shall be against owner of the land and not against
the vendee (presumably because consideration for the sale already
includes value of improvements).
BULDER, SOWER, PLANTER IN GOOD FAITH
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown
or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided
for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted
to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its
value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.]
16 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Application of the Article
A. This is applicable when a person builds, plants, or sows, in good
faith on the land of another.
Good faith – honest belief that the land he is building, sowing or
planting on, is his or that by some title, he has a right to build, etc.
thereon, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title.
B. This article refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties – one of whom has built some works or sown or
planted something.
C. Applies only to a possessor in good faith. It does not apply where
one’s interest in the land is merely that of a holder (i.e. mere tenant
or lessee) because they recognize that the lessor is the owner of
the property.
Reason for the provision
To prevent the creation of a forced co-ownership.
OPTIONS GIVEN TO LANDOWNER
Option alternative or preclusive
The landowner on which anything has been built, planted, or sown in
good faith, has the option, either:
1. To acquire the improvements upon payment of the required
indemnity (pay for the value of improvement)
2. To oblige the builder or planter to pay the price of the land and the
sower, to pay the proper rent. (sell the portion of the land where
the improvement stands)
Provided, the value of the land should not be considerably higher
than the value of the improvement. Otherwise, forced lease is
created.
Important: The good faith of the builder, planter, or sower (BPS) is
immaterial because the option given by law to retain the premises, pay
for the improvements or sell the premises – belongs to the owner of the
property.
Q. Who has the ‘option’?
It is the owner of the land which has the option (Principle of accession,
he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing)
Important: Only permanent constructions are contemplated. If it is of
a transitory character or is transferable, there is no accession, and the
builder must remove the construction. The proper remedy of the
landowner is an action to eject the builder from the land.
Q. May the landowner refuse to exercise the option?
No. He has to choose between the two options available. He cannot
refuse to exercise his right of choice and compel the builder to remove
or demolish the improvement.
Thus, an order by a court compelling a builder in good faith to remove
his building from a land belonging to another who chooses neither to
pay for such nor sell the land is null and void.
Q. When is the landowner entitled to remove or demolish the
improvements?
The landowner can only ask for demolition of improvement if, after
having chosen to compel builder or planter to buy land, the latter fails
to pay. (Sarmiento v. Agana)
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
RIGHT OF RETENTION BY BPS BEFORE PAYMENT
The BPS in good faith may retain both the land and the improvements
before indemnity has been fully paid by the LO who has elected to buy
the improvements.
Purpose: To protect the builder in good faith and to guarantee full and
prompt reimbursement.
Important: The rule now is that a builder in good faith has the right to
retain the premises until full reimbursement. However, whatever fruits
he may receive should be deducted from the value of the improvement.
Notes:
A. Neither of the parties may bring a reinvindicatory action against
the other. Landowner has no right to ask for rents from the builder.
B. After the owner of the land chooses to compel the builder or planter
to pay for the land or the sower the proper rent, the latter will lose
right of retention if he fails to pay as required.
C. In the event of failure of the builder to pay after landowner has
opted to sell the land, the latter is entitled to removal of
improvements.
D. If, in the meantime, improvements is gutted by fire, right of
retention is extinguished.
Manotok Realty v. Tecson
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the
basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has already
been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other
recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and
deliver the same to herein petitioner.
Filipinas Colleges Inc. vs. Timbang
Upon failure of builder to pay the value of land, the landowner does not
necessarily become automatically the owner of improvements under
Article 445.
There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546,
which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of
the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the
land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the
improvement under Article 445.
Reckoning period for valuing the property – current FMV at the
time the seller elects to sell the lot
Mercy Vda de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation
Although these provisions of the Civil Code do not explicitly state the
reckoning period for valuing the property, Ballatan v. Court of Appeals
already specifies that in the event that the seller elects to sell the lot,
"the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment."
More recently, Tuatis v. Spouses Escol illustrates that the present or
current fair value of the land is to be reckoned at the time that the
landowner elected the choice, and not at the time that the property was
purchased.
XXXXX
17 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
Art. 448 applies only when a person builds, plants, or sows, in
good faith on the land of another.
Balucanag v. Judge Francisco
But even in the absence of said stipulation, respondent Stohner cannot
be considered a builder in good faith. Article 448 of the Civil Code, relied
upon by respondent judge, applies only to a case where one builds on
land in the belief that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply
where one's only interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental
contract.
Floreza v. Evangelista
Said codal provision applies only when the builder, planter, or sower
believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow because he thinks he
owns the land or believes himself to have a claim of title.
PNB v. De Jesus
Equally significant is the fact that the building, constructed on the land
by Ignacio, has in actuality been part of the property transferred to
petitioner. Article 448 of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose
ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built
some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a case where
the owner of the land is the builder, sower or planter who then later
loses ownership of the land by the sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated,
“where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own land,
the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.”
Parilla v. Pilar
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that
Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters
believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, have a claim of
title thereto, but not when the interest is merely that of a holder, such
as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A tenant cannot be said to be
a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.
Cases where requirement that improvement must be built by
one who believes that he is owner but he is not, is relaxed:
Sps. Del Campo v. Abesia
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the
partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or
occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs
which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions
of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.
Ismael Macasaet et. al. v. Spouses Macasaet
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the
builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land
or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.65 It does not apply when the
interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or
usufructuary.66 From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by
the belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the
right to build, plant, or sow thereon.
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by
recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition.
Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia, this provision was applied to one whose
house, despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner,
overlapped with the land of another.
This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the
law deemed the builder to be in good faith.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
In Sarmiento v. Agana, the builders were found to be in good faith
despite their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had
mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present
factual milieu.
The established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented
to the improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the
children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly
knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon. Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith
when they built the structures on those lots.
Good Faith Builder, Subdivision Lot Buyer
Communities Cagayan Inc. v. Spouses Arsenio
In fine, the Court applied Article 448 by construing good faith beyond
its limited definition. We find no reason not to apply the Court’s ruling
in Spouses Macasaet v. Spouses Macasaet in this case. We thus hold
that Article 448 is also applicable to the instant case.
1. First, good faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-
spouses.
2. Second, petitioner failed to rebut this presumption.
3. Third, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner opposed
or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-
spouses. Consequently, we can validly presume that petitioner
consented to the improvements being constructed.
This presumption is bolstered by the fact that as the subdivision
developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits
to commence and undertake the construction. Under Article 453 of the
Civil Code, "it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the
landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without
opposition on his part."
Rule on expenses:
A. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only
the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been
reimbursed therefor.
B. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount
of the expenses
C. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded
to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments
with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no
injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not
prefer to refund the amount expended.
BULDER, SOWER, PLANTER IN BAD FAITH
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work,
or that the planting or sowing be removed in order to replace things in
their former condition at the expense of the builder, planter or sower,
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land,
and the sower the proper rent.
18 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Application of the Article
This provision applies when the BPS is in bad faith, while the LO is in
good faith.
BPS forfeits rights
As a just punishment for bad faith, the BPS forfeits what he has built,
planted or sown without any right to be paid indemnity therefor.
Important: However, as a matter of justice, he is entitled to
reimbursement for necessary expenses of preservation of the land
incurred by him but without right of retention.
Q. What are necessary expenses?
Necessary expenses are those made for the preservation of the property
or thing upon which they have been expended (e.g. dike to preserve
from destruction caused by flood; real property taxes)
Conversely, that those that merely “augment” the thing like expenses
for the leveling of the land are not necessary expenses.
Instances of bad faith:
1. Had presumptive knowledge of the owner’s Torrens title.
(Rodriguez v. Francisco)
2. Bought a land and then constructed a new building after the filing
of action against him for annulment of the sale. (Mindanao
Academy v. Yap)
3. Bought a land with the knowledge that the property was under
litigation and then planted coconut trees thereon. (Lumungo v.
Usman)
4. Built a house on a lot after his predecessor in interest, his parents,
had been summoned in a civil case regarding said lot, and even
reconstructed the house into a bigger one while the case was
pending. (Santos v. Monica)
RIGHTS OF LANDOWNER WHERE BPS IS IN BAD FAITH
These rights are alternative. Landowner can choose only one:
1. To appropriate the improvement without any obligation to
indemnify, except for necessary expenses for preservation
2. To ask the removal or demolition of the improvement at the
expense of the BPS.
3. To compel the builder or planter to pay the value of the land
regardless of whether its value is considerably higher than that of
the improvements, and the sower to pay the proper rent.
Important: Landowner is entitled to damages in all instances.
LIABILITIES OF BPS IN BAD FAITH
1. He loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity
except for necessary expenses
2. He may be required to remove or demolish the work, in order to
replace things in their former condition
3. He may be compelled to pay price of the land
4. He is liable for damages
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

LANDOWNER AND BPS BOTH IN BAD FAITH B. Only OM in bad faith

Art. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who
built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of
the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the
same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.
Application of the Article
This provision applies both the LO and BPS are in bad faith.
Rule:
1. Bad faith of one neutralizes the other
2. Rights shall be determined as if both acted in good faith
Q. When is BPS in bad faith?
When he knows that the land does not belong to him, and that he has
no right, permission, or authority to do so.
Q. When is the LO in bad faith?
When the act is done with his knowledge and without opposition on his
part.
WHEN LO IS IN BAD FAITH; BPS IN GOOD FAITH
Art. 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder,
planter or sower proceeded in good faith, the provisions of Article 447
shall apply.
Application of the Article
This provision applies when the LO is in bad faith, while the BPS is in
good faith.
Rule:
The provisions of Article 447 applies. It is as if the owner built on his
land in bad faith with the material of another. Hence, he should pay
the value of the materials plus damages.
WHEN LO, BPS, OM – DIFFERENT PERSONS
Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who
has not acted in bad faith, the owner of the land shall answer
subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one who made
use of them has no property with which the pay.
 Forfeits his rights to his materials without right of indemnity
 Liable for any consequential damages
C. Only BPS in bad faith
 BPS principally liable to OM for value of materials, plus
damages
 If insolvent, LO is subsidiarily liable but not for damages
(applies only if LO wants to appropriate the accession)
D. Only LO in bad faith
 Pay value of the materials with damages
 BPS or OM is entitled remove improvements whether or not
injury would be caused, plus damages
E. Only LO in good faith
 LO can exercise his alternative rights under Art 449-451 with a
right to demand damages from both OM and BPS.
1. Appropriate improvement without payment of indemnity
2. Have the improvement demolished at the expense of BPS,
plus damages
3. Compel BPS to pay value of land regardless of whether it
is considerably higher or not
 OM entitled to reimbursement from BPS (Since both of them
acted in bad faith = good faith)
 LO not subsidiarily liable even if he wants to appropriate the
improvement because both are in bad fait
Subsidiary liability of LO
Landowner shall be subsidiarily liable for the value of the materials if the
following requisites are present:
1. LO appropriates the accession to himself
2. OM should be in good faith
3. BPS has not property with which to pay
Right of BPS who pays OM
Presupposes a situation where the LO appropriates the improvement to
himself and it was the BPS in good faith who paid OM the value of the
materials
 BPS is entitled to reimbursement from LO (principle of unjust
enrichment)

The provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the right
granted by Article 450. If the owner of the materials, plants or seeds
has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter may demand
from the landowner the value of the materials and labor.

Application of the Article

A. Applies when the LO, BPS and OM are different persons
B. Solely deals with the right of the OM regardless of the good or bad
faith of the landowner and BPS.

RULES

A. OM in good faith
Entitled to reimbursement for the value of materials principally
from the builder.

Note: If builder is insolvent, landowner is subsidiarily liable should

he want to appropriate the improvement to himself. If not, he is
not subsidiarily liable.

19 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
ACCESSION NATURAL
ALLUVION
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
Rule
The accretion which the banks of rivers gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters – belong to the owners of lands
adjoining the said banks.
Reason for the rule: – Owners adjoining banks of rivers are exposed to
floods and other damages due to the destructive force of the waters and
if by virtue of law, they are subject to encumbrances, it is only just that
such risks and dangers should in some way be compensated.
ACCRETION V. ALLUVION
A. Accretion – Process by which a riparian land gradually and
imperceptively receives addition made by the water to which the
land is contiguous
B. Alluvion – soil deposits or the soil itself brought about by accretion
REQUISITES FOR ALLUVION
If these requisites are present, the owner of the land adjoining the river
banks automatically becomes the owner of the accretion made from the
effects of the river currents. But of course, owner still has to register the
same under the Torrens system.
1. The soil deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. It be made through the effects of the current of the water (deposits
by human intervention not included) and
3. The land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.
1-The soil deposit be gradual and imperceptible
Example: The Cagayan River moved year by year for 49 years, causing
soil deposits in the land of A thereby making his land bigger in area.
Note: It must be a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of soil
deposits and not a sudden and forceful action like that of flooding.
Binalay v. Manalo
A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is hardly the alluvial
process contemplated under Article 457 of the Civil Code. It is the slow
and hardly perceptible accumulation of soil deposits that the law grants
to the riparian owner.
Republic v. CA
Movement of dikes, not an accretion formed by natural process.
Zapata v. Director of Lands
The fact that the fish traps set up in the creek might have slowed down
its current, and might have been brought about or caused accretion, will
not affect his ownership, in the absence of evidence, to show that the
setting up or erection of fish traps was expressly intended to cause or
bring about accretion
2-It be made through the effects of the current of the water
(deposits by human intervention not included)
a. Current – participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of
waters due to high and low tide.
20 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
b. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not made
artificially by the riparian owner
c. Deposits consisting of boulders, soil, sawdust and other filling
materials, caused by human intervention are excluded from Art.
457 and, as such would still be part of public domain.
Republic v. CA
The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.
3-The land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks
of rivers
Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano
Riparian accretion should be distinguished from accretion due to sea
water. In the latter case, the accretion is public land.
Important: Accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay have
been held to belong to the owners of the lands to which they are added
(legal basis: Spanish Law of Waters)
De Buyser v. Director of Lands et al
Land formed by accretion from the sea is part of the public domain. It
cannot be acquired by adverse possession. It is outside the commerce
of man unless otherwise declared by the executive and legislative branch
of the government.
The law does not require an express act of appropriation or
possession to acquire ownership of the alluvial accumulation.
However, it is not automatically registered.
Grande et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
An accretion to land covered by Torrens Title does not automatically
become registered land. It must be registered. If not registered, it is
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Reynante v. CA
Alluvial deposit acquired by a riparian owner of registered lands by
accretion may be subjected to acquisition through prescription by a third
person, by the failure of such owner to register said accretion.
Republic v. Santos
By law accretion – the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through
the effects of the current of the water – belongs to the owner of the
land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the
river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State
as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law
vests the ownership in some other person.
AVULSION
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to
another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion
belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the
same within two (2) years.
Avulsion or force of river
Accretion which takes place when the current of a river segregates from
an estate on its bank a known portion and transfers it to another estate.
Here, the old owner retains ownership, provided he removes the same
within 2 years. Failure to remove within 2 years automatically transfers
ownership to the owner of the other estate.
Note: Avulsion is otherwise known as ‘delayed accession’.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Important: This is caused by a violent and sudden action of a torrent
and not by the slow and constant action of the waters.
Alluvion v. Avulsion
Alluvion Avulsion
Soil deposit is gradual It is sudden or abrupt
Soil deposit belongs to the Owner of property from which a
owner of property where the part was detached retains the
same was deposited ownership thereof
The soil cannot be identified Detached portion
can be identified
Requisites of avulsion
1. Segregation and transfer must be caused by the current of a river,
creek, or torrent
2. The segregation and transfer must be sudden or abrupt
3. Portion of land transported must be known and identifiable
1- Segregation and transfer must be caused by the current of a
river, creek, or torrent
A. Current – continuous movement of a body of water, often
horizontal, in a certain direction
B. River – a natural surface stream of water of considerable volume
and permanent or seasonal flow emptying into an ocean, lake or
body of water
C. Creek – is a small islet extending further into the land; natural
stream of water normally smaller than and often tributary to a river
D. Torrent – is a violent stream of water as a flooded river or one
suddenly raised by a heavy rain and descending a steep incline; a
raging flood or rushing stream of water.
2-The segregation and transfer must be sudden or abrupt
Payatas Estate Improvement Co. v. Tuason
In the absence of evidence as to whether the change in the course of a
river was caused by accretion and erosion (alluvion) or whether it had
occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was
gradual and was caused by alluvion.
3-Portion of land transported must be known and identifiable
The detached portion must be known or at least identifiable. It
contemplates mass of earth suddenly transferred to another’s estate and
therefore removable by the original owner.
Take note: If only soil is removed by the water and transferred over
another’s land, it cannot be said to be identifiable.
TRANSFER BY OTHER FORCES
A known portion of land may be transferred from one tenement to
another by other forces of nature than the current of a river, e.g. land
from a mountain slope rolls down to another tenement. Present article
may be applied by analogy.
21 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CHANGE OF RIVER BED
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change
in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose
lands are occupied by the new course, in proportion to the area lost.
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall
not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
Requisites for the application of the rule
1. There must be a natural change in the course of the river, not man-
made or artificial
2. The change must be abrupt or sudden. If gradual, it is alluvion and
the accretion belongs to the owner of the riparian lot.
3. There must be a change of river course (not simply dries up or
disappears, otherwise, it is property public dominion)
The abandoned river bed is automatically owned by the owners
of the lands occupied by the new course, in proportion to the
area lost.
This is because the new owners lost a portion of their land due to the
new course of the river. In other words, their lands were invaded.
Hence, they should own the old river bed, in proportion to the area of
the land they lost)
Important: In proportion to the area lost implies that there are two or
more owners whose lands are occupied by the new bed. Thus, if only
one owner lost a portion of his land, the entire old river bed should
belong to him.
Right of owners of land adjoining the old bed
They are given preferential right to acquire the same by paying the value
thereof to promote the interest of agriculture because the riparian
owners of the old course can better cultivate the same.
Note: Indemnification shall not exceed the value of the area occupied
by the new bed. In case of disagreement, courts shall fix the value.
Provision of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
[Art. 58. When a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse
private land, the owner of the affected lands may not compel the
government to restore the river to its former bed; nor can they restrain
the government from taking steps to revert the river or stream to its
former course. The owner of the lands thus affected are not entitled to
compensation for any damage sustained thereby. However, the former
owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in
proportion to the area lost by each.
The owners of the affected lands may undertake to return the river or
stream to its old bed at their own expense; Provided, that a permit
therefore is secured from the Secretary of Public Works (Transportation
and Communication) and works commenced within two years from the
change in the course of the river or stream.]
Dionesia Bagaipo v. CA
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion
of respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion and
accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.
Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed
because the same is inexistent. The riverbed’s former location cannot
even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao
River took place gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the
present.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river
was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that
the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion.
Q. When is riverbed deemed abandoned? Are beds of river
considered abandoned ipso facto whenever there is a change in
the course of the river? Or, is it still necessary that there be
abandonment of the bed on the part of the government?
No. The change in the course of a river does not ipso facto result in the
abandonment of the old river bed. There needs to be a positive act from
the government to abandon the same. Abandonment implies the giving
up or relinquishment of something. It cannot be done by an inanimate
property like a river.
Panlilio v. Mercado
While the abandonment of the bed may be the consequence of the river
changing its course, it is not necessarily the action of the river itself
which is the only and final determining factor in such abandonment.
Note: See however Dean Capistrano’s opinion: “ipso facto” makes it
clear that the rule applies by the mere fact of the occurrence of a natural
change in the course of the water.
NEW BED THROUGH PRIVATE ESTATE – PUBLIC DOMINION
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes,
opens a new bed through a private estate, this bed shall become of
public dominion.
New bed is property of public dominion
If the river changes its course due to natural means and opens a new
bed, this becomes of public dominion even if it is on private property.
Important: The change of course must be by natural means and not
due to man-made causes.
RIVER DIVIDED INTO BRANCHES
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land
retains his ownership. He also retains it if apportion of land is separated
from the estate by the current.
Application
This does not refer to the formation of islands through accretion treated
in Arts. 464 and 465 but to the formation of an island cause by a river
dividing itself into branches resulting in:
A. The isolation (without being physically transferred to another
place) of a piece of land or part thereof; or
B. The separation (or physical transfer) of a portion of land from an
estate by the current
Note: The owner preserves his ownership of the isolated or separated
property.
22 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
FORMATION OF ISLANDS
Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes, and on navigable or floatable
rivers belong to the State.
Art. 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial
deposits are formed in non-navigable and non-floatable rivers, belong
to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or to
the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in
which case it shall be divided longitudinally in halves. If a single island
thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other, the
owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner thereof.
Rules:
A. Belongs to the State as part of its patrimonial property – if formed
on the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on lakes, and
on navigable or floatable rivers
B. Belongs to the nearest riparian owner – if formed in non-navigable
waters and non-floatable rivers (this is so because he is
considered in the best position to cultivate and develop the island)
Concept of navigable river
One which forms in its ordinary condition by itself or by uniting with the
other waters a continuous highway over which commerce is or may be
carried on.
Right of accession with respect
to movable property [Accession Continua]
Kinds of accession (personal property)
1. Adjunction
2. Mixture (commixtion or confusion)
3. Specification
ADJUNCTION
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners
are, without bad faith, united in such a way that they form a single
object, the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory,
indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value.
ADJUNCTION
Union of two movable things belonging to different owners in such a
way that they form a single object, but each one of the component
things preserves its value.
Characteristics
A. Two movable things belonging to different owners
B. United in such a way that they form a single object
C. They are inseparable that their separation would impair their
nature or result in substantial injury to either component
Kinds of Adjunction:
1. Engraftment – e.g. diamond is set on a gold ring
2. Soldering – e.g. lead united or fused to an object made of lead
3. Writing – e.g. a person writes on paper belonging to another
4. Painting – e.g. a person paints on canvas belonging to another
5. Weaving – e.g. such as when threads belonging to different
owners are used in making textile
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
TEST TO DETERMINE PRINCIPAL IN ADJUNCTION
Relevant provisions: Arts. 465, 467
Order of preference in determining which is the principal and
which is the accessory:
1. That thing to which the other has been united as an ornament or
for its use or perfected
2. If of unequal value, the one of greater value
3. If of equal value, the one of greater volume
4. That of greater merits taking into consideration all pertinent legal
provisions applicable
Note: In paintings, etc., what is painted is of greater value or importance
than the board, etc. Hence, the painting is the principal.
WHEN SEPARATION OF THINGS UNITED ALLOWED
Relevant provision: Art. 469
1. Separation without injury – when separation can be done
without injury, their respective owners may demand separation.
2. Accessory more precious – where the thing (diamond) united
for the embellishment of the other, is much more precious than
the principal thing (gold ring), the owner of the diamond may
demand its separation even though the principal thing may
suffer some injury.
Who shall bear the expenses for separation?
The owner who caused the incorporation because he is the one
considered at fault although he acted in good faith.
3. Owner of principal acted in bad faith – owner of the
accessory may separate it even if the principal be destroyed.
ADJUNCTION IN BAD FAITH
Relevant provision: Art. 470
Rules:
1. Bad faith on the part of the accessory owner
A. He shall lose the thing incorporated
B. Liable for damages
2. Bad faith on the part of the principal owner
Accessory owner is given the option to:
A. Require the principal owner to pay the value of the accessory
B. Have the accessory separated even if it destroys the principal
Note: Damages are available in both cases.
3. Bad faith on the part of both
Bad faith of one neutralizes that of the other. Both are then
deemed to be in good faith.
MIXTURE
Relevant provisions: Arts. 472-473
TWO KINDS OF MIXTURE
1. Commixtion – mixture of solid things belonging to different
owners
2. Confusion – mixture of liquid things belonging to different
owners
23 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Note: May be voluntary or by chance.
RULES GOVERNING MIXTURES
1. Mixture by will of the owners – Their rights shall first be
governed by their stipulations. If there is none, each owner
acquires a right I the mixture in proportion to the value of his
material as in co-ownership.
2. Mixture caused by an owner in good faith or by chance–
Share of each owner shall be proportional to the value which
belonged to him.
A. If things mixed are exactly the same kind and quality:
Divide the mixture equally between the owners.
B. If things mixed are of different kinds or quality:
Co-ownership arises
However, if the things mixed can be separated without
injury, their respective owners may demand their
separation.
3. Mixture caused by an owner in bad faith
A. Owner in bad faith forfeits the thing belonging to him
B. Liable to pay indemnity for damages
4. Mixture made without the knowledge and without the
objection of the other owner = good faith
SPECIFICATION
Relevant provision: Art. 474
SPECIFICATION
Takes place whenever the work of a person is done on the material of
another and as a consequence of the work, such material undergoes a
transformation; the making of the material of another into a thing of a
different kind.
Examples: Flour into bread; grapes into wine, etc.
RULES
A. Worker made use of material of another in good faith
GR: Worker becomes owner of the new thing, but he must
indemnify the owner of the material for its value.
XPN: If material is more precious or of more value than the new
thing, the owner of the material may choose either to:
1. Appropriate the new thing to himself upon payment of the
value of the work or labor
2. Demand indemnity for the material
B. Worker made use of material of another in bad faith
GR: Owner of the material has the option either to:
1. Appropriate the work to himself without paying the worker
2. Demand the value of the materials, plus damages
XPN: First option not available if the value of the work is
considerably more than that of the material. Hence, labor or work
is considered as the principal.
C. Worker made use of material of another with the consent
and without the objection of the latter = good faith
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

Adjunction, Mixture, Specification 3. The instrument, etc. claimed to casting loud on plaintiff’s title must
be shown to be in fact invalid despite its prima facie appearance
of validity
Adjunction Mixture Specification
Difference between an action “to quiet title” from a suit “to
remove cloud”
May involve only
Involves at least Involves at least one thing (may be A. To quiet title – An action for the purpose of putting an end to
two things two things more) but form is vexatious litigation in respect to the property involved; remedial
changed action involving a present adverse claim.

B. To remove cloud – To procure cancellation, delivery of, release of

As a rule, accessory As a rule, co- As a rule, accessory an instrument, encumbrance, or claim constituting a claim on
follows the principal ownership results follows the principal plaintiff’s title; preventive action to prevent a future cloud on the
title.

The things mixed or The new object Two classifications of an action to quiet title
The things joined confused may either retains or preserves 1. To remove a cloud on title (remedial action)
retain their nature retain or lose their the nature of the 2. To prevent the casting of a cloud on title (preventive action)
respective nature original object
Application
1. Applies only in the case of real property
2. The matter complained of must have prima facie appearance of
QUIETING OF TITLE validity, therefore, when invalid or inefficacious on its face, an
action to remove cloud on title does not exist
REASONS FOR PROVISIONS ON QUIETING OF TITLE
Examples: Title procured by fraud, deceit, forged, instrument, taxes
Purpose levied on exempt property etc.
The quieting of title or removal of cloud therefrom when there is an
apparently valid, or effective instrument or other claim which in reality Prescriptive period to file an action to quiet title:
is void ineffective or voidable or unenforceable. A. If plaintiff is in possession the action does not prescribe.
B. If plaintiff is not in possession, the action may prescribe.
Originated from equity jurisprudence.
Gallar v. Husain
Reasons: By the delivery of possession of the land on April 2, 1919 the sale was
1. Prevention of litigation consummated and title was transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this
2. Protection of the true title and possession action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to
3. Real interest of both parties, and tat of right and justice, which remove the cloud cast on appellee’s ownership as a result of appellant’s
require that the precise state of the title be known refusal to recognize the sale made by the predecessor. And, as plaintiff-
appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible.
CLOUD ON TITLE
Appellant’s argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if
Meaning – a semblance of title, appearing in some legal form but they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an
which is in fact invalid or unfounded. action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the
statutory period of limitation governing such actions.
Requisites for existence of cloud Caragay-Layno v. CA
1. There is an instrument, record, encumbrance, etc. which is Prescription cannot be invoked against Juliana for the reason that as
apparently valid or effective lawful possessor and owner of the disputed portion, her cause of action
2. Such instrument, etc. is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property,
voidable or unenforceable falls within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property
3. Such instrument, etc. may be prejudicial to said title in one’s possession is imprescriptible. Her undisturbed possession over
a period of 52 years gave her a continuing right to seek aid of a Court
ACTION TO QUIET TITLE of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
A remedy or proceeding which has for its purpose an adjudication that and the effect on her own title.
a claim of title to realty adverse to the plaintiff, is invalid, inoperative or
defective and hence, plaintiff may forever be free of any hostile claim. A case for quieting of title is not a remedy to settle a “boundary
dispute’
Only issue: Whether there is a cloud on a title to real property because
of any instrument, etc. that has a prima facie appearance of validity. Anastacia Vda. De Aviles et al v. CA
The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of boundary
Purpose: To remove the cloud on plaintiff’s title. dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
Requisites: upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.
1. Plaintiff has a legal or at least an equitable title to in the real
property subject of the action
2. Defendant claims an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff arising
from an instrument, etc.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
CO-OWNERSHIP
DEFINITION
Relevant provision: Art. 484
CONCEPT
A. Right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided
(Sanchez Roman)
B. Manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of
being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the
things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the
undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same
(Manresa)
C. Co-ownership is not a real right distinct from ownership, but is a
mere form or manifestation of ownership (De Diego)
CHARACTERISTICS
A. Plurality of subjects (there must be two or more co-owners)
B. Unity of object (material and physical indivision) and recognition of
the ideal or intellectual shares of co-owners
C. There is no mutual representation by the co-owners
D. It exists for the common enjoyment of the co-owners
E. It has no distinct legal personality
F. It is governed first of all by the contract of the parties, otherwise,
by the special legal provisions, and in default, by the provisions of
Title III on co-ownership.
Note: Relationship of co-owner to his other co-owners is fiduciary in
character.
CAUSES THAT GIVE RISE TO CO-OWNERSHIP
1. Law – e.g. commixtion, Art. 147 of the Family Code
2. Contract
3. Succession – e.g. property left by a decedent to several heirs
4. Donation inter vivos – donor prohibits partition for a certain period
5. Fortuitous event – commixtion
6. Occupancy – catch a wild beast or hidden treasure
SHARE IN BENEFITS AND CHARGES
Relevant provision: Art. 485
IN PROPORTION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS
The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a
contract to the contrary shall be void.
Example: If one’s interest in the co-ownership is ¼, his share in the
benefits and charges is also ¼.
Important: The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-
ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
CONTRARY STIPULATION IN A CONTRACT
GR: Any stipulation making the share in the benefits and charges
disproportional to their respective interests of the co-owners is void.
XPN: If the co-ownership is created other than by a contract (e.g. by
will, donation) – the share of the co-owners need not be proportionate
to their respective interests.
25 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
LIMITATIONS ON CO-OWNERS’ RIGHT OF USE
Relevant provision: Art. 486
LIMITATIONS
A co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so:
1. In accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
2. In such a way as not to injure the interests of the co-ownership
3. Without preventing others from making use thereof according to
their own rights.
Meaning of “purpose for which it is intended”
Agreement of the parties should govern. If there is none, that use for
which it is ordinarily adapted according to its nature (e.g. house only for
living and not to be used as a factory) or use to which is has been
previously devoted.
Note: The co-owners are free to change the purpose of the co-
ownership by agreement.
Principles:
1. Mere tolerance on the part of the co-owners cannot legalize the
change in the use of a thing from that intended by the parties.
2. No prejudice to co-ownership-co-owners agreed to lease, co-owner
cannot use without paying rent.
De Guia v. Court of Appeals
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of
the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject
is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their
respective families to the extent possible.
However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without
opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement,
the other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if
there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand
rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
Pardell v. Bartolome
The defendant Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the
upper floor of the said house, did not injure the interests of her co-
owner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter from living
therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as a
co-owner of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership
rights which entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said
house, yet, in view of the fact that the record shows it to have been
proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de Bartolome,
occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same
house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace,
a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice
requires that he pay his sister in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the
monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they
been leased to another person.
THE DUAL NATURE OF OWNERSHIP IN CO-OWNERSHIP
1. Ownership over the ideal share
2. Joint ownership over the whole
Co-owner cannot claim a definite portion
Important: Note, however, that if transferees of an undivided portion
of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

portion thereof, such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owned property. (Vda. De Cabrera v. CA)
Cruz v. Catapang
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to
their rights.
Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the co-owned
property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other
co-owners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Resuena v. Court of Appeals
Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that "any one of the
co-owners may bring an action in ejectment," is a categorical and an
unqualified authority in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the
portions of Lot No. 2587.
This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an
action for ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-
owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When
the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice
their rights.

ACTION IN EJECTMENT Respondent's action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be

instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since
petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy
Relevant provision: Art. 487 the same.
WHO MAY BRING THE ACTION Arcelona v. CA
Any co-owner may bring, in behalf of himself and others, an action for Contrariwise, it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status
ejectment affecting the co-ownership. as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners; in failing to do so,
there can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a
Notes: tenant who fails to implead all the co-owners cannot establish with
A. The suit may proceed without impleading the other co-owners finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.
B. A favorable judgment shall benefit the other co-owners, but if
adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the co-owners Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are
who were not impleaded encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties; thus, all of
them must be impleaded.
The article covers all kinds of actions for recovery of possession
Q. Can an ejectment case be filed by one co-owner against
De Guia v. CA another co-owner?
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, “any one of the co-owners may Yes. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against
bring an action in ejectment.” This article covers all kinds of actions for a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive
the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property.
unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reinvidicacion). In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of
The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of
recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate
municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. part of the property.
The action must be instituted for all RULES ON WHO DECIDES ON THE FOLLOWING
1. Acts of Preservation
Adlawan v. Adlawan 2. Acts of Administration
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for 3. Acts of Alteration
unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of
self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that
Acts of Acts of Acts of alteration,
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instance action considering that
preservation or administration or encumbrance, or
he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his
necessary repairs management alienation
theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in the petitioner’s claim that he has
Any co-owner may This is to be decided Unanimous consent
the legal personality to file the present unlawful detain suit because the
decide on an act of by the majority of of all the co-owners
ejectment of the respondents would benefit not only him but also his
preservation the co-owners is needed
alleged co-owners.
(Art. 489) (Arts. 489 and 492)
Run to the courts
However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire
If practicable, first By majority is meant for appropriate
possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone
notify his co-owner the controlling relief, if withholding
will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the
of the necessity of interest (financial of consent of one or
award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana.
repairs majority) not some of the co-
numerical majority. owners is clearly
Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to
prejudicial to the
his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of
Appointment of an common interest
the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labelled as “fictitious heirs,”
administrator if (Art. 491)
the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner
there is no majority.
entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
OBLIGATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO EXPENSES
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-
owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or
right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may
exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his
undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-
ownership.
EXPENSES OF PRESERVATION AND TAXES
GR: The expenses of preservation of the thing owned in common and
the amount of taxes should be borne by all.
XPN: If co-owner renounces so much of his undivided interest as may
be equivalent to his share of the expenses – exempt from payment.
Example:
A, B, and C owners of property worth 3M.
1M respective interest.
Expenses worth 500,000.
A, B, or C may renounce up to 500,000.
(Note: He cannot be required to renounce, option is upon him)
Old rule: Co-owner may renounce his whole interest, and
pertains to exemption in being required to contribute to future
expenses.
New rule: Renunciation of a portion of interest in co-ownership.
Criticism to the new rule (Tolentino)
1. This is dacion en pago etc.
2. Since this renunciation pertains to a debt already incurred, consent
of the other co-owners is required such as on the following
matters: valuation of the share
3. Effect on creditors (third party) – Can the co-owner exempt himself
to pay his share of the expenses to the creditor simply by
renouncing an equivalent portion of his share in the co-ownership?
No, because this constitutes novation by change of debtor and
requires consent of creditor.
ALTERATIONS
Relevant provision: Art. 491
ACTS OF ALTERATION
A change made by a co-owner in the thing owned in common, which
involves:
1. Change of the thing from the state or essence in which the others
believe it should remain
2. Withdrawal of the thing from the use to which they wish it to be
intended
3. Any other transformation which prejudices the condition or
substance of the thing or its enjoyment by the others
Notes:
A. Affects the substance of the thing
B. Consent to (alteration) may be given expressly or tacitly
C. If alteration is unauthorized, act is illegal, erring co-owner may be
compelled to undo what has been done.
27 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
D. Erring co-owner shall likewise be liable for losses or damages
Some examples of “acts of alteration”
1. Sale, donation, or mortgage of the entire property
2. Sale, donation or mortgage of a part of the property but with
definite boundaries
3. A voluntary easement
4. Lease of real property
5. Construction of a house on a lot owned in common
6. Contracts of long duration
UNANIMOUS CONSENT NEEDED
Unanimous consent of all the co-owners (not just majority) is necessary
even if alteration would prove beneficial, because alteration is an act of
ownership and not of mere administration.
Form of consent
1. Express
2. Implied
Important: If the withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-
owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
EFFECTS OF AN ILLEGAL ALTERATION
A co-owner who makes such alteration without the express or implied
consent of the others acts in bad faith and as punishment, he should:
A. Lose what he has spent
B. Be obliged to demolish the improvements done
C. Be liable for losses and damages
Note: Whatever benefits belong to the co-ownership
Alteration of property under co-ownership
Cruz v. Catapang
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations the thing owned in common. It necessarily
follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or owners had any
encumbrance or disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of
alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an
act of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of
the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners, respondent
had no right construct her house on the co-owned property.
ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION AND BETTER ENJOYMENT
Relevant provision: Art. 492
Meaning of acts of administration and better enjoyment
They contemplate acts or decisions for the common benefit of all the
co-owners and not for the benefit of only one or some of them.
Notes:
A. Refers to the enjoyment of the thing and are of a transitory
character
B. Improvement or embellishment of the thing owned in common for
the purpose of better enjoyment
Examples:
1. Appointment of administrator to manage the property
2. Engaging the services of a lawyer to preserve the ownership and
possession of the property
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
3. Payment made in the ordinary course of management
4. Unregistered lease of 1 year or less
Note: Mere majority cannot lease a real property for more than one
year.
EXTENT OF RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER
Relevant provisions: Arts. 493-494
RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNER
1. Full ownership of his undivided share in the common property
2. Full ownership of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto
3. Right to alienate, assign or mortgage his ideal interest
independently of the other co-owners
4. Right to substitute another person in the enjoyment of his part,
except when personal rights are involved
5. Demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned
Effect of sale by one co-owner
Pailmitan v. CA
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled
to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void (valid).
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
RIGHT OF LEGAL REDEMPTION
A co-owner has the right to redeem the property in case the shares of
all the other co-owners or any of them are sold to a third person.
See: Articles 1619-1623.
Note: Redemption by a co-owner does not terminate the coownership
nor give him title to the entire property
Effect of Redemption by one co-owner
Adille v. CA
While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be
compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one
co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming
co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode
of terminating a co-ownership.
Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-
ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-
ownership. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles
the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in
his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner
the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
A case of no co-ownership
Tan v. CA
Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased
parents, there can be no question that a co-ownership existed among
the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed
property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to
the benefit of all.
28 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
The records show that when the petitioner purchased the disputed
property on August 30, 1974, any co-ownership among the brothers and
sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more than
one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank
consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's
name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire
without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-
ownership was extinguished. The challenged ruling of the respondent
court is, therefore, based on erroneous premises.
SALE OR MORTGAGE OF COMMON PROPERTY
Undivided portion
A co-owner is free to dispose of his pro indiviso share and of the fruits
and other benefit arising from that share.
Note: Transferee’s right is limited to the portion which may be allotted
to him upon partition (he does not acquire any determinate physical
portion of the whole)
Definite portion
A deed of sale appearing to convey a definite portion of the property
does not per se render the sale a nullity.
A. Sale is valid subject to the condition that the interests acquired by
vendee is limited to the part that may be assigned to the co-owner
vendor upon partition.
B. There may also be a valid sale of a definite portion where estoppel
applies, as when the co-owners consented to the same or never
objected despite knowledge.
Whole property
Sale is valid only insofar as his ideal quota, unless authorized by the
other co-owners.
Important: Appropriate remedy of other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale is an action for partition under Rule 69. Recovery of
possession nor restitution cannot be sustained since buyer is a legitimate
proprietor and possessor.
Lease of half-interest
A co-owner could validly lease his half-interest independently of the
other co-owner and could cancel the said lease agreement without the
need of securing the consent of the other.
No common interest is prejudiced where one of the co-owners
refuse to sell the co-owned property
Arambulo v. Nolasco
At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as co-owners, can
be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares
in the co-owned properties. Until it reached this Court, the discussion of
the issue moved around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to remove
the issue out of the coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the
problem arising out of the proposed sale of the property co-owned by
the parties in this case.
Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that,
insofar as the sale of co-owned properties is concerned, there is no
common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co-
owners refuse to sell the co-owned property, which is exactly the factual
situation in this case. When respondents disagreed to the sale, they
merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without unanimity,
there is no common interest.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co-owners may bring
a suit for partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co-
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may
demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as
his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that
it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be
sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to:
(a) When the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the
co-owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be
subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the
co-owners, and
(b) The co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners.
TERMINATION OF CO-OWNERSHIP
Relevant provision: Art. 494
Q. What are the ways to terminate co-ownership?
1. By consolidation or merger in only one of the co-owners of all the
interests of the others
2. By the destruction or loss of the property co-owned
3. By acquisitive prescription in favor of a third person
4. By the partition, judicial or extrajudicial of the respective undivided
shares of the co-owners
5. By the sale by the co-owners of the thing to a third person and the
distribution of its proceeds among them
Note: Redemption is not a mode of terminating co-ownership. Hence, a
co-owner who redeems the property in its entirety does not make him
the owner of all of it.
Termination by sale
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and
the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay
of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on,
respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his
family vacate.
Termination by prescription
GR: Prescription does not run in favor or against a co-owner. This is
because the possession of a co-owner is ordinarily not adverse to the
others.
XPN: If the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Prescription begins
to run from the time of repudiation.
Requisites for valid repudiation:
1. He had performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the
coownership amounting to an ouster of other
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the
other co-owners
3. The evidence is clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish
prescription without any shadow of doubt
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
29 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Mariano v. De Vega
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership."
In view of their lack of a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, duly
communicated to the petitioners (the other co-owners), private
respondents cannot acquire the shares of the petitioners by prescription.
The record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation
and communication contemplated by the law. Neither may the private
respondents' possession of the premises militate against petitioners'
claim. After all, co-owners are entitled to be in possession of the
premises.
The existence of the co-ownership here argues against the theory of
implied trust, for then a co-owner possesses co-owned property not in
behalf of the other co-owners but in his own behalf.
Delima v. Court of Appeals
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others
any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but
of ownership.
In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no
longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely
possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription.
Evidence shows that the TCT in the name of the legal heirs of Lino
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo
Delima, and that the latter obtained a new title in her name to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an
open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership.
Thus, the lapse of 10 years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription.
Case where prescription counted from issuance of the title
Segura v. Segura
It is noted that when Amojido secured the registration of the land in his
name following the deed of sale executed in his favor by the parties to
the extrajudicial partition, his certificate of title carried an express
reservation of whatever rights might pertain to the other heirs.
This annotation constituted an acknowledgment of the possibility that a
portion of the land might not belong to him and the commitment that
he would be holding such part as impliedly conveyed to him in trust by
and for its true owners.
However, when Amojido himself sold the land to Mirope, the transfer
certificate of title issued in her name no longer carried the said
encumbrance.
By the deletion of this annotation, Mirope, as the new transferee,
repudiated as of the date of registration the claim of the other heirs to
their shares in the property. From then on her assertion of ownership
over the whole land became adverse even as against the appellants
herein. And as the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of
her exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the said
heirs and started as against them the period of prescription.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Case where prescription not counted from issuance of the title
Maritegui v. Court of Appeals
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title
does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming
there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration
operates as a universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud
of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced
from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of
defraudation. Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action
barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their
names the lots involved.
RIGHT OF CO-OWNER TO DEMAND PARTITION
Partition
The division between two or more persons of real or personal property
which they own in common so that each may enjoy and possess his sole
estate to the exclusion of and without interference from the others.
Right to demand
GR: A co-owner has the right to demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned for no co-
owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Important: Action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches
XPNS:
1. When the co-owners have agreed to keep the thing undivided for
a period of time, not exceeding 10 years
2. When the partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a
certain period, not exceeding 20 years
3. When the partition is prohibited by law (e.g. ACP, CPG, family
home, party walls and fences)
4. When partition would render the thing unserviceable for the use
for which it is intended
5. When another co-owner has possessed the property as exclusive
owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription
Note: If the period stipulated for indivision exceeds 10 years, the
stipulation is only void insofar as the excess is concerned.
Existence of the fact of co-ownership
Partition presupposes that the thing to be divided is owned in common
and it is presumed that the parties admit the fact of co-ownership.
Hence, it is immaterial in whose name the property is declared for
taxation purposes.
5
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.
A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this
Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property.
SECTION 2. Order for partition, and partition, by agreement thereunder.
If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it shall order the partition
of the real estate among all the parties in interest.
Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make the partition among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by
30 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Partition as a mode of terminating co-ownership
Note: See Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.5
Restriction on right to ask for partition
1. An agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of
time, not exceeding 10 years, shall be valid. This term may be
extended by a new agreement. (2nd par., Art. 494)
2. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall
not exceed 20 years. (3rd par., Art. 494)
3. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed (Art. 498.)
Parol (Oral Partition)
Quimpo v. Abad
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to
support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a
deed of partition may be presumed.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties
thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking
possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
Effects of partition
1. Co-ownership is terminated
2. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not prejudice third
persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage, servitude or any
other real rights belonging to them before the division was made.
Personal rights pertaining to third persons against the co-
ownership shall also remain in force, nothwithstanding the
partition. (Art. 499)
See Art. 6186
3. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits
received and reimbursements for expenses made. Likewise, each
co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of his negligence
or fraud. (Art. 500)
See Art. 10877
4. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects of title
and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other co-owners.
(Art. 501)
all the parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court confirming the same,
shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is situated.
A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.
6
Easements are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided between two or more persons, the
easement is not modified, and each of them must bear it on the part which corresponds to him.
7
In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the income and fruits which each
one of them may have received from any property of the estate, for any useful and necessary
expenses made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice or neglect.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
RA 4276 CONDOMINIUM LAW
Condominium, defined
A condominium is an interest in real property consisting of separate
interest in a unit in a residential, industrial or commercial building and
an undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in the land on
which it is located and in other common areas of the building. A
condominium may include, in addition, a separate interest in other
portions of such real property. (Sec. 2)
Applicability of the Act
The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided
into condominiums only if there shall be recorded in the Register of
Deeds of the province or city in which the property lies and duly
annotated in the corresponding certificate of title of the land, if the latter
had been patented or registered under either the Land Registration or
Cadastral Acts, an enabling or master deed. (Sec. 4)
Extent of transfer
Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or
other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the
undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper case, the
membership or shareholdings in the condominium corporation. (Sec. 5)
Partition of condominium
Where several persons own condominiums in a condominium project,
an action may be brought by one or more such persons for partition
thereof by sale of the entire project, as if the owners of all of the
condominiums in such project were co-owners of the entire project in
the same proportion as their interests in the common areas. (Sec. 8)
Partition shall be made upon showing that:
1. That three years after damage or destruction to the project which
renders material part thereof unit for its use prior thereto, the
project has not been rebuilt or repaired.
2. That damage or destruction to the project has rendered one-half
or more of the units therein untenantable and that condominium
owners holding in aggregate more than thirty percent interest in
the common areas are opposed to repair or restoration of the
project.
3. That the project has been in existence in excess of fifty years, that
it is obsolete and uneconomic, and that condominium owners
holding in aggregate more than fifty percent interest in the
common areas are opposed to repair or restoration or remodeling
or modernizing of the project.
4. That the project or a material part thereof has been condemned or
expropriated and that the project is no longer viable, or that the
condominium owners holding in aggregate more than seventy
percent interest in the common areas are opposed to continuation
of the condominium regime.
5. That the conditions for such partition by sale set forth in the
declaration of restrictions, duly registered in accordance with the
terms of this Act, have been met.
Declaration of restrictions
1. The owner of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any
condominium therein, register a declaration of restrictions relating
to such project, which restrictions shall constitute a lien upon each
condominium in the project.
2. The Register of Deeds shall enter and annotate the declaration of
restrictions upon the certificate of title covering the land included
31 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
within the project, if the land is patented or registered under the
Land Registration or Cadastral Acts.
Condominium Corporation
Whenever the common areas in a condominium project are held by a
condominium corporation, such corporation shall constitute the
management body of the project.
The corporate purposes of such a corporation shall be limited to the
holding of the common areas, either in ownership or any other interest
in real property recognized by law, to the management of the project,
and to such other purposes as may be necessary, incidental or
convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes.
POSSESSION
POSSESSION AND THE KINDS THEREOF
Concept of Possession
A. The holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right with the intention
to possess in one’s own right.
B. Extends to both corporeal and incorporeal
C. Relation of power or control over object of possession and its
possessor, whether object be things or rights
Elements:
1. There must be holding or control of a thing or right
2. The holding or control must be with intention to possess
3. It must be in one’s own right
1- There must be holding of control of a thing or right
Possession always implies the element of occupation, whether in one’s
own name or in that of another.
Note: There should be occupancy, otherwise there is no
possession.
Yu v. Pacleb
Possession always implies the element of corpus or occupation, whether
in one’s own name or in that of another. But it is necessary that there
should be such occupancy or there is no possession.
2-The holding or control must be with intention to possess
Possession must involve a state of mind on the part of the possessor
whereby he intends to exercise a right of possession, whether the right
be legal or otherwise.
Animus Possidendi
This involves a state of mind whereby the possessor intends to exercise
and does exercise a right of possession, whether this right be legal or
otherwise and the intention and will to possess usually are inferred from
the fact that the thing in question is under the apparent power and
control of the alleged possessor.
3-It must be in one’s own right
Possession may be held by a person in his own name or in that of
another (i.e. by an agent in the name of the principal)
1. Possession may be in the concept of owner or a holder of the
thing (ex. Lessee) with ownership pertaining to another
2. Possession is exercised by the owner or holder, as principal,
through his agent
Note: In both cases, the possession of the owner or holder is by virtue
of his right as such owner or holder. Strictly, the agent has no possession
in law because it is not by virtue of his own right.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Possession v. Ownership
Medina v. Greenfield Dev’t Corp
Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as
possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-
possession inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that petitioners’
allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in the case at hand
because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed
equivalent to delivery of the property to respondent, and prior physical
delivery or possession is not legally required.
Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, “when the sale is made through a
public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot be inferred.” Possession is also transferred, along
with ownership thereof, to respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds
of conveyances.
Possession v. Occupation
Ong v. Republic
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not
to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit
the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
CLASSES OF POSSESSION UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
A. Possession in one’s own name or in the name of another
B. Possession in the concept of owner or in concept of holder
C. Possession in good faith or possession in bad faith
VIEWPOINTS OF POSSESSION
A. Right to Possession (jus possidendi) – This is a right or incident
of ownership (e.g. owner of parcel of land is entitled to possess)
B. Right of Possession (jus possessionis) – This is an independent
right in itself, independent of ownership (e.g. lessee by virtue of
the lease agreement is entitled to possess)
Ernesto Yu v. Pacleb
The issue in this case is: “Who has prior possession over a parcel of land
that is subject of an ejectment suit?”
1. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners (Yu’s) who bought
the property not from the respondents (who are the registered
owners) were not able to prove “prior possession”.
2. It wasestablished that the ones who supposedly delivered
possession of the land to them (petitioners) were not owners.
Specific acts that the SC noted to be indicative of respondents’
possession:
1. Tax declaration and receipts in 1994 and 1995 established the
possession of respondents.
2. The title of the land remains with the respondents.
32 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
DEGREES OF POSSESSION
1. Possession without title whatsoever – mere holding or
possession without any right or title at all, and in violation of the
right of the owner
Ex. possession of a thief or a usurper of land.
2. Possession with juridical title – possession is predicated on a
juridical relation existing between the possessor and the owner of
the thing but not in the concept of owner; it gives the transferee a
right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against
the owner, but not that of ownership. This is possession peaceably
acquired.
Ex. possession of tenant, depositary, or pledgee.
3. Possession with a just title – possession of an adverse claimant
whose title is sufficient to transfer ownership but is defective; a
title sufficient to transfer ownership, but not from the true owner
Ex. The possession of a vendee of a piece of land from one who
pretends to be the owner but is in fact not the owner; when the
seller is not the true owner or could not transmit his rights to he
possessor who acted in good faith.
4. Possession with a title in fee simple – possession with a just
title from the true owner. This possession springs from ownership.
This is the highest degree of possession.
EXTENT OF POSSESSION
Possession can either be actual or constructive.
D. Actual possession – occupancy in fact of the whole or at least
substantially the whole; Acts of dominion over the land in such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his property.
E. Constructive possession – possession does not mean that a
man has to have actual or physical occupation on every square
meter of ground for him to be considered in possession.
Important: The rule is, possession and control of a portion of a
tract under a claim of ownership is a constructive possession of all,
if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
NAME UNDER WHICH POSSESSION MAY BE HAD
Relevant provision: Art. 524
A. In one’s own name – the fact of possession and the right to such
possession are found in the same person, such as the actual
possession of an owner or a lessor of land.
B. In the name of another – the one in actual possession is without
any right of his own, but is merely an instrument of another in the
exercise of the latter’s possession, such as the possession of an
agent, servant, or guard.
Note: The meaning of possession in one’s own name is dependent on
the meaning of possession in the name of another.
Commentators: possession in another’s name = situation where
possessor is bound by some obligation or legal tie to another (e.g. agent,
administrator, lessee, borrower in commodatum.)
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
This view, in effect, embraces these two situations:
1. Possession strictly as an agent of the one entitled to possession
there being no right whatsoever in the one exercising it.
2. Possession with a right belonging to the person exercising the
possession in the name of another of which right that person is in
possession (implying existence of juridical relation) e.g. lessee or a
mere usufructuary.
CONCEPT IN WHICH POSSESSION MAY BE HAD
Relevant provision: Art. 525
1. Possession in concept of owner – when the possessor of a
thing or right, by his actions, are considered or believed by other
people as the owner, regardless of his good or bad faith
Note: Opinion not of possessor himself but opinion of others. The
possessor in the concept of owner may be the owner himself or
one who claims to be so.
2. Possession in the concept of holder
When the possessor of a thing or right holds it merely to keep or
enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another person.
Note: One who possesses as a mere holder, or not in the concept
of owner, acknowledges in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong (e.g.
tenant, usufructuary, or borrower of a thing in commodatum)
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals
The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert
petitioner's possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of
land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient
to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to
possess as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature
and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice
that the possession is under a claim of right.
In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by
petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be implied, its
possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the
same character as when it was acquired (that is, it possessed the land
only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of way), or
was by mere license or tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).
It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of
possessory character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the
owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION IN CONCEPT OF OWNER
1. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner
can serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
2. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be
obliged to show or prove it.
3. Possessor can bring all actions necessary to protect his possession,
availing himself of any action which an owner can bring, except
accion reinvidicatoria which is substituted by the accion publiciana
4. He can ask for inscription of his possession in the registry of
property
5. Upon recovering possession, he may demand fruits and damages
33 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH AND IN BAD FAITH
Relevant provision: Art. 526
CONCEPT
Possession, depending on the manner it has been acquired, may be
either in good faith or in bad faith. Good faith is always presumed, and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
A. Possessor in good faith – one who is not aware that there exists a
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
B. Possessor in bad faith – one who possesses in any case contrary
to the foregoing (i.e. he is aware that there exists in his title a flaw
which invalidates it)
When distinction important
1. Receipt of fruits
2. Payment of expenses and improvements
3. Acquisitive prescription
POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH
1. Good faith consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from
whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could
convey his title.
2. The belief of the possessor that he is the legal owner of the thing
must be based upon some title or mode of acquisition such as sale,
a donation, inheritance, or other means of transmitting ownership.
Without this, there can be no real well-grounded belief of one’s
ownership.
3. Ignorance of the law may be excusable and thus serve as the basis
of good faith. (e.g. prohibition to transfer during the 5 year period
in case of lands covered by a free patent)
POSSESSOR IN BAD FAITH
One in possession of property knowing that his title thereto is defective.
Examples: Possessor bought from one whom she knew was merely a
tenant; where he knew that land belong to another etc.
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CA
Facts:
(Appeal from Decision of Court of Appeals declaring private respondent
Felipe Carillo as a builder in good faith with a right to remain in the
questioned premises free of rent until reimbursed by petitioner, Manotok
Realty, Inc.)
1. There is no dispute that herein appellee is the registered owner of
a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 2455 and 2456
issued by the City Assessor's Office of Manila.
2. It acquired the aforementioned property from the Testate Estate
of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, being the highest bidder in a sale
conducted by the Probate Court.
3. After having acquired said property, the appellee subdivided it, but
could not take possession thereof because the whole area is
occupied by several houses among which is the one belonging to
the herein appellant Felipe Carillo.
4. Carillo claims to have acquired the lot in dispute from a certain
Delfin Dayrit on September 25, 1962, pursuant to a deed of
assignment.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

5. It was established by evidence that: Exception: Financing institutions

A. Dayrit in turn had acquired the property from the late Clam
Tambunting by virtue of a contract of Sale on Installment
Basis;
B. That Dayrit had religiously paid the monthly installments as
they fell due, his last payment being on May 25, 1954, in the
sum of P200.00, then leaving an unpaid balance of P1,306.00
when the said parcel was conveyed to defendant Carillo
Issue:
Whether or not Felipe Carillo is in good faith?
Ruling:
No. A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. (Art. 526,
Civil Code) One who acquires real estate with knowledge of a defect or
lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto
in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest
therein, and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge
of facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claims that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no
defect in the title of the vendor.
Applying the foregoing principle, the Supreme Court ruled that when
Dayrit executed the deed of assignment in favor of the respondent, the
disputed lot was already registered and titled in the name of the
petitioner. Such an act of registration served as a constructive notice to
the whole world and the title issued in favor of petitioner made his
ownership conclusive upon and against all persons including Dayrit and
herein respondent, although no personal notice was served on either of
the latter.
State Investment House v. CA
Nevertheless, we have to deviate from the general rule because of the
failure of the petitioner in this case to take the necessary precautions to
ascertain if there was any flaw in the title of the mortgage.
The petitioner is an investment and financing corporation. We presume
it is experienced in its business. Ascertainment of the status and
condition of properties offered to it as security for the loans it extends
must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations. Surely, it
cannot simply rely on an examination of a Torrens certificate to
determine what the subject property looks like as its condition is not
apparent in the document.
Indefeasibility of a Certificate of Title cannot be invoked where
title was obtained by means of fraud
Spouses Bornales v. CA
The petitioners claim that they were not aware of any defect in the title
of their vendors because the certificate of title in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest which their lawyer examined contained nothing
to put them on guard. The fact however remains that the petitioners
knew and were parties to the fraud committed against the private
respondent.
Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from their
vendors who procured title thereto by means of fraud, petitioners cannot
invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against the private
respondent to the extent of her interest therein. The Torrens system of
land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud
against the rightful owner of real property. Registration, to be effective,
must be made in good faith.

Furthermore, the respondent did not even bother to inquire about the
certificate of title covering the lot in question to verify who was the real
owner thereof, despite the fact that his transferor, Dayrit, never showed
him any title thereto; a circumstance which should have put him upon
such inquiry or investigation. His failure to exercise that measure of
precaution which was reasonably required of a prudent man in order to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor precludes him
from claiming possession in good faith.

A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely

relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale.

Buyer can rely on the Certificate of Title

Villamil v. Villarosa
Well-settled is the rule that every person dealing with a registered land
may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.

Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or

vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right
that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.

Gardner v. CA
While one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look
behind the certificate of title, he is nevertheless bound by the liens and
encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the
vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.

34 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION Examples:

1. Tradition simbolica (e.g. delivery of keys) and
WAYS OF ACQUIRING POSSESSION 2. Tradition longa manu (mere pointing of things transferred).

3-PROPER ACTS AND LEGAL FORMALITIES

Relevant provision: Art. 531
Another means of acquiring possession is through performance of
1. Material occupation juridical acts and legal formalities (e.g. donations, succession, contracts,
2. Subjection of thing or right to one’s will judicial possession, execution of judgments, execution and registration
3. Proper acts and legal formalities of public instruments etc.)

1-MATERIAL OCCUPATION Note: The law in these instances gives the force of acts of possession)
Possession always includes the idea of occupation, except in cases under
Execution of a public document
Article 537.
Ignacio Wong v. Hon. Carpio and Manuel Mercado
(Article 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely
The execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to
and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence,
the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If,
do not affect possession.)
however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing
Notes:
and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are
A. Actual physical possession/material apprehension
opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
B. Synonymous with occupation (under Art. 712)
Cebu Winland Development v. Ong Sia Hua
Difference between occupation in Article 531 and Article 712:
Article 14978 contemplates what is known as real or actual delivery,
when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession of the
Occupation under Art. 531 Occupation under Art. 712
vendee. Article 14989, on the one hand, refers to symbolic delivery by
the execution of a public instrument.
Has a juridical or
Used in grammatical sense
technical meaning
It should be noted, however, that Article 1498 does not say that the
execution of the deed provides a conclusive presumption of the delivery
Mode of acquiring possession Mode of acquiring ownership
of possession. It confines itself to providing that the execution thereof
is equivalent to delivery, which means that the presumption therein can
Must be coupled with Must be coupled with intent to
be rebutted by means of clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the
intent to possess own or appropriate presumptive delivery by the execution of a public instrument can be
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the
Applies where property is Can take place only with respect land sold.
with an owner or not to property without an owner
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION THRU SUCCESSION
Occupation can have its It cannot have as its
object a parcel of land object a parcel of land Relevant provisions: Arts. 533-534

Material occupation by delivery
The material occupation of a thing as a means of acquiring possession
may take place not only by actual delivery but also by constructive
delivery. Constructive delivery may be considered as equivalent to
material occupation in those cases where such occupation is essential
to the acquisition of possession.
A. Tradition brevi manu – takes place when one who possesses the
things by title other than ownership continues to possess the same
but under a new title that of ownership. (e.g. lessee who buys the
land leased)
A. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. One who validly
renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the
same. (Art. 553)
B. One who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the
consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is
not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the
effects of possession in good faith shall not benefit him except from
the date of death of the decedent. (Art. 534)

B. Tradition constituted possessorium – when the owner alienates the Illustration:

thing, but continues to possess the same under a different title.
(owner sells land and becomes a lessee thereof) If father or decedent was in bad faith, it does not necessarily mean
that the son was also in bad faith (because bad faith is personal).
2-SUBJECTION OF THE THING TO ONE’S WILL The son is presumed to be in good faith.

The occupation has the effect of subjecting things to the action of the However, since the father was in bad faith, the consequences of
possessor’s will. This does not necessarily involve material occupation, the good faith of the son should be counted only from the date of
but connotes a degree of control over the thing. the decedent’s death.

8
The thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. With regard to movable property, its
of the vendee. delivery may also be made by the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is
9
Art. 1498. When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be stored or kept.
equivaent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the

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Acquisitive Prescription involving hereditary property Exercise of rights of possession through legal representatives
Possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir Once possession is acquired, there is born the right of possession. In
without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent, in case the exercise of this right, they need the assistance of their legal
inheritance is accepted (tacking of possession) representatives.

Example: ACTS WHICH DO NOT AFFECT POSSESSION

Father died on June 1, 2003. Son accepted the inheritance on June 25,
2003. Possession is deemed transmitted not on June 25, 2003 but on
Relevant provisions: Art. 536-537
June 1, 2003.
1. Force or intimation
Rules in computation of time necessary for prescription
As long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. Does not apply
if the possessor makes no objection.
1. The present possessor may complete the period necessary for
prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or
Important: Thus, even if possessor is physically ousted from the
predecessor in interest.
property through the use of force or violence, he is still deemed
the legal possessor.
2. It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the
possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession
2. Acts merely tolerated
during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary
Those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner
of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
3. The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. (Art.
property. It is not merely silence or inaction. It means permission,
1138)
express or tacit, by virtue of which the acts of possession are
performed.
Q. If the predecessor held the property in bad faith for several
years, how should this possession (in bad faith) be taken into
Example: Acts of little disturbances, in the interest of
account for purposes of computing the required number of
neighborliness or friendly relations, e.g. permitting others to do on
years of possession for the (benefit) of the successor?
his property to pass his land, tie a carabao, or getting some water
from a well.
ANS: In the conversion of the character of possession by the same
possessor (unlike in tacking of possession), i.e. “ from good faith to bad
3. Acts executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of
faith, most civilists advance the view that the possessor during his
the possessor
possession in good faith should be granted an equivalent period of
The acts are not public and unknown to the possessor or owner.
possession as the extraordinary prescriptive period bears to the ordinary
period of prescription.
Kilario v. CA
Or, in the proportion of 3:1 (30 years extraordinary to 10 years ordinary) Re: Possessors by mere tolerance cannot be considered as builders in
good faith under Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
Important: In other words, every 3 years of possession in bad faith is
equivalent to 1 year possession in good faith. Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property
by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the
Illustration: premises may be terminated any time.
Father possessed in bad faith “A”s land for 3 years, after which the
property was presumably inherited by M (son). M was in good faith. For Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
how many years more from the father’s death, should M possess the permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
land in order to become its owner? an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing
in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
A: For 9 years. How is this arrived? them.
3 x 10/30 = 30/30 = 1
Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith.
In other words, we took and considered this 1 year and add it to 9 (to It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil
complete) possession in good faith of M to 10 years. Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION BY INCAPACITATED possessor in good faith, i.e. one who builds on land with the belief that
he is the owner thereof.
Relevant provision: Art. 535
Not a case of tolerance
POSSESSION BY MINORS AND INCAPACITATED
Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; Macasaet v. Macasaet
but they need the assistance of their legal representatives in order to The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely
exercise the rights which from the possession arise in their favor. “something not wholly approved of” by respondents. Neither did it arise
from what Tolentino refers to as “neighborliness or familiarity.” In point
Important: Things are limited to corporeal things only. Rights are not of fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the
included. complete approval of respondents, who desired that their children would
occupy the premises. It arose from familial love and a desire for family
Incapacitated persons solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.
1. Minors
2. Spendthrifts
3. Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write
4. Those under civil interdiction

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When possession is not adverse

POSSESSION AS A FACT IN 2 DIFFERENT PERSONALITIES
Relevant provision: Art. 538
Conflict over possession de facto
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Important: The word “personalities” is not synonymous to persons. In
co-ownership, there are two or more persons, but only one personality.
Preference of possession
In case a dispute arises regarding the fact of possession, the order of
preference is as follows:
A. The present possessor shall be preferred.
B. If there are two possessors, the one longer in possession
C. If the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents
a title
D. All things being equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings.
EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
GENERAL EFFECTS
A. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored
to said possession by the means established by the laws and the
Rules of Court. (Art. 539)
B. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall
be deemed to have exclusively possessed the part which may be
allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period
during which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the
possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in common
shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors. However, in case of
civil interruption, the Rules of Court shall apply. (Art. 543)
Wolfson v. Aenlle
Facts:
1. At or about the time the shortage in plaintiff's land was discovered,
the defendant said to the plaintiff: "Let us wait for the cadastral
survey, and if it is established by that survey that I am holding any
part of your property, I will return to you all of that portion which
may be in excess of what appears in my title.”
2. The cadastral survey was later made from which it was found as a
fact that the defendant was holding 1,635 square meters of
plaintiff's land in excess of defendant's record title.
3. The refusal of the defendant to abandon his claim to the plaintiff
for the excess of the 1,635 square meters, which was found to exist
by the cadastral survey, resulted in the commencement of this
action.
Ruling:
After 1910, the defendant's possession of the land in dispute could not
be adverse to plaintiff's claim until after the cadastral survey was made,
and the defendant had refused to abandon his claim for the excess. That
important fact, having been established by the evidence of an impartial
witness whose testimony is not disputed or denied, is conclusive of this
case. Under such a state of facts, the defendant could not acquire title
by prescription.
Where a party, through ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake, occupies
land up to a given line beyond his actual boundaries because he believes
it to be his true line, but has no intention of claiming title to the extent,
if it should be ascertained that such line is on his neighbor’s land, such
possession beyond his true line is not adverse.
LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF JUST TITLE
A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal
presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged
to show or prove it.

EFFECTS OF POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER Meaning of “Just Title”

Title is not necessarily the document. “Just title” means that which is
Relevant provisions: Art. 540-541 legally sufficient to transfer ownership or the real right to which it
relates.
TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION
Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can Possession Prescription
serve as a title for acquiring dominion.
A. Just Title is presumed A. Just Title must be proved
Application
B. Just Title means “titulo B. Just Title means “titulo”
verdadero y valido” (true (merely colorable title
1. To consolidate title by prescription, the possession must be
and valid title sufficient to although there was a mode
underclaim of ownership and it must be peaceful, public and
transfer ownership) of transferring ownership)
uninterrupted.

2. Acts of possessory character done by virtue of a license or mere

Notes: Notes:
tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient e.g.
 There is a mode of Although there is a mode of
possession by lessees, trustees, pledges, tenants.
transferring ownership (Art. acquiring ownership, still
71210) something is wrong, because
3. Where a party through ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake
 The grantor is the owner the grantor is not the owner.
occupies a land up to a given line beyond his actual boundaries
 No need for prescription
because he believes it to be his true line, but has no specific
intention of claiming title to that extent, if it should be ascertained
that such line is on his neighbor’s land, such possession is not
adverse. The question is one of intent.

10
Art. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.Ownership and and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition. They may also
other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by estate be acquired by means of prescription.

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RIGHT OF POSSESSOR TO FRUITS
Relevant provisions: Arts. 544-545
RIGHT TO FRUITS
A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted.
A. Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time
they are gathered or severed.
B. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor
in good faith in that proportion.
RULE ON PENDING FRUITS
A. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or
industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the
expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in
proportion to the time of the possession.
B. The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two
possessors.
C. The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the
possessor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation and
gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his part of the
expenses of cultivation and the net proceeds; the possessor in
good faith who for any reason whatever should refuse to accept
this concession, shall lose the right to be indemnified in any other
manner.
Q. How is good faith interrupted?
To interrupt, it is not necessary to initiate legal proceedings such as filing
a case in court. (e.g. Receipt of demand letters, summons, etc.)
Rosales v. Castelltort
Good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment defects in
the title are made known to the possessor by extraneous evidence or by
suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. In this case,
Castelltort’s good faith ceased on August 21, 1995, when petitioners
personally apprised him of their title over the questioned lot.
Bartolome Ortiz v. Kayanan
Possessor in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the
recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the possessor may
receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he answers the
complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or lawful
possessor.
EXPENSES
Relevant provisions: Arts. 546-548
NECESSARY EXPENSES
What are “necessary expenses”?
1. Expenses imposed by the existence of the thing itself, and have no
relation to the desire or purpose of the possessor; hence, they are
reimbursed, whatever may be the juridical character (whether one
is in good faith or bad faith) of the person who advanced.
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2. Those incurred for the preservation of the thing, they are not
considered as improvements. They do not increase the value of the
thing, but merely prevent it from being useless.
Rule on Necessary Expenses
A. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor
B. However, only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Art. 546)
USEFUL EXPENSES
What are Useful Expenses?
They are incurred to give utility or productivity of the thing. (e.g.
expenses for filling up with soil, house constructed on the land, etc.)
Rule on Useful Expenses
A. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention
B. The person who has defeated him in the possession has the option
of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase
in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Can a “possessor in good faith” remove improvements?
Yes. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the
principal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them, unless
the person who recovers the possession exercises the option under
paragraph 2 of the preceding article.
EXPENSES FOR PURE LUZURY
What are “Expenses for Pure Luxury”?
These expenses do not affect the existence or the substance of the thing
itself, but only the comfort, convenience, or enjoyment (C-C-E) of the
possessor.
Rule on expenses for pure luxury
A. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded
to the possessor in good faith.
B. The possessor in good faith may remove the ornaments with which
he has embellished the principal thing, provided:
b) The principal thing suffers no injury thereby, and
c) His successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended.
SUMMARY
1. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor, whether
in good faith or in bad faith.
2. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith.
3. With respect to expenses for pure luxury or pleasure, two kinds of
possessors (good faith and bad faith possessors) have the same
rights:
To remove the improvements upon which they were made if the
principal thing will suffer no injury and the owner does not prefer
to retain them upon payment of the proper indemnity. (Art. 549)
Note: They only differ in amount of refund:
a) Good faith – amount expended
b) Bad faith – value they may have at the time (successor) enters
into possession.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

Important: With regard to useful expenses, the possessor in bad faith Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
has no right to remove. over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
*See however the case of Carbonell v. CA (No longer controlling) matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
Carbonell v. CA
As a matter of equity, the possessors in bad faith should be allowed to HOW POSSESSION MAY BE LOST
remove the aforesaid improvements (useful improvements e.g. draining
the property, filling it with 500 cubic meters of garden soil, building a 1. By the abandonment of the thing
wall around it and installing a gate and P11,929.00 for erecting a 2. By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous
bungalow thereon), unless the lawful possessor chooses to pay for their title
value at the time the possessor in bad faith introduced said useful 3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out
improvements. of commerce
4. By the possession of another
Important: However, in the later case of MWSS v. CA, the Supreme 5. Abandonment
Court reiterated that the right given a possessor in bad faith to remove 6. Assignment
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere 7. Destruction (Loss)
pleasure as provided in Article 549 of the Civil Code. 8. Possession of another

POSSESSION OF MOVABLES Abandonment

Requisites:
1. Spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone
Relevant provision: Art. 542 2. Animus revertendi (intention of returning) is finally given up

EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE United States v. Laurente Rey; Domalsin v. Valenciano

The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to a title.
Requisites for title:
1. Possession is in good faith
2. The owner has voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing
3. Possessor is in the concept of an owner.
Rule of Irrevindicability
GR: If the owner has lost the thing, or he has been unlawfully deprived
of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber,
but also from third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from
such finder, thief, or robber.
XPN: When possessor acquired it in good faith in a public sale. In this
case, owner may recover provided he shall reimburse the possessor.
Abandonment of a thing is the voluntary renunciation of all rights which
a person may have in a thing, with the intent to lose such thing. A thing
is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost if the spes
recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi
(the intention of returning) is finally given up.
USUFRUCT
USUFRUCT IN GENERAL
Relevant provisions: Arts. 562-565
USUFRUCT, DEFINED
Right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides.

Important: There are, however, instances where even if the owner
offers to reimburse, still he cannot recover as a matter of right:
1. Estoppel
2. If title is lost through prescription
3. If possessor is a holder in due course of a document of title
Another definition
Real right, of a temporary nature, which authorizes its holder to enjoy
all the benefits which results from the normal enjoyment of another’s
property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either
the same thing, or in special cases, its equivalent (quasi-usufruct).

Q. What is the meaning of “unlawful deprivation”? Includes both the:

Unlawful deprivation is not limited to cases where property is stolen. It 1. Right to use
extends to all cases where there has been no valid transmission of 2. Right to the fruits
ownership, including the case where the proprietor has entrusted the
thing to a borrower, depositary, or lessee who has sold the same. Usufructuary
(Dominador Dizon v. Suntay) One who has the right of usufruct.

EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos Naked owner

Issue:
Whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was
dishonored.
Ruling:
No. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind
the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks.
But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to
another.
Owner of the thing without the right to the fruits and the right to use
the fruits.
Characteristics of Usufruct:
1. It is a real right of use and enjoyment
2. It is of a temporary nature or duration
3. It is transmissible
4. It may be constituted on real or personal property, consumable or
non-consumable, tangible or intangible – ownership of which is
vested in another
5. Purpose is to enjoy the benefits and derive all the advantages of a
thing as a consequence of normal use or exploitation

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Important: A person cannot create a usufruct over his own property
and at the same time retain possession over the same. To be a
usurfructuary of one’s property is a contradiction in terms and a
conceptual absurdity.
EXTENT OF USUFRUCT
A. Usufruct is a real right (power belonging to a person over a specific
thing, without a passive subject individually determined against
whom such right may be personally exercised) and includes both
the jus utendi and the jus fruendi.
B. There is an obligation to preserve the form and substance of the
thing in usufruct as a rule (e.g. If usufruct on a fishpond, it must
be preserved as a fishpond; if a sugarcane field, it must be
preserved as a sugarcane field)
RIGHTS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
Relevant provision: Arts. 566-582
RIGHTS OF USUFRUCTUARY
1. The usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property, to the same
extent as the owner, but only with respect to its use and the receipt
of its fruits. He is entitled to all the natural, industrial, and civil
fruits of the property. (e.g. right to receive dividends as
usufructuary of shares of stock)
Note: However, he cannot extract products which do not constitute
fruits, because he is bound to preserve the form and substance of
the thing.
2. May personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or
alienate his right of usufruct even by a gratuitous title, but all the
contracts he may enter into as such shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct.
Exception: Legal usufruct such as right of usufruct of parents over
properties of minor children.
3. Usufructuary may make such useful improvements or expenses for
mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter
its form or substance, but he has no right to be indemnified.
Note: He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property or set-off the
improvements against any damage to the same.
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
Relevant provisions: Arts. 583-602
OBLIGATIONS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY
At or before the beginning of the usufruct, the usufructuary has the
obligation to:
1. Take care of the things in usufruct as a good father of a family.
2. Shall answer for any damage (in case he alienates or lease his right
of usufruct)
3. Obliged to make ordinary repairs (Note: extraordinary repairs are
at owner’s expense, but usufructuary obliged to notify owner)
4. Usufructuary obliged to notify owner of any act of third person, of
which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to rights of
ownership
5. Make an inventory of all the property (appraisal of the movables
and description of the condition of immovables)
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6. To give security
Important: Non-compliance does not prevent usufruct from taking
place, but usufructuary cannot enter into possession.
Effect of failure to give security
Naked owner may demand that:
A. Immovable be placed under administration
B. Movables be sold
C. Public bonds, instruments of credit, etc. be converted into
registered securities
Limitations on the rights of the usufructuary (when he does
not put up the required security)
1. Usufructuary cannot possess the property until he gives security
2. Usufructuary cannot administer the property, hence he cannot
execute lease
3. Usufructuary cannot collect credits that have matured
Note: But, usufructuary can alienate his right of usufruct (since failure
to give security does not extinguish usufruct)
Usufructuary may (in certain instances) be exempted from
putting up security
“Caucion Juratoria” – promise under oath (Article 587)
[Art. 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security claims, by
virtue of a promise under oath, the delivery of the furniture necessary
for his use, and that he and his family be allowed to live in a house
included in the usufruct, the court may grant this petition, after due
consideration of the facts of the case.]
Important: Here, the promise under oath takes the place of bond and
security. This is based on necessity and humanity.
Q. Who between the naked owner and the usufructuary has the
obligation to pay annual charges or taxes?
A. Those considered as lien on the fruits – usufructuary
B. Those considered as lien on the capital – naked owner
Q. Who has the obligation to pay real estate taxes?
There is variance of opinion.
A. Chargeable against the usufructuary (Manresa, JBL Reyes, CA in
Quirante v. Quirante)
B. Chargeable against the owner as the land burdens the capital
(Bislig Bay Lumber v. Surigao; BAA of Zamboanga v. Samar Mining
Company)
Note: See however Art. 597 which provides that taxes which, during the
usufruct, may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the expense
of the owner.
RIGHTS OF NAKED OWNER
Naked owner may either:
A. Deliver property to usufructuary
B. Choose retention of property as administrator (i.e. usufructuary
gets net proceeds less administration expense)
C. Demand receivership
Note: During the usufruct, the usufructuary enjoys the beneficial title to
the property, the naked title being retained by the owner.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

USUFRUCT OVER CONSUMABLE THINGS Fulfillment of a resolutory condition

A. With regard to consumable things, strictly speaking there can be Mercedes Moralidad v. Sps. Pernes
no usufruct, because they cannot be enjoyed without being
A provision in the contract states: “Anyone of my kins may enjoy the
consumed. But since the law recognizes usufruct over all kinds of
privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided,
things, if thing is consumable, usufruct should be considered as on
however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof”
their value if appraised, or an equal quantity and quality if not.
That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between
B. Even unproductive things can be an object of usufruct.
and among kin constitutes an indispensable condition for the
continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding
Notes:
provision which states: “Anyone of my kins who cannot conform to the
A. Improperly called “quasi-usufruct”.
wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his
B. The usufruct is not upon the consumable things themselves which
own.”
are delivered to the usufructuary, but upon the sum representing
their value or upon a quantity of things of the same kind and
In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the
quality.
atmosphere of cooperation, them bickering or the cessation of
C. Usufructuary becomes the owner of the things in usufruct such as
harmonious relationship between or among kin constitutes a resolutory
a sum of money or a quantity of liquids or grain. Grantor becomes
condition which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the
merely a creditor entitled to the return of their value or of things
usufruct.
of the same quantity and quality.
Prescription
Usufruct granted to aliens
Note: It is not the non-use by the usufructuary, but use by a third person
that extinguishes usufruct.
Ramirez v. Ramirez
This opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda
EFFECT OF BAD USE OF THING
because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in
the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
A. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the thing in usufruct.
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
B. However, if the abuse should cause considerable injury to the
EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT naked owner, the latter may demand that the thing be delivered to
him, binding himself to pay annually to the usufructuary the net
Relevant provisions: Arts. 603-612 proceeds of the same, after deducting the expenses for
administration
EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT
EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF USUFRUCT
1. By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears 1. The usufructuary loses right to the possession of the thing in
2. By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by usufruct
the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct 2. Usufructuary has the obligation to deliver to the naked owner the
3. By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person thing in usufruct, unless he is entitled to the right of retention.
4. By renunciation of the usufructuary
5. By the total loss of the thing in usufruct Right of retention
6. By the termination of the right of the person constituting the The usufructuary has the right to retain the thing in usufruct, until
usufruct payment by the owner of:
7. By prescription
1. The sums advanced for payment of taxes imposed directly on the
Death of usufructuary capital
2. Amount equivalent to the increase in value of the immovable by
Eleizegui v. Lawn Tennis Club reason of extraordinary repairs paid for by usufructuary
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises from a lease.
It is a real right and includes all the jus utendi and jus fruendi.
Nevertheless, the utmost period for which a usufruct can endure, if
constituted in favor of a natural person, is the lifetime of the
usufructuary.

Important: Usufruct is extinguished upon the death of the

usufructuary. This is true even if there is a resolutory condition or
condition stipulated and the usufructuary dies before the expiration of
the period or fulfillment of the condition, unless a contrary intention
appears. In which case, the usufruct continues even after the death of
the usufructuary.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

EASEMENTS OF SERVITUDES 2. Discontinuous

EASEMENTS IN GENERAL C. As to whether its existence is indicated

1. Apparent
Different Kinds of Easements 2. Non-apparent

D. As to duty to servient owner

Relevant provision: Arts. 613-619
1. Positive
2. Negative
CONCEPT OF EASEMENT
It is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
E. As to its source
another immovable belonging to a different owner.
1. Voluntary – constituted by will or agreement of the parties
2. Mixed – created partly by agreement and partly by law
A. Dominant estate – immovable in favor of which the easement is
3. Legal or compulsory– constituted by law for public use or for
established.
private interest
B. Servient estate – immovable subject to the easement.
a) Waters (art. 637-648)
b) Right of way (arts. 649-657)
What is easement?
c) Party wall (arts. 658-666)
Easement under common law is only one form of servitude. It is always
d) Light and view (arts. 667-673)
predial or real (benefit of another realty)
e) Drainage of buildings (arts. 674-676)
f) Intermediate distances
What is servitude?
g) Against nuisances and
Servitudes is a term used for easement in civil law countries. It may
h) Lateral and subjacent support
refer to predial easement or to a personal easement (benefit of
community or of one or more persons to whom encumbered estate does
not belong) Modes of acquiring easements

CHARACTERISTICS OF EASEMENTS: MODES

1. It is a real right but will affect third persons only when registered Relevant provisions: Arts. 620-626
2. Can be imposed only on the property of another, never on one’s
own property 1. TITLE
3. It is inseparable from the estate to which it is actively or passively
attached, hence, it cannot be alienated independently of the estate All easements
4. It is indivisible for it is not affected by the division of the estate A. Continuous and apparent
between two or more persons B. Continuous and non-apparent
5. Produces limitation on ownership, but ownership of servient estate C. Discontinuous, whether apparent or non-apparent
is unimpaired
6. Exists only between neighboring tenements. 2. PRESCRIPTION

Characteristics of “intransmissibility” and “indivisibility” Easement may be acquired by prescription of 10 years if it is

continuous and apparent.
A. Intransmissibility – cannot be alienated or mortgaged separately
from the estate to which it forms part A. Continuous easements – those the use of which is or may be
incessant, without the intervention of man e.g. easement of
B. Indivisibility – necessary consequence of inseparability of the drainage (manner of exercise, not its continuous existence)
easement or servitude.
B. Apparent easements – those made known by external signs
Note: Thus, even if servient and dominant estates are divided between e.g. right of way, window in a party wall visible to both
two or more persons, easement continues to attach to the estates. owners.

Unisource commercial v. Joseph Chung
In case of division of the dominant estate into several parts, each and
every part shall continue to enjoy the easement in its entirety. The mere
fact that respondents subdivided the property does not extinguish the
easement. Article 618 of the civil code provides that if the dominant
estate is divided between two or more persons, each of them may use
the easement in its entirety, without changing the place of its use, or
making it more burdensome in any other way.
Important: Only continuous and apparent (C & A) easements may
be acquired either by title or prescription. The others may be
acquired by any other modes, but not by prescription.
Note: Right of way cannot be acquired by prescription being not
continuous although it is apparent.
Concurring Opinion of J.B.L. Reyes (Ronquillo v. Roco)

CLASSIFICATIONS OF EASEMENT The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the
power of the dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient
A. As to recipient of benefits tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner.
1. Real As a servitude, it is a limitation on the servient owner's rights of
2. Personal ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from his
property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner
B. As to manner of its exercise actually crosses or passes over the servient estate; because when
1. Continuous he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect and
undisturbed.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and
uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at
intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or
discontinuous nature.
In acquiring easement by prescription, the time of possession shall
be computed as follows:
1. Positive easements (e.g. drainage or aqueduct) – from the
day on which the owner of the dominant estate or the person
who may have made use of the easement commenced to
exercise it upon the servient estate.
2. Negative easements (e.g. light and view) – from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an
instrument acknowledge before a notary public (notarial
prohibition), the owner of the servient estate from executing
an act which would be lawful without the easement.
3. BY DEED OF RECOGNITION
Applies to easements mentioned in Art. 622
1. Continuous non-apparent easements
2. Discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not
Note: It presupposes that there is a title for the easement but
there is no document or proof showing its origin.
Important: The absence of document showing the origin of
easement may be cured by the act of the owner of the servient
estate in voluntarily executing a deed of recognition acknowledging
the existence of the easement.
4. BY FINAL JUDGMENT
If the servient owner refuses or denies the existence of the
easement, the court may declare such existence upon sufficient
proof.
5. BY APPARENT SIGN OR LEGAL PRESUMPTION
Existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be
considered, should either of them be alienated as a title, unless at
the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
is provided or the sign is removed.
Valisno v. Adriano
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant's land for the
passage of water from the Pampanga river to Honorata's land prior
to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was
equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it,
as provided in article 624 of the Civil Code.
Eduardo Tañedo v. Bernad et.al.
In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the
easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of lot
7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use
of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of lot 7501-a
before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tañedo. Hence, the use of the
septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the
11
Facts: The lower court ruled that North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the
hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands.
Issue: Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar
cane from the hacienda owners’ lands.
Ruling: No. It is clear that the easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of
the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.
43 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim, the new owners of the servient
estate (lot 7501-B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude.
EFFECTS OF EASEMENTS
Relevant provisions: Arts. 625-626
Q. What are some of the effects of easement?
1. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary
for its use are considered granted.
2. Title to an easement govern the rights of the dominant estate and
obligation of the servient estate.
Jabonete v. Monteverde
Right of way granted to “family, drivers, servants, and jeeps” was
held to be personal servitude and not predial servitude, that inures
to the benefit of the above-named persons and not to whoever
should own the dominant estate.
3. Owner of dominant estate cannot use easement except for the
benefit of immovable originally contemplated, neither can he
exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established. (e.g. easement to draw water for irrigation purposes
cannot be used to supply water to factory)
Exception: Valderrama v. North Negros Sugar Co.11
Section 3 – Rights and Obligations
DOMINANT ESTATE
Relevant provisions: Arts. 627-628
1. May make at his own expense, on the servient estate any works
necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but
without altering it or rendering it more burdensome. For this
purpose, he must:
A. Notify the owner of the servient estate
B. Choose the most convenient time and manner so as to cause
the least inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate
2. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners of all of them
shall be obliged to contribute to the expenses referred to in the
preceding article, in proportion to the benefits which each may
derive from the work. Anyone who does not wish to contribute may
exempt himself by renouncing the easement for the benefit of the
others.
Note: If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the
easement in any manner whatsoever, he shall also be obliged to
contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated.
Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the
corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced
by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is
nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
SERVIENT ESTATE
Relevant provisions: Arts. 629-630
1. Retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is
established and may use the same in such a manner as not to
affect the exercise of the easement.
2. Cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Important: However, if the easement same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent
him from making any important works, repairs or improvements
thereon, it may be changed at his expense, provided:
a) He offers another place or manner equally convenient and
b) In such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner
of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to
the use of the easement.
Modes of Extinguishment of Easements
EXTINGUISHMENT OF EASEMENT
Relevant provisions: Arts. 631-633
1. By merger in the same person of the ownership of the
dominant and servient estates.
Note: See the case Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading, where
the Supreme Court held that there is no genuine merger, the
easement of right of way therein being a case of “personal
easement” but not a case of pre-dial easement.
2. By nonuser for 10 years
A. From the day on which they ceased to be used – with respect
to discontinuous easements
B. From the day on which an act contrary to the same took place
– with respect to continuous easements
3. When either or both of the estates fall into such condition
that the easement cannot be used
Note: But it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates
or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the use
becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding number.
4. By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the
condition
Note: This applies if the easement is temporary or conditional.
5. By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
6. By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the
dominant and servient estates
44 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Merger
Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading
In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant
tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate, in this case, the public at large.
Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient
dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves
the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor
of the public if that is possible, no genuine merger can take place that
would terminate a personal easement.
LEGAL EASEMENTS
EASEMENT RELATING TO WATERS
Relevant provisions: Arts. 637-648
1. Natural drainage (lower estates are obliged to receive the waters
which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher estates)
2. Drainage of buildings (owner of building obliged to construct roof
so that rain water shall fall on his own land)
3. Easement on riparian banks for navigation, floatage, fishing etc.
(Article 51, Water code of the Philippines)
4. Easement of a dam
5. Easement for drawing water/watering animals
6. Easement of aqueduct (a person who may use water upon his
estate shall have the right to make it flow through intervening
estates
7. Easement for construction of stop lock or sluice gate
Example of “legal easement”
Art. 51. The banks or rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and
lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of 3 meters in
urban areas, 20 meters in agricultural areas and 40 meters in forest
areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in
the interest of recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing and salvage.
No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
necessary for recreation, navigation, flotage, fishing or salvage or to
build structures of any kind. (Water code of the Philippines, PD 1067)
Chiongbian-Oliva v. Republic
Issues:
1. Whether the trial court is correct in taking judicial notice of the fact
that petitioner’s lot is situated in an urban area and not in a forest
area, and in thus concluding that the legal easement applicable for
river bank protection is 3 meters and not 40 meters.
2. Whether Section 90 (i) of CA No. 141 which provides for a uniform
easement of 40 meters from the bank on each side of any river,
and which preserves the said 40-meter portion as permanent
timberland regardless of whether it is situated in a forest area or
an urban area, is still applicable to lots situated in an urban area in
the light of the provisions of subsequent legislation, specifically
Section 51 of PD No. 1067.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Ruling:
Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the public
domain, the application for free patent contained the condition that a
40-meter legal easement from the banks on each side of any river or
stream found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved as
permanent timberland. However, after the property was administratively
titled, it underwent several surveys for purposes of subdivision,
consolidation, or consolidation-subdivision. Thus, presently only 3
meters is required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent
timberland.
In this case, the trial court properly took judicial notice that Talamban,
Cebu City is an urban area.
EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY
Relevant provisions: Arts. 649-657
RIGHT OF WAY
The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or
use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Requisites:
1. Dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway.
2. Payment of the proper indemnity
3. Isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate
4. Right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Note: Hence, subject to the limitation that the usefulness of the
servient tenement to its owner is not impaired.
Important: In case of conflict, “least prejudicial” prevails over
“short distance”.
RULES GOVERNING EASEMENTS
A. Must be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and if possible, the shortest distance. In
case of conflict, short distance prevails over least
prejudice.
Guitmen v. CA
In easement of right of way, that easement where the way is
shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if
the two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way
where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest
route. This is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest
distance.
This means that the court is not bound to establish what is the
shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to
the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls
which can be avoided by a roundabout way, or to secure the
interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance
would place the way on a dangerous decline.
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Quitanilla v. Abangan
Re: Requirement of least prejudice not complied.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong
materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and
another right of way which although longer will only require a van
or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement.
Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing
the easement, the same should not be imposed.
B. Width of the easement shall be that which is sufficient for
the needs of the dominant estate. May be adjusted from
time to time.
Tomas Encarnacion v. CA
Facts:
1/2 meter width of the path was taken from the servient estate and
the other 1/2 meter portion was taken from another lot owned by
Mamerto Magsino. It was also about t hat time that petitioner
started his plant nursery business on his land where he also had
his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the highway
for his family and for his customers.
Ruling:
While the Supreme Court recognized “that an additional 1 ½
meters in the width of the pathway will reduce the servient estate
to only about 342.5 square meters”, it noted that petitioner has
expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his land
to compensate private respondents for their loss (thus, addressing
the requirement of least prejudice)
When petitioner started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his
family could easily make do with a few pushcarts to tow the plants
to the national highway. But the business grew and with it the need
for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport. Manual
hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have
become extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force
petitioner to leave his jeepney in the highway, exposed to the
elements and to the risk of theft simply because it could not pass
through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness on the
part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for
all the people concerned.
Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary
aspect of the plant nursery business.
C. If piece of land is acquired by sale, exchange, or partition,
vendor, exhanger, or co-owner is bound to grant right of
way, without indemnity. In case of simple donation, donor
shall be indemnified.
D. Mere convenience to the dominant estate is not
determinative for the grant of a compulsory easement of
right of way.
Remigio Ramos v. Gatchalian Realty
Petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet
to the Sucat road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne
out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided
by the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos subdivision indicated as lot 4133-
g-12 in its Subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that
said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the
petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not
bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Requirement of proving “that there is no other adequate outlet:
Here, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had
established the existence of the four requisites mandated by law.
For one, they failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from
their respective properties to a public highway. On the contrary, as
alleged by the petitioner in its answer to the complaint, and
confirmed by the appellate court, "there is another outlet for the
plaintiffs (private respondents) to the main road."
Constabella Corp. v. CA
To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is
"adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need
to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. For to justify
the imposition of an easement or right of way, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it.
Encarnacion v. CA
Re: A case of inadequate outlet
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally,
the right of way may be demanded:
1. When there is absolutely no access to a public highway,
2. When, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use
or is grossly insufficient.
In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-
concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the
highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must
literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the
rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus,
it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent
disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not
impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
E. Easement of right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription being a “discontinuous easement” although it
is apparent.
See: Concurring Opinion of J.B.L. Reyes (Ronquillo v. Roco)
Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. CA
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not
in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way to
one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or
physical indications showing the existence of an easement, but
rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such
easement into continuous or discontinuous.
The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement
into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right
of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view)
are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond
a certain height is non-apparent.
COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT
A. Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use
may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage – the indemnity shall consist of
the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate.
46 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
B. In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the
cultivation of the estate surrounded by others and for the gathering
of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way
– the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused
by such encumbrance. (Art. 649)
Amount of compensation (aerial right of way)
NPC v. Suarez
Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent’s
property was purely an easement of a right of way, still, we cannot
sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee and not the full
value of the property.
The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases
in which the Supreme Court sustained the award of just compensation
for private property condemned for public use.
True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the
easement itself, and respondent retains full ownership of the property.
The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis.
Considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power lines,
the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would
deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the
latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
EFFECT WHEN EASEMENT IS EXTINGUISHED
If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be
necessary because its owner has joined it to another abutting on a public
road, the owner of the servient estate may demand that the easement
be extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of
indemnity. The interest on the indemnity shall be deemed to be in
payment of rent for the use of the easement. (Art. 655)
EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL
Relevant provisions: Arts. 658-666
Co-ownership or easement?
A. Easement (Manresa, De Diego, Castan, And Ricci)
B. Co-ownership (Sanchez Roman, Valverde, etc.)
This co-ownership is a special class in itself as shown by the following:
1. Co-ownership is indivisible
2. Part pertaining to the co-owner can be materially designated
3. Rights of a co-owner greater than those of an ordinary co-owner,
such as with respect to increasing the height of the wall. This is a
kind of compulsory kind of co-ownership.
It is a servitude
It is a servitude because, in an ordinary co-ownership, none of the co-
owners may do anything on the common property for his own exclusive
benefit, but in a party wall, there is no limitation upon the juridical action
of the owners.
Being a case of “forced-ownership”, adjoining estates may be
considered as dominant and servient to each other. Others, however,
prefer to consider the estates as the dominant immovables and the party
wall the servient property.
Presumption of existence of party wall
1. In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the point of common
elevation
2. In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities, towns, or in
rural communities
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
3. In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands. (Art. 659)
Instances of existence of proof to the contrary are enumerated
under Article 600
Domingo Labo v. Heirs of Alburo
Facts:
This involved a conflict in the inclusion of stone wall in the application
for registration of a parcel of land. It was contended by the oppositor:
A. That a stone wall shown in that plan to be northeast of the said
parcel had been improperly included
B. That this wall had belonged to the said Lorenza Alburo, for it had
existed since march 8, 1881
C. That the principal timbers of the building that had belonged to the
said deceased had rested on it for more than 35 years, and
D. That the latter's successors had been and were now in the quiet,
peaceable, and uninterrupted possession of the said wall.
Ruling:
The record shows it to have been duly proven that:
1. The enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A, belonging to
the applicants, is much higher than the adjoining building of the
objectors
2. Along the top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the
rain water from the eaves of the roof of the applicants' building
and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron pipe
fastened to the said wall
3. ½ of the top of the said wall is covered by the roof of the
applicants' building
4. The supports of the said wall project toward the side of the
applicants' land and that none of the buttresses are on the side of
the objectors' lot
5. The stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear
enclosing wall of the applicants' property in such wise that the two
walls that inclose the lot form but a single construction, the exterior
signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall,
but that it forms a part of the applicants' building and belongs to
them.
Extent of right of every part-owner
Every part-owner of a party wall may use it in proportion to the right he
may have in the co-ownership, without interfering with the common and
respective uses by the other co-owners. (Art. 666)
Prohibition to open an opening or window:
No part-owner, may, without the consent of the others, open through
the party wall any window or aperture of any kind (Art. 667)
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW
Relevant provisions: Arts. 667-673
1. Easement of light – right to make an opening to admit light from
an adjoining tenement (“jus luminum”)
2. Easement of view – right to make projections which can afford
a direct or oblique view and disallowing owner of the servient
estate from obstructing that view.
Examples:
1. “Servidumbre prospectus” – as in the case of full or regular
windows overlooking adjoining estate.
2. “Altius non tollendi” – easement not to build higher for the purpose
of obstruction.
47 | U N I V E R S I T Y O F S A N C A R L O S
Can this be acquired by prescription?
Yes, because this is a continuous and apparent easement.
When does the period of prescription start to run?
It depends on whether it is a positive easement or a negative easement.
When “positive”?
When opening is made on another’s wall, or on a party wall, the
servitude acquired is positive, because the owner or owners of such wall
permits the encumbrance to burden his or their wall.
When “negative”?
When the openings are made in one’s own wall (when a person makes
openings on his own wall to admit light at the height of the ceiling joists
or immediately under the ceiling) and he acquires a servitude to admit
such light, the servitude is a negative one because it imposes upon the
owner of the adjacent estate the obligation not to construct on his land
in such manner as to obstruct the light.
Cortes v. Tu-Tibo
Facts:
This involves the plaintiffs asking for an injunctive writ to restrain the
building commenced by defendant.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court noted that “windows were opened on a wall
belonging to the wife of plaintiff”. The opening made was just a plain
exercise of the right of ownership. No easement was created at this
point (even if this is tolerated by the neighboring owner), the reason
being that this may be covered “anytime by the owner of the abutting
property”.
The easement really consists in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent
owner from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the
light.
Note: Distinguish this case from that of Gargantos v. Tan Yanon.
Gargantos v. Tan Yanon
Facts:
This involves a sale of a house a land with improvements by one owner
which he subdivided into three and sold to 3 different individuals, and
one of those sold already had existing windows and doors at the time of
sale.
Ruling:
It is obvious that Article 621 and the doctrine in the Yu-Tibo case are
not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by
petitioner, and that owned by respondent, were formerly owned by just
one person, Francisco Sanz.
It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in
such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the
Camarin on the portion now belonging to petitioner. On said
northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which
serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in
existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz.
The deed of sale did not provide that the easement of light and view
would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered by
Article 624 which provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner
of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a
title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively,
unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them,
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the
deed.
Distance requirements
A. Art. 670 prohibits the opening of windows, apertures, etc. which
afford a direct view upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement
without leaving a distance of two meters between the wall in which
they are made and such contiguous property.
B. For side or oblique views, a minimum distance of 60 centimeters.
Important: Non-observance of these distances does not give rise to
prescription.
Effect of non-observance
Illegal and may be ordered closed. Any stipulation to the contrary is
void.
Regulatory distances
When the distances in article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall
which is not party wall, adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging
to another, can make in it openings to admit light at the height of the
ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty
centimeters square, and, in every case, with an iron grating imbedded
in the wall and with a wire screen. (Art. 669)
EASEMENT OF DRAINAGE OF BUILDINGS
Relevant provisions: Arts. 674-676
Easement of drainage of buildings:
A. Owner of a building is obliged to construct his roof or covering in
such a manner that the rain water falls on his land or on a street
or public place, and not on the land of his neighbor.
Note: Even if it should fall on his own land, he shall be obliged to
collect the water in such a way as not to cause damage to the
adjacent land.
B. If surrounded by other houses, no possibility of outlet,
establishment of drainage can be demanded.
EASEMENT OF INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES, ETC.
Relevant provisions: Arts. 677-681
Easement of intermediate distances and works for certain
constructions and plantings
1. Constructions cannot be built or plantings near fortified places or
fortresses
2. No trees shall be planted near a tenement or piece of land
belonging to another except if certain distance requirements are
observed.
A. In accordance with customs, or
B. In the absence thereof:
 2 meters from dividing line of estates if tall trees are
planted
 50 centimeters if shrubs or small trees are planted.
C. If branches of any tree should extend over another’s property, the
owner of the latter may demand that it be cut off. If it be roots
which should penetrate into the land of another, the latter may cut
it by himself.
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D. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of
said land.
EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE
Relevant provisions: Arts. 682-683
Easement against nuisance
A. Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which
prohibits the proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance
through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water,
glare, and other causes.
B. Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations,
factories and shops may be maintained provided the least possible
annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.
EASEMENT OF LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT
Easement of lateral and subjacent support
No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive
any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
Note: This easement is not only for buildings standing at the time the
excavations are made but also for constructions that may be erected.
VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
Relevant provisions: Arts. 688-693
Voluntary easements
Every owner of a tenement or piece of land may establish thereon the
easements which he may deem suitable, and in the manner and form
which he may deem best, provided he does not contravene the laws,
public policy or public order.
Unisource Commercial v. Joseph Chung
The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only
legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case
at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as
an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. A
voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner
of the dominant estate.
Easement over a co-owned property
If the tenement or piece of land is in a state of co-ownership, the
unanimous consent of all co-owners is required in order to constitute a
voluntary easement upon the same.
Consent by the co-owners may be given by them either simultaneously
or successively. In the latter case, the consent given by one of the co-
owners separately from the others shall already bind him and his
successors.
Effect of non-registration in the title of dominant estate
Unisource Commercial v. Joseph Chung
Although the easement does not appear in respondents’ title over the
dominant estate, the same subsists. It is settled that the registration of
the dominant estate under the torrens system without the annotation of
the voluntary easement in its favor does not extinguish the easement.
On the contrary, it is the registration of the servient estate as free, that
is, without the annotation of the voluntary easement, which extinguishes
the easement.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
NUISANCE
Relevant provisions: 694-707
NUISANCE, DEFIEND
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
1. Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
2. Annoys or offends the senses; or
3. Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
4. Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street, or any body of water; or
5. Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Important: Nuisance is a tort because legal liability for a nuisance is
predicated on an invasion of the plaintiff’s legal rights by an act not
warranted by law, or from a neglect of duty imposed by law.
However, it differs from negligence. The basis of liability (arising from
nuisance) is not negligence. Negligence is want of proper care. But a
person who creates a nuisance is responsible for the resulting injury
regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised to avoid such injury.
KINDS OF NUISANCE
Public nuisance
A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
Private nuisance
A. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing
definition.
B. The essence of a private nuisance claim is the protection of a
property owner’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of his
land.
Nuisance may also be:
A. Nuisance Per se – nuisance at all times e.g. House of
prostitution, gambling houses, houses constructed on public
streets, and river beds
B. Nuisance Per accidens – nuisance only under or because of
certain circumstances or conditions. This necessitate a previous
determination by a tribunal, e.g. Rubber factory in a residential
subdivision, raising or breeding of pigs in a residential area
Who is liable for nuisance?
Owner, successive owner, or possessor of property who fails or refuses
to abate a nuisance started by a former owner. Aside from abatement
as a remedy, he may also be held liable for damages.
REMEDIES AGAINST NUISANCE
A. Public nuisance
1. Prosecution under the Penal Code or local ordinance
2. Civil action (e.g. Injunction), or
3. Abatement without judicial proceedings
Basis for exercise of abatement
a) Police power (e.g. Section 16, of RA 7160 “General
Welfare Clause”)
b) No right to compensation
Important: As a rule, civil action to abate a nuisance shall
be commenced by the city or municipal mayor (art. 701), but
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a private person may file it himself if it is especially injurious
to himself.
B. Private nuisance
1. Civil action
2. Abatement without judicial proceedings.
Note: It is however desirable that the procedure for
extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance shall be followed
(i.e. Demand first, seek approval of district health officer, and
assistance from local police)
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
A. Dangerous instrumentality or appliance which is likely to attract
children at play.
B. One who maintains on his estate or premises an attractive nuisance
without exercising due care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years
who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser
in the premises.
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. v. Guillermo Balandan
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the
work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not liable because
of having created an `attractive nuisance.”
Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. CA
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.
That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated
under the undefined law of necessity.
The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By
its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health
or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may
be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.
Other cases:
Parayno v. Jovellanos
Resolution struck down as invalid which authorizes the closure or
transfer of location of a gasoline station upon authority of its official
zoning code. According to the court, the business of a gasoline station
could not be considered a nuisance per se which the municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police power.
Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. Jac Liner Inc.
An ordinance prohibiting the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals
within lucena, including those already existing and allowing the
operation of only one common termina, invalid. Bus and jeepney
terminals are not nuisances per se. They cannot be abated via an
ordinance without judicial proceedings
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP DONATION

Relevant provision: Art. 712 Relevant provisions: 725-773

How is ownership acquired? DONATION

A. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
B. Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and
transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate
succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
Other notes:
 Ownership may also be acquired by means of prescription.
 Ownership may be acquired by law (Hidden treasure – share of
owner of land where treasures are found; changes in the course of
river; fruits of trees falling naturally on the property of another)
Donation is an act of liberality, whereby a person disposes of
gratuitously of a thing or right in a favor of another who accepts it.
Notes:
A. Only gratuitous and remuneratory donations are governed by the
provisions of Title III donations with an onerous cause are
governed by the rule on contracts.
B. Donations mortis causa governed by the formalities required in
execution of notarial will (Art. 805)

Different modes of acquiring ownership C. Donations propter nuptias are governed by the Family Code.

Theory of mode and title: Characteristics (elements) of donation:

The efficacy of the various modes of acquiring ownership and other real 1. Essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor
rights over property are predicated on the existence of title or the 2. Increase in the patrimony of the donee
juridical justification to permit those modes to become effective 3. Intent to do an act of liberality
processes of ownership acquisition.
Is donation a contract?
Mode and title Yes. A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby
one binds himself, with respect to the other to give something or to
A. Mode – is the specific cause which produces dominion and other render some service. Like any contract, donation also requires the
real rights as a result of the co-existence of special status of things, concurrence of the reciprocal consent of the parties and it does not
capacity and intention of persons and fulfillment of the requisites become perfect until it is perfected by the donee.
of law.
ELEMENTS OF DONATION
B. Title – is the juridical act, right, or condition which gives the means
to their acquisition (but which in in itself insufficient to produce 1. Consent
them).
Following theory of cognition, donation is perfected from the
moment donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
Mode Title
a) Donee must accept the donation personally, through an
authorized person with a SPA, otherwise donation is void.
Property is seized b) Acceptance must be made during the lifetime (and before
Occupation Seizure
without a known owner incapacity of the donor and of the donee)

Persons who may give or receive a donation:

Donation Formalities/delivery Agreement of parties
1. All persons who may contract and dispose. Donor’s capacity
is determined as of the time of the making (execution of
Succession Death Law or will formalities and acceptance) of the donation.

2. All those not disqualified by law may accept donations. Minors

Tradition Delivery Agreement of parties and others who cannot enter into contract may become
donees but acceptance shall be done by their parents or legal
representatives.
OCCUPATION Void donations:

Relevant provisions: Arts. 713-720 1. Those between persons guilty of adultery and concubinage at
the time of the donation
Occupation 2. Between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense
Things appropriable by nature without an owner (“res nullius” e.g. 3. Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
animals object of hunting, hidden treasure and abandoned movables) ascendants, by reason of his office.
are acquired by occupation.
2. Object
Important: Ownership of piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation. Ordinary donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives, who at the time of the acceptance of donation, are by
law entitled to be supported.

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

a) Without reservation, donation is not void, but it shall be Inter-vivos donation

reduced on the petition of a person affected by it.
b) No donation of future property (anything which the donor
cannot dispose of at the time of the donation)
3. Cause
Donation is an act of liberality, although it may be made on account
of the donee’s merits or services not constituting a demandable
debt or of a burden which is less than the value of the thing given.
(See Liguez v. Lopez)
INTER-VIVOS AND MORTIS CAUSA DONATIONS
Donation inter vivos Donation motis causa
Austria-Magat v. CA
The Deed of donation provides:
Ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi mababawi sa naulit na
apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, ang aking lupang
residential o tirahan sampu ng aking bahay nakatirik doon.”
This is a clear expression of the irrevocability of the conveyance. The
irrevocability of the donation is a characteristic of a donation inter vivos.
By the words “hindi mababawi”, the donor expressly renounced the right
to freely dispose of the house and lot in question. The right to dispose
of a property is a right essential to full ownership. Hence, ownership of
the house and lot was already with the donees even during the donor’s
lifetime.
Relevant provisions:

Takes effect during the lifetime
of the donor, independently of
his death
Made out of the donor’s
pure generosity
Valid even if the donor
should survive the donee
Takes effect upon the death of
the donor testator
Made in contemplation of his
death without the intention to
lose the thing in case of survival
Void should the donor
survive the done
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect
during the lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be
delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos.
The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the
donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor provides
otherwise.
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive
condition, which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life
of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter
vivos, unless a contrary intention appears.

Characteristics of a mortis causa donation

Must follow the formalities Must follow the formalities for
of donations the validity of a will Bonsato v. CA
The characteristics of donation mortis causa are as follows:

Must be accepted by the
donee during his lifetime
Cannot be revoked except for
grounds provided for by law
Right to dispose the property is
completely conveyed to the
done
Can only be accepted after
the donor’s death
Always revocable at any time
before the donor’s death
Right is retained by the
donor while he is still alive
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death
of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.

In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is

Subject to donor’s tax Subject to estate tax
confirmed by the fact that the donations do not contain any clear
provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior to
Cabatingan’s death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of
Q. Is the designation given to donations conclusive?
the donor" admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not
No. Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the
intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners during
nature of the disposition made as reflected from the provisions or terms
her lifetime.
contained in the donation and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations as mortis
causa in the following acceptance and attestation clauses, uniformly
Q. In case of doubt, what is the presumption?
found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation mortis
causa. The construction must be that entailing the least transmission of
“That the donee does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis
rights and interests.
causa under the terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself
of this occasion to express her profound gratitude for the kindness and
generosity of the donor.”

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Formalities requires for mortis causa donation (same as in will
and testament)
See Art. 805.
1. Subscribed by the testator
2. Attested and subscribed by at least 3 credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of another
3. Testator shall sign each and every page, except the last, on the left
margin
4. All the pages shall be numbered, etc.
CLASSIFICATION OF DONATIONS
A. Simple – cause is pure liberality
B. Remuneratory (first kind) – to reward past services (e.g. donation
who saved life of his son)
C. Remuneratory (second kind) – to reward future services
D. Onerous – there are burdens, charges, or future service. This is
govern by the rules of contracts (obligations and contracts)
Important: For onerous donations, the rule in obligations and contracts
applies.
ILLEGAL AND IMPOSIBLE CONDITIONS
Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy
and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends
upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is not
affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid. (Art.
1183)
Effect
Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations
shall be considered as not imposed. (Art. 727)
Important: This only applies if the donation is purely gratuitous.
Illustration:
“A” donates in proper form parcel of land worth P100,000. He imposed:
1. Burden valued at P50,000, and
2. Impossible condition.
Portion in excess of P50,000 (value of burden) is governed by Title III,
while P50,000 (other half equivalent to burden) is governed by the rules
on obligations and contracts
Consequences:
A. The P50,000 gratuitous portion is valid even if there is an
impossible condition because this condition will simply be
disregarded.
B. With regard to the other half corresponding to the onerous portion
(equivalent to the burden), this would be invalid because the rule
on contracts says impossible condition would invalidate the
obligation.
Let’s assume that donation is in a private writing and no impossible
condition is imposed
Rule is: If it is a simple donation, donation of immovable must be in a
public document. Therefore, the legal effects would be as follows:
A. Gratuitous portion (P50,000) is void, not being in a public
document.
B. But, onerous portion (other P50,000) would be valid because a
private writing would suffice for validity under the rule on
contracts.
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FORMALITIES OF DONATION
A. If subject is movable
a) May be made orally or in writing. Oral donation requires
simultaneous delivery, actual or constructive, of the thing or
of the document representing the right donated
b) If value of movable exceeds P5,000, donation and acceptance
shall be made in writing, otherwise donation shall be void.
B. If subject is immovable (to be precise, immovable by
nature)
a) Donation must be made in a public document.
b) Acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in
a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
EFFECT OF DONATION
A. Once perfected, donation is final. Except if there are legal grounds,
it cannot be revoked or rescinded.
B. Fruits of the property from the time of acceptance of the donation
pertains to donee, unless donor provides otherwise.
C. When donation is made to several persons jointly, understood to
be in equal shares, no right of accretion among them (unless donor
otherwise provides).
D. In donations made to the husband and wife jointly, there shall be
right of accretion.
E. Donee subrogated to all the rights and action (which in case of
eviction) would pertain to the donor. Donor, however, is not
obliged to warrant the things donated (except if donation is
onerous, in which case the donor shall be liable for eviction or
hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part)
F. Ownership of property can be donated to one person and the
usufruct to another, provided all the donees are living at the time
of the donation.
Obligation of donee to pay debts of donor:
1. When donation imposes (upon the donee) the obligation to pay
debts of donor, the donee is only liable to pay debts previously
contracted (unless there is a declaration to the contrary)
2. Donee not responsible for debts exceeding the value of the
property donated.
3. Should there be no stipulation to the contrary regarding payment
of debts, the donee shall be responsible only when donation has
been made in fraud of creditors (i.e. at the time donation was
made, the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his
debts)
REVOCATION AND REDUCTION OF DONATIONS
Grounds for revocation or reduction:
1. Appearance of children
2. Breach of condition
3. Ingratitude or inofficiousness
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon
Appearance of children
a) If donor, after donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or
illegitimate children, even though posthumous.
b) If child of donor believed to be dead, should turn out to be living.
c) If donor should subsequently adopt a minor child.
Extent of revocation or reduction
Donation shall be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion
that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account whole (net)
estate of the donor at the time of birth, appearance, or adoption of child.
Example: “A” has net estate = 10million. 5M is reserved for compulsory
heirs; 5M may be donated gratuitously)
Upon revocation or reduction, the property affected shall be returned,
or its value if the donee has sold the same.
Note: Donee is not obliged to return the fruits except from the filing of
the complaint.
Prescriptive period (for filing action to revoke or reduce based on this
ground)
4 years from the birth of the first child, or from his legitimation,
recognition or adoption, or from the judicial declaration of filiation, or
from the time information was received regarding existence of the child
believed dead.
Note: Action cannot be renounced, and is even transmitted, upon the
death of the donor, to his legitimate and illegitimate children and
descendants.
Breach of condition
May be revoked at the instance of the donor. The ground is failure to
comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the
donee.
Effect: Property shall be returned to the donor, alienations made by the
donee void, but subject to limitations under the mortgage law and the
land registration laws.
Important: If ground is breach of condition, the donee shall return not
only the property but also the fruits thereof which he may have received
after having failed to fulfill the condition
Prescriptive period to file
4 years from the non-compliance of conditions. This may be transmitted
to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee’s
heirs.
Note: However, this 4 year period applies if it is a simple donation. In
onerous donation, the rules on contracts applies
De luna et.al. Vs. Hon. Abrigo
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the
revocation of a donation must be brought within 4 years from the non-
compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is our opinion
that the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the
specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on contracts. In the light of the above, the rules
on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Ingratitude
Grounds:
1. Commission of offense against the person, honor, or the property
of the donor, or of his wife or children
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2. If donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act
involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless
the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself,
his wife, or children under his authority
3. If donee unduly refuses to give donor support when donee is legally
or morally bound to give support.
Important: These grounds are exclusive.
Prescriptive period to file
1 year from the time donor had knowledge of the fact, and it was
possible for him to bring the action.
Inofficiousness
No person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may
give or receive by will. The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may
exceed this limitation.
If, bearing in mind the estimated net value of donor’s property at the
time of his death, what was received by way of donation exceeds or
impairs what a compulsory heir shall receive, donation shall be reduced
with regard to excess.
Who may question (or, file an action to reduce based on this ground)?
Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the
legitime, and their heirs and successors in interest, may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. (Note: Devisees and legatees have
no legal personality to ask for the reduction based on this ground)
They cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of the donor, either
by express declaration, or by consenting to the donation.
Prescriptive period for the filing of action to revoke (or, reduce) based
on “inofficiousness”?
Eloy Imperial v. CA
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created
by law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the 10-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation
to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771, to the extent
that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
XXXXX
OTHER RELEVANT PRINCIPLES/CASES
Acceptance of donation
Pajarillo v. IAC
Facts:
Donation that is involved is that from a mother to a daughter. Donation
was accepted by salud suterio in a separate public instrument, but the
acceptance was not noted in both instruments, meaning, the extra-
judicial partition (where the donation was made) and in the instrument
of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance
of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar,
it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for
she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not
registered during her lifetime by salud.
Given this significant evidence, the court cannot in conscience declare
the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial
settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would be placing too much
stress on mere form over substance.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW | PROPERTY LAW | Based on Gravador notes + Slides + De Leon

No need to mention name of donee in acknowledgement of

deed of donation

Quilala v. Alcantara
Facts:
The acknowledgement only contains the name of the donor to be the
only one who appeared before the notary public. There was no mention
of the donee. But in the deed of donation itself, there appears a
stipulation that the “donee hereby receives and accepts the gift and
donation made in her favor by the donor”

Ruling:
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before
the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The
instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a
private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee
was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no
moment.

Void donation may be basis for title through acquisitive

prescription

Calicdan v. Cendana
Facts:
The donation involved a 760 sq.m. parcel of land in Pangasinan executed
by Fermina Calicdan ( in 1947) in favor Of Silverio Cendana. This is a
suit for recovery instituted by Soledad Calicdan, one of the children of
fermina.

The donation was found to be the exclusive property of Fermina’s

husband, Sixto, being an inheritance from the latter’s parents.
Ruling:
Although the donation is void for having been executed by one who is
not the owner, considering that it was established that respondent
Silverio Cendana has been in possession of the land for 45 years already,
he has acquired title to it by acquisitive prescription.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA

Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for
the revocation of a donation must be brought within 4 years from the
non-compliance of the conditions of the donation, the same is not
applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein
expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in
case of violation of the condition therein, hence a judicial declaration
revoking the same is not necessary.

When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for

automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules
on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not
Article 764 of the Civil Code.

Example of an “impossible/illegal condition”

Prohibition to alienate for 100 years from date of execution of donation

Roman Catholic Archbishop v. CA

In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation
against the alienation of the property for an entire century, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of
ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition
within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.

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