Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Reference Title
IEC-61511 part 1-3 Functional safety – Safety instrumented
systems for the process industry sector.
IEC-61508 part 5 Functional Safety of
Layers of Protection
Protection Layers
Question:
which principles (minimization, substitution, moderate, simplicity) of
inherently safe design could be study and recommended in HAZOP?
2st Layer: Basic Process Control Systems
Video
3rd Layer: alarms, Operator Interventions
Questions:
How much shutdown system should be reliable?
How much money to be spent for buying shutdown system?
4th Layer: Safety Instrumented Systems
❖ SISرا می توان به صورت ”سیستم ابزار دقیق ایمنی“ ترجمه نمود و عبارت است از
یک سیستم متشکل از سنورها ،کنترلر های منطقی و اجزای نهایی با هدف این که در
زمانی که از شرایط نرمال فرایندی انحراف به وجود بیاید (که بتواند آسیبی به سیستم
❖ به طور کلی از مصداق های ) SISدر صنایع فرایندی( می توان به موارد زیر اشاره
نمود:
10
SD CAUSES
4th Layer: Schematic of Restricted Area/ Fire Zone / Unit/ equipment
Generally 4 Levels:
ESD Levels :
– ESD 0 (Restricted Area)
12
SD CAUSES
4th Layer: Shutdown Levels
13
SD CAUSES(Pre-release Protection)
5th Layer: Physical Protections
Video
14
SD CAUSES(Pre-release Protection)
5th Layer: Physical Protections
15
SD CAUSES
6th Layer: Physical Protection (Post release Protection)
16
SD CAUSES
7th Layer: Plant Emergency Response
17
8th Layer: CommunitySDEmergency
CAUSES Response
18
SD CAUSES
Prevention Layers vs. Mitigation Layers
(P&ID Development)
What is P&ID?
▪Process engineer
▪Instrument and Control Engineer P&ID Preparation
▪Piping Engineer
What is P&ID Development?
Centrifugal Pump
•Vessel/Tower
Blow-
Vessel Volume, Vent Drain Pump-out Steam-out
down
m3
Up to 1.4 1" 1" 1" 1" 2"
1.4 to 5.7 1" 1.5" 1.5" 1" 3"
•Heat Exchange
Size of vent and drain should be 3/4", otherwise instructed.
•Pump and Compressors
Basically, size of vent and drain should be 3/4". However, size of
vent and drain on pump and compressor casing should being
accordance with vendor's standard..
•Piping
Size of vent and drain should be 3/4", otherwise instructed.
Example: Valve failure mode
Valve failure action on interruption of the operating
medium (pneumatic, electric or hydraulic supply) should
be generally determined as follows in principle.
•Shut down/isolating valves to take "fail to close"
position
•If the control valve is fail-to-close (FC) type, bleeds (purge) should
be provided both upstream and downstream of the control valve.
•1f the control valve is fail-to-open (FO) type, only one downstream
bleed shall be installed.
•For the control valve sizes below or equal to 6", however, only one
Basis:
A hazard does not occur if the process is always
operated within its design intention
•Weakness
-You don't know what you don’t know
-Time Consuming
HAZOP Steps
Step 1
Receive and Study of Documents
Step 2
Node Definition
Step 3
Step 4
Causes Identification
Step 5
Consequence Identification
Step 6
Safeguards Identification
Step 7
Recommendation
HAZOP Worksheets
Node: (Step 2)
Deviation: (Step 3)
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation
P&ID
ESD Process
Control
PFD
Philosophy
1) Size of Node
More equipment in a node leads to increase number of deviations
and causes so decreasing performance of team members in HAZOP
meetings, also less equipment in a node leads to increase time of
➢Design Intent
designer’s desired, or specified range of behavior for
elements and characteristics (e.g. pressure, temperature,
composition, pH, etc)
Practice
According to PFD and P&ID
explain the design intent
Step 3: Deviation Definition
HAZOP Assumption:
In the lines that their flow is controlled either by a
simple loop or a cascade one, the deviation that is
studied is the one that is related to the main design
c) Manual Valves
Step 4: Causes Identification
b) On/Off Valves
c) Manual Valves
“Closure of any manual valve by failure or error”
HAZOP assumption:
1) All drain and bleed valves are plugged or capped on
•Etc.
Step 4: Causes Identification
Practice
Show on P&ID which valves to
e.g.
Etc.
Step 6: Safeguards Identification
Practice
Show and write alarms on P&ID.
Step 6: Safeguards Identification
Practice
Regarding to P&ID show and write
mechanical protection systems
Step 6: Safeguards Identification
❖ SIFبه صورت ”کارکرد ابزاردقیق ایمنی“ قابل ترجمه است و عبارت است از یک
کارکرد ایمنی با یک سطح یکپارچگی ایمنی ( )SILکه جهت رسیدن به ایمنی کارکرد
الزم می باشد!
SIF
65
SIS vs. SIF
66
)Safety Integrity Level (SIL
SILبه صورت ”سطح یکپارچگی ایمنی ” قابل ترجمه است و در حقیقت نشان دهنده
میزان کاهش ریسکی ( )RRFاست که یک SIFبایستی داشته باشد تا مقدار ریسک به
مقدار قابل قبول برسد و طبق استاندارد به چهار سطح 1،2،3و 4تقسیم می گردد.
SILبرای تجهیزات غیر ابزار دقیقی از قبیل Rupture Disk ، Pressure Safety Valve
67
Safety Integrity Level Types (SIL)
) مالی و زیست محیطی، جهت پوشش دادن به همه جنبه های ریسک (انسانیSIL ❖ در مطالعات تعیین
مثال
SIL --- = sIL
➢eIL= SIL --- SIL 1 Selected
➢aIL= SIL 1
68
)Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD
❖در حالت کلی PFDتابع زمان می باشد لذا در مطالعات SILاز مقدار متوسط آن
❖ آنچه که در مورد PFDبسیار مهم است رابطه کلیدی زیر جهت تبدیل PFDبه
RRF=1/PFD
69
Prepared By: S.Khoshbazm
LOPA Concept
LOPA Concept
Step 0 Pre requisites (Risk Matrix / Target Likelihood / Documents/ LOPA Worksheet)
72
Step 0: Pre requisites (Risk Matrix / Documents)
➢Risk Matrix Selection
•Your Organization
•Your Company
73
Step 0: Pre requisites (Risk Matrix/ GS-EP-SAF-041)
Frequentمعم
HIGH RISK
ول
(Risk cannot be justified except
in extraordinary circumstances)
0.01/year
High
باال
Frequency (Demand Rate)
0.0001/year
LOW RISK
Low
پایین
It is necessary to maintain
assurance that risk remains at
0.000001/year this level.
به ندرت
Rare
ر
سال< 10^- 2 / بیشت از 2بار در سال معمول Likely 1
سال - 10^- 3 /سال10^- 2 / به طور معمول یک بار در سال باال Unlikely 2
ر
سال> 10^- 6 / کمت از 500سال یک بار به ندرت Remote 5
75
)Step 0: Pre requisites (Risk Matrix/ GS-EP-SAF-041
پیامدانسان سطوح شدت ستون
صدمات قابل رصف نظر (جزئ ) 1
صدمات جدی 2
یک نفر کشته 3
2تا 5نفر کشته 4
ر
بیشت از 5نفر کشته 5
10،000،000- 100،000،000یورو
4
ر
بیشتاز 100،000،000یورو 5
76
Step 0: Pre requisites (Target Likelihood)
➢Target Likelihood
▪ The target likelihood of a scenario is a direct result of the severity of
its consequences.
▪Calibration factor=0.2
Step 1
Likelihood.
and cha Target e
Sce at e Likelih RRF I
Severity nic IPL IPL
nari Desc. Desc BPCS Interve Likeli ood L
al 1 2 Risk Tim
o ntion of hood
e
Operato Bar
r rier
Asset Damage
Haz Initiating
Event
Consequences Protection Layers (RRF)
ardo Exp
us ALARM Me Cal.
Time osur
Likelihood.
Step 1
Initiators Logic Solver Final Elements SIF
0222 closes
ESDV-0221; ESDV-
PT-0221 ESD2
0222
80
Step 2: Identification of Initiating Events (determination of Likelihood)
HAZOP WORKSHEET
Node:
Deviation:
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation
81
Step 2: Identification of Initiating Events (determination of Likelihood)
82
Step 3: Identification and Evaluation of Consequences
HAZOP WORKSHEET
Node:
Deviation:
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation
قابل اندازه گیریTarget Likelihood❖در این مرحله بعد از مشخص شدن شدت پیامد مقدار
.است
83
Step 3: Identification and Evaluation of Consequences
پیامدمایل (با در نظر گرف ری پیامدزیست محییط )(E پیامدانسان )(S سطوح شدت ستون
وقفه در تولید)
)(A
ر
کمت از 200،000یورو
نشت یا انتشار آالینده نیاز به اطلعرسائ
صدمات قابل رصف نظر (جزئ)
به مسئولی دارد ،اما پیامدهای زیس ت- متوسط )(A 1
)(SA
84
Step 3: Target Likelihood
➢Target Likelihood
▪ The target likelihood of a scenario is a direct result of the severity of
its consequences.
HAZOP WORKSHEET
Node:
Deviation:
Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation
86
Step 4: Identification and Evaluation of Independent Protection Layers
87
Step 5: Time at Risk (TAR)
88
Step 6: Exposure Time Parameter (ETP)
Calibrated Risk در روشFA/FB ➢ این پارامتر تنها مختص به پیامد انسانی می باشد و مشابه پارامتر
. در نظر گرفته شود1 برای پیامد های مالی و زیست محیطی می بایستETP مقدار. می باشدGraph
➢The ETP shall be expressed in the range from 0.1 to 1; e.g. a not normally
manned offshore, platform where personnel are present 20 hours per week has
an ETP of 0.119.
89
Step 7: Calculated Likelihood
90
Step 8: Calculation of RRF/PFD/SIL
The Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) required for the additional SIF is then
the ratio between the total calculated likelihood and the target likelihood.
At the end of the LOPA the 3 following parameters are essential for the
next phase in Safety Life Cycle (SIL Verification???):
• SIL assignment
• PFDavg
• RRF. 91
Personal Information