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THE QUANTIFICATION OF ARISTOTLE'S

THEORY OF REVOLUTION
FRED KORT
University of Connecticut
The decisive impact of classical Greek thought on medieval scholasticism
and the Renaissance failed to prevent the general neglect of Aristotle's theory
of revolution. The first noteworthy attempt to revive the theory must be at-
tributed to an English political theorist of the seventeenth century, namely, to
James Harrington. The subsequent prevalence of Aristotle's idea in American
political thought, from the defense of an agrarian democracy by Jefferson to the
crusade against trusts by Roosevelt and Wilson, can be explained in terms of
Harrington's influence. Nevertheless, this conceptual persistence contributed
little to the empirical verification of Aristotle's theory as a scientific hypothesis.
Twenty-three centuries elapsed before the idea of the classical Greek philosopher
was cast into a form which has opened new avenues for investigation. The
hypotheses on income and political disturbances of the contemporary American
mathematician Harold T. Davis, which are based on Vilfredo Pareto's theorem
of income distribution, are virtually a restatement of Aristotle's theory of revo-
lution. In its ultimate perspective, the Pareto-Davis theory constitutes a quan-
titative presentation of a relationship that was conceived in qualitative terms
during the fourth century B.C.

i. ARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT OF THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION

The diversity of the causes of revolution under different forms of govern-
ment, which Aristotle discussed in the fifth book of the Politics, did not pre-
clude his conviction that all revolutions originate in a condition of inequality:
"In all these cases [whether sedition is directed against the constitution, or only
towards its modification] the cause of sedition always is to be found in inequal-
ity—though there is no inequality [and therefore no justification for sedition]
when unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between
>n
them
A notion of equality in terms of natural rights is an idea that belongs to a
later period in political thought and cannot be attributed to Aristotle. His con-
cept of inequality must be understood in terms of the relative political and eco-
nomic status of individuals, in terms of what he called "equality proportionate
to desert."2 Accordingly, a condition of inequality is created by a situation in
1
Ernest Barker, trans. Politics (Oxford, 1948), Bk. 5, Ch. 1, §11. The portions in
brackets are comments of the translator. The term "sedition" in Barker's translation
should be noted. Benjamin Jowett uses the term "revolution." Barker prefers "sedition"
as a translation of the Greek word stasis in order to do justice to the comprehensive mean-
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ing of stasis, which is not confined to armed rebellion. In view of the fact that the term
"revolution" acquires a definite denotation in the Pareto-Davis theory, Barker's concept
of "sedition" is helpful for the purpose of this inquiry.
1
Ibid., §12.
486
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which (a) groups that occupy a privileged political status do not enjoy a cor-
responding economic status, or (b) groups that have decisive economic ad-
vantages are deprived of corresponding political privileges. The result of this
incongruity is a dominant consciousness of inequality, for which a remedy is
sought in revolution. A consistent pattern of thought thus can be ascribed to
the statement that "there is no inequality . . . when unequals are treated in
proportion to the inequality existing between them". According to Aristotle,
inequality between different strata of society is not a cause of revolutions; only
inequality in the sense of an incongruity of the respective political and economic
status within social classes is a factor which promotes political disorders. In its
essential features, Aristotle's theory may be reduced to the proposition that
whenever political and economic power are separated, a revolution is likely to
occur.
An extensive illustration of Aristotle's general theory is found in his discus-
sion of revolutions under democracies, oligarchies, aristocracies, kingships, and
tyrannies. According to Aristotle, revolutionary changes in democracies are the
result of political attacks upon the wealthy by the demagogues. The members of
the propertied class unite under this challenge and overthrow the democratic
institutions. Such a situation existed at Cos, where notables formed an alliance
against the rising demagogues and abolished the democracy. Similarly, when
the demagogues of Rhodes withheld funds which were due the trierarchs, the
trierarchs combined and terminated the era of democratic government. In
Heraclea democracy came to an end when the notables, exiled by the dema-
gogues, returned and destroyed the democracy. A parallel situation existed at
Megara. The demagogues expelled the notables in order to confiscate their prop-
erty; however, the notables returned from their exile, defeated the people in a
battle, and established an oligarchy. And the same fate befell the democracy
at Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus.3 It should be noted that in
all of the foregoing instances political power was vested in a numerical majority,
which supported the demagogues, whereas economic power resided with a few
notables.
A similar separation of political and economic power is Aristotle's explana-
tion of revolutionary changes in oligarchies. At Massilia, Istros, Heraclea, and
in other city-states, he reported, the oligarchies were overthrown because only
a few members of the economic elite held public office. The excluded members
created disorders until they became office-holders. As a consequence, the oli-
garchy at Massilia was changed to a form of government that resembled a
polity, at Istros it was transformed into a democracy, and at Heraclea it was
extended to include six hundred members.4 In the foregoing instances, political
and economic power were separated, and revolutionary changes ensued. Aris-
totle also indicated that the existence of oligarchies could be undermined by the
assumption of demagogic power by a member of the governing body. This was
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the case in Athens in the days of the Thirty and in the days of the Four Hun-

' Ibid., Bk. 5, Ch. 5, §§1-4. *Ibid., Bk. 5, Ch. 6, §§2-3.

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dred, and it was also the case in Larisa.6 The rising demagogues gained the sup-
port of the masses, and political power shifted from the privileged holders of
public office to the popular majority; but the wealthy few—the former holders
of political power—still retained economic power. The resulting separation of
political and economic power led to a revolution. Other instances to which
Aristotle referred show how competitive oligarchies were organized within the
same city-state. Political and economic power were separated, and this condi-
tion promoted the ultimate destruction of the entire oligarchial system.
As in oligarchies, Aristotle saw revolutionary changes in aristocracies as
caused by the concentration of political power in the hands of a wealthy elite,
while other economically powerful groups do not have a commensurate share
in government. This was the case in Sparta, where the illegitimate sons of
Spartan peers, called the Patheniae, formed a conspiracy to overthrow the exist-
ing government. Their intentions were detected, and they were sent into exile
to Tarentum.8 A different situation existed at Thurii, where the concentration
of economic power in the hands of the few was challenged by the ascending
political power of the people. The ruling aristocracy had acquired more land
than it was allowed to have by law, but, as the result of a war, the people had
acquired virtual rather than nominal political power; they protested against
the concentration of economic power in an elite, and forced the notables to
abandon their excessive property.7
A detailed examination of Aristotle's discussion of revolutions under king-
ships and tyrannies does not seem to be warranted here. His general statement
to that effect should suffice: "The aims pursued by revolutionaries, like the
origins of revolution, are the same in tyrannies and kingships as they are under
regular constitutions."8
The preceding account of Aristotle's historical illustrations should be suffi-
cient to justify the initial inference made here regarding the essence of his
theory of revolution: that whenever political and economic power are sepa-
rated, a revolution is likely to take place. To be sure, nowhere in the Politics is
his theory of revolution stated in this particular form. Nevertheless, the specific
illustrations with which Aristotle supplemented his theory, added to his con-
cept of inequality, hardly permit an alternative interpretation. Supplementary
support for its validity can be obtained if the corollary of Aristotle's theory
of revolution is considered, namely, the concept of constitutional stability in
a polity. That an equitable political balance may best be maintained in a
polity where economic and political power are unified, was a conclusion which
Aristotle reached in the course of his extensive comparative study of gov-
ernments. (The theory that democracy—polity in Aristotle's sense—is most
stable wherever there is a strong middle class, is a contemporary version of
the relationship originally ascertained by Aristotle.) "Constitutional stabil-
ity," the concomitant phenomenon of a unification of political and economic
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power, and "revolutionary trends," the result of a separation of political and

• Ibid., §§6-7. • Ibid., Bk. 5, Ch. 7, §§1-2.
' Ibid., §9. « Ibid., Bk. 5, Ch. 10, §14.
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economic power, thus appear as conceptual manifestations of a consistently

integrated pattern of thought. They are the product of Aristotle's inquiry, but
their ideational basis was prevalent in the Athenian commonwealth even before
Aristotle's time. According to Plutarch, their inception may be ascribed to
Solon:
Solon, however, himself says that it was reluctantly at first that he engaged in the state
affairs, being afraid of the pride of one party and the greediness of the other; he was
arbitrator and lawgiver; the rich consenting because he was wealthy, the poor because he
was honest. There was a saying of his current before the election, that when things are
even there never can be war, and this pleased both parties, the wealthy and the poor; the
one conceiving him to mean, when all have their fair proportion; the others, when all are
absolutely equal.*

II. THE PARETO-DAVIS THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION

AND POLITICAL DISTURBANCES
The familiarity of Pareto and Davis with Aristotle's theory of revolution
would not justify the assumption that the two contemporary thinkers relied
on the ideas of their classical predecessor. As a unified product of a related
endeavor, the Pareto-Davis theory of income distribution and political disturb-
ances indicates a development of thought which has maintained its independence
from its precedents. Inasmuch as Pareto limited his analysis to income distribu-
tion, he apparently did not exhibit particular interest in the political implica-
tions of Aristotle's theory. Davis certainly is concerned with the ramifications
of income distribution for politics, and there is evidence that he formulated
his hypotheses with full knowledge of Aristotle's theory, but without reliance
on this classical precedent.
The essence of Pareto's theorem is contained in the hypothesis that, in all
places and at all times, the distribution of income conforms to a definite pat-
tern, and that this relationship may be stated in the following mathematical
terms:

x"
N represents the number of people whose income is equal to or higher than
income denoted by x; A is a constant, depending upon the size of the economy;
a is a parameter. If the logarithms of the values of N and x are graphically
represented in such manner that the logarithms of N are projected along the
vertical axis of the graph and the logarithms of x along the horizontal axis, the
resultant curve is a straight line with a slope of — a. This curve represents the
distribution of income.11
' The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. John Dryden and rev. Arthur
Hugh Clough (Modern Library ed., New York, 1932), p. 104.
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10
Vilfredo Pareto, Cours d'economie polilique (Lausanne, 1896-97), Vol. 2, p. 306.
11
Representative samples were found by Pareto in the income distributions of the
following countries and cities during the specified periods: England, 1843, 1880, and 1894;
Prussia, 1852, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1890, and 1894; Saxony, 1880 and 1886; Florence, the
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Pareto failed to explore the political implications of variances in income dis-

tribution; but these neglected implications became the focal point in the in-
quiry pursued by Davis. The examination below in terms of graphical represen-
tation reveals that Pareto's original relationship encompasses various degrees
of income concentration. Inasmuch as the numerical value of a determines
the slope of the curve which represents income distribution, a high numerical
value of a indicates a wide dispersion of income, and a low numerical value of a
denotes a high concentration of income. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 illustrate hypothetical
situations of extreme values for a. In Fig. 1, where a approaches infinity, al-
most complete equality of income prevails. In Fig. 2, where a approaches 0,

log.

FIG. 1 FIG. 2 FIG. 3

a very high concentration of income exists. In differentiating between vari-

ous degrees of income distribution, Davis made a distinction between situa-
tions which may be identified with a stable economy and contrary situations, as
shown by these two figures, which are characterized by a high concentration or
wide dispersion of income. Fig. 3 represents graphically a stable economy; in
this case, a is approximately 1.5. According to Davis, such stability in the econ-
omy of a society (i.e. a "normal" income distribution) is indicative of polit-
ical stability; on the other hand, high concentrations or wide dispersions of
income are correlated to political disturbances.
To avoid the inverse relationship between values of a and the concentration
of income, Davis introduced a new concept in his modification of Pareto's
theory, namely, the concentration ratio.12 Symbolized by p, the concentration
ratio can be related to the parameter a by means of the following equation:
1
P =
2a - 1

city and county of Perugia, Aconia, Arezzo, Parma and Pisa combined, and other Italian
cities in combination (no dates specified); Augsburg, 1471, 1498, 1512, and 1526; Peru, at
the end of the 18th century (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 312).
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12
Harold T. Davis, Political Statistics (Evanston, 111., 1948), p. 185. Davis points
out that this concept originally was proposed by C. Gini in "Intorno alle curve di concen-
trazione," Metron, Vol. 9, 1932, Nos. 3-4, pp. 3-76.
" Political Statistics, p. 185. Davis uses a different notation in this formula; the parame-
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In accordance with this formula, the concentration ratio p varies from 0 to 1 as

the parameter a varies from infinity to 1. With the aid of a simple process of
substitution, it can be readily seen that a value of 0.5 for p corresponds to a
value of 1.5 for a.14 In other words, a stable economy is characterized by a con-
centration ratio p of 0.5 as well as by a parameter a of 1.5. Moreover, as a in-
creases beyond 1.5, p falls below 0.5 and indicates a relatively dispersed dis-
tribution of income. On the other hand, as a decreases below 1.5, p rises beyond
0.5 and denotes a relatively high concentration of income.
The two main hypotheses that Davis formulated with the aid of the con-
centration ratio constitute a decisive amplification of Pareto's original theory:
(1) whenever the concentration ratio exceeds a certain critical value above 0.5,
i.e., whenever a critically high concentration of income prevails in a society,
a revolution is likely to occur; (2) whenever the concentration ratio is lower than
a certain critical value below 0.5, i.e., whenever income is dispersed beyond a
certain critical minimum of concentration, a civil war is likely to take place.16
No claim is made by Davis that the relationships between income distribu-
tion and political disturbances have attained the status of scientific laws. They
are presented in the form of hypotheses, with the definite understanding that
their validity is contingent upon extensive empirical verification. To be sure,
a noteworthy amount of empirical evidence has been obtained by Davis him-
self. He has interpreted the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution
of 1917, and the Spanish Revolution of 1931 as situations which support the
first hypothesis. All of these revolutions were preceded by an unduly high con-
centration of income and wealth, i.e., the concentration ratio exceeded the criti-
cal value above 0.5. The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 and the American Civil
War serve as verifying instances for the second hypothesis. The latter event is
of particular interest inasmuch as its detailed examination by Davis yields a
concentration ratio of 0.20, a value that is definitely below the critical minimum
of income concentration.1'

in. AHISTOTLE'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION RESTATED IN

QUANTITATIVE TERMS
The correspondence of the Pareto-Davis theory of income distribution and
political disturbances with Aristotle's theory of revolution is exhibited by two

ter a. is symbolized by i>. In order to maintain a consistent set of symbols, the formula has
been modified here accordingly, and Professor Davis has approved the change for the
purpose of this presentation.
» 1 1
_ __ fl e _

2a - 1 3-1
(a = 1.5)
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" Political Statistics, p. 195. The distinction which Davis makes between "revolution"
and "civil war" obviously is the following: a revolution is a political disturbance that is
created by an underprivileged majority; a civil war is a political disturbance that is ini-
tiated by a privileged minority. " Ibid., pp. 195-202.
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fundamental parallels. First, Davis' concept of a stable economy is analogous to

Aristotle's idea of a polity. A stable economy is characterized by a "normal" in-
come distribution (a concentration ratio of 0.5), and no political disorders are
anticipated. A polity finds its distinctive feature in the presence of a strong
middle class, and constitutional stability is assured by a unification of political
and economic power. Second, although Aristotle made no distinction between
"revolution" and "civil war," it would be justifiable to identify his concept of
"sedition" with both "revolution" and "civil war" as employed by Davis. On
this basis, an agreement between the two theories under investigation can be
established. The first hypothesis of Davis—i.e., that whenever the concentra-
tion of income exceeds a certain critical point, a revolution is likely to occur—•
can be stated in Aristotelian terms as follows: Whenever a separation of polit-
ical and economic power results from the fact that economic power is vested
in the wealthy few, whereas real (not necessarily nominal) political power re-
sides with the many, the holders of political power, in an attempt to eliminate
the concentration of economic power in the elite, probably will advocate a
revolution. The second hypothesis of Davis—i.e., that whenever income is dis-
persed beyond a certain critical minimum of concentration, a civil war is likely
to take place—would read in Aristotle's sense as follows: Whenever a separation
of political and economic power exists because economic power has shifted to
the many, whereas real (not necessarily nominal) political power is retained by
the few, the few, in order to regain their economic power, will probably resort
to a civil war.17 In both cases, it is a separation of political and economic power
which entails political disorders.
The validity of the Pareto-Davis theory is not a focal point of concern in
this inquiry. It has been emphasized that Davis presented his observations in
the form of hypotheses, that he obtained significant verifying instances in sup-
port of his hypotheses, but that he has not claimed the status of scientific laws
for the relationships which he formulated. The relevance of his investigation
which can be ascertained within the limits of the present inquiry manifests it-
self in two respects: (1) a qualitative relationship has been restated in quanti-
tative terms; (2) the pertinence of a theory of the fourth century B.C. for con-
temporary problems has been established, and a new method for its investiga-
tion has been devised.
Aristotle, of course, conceived his theory of revolution in qualitative terms.
He detected a cause of "sedition" in the separation of political and economic
power, but he was not able to determine what degree of such separation would
assume alarming proportions. The concept of the concentration ratio supplies
17
The distinction between real and nominal political power can be illustrated by the
following examples: (1) During the Russian Revolution of 1917, nominal political power
was vested in the Provisional Government; real political power resided with the Soviets.
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(2) During the Spanish Civil War, nominal political power could be identified with the
Republican Government; real political power would have to be ascribed to the supporters
of Franco. In any case, real political power is the decisive criterion; for it is the residue of
real political power which enables groups to commence a revolution or a civil war.
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numerical values for the critical points in. the separation of political and eco-
nomic power; i.e., it specifies that if the separation of political and economic
power has proceeded beyond certain values (above or below 0.5), political dis-
turbances will ensue.18 In this manner, the qualitative relationship which Aris-
totle formulated has been restated in quantitative terms.
The applicability of Aristotle's theory to contemporary situations appears
to be beyond dispute if it is noted that Davis supported his hypotheses primar-
ily by referring to events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
It is in this connection that the quantitative restatement of Aristotle's theory
by Davis attains its full significance. To be sure, qualitative relationships can
be empirically verified; Aristotle himself succeeded in obtaining verifying in-
stances for his qualitatively conceived theory. The difficulty of dealing with
qualitative relationships is to determine the pertinence of a particular situation
to the general content of the hypothesis under investigation. For example, in
order to appraise the adequacy of the American Civil War as a possible verify-
ing instance for Aristotle's theory, it would be necessary to compare the degree
of separation of political and economic power in that particular instance with
the degree of separation envisaged by the theory. A comparison in qualitative
terms would entail decisive handicaps. If, however, the degree of separation of
political and economic power can be expressed in quantitative terms, the per-
tinence of the particular situation to the general content of the theory can be
readily determined. The contribution of Davis, therefore, is a method of in-
quiry which immensely facilitates the ultimate verification (or possible refuta-
tion) of Aristotle's theory of revolution.
18
An index that would measure the distribution of political power in the same manner
as the concentration ratio measures the distribution of economic power, would be an addi-
tional aid. Research in that direction would be an extremely difficult, but worthwhile, un-
dertaking.
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