Change and Continuity in Indonesian Foreign

Policy: From Sukarno, Subarto to Megawati

ANINDYA BATABYAL

A country's foreign policy is determined by primarily two sets of

factors. One is the country's position within the existing operational
international political environment and the other is a domestic
economic social and political factor present within the states frontiers.
These sets of domestic and external considerations shape a states'
foreign policy. However changes in these factors also produce
simultaneous changes in foreign policy considerations of a state.
Indonesia's foreign policy since its independence is no exception. After
its independence from Dutch colonial control the foreign policy of
Indonesia can be divided into three distinct phases -the period when
Sukamo was the president of the country (1949-1965), foreign policy
under president Suharto ( 1966-1998), and foreign policy after
Suharto's fall from power in May 1998. Indonesia's foreign policy
during these three distinct phases exhibited patterns of continuity in
certain respects and changes in the other. According to Prof.
F.S.Northedge, " Foreign policy constitutes an endless dialogue
between the powers of continuity and the powers of change.~» This
article intends to explore the features of continuity and change as
reflected in Indonesian foreign policy since independence. The ftrst
part of the article will discuss the basic premises or the foundations of
Indonesia's foreign policy during the time ofSukamo. The second part
would analyse the trends of continuity and change in Indonesia's
foreign policy after Suharto came to power. And the fmal section
would evaluate the foreign policy orientations of the country after
President Suharto's resignation in May 1998. It would also be
interesting to see as to whether there has been any significant break
with the past as far as the present foreign policy of Indonesia is
concerned.
Fundamental Premises of Indonesian Foreign Policy : Sukarno
Era
In February 1948, during the formation of Hatta' s government, former
Prime ·Minister Sjahrir had made a statement before the central

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30 Anindya Batabyal

Indonesian National Committee, which contained the seeds of post··

independent foreign policy. Its fundamental basis was the rejection by
Sjahrir of any alignment with the former Soviet Union whose support
for the Republic within the United Nations (UN) stood in contrast to
the ambivalent attitude displayed by the United States of America.
Together with this Mohammed Hatta, speaking before the Central
Indonesian National Committee on 2 September 1948, stated that "
Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course
of action open to them to choose between being pro Russian or pro-
American? Is there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of
our national ideals? The government is of the opinion that the position
to be taken is that Indonesia should not be a passive party in the arena
of international politics but that it should be an active agent entitled to
determine its own standpoint with the right to fight for its own goal-
the goal of a fully independent Indonesia." 2 In fact one of the first
tenets of Indonesia's foreign policy lies in its basic ideal of being
'bebas- actif'(independent and active). The other strong commitment
that influences Indonesian foreign policy is 'anti-kolonialisme
'(anticolonialism). Along with frequent domestic political upheavals
since independence, the course of Indonesia's foreign policy may have
undergone several changes, but fundamentally such changes have
always been conceived and justified within these two basic principles
of anticolonialism and an independent and active foreign policy. An
independent and active foreign policy - 'politik babas -actif- as
defined by Hatta comprised four significant premises. First the conduct
of foreign policy should be based on an ideological foundation, namely
the state's Pancasila (five principles which include belief in one God,
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social justice)
ideology. Second, foreign policy should be aimed towards
safeguarding the national interest as defmed in the country's
constitution. Third, the pursuit of national interest is best served by an
independent policy. Fourth, Indonesia's foreign policy is to be
conducted pragmatically, that is, it "should be resolved in the light of
its own interest and should be executed in consonance with the
situations and facts it has to face.'' 3

Therefore it is clear from the above assertions that the

principles of 'anti- kolonialisme' (anti colonialism) and 'bebas actif
(active and independent) provide the conceptual framework within
which Indonesian foreign policy needs to be understood. These two

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 31

basic formulations of foreign policy were intended to give two

important messages for both external and internal audiences. To the
outside world, politik behas-actif constituted an indentification of
Indonesia's place and position in the international system, registering
the rejection by the Indonesian government of a commitment to join
either bloc in the~rivahy that had developed between the U.S and the
former Soviet Union just after the end of the world war II. In particular,
the anti-Western position adopted by Indonesian's foreign policy
makers in the initial period had its origin in the refusal by Western
powers to force the Dutch to withdraw from Indonesian territory they
had occupied by force after the surrender of the Japanese forces after
the end of world war II. This attitude by the Western powers including
the US undermined the initial hopes of Indonesian leaders that the
Western powers especially the US would favour national self-
determination for colonial peoples. The later American pressure on the
Dutch to withdraw from Indonesia did not alter this ftrst impression.
To the domestic audiences, the 'bebas-actif principle was meant to
mitigate rivalry between competing elites in Indonesia's domestic
politics. In this connection, declaring Indonesian's independence in
world politics was significant as it was intended to prevent the
ideological rivalry between the world's superpowers from aggravating
the acute political difference within the country's political leadership.
Vice-President Hatta argued that if Indonesia was to offset the
influence of agitation by radical circles, a foreign policy that aligned it
with either bloc of Great Powers must be avoided. In a way, Hatta
sought to cultivate national unity by taking an independent position
towards the outside world. 4

With the inauguration of the period of 'Guided Democracy'

and also 'Guided Economy' since 1957 by President Sukamo,
Indonesia's foreign policy became much more radicalized than what it
previously had been. Ideologically, Sukamo's Guided Democracy,
Guided Economy and his militant foreign policy can be viewed as the
part and parcel of the same process of change, which the political
manifesto (i.e Sukamo 's Independent Day speech of 17 August 1957)
deftned as a "revolution opposing Imperialism-Coloniaiism" and "a
concentration of national strength". Infact, Sukamo's anti-colonial
hysteria and ambition for personal leadership, which took a militant
character during his confrontation with the Dutch and later on with
Malaysia, were the roots ofboth his domestic and foreign policy. When

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32 Anindya Batabyal

several attempts towards the peaceful resolution of the West Irian

problem through United Nations (U.N) proved futile between 1954-
1957 due to the attitude of the Dutch, Sukarno abruptly confiscated,
with the help ofhis army, the Dutch properties in Indonesia and evicted
about 50,000 Dutch nationals from the country. The Dutch airline
KLM was even denied rights to operate from Indonesia and all Dutch
publications were prohibited. Moreover, in late 1957 and in early 1958,
Sukarno took over more than four hundred plantation estates and many
commercial, industrial and banking firms under the direct supervision
of the army. Although the seizure of Dutch plantations and properties
was the direct result of the refusal of the Dutch authorities to yield over
the west Irian issue, this was also Sukarno's fust step towards the
implementation of his socialism a'la Indonesia (Guided Economy), the
real form of which he had yet to explore. Similarly, Sukarno
formulated his aggressive foreign policy during the per;!od of Guided
democracy with the objective of playing a leadership role in Afro-
Asian affairs. 5

Although it may appear that the militant and radical nature of

foreign policy unfolded by Sukarno since 1957 ushered in far-reaching
changes in the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy, a closer scrutiny
reveals that there were strong currents of continuity in the formulation
offoreign policy even in the midst of such modifications. For example,
during the period of Guided Democracy, it appeared that the precept of
an independent and active foreign policy was discarded and in its place
was enthroned an alternative notion of Progressive New Emerging
Forces with Indonesia depicted as their vanguard. However it is clear
that Sukarno from 1957 onwards had put too much emphasis on the
character of anti -<:olonialism in a way which some what ignored the
independent component. A well known scholar on Indonesia Rizal
Sukma has aptly remarked that since 1957, ''Sukarno' s foreign policy
became too active at the expense ofindependent" 6. Therefore inspite of
a certain degree of radical component which was injected into
Indonesia's foreign policy during the period Guided Democracy ,
foreign policy of Indonesia never moved beyond the fundamental
premise of being 'bebas -actif although ifbecame qualifiedly disposed
towards the western constellation of states . In the words of Pro£
Michael Leifer "although some changes are evident in Indonesia's
Foreign policy, they had been more than matched by a strong strain of
contuinity."7

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 33

New Order Foreign Policy: Anything New?

The fall of Sukamo amidst the aborted coup attempt of September

30,1965 leading to the establishment of the New Order government
under general Suharto in 1967 infused certain adjustments in the
formulation of Indonesia's Foreign policy. It was during the New
Order regime of President Suharto that Indonesia became capable of
preserving its link with the pest by bringing foreign policy back to a
more conceptualised bebas- actif principle and at the same time
moving towards completing the ideal form of that principle. It was
achieved by reconceptualising foreign policy based upon the need to
build internal strength. Also the New Order administration under
President Suharto reiterated that the country's foreign policy can only
be independent and active after the Republic achieves a necessary
internal strength. /

The New Order government set for itself the task to "return to
the original Pancasila and UUD 1945", the ideological and
constitutional basis of the state of Indonesia without seeking a return to
the constitutional democracy of the early 1950's or to create a distinct
new political system. General suharto renounced the flamboyant and
radical style of his predecessor's foreign policy and gave high priority
to the termination of the confrontation (kon:frontasi) against Malaysia
and normalisation of relations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.
Sukamo's effort towards the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) based
upon new international order were quickly abandoned and was
replaced by moderate attempts at improving Indonesia's relations with
the west. However such a reversal in direction cannot be seen as a
complete break with foreign policy during the time ofSukamo. Indeed
the New Order government had no intention of moving beyond the
framework of 'bebas - actif foreign policy. On the contrary, it set for
itself the task of returning to the "original" independent and active
foreign policy. 8

Only a week after assuming office, the then Foreign Minister of

Indonesia, Adam Malik issued a statement on 4 April1966 which inter
alia stated that Indonesia would again pursue an "independent " and "
active" foreign policy based upon "Pancasila" and that it would be
guided by the realities exiting in the outside world." The new foreign
policy was further characterised by him as " .... opposed to imperialism

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34 Anindya Batabyal

and colonialism in all their forms and manifestations and participating

in and implementing a world role based on independence, abiding
peace and socialjustice."9 fu this regard, although the Pancasila and the
UUD 1945 do not provide direct guidance on how the Republic's
foreign policy is to be conducted, they do provide some significant
values from which its conduct can be derived. The principles of
humanitarianism and social justice in pancasila served as the
ideological basis of the continious support for anti-colonialism and
greater equality among nations. The 1945 constitution's preamble
obliges fudonesia to work for the eradication of colonialism and the
establishment of a new world order based on independence, peace, and
social justice. The New Order also implied that before fudonesia could
embark upon an independent and active foreign policy on an ideal
course, there was an inevitable need for internal reconstruction, which
took the form in the introduction of 'pembangunan Nasional', or
national development as the core task ofSuharto's regime. The element
of 'pembangunan ekonomi' in foreign policy found its reflection
through a policy motivated to secure foreign aid. This approach
logically brought hldonesia much more closer with the non-communist
Western states including the USA and through this an element of
pragmatism replaced the previous radicalism in foreign policy. As a
result, the New Order's foreign policy bore an impression of being
neither independent nor active as there was a tendency in some circles
to equate the principles of independent and active with the principle by
which Sukarno' s anti colonialism had been closely identified. However
there are two other relevant components that comprised the 'babas-
actif policy which were independence and pragmatism. The New
Order government believed that an independent and active foreign
policy can oruy be pursued by placing more emphasis upon the third
component, i.e. pragmatism. This element of pragmatism was reflected
in the fulftlment of national interests defmed as the accumulation of
internal strength through economic development. 10

Also since mid 1980's, there were growing signs of

assertiveness, which can be discerned frow 1najor foreign policy
initiatives of fudonesia under Suharto. Although the New Order
government preferred a more reserved style and avoided the glamorous
slogans of the Guided Democracy period, one will not fmd it difficult
to ascertain the signs of increasing assertiveness in fudonesian foreign
policy by closely analyzing foreign policy initiatives. The first was the

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 35

commemoration in April 1985 of the 30th Anniversary of the Asia-

Africa conference in Bandung which provided a convenient venue for
Indonesia to show Asian and African countries that it was willing to
make a 'comeback' to the international stage after being "not too
interested" in the global issues for two decades. To prove that
Indonesia's renewed attention to Third world movements was not a just
a lip service, Jakarta began to increase its role in the Non· Aligned
Movement (NAM) and even hosted the 1992 NAM summit in Jakarta.
Thus by cultivating closer likes with the NAM, Indonesia tried to play
a more assertive and meaningful role in global affairs in the post-cold
war era. This sense of increasing self-confidence was further very
strongly reflected in Jakarta's decision to dissolve the Inter-
Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a major source of foreign
aid for Indonesia's economic development. Indonesia took this action
in early 1992 in response to criticism by the IGGI chairman Jam Pronk
of the Netherlands, over the killing of East Timorese demonstrators by
Indonesian troops in Dili in November 1991. Instead of loosing an
important source of foreign aid, Indonesia managed to create a new
consortium coordinated by the World Bank, which excluded the
Netherlands. 11

Also despite a determination to differentiate itself from the

style and international alignmentS of its ill-fated predecessor, the
Suharto government was consistent its pursuit of Indonesia interests
and in the process reflected a notable continuity in foreign policy. For
example in 19(:,7, its representatives were instrumental in shaping the
declaratory terms of reference of ASEAN' s founding document which
registered national priorities for managing regional order on an
exclusive resident state regional basis which were consistent between
the tenure of Sukarno and Suharto. A similar influence was excercised
in 1971 in promoting and securing an alternative formula of a 'Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality' to Malaysia's earlier proposal for
neutralizing the region through the veiled ofgreat power guarantees. At
issue was the prerogative managerial role of regional states, which
Indonesia being the largest among them wished to assert to the
exclusion of exernal powers. 12

Therefore, critical analyses of Indonesia's foreign policy during

the time ofSukarno.as well as ofSuharto reveals that inspite of certain
operational changes in foreign policy, there were also strong currents

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36 Anindya Batabyal

of continuity within it. That continuity, expressed in international

outlook and policy goals has been a direct product of a shared
experience on the part of post-colonial successor elite. A Java-centric
view of the regional standing and vulnerability of archipelagic
Indonesia, which was formed during the struggle for independence has
been sustained since its attainment. Indeed both general Suharto and
Adam Malik were actively involved in the independence struggle in
different ways. However the group of soldiers who were instrumental
in deposing Sukamo under the leadership of General Suharto did not
constitute a new political force. They were the product of the same
military and political experience attendant on the creation of the
Indonesia state out of a Dutch administrative frame. It is to be
remembered that the armed forces of Indonesia had not initially at least
differed with Sukarno in opposing the advent of Malaysia. However
the views of the armed forces changed as in course of the confrontation
over Malaysia, it appeared that the whole process is serving the
interests of the PKI and is leading to an unpalatable alliance or
alignment between Indonesia and the peoples of Republic of China. 13
The foreign policy of Indonesia was not cast in a totally new mould
especially as the army had a shared experience of national vulnerability
which had given rise to deep suspicion of the motives of all extra
regional powers. In principle, Indonesia's foreign policy, as it emerged
after the aborted 1965 coup that led to internal transfer of power,
reinstated a former course rather than pursuing a novel one. As
Michael Leifer has said, "Novelty obtained, but it arose, in part from a
change in style and not from the reintroduction of an idiom identified
with the view of the former vice-President Mohammed Hatta" 14

Post-Suharto Foreign Policy Orientation of Indonesia

President Suharto was forced to abdicate power on 21 May 1998

amidst unprecedented political turmoil and anarchy in Indonesia. Since
Suharto' s resignation. Indonesia till now has seen three governments
headed by three different Presidents. This section will analyse the
foreign policy measures under taken by the governments of president
B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman W ahid and the current president Megawati
Sukarnoputri and would tty to assess as to whether the foreign policy
of the country has changed in any substantial manner from what it had
been during the reign of former presidents Sukarno and Suharto.

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 37

A major factor in recent foreign policy formation has been the

revitalization of a professional diplomatic corps since the fall of former
President Suharto. During the New Order period, the Department of
Foreign Affairs (Department Luar Negeri or Deplu) was in effect
subordinate to the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI).
During the New Order period, decision making on key foreign policy
issues were dominated by the military and the most well-known case of
a difference between the TNI and Deplu was over the status of East
Timor. Deplu had urged for a settlement of the East Timor issue, not
least of all because East Timor had proved to be a major impediment to
Indonesia's aspirations on the global stage. However, it was the
military or the TNI which took the fmal decision on this matter. Also
during the Suharto era, ambassadorial appointments went to generals
rather than career diplomats. But former President Abdurrahman
Wahid's administration showed the intention to reverse this trend in
order to allow more civilians to serve in these positions. 15 However,
there were also other instances where differences of opinion arose
between the Deplu and the TNI. This difference of perception between
the foreign ministry and the armed forces had persisted during the
Suharto era concerning relations with People's Republic of China. The
Indonesian armed forces believed that China's ultimate objective was
to dominate Southeast Asia by supporting communist insurgency
movements and direct military action. But the Indonesian foreign
affairs ministry favoured a more realistic and constructive policy
towards China during the New Order era. The foreign ministry had
supported China's application to join the United Nations in 1971, but
the military had opposed the move, forcing Indonesia's ambassador at
the United Nations to abstain on the issue. Although the then foreign
minister Adam Malik was willing to restore diplomatic relations with
China in 1973, President Suharto allowed the armed forces' views on
Indonesia's policy on China to prevail over those of the Deplu or the
foreign ministry and as a result of its diplomatic relation between
China an Indonesia remained frozen from 1967 till1990 16 . At present,
Deplu, which is till :finding its political autonomy after having been
intimately connected to Golker for several decades, is now in a position
where it will have to serve political masters who are from different
political parties and may not be specialists in the portfolio as with the
case of the current foreign minister, Alwi Shihab. In short, Deplu is
now in l1 multi-party environment where it must be neutral and learn to
serve changing administration.

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38 Anindya Batabyal

Also it appears that post-Suharto Indonesia is more politicized

than it had been in the past few decades. The emergence of civil
society signifies that foreign policy can no longer be made in isolation
by a small number of insulated political elites. Former President
W ahid' s inability to provide formal recognition to Israel was the result
of opposition from Parliament and society. Numerous street
demonstrations and a threatened parliamentary boycott by legislators
forced Akbar Tanjung, the speaker of Parliament to announce that an
Israeli delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union would not be
attending the Jakarta-based conference. 17

However, inspite of these modifications in the domestic

political situation which have impacted on foreign policy formulation,
the strong trend of continuity in Indonesian foreign policy remains
even after the resignation of Suharto in May 1998. This trend of
continuity is reflected in Indonesia's foreign policy orientation towards
the Third World. A common thread in Indonesia's foreign policy has
been an aspiration to Third World leadership. In 1955, Indonesia, under
Sukarno played host to the Afro-Asian summit at Bandung. Despite
Suharto 's downplaying of Sukarno' s rhetoric, Indonesia continued to
remain active within the NonAligned Movement (NAM) and other fora
for discussing Third World concerns. Since the Afro-Asia summit of
1955, Indonesia has taken a leading role in NAM, including the chair
of the tenth summit at Jakarta in 1992. With the culmination of the cold
war, the NAM still continue to enjoy a growing membership, although
its concerns are now focused more on North-South development issues
rather than opposition to bloc politics and Indonesia was instrumental
in this evolutionary change. Indonesia has also sought an increase in
membership of UN Security Council in order to include new
permanent members like Indonesia, India and Japan. President Wahid
has continued with Suharto' s policy of playing the role of a mediator in
a series of Third World problems such as the successful role it played
in the southern Philippines during the Moro insurgency. Moreover,
W ahid, during his one and half years as President, has set a world
record for state visits, thus signally the presence of a very active
"foreign policy President". The foreign minister of Indonesia in
explaining why Wahid had toured an incredible twenty-six countries in
the four months of his Presidency stated that this was "in order to
rebuild the good image of Indonesia in the eyes of the International
Community" 18. This highly active Indonesian foreign policy is very

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 39

much consistent within the framework of a 'bebas - actif foreign

policy, and reinforces the essential continuity of its character.

In addition to all these, Indonesian foreign policy since the East

Asian Economic crisis has focused on fmding the resources to cope
with the effects of the crisis. This in turn has meant a greater reliance
on the developed world. Speeches on foreign policy by Indonesian
foreign minister Alwi Shihab have stressed the need for independence
in the modern world and a foreign policy "geared to the realities of our
economic situations" 19. Thus the element of pragmatism which is one
of the key elements constituting the Indonesia's foreign policy as
enunciated by Mohammad Hatta in 1948 is clearly reflected here. In
order to tide over the impact of the crisis, Indonesia requires more
fmancial help from the Western countries, especially the United States,
as also from other international lending institutions.

The end of the cold war also affected US - Indonesian relations

in ways that could be defmed in economic terms of bargaining. It was
no longer possible for the Indonesian political leaders to use the "
Soviet/People's Republic of China Card" if the US did not treat
Indonesia properly. During the Sukarno era, Indonesia used its
relations with the socialist states of former Soviet Union and Peoples
Republic of China as a bargaining tool for extracting concessions from
countries like the US on key political and military issues. Although
Suharto' s Commitment to anti- communism prevented his active use of
the Soviet/China card in the same manner as his predecessor did, yet
even during this period, Indonesia did at least ori one occassion
consider purchasing military hardware from the former Soviet Union
during Surharto's reign when pushed by President Jimmy Carter of US
over human rights issues. Thus, even though the Soviet/P.R-C Card
was not as actively used by Suharto as had been used by Sukarno, the
existence of an alternative camp improved Suharto' s bargaining
position. But this situation has drastically altered after the end of the
cold war. For example in 1996-97, after the US congressional
humiliation of Suharto on the issue of the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft,
the Indonesian political elite decided to explore the possibilities of
purchasing Russian MiGs and went publicized with their plan. Such a
move had previously caused anxiety and often drawn concessions from
the US, but in 1996-97 the Pentagon perceived it as neither offensive
nor even threatening. 20

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40 Anindya Batabyal

Infact one of the factors which made Suharto to withdraw

Indonesia from purchasing F-16s from the US was that the US
Congress had attached human rights conditions to the sale which were
unacceptable to Indonesia. Indonesia is intent on defming human rights
in its own historical terms as indicated by the state Policy Guidelines
adopted by the MPR in March 1998. In the Indonesian view the right to
a secure life and decent living is far more important than individual
freedom of expression. Juwono Sudarsono, former vice- governor of
the Institute ofNational Resilience has declared that capitalism is more
dangerous to Indonesia than Communism as capitalism undermines the
'kekeluargaan' or family values on which the nation is based. Juwono
Sudarsono is among those who would accept all international,
including US, help only as long as it is not corrosive of Indonesian
values. 21

The government of former President Wahid had signed three

letters of Intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 20
January, 17 May and 31 July 2000 respectively which set out
essentially the conditionalities for continued funding. The needs for
these funds has made Indonesia quite vulnerable to pressure from
developed countries, in particular that of the US.For example, the
military to military relations between the United states and Indonesia is
far from being normal. In 1999, the U.S. Congress voted to suspend
military assistance and senior U.S. military officials have remarked that
it will not be restored unless senior TNI, officers involved in the East
Timor violence are brought to justice. 22

Therefore it appears that Indonesia will continue to depend

economically for sometime upon the U.S. and other Western countries.
However, inspite of this dependence, Indonesia would continue to
maintain its active postures towards the Western countries especially
over issues concerning human rights which, under Western dictates,
can seriously undermine fundamental Indonesian social values and
traditions. This even at present under President Megawati
Sukamoputri, Indonesia foreign policy woul<l reflect the element of
activism and pragmatism in its dealings with Western states. For
example, Indonesia criticized the unilateral US military action against
Mghanistan in the wake of the terrorist strikes in the U.S on September
11,2001. Speaking at a mosque in Jakarta, Megawati stated that "we
cannot imagine that other groups or nations can make their own

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 41

measurements and rules to decide who is right or wrong and then

attack other parties." The vice -President, Mr. Hamzah Haz, who is
seen as a hardliner, had demanded an end to US military strikes even
before President Megawati had spoken .23 This further illustrates that
inspite of its dependence on the West, Indonesia would continue to
advocate an active policy wherever political necessities demand such
an action.

Moreover, it remains true that ASEAN is the cornerstone of

Indonesia's foreign policy. As an organization that has brought some
resilience to the region, ASEAN remains crucial for present-day
Indonesia. In its July2000, Foreign Ministers Meeting, the ASEAN
emphasized support for Indonesia's territorial integrity. Also during the
East Timor crisis, the ASEAN countries were careful not to take any
action that might offend Indonesia. 24 Megawati, after becoming
President, traveled to nine ASEAN capitals in eight days in August-
September 2001 and thereby signalled the original groupings centrality
in her foreign policy approach. The President stated that she believes
that ASEAN was the "main vehicle" of foreign policy and declared that
Indonesia would assume the leadership role in ASEAN once the
current problems of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN in
Indonesian parlance) and a wobbly economy were addressed. 25 Also
Indonesia at present is seeking greater cooperation among ASEAN
states to combat the threat posed by terrorism, both global as well as
local. Given the number of unresolved bomb attacks in Indonesia and
with radical lslamic outfits being active in the Philippines and
Malaysia, serious cooperation on terrorism does appear to be a priority
for ASEAN member states including Indonesia. 26

Another important objective of Jakarta's foreign policy in the

aftermath of the Suharto regime was to ensure that potential breakaway
regions do not get any external support. Since the East Timor episode
which many Indonesians have blamed on the Australian Government,
the Indonesian political elite have acted to ensure that no support is for
forthcoming to other independence movements most notably in Aceh,
Irian Jaya and in Papua. Foreign policy now have been focused on
avoiding foreign intervention of any kind in Indonesia, which is now a
more distinct possibility in a more globalised post-cold were
environment. 27 In fact the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the
Yugoslav federation after 1991 turned the disintegration of Indonesia

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42 Anindya Batabyal

from a subject of mildly imaginative speculation into a serious topic of

discussion. Both multi-ethnic communist states had seemed secure and
had even been praised for their successful management of ethnic
diversity in the past. Yet when a crisis developed in their central
leadership, each state fell apart as easily as bones part company in a
well-cooked chicken. This question gathered momentum when
Indonesia's own central leadership was in a weak position, especially
in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997-98. The possibilities of
disintegration are to a large extent fuelled by economic and cultural
reasons. The island land of Java which is the largest in Indonesia and
densely populated is believed by many in the other islands to exercise
cultural and political hegemony in the archipelago. The official
programme of transmigration has shifted hundreds of thousands of
Javanese, Madurese and Balinese to supposedly less crowded regions
in other parts. In the process, traditional users ofland have been utterly
transformed. The fact that former president Habibie came from
Sulewesi did not in any way contradicted the conventional wisdom that
the president of the Republic must always be a Javanese as Habibie's
political base was in Jakarta rather than in other region. Thus a
complaint often heard in certain non Javanese circles is that "we
exchanged Dutch colonial rule for Javanese colonial rule". These
resentments are further accentuated due to economic difference
between Java and the outer islands. Aceh and East Kalimantan are
exporters of natural resources (e.g. oil, natural gas for Aceh and oil and
timber for East Kalimantan) in which the local people have a slender
share28. Thus economic disparities between Java and the other regions
can spell trouble for Indonesia in future. In Indonesia there are voices
which fear that foreign governments may aid potentially rebellious
regions to break away from the union. W ahid' s minister for regional
autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, has actually ranked Papua as a more
formidable candidate for seccession from Indonesia than Aceh as
Papuans being christians are more likely to garner Western sympathy
in the long run than Muslim Acehnese. 29 Moreover, in the wake of
Australia's leading role in the UN-mandated International Force for
East Timor (INTERFET) in September ~t999, Indonesia abruptly
decided to abrogate its four year security agreement with Australia by
accusing it of overreacting on the East Timor issue. Thus, at the
strategic level, although Indonesia never consider Australia as a threat,
it led to souring of relations between the two. In Jakarta protestors took

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Indonesian Foreign Policy 43

to the streets regularly to rail against what they viewed as a conspiracy

by Western powers to weaken their country?0

Conclusion

Indonesian foreign policy elite have a basically suspicious view of the

world and are constantly on guard against attempts by other powers to
compromise the country's ability to carry out its much vaunted
'independent and active foreign policy'. They have questioned the
motives and objectives of both Asian as well as global powers. In this
respect foreign policy of Sukamo as well as of Suharto regimes
exhibited a high degree of suspicion and distrust of the outside world.
Together with these, Indonesia's approach to regional affairs is aimed
at creating a climate of mutual confidence among nations in°the region.
Super power involvement in Indonesia's view tends to accentuate
conflict situations. Although Indonesia under ordinary circumstances is
prepared to tolerate the US as the world's sole superpower at present, it
would not like to see any US intrusion in Southeast Asia as a regional
hegemon. Indonesia dislikes any occasion in which it is not recognized
as amajor actor in the global stage by other actors. 31This trend in
Indonesian foreign policy has been evident during the times of
Sukamo, Suharto and even today under Megawati Sukamoputri. Thus,
foreign policy of Indonesia has been shaped by strong currents of
continuity and continues to be deeply embedded within the framework
of 'bebas-actif' (independent and active) even today. The apparent
changes in Indonesia's foreign policy are more related to style and
posturing and not in any way as far as the fundamental tenets of foreign
policy are concerned.

Notes and References

1. F.S. Northedge, "The Nature of Foreign Policy" in F.S.Northedge(ed), The

Foreign Policy ofthe Powers, Faber and Faber, London, 1968, p. 11.
2. Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, George Allen & Unwin
Publishers Ltd., London, 1983, pp. 19-20.
3. Rizal Sukma, "The evolution of Indonesia's Froeign Policy: An Indonesian
View.", Asian Survey (California), vol., XXXV, no.2, March 1995, p.305-
308.
4. Ibid., pp., 306-308.
5. Kalyani Bandyopadhyaya, Political Economy of NonAlignment: Indonesia
and Malaysia, South Asian Publishers, NewDelhi , 1990, pp. 60-62.
6. Rizal Sukman. 3, p.310.

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44 Anindya Batabyal

7. Michael Leifern.2, p. 172.

8. RizalSukman.3,pp.310-311.
9. Kalyani Bandyopadhyaya, n.5, pp. 108-109.
10. Rizal Sukman. 3, pp. 310-312.
11. Ibid, pp. 312-314.
12. Michael Leifer, "The changing temper of Indonesian nationalism", in
Michael Leifer (ed.) Asian Nationalism, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 163.
13. MichaelLeifer,n.2,pp.174-175.
14. Ibid, p.11l.
15. Anthony L Smith," Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid:
Radical or Status Quo States?", Contemporary South East Asia, (Singapore)
vol. 22, no. 3 December 2000, p. 504.
16. Ian James Storey, "Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond:
Problems and Prospects" , Contemporary South East Asia, (Singapore) vol.
22, no.1, April 2000, pp. 147-148.
17. Anthony L. Smith, n. 15, p.504.
18. Ibid., pp. 503-505.
19. Ibid., p. 506.
20. Times kivimaki, US-Indonesian Relations During the Economic crisis: where
has Indonesia's Barganing Power gone?" Contemporary South East Asia,
(Singapore) vol. 22, no.3, December 2000, p. 531.
21. Theodore Friend, "Indonesia in flames", Orbis (Philadelphia),vol. 42, no. 3,
Summer 1998, pp. 389-391.
22. Anthony L. Smith, n. 15, pp. 513-514.
23. Amit Baruah, "Megawati Denounces US Strikes", The Hindu (Chennai), 16
October, 2002.
24. Anthony L. Smith, n. 15, p. 509.
25. ''Megatour", The Hindu (Chennai), 2nd Sep. 2001.
26. Ibid.
27. Anthony L. Smith, n. 15, p. 507.
28. Robert Cribb, "Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of
Indonesia", Australian Journal of International Affairs (Canberra), vol. 53,
no.2, 1999,pp. 172-175.
29. Donald K. Emmerson, ''Will Indonesia Survive", Foreign Affairs
(Washington D.C.) vol.79, no.3, May-June 2000, p. 105.
30. Rabindra Sen, "Indonesia's threat perceptions and security concerns", in
Suchita Ghosh and Rabindra Sen (eds.), South East Asia: Security in the
coming millennium, Allied Publishers, Kolkata, 2000, p. 201.
31. Ibid., pp. 199-201.

Mr. Anindya Batabyal is Project Fellow, UGC DSA Programme, Department of

International Relations, Jadavpur University.

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