Indonesian Foreign Policy

BETHANY J. KRACKE
ACICIS
STUDENT ID: 2017331245
Indonesian Foreign Policy and Megawati Soekarnoputri

From the time Independence was established in Indonesia there have been 2 defining
characteristics to the country’s foreign policy. ‘Bebas-Aktif” or ‘Free and Active’ policy and
‘Anti-kolonialisme’ or anti-colonialism. These 2 characteristics have remained constant
despite multiple leadership changes and political and economic upheaval. Megawati
Soekarnoputri was the president of Indonesia from 2001-2004 at time of great changes on the
international scene after the attack on the United States of America which has become known
as 9/11. This paper will focus on Indonesia’s “Free and Active” policy and examine the way
in which Megawati maintained this policy in the face of major international turmoil in a
changing world.

Free and active policy has been described as meaning that Indonesia is ‘Free’ to choose her
own destiny without interference from outside sources, especially at the time of the Cold War
when most countries were siding with one of the 2 great power ‘Blocs’, and ‘Active’ denotes
the country’s wish to be actively promoting peace on the world stage (Batabyal 2002).
Muhammad Hatta, vice president to Indonesia’s first president Sukarno defined a ‘Free and
Active’ foreign policy as having four core premises (Batabyal 2004). The first of these is a
foreign policy with an ‘ideological’ foundation. For Indonesia this is the 5 principals of the
‘Pancasila’. Belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social justice
(Batabyal 2004). The second premise is that the national interest as defined in the constitution
should be protected (Batabyal 2004). Thirdly, an independent policy is considered the best
condition in which to serve the national interest and finally Indonesia’s foreign policy should
be pragmatic, that it should be serving in the best interests of the country and that decisions
are made according to the current conditions (Batabyal 2004).
Through the course of Megawati’s Soekarnoputri’s presidency these principals helped
Indonesia to maintain continuity (Batabyal 2004).

Megawati came to power after Abdurrahman Wahid or “Gus Dur’ was removed from power
in 2001 following allegations of corruption which he strongly denied and which were never
proven (Bubandt 2014). It is possible that it was his inflexibility in his dealings with other
members of the government and his restructuring of the role of the army which led to his
inevitable down fall (Kingsbury 2003). One of Megawati’s first acts as President was to
reshuffle parliament to try to rebalance these issues (Lanham 2004). An observer stated that it
appeared Megawati’s intention from the outset was to inject new image into the government,
promoting it as a government concerned with public issues rather than ‘ivory tower’ issues
(Lanham 2004).

Shortly after her election the world suffered a major shock and loss of innocence when
terrorists hijacked planes and flew them into the Twin Towers, a financial hub, in New York
City causing them to collapse and creating a massive loss of life.
Megawati flew to the United States a week after the attack to meet with President Bush. As a
largely Islamic country Megawati was repeatedly asked to defend the country’s position on
the international stage after the attack was declared to have been perpetrated by Al-Quaeda, a
radical Muslim group (Pitsuwan 2014) but the pragmatism and activism of Indonesia’s
foreign policy can be seen in the way Megawati conducted herself after the September 11
terrorist attacks (Batabyal 2004). While fighting to maintain a positive image for the large
Muslim population of her country in the international arena, Megawati was forthright in her
disapproval of the US military action after 9/11 (Batabyal 2004). In Jakarta while speaking at
a mosque shortly after her return from the U.S Megawati said, “we cannot imagine that other
groups or nations can make their own measurements and rules to decide who is right or
wrong and then attack other parties” (Batabyal 2004). Idealistically, Indonesia could
sympathize with America’s grief at the 9/11 attack but felt compelled to voice their
displeasure at the way the country responded (Lanham 2004). In response to the backlash
against Islam Indonesia’ foreign minister at that time, Mr Hassan Wirajuda suggested the use
of the ‘Free and Active’ policy to promote Indonesia as a country that while heavily Islamic
did not embrace extreme Islamic ideals and was distanced from the ‘global Islamist
movement’ (Batabyal 2004), Megawati embraced Indonesia’s status as a largely Islamic
nation but put forward the notion that it was a country where religions, modernity and
democracy could all coexist (Batabyal 2004)

With the Bali bombings in 2002 and the Marriot Hotel Jakarta bomb in 2003 Indonesia and
Megawati Soekarnoputri were once again thrust into the international spotlight (Pitsuwan
2014). The largely Muslim population and the outspoken manner of some extreme views
within the country had fostered distrust by some nations outside of Indonesia (Pitsuwan
2014). The willingness of the Indonesian government to cooperate with other nations and
bring the perpetrators to justice showed evidence of Indonesia’s long-term policies to
promote peace within the region (Pitsuwan 2014). As a further step towards promoting peace
Indonesia sought to strengthen ties with old ASEAN allies (Weatherbee 2005). The
government planned an implemented the Bali Summit in October 2003, a meeting of 10
ASEAN member states (ASEAN 2003). In a sense, at the ASEAN level, the 2003 Bali
Summit and its formal documents signified a redirection back to the goals expressed more
than a quarter of a century before reinforcing the continuity of Indonesian foreign policy
beginning with the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Weatherbee 2005). The challenges of the
ASEAN 10 however are different to those faced by the core 5 (Weatherbee 2005). Today’s
security agenda is topped by terrorism and trans national crime (Weatherbee 2005).
Economic and political storms had been weathered and Megawati and her government
pushed forward with the Bali Summit, reiterating the country’s position as a leader of
peaceful negotiation on the world stage (Weatherbee 2005). The decision of Megawati to
concentrate the country’s energy in the local area has been labelled a pragmatic decision
(Lanham 2004). The fallout from the Asia economic crisis and the upheaval of the previous 3
years had left Indonesia’s credibility questioned by some of the larger foreign powers
(Pitsuwan 2014). By focusing on ASEAN Indonesia consolidated its position as a leader
within the area (Lanham 2004). Additionally, the willingness of Indonesia to connect and
share mutual support with other countries including Australia, Japan and America in
cooperation against terrorism and transnational crime the government showed both
pragmatism and realism in the effort to curb threats both within and outside the country
(Lanham 2004).

Despite the four years of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency being some of the most
turbulent in recent history the Indonesian government used the country’s “Bebas-Aktiv’
active policy as a tool to provide stability to a country caught up in what could have
potentially devastating situations. Despite external pressure from the international community
Indonesia maintained her dignity in the face of condemnation and actively sought to be a
force for peace. The pragmatism of the country’s foreign policies enabled Megawati and her
government to weather these storms proving the strength and continuity of these policies
founded in the earliest days of Indonesia’s independence.
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