Africa Peace and Security Program – APSP

Institute for Peace and Security Studies – IPSS

Addis Ababa University

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
AFRICA PEACE AND SECURITY PROGRAMME

MEDIATING POLITICAL CRISES: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM THE KENYAN AND
ZIMBABWEAN MEDIATION PROCESSES, 2007 - 2008

BY

DUDZIRO NHENGU (GRS/3095/07)

SUPERVISOR

DR. MARTHA MUTISI

A LONG ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
MANAGING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA.

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA, FEBRUARY, 2016

i
 Addis Ababa University

School Of Graduate Studies

Institute for Peace and Security Studies

Africa Peace and Security Programme

MEDIATING POLITICAL CRISES: INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM THE KENYAN AND ZIMBABWEAN
MEDIATION PROCESSES, 2007-2008

Submitted by

DUDZIRO NHENGU (GRS/3095/07)

DECEMBER, 2015

ii
 DECLARATION

I, Dudziro Nhengu, do hereby affirm that the research work presented in this long essay is original. This work has
never been presented at any other college, journal, university or institution. In the process of analysing data and writing
this essay, I have referred to other scholars’ studies on the subject, but have provided citations in recognition of their
work. Full quotations have also been referenced accordingly. With these acknowledgements, I do not hesitate to
declare this work as originally mine. The long essay is academic research presented in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of the Managing Peace and Security in Africa (MAPSA) Degree at the Institute of Peace
and Security Studies, Adds Ababa University, Ethiopia.

Dudziro Nhengu (GRS/3095/07)

Signed_____________________________________

Date_______________________________________

iii
 APPROVAL SHEET FOR THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature: ___________________ Date: __________

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University - thank you. Doctor Martha Mutisi, my supervisor -
ndinotenda Hungwe. Professor Charles Ukeje, Doctor Frank Owusu, Professor Simon Akindes, Professor Martin Rupiya
and all guest lecturers on the MAPSA 10 programme - ngiyabonga. Nebiyat, Dennis and all MAPSA 10 support staff -
obrigado. Emily, Afeif, Rekia, Augustine and Ernest - merci. Colleta - asanteni. Okechukwu, Igwee - imela. Rona, Seblu
and Mellessi - amasiginelow. Abdirashid and Mojahed, in Africa we save the best for last - dank je. My family, my lovely
and beloved children, thank you for your patience, and for believing in me - inkosi. All sheroes and heroes of the struggles
for liberation, thank you for making Africa possible - arigato. To the current leaders of Africa, a silent wish for silenced
guns by 2020, and …
To God be the glory!

v
 ACRONYMS
ACCORD African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ANC African National Congress
APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
AU African Union
ANC African National Congress
AU Protocol African Union Protocol
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
COPAC Parliamentary Select Committee
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DPA Department of Political Affairs
ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya
EU European Union
GPA Global Political Agreement
GNU Government of National Unit
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe
HIV/AIDS Human Immuno Virus/Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome
IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDASA Institute for Democracy in Africa
JOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
KANU Kenya African National Union
KNA Kenya National Accord
MDC Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-T Movement for Democratic Change led by Tsvangirai
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
NP National Party
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
PCRD Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
ODM Orange Democratic Movement
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONHRI Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
OPDSC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
PNU Party of National Unity
PSC Peace and Security Council
vi
RECs Regional Economic Community
SADC Southern African Development Community
SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference
SPLM/A Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army
UN United Nations
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNSG United Nations Secretary General
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNON United Nations Office in Nairobi
UNSCR1325 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)

vii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page ii
Declaration iii
Approval sheet iv
Acknowledgements v
Acronyms vi
Abstract 1
Maps 2
1.0 Introduction, Historical Background and Climate Setting 3
1.1 Brief background of the cases: Zimbabwe and Kenya 3
1.2 The SADC and background to its mediation role in Zimbabwe 7
1.3 Historical background leading to mediation in Kenya 14
1.4 Background to conflicts in Kenya 15
1.4.1 Ethnicity and resource distribution 16
1.5 Formation of the post conflict state in Africa 17
1.6 The Global, Continental and Regional Architecture for peacebuilding in Africa 19
1.6.1 The United Nations’ role in peace building 21
1.6.2 The role of the AU in mediation in Africa 22
1.6.3 Background to role of RECs in mediation in Africa 24
1.7 Statement of the research problem 25
1.8 Objectives of the study 27
1.9 Research questions 27
1.10 Justification and research objectives 27
1.11 Theoretical Framework for data collection 28
1.12 Theoretical Framework for Data Analysis and Interpretation 29
2.0 Literature Review 31
2.1 Mediation concept 31
2.2 Stages of the mediation process 34
2.3 Conflict Analysis 36
2.4 Preparatory and Pre-Agreement Phase 36
2.5 Negotiation phase 36
2.6 The post-Agreement Phase 37
2.7 The Closing Stage 37
2.8 Types of mediation 38
viii
2.8.1 Third party and Multi-party mediation 38
2.9 Mediation Framework and determinants for success and failure 40
2.10 Mediation styles 44
3.0 Research Methodology 46
3.1 Introduction 46
3.2 Research Design 46
3.2.1 Data Collection Methods 47
3.2.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation 49
3.2.3 Ethical considerations 50
3.2.4 Methodological limitations 51
4.0 Findings and Discussions 52
4.1 Introduction 52
4.2 Findings for the Zimbabwe mediation process 53
4.3 Conflict intensity and duration as variables for mediation success 59
4.4 Fulfilling gender obligations as a variable 60
4.5 Underlying causes of a dispute 62
4.6 Findings for Kenya 70
4.6.1 The Kenya Mediation Process 70
4.6.1.1 Mediation team’s ‘fit for purpose’ and getting it right on the onset 72
4.6.1.2 Expediency, Good research and adequate planning are key to success 73
4.6.1.3 Inclusivity and playing the politics right 74
4.6.1.4 Aligning mediation to local protocols and legislation 75
4.6.1.5 Tact and prioritisation of issues 76
4.6.1.6 The power of hybridisation of mediation 78
4.6.1.7 Taking gender as a key mediation consideration 79
4.6.1.8 Managing participating groups as a pre-determinant for mediation success 81
4.6.1.9 Political insight 82
4.6.2 Balancing the arguments - Kofi Annan committed some of
Brahimi’s deadly sins of mediation: Haste 83
4.7 Lessons learnt from the Zimbabwe and Kenya Mediation Processes 85
5.0 Conclusions 89
6.0 References 92

ix
 ABSTRACT

In Africa, conflicts fall simultaneously within the peace-making mandates of the AU, the United Nations (UN) and one
of the regional economic commissions (RECs). (AU, 2009) This presents a complex and fragile nexus, characterised
by tensions over leadership, and by a shifting of blame in times of mediation failure. (Ancas, 2013) The key question is
whether in the interest of ensuring peace and stability on the continent, RECs should follow the global set ‘one size fits
all’ conventional and scientific theoretical process of mediation, or whether each REC should pay due consideration to
its contextual dynamics with regards to its social, political, peace and security interests? Further questions on whether
mediation is a political or a scientific process, and questions of what constitutes mediation success or failure in Africa
also arise.
Existing pioneer literature on mediation process and design emanates from the West, and by nature, preclude a
befitting analysis of conditions that shape conflict and mediation processes on the African continent. Mainstream
mediation literature pays limited or no attention to the continuous linkages between mediation practices in the
negotiation phase and processes in the post-peace-agreement phase of intervention, which is the peace implementation
phase. Linking the motives and practices of mediation from negotiation to implementation phase into a more
integrated process, this long essay provides a unique counter hegemonic version to the existing Western ‘liberal’
models of mediation process design. Additionally highlighting the role of local institutions, women and local
communities as relevant and key players in mediation processes in Africa, the essay contends that just as conflict is
shaped by human processes, any efforts to mitigate it, such as mediation, should in practice be shaped and controlled by
local human knowledge in relation to conflict conditions on the ground. From an appreciative inquiry (AI) theoretical
framework, the essay advocates for production of a home grown body of mediation literature, one that accepts the
relevant from existing literature, while critically negating imposed theories that do not befit a genuine African
experience.
Drawing insights from a thorough examination of the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation processes of 2008,
enriched with further examples from other African states and aided by a few interviews with mediation scholars,
practitioners and researchers, this essay theorises a befitting African mediation experience to shape and guide processes
for sustainable peace on the continent. The essay is a positive affirmation of the need for African scholars to generate
home grown knowledge sources based on specific Africa processes and experiences. The long essay will be of much
interest to students of peace building, state-building, peacemaking, war and conflict studies, peace and security studies
and development work in general.

Keywords: Mediation, Conflict, Peace building, Peacemaking, Peace implementation, Mediation Process
Design, Mediation Literature, Mediators, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Gender, Gender Analysis.

1
MAPS OF ZIMBABWE AND KENYA

2
 1.0 INTRODUCTION, HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CLIMATE SETTING
1.1 Brief background of the cases: Zimbabwe and Kenya
This long essay is a critical enquiry of the 2008 mediation processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe, namely the 2008 Kenya
National Accord (KNA) and the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) respectively. While significant attention has
been paid to how these two mediation processes facilitated peace implementation and ended violent conflict in the two
countries, less attention has been paid to how the two mediation processes were aligned to mediation process design.
There is also a paucity of scholarship that clearly delineates the political aspects of mediation from its theoretical ones
in the two mediation processes. This long essay contributes to African based knowledge production on mediation
process design, and on the political and theoretical aspects of mediation. The essay also contributes knowledge on
what constitutes mediation success or failure in Africa, drawing main lessons from the Zimbabwe and Kenya
mediation processes, as well as from other relevant processes on the continent.
The long essay also proffers a gender analytical lens to the study of mediation in Africa. The inquiry further
explores how the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation processes were aligned to the requirements and stipulations of
mediation process design, at the same time seeking to find out how successful they were; firstly in terms of fulfilling
mediation theory requirements, and secondly in enabling full implementation of the peace processes in the two
countries. Questions of what constitutes mediation success or failure are explored, while practical solutions to
mediation challenges in Africa are also proposed, based on the lessons learnt from the two countries under study.
Building on Lederach’s (2007) transformative peace building theories which call for a shift of understanding of
mediation as a single peacemaking event that ends with the signing of a peace accord to an all-encompassing
understanding of mediation as a peace building process, this long essay also aligns itself to a conceptual understanding
of mediation as a combination of the facets of both peacemaking and peace building. The essay achieves this purpose
by critically examining how peace building theory has influenced the shift of policy discourse and practice of peace
building from the international to the local. (Cited in Paffenholz, 2013) The key argument guiding the inquiry is that
peacemaking is not the final step in the peace process, and as Paffenholz further argues, it takes more than just a peace
accord to bring peace to a region. (Ibid)
While it is admitted that the major thrust of this long essay is on mediation, the need to locate mediation within the
peacemaking and peace building process, tied to the need to outline distinctions and similarities between peacemaking
and peace building is, likewise granted. As such, as part of building a historical background for a better understanding
of mediation processes in the two countries under study, the essay additionally analyses the relationship and role of
international and local organisations in achieving peace in Africa, and these are namely the United Nations, the African
Union (AU) and the regional economic commissions (RECs). Tied to this analysis will be a critical analysis of the
evolvement of the post conflict state in Africa, with special interest on the fall-out between the nationalist agenda on

3
state sovereignty versus the Western ideologies guiding the opposition political party ideology in the case of
Zimbabwe, and the role played by the UN in reinforcing the efforts of local AU players in the Kenyan process.
Peacemaking is the practice of building a consensus between disputing parties. This can be done in direct dialogues
with the two disputants, and often with a third-party negotiator who supports with process and communication
problems, in addition to helping the parties draft a practicable peace accord. In most cases mediators are official
envoys, although citizens are getting involved in the peacemaking process more and more of late. (Ibid) Citizen
diplomacy is becoming an increasingly common way to start the peacemaking process, which is then finalized with
official diplomatic efforts, as the case of Kenya shall illustrate in the ensuing discussions.
Peace building on the other hand addresses social, economic and political structures that have an impact on
people’s lives. (Ibid) Notwithstanding these conceptual distinctions, the differences between peacemaking and peace
building become less visible when applied in practice, in mediation processes that move beyond the mere signing stage.
(Ibid) Peacemaking and peace building therefore remain interconnected and inseparable in practice, and are a
continuum, rather than separate processes. The peace accord is thus a culmination of the beginning stage, which is
followed by long-term peace building, which is in other words the process of normalizing relations and reconciling
differences between all citizens of the warring factions. (Ibid)
According to Boutros-Ghali (1999), post-conflict peace building” (as it was originally known) is a new concept of
which the UN first took note in 1992, but has now become a widely accepted part of most UN missions. There are two
basic types of peace building: it aims either to reinforce preventative diplomacy (remedying the root causes of conflict,
such as environmental degradation, underdevelopment, and threats to the human security of individuals), or to buttress
diplomatic peacemaking (by institutionalizing peace after a conflict). (David, 1995) Peace building consists of
activities that, during the Cold War, were considered the exclusive purview of states. It can involve democratic
institution building, the design and monitoring of elections, training of security institutions (the police and military), and
reconciliation and human rights initiatives. (Ibid)
This being said, this long essay also contends that while mediation theory can be general and applicable across the
spectrum globally, in practice there is need to take note of the context and its prevailing political, economic and social
conditions when applying mediation theories for mediation success. This long essay thus argues for recognition of the
fact that what may work in the Westphalian concept of democracy and political pluralism may not necessarily work in
the same manner in Africa. It is admitted that most conflicts in Africa are between the ruling elite and the rising
opposition political contenders, and in some instances some opposition political parties, because of funding and other
reasons, lean on, and are influenced by Western ideologies.
The study thus argues that, “the culture of political parties in an African state is directly linked to the purposes for its
subsistence, and that the state itself survives for reasons that should be determined by its national interests.” (Reilly and
Nordlund, 2008) What this means is that the African state survives much on the organic or shared values with its
citizens, which is what determines its hegemony and legitimacy over the citizens, and as such, given the political

4
linkages between the African state, the REC and the AU, certain political obligations may arise in the process of
mediation, which lie in the interest of safeguarding the hegemony of the state, of the REC and of the region, but may
however not necessarily be in tandem with the theoretical requirements of mediation. As such, an analysis of what
works and what does not work in Africa with regards to mediation design and process theories is also imperative in this
long essay.
Although Zimbabwe and Kenya belong to different geographical environments, and to different RECs, their
conflict experiences can safely be categorised as political in nature, with electoral disputes playing a major role in
fuelling and directing the political conflicts. Again, their two political agreements both helped to end solemn
intensities of conflict in their respective states, and subsequently enabling conditions with likelihood to facilitate peace,
while laying the ground for “possible” transition to positive peace in the said countries, and this makes them interesting
cases for peace and security inquiry. Secondly, juxtaposing the two cases helps highlight challenges faced by the
RECs, and in this instance SADC, in facilitating peace implementation on their own with minimal supervision from the
AU, as opposed to a process that involves full oversight of the AU, and additionally, how including international actors
as part of the mediation team and local eminent persons as advisors may bring better gains to political conflicts and
settlements as in the case of Kenya.
A third, and equally important unifying factor to warrant scholastic interest is that the two agreements help
demonstrate certain conflict analysis and mediation theories. The agreements were both signed after one or both parties
in the conflict were suffering from William Zartman’s ‘hurting stalemate’ – a situation where one or more actors feels
hurt by the conflict to the extent that they cannot bear its high costs, and would therefore rather have it resolved.
(Zartman, 2008) For Zimbabwe, the collapsing economy and associated violence, coupled by international isolation
and constant call by the mother body, the SADC for the parties to dialogue peacefully, was cause for ripeness as SADC
felt that they had to intervene and resolve the crisis for the benefit of the whole region. Although both ZANU PF and
the MDC were not bold enough on their own to settle for talks until the SADC exerted pressure on them, one can
arguably say there was some “subjective indication of hurting stalemate” on the part of both ZANU PF and MDC.
A hurting stalemate occurs when it does not make sense for one or both of the parties to continue with the direction
of the conflict. The hurting stalemate presupposes that the parties can feel psychologically, economically, financially,
materially and sociologically “pained” by the continuation of the conflict, and the “pain” could be resulting from loss of
energy, stamina, economic resources, allies, face and other related issues that make a continued conflict escalation path
to be unreasonable.
For Kenya, the PNU and the ODM had also become targets for regional and international criticism owing to the
damaged business environment and foreign policy image, but like Mugabe and Tsvangirai, they were not keen on talks,
had it not been for pressure from various actors. (Mutisi, 2011)
Finally, both agreements present learning points to the RECs, the AU and the UN, regarding the central role that
can be played by the various stakeholders, and how these three entities can combine energies and efforts in organising

5
for conflict management and peace implementation, as well as for post conflict state building. Also of interest to note
are the following historical similarities between Zimbabwe and Kenya, which in turn warrant a comparative analysis of
their mediation processes: The two countries’ shared colonial history, and the resulted armed struggles which led to
negotiated independence settlements. In this regard, both Kenyan and Zimbabwean nationalists negotiated with
colonialists with the subsequent Lancaster House Agreements ushering in the Lancaster House Constitutions. Both
countries were never able to come up with alternative Constitutions to the Lancaster ones, until after the mediated
conflicts and subsequent GNUs. Both countries have trajectories which were punctuated by rejection of their
constitutions by the public. Zimbabwe’s initial revised constitution was rejected in 2000 while in Kenya, the
population also rejected the 2005 draft constitution.
There are two threads of arguments for the ‘No’ vote to the Zimbabwe referendum. On one hand the ‘No’ vote has
been widely interpreted as a plebiscite on the ZANU PF government and on Mugabe's leadership. This was so in the
face of an unprecedented economic and social crisis in the country, with unemployment rates over 50% and inflation at
60%, a fuel crisis is crippling industry and agriculture, spending on education and health having been slashed and in a
situation where at least one-quarter of the population was infected with HIV/Aids, and this further affecting the cost of
medical care which had nearly doubled in the previous year, 1999. (Zimstats, 1991) An estimated 76% of Zimbabwe's
population lived in poverty, which was described as “widespread and severe, with a high degree of inequality, even by
regional standards" (Ibid) On the other hand, the argument that the result of the referendum was greatly influenced by
external factors also sustains.
There was huge growing hostility to Mugabe’s rule among Western governments and financial institutions, and
efforts to destabilise the ZANU PF government were high. For example, the International Monetary Fund had
suspended funding for Zimbabwe in November 1999, while all the major banks soon followed suit, and only US$34
million of the US$193 million credit facility from the IMF was been extended to the country. (Slaughter and Nolan,
2000) Regarding rejection of the Kenya referendum, two camps also emerged, one for the ruling elite and the other for
the opposition. The ruling elite camp supported a government system which had a powerful president arguing that
many centres of power were a recipe for civil war. They wanted the government to control all the national resources
and be responsible for all the finances generated from all sectors of the country’s economy. The opposition vouched
for the exact opposite, a ceremonial president with a very powerful parliamentary system led by a prime minister who
would automatically become leader of the majority party in parliament. (Ibid)
The genealogy of politics in Kenya and Zimbabwe is characterised by the challenge of political violence, which
affected both countries. The post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 in Kenya, and the post-2008 election violence in
Zimbabwe have been considered as in the two countries’ struggles towards peace and reconciliation. These episodes of
political and post-election violence were decisive in spearheading of negotiations that culminated in GNUs,
mechanisms that were used to facilitate power sharing and temporal restoration of order and peace. In addition, other
developments such as international condemnation, regional isolation, citizen pressure on political parties to engage in

6
dialogue, as well as the loss of moral and political stamina on the part of the conflict parties, could also have aided in
necessitating the negotiation processes in both Kenya and Zimbabwe.
In the gender and women’s empowerment trajectories, both Kenya and Zimbabwe share similar post-colonial
political experience for women in general and for the women’s movement in particular. In the mid-1990s, women
from both countries continuously engaged the state in processes that effectively brought gains for women through
gender sensitive Constitutions, with special measures for women’s increased participation in politics through
parliament. However, although on a positive note, both the Kenyan and Zimbabwean Constitutions have incorporated
progressive provisions for women, which present opportunities for galvanizing the role of women in politics and
decision making, women continue to face challenges as leaders and politicians, including the prevalence of sexual and
gender based violence (SGBV) and prevailing cultural values and attitudes that are inimical to women’s advancement.
Again, the mediation processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe included some limited space for women. Albeit THE
limitations, women’s movement from the side-lines attempted to influence the political negotiations, and often called
for an end to violence, and the need for dialogue between the political parties. In Kenya, Madame Graca Machel, who
was a member of the AU Eminent Personalities helped convene civil society dialogues, on the margins of the Kofi
Anan-led mediation processes. These dialogues also made a dedicated attempt to reach women’s groups and to
generate gender disaggregated data on the impact of the conflict.
In the Zimbabwe scenario, the SADC formally mandated Thabo Mbeki, then President of the Republic of South
Africa, to facilitate the dialogue between ZANU PF and the MDC, while Jacob Zuma took over for continuous
monitoring on behalf of the SADC, in the post-agreement phase. (Mutisi, 2011) In Kenya, the process was owned by
the AU, who in turn appointed anterior United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan to lead the process, assisted by
the AU Panel of Eminent Persons, Graca Machel, and Benjamin Mkapa, former President of Tanzania and former UN
Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. (Ibid)
1.2 The SADC and background to its mediation role in Zimbabwe
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is made up of the following fifteen member states
namely, Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. The SADC evolved as an initial coalition of Frontline States, with the main objective of the
political liberation of Southern Africa from colonial rule. This coalition was a culmination of a long process of
consultations by the leaders of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.
Consultations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Ministers responsible for Economic Development
of these seven countries were held in Gaborone, Botswana. These consultations were followed by a further
meeting held in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979.
This meeting led to the establishment of Southern African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC) in April 1980, in Lusaka, Zambia. The SADC Treaty and Declaration was finally signed in August

7
1972 by the SADC Heads of State and Government. This treaty translated the SADCC into SADC, with an
additional objective of economic integration, following the independence of the rest of the Southern African
countries. (SADC: 2014) The SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) plays
a frontline role as part of the institutional mechanisms for promoting and maintaining peace and stability in the
region. (Hoste and Anderson, 2010) SADC was involved in the Zimbabwean mediation process informally as
far back as the year 2000, following formation of the MDC. Formation of the MDC was in direct response to
the culmination of the Land Resettlement process. However, the real stimulus for SADC’s involvement in
Zimbabwean affairs was the controversy that often accompanied elections in this country, firstly in the 2002
presidential elections, and later in the controversy related to the 27 June run-off in 2008. (Mandara and Pooe,
2013) The formal negotiation process in Zimbabwe can be captured in three distinct phases: the pre-2008
harmonised election phase - and this mediation began in 2007 and ended in 2008; the post-harmonised election
phase and the period following the inauguration of the inclusive government, which then led to the 2013
harmonised elections.
Mandated by the SADC, Thabo Mbeki, then president of the Republic of South Africa steered a mediation
process in Zimbabwe between the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
and two formations of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), then led by Arthur
Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC and the MDC –T respectively. This mediation process led to
the signing of a Global Political Agreement (GPA), the successive formation of a government of national unity
(GNU) in 2008, adoption of a gender sensitive Constitution on 16 March 2013, and the subsequent peaceful
elections in June 2013.
The background to the Zimbabwe conflict can be explained by long term land and property rights issues from
colonial conquest. In 1999 the government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) commissioned a land reform programme which
became a fast track exercise in 2000, in protest to the prevailing land and economic reality which was tilted against the
black majority. By 1980, when Zimbabwe declared independence, approximately 6,000 white commercial farmers
owned 15.5 million hectares (or 47%) of the country's agricultural land; 8,000 black small-scale farmers owned or
leased 1.4 million hectares; and 700,000 peasant farmers occupied 16.4 million communal hectares, characterised with
poor and in arable soils. (PBS, 2009) The land resettlement exercise led to the displacement of (Southern Eye, 2015)
approximately 6,214 white farmers by indigenous citizens.
The major outcry from the white community was that the exercise was undertaken violently, and without
compensation to the displaced farmers, yet the question of who deserved what compensation remains a historic
nightmare within the “victim-becomes-perpetrator’1 conundrum in Zimbabwe. Reports of violence during the land
resettlement exercise have remained one sided throughout the narrative, looking only at the manner in which the white
people were treated, without however flipping the narrative around to capture the amount of resistance from the white

1
The debate on who is the victim or perpetrator between the black majority and the displaced white farmers remains a puzzle in Zimbabwe
given the obtaining colonial relations where the blacks were formerly displaced by the same white people they later displaced.
8
community here in Zimbabwe and abroad which might have triggered the violence. (Sachikonye, 2011; RAU, 2011)
Same reports also negate the narrative of how legitimate indigenous people have also once been victims of similar land
displacements during colonialism, as well as of how the British violated the Lancaster House peace agreement promise
of financing the Land Reform Programme.
The "sunset clauses" in the Lancaster House Agreement made the Land Reform Exercise almost impossible,
giving special protections to white farmers, while prohibiting the government to repossess land for the first ten years of
independence. Key provisions were that the new nationalist government would not engage in any compulsory land
acquisition, and that when land was acquired, the government would "pay promptly adequate compensation" for the
property. Land distribution would only be possible under the "willing buyer, willing seller” clause, and as such,
beginning from 1985, every willing seller was required to obtain a "certificate of no present interest" from government
before going ahead with the sale. These “sunset clauses” were amended in 1990, and compulsory acquisition of land
for redistribution and resettlement became possible.
Furthermore, in 1992, the Land Acquisition Act gave government increased authority to procure land for
resettlement, and power to limit land size and introduce tax, and this would only be possible following payment of
"fair" compensation and powers to limit the size of farms and introduce a land tax. A 1994 land tenure commission
also recommended that the best way to achieve vital redistribution was through a land tax, without however putting in
place a set tax. These efforts did not heighten the land distribution exercise to desired levels, and in the first decade of
independence, government acquired only 40 percent of the target of eight million hectares, resettling more than 50,000
families on more than three million hectares. (HRW Report, 2002)2 The pace of land reform declined by the end of the
second decade of independence, and less than one million hectares was acquired for distribution during the 1990s,
resettling fewer than 20,000 families. (Ibid)
At the end of “phase one" of the land reform and resettlement program in 1997, the government had resettled
71,000 families (against a target of 162,000) on almost 3.5 million hectares of land. (Ibid) Zimbabwe received part of
the financial assistance promised by the West to aid the resettlement programme in the first two decades of
independence, an amount of £44 million, through a "land resettlement grant" and budgetary support to the Zimbabwe
government, but the later years saw Britain reneging from the commitment with the Minister for International
Development Clare Short writing to the Zimbabwean government stating that "we do not accept that Britain has a
special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe." (HRW Report, 2002) This was followed by a
donors’ conference to facilitate dialogue on the West meeting its land distribution aid obligation, but this conference
witnessed the donor community continuously raising various problems with the way in which the funds provided for
land redistribution were disbursed. This ‘breach’ further polarised relations between the British government and
Harare.

9
Alongside this discourse, and by way of providing more background to the relations between colonialism and
Zimbabwe, this essay also highlights the violent manner of colonial conquest through colonial capitalism. This
argument is premised within the framework of the colonial state’s primitive accretion of capital, starting from
Marx’s classification of free labour, and expounding, in addition, how other forms of subsumption of labour to
capital (unfree) were set up to sustain the process of reproduction of capital through the exploitative means of the
colonial state. (Moyo, 2000)
The ways which the colonial state used to accumulate labour force were numerous, including “… the
imposition of taxes to force the sales of the means of subsistence and translate the discretionary character of
the African participation in the money economy in a necessary one; the restriction of the access to the land; forms
of indebtedness that to be extinguished required a seasonal participation of Africans to the mines or plantations
or in the settlers estates works, forms of forced labour or chibaro/chibalo as in the Portuguese colonies.” (Van
Onselen, 1976: 26)
The chibaro/chibalo constituted an instrument to extract cheap labour force to be used in labour services locally,
and at the same time a threat to push people to accept contracts to work in the mines (First, 1982) ‘… since the
acceptation of a contract labour with one of the main recruiting agencies represented an exemption from the
“social” obligation to provide a basic amount of labour time for colonial infrastructures which were necessary to
exploit the human and material resources of the colony. Those agencies recruited, legally and illegally, labourers
in the whole Southern Africa to work in the mines of Witwatersrand or in Rhodesia, WENELA (Witwatersrand
Native Labour Association) and RNLA (Rhodesia Native labour Association).” (Ibid)
This theoretical analysis holds the capitalist state accountable for creating prevailing modes of leadership and
citizen exploitation by the state, arguing that African leaders post colonialism inherited systems and processes set up by
the colonisers, and modelled along the exploitative nature of the colonies, and as Marx (1976) argues, “Since the state
is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their interests, and in which the whole society is
epitomised, it follows that the state mediates in the formation of all institutions.” (Marx, 1976) The analysis further
contends that African leaders need to rise above the exploitative models of the colonial capital state for effective and
democratic post conflict state reconstruction to take place, and one way of doing that is to ensure inclusive participation
of all citizens in governance, peace building and other processes. This also includes giving women space for
participation in governance and peace building processes.
As noted from the ensuing discussion, the land reform exercise was indeed a noble initiative seeking to rectify
previous imbalances of the colonial era in land ownership between the white minority and the black majority. Effects
of these long term historical oversights were to manifest themselves through a contest for political power between
ZANU PF and the MDC, following formation of the MDC in 1999, which was followed by a subsequent failure of the
referendum for the ZANU PF led reform processes in 2000. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013) The contestations between

10
these two parties were mainly ideological, with the MDC totally opposed to the land reform exercise which the ruling
ZANU PF party highly legitimised.
The continued power struggles between the two parties manifested around the legitimacy of electoral processes,
related institutions and credibility of electoral outcomes. The power contests reached climax in 2008, (Kaarhus,
Derman and Sjaastad, 2013) with the international community also becoming a strong actor in this conflict. (Cited in
Mandara and Poe, 2013) This in turn influenced withdrawal of donor funding and imposition of boycott sanctions by
the West as a calculated means of further weakening the state and buttressing support for the opposition MDC for
regime change. (Mlambo & and Raftopoulos, 2010). This historical fact characterises the continued current
polarisation between the ruling ZANU PF party and the MDC, with the former aligned to African nationalism while
the latter is associated with Western influences and Western donor support to accelerate regime change in Zimbabwe.
The conflict in Zimbabwe then and to date can rightly be classified as a product of both endogenous and exogenous
factors and processes, and also worth highlighting are the liabilities brought by opposition parties’ alliances with the
West, which in the long run crippled the economy and affected livelihoods of citizens, partly through Western imposed
sanctions, and finally also crippled the MDC following withdrawal of AID by the West.
The massive movement of the rich white community from Zimbabwe, coupled with the shutdown of factories and
industries in the face of sanctions, turned the crisis into both a political and an economic one, with a negative viral effect
on the economies of neighbouring countries in the region. Peace and security scholarship contents that, the imploding
economy and international isolation from the sanctions regime, as well as more vociferous condemnation of the
violence by the SADC, facilitated Zartman’s ‘hurt stalemate’ and ripeness of this Zimbabwean conflict, (Mutisi, 2011)
forcing both ZANU (PF) and MDC to accept a SADC mandated–South African led mediation.
SADC, as already noted above, became involved in the Zimbabwe mediation at two accumulative levels from as
far back as 2000, firstly through informal means, with the process becoming more formalised in 2008. (Chikane, 2013)
In 2000, SADC mandated Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Joaquin Chissano of Mozambique and Sam Mujoma of
Namibia to engage Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe (Mugabe) on the method and effects of the Land Reform
process to the country’s economy and the citizens’ human rights in the face of foreign imposed sanctions and donor
fatigue. (Cited in Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
Mugabe’s willingness to support the SADC initiatives for an initial a peaceful approach to land reform can be
juxtaposed against failure by Britain and the ‘world powers’ to honour the commitment they made at the 1998 donor
conference on the Zimbabwe land question, where the United Kingdom agreed with Zimbabwe on the framework and
principles of international assistance on land resettlement. (Ibid)
The SADC mediation efforts through South Africa led to relatively credible harmonised parliamentary and
presidential elections held on 29 March, 2008. The elections did not come up with a clear winner, forcing the country
to fall into further violence, and a call for a re-run. Zimbabwe had adopted Constitutional Amendment 19, which
indicated that to be president, the winner of the presidential elections in Zimbabwe had to have 51% or plus of the vote.

11
This Amendment Number 19 was an outcome of the SADC mediation process. The commission announced the
presidential poll results on May 2, in which MDC received 1 195 562 votes, representing 47, 9% of the valid votes,
while ZANU PF polled 1 079 730, which is 43, 2 % of the valid votes. Since neither candidate achieved an absolute
majority, a run-off was required under the Constitution. The run-off would be held in terms of Section 110 (4) of the
Electoral Act, which stipulates that the two candidates who receive the highest and next highest votes would be eligible
to contest in the second round. (Ibid)
The second elections held in June 2008 were tainted by allegations of electoral flaws; entrenched, institutionalised
violence, and a regression into the pre 29 March era, prompting SADC to mandate South Africa to facilitate inter-party
negotiations for a political solution among key political players, ranging from Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ to Zuma’s
‘assertive stance’ – amid competing domestic and international interests. (Ibid) The mediation was concluded in
September of the same year with the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), and formation of a coalition
government comprising ZANU PF and the two opposition formations, a political union that ‘prevented the country’s
descent into abysmal chaos.’ (Ibid)
From the onset, Mbeki’s mediation had to overcome a number of internal and external challenges, most of which
also either emanated from or were shaped by the deeply polarised stance between ZANU PF and the MDC.
Internally, there was a deep mistrust as well as competing concerns between the parties regarding the questioned
impartiality of Mbeki, owing to the historical links between the ANC and ZANU-PF. Externally, South Africa had to
contend with constant demands by countries in the West for a forceful approach against Robert Mugabe. (Mandara
and Pooe, 2013) This being said, and as noted in the analysis above, arguments around South Africa’s facilitation of
the Zimbabwe process are presented under four streams; historical experiences, South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign
policy, African conflict resolution approaches and dynamics underpinning the Zimbabwean conflict. (Ibid)
Although there are different definitions and interpretations of the causes of the Zimbabwean conflict that
culminated in the violence of 2008, there is inherent consensus on its structural causes, which are highlighted mainly as
land and property rights. (Raftopoulos, 2004; Chiumba and Musemwa, 2012) Long term effects of these conflict over
land and property rights rose in the 1990s to “… a profound economic and political crises …” which Rupiya analyses
as a “protracted internal political crisis” (2012, 169), while Raftopoulos and Eppel term it an “electoral crisis” (2008,
269).
The rise of the MDC opposition movement in the year 2000 for the first time presented a close to realistic challenge
to ZANU PF’s political dominance in Zimbabwe, yet the opposition party was internally weakened by inside
polarisations, too much lineage on Western support and borrowed ideologies and a general lack of political clout and
skill.
The first round of elections on 29 March were characterised by a dispute in which the over expectant MDC claimed
victory, while the results revealing ZANU PF’s victory were attributed to election rigging. Tension led to the
scheduling of a run-off, which became a hallmark for violence and intimidation of voters by both political parties. The

12
levels of violence, and the subsequent rise in the number of refugees who fled to South Africa, Zambia and Botswana,
accompanied by the collapsing economy became cause for concern for the region, who converged an emergency
summit in Lusaka in April 2008 focusing on the Zimbabwe election violence, with the subsequent mandate given to
the SADC to mediate between the two warring political parties.
The current polarisation between ZANU PF and the MDC formations can also be traced back to the very origins of
this conflict. While ZANU‐PF based its claims for legitimacy on the history of the liberation struggle and the hard won
independence from colonial rule, as well as on the need to further protect the country’s sovereignty from foreign re-
infiltrations, the MDC leaned much on the West for political support, and called for the country’s isolation from the
international community through sanctions as a way of gaining recognition to power. The MDC, in contrast to
ZANU‐PF, was constructed through a language of post-nationalist aspirations (Raftopoulos, 2011) and as
Ndlovu‐Gatsheni rightly observes, the major weakness of the MDC derives from its focus and linage on the West. “…
a post‐liberation political formation like the MDC–T, with its roots in civil society rather than in the liberation struggle,
has had to contend with resilient pre and post‐liberation subtexts of histories, memories and reconstruction of myths of
solidarity within Southern African national‐liberation movements.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:29)
This ‘polarisation’ was to determine the rise of Zimbabwe from its conflict effects during the post conflict era,
following signing of the GPA and formation of the GNU. While for ZANU PF and the SADC’s focus remained on
safeguarding the sovereignty of both the region and the country through a continued nationalist discourse against the
West, for the MDC, courting the West for financial support of the political party at the expense of the post conflict
reconstruction agenda became the centre of their body politic. Without disputing the above descriptions, the role of the
international community can also never be overlooked in shaping up the conflict dynamics of Zimbabwe. The World
Bank’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes had adverse effects on the welfare of the citizens in Zimbabwe
(IJR, 2010:9) as they caused unemployment and stagnated industrial production. (Mlambo and Raftopoulos, 2010) In
addition, the effects of the internationally enforced sanctions and donor fatigue also negatively affected Zimbabwe’s
economy.
Thus in the final analysis, the variance in political ideology between ZANU PF and the MDC, which also further
ropes in the West, had far reaching and irreversible consequences that besides plunging the country into further political
and economic turmoil, have remained the trademark of the land’s politics, focusing political attention on political party
differences rather than on development issues at every stage. One graffiti image in a toilet Mbare, Harare’s oldest
suburb reads, “My country suffers from Polaricytosis.”3 This polarisation also had far reaching consequences during
the mediation process, as both parties were mainly seen to be keen to support their respective political stances as
opposed to assessing the social and political dividends that would ensue from those positions, and how these would in
turn contribute to the provision of relevant goods and services to the citizens.

3
Graffiti on toilet wall at Mbare Matapi
13
 1.3 Historical background leading to mediation in Kenya
Many scholars concur that the crisis which broke out in Kenya from December 2007 was not merely a response to the
dispute over election results, but was embedded in long-term, foundational issues that had remained unaddressed since
Kenya gained independence in 1963. (Kanyinga and Watson, 2008)
Elections are a political platform to contest for power. By nature and design elections are inherently contentious,
and as such, if not conducted fairly, they will often lead to violence. (Kisangani, 2012) This being said, underlying
causes of ‘election triggered conflict’ should always be unearthed as a means to effective peacemaking and peace
building. In Kenya, there were deep-seated issues concerning ethnic inequalities, land rights, poverty, political power
and the politics of exclusion, (Ibid) and related weak institutions of governance. (Murithi, 2008/9) These problems
manifested themselves through a general lack of access to basic necessities, as well as the rate of youth unemployment
and gross inequalities and unsatisfactory fulfilment of economic and social rights that have been long-standing in
Kenya. (Lawrence, 2002)
The Kenyan mediation process was equally African-led, although in this instance, the continental body, the AU,
played a more central role, compared to the regional economic communities. The severity of the crisis in Kenya
prompted the French Foreign and European Affairs Minister, Bernard Kouchner, to petition the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" (Khaled Mohammed
Aman, 2009) to avoid a full blown conflict. This was followed by a statement on 31 December 2007, by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, expressing concern for the ongoing violence. (Ibid) On the same day, then UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, also called on the Kenyan Government to abide by its international
human rights obligations. (Ibid)
Efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully through dialogue began in the first week of January 2008, firstly by South
Africa’s Archbishop, Desmond Tutu, on 2 January, and quickly followed by US Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, on 5 January. On 8 January 2008, former African presidents Benjamin Mkapa
(Tanzania), Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique), Ketumile Masire (Botswana) and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) also
attempted to dialogue, followed also by the then African Union Chairman, Ghanaian President John Kufuor, for talks
with President Kibaki. Despite all these mediation attempts, no one was able to broker a peace agreement. After all
these efforts, Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), assisted by Graca Machel and
Benjamin Mkapa, and both representing the Panel of the African Union (AU) Eminent Persons steered the mediation
process in Kenya. Following the Kenya Electoral Commission’s declaration of Kibaki's victory, tribe-based rioting and
violence broke out across the republic. (Khaled Mohammed Aman, 2009)
The violence impact hastily spread across the region, negatively affecting communication and economic activities
herein, and in turn attracting negative foreign policy image, condemnation and ridicule from the international
community, (Mutisi, 2011) as well as forcing the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) into a ‘hurting stalemate.’ (Zartman, 2000, as cited in Mutisi, 2011)

14
 1.4 Background to conflicts in Kenya
Kenya is a member state of the East African Community (EAC). The EAC is a regional inter-governmental
organisation of four other states, namely the Republics of Burundi, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the
Republic of Uganda, with its headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania. The EAC was enforced on 7 July 2000, following the
signing of its establishment Treaty on 30 November 1999. (KNDR, 2009)
The EAC’s major objective is the broadening and expansion of political and social and economic collaboration
among the member States for their common benefit. In order to support this objective and bring it to fruition, the EAC
countries established a Customs Union in 2005, and a Common Market in 2010. (Kreigler Report, 2008) This was
followed by the adoption of the Protocol for the establishment of the East African Monetary Union by the Heads of
State in November 2013. Currently the EAC is in the process establishing an East African Federation towards a
powerful and sustainable East African economic and political bloc. All these initiatives will work for the best in the
attempts for continental integration towards Agenda 2063, and are a best practice for other RECs to emulate. Among
the EAC partner states, and as at 2013, Kenya was the largest with a GDP of $14.1 billion, a population of 31.9 million,
out of a combined GDP of $31.4 billion in 2003 for the 5 member states. (Moran, 2012)
Violence is a general feature of Kenya, and this is a result of both endogenous and exogenous causes. The
country’s geographical positioning, in proximity to Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Eritrea has left the country vulnerable
to violence related to high sea crime and terrorism from both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab. (Chikwanha, 2007) This
position has been worsened by the advent of armed operations supported by the government in Somalia which involve
the use of improvised explosive devices and automatic weapons. As a result, the country has become a thriving
informal business of buying, selling and renting weapons, with an estimated 600,000 small arms in circulation. (Survey
Special Report, 2012)
The impact of piracy activities on the seaway from the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean has been more direct on
shipping lines plying the Eastern Africa coast, providing an international security threat and cause for serious
humanitarian crises. In the attempts to support counter terrorism and mitigate this piracy, more violence has been
generated. (Chikwanha, 2007)
In addition to this, Yemen has been a traditional training ground for Al Qaida, linked to the terrorist activity in
Somalia, with Sudan and Eritrea also providing safe havens for elements associated with these two terrorist entities, as
well as procuring recruits for violence form Kenyan youths. (Ibid)
Triche (2015) points to a number of issues which stimulate and fuel violence in Kenya: Firstly, Kenya shares cross-
border areas with Somalia, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda. As a result, issues of cattle rustling, whose key
drivers are water and pastoral land have been causes of conflict amongst the communities. These have also been
aggravated by the Moslem dynamic as well as by the issues of community identities in relation to administrative and
political constituency borders. Land issues have also fuelled conflict, though at low levels, among the Samburu-Isiolo,

15
the Narok-Kisii border, the Kericho-Kisumu border, the Kericho-Kisii border, the Kajiado-Limuru border (Maai
Mahiu), the Tana River and the Mount Elgon area.
European colonization policy on land acquisition disturbed the traditional system of communal land ownership.
The colonisers parcelled out fertile and arable land to themselves, whilst pushing the indigenous Kalenjin off to the
infertile farming land in the Rift Valley. (Kniss, 2010) Later, during Kenyatta’s rule, tribes formally employed as farm
workers took advantage of the land-buying schemes offered by President Kenyatta and bought the land they had
worked on. (UNOHCR, 2008) This land relocation nurtured jealous and deep resentment among rival ethnic groups,
especially the Kalenjin, who viewed the Kikuyu as settling on their ancestral land, turning the land issues into a key
ethno-political competition issue. (Ibid) The effects of this arrangement were to manifest in the period between 1992
and 1993, when violence, triggered by election and other political processes, forced many Kikuyu farmers out during
Moi’s rule.
In Kenya, land has been used as a political tool to award patronage, solidify support and build political, social and
economic alliances. (Ibid) This is the reason why the persistent land conflicts figured prominently in Kibaki’s rise to
power in 2002. Kibaki took advantage of this dynamic, making land reform a key springboard for his campaign
messaging. As soon as he was elected, Kibaki rightly so launched the Ndung’u Commission to inspect land corruption
and land inequalities, which however did not help much in social and political reconstruction as the report leaned more
on corruption than on land distribution. (Southall, 2010)
Triche further notes that it is also around the re-possession of land that the struggle for independence in Kenya was
focused on, in protest to the manner in which the original communities to these lands were forcefully removed to give
way to large scale farming for white farmers. In the Rift Valley, a relatively peaceful place, some localities also
experience different types and levels of conflict from time-to-time, and these are particularly related to cattle rustling as
well as commonly-shared natural resources (mainly water and grazing land) amongst the more pastoral communities,
such as the Pokot, Marakwet, Turkana and others. (Ibid)
1.4.1 Ethnicity and resource distribution
Kenya has had three post-colonial presidents, all of them drawn from only two ethnic groups. This has in the long run
caused and perpetuated ethnic hostilities. (Murithi, 2008/9) These unequal political patterns compounded further socio-
economic inequalities under the colonial state, also resulting in unequal patterns between the groups and the state, and
among the groups themselves. These patterns also enforced a dominant authority and narrative that centrally controlled
all political and socio-economic powers, in turn normalising rivalry in accessing the sources of patronage and power.
(Dersso, 2007) The Kenya African National Union (KANU) emerged as a moderator between two larger parties that
opposed each other over the rights of the poor and landless versus those of the large farmers and business class.
Despite these efforts, ethnic factions increasingly manoeuvred to form dominant coalitions, further undermining the
importance of political compromise. (Barkan, 2008a) Between 2002 and 2007, inter-ethnic rivalry and bitterness grew
(Ibid) as the presidency rewarded fellow Kikuyus and the ‘culturally related Meru and Embu communities’ with power
and authority at the expense of other communities. Kikuyus held a few positions in government, while a small group
16
of Kikuyu and Meru ministers, known as the Mount Kenya Mafia, held an overwhelming proportion of power
controlling key government departments like defence, justice, finance, information and internal security. (Kanyinga and
Walker, 2008)
This scenario propagated a personalization of power around the presidency, essentially creating an ethicized cult of
personality around the figurehead and further undermining accountability. Distribution of public goods such as
education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure followed patterns of access to political power for a long
time in Kenya, (World Bank Report, 2012) until Moi’s rule reversed existing patterns of ethnic patronage by limiting
the access of Kikuyu people to investment opportunities and transferring control of over 40 of 85 profitable state-
owned enterprises to his Kalenjin co-ethnics. (Ibid)
This concentration of power in an ethnicized presidency has had even worse effects in a country already strained by
severe inequalities, extending not only to issues of resources and power, but also to issues of social construction and
district arrangement. The subsequent creation of new districts was done with the intention of enhancing the already
existent ethnically biased structure, (Fox, 1996) and the effect of this is that members of parliament are elected from
Constituencies corresponding with tribal boundaries; which further polarizes competition for resources along ethnic
lines. (Oucho, 2002) The other conflict dynamic in Kenya has been the emergence of youth vigilantes, owing from the
youth bulge versus the high levels of poverty and unemployment. The most famous of these is the Mungiki which
over time slowly became a criminal establishment running an extortion empire with ultra-violent methods and
suspected political links. (UNOHCHR, 2008) Other communities such as the Kalenjins have their own militias, which
reportedly launched large-scale attacks against their perceived enemies and along the north-western border areas. (Ibid)
It is against this background of political and other violence, deep economic inequalities and sustained far-reaching
impunity that the presidential elections took place and post-election violence swiftly followed. (Ibid)
1.5 Formation of the post conflict state in Africa
An inquiry seeking to effectively explore the successes and/or challenges of mediation processes in Africa cannot
preclude a discussion of the political and economic role of the AU and the RECS in conflict prevention and peace
building processes, and how these dynamics in turn influence development of the post-conflict African state.
Given the principal role of the AU and the Regional Economic Commissions (RECs) in peace implementation,
analysis in this essay is deliberately framed to highlight challenges faced by these continental blocks in pioneering
mediation success so far on the continent, using Kenya and Zimbabwe as cases to draw from. Using mediation process
tracking, key questions on the process of peace implementation are raised, embedding analysis in the close examination
of the Kenya and Zimbabwe peace implementation processes. Discussion of what makes mediation processes succeed
or fail using examples from Zimbabwe and Kenya enables key recommendations for effective peace implementation
on the continent. (Mutisi, 2011)
Alongside this discussion, the essay pursues a theoretical argument on state-transformation as a step towards
sustainable peace, doing this to enrich political thought and debate on the challenges for state-reconstruction in post-

17
conflict Africa. The essay accentuates the arguments of conflict studies predecessors’ for “state autochthonous
transformation” (Ake, 1974 as cited in Aworosegbe, 2011) as the pre-requisite and central component of peace building
and post-conflict transition on the continent. The point of departure for Ake’s argument on the autochthonous state is
the refutation of the view that the state project in Africa is ‘hopeless’ or at a dead-end. While acknowledging the
shortcomings of the state-formation project in some countries, the Ake takes the view that the state on the continent
remains a key institutional and social actor, which needs to be understood more in terms of its historical moorings,
political economy and (subordinate) place in the international system. The paper also establishes a case for
interrogating hegemonic discourses on the nature of the state in Africa and post-conflict peace building on the
continent.
Ake further argues that the state in Africa has limited autonomy, which renders it susceptible to capture by
hegemonic elites, and to become a site for intra-elite struggles for power, as well as an actor in conflict against
excluded and marginalised social groups, further rendering it prone to violent conflict. Ake argues for total
transformation of the state and for a relationship between the state and its citizens for effective peace building to take
place. In this regard, the connections between the possible predatory character of the state and the descent into violent
conflict in Zimbabwe and Kenya are critically analysed. Key questions on the ‘autonomous state in Africa’ against the
backdrop of ‘externally driven state-reconstruction’ hinged on global hegemonic discourses on nation-building in post-
conflict situations (Ibid) are pursued.
This being said, this essay contributes to knowledge that distinguishes mediation by all means necessary from a
mere supernumerary for independent legal, procedural or commercial advice to an integral component of
implementation and subsequent post-war reconstruction and state-building. (Nathan, 2011) Nathan further rightly
contends that peace is not automatically attained when the parties sign an agreement but extends to the implementation
period, hence to effectively implement the agreement the parties will invariably need the support of mediators and other
actors for a considerable period, and in that period, issues of post conflict reconstruction should be pursued with
centrality. (Ibid)
Like other archetypes in African scholarship, the essay proposes a return to ‘endogenous initiatives of rebuilding
the state from below’, and of involving indigenous actors as a condition for achieving a ‘sustainable democratic
reconstruction of the state’ in post-conflict Africa. (Aworosegbe, 2011) Arguing that both the Kenya and Zimbabwe
peace implementation processes were highly successful, but could have been even more successful if they had
heightened the involvement of local people and local processes on the ground, the essay makes a case for a more
sustainable mediation alternative in Africa based on endogenous rather than exogenous initiatives as the means for
effectively rebuilding the post-conflict state from the base upwards, also noting that the majority of insecure citizens in
any conflict or post conflict situation are concentrated at the base. (Ibid)
In spaces where problems are of an exogenous nature, indeed multiparty politics is no guarantee of development
because while it may on one hand empower vulnerable groups, increase transparency, mediate conflict and achieve

18
redistribution of income to the poor, it may on the other hand subvert the broader process of democratization by among
other things, mobilizing ethnic groups against each other, (Ibid) and also inviting external influences driven by “rent-
seeking attitudes” (Ibid) which are in the end destructive to national interests. In line with this argument, the soft
diplomacy of Mbeki, and the protective nature of ZANU PF of its nationalist agenda under the rubric of state
sovereignty is viewed within the African principle of subsidiarity and complementarity, and the need to protect African
led processes from Western infiltration and take over. Since it had rightly deferred mandate for mediation of the
Zimbabwe conflict to SADC as the closest regional body and most well attuned to Southern African politics, the AU
could not further interfere in the mediation process, and this was rightly so, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity.
1.6 The Global, Continental and Regional Architecture for peacebuilding in Africa
The post-Cold War period left a security void on the continent, one fraught with a new phenomenon of small scale
wars and causing even more people to die in Africa than anywhere else on the globe over the last two decades.
(NEPAD, 2005: 9) Close to 26 armed conflicts are recorded in Africa between 1963 and 1968, affecting the lives of
474 million people, representing 615 of the population of the continent, and claiming over 7 million lives. (Ibid) In this
connection, the extent to which some legacies of Africa’s ‘colonial past’ still influence its ‘post-colonial present’ is a
subject of continuing debate, which cannot be isolated from mediation study and practice given that mediation has
become a default variable in the African conflict ‘supply and demand’ chain. (Ibid)
Effectively, these conflicts have eroded Africa’s fragile post-colonial socio-cultural, political and economic
systems, while destroying most of its transport and communication infrastructure, health and educative services. (Ibid)
The conflicts also undermine African and foreign investor confidence, while weakening indigenous economic
development, and increasing the continent’s dependence on foreign loans and assistance.
The situation has turned the continent into a safe harbour and rear base for international terrorism, while
encouraging growth of international criminal networks involved in drug and human trafficking. (Ibid) In this regard,
development funds for Africa have been diverted to conflict mitigation, with some African governments spending
close to US1 million a day or more on the prosecution of war alone. (Ibid) In addition, in Africa, unsuccessful conflict
resolution has proven more elusive, with evidence that about half of all peace agreements fail in the first five years of
having been signed. (NEPAD, 2005)
The UN places failure rate of peace agreements in Africa at 60%. (Ibid) The reasons why peace processes are not
sustainable are many, but major and of interest in this study are firstly the theoretical based and process led mediation
style that negate political realities of African states, and which although they achieve peace agreements and or
governments of national unity, are often short lived and a recipes for relapses into even prolonged conflicts; secondly,
the shortcomings in the support for post conflict reconstruction provided by external actors (Ibid) and finally, the
external agendas delivered in a top down manner based on funding conditional ties which however do not find
relevance in Africa. (Paris, 2005)

19
As a result, relations between the West and Africa are often modelled along a top to bottom model, and guided by a
wrong and dangerous assumption that the West, by virtue of their position in world economic and political hierarchies,
are both the knowledge and economic benefactors of Africa. As a result, external bodies and sources of information
often underestimate the complexities of the continent’s international relations, while adopting a tendency to force their
way into post-conflict efforts in Africa using foreign models and agendas. (Hoste, 2010) These dynamics breed a post
conflict reconstruction dilemma in Africa, which in turn replicates negative thinking and misunderstandings on local
processes among some Africans. (Ibid)
On a positive note, in African scholarship on governance, peace and security concerns, the West’s paternalistic
ideologies continuously ignite and motivate the need to craft a counter hegemonic thinking and practice to create
suitable tools with which to dismantle the master’s house. (Ibid) This being said, an understanding of the factors
influencing decision making in Africa, from the AU through the RECs down to the state and vice versa, is imperative
to building an understanding of the post conflict reconstruction dynamics on the continent.
For purposes of this analysis, Post-conflict reconstruction is explained as a complex system that provides for
simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into
violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately aimed at
addressing the root causes of a conflict and to lay foundations for social justice and sustainable peace. (NEPAD, 2005)
As such, post-conflict reconstruction cannot be divorced totally from state-building, and as a result the two phrases may
be used interchangeably in this analysis. The OECD/DAC guidance on state-building defines it as ‘an endogenous
process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations’ (OECD DAC,
2011a: 2), which ties up with the objective of post-conflict reconstruction stated above.
Composition of each post-conflict reconstruction system is determined by the interaction of specific internal and
external actors present, the history of the conflict and the processes that resulted in the peace agreement. (Hoste, 2010)
Post-conflict reconstruction systems have five dimensions:
 Security
 Political transition,
 Governance and participation
 Human rights
 Coordination, management and resource mobilisation. (Mutisi, 2015)
These five dimensions need to be programmed to simultaneously and cumulatively develop momentum to sustainable
peace. (Ibid) In examining the dynamics of decision making for post conflict reconstruction in Africa as part of peace
implementation process, and the nature of the post-conflict state in Africa, the following two questions will frame the
ensuing analysis: i) What are the key drivers and interests that influence pan-African decision-making processes
mediation in Africa? ii) What are the areas of consensus and divergence? (Ibid) Discussions on post-conflict
reconstruction will be pursued through an analysis of the nexus between the UN and the AU, and in turn between the

20
AU and the RECs in the following sections. The same discussion will also be imbedded in the discussions on the
mediation process in Zimbabwe at every stage.

1.6.1 The United Nations’ role in peace building

The notion of post conflict peace building dates back to the end of the Cold War, where peace building was
conceptualised as a specific area of international policy intervention within the UN, with support from the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). (Murithi, 2008; Curtis, 2012, as cited in Cheeseman & Tendi, 2013) This
thinking was based on former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s (1992) definition of post conflict peace
building as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a
relapse into conflict.” At this stage, and for Boutros Ghali, post-conflict peace building was conceptualised as related to
but distinct from preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.
Other than the UN, other institutions also started to promote post-conflict peace building through peace missions,
with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) taking the lead in 1997. The (OECD)’s
Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network aimed to help better coordinate aid agencies’ peace
building activities in 1997. That same year, the World Bank adopted a framework for its involvement in post conflict
reconstruction and establishment of the Post-Conflict Fund to ensure faster loans and grants to conflict-affected
countries.
In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the AU separately developed post-conflict
reconstruction frameworks in June 2005 and July 2006 respectively. In 2005, the UN created a Peace building
Architecture (PBA) to respond to the gaps identified in the post-conflict response mechanism of the UN as well as to
provide a mechanisms for tackling challenges of low political will and commitment, setting priorities, and holding
actors at various levels accountable to meet their obligations in adding member states’ transition between conflict and
post-conflict peace building, as well as in ensuring action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (Ibid) The PBA is made up of the Peace building
Commission (PBC), Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) and the Peace building Fund (PBF).
This architecture has so far recorded a number of accomplishments in terms of facilitating increased chances for
funding of peace building initiatives, working with relevant member states to meet the local-level needs in the 10 years
of its operations. Criticisms of the PBA emanate largely from its mandate which is fraught with gaps between reality
and expectations of implementation, and overly high hopes of its efficacy. The PBA does not have the capacity, field
presence or technical expertise to either support the planning and strategic engagement, or to provide technical advice
to all who need it. (Ibid) Its successes in contributing to prevention of relapses into conflict in Burundi, Liberia and
Sierra Leone are often juxtaposed against its inability to get the UNSC to pay attention to the situation of a conflict
relapse in the Central Africa Republic (CAR0 and the unconstitutional change of government in Guinea-Bissau, and
this points to its failure to work hand in hand with local national governments, to encourage coherence and
coordination as well as local accountability and ownership. (Ibid) On the other hand however, there is also need to
21
realise that the PBA may be restricted by the responses of member states and the AU as a body, and whatever
initiatives it may be willing to take have to take cognisance of the position of these states.
The success of the PBA thus relies largely on the relationship between the UN and the AU, (as well as with the
RECs and member states, through the AU) in all peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building initiatives, and a best
practice can be cited from the Hybrid Operation of the UN and the AU in Darfur. This relationship calls for a balance
between the UN’s realisation of the fact that their financial and technical support can only be effective as a compliment
to local solutions to peace building, and the AU’s realisation of the need to have adequate initiative and political will in
implementing their own agendas in addition to the resource support they may receive. (Connolly)
As Connolly (2015) further rightly notes, a good example of this dynamic is the AU’s refusal to follow the UN and
support the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on 3 July 2009 [and
in 2014], a move [that] could be perceived as a protest in response to the perception that the ICC only targets African
countries, or as one aimed at showing independence from the UN. Regardless, it appears there is an imbalance of
power between these two multilateral organisations which should be rectified to support enhanced coherence in post-
conflict intervention. Further, it is important to align the AU Post- Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD)
policy and the UN PBA in order to prioritise and tackle the same issues on the continent. Also crucial is a supportive
environment, as well as shared commitment to upholding the same mandate among actors. (Ibid)
As mentioned above, there have been times, especially on issues of international justice, where the two bodies have
opposed each other. Strategically, the UN and AU need to foster a common narrative that is mutually reinforcing and
respectful of each other’s roles. Operationally, the two should work on developing mechanisms to ensure the provision
of strategic guidance and joint guidelines on transitions, so that it becomes easier for both organisations to involve each
other from the earliest stages in assessments, planning, coordination mechanisms, [and] mission support, benchmarks
and evaluation. The Joint UN-AU Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, signed by the AU
Department for Peace and Security and the UN Office to the AU in March 2014, and the Common African Positions.”
Proponents of this reinforcing relationship between the UN and the AU further emphasise the need for the UN to
respect the notion of local ownership of peace building processes, realising that the future of a society should not be
determined by external actors (Ibid), including civil society, and a realisation that civil society also constitute the private
sector who are key in terms of promoting a sustainable local funding base that can bring financial autonomy in future.
(Ibid)
1.6.2 The role of the AU in mediation in Africa
The AU has one of the most comprehensive peace and security frameworks, the African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA), drawing its relevance and effectiveness from its expertly interlinked institutions and frameworks
and draws its mandate, experiences, methodologies and insights from home-grown traditional values. (AU Handbook,
2014) Although it is not possible to have an absolute streamlined African Style of mediation, the desire to make use of
local institutions and frameworks to tap into the relevant foreign (global) standards and best practices to assimilate them
into the local contemporary context has become the cornerstone of the APSA. (Ibid)
22
There is a clear relationship between the AU and the UN down to the RECs in matters of peace and security and post
conflict reconstruction agendas in Africa. The relationship maybe in some instances mutually reinforcing, while in
other instances there may be glaring contradictions that if not handled properly may be of detriment to the peace and
security agenda on the continent. Given this set-up, Regional Economic Commissions, (RECs) have by default
become key players in the operationalisation of the APSA, (Ibid) and have a special mandate in carrying out mediation
processes on the continent. The backing argument is that mediation is a contextual exercise, and that the internal
dynamics of each region impact on the effectiveness of regional security mechanisms, and as such it is important for
the AU to build consensus with RECs on decisions and processes. (Ibid)
At its inaugural summit in 2002, AU members established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) with a special
mandate of overseeing and arranging possible interventions under ‘grave circumstances’ such as war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity (African Union, 2002: Article 4(h)). In the PSC Protocol (African Union, 2002), there is
emphasis on ‘the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these Regional
Mechanisms and the African Union’. (Ibid) Article 16 also states that peace, security and stability activities need to be
harmonised, coordinated and developed through an effective partnership between the organisations. Against this
backdrop, the GPA peace process was mediated by the SADC while the KNA was undertaken with complete
ownership of the AU. The two cases may differ a bit in the sense that the Kenyan mediation process was owned by the
AU, with support from the international community and appointment of eminent persons to assist former UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan in the process, while the Zimbabwean process was facilitated informally by Chissano, Mujoma
and Mbeki, and formally by Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, on behalf of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC).
Further, under Article 16(1) (b), it establishes that ‘the modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the
comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances’. The principle of comparative advantage recognises
the fact, inter alia, that some of the sub-regional organisations were actually more advanced or more competent in
peace operations than the AU was at the time (Abass, 2010)
The AU philosophy on peace and security issues in Africa is guided by the principle of ‘subsidiarity and
complementarity’ with other Organs, Member States and RECs (African Union, 2010). This stance places the position
of the UN at a somewhat compromised position a contradiction between the ‘primary responsibility’ of the UNSC, the
‘primary responsibility’ of the Union, as noted in the PSC Protocol, and the principle of subsidiarity, emphasised in the
MoU and by the Commission. (Ibid) This tension tends to present in some cases, an obstacle in the establishment of a
clear, institutionalised working relationship between these organisations when it comes to cooperation on peacemaking
over who has more power and authority to determine the course of events in post conflict reconstruction agendas in
Africa.
In line with the design of the APSA, the AU is perceived as a regional interlocutor in the international arena, with
the understanding that it may provide a platform for advancing collective action to promote the continent’s strength and

23
prominence that can help counter Western ideologies and imperialism. (AU Handbook, 2005) The AU was advanced
to augment the autonomy of Africa, building on the model of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). (Matlosa,
2014)
As an intergovernmental officialdom seeking to maintain peace and stability on the continent from an African
standpoint, and also given the history of colonialism and the continuing negative effects of colonial influence on the
continent as highlighted above, issues surrounding sovereignty and home grown strategic intervention play a huge role
in the this regional body’s decision making structural design and processes. It is admitted that Western models such as
the European Integration Model (Ibid) have indeed inspired the AU structures and institutions. (Ibid) However, the
AU organs, especially the AU Commission, have maintained a separate model from that of its European counterparts.
Major policy-making instruments of the AU are staffed by official state representatives, and remain a reflection of the
national interests of the states that make up this continental peace and security framework.
The highest decision-making organ of the AU is the Assembly of the African Union (The Assembly). The
Assembly works with the Executive Council, made up of the Foreign Ministers of AU member states, who are
responsible for influencing decisions for the Assembly. The Executive Council has authority to adopt some of the
proposals of the member states, depending on their nature and political sensitivity. Where decisions are highly
sensitive, the Committee makes recommendations and refers them to the Assembly for final implementation. (Ibid)
This dynamic positions the Assembly among the most influential decision-making organs in the AU, giving member
states full oversight over all AU judgements, while reducing the role of the Commission (AUC) to a secretarial one.
Similar dynamics as above also play up at the sub-regional level, in the decision making system of the RECs. Like
the AU, the RECs are confronted with the practical implications of the conflict between supranationalism and national
sovereignty as states are reluctant to strengthen the national contact points within the RECs for fear of losing their
independence and autonomy. (Matlosa, 2014) The RECs are the ‘building blocks’ of the AU, and instruments for sub-
regional political, economic and social development. (Ibid)
1.6.3 Background to role of RECs in mediation in Africa
Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) are key structures that play an increasingly important role in peace
and security as well as in economic and governance affairs on the continent. RECs were established with a mainly
economic goal that encompassed augmenting economic integration, trade, and development. In response to the
escalating conflicts on the continent, RECs and in general SADC, has since 1992, added a peace and security agenda
as such matters have become increasingly pressing and unavoidable, and also following a realisation that serious and
effective economic and trade activities cannot take place in the absence of peace and stability.
The effects of a conflict in one country may also negatively affect the agenda of regional integration as spill over
effects of conflict often breed more animosity between countries. A case in point is the Zimbabwe and South Africa
scenario where the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe have partly contributed to the dynamic of a brain

24
drain into South Africa, in turn fuelling xenophobic attacks of South Africans against Zimbabweans in 2015, but most
importantly negatively affecting the electricity deals between the two countries that have so far been cancelled.
RECs should demonstrate a commitment to pay attention to enduring conflict resolution in their respective regions with
a bid to creating peace in their neighbourhood and avoiding the negative effects of conflicts, such as cross-border
refugee flows already noted above, but of course their efforts can be made more successful by combined efforts from
the AU and the UN. As Franke (2006) argues, the comparative advantages of the international (UN) and regional level
can be combined for the most efficient response to conflicts.
The RECs have been considered ‘building blocks’ of the African peace and security architecture (APSA). (African
Union, 2002). Mwanasali (2003) contends that the success of the AU in the peace and security agenda will ‘depend, to
a large extent, on the ways in which [RECs] and regional security arrangements will merge into the AU’. The RECs
are also confronted with their own internal challenges. Firstly these bodies differ in ideology and also in the manner
they handle issues of conflict, depending on their historical backgrounds and dynamics.
The different RECs subscribe to the founding principles along which they were fashioned, based more on their
geographical membership, to build a sense of belonging and create inclusiveness. (Ibid) For this reason, the AU’s role
is fundamental in propelling an agenda for total governance of the affairs of these RECs. It can be safe to say the RECs
rather influence the nature of affairs of the AU, as already explained above, and not vice versa. As such African
common positions are less a product of the AU as an institution and more an artefact of several factors and forces.
(Ibid) For instance, national interests of the member states; the personality, resources and agenda of the Chairperson
and the nature of the issues on the agenda play a large role. There are also certain linguistic (Anglophone versus
Francophone) and geographic (North versus South) sensitivities that have to be taken into account. (NEPAD, 2005)
In short and of essence, the RECs came into existence before the AU; they evolved on their own to focus firstly on
regional economic affairs, and later and by default, developed focus into governance, peace and security, while the
OAU also evolved with its separate agenda, focusing on Africa’s politics and sovereignty. As such RECs have
different institutional cultures; and they are confronted with the challenges of timing and multiple memberships before
they can be effective building blocks of the AU. (Ibid) Thus the AU has not reached an infrastructure level where it
can represent itself and enforce decisions overall above the RECs. Where RECs are more grounded in terms of
resources, they can make their own decisions that are good for them without considering the AU decisions, and owing
to the role played by member states in the AU governance issues, the AU may be forced to subscribe to the agenda and
decisions of the RECs where there is consensus.
1.7 Statement of the research problem
Strong debate exists on how to define mediation success and failure in general and as well as mediation success and
failure in particular, in the case of the two countries under scrutiny. Does the signing of an agreement, such as the GPA,
or the KNA translate into mediation success? Does successful mediation and implementation of the peace agreement
mean that the parties involved have to merely respect the agreement despite their political ideologies in order to

25
constitute success, and, can the signed agreement be scrutinised and revised in practice during implementation
according to evolving political insights, developments and ideologies?
Zartman (2001) posits that sometimes a party’s or parties’ involvement in a mediation process is just superficial
commitment, what he labels “tactical interlude,” and this refers to the difficulty in judging the sincerity and maturity of
actors involved in mediation. Likewise Robert Gurr (2000) alludes to how conflict resolution initiatives are not
“uniformly effective,” noting that internationally brokered settlements and signing ceremonies accompanying them are
often a façade behind which protagonists jockey for political advantage and resources that fuel the next round of
fighting. It is a fact that the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation processes were lauded by many as successes. However,
the two processes were also criticised by many as insincere processes where the regional blocs and international actors
to the mediation processes played insincere games to buttress ZANU PF’s monopolistic rule in the case of Zimbabwe,
and the same finding also applies for Kenya.
In sincere analysis therefore, one notes that despite the delayed and ‘outstanding’ reforms in the peace
implementations in both Kenya and Zimbabwe, it is beyond controversy that both agreements helped end serious
levels of violence, while ushering in new dispensations of ‘negative peace’ that have allowed current stability and saved
lives from violent bloodshed in the two countries. The “negative peace” is absence of mere forms of direct violence.
However, in hindsight, the negative peace was crucial for ushering in some reforms which could be crucial for
facilitating positive peace. Reforms which were facilitated by the signing of the political agreements in the two
countries included the following media reform; electoral reforms; constitutional reforms; institutional reforms,
economic reforms and establishment of governments of national unity (GNUs), which engendered the spirit of political
cooperation, albeit temporarily.
The GPA managed to, among other gains, facilitate the collaborative work of government in addressing the
economic malaise in the country. In particularly, through the efforts of the GNU, and the spirit of political compromise
that was introduced, the main political parties in Zimbabwe, i.e. ZANU PF and MDC- T and MDC- M had to work
together collaboratively to reduce a hyperinflation of 230 million down to 3%, in addition to enabling fiscal sanity and
availability of basic commodities, whilst in Kenya the economy was also restored and violence eliminated. (Mutisi,
2011)
In Africa, conflicts fall simultaneously within the peace-making mandates of the AU, the United Nations (UN) and
one of the RECs (AU, 2009), presenting a nexus that is both complex and fragile, and one characterised by tensions
over who and whose interests should take the lead in mediation, and for what reasons. Challenges of the peace
implementation process in Zimbabwe have on one hand been blamed on the deliberate unwillingness of ZANU PF to
adhere to the requirements of the GPA, while on the other hand the SADC regional block has been largely blamed for
failing to follow process design with intentions of favouring ZANU PF during the mediation process. The key
question is: In the interest of ensuring peace and stability on the continent, should RECs follow the general
conventional and scientific theoretical stages of mediation in a one size fits all manner in order to meet global set

26
process requirements, or should each REC follow due consideration of its contextual dynamics with regards to its
unique political, peace and security interests? Is mediation a political or a scientific process, or is it both?
1.8 Objectives of the study
The research purpose is three fold: Firstly it seeks to add to existing knowledge for a better understanding of the
concept of mediation and mediation practice in relation to its applicability to the mandate of the RECs in mediating
conflicts on the African continent. Secondly, the study explores the challenges faced by the RECs in general and as
separate entities in mediating conflicts on the continent, and tied to this purpose is the motive to strengthen African
scholarship, knowledge and home grown theories on the role of RECs and their preparedness and capacity to handle
successful mediation processes on the continent.
1.9 Research questions
The following key questions, in addition to those already highlighted, will guide this analysis:
 What is mediation and what role does process design play in the success of a mediation process?
 What factors facilitate the ripeness of a conflict for mediation and what implications do these decisions have in
the success or failure of the peace process?
 At which stage is the peace process deemed a success or failure?
 What is mediation success?
 At which juncture is a mediation process deemed complete, a success or a failure?
 What are the major criticisms and debates of the 2008 Mediation in Kenya and Zimbabwe?
1.10 Justification and research objectives
This research is a comparative case study of the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation processes carried out by the SADC
and the AU in collaboration with the UN respectively in 2008. The analysis seeks to find out how the two processes
were aligned to the requirements and stipulations of mediation process design.
The study achieves this through an exploration of the history of post conflict state reconstruction in Africa at a
general level as a method for climate setting to the whole study. The broader motive is to strengthen Africa’s strategies
and capacities to respond to conflict and build sustainable peace. Added benefits also embedded in the highlighted
objectives of the study are an understanding of the Kenya and Zimbabwe peace processes within the context of both
mediation and political practice, and this is achieved through a comparative analysis of the two peace implementation
processes in relation to how they strive to balance the theoretical requirements of post mediation peace implementation
with realities on the ground.
Admittedly, the number of African countries facing violent conflict has declined in recent years. “Between 1990
and 2005, Africa accounted for about half of the world’s battle deaths, (African Development Bank, 2008). From
2002-2007, the combines total of inter-state and intra-state conflicts declined by 645 from 39 to 14, while the official
battle-related deaths over the same period decreased by over 70% from 9,368 to 2,727. However, between 2006 and
2007, the number of recorded campaigns of ‘one-sided-violence’ against civilians increased from five to ten and the

27
total number of official fatalities increased from 583 to 693. Moreover, in conflict countries far more people die from
indirect causes such as disease, starvation, malnutrition, and breakdown of health services.” (ACCORD, 2009)
However, these indicators constitute a relatively small part of the true human economic cost of war. In addition to the
increases in civilian deaths from both ‘one sided violence’, disease, starvation, malnutrition and breakdown of health
services, additional complex challenges that remain also include: consolidating the peace, rebuilding state institutions,
and rejuvenating economic activity in countries emerging from conflict. (ACCORD, 2009)
Needless to mention that mediation is an integral component of managing and ending conflicts as Africa enters a
new era of conflict resolution and peacemaking towards Agenda 2063. While the AU works in collaboration with the
RECs, and the UN to define, institutionalise and consolidate mechanisms and processes for mediation, mediation
scholarship should likewise be deepened and strengthened to contribute towards developing specialist expertise and
systematic mediation practice that recognises the diversity of our sovereign states while pursuing the oneness that our
region seeks to achieve. (AU, 2000, Article 6.3) According to the AU Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and
Security Council (PSC), mediation is one of the specific functions of the African Peace and security Architecture.
(APSA) (Ibid) This thought speaks to the third objective of this long essay, which is to build scholarship towards a
common understanding of the political processes in both Kenya and Zimbabwe during the 2008 peace implementation
processes under the ambit of post conflict state reconstruction on the continent.
The mediation processes in Zimbabwe and Kenya did well in altering the ‘enemy images” which the different
political parties had of each other. The mediation processes also led to the halting of direct forms of violence and paved
way for the institutionalisation of reforms in the political spheres. Although this could be classified as “negative peace”
or ephemeral peace,” by pundits, reality is that the peace settlements did provide for the building blocks towards more
sustainable and more durable and positive peace in both countries. Arguing for mediation as part of political
settlement, this discussion moves the debate beyond the theoretical, providing insights into the practical challenges and
possibilities that arise when translating political settlements theory into practice. (Nathan, 2011)
Finally, the two cases are chosen as archetypes to demonstrate, firstly, how international actors can work
cooperatively on political settlements, and secondly, to show the role of the RECs in mediation. (Mandara and Pooe,
2013) Juxtaposing the two cases is strategic in highlighting challenges faced by the SADC in facilitating mediation in
Zimbabwe on its own with minimal supervision from the AU, as opposed to a process that involved full oversight of
the AU and inclusion of international actors in the Kenya mediation. The value of this essay is that it grounds
scholarship on African peace processes on contextual reality on the ground, whilst drawing from existing global
theories on the same. It also lays the ground for building blocks towards African solutions to African problems, while
also refining African processes and realities to align to useful global trends and practices.
1.11 Theoretical Framework for data collection
The analysis of available literature for this long essay was based on the theoretical framework of “appreciative inquiry”
(AI) technique. AI emerged from the fields of organizational development, leadership, change management and peace

28
building (Cooperrider, Whitney and Stavros (2005; Whitney and Trosten-Bloom (2003); Cooperrider, and Suresh
(1987); Cooperrider (1990); Srivastva and Cooperrider (1990). This theoretical framework is a form of action research
methodology which underscores affirmation rather than criticism, and focuses on building on existing opportunities
rather than focusing on deficiencies and faults. It is a theory and practice for approaching change from a holistic
framework, rooted on the premise and belief that human systems are made and imagined by those who live and work
within them. (Ibid) Proponents of AI argue that it has potential to lead systems to move toward the generative and
creative images that reside in their most positive core – their values, visions, achievements, and best practices.
(Cooperrider, 1990); Srivastva and Cooperrider, 1990)
In theory, AI is a perspective, a set of principles and beliefs about how human systems function, a departure from
the past metaphor of human systems as machines. Appreciative Inquiry has an attendant set of core processes,
practices, and even ‘models’ that have emerged. In practice, AI can be used to co-create the transformative processes
and practices appropriate to the culture of a particular organization. Grounded in the theory of ‘social constructionism,
AI recognizes that human systems are constructions of the imagination who are capable of change at the speed of
imagination. Once organization members shift their perspective, they can begin to invent their most desired future.”
(Ibid: xxi)
Conflict is a phenomena of human construction, and as such, effective methods of responding to it can also be
continuously shaped and constructed by professionals of conflict mitigation. Mediation is a form of conflict mitigation,
and as such, it requires constant updates to align with the constantly evolving conflicts on the continent.
The long essay acknowledges existence of useful theories of mediation so far, but acknowledges that with the
constantly changing nature of conflict, better and more theories that build on the existing ones can be formulated. Most
theories on mediation in the Zimbabwe and Kenya conflict have been propounded by Western scholars, and at the
same time, in Africa, there is an emerging consciousness to re-write history, re-conceptualise knowledge production on
and for the continent, and to couch local theories that proffer insights for local solutions to local problems. AI on the
other hand, enables a more critical counter-hegemonic analysis bent on deconstructing imposed models of perceiving
mediation processes on Africa while reconstructing a more relevant home grown mediation literature in Africa.
1.12 Theoretical Framework for Data Analysis and Interpretation
The theoretical framework guiding data analysis and interpretation for this long essay is grounded theory (GT). This
theoretical approach was first articulated by Glaser & Strauss (1967) as an empirical approach for developing theory,
and this was in response to the objectivism of the times where much of research theory development was done before
collecting and analyzing data. Thus Glaser and Strauss were in contention for an alternative approach that involves
developing theories in a way that is connected to the data collection and analysis process, and to the realities on the
ground. Other scholars have also hailed GT as an approach for developing theory that is "grounded in data
systematically gathered and analyzed" (Strauss and Corbin, 1994). By centering analysis on reality on the ground, and

29
on evolving rather than pre-conceived theories, GT informs theory of change, because it allows the voices of the
marginalized populations and processes to be brought to the centre for knowledge production.

30
 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Mediation concept
Using the appreciative inquiry (AI) theoretical framework, this section provides a critical analysis of the available
literature on mediation in general, and on mediation in Zimbabwe and Kenya. Mediation as an approach to conflict
resolution has been used for a long time in both formal and informal ways. A plethora of definitions for the concept of
mediation exist in peace and security scholarship, and some of the definitions differ in relation to their methodological
principle.
The baseline for defining mediation designates a voluntary and confidential method, through a structured process,
where one or more impartial third-parties assist the fighting parties to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. The
mediator provides a framework and conducts the mediation, but makes no substantial suggestions and decisions in the
cases. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013) This definition is appreciated for providing theoretical guidelines on the need for the
mediator to remain impartial and as much influential to the mediation outcome as possible. However, in reality, and
given the historical and other factors surrounding the conflict, it might also be a good strategy for the mediator to make
some reasonable suggestions to the parties, without however invoking force for adoption, and always ready to accept
rejection of the suggestion from the parties, especially where there is threat of a stalemate. In my view the mediator is
also a careful and gentle educator, and like a careful horse rider the mediator should be ready to control the most
experienced horse’s bridles to avoid an accident.
Berchovitch, et al (1991) define mediation as a process of conflict management where disputants seek the
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve
their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law. The first definition above focuses
on the acceptance of the third party as the core element to lead the mediation process, while the second emphasises the
behavioural dimensions of the mediation process. Both elements in the definitions are key and true, except to add that
also key in mediation is an assessment of what motivates parties to accept a mediator or to agree to a mediator’s
invitation. In general, it is the individual expectation of those involved in the conflict that mediation will be effective in
helping each of them secure more favourable gains than would otherwise be possible. (Ibid)
Prencen, (2014) cites “the individual interests” as opposed to “the shared values” or “the convergence of the
interests,” as the driving force behind the approval of the third party in mediation. Rightly so, mediation processes are
driven more by the individual interests of the conflicting parties, but they are also in turn controlled to some extent by
the stimulus of the mediator. Additionally, Berchovitch (1992) notes that a disputing party expects a mediation
outcome to help bring an end more quickly to a conflict or a crisis that would otherwise persist. This argument concurs
with Zartman’s hurting stalemate where a party sees better value in ending the conflict and more hurt in pursuing it.
Thus one or both of the contending parties often seek third-party mediation in the conviction that the mediator will
warrant an agreement, reduce the likelihoods of impending costly conflicts and reinforce peace. There are however
cases where the parties may fail to deliberately concede to a hurting stalemate despite the hurting experiences they will

31
be going through, and it might take the influence of the mediator and other stakeholders to assist them reach the hurting
stalemate position.
Wikenfeld (2005) also posits that involvement of the third party in mediation process reduces likelihood of the
intensification of a dispute to an international or civil crisis. In the bid to ensure that conflict escalation is curbed,
mediators will sometimes push for either elections or a GNU without taking care to assess whether the peace
agreement is mature enough to end the conflict. As a result, many conflicts have heightened even more intensely after
failure of the parties to sustain the said agreements. From experience in Africa, for example in Mali, mediators
habitually push for a non-violent settlement to the dispute, either through elections or through a power sharing
government. After months of failed shuttle diplomacy in Mali, violence escalated to unprecedented levels, forcing the
Mali government and the Algiers Platform, a coalition of pro-government armed groups, to sign the deal in May.
The Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA), the main rebel coalition in northern Mali refused to sign,
and violence escalated, which saw about 30,000 people fleeing their homes around Timbuktu because of fighting.
After continued shuttle diplomacy, the Coordination of Movements for Azawad (CMA), the main rebel coalition in
northern Mali, officially signed a peace agreement in Bamako on 20 June. (UN Women; 2015) This is a welcome
development for Mali and a great relief for the Algerian-led international mediation.
However, after previous agreements failed to restore peace in 1992 and 2006, there are reasons to remain cautious.
Three stand out. The CMA – an alliance of Tuareg and Arab-led rebels, signed the agreement under huge international
pressure. Algeria, France and the UN Mission in Mali (Minusma) pushed hard to persuade the CMA’s leadership to
concede, and the CMA, not wanting to be linked to the al-Qaida fighters who overpowered the Tuareg rebels in
northern Mali during 2012, eventually decided to sign up. (Ibid) Distrust between the government, the Platform and
the CMA continued, despite the peace agreement breakthrough, an indication that the peace agreement was out of
political expediency, especially for the CMA. The day after it was signed, disgruntled CMA members called for an
extraordinary meeting of militants and combatants in favour of Azawad to protest against the peace agreement.
Another problem in this arrangement is that the agreement focused on short-term security through disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration just to ensure that there was a signed deal, without building a solid enough foundation
for a sustainable peace implementation beyond the signed deal. The ensuing violence and the mediation process that
again resurfaced in August is evidence that a ‘pressured’ peace settlement is not the end all, and might not necessarily
bring lasting peace. (Ibid)
From an AI point of view, the two definitions above are on course in terms of defining mediation as a theory, but
constrained in that they conceptualise mediation as an event that ends with the signing of a peace agreement, ‘getting to
yes’ (Fisher, 1995) instead of making it part of the long term peace implementation process beyond the mere peace
agreement signing stage. The main argument remains that there is more to peace than just the cessation of hostilities,
and mere cessation of hostilities does not guarantee a sustainable peace, because unripe mediations have often relapsed
into even worse forms of violence and conflict. (Ibid)

32
This being said, mediators and guarantors of peace agreements should mainstream long-term peace building needs into
peace agreements. (Mutisi, 2011) To ensure this, Track 1 Diplomacy4 should be a useful tool for fostering peace
agreement implementation and for ensuring long term and continuous dialogue between the warring parties beyond the
signing stage, while Track II Diplomacy, which refers to inclusion of non-state actors including civil society
organisations, research and academic institutions, in the process of mediation and peace implementation should also
complement Track I Diplomacy. Follow up processes for successful peace implementation after signing of a peace
deal, should include both Track I and Track II. (Ibid)
Nathan (2009: 2), as cited in ACCORD (2009) defines mediation as “a process of dialogue and negotiation in
which a third party assists two or more disputant parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict
without resort to force,” Herrberg, et al (2009) distinguish mediation from other forms of third-party intervention,
arguing that mediation is not premised on force, and also that the parties maintain a certain degree of ownership over
the outcome of the peacemaking process.
Mediation is the most suitable way out when there is a high level of animosity and mistrust between disputant
parties, and Nathan (2005, as cited in ACCORD, 2009) contends that, “… the mediator serves as both a buffer and a
bridge between the antagonists, ameliorating the anger and suspicion that prevent them from addressing in a
cooperative manner the substantive issues in dispute… [to]… assuage mistrust between warring parties and raise their
confidence in negotiations, in turn enabling the parties to reach agreements they find satisfactory and are willing to
implement.” (Nathan, 2005 cited in ACCORD, 2009: 14)
In a practical sense mediation is extensively used in areas ranging from international and internal conflict; labour
management relations, community level conflict resolution, public policy and family disputes. (Porto, 2015) By
practical explanation, it is a process in which an impartial third party, also known as the mediator, facilitates the
resolution of an ongoing conflict or dispute between two or more parties through dialogue and compromise rather than
through violence. “The mediator achieves this by skilfully and professionally promoting the conflicting parties’
voluntary agreement or self-determination of the conflict in an open and transparent manner.” (Ibid)
The duties of the mediator are many, and come in stages, cumulatively facilitating the coming together of the
conflicting parties for negotiation; including continuous communications with all parties and stakeholders involved;
promoting understanding, centring the parties on their stated and unstated interests; planning and rolling out the
mediation exercise; while also seeking to find creative solutions to problems that enable the parties to reach their own
agreements. (Bouvier, 2012) The process of making peace is embedded throughout the whole operation of mediation,
inter alia: prior to conflict through preventive diplomacy; during a conflict through peace-making activities; after a
conflict to promote implementation modalities and agreements and during peace building efforts to consolidate peace
and lay the foundation for sustainable development. (Ibid)

4
Track I Diplomacy refers to official diplomatic effort in peacemaking, and is characterised by the government, the military and
policymakers as actors. Track I Diplomacy is often expressed through formal aspects of the governmental process.
33
Failure to recognise and consider how these cumulative stages build up into a single process may cause one to lose
sight of the profundity of mediation as a combination of facets of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building,
thereby reducing mediation to a mere pragmatic and scientifically procedural process. A successful mediation effort
seeks to have an outcome that is accepted and owned by the both parties, so it suffices to argue that mediation is both a
peacemaking and a peacekeeping process because it collapses some components of all three processes together.
Rightly so, Nathan (2009) further argues that mediation does not equal peacemaking perse, but is one strategy within
the broader conceptual framework of peacemaking. Peacemaking includes preventive diplomacy, use of “good
offices”, as well as crisis management, among other factors. He maintains that mediation includes arbitration and
adjudication; unilateral action by one of the disputant parties; domestic political reform by making governance more
inclusive; confidence and security building measures; and the offer of inducements to, and application of pressure on,
one or more of the parties by international organisations and foreign powers. (Nathan, 2009:11 as cited in ACCORD,
2009)
Like any other practice, effective mediation requires that the mediators, especially the lead mediator in the instance
where there is a mediation team, be competent by training, experience, judgement and disposition, as well as impartial.
This will ensure that the conflicting parties reach their decision voluntarily and with self-determination, and that their
decisions are based on factual, sufficient and accurate evidence. However, owing to its complexity, in most mediation
processes success is often difficult to achieve, while mistakes come easily, and in some cases the mistakes can be fatal
for the whole peace process. (Brahimi, 2008)
The Australian principles of conduct for mediators stipulate specific principles of mediation. Failure to adhere to
these mediation values and ethos results in the pitfalls which Brahimi terms the ‘seven deadly sins of mediation,’ and
these are ignorance; arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility and false promises. On the flipside, striving to
avoid the seven deadly sins of mediation is aligning mediation processes to the UN normative frameworks for effective
mediation. (UN, 2015) It is however recognised that in some cases application of these principles may be affected by
the law or contractual agreements, and as such these principles are basically intended to perform three major functions:
to serve as a guide for the conduct of mediators; to inform the mediating parties; and to promote public confidence in
mediation as a process for resolving disputes.
2.2 Stages of the mediation process
Given that mediation is a facilitated negotiation process by a third party between the belligerent parties, its success
hinges much on the moderator being well aware of each step and acting to maximize results through sensitivity to
proper and full observation of their behaviour throughout the whole process.
Mediation processes differ per conflict context, and methods cannot work in a cut and paste manner, hence the
need to always differentiate between mediation as a norm and mediation as a practice. (Moore, 2004) However, there
are common strategies that can be standardised to ensure successful mediation as guided by various mediation
principles. Most important to mediation is consideration of the 3Ps, which are i) understanding the problem, ii)

34
understanding the people involved in the conflict and their followers, and iii) properly planning the process for
mediation. (Ibid)
Problem refers to dynamics of the conflict in relation to its underlying structural and proximate issues, as well as
the election dispute issues triggering violence. People refers to understanding of the key actors at local level and their
stated and non-stated interests, as well as actors in the background supporting either side of the warring parties at
national regional and global levels is important. (Ibid)
Process refers to engagement of the mediator and the first stage is seeking to engage non-partisan domestic actors
or independent bodies. The main argument is around ownership of the mediation process by local actors, who
normally and naturally have better understanding of problems, and are also good for ownership of the process. Local
bodies and parties may also wield social and political gravitas that helps speed up mediation. Where local bodies are
hard to get or work with, third parties should be drawn in. Local bodies or individuals can also work with third parties
to good effect, and as a good and effective practice for best results, mediators should involve themselves at all stages
throughout the talks until final implementation of the peace agreement. (Ibid)
Third party mediators are more of facilitators, and should broker dialogue and elicit buy in, information and
corporation without forcing formal authority over the belligerents. (AU Handbook of Mediation, 2005) Third party
mediation also raises moral concerns over the engagement of the mediator and the international community, and the
mediator has to walk the fine line between respecting the state sovereignty and the responsibility of protecting the
citizenry against the overriding hegemonic dictates of the state. (Maiese, 2003) While this is called for normatively,
and while it also has effects of ensuring observation of human rights, in practice the mediator may want to exercise care
and clout to maintain the interests of the state, as a means of ensuring the state’s interests to cooperate and protect the
security interests of the citizens. How the mediator can achieve this without seeming to be partial towards the state is a
long and subjective debate. Being aggressive to the state may be detrimental to the whole process, further escalating
the conflict, and the same is also true of the need for the mediator to use acumen to also sustain the interests of the
opposition.
The success or failure of a mediation process is influenced by, and depends largely on the nature of the design of
the whole process. The series of events, steps, approaches, concessions and smaller agreements undertaken eventually
lead to the achievement of a broader result. Generally, mediation follows several phases which form the building
blocks of the process, and in which the mediators, co-mediators, supporters to the mediation, external actors and the
parties themselves have certain ascribed and prescribed roles to perform. (Accord, 2013) The different stages as they
apply in process design are as follows: Conflict Analysis; Preparatory or Pre-Agreement Phase; Track I
Mediation/Negotiation/Facilitation; Track II Dialogues and Activities; Establishment of Formal Process; Negotiation
and Agreement Phases and Post-Agreement Phase. A brief outline of these stages is provided below:

35
 2.3 Conflict Analysis
Conflict analysis entails the evaluation of the conflict and its ripeness for resolution, including defining conflict actors;
defining the sources and drivers of conflict, including the structural and proximate causes as well as the conflict
triggers; assessing national and international context; identifying potential spoilers and identifying potential allies.
(Porto, 2013) Attempting to bring a solution to a conflict situation without properly understanding the long term
causes often lead to a premature prescription of solutions, and subsequently to a repetition of the same conflict.
Most mediation processes should include a gender sensitive conflict analysis, which is basically the analysis of
how the conflict affects different genders, how it affects gender roles and to what effect these changes in gender roles
bring to the whole situation. Precluding a gender analysis to conflict analysis may also result in wrong and inadequate
planning for conflict mitigation, wrong costing of the effects of conflict and misrepresentation of the depths of violation
of human rights by gender, such as such as rape and transmission of disease and birth of unwanted children.
2.4 Preparatory and Pre-Agreement Phase
The second stage is the preparatory or pre-agreement phase, which includes the design strategy for process,
determining partners, managing spoilers, reaching out to conflict parties and putting them in touch with each other for
progress, assessing party readiness, initiating “talks about talks,” preparing the parties, drafting the framework for talks
and producing the framework agreement in accordance with the deliberate willingness of the parties. Every mediator
will obviously have specific interest and biases, and these can in some instances be of positive benefit to the mediation
process if they are handled with caution and balance. (Mutisi, 2011) Thus while meeting with parties together is good
for transparency, meeting with parties separately often helps the mediator to try and influence positive outcomes that
are best for the context, without however implicitly imposing solutions, especially where there is deep conflict between
the parties.
The next stage would be to meet with the parties together to plan and agree on the framework of the mediation: the
venue, timelines, participants, language rules and procedure. During this stage the mediator introduces the parties,
examining how they relate, registering their discomforts, and strategizing on mitigating their discomforts. The
mediator must avoid domineering, at the same time taking care to exercise enough power to contain the process. This
stage also helps the mediator to assess the ripeness of the conflict as the belligerents must be receptive and willing to
participate. Where parties feel better off in conflict, the mediator can manipulate using the carrot and stick (Ibid)
strategy or call for international influence, without forcing decisions.
2.5 Negotiation phase
The Negotiation phase, which is the fourth one, entails establishing principles of engagement, designing the
communications strategy, facilitating humanitarian agreements, determining ceasefire and security agreements and
arrangements, establishing mechanisms for monitoring and verification, establishing contributions of parties to truth,
justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition and draft comprehensive agreement. During talks the mediator
ought to ensure impartiality (Fisher and Ury, 2003, as cited in Maiese, 2003), manage the expectations of the parties,
be flexible to processes, exhibit full knowledge of the issues and give parties equal chances to express themselves. The
36
mediator should be quick to adjourn process where there are threats of violence or perpetual misunderstanding, and
separately seek to influence the parties for resumed peaceful dialogue with time. The mediator must always assess for
spoilers, and in the interest of time and good results, may also seek to influence possible outcomes to the conflict, such
as power sharing and peace agreement options, without however forcing decisions, and such persuasion power always
yields the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. (Ibid).
When parties concede to a peace agreement, the mediator must ensure inclusive participation of representatives of
both parties in the drafting process, and also ensure usage of legally binding language for an implementable agreement.
The tricky bit about mediation language can be at two levels: firstly in that failure to make the language legally binding
has a determining effect to the implementation process, and one of the parties, especially that wielding more power and
advantage by virtue of being more seasoned politically may turn the loopholes in the language to their advantage.
Secondly, once the language is not legally binding, it may be hard at a later stage for one of the parties to take the other
to court based on those loopholes.
2.6 The post-Agreement Phase
The final stage is the post-Agreement Phase which includes implementation of all agreements and post-Monitoring and
Reporting Mechanisms. Most peace agreements in Africa fail to go beyond the signing stage into the continuous
monitoring stage, and this was also the case for Zimbabwe. Soon after the signing of the agreement, Pretoria, for
various reasons beyond the scope of this discussion did not make the necessary follow ups for peace implementation as
agreed. Likewise at Lancaster, there were no mechanisms to ensure continued monitoring of the implementation
process, leading to the British withdrawing on financing the land reform process, which ultimately caused another
violent conflict in Zimbabwe. The mediator must follow up the mediation process to implementation stage, calling the
parties to order for total fulfilment of their agreed issues, as well as assessing for possible hindrances to implementation
in order to advise the parties and seek help accordingly.
2.7 The Closing Stage
In this stage, the pact is reached and the process is coming to an end. The terms of the deal are drafted and an
agreement is submitted to the parties for signatures. The signature of an agreement omits all past confusions and might
lead to an enforceable agreement depending on the rules convened between the parties. While in theory this is
perceived as the final stage in mediation, in practice the final stage is the post-Agreement Phase which includes
implementation of all agreements and post-Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms. Most peace agreements in Africa
fail to go beyond the signing stage into the continuous monitoring stage, and this was also the case for Zimbabwe and
Kenya.
In Zimbabwe, soon after the signing of the agreement, Pretoria, for various reasons beyond the scope of this
discussion did not make the necessary follow ups for peace implementation as agreed, leading to a near stalemate when
ZANU PF took it within their political and ideological reasoning not to exhaust the institutional reforms as required by
the GPA. This in turn led to a near repetition of wrangles as the MDC sought to prolong the GNU basing their

37
arguments on the need for continued electoral reforms, whilst ZANU PF, and rightly so through the courts, won a case
for immediate elections that saw an end to the GNU and ushered in another era of supreme rule for the Nationalist
government.
Again, analysis fits to assess whether South Africa and the SADC’s remote observance of the processes in
Zimbabwe was genuine or a game plan in (as some critics content) support of creating an environment for ZANU PF
to exercise their will despite the requirements of the GPA. Arguments that the SADC and South Africa withdrew
deliberately to suit the arrogance of the MDC and the West who constantly called for external interference in the affairs
of Zimbabwe also befit the analysis. Yet this scenario was not new to Zimbabwe, and neither was it unique to African
processes, as reality at Lancaster was also that there were no mechanisms to ensure continued monitoring of the peace
implementation process by the mediator, leading to Britain reneging on its promises to finance the land reform process,
which ultimately, and in the long run, caused a further violent conflict in Zimbabwe.
It is important to note that while mediation stages can be referred to chronologically as above in theory, in practice
following the chronology may not always be possible, and again, issues of which stage interlinks with which one may
depend entirely on the context and nature/intensity of the conflict as well as the expertise of the mediators than on the
need to follow theoretical process design. Again, the line between mediation closure and transformation into the next
level of peace implementation, peace facilitation, peace building, peacemaking or PCRD is blurred. This essay argues
that mediation processes do not come to a close perse, they rather translate into the next appropriate process.
2.8 Types of mediation:
2.8.1 Third party and Multi-party mediation
The cases of Zimbabwe and Kenya present a good comparison of single party and multi-party mediation. However, to
make the distinction between single party and multi-party mediation clearer for knowledge building, this section will
not limit examples to Zimbabwe and Kenya perse, but will also draw from experiences from other African countries.
Third-party mediation is simply where a third party, the mediator, assists two disputing parties to resolve a conflict.
While multi-party mediation entails the involvement of multiple third-party State or non-State, the general feature that
has been evident especially in the end of the cold war. (Porto, 2013) The Kenya process cud fit in the frame of multi-
party mediation, in the sense that although it was led by the AU eminent personalities, the UN and the REC also
provided mediation support. On the other hand, the Zimbabwe process where Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma from
South Africa represented the SADC in the mediation is an example of third party mediation, which is single party
mediation. Like single-party mediation, multi-party mediation also has both advantages and disadvantages to it, and its
advantages include the following:
Firstly, involvement of multiple parties in the mediation process means that each of them shoulders a smaller share
of the fiscal burden and the political risk associated with the mediation effort. Third parties cannot share only the costs
of a diplomatic intervention, for example the expenses for travelling, the meetings and related security arrangement, but
also much more importantly the potential costs related with the failure. However, basing the argument on the case of

38
Zimbabwe, and given the political complexities that were associated with it, multi-party mediation would have cost the
process as opposed to third party mediation given the camaraderie between Zimbabwe and South Africa as nationalists,
which might not have necessarily worked the same if parties from other RECs who do not identify as such were
brought into the negotiations.
Secondly, groups of mediators can pool resources, skills and leverage in trying to sway disputants. A good
example can be drawn from the efforts by the intergovernmental authority on Development (IGAD), to settle the
decades of the long-time war between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A). IGAD took the lead in facilitating the 2005 Naivasha Agreement, but benefited greatly from diplomatic
weight, logistical support and technical expertise provided by United States. Earlier mediation process led by IGAD in
1990 failed to bring Ahmed Al Bashir’s Government and John Grang’s rebel forces to a real agreement until 2001
when IGAD benefited from a group of Western countries included United States, United Kingdom and Norway that
was “the engine needed to push the process forward.” (Simmons and Dixon, 2006)
The case of Multi-Party mediation during the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia led to the signature of an
Agreement in December 2000. The mediation process was led by the AU, which was primarily presented by Algeria,
eventually leading to a settlement, but only after the US, the UN and the EU had joined this particular mediation
process.
Thirdly, a group of third parties can collectively be less biased than an individual group of mediators. The IGAD
led mediation in Sudan is again an instructive example. The US was ambiguously biased in favour of the Christian
SPLM/A against the Islamic Government in Khartoum. US President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth
as his Special Envoy to Sudan, who understood the conflict as “clear hostility between Christianity and Islam” (Ibid),
and left little doubt that the SPLM/A could expect his sympathy towards the Christians against the NIF and Sharia law.
The second reason of the US bias in favour of the SPLM/A, was the past support of the Sudan’s Government for
Al-Qaeda. Operatives located in Sudan were allegedly involved in the bombings of the US Embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya, and then, the US considered “Sudan as State sponsor of terrorism.” When US bias threatened to become a road
block to the negotiation, the IGAD and its Kenyan lead mediator Sumbeiywo kept negotiation on track. When US
pushed for the capital-Khartoum to be Sharia free, in contradiction to what had been agreed on in the 2002 Machakos
Protocol, Sumbeiywo threatened to shoot the American envoy and throw him out of his office.
Challenges of multi-party mediation have been summarized by Crocker as a problem of leadership, problems of
managing complexity, coordinating the use of comparative advantages, maximizing leverage, voiding crossed wires
and conflicting agendas, and maintaining focus and coherence. (Crocker, 2011) Firstly, third parties can have divergent
interests with respect to how and under what conditions a conflict is resolved. A case in point is the mediation process
in Burundi, where the profusion of players, each with its own Agenda and favoured solutions, undermined the
coherence of the international community’s response. (Ibid) writes that Boutros Ghali’s special representative in
Burundi counted no fewer than seventy government delegations that passed through the country between the end of

39
1993 and the beginning of 1995 in the hope of contributing to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In addition to these
diplomatic efforts, no fewer than 35 non-governmental and multilateral groups engaged in Track II conflict resolution
activity between 1995 and 1998.
Third party mediation can also suffer from unclear division of labour and lack of responsibility over decision-
making powers within the group. In the best case, this can be a logistical irritation, but in the worst case disputants can
try to exploit this situation for their own gain at the expense of the negotiation. The failure of the multiparty mediation
in Rwanda can be attributed to the unclear tasks of each party during the process. Likewise in Somalia, the
uncoordinated intervention by the multiple-party mediators led to process failure. In Kenya the presence of a woman
in the mediation team would have assumed that gender issues were going to be given due consideration. In reality
however, failure by Graca Machel to press for realisation of this issue may be a result of the failure by the mediation
team to allocate each other specific duties according to individual expertise.
Thirdly, even if decision-making structures are well defined, involvement of multiple mediators makes it difficult
to reach an easy agreement. A well balanced and successful multiparty mediation may well depend on the requisite
element of cooperation and coordination among the parties involved. The presence of a mediator serving as a
coordinator between the other third parties involved in the process is a guarantor for the realization of positive
interconnections between their different intermediary roles.
2.9 Mediation Framework and determinants for success and failure
Given the endemic nature of conflict to all façades of society, mediation has by default become an increasingly
common response to conflict, as well as “…almost as common as conflict itself” (Simpkin, 1992). As noted above,
there is need for mediation scholarship to distinguish between mediation as a norm and mediation as a practice, or in
other words, mediation as a political and pragmatic process as opposed to mediation as a scientific and methodical
theoretical process. Given the complexities of conflict, and also given the diverse nature of socio-political conditions
per state on the continent, there is no clear hypothetical answer as to what accounts for successful mediation process or
how to define it, and this is because of the myriad forms mediation can take. Simpkin (1992) describes mediation
effort as “… an exercise in futility,” arguing that in the final analysis, its results are often seen to be “oversimplified” in
comparison to the complex practicalities of conflict situations. Kleiboert (2006) terms mediation success an “elusive
notion” while Beardsley (2008) alternatively terms any definitions of mediation success as “inconsistent” (Ibid).
When assessing a mediation case study, the most practical definition of mediation success may relate to intentions
and outcomes of the process as opposed to measuring the process against the complexity of the conflict. In other
words, success is difficult to judge if one does not understand the mediation’s initial objectives. (Beardsley, 2010)
Secondly, it is important to clearly distinguish between short term and long term mediation success. In many cases
mediation increases the chance of a formal agreement – which on one hand increases the likelihood of long term
mediation success, (Ibid) while on the other hand a rushed formal agreement may determine long term failure to peace
implementation.

40
Alongside this argument, Grieg (2001) distinguishes between “short term and extended term” mediation success, with
other scholars arguing that when mediation finally fails in the long term, this “…is not necessarily a failure of
mediation per se, but a failure of the post mediation environment.” This connotes that increased mediation during the
post conflict peace implementation phase may help avoid a relapse (Beardsley, 2008: 737-738), thus pointing to
mediation as a process beyond just the signing of an agreement, but one requiring close follow up and monitoring
beyond the whole peace implementation process.
Bercovitch et al (1992) situate mediation success in the normative criteria relating to “greater fairness, efficiency
and legitimacy, etc.,” while Fisher (1972) reduces mediation success to just “resolution.” The problem of equating
mediation success to resolution lies in that resolution has many stages, and initial resolution may not necessarily entail
conflict transformation. There is more weight to Bercovitch and Langley (1992)’s argument, which delineates the
successful outcome variables or resolution at three stages viz: “a cease fire”; “partial settlement” and “full settlement.”
Effectiveness of the mediation process is also judged in terms of “formal agreement, post-crisis tension reduction, and
contribution to crisis abatement.” (Ibid). Beardsley (2010) further argues for actor satisfaction as a potential judge of
success, at the same time admitting that issues of effectiveness are difficult to quantify, while Fearon (1995) and
Powell (1999) establish the alternative of effectiveness as “continued conflict” (Beardsley, 2006).
Dixon argues for mediation success at various and possibly cumulative levels, positing that mediation can be
successful even in the short term, in as far as it enables temporary relief from conflict. Sometimes, the goal of
mediation is to halt the direct violence and get parties to dialogue and demystify enemy images of the other. On the
other hand Beardsley (2008), states that short term mediation success can be detrimental and inhibitive to possible
sustained peace, because it may create artificial incentives that, as the mediator's influence diminishes and the
combatants' demands change, leave the actors with an agreement less durable than one that would have been achieved
without mediation. According to Beardsley, (Ibid) mediation is characterised by “competing short and long-term
effects,” and short term mediation success may not always be mirrored in long term success.
This analysis has established the need to distinguish between mediation as scientific process and as political
practice, and related to it is the need to consider contextual differences when debating mediation success or failure in
mediation scholarship in Africa. Explanations of failure and success thus require a nuanced understanding of the
context, as they are case dependent. For example, still using the mediation in Mali, it would be wrong to out rightly
say the process was a failure, because it did provide a rallying point for the government of Mali and the disputing
parties to start to realise the need to stop violence and consider negotiating for a lasting solutions to this violence
through a compromise. At the same time, the process cannot be out rightly deemed a success because of the continued
violence and also because of the rush to sign without providing an agreed implementation plan to ensure sustainable
peace.
Success can also relate to the achievements visa viz the complexities of the conflict the mediation sought to
resolve, as well as the material conditions on the ground that combine towards ensuring success of the process, and

41
they are many, including the type of mediation, style of mediation, parties involved, the intensity of the conflict,
resources available, to mention a few.
Berovitch and Houston (2000) promulgate a “contingency approach” which contends that mediation success is
determined by a number of contextual and process variables. This approach recognizes three stages of conflict
management, specifically the “antecedent” or “contextual dimensions,” the current stage and the consequent stage.
While the antecedent stage or contextual dimensions nature the mediation approach and verdicts of the parties, the
“current” stages include the mediator’s qualities and the “consequent” stages that are “past interactions of experiences
the parties have had with mediation” (Ibid). In turn contextual variables are classified as “(a) the nature of the dispute
(b) the (clarify statements) nature of the parties, and (c) the nature of the mediator,” including mediator strategy in
process variables (Ibid). Additional acknowledged features affecting the contingency model, are “party alignment,”
“mediator’s relationship with parties,” “mediation environment” and “expected mediation duration.” (Ibid)
The contingency approach cites four important factors viz; Transition from conflict to negative peace and finally to
positive peace, protection or accountability, participation and programmatic interventions. The first one has to do with
is the process of transition from conflict to negative peace and finally to positive peace, or simply prevention of conflict.
(Roberts, 2008) Notable in this factor is that while negative peace aims at eradicating violence, positive peace aims at
also eliminating the indirect forms of violence such as political exclusion, discrimination, and disempowerment which
often lie at the core of the conflict. (Galtung, 2012) Positive peace is therefore a progress from state centric notions of
security towards an all embracing human security model that is also all inclusive, taking cognizance of issues of gender
and human rights frameworks.
The second factor is protection or accountability, which aims at institutional reforms to ensure that state
establishments such as anti-corruption and other commissions, legislative and judicial bodies, the ombudsman’s office,
transitional justice mechanisms where they are relevant and all-encompassing community level peace structures and
mechanisms score for citizens’ civil, political, economic, social and cultural liberties. (IDEA, 2008: 21)
The third norm of participation recognises the supremacy citizens as active agents to the democratic processes
(IDEA, 2008: 9), including all collective parties such as civil society, women’s groups, communities and local
authorities in conflict transformation and post conflict reconstruction activities.
The final factor is that of relevant programmatic interventions to ensure active participation of all sectors of society
in restoring peace and order in society post conflict. Consulting and actively harnessing the efforts of local populations,
especially the marginalised and the most affected by conflict upsurges the effects of the peace building processes as
well as embolden the legitimacy and local ownership of post conflict reconstruction processes. (Paris, 2000)
Bercovitch and Houston also claim that parties who have similar social and political backgrounds hold more positive
perceptions of each other, and this is an incentive for successful mediation. (2000) This argument may hold true for
the nationalist brotherhood between Zimbabwe and South Africa as the ensuing argument will reveal. Kressel and
Pruitt, (1985) also state that the higher the degree of acrimony between the parties,” the higher the need for third party

42
involvement (2000), and again this is relevant to the bald blood between Mugabe and Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe, and the
role played by Thabo Mbeki in levelling the playing field towards a transition from conflict to a condition of negative
peace currently prevailing in the country
The political and conflict context can also determine mediation success or failure. (Zartman, 2001) As noted prior,
Zartman (2001) posits that in some instances a party’s/parties’ involvement in a mediation process maybe just a
superficial commitment, what he labels “tactical interlude,” and this refers to the difficulty in judging sincerity of actors
involved in mediation. “Tactical interlude” in this case may also refer to political tactics regional bodies such as the
AU and the SADC may deliberately engage in relating to the manner in which they influence the process and outcome
of mediation in order to safeguard regional and state political ideologies and interests as shall be seen in the case of
Zimbabwe in the ensuing analysis.
Likewise Robert Gurr (2000) alludes to a similar situation, of how conflict resolution initiatives are not “uniformly
effective,” arguing that internationally brokered settlements … and signing ceremonies accompanying them are often a
façade behind which protagonists jockey for political advantage and resources that fuel the next round of fighting.
Zartman (2001) further accentuates that parties have “an interest in winning” and that mediation will only be fruitful if
it produces a “favourable outcome” (Ibid: 282). Brown and Shraub (1992) also concur that parties need to have an
“interest” in solving the conflict at mediation and that the way parties perceive their interests may differ from generally
“perceived interest.” At the same time the regional and global political dynamics and dictates can also determine
mediation failure or success.
Fear of, or effects of sanctions have witnessed rushed peace agreements which in the long run may prove difficult
to sustain and relapse into further conflict. At the same time economic decay and political conditions in neighbouring
countries may also enforce a rushed process even where the parties have not reached a hurting stalemate, as in the case
of Zimbabwe and Kenya and the pressure they both received from the regional bodies to end the conflict in relation to
its spill over effects regionally and continentally.
For Zartman (2008), the timing of mediation is as important as the content of the peace agreement reached.
Ripeness is a state in which the parties perceive themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate “…optimally associated
with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe” (Zartman, 2001). Staying in the mutually hurting stalemate
would bring more pain and cost to either or both parties than relief, and as a result parties are inspired to seek a solution.
Ripeness also refers to a shift in power dynamics, when the upper hand starts slipping and the underdog starts
rising. (Ibid) Zartman further argues that ripeness alone, though is not a sufficient condition for mediation success,
hence the need for consideration of other variables, further positing that it is the work of the mediator to induce
ripeness because conceptually, the moment stands out, but in reality it is buried in the rubble of events. (Ibid) This
places much responsibility in the hands of the mediator, in their helping the parties to perceive the ripeness. The
existence of a ripe moment is a necessary but insufficient factor for mediation success. Zartman further notes that
moments, when ripe, do not fall into one’s hands; they have to be taken with skill. (Ibid)

43
Stedman (1991) on the other hand disagrees with Zartman, arguing that the usefulness of ripeness as a theoretical and
practical tool depends on the clarity of its indicators. He argues that ripeness does not hold much use in conflict
resolution, and that its presence is not evident. Elangovan, (as cited in Bercovitch and Houston, 2000), argues that
mediation strategy is an important variable to consider when judging mediation outcome, and that it influences
“strategic bargaining’ to a great extent. (Ibid)
In conclusion, while the various scholars cited above differ on the aspect of long and short term success variables,
they strike commonality on the argument that mediation success is to be based on the mediation’s original intentions
and outcomes not only in the interim but both in the interim and beyond the adoption of a peace treaty to the
accomplishments in satisfying the obligations of the requirements of the approved pact all through the implementation
era. They also agree on the idea that traditional and normative factors of mediation as a conceptual framework may not
necessarily be applicable to mediation in practice, which has its own determinants as affected by the diverse historical
and political processes on the continent.
2.10 Mediation styles
The three main styles of mediation are facilitation or communication, formulation and manipulation. The mediator
facilitator plays a passive role in facilitating information exchange, and thus their role is primarily to communicate.
(Zartman, 1996) This type of mediation also refers to third party consultation, good office or process facilitation. The
mediator-facilitator can organize the logistics of the negotiation process, collect information, set the agenda regarding
the issues to be discussed as well as determine the order of the discussions, while also delivering messages for face to
face communication between the parties. (Ibid)
Formulation mediation sees the mediator take “a more substantive role” (Zartman, 1996) in negotiations, including
“…suggest[ing] solutions to…disputes” (Brown and Shraub, 1992).
Manipulation employs the mediator’s involvement to “the maximum degree [to the point of] making itself a part of
the solution” (Ibid) as a means to ensuring a desired outcome. (Brown and Shraub, 1992) Unlike the mediator-
facilitator, the mediator-formulator conveys substantive contribution during the negotiation process, including the
suggestion of alternative and new solutions to help parties easily reach a solution when the negotiation leads to an
impasse. However, the mediator-formulator cannot oblige parties to consent the solutions that she/he proposes, but can
just submit them to each party for possible free and mutual consent. (Ibid)
Finally, the manipulative mediator similarly to the mediator-formulator contributes substantively in the negotiation,
using their position and leverage to “manipulate parties into agreement” (through persuasion, comprehension and
political power). (Ibid)
A mediator can use more than one style during the process, consequently changing attitude towards the parties
according to the demands of the situation. The different styles of mediation and the flexibility that the mediator should
exercise in the advancement of the process equally calls for a befitting analysis of the different stages of the mediation
process as well as the dynamics characterizing each step. Beardsley et al. (2006) conclude that a combination of

44
formulation, facilitation and manipulation brings most success in mediation. Kleiboer asserts that “…the higher the
mediator's status, the greater the chances of success” quoting Low’s (1985) examination of the Lancaster House
negotiations in Zimbabwe as being made possible by the high status of third party involvement.
Left to their own instincts without constant monitoring and exertion of pressure to consider the requirements of the
mediation process and the peace agreement, disputants may fall out of their mediated settlement. (Brown and Shraub,
1992) For this reason, although the mediator is often tempted to start a process and then slip away as it develops its
own momentum, the mediator may in fact be required to be more involved in the regional structure of relations after a
mediation effort than before (Ibid)
Brown and Shraub further refer to mediation occurring within the “context of power politics” thus affecting the
mediator’s motives (1992). They further explain that mediator’s motives are of “self-interest”; only intervening when
“a conflict threatens their interests…” (Ibid)

45
 3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This long essay is a critical enquiry of the 2008 mediation processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe, namely the 2008 Kenya
National Accord (KNA) and the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) respectively. While significant attention has
been paid to how these two mediation processes facilitated peace implementation and ended violent conflict in the two
countries, less attention has been paid to how the two mediation processes were aligned to mediation process design.
The research purpose is three fold: Firstly it seeks to add to existing knowledge for a better understanding of the
concept of mediation and mediation practice in relation to its applicability to the mandate of the RECs in mediating
conflicts on the African continent. Secondly, the study explores the challenges faced by the RECs in general and as
separate entities in mediating conflicts on the continent, and tied to this purpose is the motive to strengthen African
scholarship, knowledge and home grown theories on the role of RECs and their preparedness and capacity to handle
successful mediation processes on the continent.
3.2 Research Design
This essay grasps a feminist approach to research, and doing this in a bid to provide a gender sensitive lens to mediation
studies. There is no distinctively or uniquely feminist methodology that can stand alone from contemporary research
culture. Notwithstanding the importance of using a triangulation of methods to eliminate all possible biases in research,
feminist epistemology advocates more for the use of qualitative research (QR) methodologies in the study of conflict,
arguing that qualitative methods are investigative and seek to answer specific questions about social reality as opposed
to validating pre-existing hunches. (Gadbois, 1999) Feminist researchers do applaud the use of quantitative data such
as statistics, noting that statistical information can allow a researcher to recognise the enormity of a widely occurring
problem such as abuse of women, and this is a powerful tool for setting women’s experiences in a larger context.
Statistics also help development workers to grasp the differences as well as commonalities between gender, races and
classes of people affected by conflict. (Ibid) However, feminist scholars also persist that quantitative research methods
are often constraining and limited in their ability to fully uncover the complexity of sensitive issues, especially where
violation of women’s rights are concerned. (Ibid)
QR methods are considered a more descriptive and in-depth approach to collecting and analysing data, and they
ground analysis in real life which allows people to examine how social experience is created and given meaning.
“Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in
terms of the meanings people bring them.” (Gadbois, 1999: 8) As such, while statistics can help give us shared
perception on for example, the number of women raped during a violent conflict, they cannot be able to give us the
shared social and psychological reality of the damage wrought by the incidences of rape to the survivors of such
conflict processes.
QR is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices
that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations,
46
including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level,
qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 3) This
means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret,
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” (Ibid) Through talking to the women survivors of rape in
conflict, using qualitative methods such as oral narratives or focus group discussions (FGDs), a researcher is able to get
deeper into the psychological domains of the women and assess the depth of the damage.
Again, where statistics only end at counting, qualitative methods add value in that they allow survivors to speak
about their experiences, and in so doing, they also benefit from the knowledge and advice of the researcher. Action
research, which is part of QR encourages researchers to provide useful information to their research respondents, such
as directing a raped woman to the women’s rape clinic or to the police to seek recourse. This essay argues that
quantitative methods are indeed important for providing factual data, but qualitative methods are more developmental
because they enable development processes to be linked up and to bring meaning to people’s lives, build confidence in
the abused and bring the voices of the marginalised to the centre to inform knowledge production. (Ibid)
Feminist scholarship (Gadbois, 1999; Mama, 2012; Mazurana, 2013) also argues that since conflicts are human led
processes, they are as complex and subjective as human nature itself. Given the complex nature of conflict, and that
social reality is subjective, qualitative methodologies promote a better understanding of reality through a systematic use
of a predefined set of procedures to collect evidence and produce findings based on subjective representations, while
producing findings that are applicable to social development even beyond the immediate boundaries of the study. Most
importantly, qualitative research methods contribute to theory of change, as they interpret social problems from the
perspectives of the local populations involved, while also bringing the voices and realities of the marginalised to the
centre. Such research can inform processes going forward, and also has potential to incorporate the voices of the
marginalised.
3.2.1 Data Collection Methods
Using qualitative research methods, and for reasons elucidated above, this long essay built evidence on the inquiry
through a comparative analysis of the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation and peace implementation processes. The
analysis thrives on particular cases, and can thus be classified as a comparative case study of two country processes.
Arend Lijphart, (1971) posits that there are six types of case study techniques, and these are interpretive, theory
confirming, deviant, hypothesis generating, theoretical and theory infirming case studies. Lijphart further contends that
in reality a case study may fit more than one category, and limiting a case study to one category may be restraining and
too prescriptive to the study. He explains the choice of a case study methodology as either an interest in the case per se
or because of an interest in theory-building. (Ibid) Given its focus on two peace implementation process, Kenya and
Zimbabwe, and their interesting mediation outcomes, this case study fits within the working definitions of an
interpretive case study.

47
Interpretative case studies focus more on a specific “interest in the case,” while making use of “established theoretical
propositions” (Ibid). For example, the special interest of this long essay in the Zimbabwe and Kenya processes are to
find out how the mediators followed mediation process and design ethos, albeit based on the distinct material and
historical conditions of each case to ensure mediation success. Within this special interest, research analysis will make
us of existing theories of mediation, such as the principles of mediation proffered by the AU and the UN as already
discussed above, or assessing the mediation process against the standard rules set by mediation scholars such as
Brahimi, which he calls the deadly sins of mediation. Interpretive case studies do not focus on theory-building as in the
case of theory confirming and theory-infirming case studies.
As already noted, this essay hinges on mediation scholarship, and thus does not seek to use theory in the way a
theory confirming or theory infirming case study does. Rather, the interest in the mediation and mediation outcomes of
the two countries under discussion ultimately leads to theory building around issues of mediation success and failure, as
well as to inference of various recommendations for successful mediation theory which is however built from reality
on the ground. Resultantly, while this study is not bent on theorisation per se, generation of theory based on reality
cannot be avoided. The long essay inquiry aims to generate lessons on the processes and practice of mediation,
particularly on the role of RECs and continental organisations in engaging with political actors, as well as on proffering
lessons on how to carry forward to benefits and positive outcomes of mediation processes through sustained follow up
and peace implementation.
This case study method clearly supports the three-fold aims of this long essay. In addition to the other two aims
of gaining greater understanding of mediation as both theoretical and political process, there is a primary aim of
confirming or infirming aspects of the theory on mediation success and failure.
To reinforce this methodological choice, a thorough desk review of primary and secondary literature was used to
account for the downsides as well as to close the gap to unavailable data. Primary documents refer to the KNA and the
GPA documents and related memorandum of understanding (MOU), and these were scanned to check on their
provisions for gender and other human rights related issues. Secondary sources included academic perspectives and
critiques as well as newspaper articles and internet related materials on post-conflict state formation, on mediation in
general, and on the mediation processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe specifically. Reliable sources such as SADC Reports
and communiques, UN and AU reports, scholarly research and books, scholarly search engines and peace building data
bases online were also explored most. Use of informal means of research, such as analysis of graffiti messages in
Mbare, the oldest high density suburb in Harare is also employed.
Graffiti is the act of inscribing or drawing on rocks or walls. The word graffiti derives from the Greek term
"Graphein," which means 'to write.' (Reisen, 2003 in Farnia, 2014) Graffiti has been around since men first started
drawing pictures in caves, and in Zimbabwe it was the main form of expression of a people’s way of life, as well as a
way of communicating various messages amongst tribes, hunters and other groups. Scholars have defined graffiti as

48
“freedom of expression” (Tracy, 2005 in Farnia, 2014) whose writer is often anonymous and is normally restrained by
personal inhibitions and social norms to freely express himself/herself (Abel and Buckley, 1977 in Farnia, 2014).
A lot of thinking tends to associate graffiti with vandalism, hoodlums, gangbangers and misguided
behaviour. In reality however, the root of the word "graffiti" is "to write," and as such graffiti can be interpreted
as an instinctual human need for communication. Reality however, based on historical evidence, is that
vandalism and graffiti derive from very different motives and environments, and researchers (Werwath, 2006)
have argued that though there is sometimes a fine line between the two, this is what gives graffiti a more
organic feel.
This essay, in selecting graffiti as one of the research methods, focuses more on its social significance and
intentional goals of this form of expression than on its history and origins. Graffiti is indeed art, and a form of
human expression, and the aesthetic criteria and motives behind the artist's work far outweigh arguments on
legality or unconventional presentation. (Ibid) The strength of graffiti also lies in that it is more inclusive, and
allows the marginalised to convey their ideas to the wider publics in a space where they have limited access to
communication resources. Graffiti is also art and it allows artists, who are in most cases left out of political
debates and discourses, express themselves, as one researcher has argued that, "People with money can put up
signs ... if you don't have money you're marginalized...you're not allowed to express yourself or to put up words
or messages that you think other people should see. … Graffiti writing breaks the hegemonic hold of
corporate/governmental style over the urban environment and the situations of daily life. .. [It is]… a form of
aesthetic sabotage.” (Ibid)
In line with Ferrell’s position that graffiti allows the marginalised to express themselves, this research plan
employed graffiti as a research method to include ideas of the usually left out voices from one of the poorest
high density suburbs of Harare.
Data from all these sources was further be triangulated - verified and compared for reliability.
3.2.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation
The theoretical framework guiding data analysis and interpretation for this long essay is grounded theory (GT).
This theoretical approach was first articulated by Glaser & Strauss (1967) as an empirical approach for
developing theory, and this was in response to the objectivism of the times where much of research theory
development was done before collecting and analyzing data. Thus Glaser and Strauss were in contention for
an alternative approach that involves developing theories in a way that is connected to the data collection and
analysis process, and to the realities on the ground. Other scholars have also hailed GT as an approach for
developing theory that is "grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed" (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).
By centering analysis on reality on the ground, and on evolving rather than pre-conceived theories, GT informs
theory of change, because it allows the voices of the marginalized populations and processes to be brought to
the centre for knowledge production.

49
Data analysis will be described as an attempt by the researcher to summarize collected data, while data
interpretation is described as the researcher’s attempt to find meaning or derive meaning from the data, while
theorizing with available findings and historical reality on the ground to create new forms of knowledge on the
subject. To avoid collecting unnecessary information, a three stage data analysis plan was developed at the
inception of the research process. The preliminary stage entailed collecting only the relevant data and recording
it, while irrelevant data was discarded. Thus relevant literature on mediation in general, selected from various
annotated bibliographies on the subject was analyzed, and it ranged from primary, secondary and internet
sources. This was followed by literature on mediation processes in Zimbabwe and Kenya per se, as well as
from a few other selected African countries. After recording all the necessary data, a great deal of time was
taken for familiarization with the data through reading and re-reading it, and also through ‘memoing. Memoing
is the act of recording reflective notes about what the researcher (is learning from the data, and is one of the
techniques employed in grounded theory research,. Memoing assists the researcher in making conceptual leaps
from raw data to those abstractions that explain research phenomena in the context in which it is examined.
Through memoing, data exploration is enhanced, continuity of conception and contemplation is enabled and
communication is facilitated.
This was followed by coding and classifying the data into analytic units, categories and themes, and again,
there were three stages to it, namely open coding, axial coding and selective coding.
Open coding entailed segmenting or dividing the data into similar groupings and forms preliminary categories
of information. (Ibid) Looking at the bigger picture of the research objective, which was to differentiate
mediation theory from mediation practice, to delineate between mediation as a political act and mediation as a
theoretical act, and also to find out and explain the determinants of mediation success and failure in general and
in the context of the two cases under study, all issues that emerged from the data along these categories were
listed down, while also taking note of continuously recurring issues different from the ones listed above.
Coding and classifying data was followed by axial coding, where identified categories were brought
together into groupings. (Ibid) To take note of these emerging themes, note cards were used to sort the data into
themes, after which note cards that belonged together were grouped and recorded. The next stage was selective
coding, (Ibid) where themes were organized and integrated to articulate a coherent understanding or theory of
the phenomenon of mediation in Zimbabwe and Kenya. This was finally followed by breaking down the data
through reading, analysing and theorizing it to derive meaning, formulate relevant arguments, appreciate
already derived theories from foregoing scholars while refuting imposed theories and formulating new
arguments for relevant knowledge production.
3.2.3 Ethical considerations
Data was compared and corroborated for accuracy and relevance before it was recorded for adoption and
analysis. The researcher also took consideration to analyse data only from reputable and reliable sources

50
 3.2.4 Methodological limitations
Lack of prior research studies on mediation process with relation to mediation processes in Africa posed a challenge in
terms of linking the generality of the literature that exist on mediation, which comes mainly from the West, to the issues
on the ground in Kenya and Zimbabwe. This essay also acknowledges that information collected through the above
listed techniques might be missing details, components or underreporting the specific issues. This is further aggravated
by the fact that the research process was not corroborated with information form key informants who were involved in
the two mediation processes per se, and thus the research largely dependent of existing written sources only.
Consequently, the conclusions and recommendations should also be considered with prudence.

51
 4.0 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
4.1 Introduction
This section provides a backdrop to the 2008 SADC led mediation process in Zimbabwe, as well as to the Kofi Annan
led AU mediation in Kenya in the same year. The task included assessing the realism of mediation theory in relation to
operationalising mediation as a political process on the ground in relation to the African principle of Subsidiarity and
complementarity; assessing the difference between single party/third party mediation and locally owned mediation as
opposed to multi-party mediation; problematizing how to solve the crisis of polarised ideologies between a nationalist
party and an opposition political party whose ideology is rooted in western influences and ideologies; conceptualising a
gender agenda in African mediation processes; assessing the validity of power sharing as a mediation norm against the
need to uphold the principle of sovereignty; assessing and inferring theoretical judgements on mediation success and
mediation failure in practice.
The long essay was written in response to the Zimbabwean and Kenyan mediation processes and their interesting
outcomes, as well as the interesting similar and opposite dynamics in the two countries. An additional built-in aim was
to highlight the main debates and criticisms, framed by important themes in mediation scholarship, that in turn
highlight various issues such as the role of the regional bodies in shaping post conflict reconstruction, the conflict
environment, ripeness issues, types of mediators and types of mediators. A secondary aim was to problematize part of
mediation theory, particularly the notions of mediation success and failure for the African continent.
The choice of comparative case studies was rational in order to explore the histories and ideologies of different
RECs, as well as to enable a comparison between a single party mediation and a multiple party mediation process. An
interpretive case study allowed leeway in researching the historical backgrounds of the two countries as well as in
understanding the political processes and dynamics that led to the mediation processes in 2008, and to the peace
implementation processes from the signing of the two agreements onwards. Appreciative Inquiry theory framing
allowed for various components of literature on mediation in general and on the two processes in Zimbabwe and
Kenya to be confirmed and infirmed, raising questions not on the Zimbabwe and Kenya processes perse but making
the analysis and discussions relevant for all mediations as well as enabling important reflection on mediation
scholarship to be carried out.
Findings for both Zimbabwe and Kenya are presented in different thematic headings for each case. The headings
were assigned according to the emerging issues during the data processing and data analysis process.

52
 4.2 Findings for the Zimbabwe mediation process

Pundits have classified the 2007 mediation in Zimbabwe a ‘tactical interlude’ (Zartman, 2011) of ‘façade’, and the
incumbent’s ‘politics of continuity,’ meaning that its outcome was an anticipated and designed act of political
expediency and political necessity. (Ibid) To the contrary, this long essay argues for a different view, noting especially
that most of the conclusions that seem to criticize the South African led mediation on Zimbabwe seem to be coming
from the West. Measuring success of mediation on both the short term and long term effects, one notes that in the short
term, the mediation in Zimbabwe ended a situation of violence that had potential to escalate into full blown conflict,
and halted the worsening of both a political and economic malaise that was obtaining. Secondly, the process managed
to put in place an infrastructure for peace building which in the long run, enabled the peaceful elections in July 2013,
following adoption of a gender sensitive Constitution that among others, has established a gender commission and a
national peace and reconciliation commission, both organisations with potential to ensure a sustainable peace in the
country.
As noted already in the literature review section, the argument that mediation success is based on the mediations’
original intentions and outcomes not only in the interim but also beyond adoption of a peace treaty to the
accomplishments in satisfying the obligations of the requirements of the approved pact and throughout the
implementation era sustains.

53
Again, measuring the success of mediation on the basis of process and mediation strategy and style, this long essay
further argues that South Africa tactfully handled the process which somewhat seemed bleak as ZANU PF was
unwilling to compromise with the MDC and vice versa, owing to the ideological differences between the two political
parties. In my view, mediation success is a continuum which starts to be measured the moment the mediator is able to
amicably bring the contending parties to the mediation table peacefully, and for sustainable dialogue. Negotiations
between the parties officially began on 25 July in Pretoria, mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki, and
these were basically talks about the ensuing talks. A final deal was reached on 11 September 2008, providing for
Mugabe to remain President while Tsvangirai would become Prime Minister. The deal was signed on 15 September.
While all parties agreed on the need to end the escalating violence in the country, contentious issues were that
ZANU PF contended that any agreement with the opposition must leave Mugabe in office as President and must not
threaten land reform, Mutambara was in agreement with ZANU PF generally, while the MDC-T was unwilling to
accept any deal that did not place Tsvangirai at the head of the government. Historic regional and continental support,
and more specifically Thabo Mbeki’s position on the country and on Mugabe buttressed this position.
The process was prefaced by meetings in Pretoria with all parties involved, followed by subsequent meetings in
both Pretoria and Harare, including separate meetings held with both Mugabe and Tsvangirai in Harare when there was
a threatening stalemate in the negotiations. In these separate meetings, Mbeki has been criticised for meeting with
Mugabe first, to brief him on the tenets of the government of national unity (GNU), before meeting other contending
parties, a style that has been criticised by many as flawed, with wrong and value laden speculation further contending
that Mbeki was in favour of ZANU PF, and thus met Mugabe to establish a common position in favour of ZANU Pf
and against the MDC.
However, as already noted in the literature review above, a good mediator will use tact, skill and take advantage of
existing relationship with one or both of the parties, and may engage them separately to avoid deepening the dispute
and the existing grudge, as a strategy to learn the interests of each of them as well as to influence a common position
separately. Given that Mugabe was legitimate head of state during the mediation process, it would seem most
reasonable for Mbeki to meet with him first, and more reasonable to avoid any clashes and possible suspicions, as this
could complicate the process.
While the opposition advances an argument of poor GPA compliance on the part of ZANU PF, further claiming
that Regional and international pressure did not bring a high enough opportunity cost to pressure the ruling party into
sincerely engaging in the peace implementation process5 and in respecting its outcome, unbiased arguments contend
that ZANU PF did in reality share government ministries, with 16 given to MDC and 15 given to ZANU PF. Some
Ambassadorial positions were given to the MDC, except for the appointment of Governors which was contested, and
rightly so because the GPA was not strengthened by a Constitutional Amendment.

5
MDC member who preferred not to be named, interviewed by Dudziro Nhengu in Harare on 23 July 2015.
54
Strategically, ZANU PF went back to interpreting the Constitution when it came to executive appointments such as the
Reserve Bank Governor, because the GPA was silent on such things. This is a lesson learnt regarding peace
agreements, and their need to be aligned to or strengthened by Constitutional provisions. Again, the view of the MDC
interviewee above is subjective and contestable because by rule, once the conflict parties are in the peace
implementation phase, or post agreement phase, it is really left to local actors and structures to ensure that parties
respect the spirit and letter of the agreement. There is a limit to what the regional and international can do. This is why
in the case of Zimbabwe; JOMIC was established to ensure that there is a mechanism which comprises of members of
the different political parties, who would ensure that the GPA was being implemented.
Poor compliance caused the mediation to be marred by stagnation (ICG, 2008) and near stalemate (BBC: 2008),
firstly as Mugabe and Tsvangirai continuously claimed election victory as well as disagreed on the extent of the Prime
Minister’s power. (McGreal, 2008) Much contention was on the control of the most strategic ministries like the
Ministry of Home Affairs, State Security and Defence. (BBC, 2008) As Chan (2008) observed, “Tsvangirai [was]
prepared to concede power over the military to Mugabe, if Mugabe [was] prepared to concede power over the cabinet
to Tsvangirai.”
Evidence from a Wiki Leaks cable to United States ambassador to South Africa, Eric M. Bost by former United
States Eric M. Bost claimed that Mugabe’s negotiators were working under instruction to offer Tsvangirai the position
of third vice president, while on the other hand Tsvangirai was adamant that he would accept nothing less than the
position of prime minister with full executive powers in a two year transitional government. (Guma, 2013)
Prevalent reproach from ZANU PF over Tsvangirai’s claim was that the MDC was asking for too much, [MDC
was asking] for a transfer of power rather than a sharing of power.” (Mail and Guardian, 2008) For this reasons some
critics. (Chitiyo and Kibble, 2014) contend that ZANU PF might not have been keen enough to cede power to
Tsvangirai, but agreed to the GNU only as a response to pressure from the AU and the SADC, taking care to ensure
that whatever conditions of the power sharing deal would still leave them in much control, as a method of ensuring
even more support from the Zimbabwean citizenry over time. Rightly so, the gulf between the MDC factions
increased from the mediation time onwards, and this created more and more distrust, a bad recipe for mediation
success, yet over time Mutambara grew more willing than Tsvangirai to compromise for Mugabe. (Eppel and
Raftopouloulos, 2009)
Muench (1960, in Fisher: 1972) states that ‘mutual distrust’ hinders successful mediation. (See also Brahimi: 2008)
The history of distrust between ZANU PF and MDC, coupled with the tension between the two MDC factions was a
clear obstacle to a quicker mediation outcome, as more tensions were further evident in the discussions on the extent of
Constitutional reforms and the election time frames. (McGreal, 2008) There were also reports of Tsvangirai pulling
out at one point during the mediation process, when the agreement was about to be signed, demanding for the
allocation of ministries to match the parliamentary victory figures, and charging “It’s better not to have a deal than to
have a bad deal.” (BBC, 2008)

55
At this point the power of the RECs in making mediation decisions that override the AU and the UN is evident in the
manner in which according to claims from a mediation insider, Tsvangirai was the only party being pressured to
compromise, while little or no pressure was put on Mugabe, for the outcome to suit the SADC desired outcome.
(McGreal, 2008)
Tsvangirai’s attempts to get the AU and the UN to take over the mediation from SADC again serve to reinforce the
already stated point on the power of the RECs in relation to mediation politics in Africa. This also is an exhibit of the
SADC providing “African solutions to African problems,” (Dzinesa and Zambara, 2011) as well as the continent’s
principle of ‘subsidiarity’, which infers that regional measures or regional institutions should make ‘every effort to
achieve pacific settlement of local disputes’ before referring them to the Security Council, as originally enshrined in
Chapter VII of the UN Charter (1945).
The norm also preceded the Charter in other emerging international organisations (Møller, 2005). Nathan (2010a),
however, criticises the lack of unanimity on the operationalisation of subsidiarity to the task of peacemaking, as well as
lack of consensus on its application within the APSA by either the AU or the RECs, and as a result, the governing
principles of this relationship remain blurred and inadequately considered. (Ancas, 2008)
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security which was signed
in June 2008 between the AU and eight of the RECs (African Union 2008a), while explaining that the principles of
‘subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage’ will guide decisions to optimise peace operations, and
while also recognising and respecting ‘the primary responsibility of the Union in the maintenance and promotion of
peace, security and stability in Africa’, its Modalities section (Article XX) however clarifies that “Without prejudice to
the primary role of the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the RECs
and, where appropriate, the Coordinating Mechanisms shall be encouraged to anticipate and prevent conflicts within
and among their Member States and, where conflicts do occur, to undertake peace-making and peace-building efforts
to resolve them …” (Ibid).
Other RECs were not necessarily in support of the SADC’s mediation scheme in Zimbabwe, and in December
2008, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga called for an AU ousting of Mugabe, and requested then AU Chair,
Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete to implement a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis (Okumu, 2008). The result
was a diplomatic battle between Kikwete and Mbeki, with Presidents Kikwete, Mwanawasa of Zambia and Khama of
Botswana urging an expanded mediation team and a more robust UN role, while Mbeki strongly resisted their efforts.
(International Crisis Group, 2008) The SADC Heads of State on the contrary maintained that Zimbabwe’s
sovereignty should preclude any other external intervention, ‘closed rank’ and upheld this moderately lucid and united
position throughout the mediation process (Nathan, 2010) Tsvangirai’s appeals for AU or UN intervention in April
2008, were to no profit (Security Council Report, 2008), and this further demonstrates how international bodies can be
relegated as demanded by the principle of subsidiarity.

56
Taking practical solutions bearing on the prevailing political dynamics is also more important than following the book
requirements of mediation, as following the demands of the international community may have worsened the situation
by leading the dispute to a coup and further relapse into violent conflict. Makumbe (2011) argues that conceding to the
demands of Mugabe, and of the SADC to safeguard the power and identity of nationalist politics in Zimbabwe was the
only means to preventing a coup from the JOC (see also Dzinesa and Zambara, 2011). In practice therefore, mediation
is not simplistically only about equal power sharing, it is also about political tact and managing the conflict dynamics to
avoid further relapses into violence, and mediators must have deep knowledge of the political facts and dynamics of the
context to avoid deepening the conflict.
Also notable is the fact that mediation success does not necessarily translate into a 50/50 power sharing equation
between the parties. As long as a good environment for peace which enables positive peace implementation is set,
mediation success can still prevail even where power relations between the parties are unequal. For example, questions
around the legitimacy of the mediation MoU and the extent of its legality were a clear problem with power separation
regarding the executive and the judiciary’s relationship (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2009) Mugabe remained with
his executive powers afforded to the presidency, and had no legal binding basis to consult Tsvangirai on appointments.
Thus the GPA remained legally ambiguous, and Mugabe’s appointment of eight retired military officials to positions in
the Information and Publicity Ministry showed not only the close connection to the military but also the powerlessness
of the MDC as a party to the GNU. (Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010)
A further example is that while Article 20 of the GPA Framework for New Government described the delineation
of ministers, Mugabe’s appointment of 41 ministers instead of 31, as well as the appointment of the Attorney General
Joannes Tomana before the installation of Tsvangirai did put a loophole in the GPA structure. The ambiguity of the
scenario is that the later reversals of these appointments following outcries from Tsvangirai and Mutambara attracted
more criticism not for Mugabe but ironically, for the MDC, as analysts cast aspersions on the opposition parties’ desire
to ensure swift implementation of the GPA agreement to the benefit of the masses. The two parties were criticised for
remaining focused on allocation of positions of power for the few elite at the expense of peace implementation. Where
conflict has really been hurting and where the citizens are more concerned about social transformation, mediation
success ceases to be about observing the theoretical process nitty-gritty to the meticulous detail, but rather about laying
the ground for delivering the required social goods and services
The GPA gave Constitutional reforms an 18 year deadline, in preparation for elections after two years. However,
lack of progress regarding the Constitution making process presented failure of the peace implementation process,
especially as the new Constitution was a condition for free and fair elections to be held. The Constitutional process was
only to start in 2010, past the deadline. Incidents of violence were recorded during the Constitution outreaches, another
pointer to lack of effective mechanisms for ensuring peace during the GPA implementation process, which can be
explained by the polarisation that has existed between ZANU PF and the MDC then [and now], and caused mainly by
the different political ideologies within the two parties.

57
Speaking about the successes and failure of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee, one of the
transitional government institutions established by Article 22 of the GPA, Priscilla Misihairambwi Mushonga, noted
that, “Success would have been more apparent had JOMIC been structured differently. Clearly, we have not been as
effective as we would have liked to be, considering our mandate. When we started, we were effective but we could not
maintain the effectiveness. There was also little interaction, if any, between is and the SADC and yet SADC is
supposed to rely on us to assess the situation in the country. This points to a lack of continuous monitoring mechanism
by the SADC, whose commitment to the process only ended as soon as the peace agreement was signed, and this could
sustain the argument that SADC entered the mediation more bent on imposing a pre-set political view rather than on
upholding a theoretical methodology of negotiation to the satisfaction of both contending parties, and as such cared less
about fulfilling international expectations and more about upholding the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity,
what Dzinesa and Zambara describe as “the fallacy of self-monitoring.” (2011)
The resolution to have the parties monitor themselves was an erroneous and simplistic view of the conflict, as
Kasambala and Mbelle write that an “active commitment” was needed from ZANU PF and MDC to ensure mediation
success (2007). At the same time, although SADC’s diplomatic responsibility was to mediate a conflict ensuring it
came to a successful conclusion, it needed to stay involved in making sure parties were committed to their agreement,
thus increasing the possibilities for sustainable peace implementation, as Zartman notes that mediators “… may be
needed to… watch over the final outcome…” (1996).
Brown and Shraub also argue that left to their own, disputants may well fall out of their mediated settlement. For
this reason, although a mediator is often tempted to start a process and then slip away as the process develops its own
momentum, the mediator may in fact ne required to be more involved in the regional structure of relations after a
mediation effort than before. (Brown and Shraub, 1991)
The GPA allowed for a number of specific normative frameworks and institutions for post-conflict reconstruction.
One of these was Article 7 of the GPA on the Promotion of Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity, which
incorporates the goal of advancing women’s rights and gender equality while providing for an Organ for National
Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) to counsel government on the best strategies to achieve peace, and
this argues for the success of the Zimbabwe mediation process because it met the objective of peace building. The
GPA also afforded specific opportunities for enhancing women’s leadership in conflict transformation and peace
building in Zimbabwe, through the work of the ONHRI, the Joint Monitoring Implementation Committee (JOMIC),
and the Constitution Select Committee (COPAC). Participation of women in these key peace building structures in
turn gave impetus to the women’s movement in Zimbabwe, which rose to the occasion by working together across
political party affiliations, and their efforts witnessed formation of the Group of Twenty (G20).
The G20 is a constitution monitoring organ formed in 2012 to ensure that all gender imbalances present in the
previous constitution were addressed. It was formed against the backdrop of the realization that women in Zimbabwe
are often excluded from social, economic, and political processes due to patriarchal attitudes and practices (especially

58
the exercise of customary laws), as well as by the general political climate of intimidation and violence. Women have
not passively accepted attempts to sideline them from political spaces. In forming this group, Zimbabwean women
realised that their previous efforts would be stronger and more effective if they worked together as women from
different political parties. That being said, the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe (WCoZ) the umbrella for women’s
organizations in Zimbabwe and an Oxfam partner, convened a meeting to discuss how they could work together.
The Group of 20 comprises civil society representatives, academics and representatives of the Women’s
Parliamentary Caucus. They are elected for the particular skills and experience they can bring to realizing the aims of
the women’s movement. This diverse group of 20 women representing various organisations from across the political
spectrum, is united by the principle that, regardless of political, religious or social background, the women of
Zimbabwe should be able to access their rights. The group has become a working space for women to discuss,
mobilize, and organize action around the new constitution, both developing policy and strategy, and advocating for
specific measures, and once again, women form the opposition political parties have demonstrated their maturity to
work together with women form the ruling party for a common women’s cause.
The G20 worked hard with all the other women in Zimbabwean society to demand gender sensitive provisions in
the Constitution, which in turn saw to the rise of women’s representation in parliament through the Constitutional
special measures. The work of women in Zimbabwe, in collaboration with the MWAGCD and the United Nations
Entity for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (UN Women) has also enabled formation of community
based peace committees in the rural areas in all provinces in Zimbabwe. These women led peace committees provide a
good opportunity for influencing a women led community early warning system that can feed into the national and
regional early warning system, which in turn feeds into the AU early warning system. These developments are key in
defining a sustainable local to continental peace building culture in Zimbabwe. Thus mediation success can only be
realistic when the agreement reached is both implementable and implemented within the set timeframes, and in turn
achieving a background as well as laying a foundation for positive peace, and based on the highlighted achievements
on the peace building front, the South African mediation process in Zimbabwe was indeed successful.
4.3 Conflict intensity and duration as variables for mediation success
Kressel and Pruitt (1989, as cited in Bercovitch and Houston, 2000) advance an argument that conflict intensity and
conflict duration are reinforcing variables that affect the success of mediation. The argument that Mbeki’s one sided
pressure on the parties to sign a peace agreement deal was a result of the need to bring sanity to the Zimbabwean
landscape after having taken stock of the effects of the violent conflict is also sustainable. Kressel and Pruitt (1989)
define conflict intensity as explained by a number of factors such as the severity of prior conflict, the level of hostilities,
the number of fatalities, the level of anger and intensity of feeling, the types of issues at stake, and the strength of the
parties’ negative perception. The intensity and duration of a conflict may force mediators into a rushed decision in
order to mitigate the effects. In Zimbabwe, the pressure from the region and from the international community is
obviously one of the reasons why SADC was to come up with a well stipulated mediation plan with laid out results,

59
which in the long run affected the manner in which the peace implementation process was carried out. The laid out
plan on the other hand, instead of achieving quick mediation results, was to see the derailment of the whole process as
the MDC protested to ZANU PF’s unmoving stance in relation to the negotiation process.
4.4 Fulfilling gender obligations as a variable
Women’s full and equal participation on the negotiation tables is one of the litmus tests for a mediation process’
accomplishment on championing the gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) cause. (UN Women and
UNDP, 2015) When women participate in key governance, peacemaking and peace building processes, democracy is
strengthened. Likewise when women are able to deliberately and without fear, voice out their needs and aspirations,
political processes become more inclusive and realistic. (Ibid) A mediation process that succeeds on ensuring that both
women and men freely participate without unfair barriers, succeeds not only in delivering on inclusive mediation
processes, but also on strengthening all the governance structures, processes and mechanisms for ensuring sustainable
peace.
Investigation of women’s involvement in peace negotiations in Zimbabwe underlines the limited role and influence
of women during the Lancaster House negotiations and subsequently in the Agreement of 1980. Nor did they have a
voice in the 1986 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and ZAPU, or in the negotiations leading to the GPA in 2008.
(UN Women, 2014) A lack of commitment by political parties and facilitators to engage civil society in the GPA
negotiations also worked against women’s interests, and experience from other countries such as Burundi, (Langis,
2011) Kenya (McGhie and Wamai, 2011) and Liberia (Amedzrator; 2014) suggests that it is through civil society that
women are most able to make their voice heard during “peace” negotiations. By and large the mediation process failed
to recognise gender as an important variable for success, and gender in this argument is not only limited to sex, but also
extends to power dynamics, i.e. involvement of actors in the mediation process based on their positions of authority,
from a patriarchal point of view.
In general, and by default, women are central actors and ‘right holders’ in any process that addresses peace, security,
human rights and sustainable development. (Women’s Organisations, 2008, as cited in ACCORD, 2009) The gender
specific consequences of War and violence require that women’s participation in formal peacemaking processes be
increased, and calling for the increase of women in mediation in peace and security scholarship addresses the issue of
marginalisation of women in formal peacemaking processes. In particular, Zimbabwean women have been a force in
the political advancement of the country both prior and subsequently after its liberation from colonial rule, throughout
subsequent political evolutions in the country, and have been involved in a comparable fight for equal rights, and to
transpose the damaging effects of a deep-seated colonial and masculine order (Schmidt, 1992 as cited in UN Women,
2014)
The various stages of political, intellectual and conceptual development they gained during the liberation struggle
equipped them for further struggles for women’s emancipation from oppression, which became an important tool of
state engagement in post-independence Zimbabwe. (Ibid) The decade long conflict between ZANU PF and the MDC

60
also had specific social and economic ramifications for women, who were caught up and exposed to violence
perpetrated by both individuals, while they also suffered the consequences of the structural differences and poverty
wrought by this strife. (Mutisi, 2011, as cited in Cheldelin and Eliatamby, 2011)
The nature of the strife also reversed gender roles as men fled the violence and women turned into both home care
takers and cross boarder traders to sustain their families in the face of the serious economic meltdown in the country.
The GPA also provided for gender parity in the proposed commissions: Anti-Corruption, Human Rights, Electoral, and
Media.
In April 2010, sixteen months after the GPA was signed, leaders of the women’s wings of the three main political
parties came together to signal their resolve to work across their political divides to accelerate implementation of the
GPA, and build a common agenda for women’s empowerment. This gesture by women leaders provided an important
morale boost to those involved in the national peace building process. The experience of Burundian women may be
relevant for comparative purposes. During the Arusha Peace talks, Burundian women united across political, ethnic
and class backgrounds to challenge their lack of representation in the negotiations, and to launch a sustained advocacy
campaign to change this.6 This action led to their being granted observer status at the peace talks, which in turn
provided an opportunity for them to directly engage the parties informally on important issues across party lines.
Amina Mama, (2000) in interrogating the persistent normalization of gender violence in Africa, argues that Africa’s
new leaders, who are primarily men, have not included transformation of oppressive gender politics in their political
ideologies. She argues that in their “masculinist memories and nostalgia” [African leaders] have recreated and
maintained the sexual and economic conditions of gender disparities that facilitate the abuse of women. Such hetero-
normative ideals reinforce the structures of mainstream opinion and representation, manifesting however as “normal”
and “natural” and lying in the crevices of everyday routine, creating, in the process, a culture of fear which enforces
political hegemony. (Ibid)
To support Mama’s contestation that men’s attitudes towards the exclusion of women in politics are deliberate, one
notes that during the war, women’s contribution to the liberation struggle was recognisable enough for ZANU PF to
establish a women’s detachment within its armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA),
with its own female commander, Sheba Tavagwisa, who was a member of the High Command. (UN Women: 2014)
The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) also established a women’s brigade with female command within its
armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), although this women’s brigade was dissolved at
independence.7
Post-independence, both ZANU-PF and MDC-T have supported a women´s wing in their parties, which however
have been criticized for marginalizing women’s issues rather than affording them mainstream status, and for stifling the
leadership potential of women within the party hierarchies. The best practice of these party wings that saw to the
election of Joice Mujuru and Thokozani Khupe as Vice-Presidents of ZANU-PF and MDC-T respectively, and of

6
Government of Burundi, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000, Arusha.
7
Dudziro Nhengu Interview with Jeremy Brickhill, Zimbabwe Peace and Security Programme, 27 October 2011, in UN Women: 2014
61
Priscilla Misihairambwi-Mushonga as the first woman Secretary General of a political party,8 have all proved the
difficulty for maintaining women’s high level positions in Zimbabwe with the demise of all the three women in the
current dispensation.” (UN Women, 2014)
Some critics however argue that the issue of lack of involvement of civil society, other local actors and women
does not necessarily signify a lack of political will, but is caused by a variety of challenges relating to international
peace mediation in deep rooted conflicts, and some of them include existing relations with civil society, issue of
sanctions, funding of the mediation process and the presence of adequate expert support on the ground.
In the case of Zimbabwe, all the challenges listed above did exists, and they reinforce each other and blend in a manner
that can exonerate the whole process as positive and contributing to good intentions of ending violence.
In 2008 Zimbabwe was reeling from sanctions from the West, which in turn favoured the opposition MDC and
civil society organisations, most of which were pushing for replacement of the Mugabe regime by the opposition. This
scenario determined existing relations between government and civil society, and resultantly, many civil society
organisations were suspected of meddling with politics and as such were not in good relations with the government in
power. In the absence of enough resources for the mediation process, and where civil society and government were
not properly coordinated and in sync because of poor relations, it would have presented Mbeki with more challenges to
coordinate the inclusion of civil society, and this would have prolonged the violence and possible escalation. At the
same time, the absence of expertise amongst civil society representatives is also an issue for consideration.
4.5 Underlying causes of a dispute
An understanding of the historical background of a conflict is also very important in mediation, as Bercovitch (1992)
notes that “Issues in conflict refer to underlying causes of a dispute.” The mediation process in itself in important but it
does not super-cede the importance of a conducive mediation environment. The environment and parties involved
need to be appropriate and amenable for the mediation process to succeed. This argument demand an inquiry of
mediation theory, and the dangers of wrongly assuming that a de-facto one party state like ZANU PF would
automatically translate itself into a political pluralism with ease in order to accommodate the MDC, and that this would
automatically also bring positive peace. (Ibid)
Mediation theory has to consider factors that determine regime change from a long term one party state to
pluralism, giving room for handling the challenges associated with it. Measured against this argument, and considering
the difficulties of suddenly translating from a one party rule to a plural one within a short space of time and with no
external support, the peace implementation process in Zimbabwe can be counted amongst the successful ones. (Opcit)
Criticisms for its failure can only reveal the fallacy in having too many expectations on the “miracles” that the GNU
could perform, the political and economic issues which this coalition government was supposed to redress within a
short period of time, and with staggered and limited support from the international community.

8
Less idealistic critics will argue that it is not enough to have a woman in a position of authority, it is what that women does for other
women when she has the power to do so that matters, and this in turn calls for a more serious critique of the real contributions made by
women in leadership to make the push for gender equality more substantive.
62
The case of Zimbabwe represents a case where the signing of an agreement meant neither that the agreement would be
implemented in whole nor are that parties committed to changing power patterns. Dzinesa and Zambara (2011) posit
that Mbeki had a clearly set mediation goal and plan when he came to Zimbabwe, which was threefold: First, to ensure
that the three parties had to endorse the decision for undertaking harmonised presidential, parliamentary and local
government elections in 2008, second, to ensure an agreement on fostering a conducive environment for free and fair
elections, and finally to facilitate conditions for acceptance of the elections results to avoid a further relapse into
conflict.
In the ensuing analysis on mediation process plan, it is noted that mediators often walk into the mediation setting
with an already drafted mediation plan, and sometimes with a skeleton peace agreement. Analysis also concurs with
most scholars that although in theoretical concerns this may be flawed, in terms of safeguarding African politics and
informing peace and security agendas on the continent, and depending on the objectives, this in some cases may indeed
be noble and of value addition to peacemaking and peace building. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
In his inception speech on the Zimbabwean mediation process, Thabo Mbeki pronounced his role as to “… begin
the process leading to the normalisation of the situation in Zimbabwe and the resumption of its development and
reconstruction process intended to achieve a better life for all Zimbabweans on a sustainable basis.” (Mlambo and
Raftopoulos, 2013) As per Mbeki’s will, the reforms that the parties agreed to in the GPA culminated in the holding
of agreed and peaceful election in 2008, notwithstanding the arguments of whether these elections were free and fair,
and the subsequent formation of a GNU that enabled a robust infrastructure for peace in the country. (Sokwanele,
2013)
Thus the necessity to work on creating an enabling environment for a compromised solution to Zimbabwe’s long
standing conflict and the incidence of violence that accompanied the election run-off became the major pre-occupation
of Mbeki. (Ibid) Consequently, the inclusive government likewise became consistent with Mbeki’s aim for a
sustainable solution that would curtail the deepening socio-economic crisis. (Ibid) The gains of this national
infrastructure for peace range from an enabling environment for women’s participation in peace building processes that
later influenced adoption of a gender sensitive Constitution with special measures for increased participation of women
in parliament, establishment of democratic institutions for healing and integration such as the Gender Commission and
the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, improvement of the country’s economy and ‘free and fair’
elections in 2013, among others. The argument that the inclusive government’s formation could also have been
influenced by Mbeki’s experience in South Africa’s transition talks which formed the government of national unity
between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party (NP) is also sustainable. (Opcit)
Dynamics of the mediation process in Zimbabwe may also help explain the role of the SADC in post conflict
reconstruction politics in Africa, as well as highlight some of the challenges the SADC may face as a REC from both
internal and external (Western) forces. The MDC’s opposition to a GNU, demonstrated by Roy Bennett’s sentiments
that, “We won’t touch a government of national unity – over my dead body, under no circumstances. The people will

63
never accept a GNU” (Godwin, 2010) also demonstrates some of the challenges Mbeki faced in ensuring acceptance
of the GNU, as well as serve refute the fact that only ZANU PF was unwilling to concede to a GNU as an option for
ending conflict in Zimbabwe. Yet a number of factors continued to militate against the MDC to an extent where a
GNU was unavoidable, and these are failure by the MDC to dislodge ZANU PF form power through the ballot box,
even despite their claims that they had won; escalating socio-economic and political suffering of the ordinary people; a
degree of uncertainty over the efficacy of Western pressure against Mugabe’s government to cede power. (Mandara
and Pooe, 2013)
Further analysis notes that the MDC’s attempts to frustrate the mediation process with the intention to push the
negotiation role from the SADC to the AU, and ultimately to the UN, claiming discomfort over what they perceived as
Mbeki’s closeness to Mugabe (Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2008) were not only reflective of the party’s distrust of Mbeki
and his approach of quiet diplomacy, but also consistent with the attitude of the EU and the United States of America
who both were keen on influencing the UN security council to impose sanctions on Mugabe’s government. This
shows some of the dynamics of Western attempts to influence African post-conflict reconstruction politics working
through some internal bodies like opposition political parties who may want to ride on external influence for financial
gain. (Ibid) Morgan Tsvangirai made several public calls for the removal of Thabo Mbeki from the role of facilitator.
The MDC’s attitude demonstrated their ignorance of the operations of regional and continental politics in relation to the
role of the SADC and the AU in peace and security and in mediation, and this further cemented the relationship
between Pretoria and ZANU PF, naturally pushing the SADC’s sympathy towards ZANU PF. (Opcit)
A strong debate exists around the role of SADC in the Zimbabwe mediation process. SADC, and particularly
Thabo Mbeki, is constantly reported as having supported ZANU-PF, among others by avoiding direct pressure on
Mugabe for fulfilment of the GPA requirements during the implementation process. Mlambo and Raftopoulos discuss
the broader crisis showing SADC’s limitations in “dealing” with parties who operate against “democratic principles by
resting their tenure on a liberation struggle and coercion.” (2010, 4)
Raftopoulos further raises as one of the challenges for the Zimbabwe mediation, “…the impediments in
implementing the regional body’s protocols on democratic accountability…” (2011). Raftopoulos and Eppel state that
the mediation casts doubt on “SADC’s political capacity,” (2008, 271) while Mhango states that SADC’s acceptance
of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy “…may be jeopardising its own commitment to peace and security…” (2012, 14)
Quiet diplomacy, he argues, was at odds with SADC principles, highlighting “…the gaps that exist in SADC’s
peacemaking framework.” (2012, 17) Contrary to this thinking however, is the reality that both SADC and the AU
were highly critical of the election result preceding the mediation, showing a decrease in continental support for
Zimbabwe, and the reasons why these two bodies exerted pressure for a negotiation process to contain this conflict.
(Raftopoulos and Eppel, 2080)
This is in turn described by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) as Mugabe and his party being “victims of an imperialist
onslaught,” who further discusses how Zimbabwe has been an important military player in the region and hence the

64
need for questions of national security to be dealt with collectively (2011, 13). He also cites ZANU‐PF’s liberation
history as the reason why SADC has treated the party and its leader “with kid gloves” (2011, 13), thereby influencing
the shape of the mediation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). Of note is that “regional concern” was focused on “restoration of
stability” rather than “regime change.” (Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2011)
Raftopoulos (2011) argues that ZANU‐PF conducted a strategy to control the formation of the GPA under the
cover of the regional body [of SADC]. He further contrasts the all-important liberation movement ties that secured
ZANU PF’s power and support to the MDC’s regional isolation, while (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011) further argue that
the MDC…only succeeded in cultivating good relations with the West and the US. Raftopoulos (2011) also argues
that the SADC and Mbeki were as nationalists, well aware that the military would not support the MDC and that the
MDC lacked the political ‘know how’ to run Zimbabwe and was too close to the West. (Ibid)
In similar argument, Nkuubi (2011) depicts SADC as a club of brother presidents’ leading ‘sister movements’ who
are prone to supporting rather than condemning each other. (Ancas, 2011 as cited in Hammerstad, 2005), posits that
while SADC has developed clear theoretical guidelines on security cooperation and safeguards on democracy and
human rights, there is still a gap between this and its practice of action on sovereignty and solidarity, elucidating that
neither SADC nor South Africa made “meaningful” attempts to counter and alter the hegemony in Zimbabwe.
Quoting the Institute for Democracy in Africa (2008), Ancas further concedes to the widespread “scepticism” of the
mediation’s effectiveness, while upholding the argument that exploits of the main local actors show the mediation
process as seeking to remedy instability. (Ancas, 2011 as cited in Hammerstad, 2005)
Challenges of the SADC are also reflected in the stance of ZANU PF towards the GPA and the GNU.
Masunungure (2011) claims that the Zimbabwe mediation process placed ZANU PF in a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, faced
with loss of popular support and a ‘crisis of efficacy’ faced with failure to provide goods and services and to balance
the state’s economy and infrastructure and save it from total decay. Likewise for them, the concept of sharing power
with the MDC remained highly unattractive, except for the pressure exerted on them by both SADC and AU over the
violence that accompanied the 2008 presidential run-off. The GPA therefore became a necessary tool for ZANU-PF
to regroup and consolidate its position, both in the country and on the continent. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
What worked in SADC’s favour were the internal dynamics of the MDC, following its split into two formations,
the larger one led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the smaller one led by Arthur Mutambara, (now led by Welshman
Ncube) after Tsvangirai’s objection to participate in the 2005 senate elections. The smaller Mutambara faction, which
did not enjoy much support from the West, supported ZANU PF’s decisions in the mediation, and together with
ZANU PF condemned Tsvangirai and the West for calling on sanctions against Zimbabwe, which they blamed for
disturbing the negotiation environment.
Dzinesa and Zambara (2011) also rightly posit that political processes are complex phenomena not immune from
the totality of global activities and events. They argue that the totality of how the Zimbabwe conflict was reported on,
and how it in turn affected the political, social and economic dynamics of other countries regionally and globally also

65
shaped Pretoria’s approach to its SADC mandated mediation role, in turn impacting on the dynamics of the SADC as a
politics and governance body. There was pressure on South Africa from the SADC and its member states to ensure
that a solution was reached to avert all other negative possibilities emanating from this conflict, and the only way out
would be through ensuring a peace agreement and a coalition government leading to harmonised elections.
Mandara and Pooe (2013) place Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy within the framework of an opportunistic political act
undertaken deliberately to redress South Africa’s hegemonic pitfalls of unilateralism in diplomatic consultations on
African peace and security concerns that had occurred under Nelson Mandela’s leadership, and among them Pretoria’s
military intervention in Maseru and in Lagos’ political crisis that led to the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa during Sani
Abacha’s reign; and thus South Africa saw it prudent to consult on matters of international relations with African
counterparts, and Mbeki seized the opportunity to relocate South Africa’s polity within the context of the regional
multilateral framework. (Ibid)
Barrow (2011) posits that as a nationalist government seeking to dissociate itself from the apartheid tendencies of
the past, South Africa’s polity required adherence to Pan-Africanism and thus it could not openly criticise a nationalist
brother in support of the opposition with support from the West, especially as Mugabe was seemingly, through the
Land Reform Programme, addressing the fundamental needs of Zimbabweans and fulfilling the requirements of the
peace agreement with the Rhodesians upon which Zimbabwe was founded, and this likewise fell in tandem with the
SADC’s bid to conserve regional sovereignty through quelling the conflict in Zimbabwe in favour of Pan-African
interests.
In similar vein, Lipton (2010) positions Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe within the framework of South Africa’s
wider foreign policy as spelt out by the African National Congress (ANC), a policy that prioritises non-racism,
emphasises on the African Renaissance, state sovereignty and multilateralism, non-violence and diplomacy to solve
interstate disputes, which is further reinforced by Mbeki’s sentiments that “… as patriots who occupied the same trench
of struggle with the people of Zimbabwe, … we, together, battled to end white minority rule in the region and
continent…”, arguing that Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe was a patriotic duty on behalf of South Africa, the SADC and
the AU. This argument on its own reinforces the thinking that post-conflict reconstruction politics in Africa is indeed
shaped by the history of nationalism and preserving African sovereignty from foreign influences, as further backed up
by McKinley. (2006)
In view of these considerations, Mbeki’s disparaged quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe can be viewed positively as
steeped in the following considerations: Mugabe’s support on the African continent; Fear of isolation from other
African states owing to the ‘big brother’ label; The need to establish a peaceful stable Zimbabwe as opposed to having
to deal with a failed state at a later stage; The history of nationalisms and the role of Mugabe during apartheid rule in
South Africa, noting that Mbeki was hosted by Mugabe while in exile during apartheid in 1980. (See also Gevisser,
2007 as cited in Mandara and Pooe, 2013)

66
In concluding arguments around Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy, it is argued that Mbeki’s approach remained consistent with
the solidarity and Pan-African framework that characterises SADC and AU governance politics. (Mandara and Pooe,
2013)
On the other hand, Jacob Zuma, who came in to facilitate drawing up and implementation of an election roadmap
for Zimbabwe in the footsteps of Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy, was generally viewed as less sympathetic to Mbeki as he
consistently called for implementation of key reforms to pave way for elections. Although Zuma was consistent in
demanding implementation of reforms, he however failed to convince Mugabe to delay elections in consideration of
full implementation of the reforms deemed necessary to facilitate holding of credible elections, and this can be
attributed to the nature of the GPA itself which left no basis for the President of Zimbabwe not to exercise his will
through the courts even though there was a coalition government.
In mediation, legal language has to be taken care of to ensure that it is binding so as to avoid similar loopholes, as
ZANU PF continues to be blamed for failure of the reform process in a context where Mugabe also believed that he
was exercising authority within the confines of the law. Mugabe proclaimed the election date of 31 July following a
constitutional court ruling in support of the matter passed on 31 May of the same year. For this and other reasons, the
Zimbabwean elections were marred with controversies of being free and peaceful as opposed to being free and fair,9
(Sokwanele, 2013) and this has been one of the major reasons why the South African mediation has been deemed a
failure by critics, especially as the observer mission contended that the elections were not in conformity with the SADC
Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
This brings to scrutiny the issue of whether it is effective or not to shift mediation personnel with different
mediation styles over time during the same mediation process. Zuma’s shift from Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy may be the
reason for Mugabe’s unwelcome disposition to his facilitation style which differed from that of Mbeki, and the reason
why Mugabe remained adamant about sticking to the 31 June election date and refused to carry out the pre-election
reforms as required by the GPA, and this scores a failure on the part of South Africa, and of the represented bloc,
SADC.
This point is buttressed by Jonathan Moyo’s scathing attacks on the facilitation team thus, who described Zuma’s
behaviour as disconcerting, and as a huge liability, not only to South Africa, but to the rest of the continent. Moyo
accused both Zuma and Zulu of being puppets of the West’s hostile manipulations. (Media Institute of Southern Africa,
2011) Pressure was also exerted on Zuma, and on the SADC indirectly by Mugabe who threatened to pull out of the
regional bloc if Zuma insisted on election reforms. Here again the issue of the need to protect regional integrity takes
precedence in the sense that much as the SADC would have loved to exert pressure on Mugabe, fears to weaken the
bloc following withdrawal of Zimbabwe ruled supreme, especially given a historical reality of what happened when
Mugabe pulled Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth (Ibid). Here we stay content with the limitations of the RECs in
dictating individual states’ internal politics in issues of conflict and post conflict reconstruction.

9
Free and fair elections is a sine qua non for credible elections
67
The assertive nature of Zuma’s facilitation team was also weakened by the MDC’s lack of political clout in that much
as they insisted on briefing the West and on siding with the West in support of sanctions against Zimbabwe, their
behaviour had ripple effects of emboldening Mugabe’s conviction and giving impetus to ZANU PF’s strategy of
aligning MDC politics with Western Imperialism, a stance the SADC also supported, thereby demoralising the
forcefulness of Zuma’s team.
The timing of the Zimbabwe mediation was a year ahead of South Africa’s own elections, and against the
background of a survey carried out by Freedom House and Afro-baromater that predicted popular support for Mugabe
than for Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe, Zuma was bound to fear that a hostile ZANU PF had potential to spoil his re-
election, against the background of Julius Malema’s strong links to ZANU PF. Thus issues of borders and boundaries
dictate political relations between neighbouring countries, a fact that the SADC can neither control nor influence.
(Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
Mandara and Pooe (2013) argue that although there was a difference in emphasis to the manner Zuma and Mbeki
handled the Harare mediation, with Zuma focusing mostly on foregrounding the need for political and electoral
reforms in Zimbabwe, while Mbeki focused more on strategically ensuring that the parties were in agreement and a
peace agreement was put in place. They further argue that there wasn’t significant difference in approach to the entire
process by these two, and also that the mediation approach was more political than operational, and also in tandem with
the SADC’s stance on the whole issue at a general level. However, in reality, Mbeki was the mediator and Zuma only
a facilitator who came into the scene following the signature of the GPA, and acting on behalf of the SADC to
guarantee a peace to Zimbabwe. This being the case, Zuma, as representative of the SADC, could rightly so act in
tandem, with the SADC’s stance.
In view of all this, little emphasis is accorded to the political standpoint of the AU in the Zimbabwe mediation
process both in reality and in scholarly analysis, as the SADC, South Africa and Zimbabwe itself become the key
stakeholders in determining the forward politics of this country. (Rupiya, 2012) The role of the AU in its individual
capacity as the supreme continental body is not highlighted much. Rupiya (Ibid) discusses the AU’s role as that of “…
seize [ing] ownership” in placing the Zimbabwe crisis on the organisation’s agenda. The AU, being a continental
body, succeeded in doing this by rightly so, largely deferring responsibilities to SADC.
This strategic political positioning of the AU managed to block any other players with different interests and
capacities, especially external players, while also artificially signalling to the parties in conflict that the AU was the
convener, arbiter and final source of legitimacy for any political institutions that were to function in Zimbabwe.
(Rupiya, 2012: 169). Whilst it is true that the AU never directly involved itself with the Zimbabwe agenda openly,
through for example convening summits for the mediation agenda, and neither did they send any envoys or political
missions to the country, waiting only to be briefed by SADC on the situation in Zimbabwe, one can still argue that
given the supra-regional role of the AU as already discussed above, and also given the need for the AU to give leeway

68
to the SADC as a regional body to determine its own regional politics, its silence was only strategic, and its legitimacy
as the overall body still accords it the final source of legitimacy for the whole process.
Rupiya further posits that the AU approached the mediation with a clear solution “…developed through trial and
error” (Rupiya, 2012), while Ancas (2011) contends that like Mbeki, the AU circumvented denunciation of ZANU‐PF,
and is branded as conflict resolution efforts limited by “the strong devotion to national sovereignty held by Africa’s
leaders” (Ancas, 2011) However, all this does not in any way reflect the weakness of the AU, and neither does
sacumbering to Mugabe’s threat for withdraw from the SADC reflect on the SADC as a weak regional polity,
especially as Ancas rightly reflects that a regional organisation’s effectiveness turns on “political will” of member states
as well “whether enough political cohesion exists.” (Ibid)
While South Africa (and behind the scenes) ‘quiet diplomacy,’ which some critics equate to support for ZANU
PF, did of course present little risk for ZANU PF, most importantly, it enabled a suitable negotiation environment,
while also enabling social and political relations that prevented another relapse into worse forms of conflict. This
strategy can also be viewed positively in terms of allowing Zimbabweans to map out solutions to their own problems.
As a practice, mediation cannot override historical facts, and while Mbeki’s language can in some instances be
misconstrued as a strategy deliberately formulated to support Mugabe, it is also a fact to agree that Mbeki was indeed
facing historic and political veracity by calling ZANU PF “… the party of the revolution.” (New Agenda, 2001)
African leaders stood behind ZANU PF mostly because the Zimbabwean case study was a test case of Africa’s
sovereignty and capacity to stand up to the West. In reality, very few African leaders were impressed with the MDC,
especially with what was construed as their externally driven political agenda. So, Zimbabwe presented an opportunity
for African leaders to tout the mantra of “African Solutions to peace and security.”
The APSA’s mediation concerns and objectives where there is violent conflict, and in the case of the AU, the UN
and the RECs, primarily focus on ending violence. (AU Handbook, 2005) Likewise Nathan (2011) also contends that
rather than following a specific set of generic theoretical and book guidelines, mediation should consider the context
and should be regarded as a highly specialised endeavour, embodying a body of knowledge and a set of strategies,
tactics, skills and techniques.
Mediation in addition requires extensive experience and a high level of proficiency. Most importantly, Nathan
(Ibid) argues that the potential of mediation should never be overstated, and that it is better for the mediator to employ
tact and achieve results than stick to overstated mediation protocol and lose the process. Nathan argues that mediators
can heighten or reduce the likelihood of achieving a positive outcome, as even the most accomplished mediator is
unlikely to achieve anything if the disputant parties reject negotiations, are unwilling to forge a settlement or sign
agreements that they later breach. (Ibid)
On the issue of Mbeki’s alleged partiality, Nathan also contends that although impartiality is considered a key
guiding principle in the practice of international mediation, in reality it is often found that mediators are often biased
towards one or the other of the primary parties at the epicentre of the conflict, and in most cases this is so because the

69
mediators would have studied the conflict context and using the issue of partiality as a tactic to ensure dispute
resolution. Thus where partiality is exercised with the right motive, within the context of the complexity of the conflict,
it can achieve positive results in terms of conflict mitigation and prevention of violence.
Nathan also argues that it is within the responsibility of the mediator to employ methods to build the parties’
confidence in negotiations, as well as pursue shuttle diplomacy when the adversaries refuse to talk directly to each
other. The Zimbabwe mediation process was characterised by animosity and volatility, and the conflict had potential to
escalate into a full blown civil war if left without diplomatic mitigation, hence the need for Mbeki to shuttle between
the parties and also to exercise caution in dealing with Mugabe, given their long standing and historical camaraderie as
nationalists.
For these reasons Mbeki was wrongly perceived by some as partial. Mbeki indeed accorded the conflict parties
equal time and considerations. He also met with the different political parties and put their interests on the Table. For
example, the Constitutional Amendment Number 17 on elections, was a result of the MDC pushing that any winner in
the elections was supposed to garner more than 51% of the vote. The MDC hardly thought that they would be the ones
to be affected by this constitutional amendment, as they felt that in the past elections, President Mugabe had “won” but
had less than 51% of the vote. So indeed, there are cases where the mediator deferred to the interests of the MDC.
4.6 Findings for Kenya
4.6.1 The Kenya Mediation Process

70
On 2nd January 2008, a few days after the explosion of in Kenya, Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa
intervened to mediate the conflict. Odinga refused to dialogue, while Kibaki saw the only remedy for the opposition as
through the courts, and this can only point to the ‘unripeness’ of the conflict. (Nathan, 2011)
The ODM misconceived negotiation for an act of legitimising Kibaki, which points to the unripe state of the
conflict. (Ibid) Two days later, United States Envoy Jendayi Frazier also came to Kenya, followed immediately by four
Former African Heads of State Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, Ketumile Masire of
Botswana and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. (Opcit)
This dynamic influenced Odinga to quickly change and accept the negotiations. Important to note is that African
leaders respect fellow African elders, and this points to the fact that mediation in Africa is not merely a methodological
and political process, but is also a recognition of cultural values and belief systems, the philosophy of ubuntu.10 At the
same time this also shows that mediation success in Africa is more than just the mediation team’s clout, and neither is it
simply methodological. What mediation theory has on one hand labelled as unripe was suddenly and strategically
attuned to ripeness by this group of elders to save a political process and ensure the nation of Kenya was saved and
people’s interest fulfilled.
Following several weeks of intense mediation effort by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his team of African
Eminent Personalities, Graca Machel and Benjamin Mkapa, despite the number of set-backs, Mwai Kibaki and Raila
Odinga finally signed a treaty, an “Agreement on the principles of partnership of the coalition Government.” The team
was preoccupied with ensuring that the parties agreed to ending a further escalation of the crisis, and that the prospect to
enable a sustainable peace was provided with expediency. (Ibid) The panel was mandated by the AU and had the
technical support of the UN, including the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Geneva-based Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the United Nations Office in
Nairobi (UNON). (Ibid)
Of concern to the analysis on this Kenya process is the role of diplomacy and strategy in peacemaking. It was only
after the African elders had convinced the fighting parties of the need to negotiate that they then brought in the
international actors, the UN, as represented by Kofi Annan to help in the process. This is a good example of giving
precedence to “African solutions to Africa’s problems” before seeking for the much needed international coalitions,
which need obviously to be recognised for the expertise as well as possible funding that they can bring for the good of
the mediation process. Key to note is that this success did not come easy, as various national, regional and international
efforts were organized to promote a cessation of violence and foster dialogue between the opposing sides such as the
visit, of John Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana, in his capacity as the then Chairman of the African Union (AU).
He also was not able to achieve much and he therefore wrote a letter to Mr Kofi Annan, asking him to take on the role
of AU Special Advisor and Chief Mediator of the forthcoming mediation process.

10
Coined in Southern Africa, and now operational in most African states, Ubuntu is an ancient African word meaning 'humanity to others'.
It also means 'I am what I am because of who we all are'.
71
The positive role of the international community in mediation is also noted here, the Panel had the responsibility of
helping the parties to the conflict ensure that an escalation of the crisis was avoided and that he opportunity to bring
about sustainable peace was seized as soon as possible. The first major breakthrough in the mediation process came on
24th January 2008 when the Panel brokered a face-to-face meeting between President Kibaki and Odinga followed by
the launch of The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR). (Kofi Annan Foundation, 2005) The former
United Nations Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan, the President of Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa, and former
Mozambican Minister and First Lady, Mrs. Machel made up the Panel.
Many scholars argue that given the levels of violence in Kenya, the success of the mediation team to reach
the basis for a peace agreement only 41 days on is a unique experience that may not be easily replicable to
another context. (AU PANEAP, 2013) This mediation experience presents many lessons around determinants
for mediation success in Africa. The first and foremost two broad lessons are that (i) Mediation of inside
conflicts is more of an art, and is better understood in terms of specific cases rather than general rules, and also
that each conflict is unique, and for this reason, mediators benefit more “from guidance than they do from
regulation; from shared principles more than accountable requirements.”; and (ii) The mediators’ personality,
experience, acumen and behaviour have a large impact on the success of the mediation process. (Ibid)
These two lessons feed into each other very well, in the sense that the experience, acumen and personality
of Kofi Annan and his panel are indeed an art that they applied strategically to the specific case of Kenya to
achieve success. In demonstrating the reasons for this argument, the ensuing discussion will also strive to
highlight thematically and point by point, how the Kenya experience infers lessons on the pre-determinants for
mediation success and failure, showing in turn how the key principals in the mediation team created conditions
for mediation success in the negotiations for the KNA.
4.6.1.1 Mediation team’s ‘fit for purpose’ and getting it right on the onset
The resolute actions taken by both President Kufuor and Kofi Annan fitted well into the purpose of ensuring a
quick end to the violence in Kenya, followed by conflict reconstruction processes towards peaceful elections.
As chairperson of the AU, President Kufuor took personal responsibility of overseeing the success of the
pre-arrangements for the mediation by timeously undertaking an advocacy visit to the intransigent principals
after adequate consultation with Kofi Annan in Ghana. This added weight and trust in relation to ownership of
the mediation process in the eyes of the conflicting parties, and as Chairperson of the AU, his degree of
impartiality was indeed guaranteed in the face of the conflicting Parties. Kufuor’s determination in the matter
is evidenced by his immunity to the two principals’ unseemly protocol imposed on him, as he strategically
moved to establish the Panel before it had been formally accepted by the parties, as well as his masterly
selection of panellists. (Ibid) This necessary sense of urgency and agency is also proof of his deftness in
mediation issues, an art not guided by theoretical or book knowledge, but by personal discernment and
understanding of historical issues on the ground. In obvious and unwavering support of President Kufuor’s

72
objectives, Kofi Annan devoted time in rallying support and a single voice on the need for the Principals to
peacefully settle the dispute from both the African community and the international community. Annan made
sure that from the onset, both Kibaki and Odinga heard a single consistent message from both the African and
the international community, and the message was to “… settle [your] differences and do so through and with
the Panel. (Ibid)
On arriving in Nairobi, the Panel moved resolutely to secure a public meeting between the Principals,
resulting in acceptance of a single mediation process. As pundits rightly argue, in achieving these goals,”
Annan confirmed his diplomatic skills, which partly reflected his culture but were also an effect of the brutal
testing that he experienced as Secretary-General of the United Nations. His finesse was evident as he
neutralized a distracting initiative led by President Museveni and applied his moral authority to bring the
Principals together, in an equitable manner on 24 January.” (AU PANEAP, 2013: 232)
The “fit for purpose” aspect can also be demonstrated by the role of panellists and their representations
which are also a key lesson to draw from for purposes of highlighting the role of inclusivity in the Kenyan
process. While Graca Machel represented women, albeit in minority, this provided a key opportunity for the
Kenyan women’s movement to participate freely and with confidence, and also helped share a discourse on the
disadvantages of having only one woman as opposed to more men on the peace tables. Likewise Benjamin
Mkapa provided a language link through his provision of Swahili translations. The role played by external
technical experts also signifies a strategy well thought out that helped avert a possible stalemate when the
Principals were disagreeing, the German State Minister Erler advised the negotiators on coalition government
while Hans Corell, a Swedish judge and former Legal Counsel at the UN, guided the technical discussion
through a working group, for inclusivity and for ensuring local ownership of the process, and limiting his role
only to that of providing technical expertise as needed.
4.6.1.2 Expediency, Good research and adequate planning are key to success
The mediating team arrived in Kenya only eleven days after the call for mediation, and there is proof that if Kofi Anna
had not fallen ill at the airport a week earlier, the team could have arrived a week earlier. (Brink, 2013:230) Secondly,
the team came well prepared for the process, with a clear mapped out strategy of how they were going to move
processes going forward. They on the onset defeated one of Brahimi’s deadly sins, that of ignorance. Although they
knew Kenya well enough owing to their professions and previous engagements, they did not negate devoting
considerable time to consultations with key groups in Kenya, such as the churches, the media, artists like Kenya’s
singers and music entertainers, who all combined their efforts to appeal for dialogue between the conflicting parties.
(Kofi Annan Foundation, 2005)) Additional role of the international community through efforts of former British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also added pressure to the parties. (Ibid) The
Kenyan Diaspora in North America and the U.K, as well as those residing in other African countries, besides
contributing funding, also called for a negotiated settlement. (Ibid) Kofi Annan also marshalled international support

73
for the initiative and indeed, as already noted, two days after they arrived, the trio managed to engineer the first
‘handshake’ between the Principals, with talks opening five days later.
4.6.1.3 Inclusivity and playing the politics right.
In a tenacious demonstration of his principle to serve not only the needs of the elite in Kenya, and to make the
mediation process nationally owned, Kofi Annan, as explained above, promptly established early meetings
with civil society and other stakeholders, and taking care to keep an open door to all Kenyans while shutting
the doors to International VIPs. Besides ensuring ownership of the process, this action also helped boost the
confidence and trust of the Kenyans in both the mediation process and the mediation panel.
Combined together, the efforts of both Kafour and Annan cumulatively worked for the best interest of the
mediation process, and also acted as catalysts to make the principals realise the need to agree for a peaceful
settlement to the conflict as follows: The international community made the settlement of the political
differences in Kenya a pre-condition for continuing business relations in Kenya; The African political agenda,
according to Article 4(h) of the African Union’s Charter provided for a peace intervention, and this made it
easier for the contending national leaders to bow down to this legitimate ‘demand’; and rightly so, Kenyan civil
society and the media combined efforts for their political leaders to act to stop the conditions in the country
from further spiralling into violence, and to reconstruct the country. (Ibid)
The far reaching good consequences of the mediating team’s promptness and assiduity achieved the
desired effect. Even though there were many calls for mass action after the Panel’s arrival and during the first
days of negotiation, and violence was an ever present threat, a fragile calm was indeed restored. The Panel’s
urgent calls for calm, and the swift agreement reached on Agenda Items 1 and 2 probably averted another
calamity. Nothing that the mediators or negotiators did was more important. Both Kofi Annan and “President
Kufuor’s efforts to persuade the parties to accept mediation were supported, and had been preceded by
diplomatic and other initiatives that pushed in the same direction,” (Brink, 2013:233) and this helped establish
a serene and enabling environment in Kenya, as well as the prepared the ground for unwavering support from
external actors in Africa and beyond.
The importance of bringing in mediators with experience, especially of working in international bodies like
the UN, (and this refers to Kofi Annan) worked to the success of the mediation, especially in terms of decision
making. The decision to avoid ‘forum shopping”11 and bring in a single unchallenged mediation team also
backed up by the international and local communities was key. While Kofi Annan and Kafour stood resolute
on this mediation team endorsed by the AU and backed by the international community, the two disputing
principals in Kenya would have wanted consideration of their own suggested teams, but Kofi Annan, owing to
what analysts have termed “his dismal experience in the UN,” stood resolute against the desires of the two, to

11
Forum Shopping is when the parties choose mediators of their own choice or are exposed to an array of possible competing mediation
groups to choose from. The convention however is that parties to a conflict should not be allowed to choose between mediators, or choose
mediators that suit their likes and interests, because interferes with serious engagement and real negotiations.
74
avoid forum shopping. (On the Brink) Kenya thus is a best practice of how effective it is to avid forum
shopping.
4.6.1.4 Aligning mediation to local protocols and legislation
The Kenya mediation is a clear case of how mediation practice aligned itself to the requirements of the AU
constitutive Act for success, which provides for the right of the Union, in certain cases, to intervene in a
member State and for the right of a member State to request such intervention.12
This study links mediation practice and experiences in Africa to the concept of Ubuntu, arguing that while
mediation theories are useful in providing foundational knowledge and guidance, on the African continent,
because of the African people’s traditions on dispute resolution and the role mediation has played even at
family and community levels since time immemorial, our experiences through all forms of violent conflict on
the continent have enabled evolvement of a unique system and practice of positive intervention. There is
ample evidence to prove that in many cases than one, African leaders have often cooperated to resolve conflicts
on the continent, and accepted an offer of mediation by the AU.
Further to note about the experience of mediation in Africa is that “… an offer of mediation, usually by a
senior statesman from the neighbourhood, is considered less insulting than in some other regions of the world,
in accordance with the already cited Article 4(h) of the African Union’s Constitutive Act. In the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM), African governments also voluntarily submit to the judgements of peer states on
the continent; like the 2006 peer review of Kenya led by Panellist Graça Machel, these can be severe.” P. 235
Brink
The same argument above can also be carried forward within the framework of the Kenyan mediation
process as presenting a good highlight of the effectiveness of the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in
African mediation. Contrary to the Sovereignty clause in the AU Charter which prohibits interference into
state politics by member states, R2P permits countries, under certain conditions, like genocide or threat to it to
make interventions to protect civilian populations in third countries using diplomatic, humanitarian and other
measures. Military may be deployed under the R2P, but only as a last resort. On the positive note, agreement
of an African and international consensus on the need to offer hybridised external mediation positively feeds
into the consensus for R2P.
The AU PANEAP (2013) argue that on a negative note, limits of R2P were revealed by the international
community’s subsequent inability to induce Kenya’s political leaders to implement the reforms they had
brought into being. (Cite). However, in my view this analysis may limit itself to a wrong and prejudice
assumption that the international community is the only big brother with clout and capability to exert pressure

12
Article 4 of the Act provides for: “(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in
respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”; and “(j) the right of Member States to request
intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.”

75
on African leaders to implement reforms, but is this true? Why not squarely blame African eladers for failing
to implement their own reforms?
The fact that the Kenyan process aligns itself to the AU Charter further helps refute allegations by some
analysts that the Kofi Annan mediation was foreign owned, and they have based their arguments on the fact
that it was foreign supported, and also that Kofi Annan, being former UN expert, was exerting external soft
power on the Kenyan process, with some even describing him as a dictator. (Lindenmayer, 2009)
This long essay, in concurrence with the AU PANEAP (2013), argues that the Kenya mediation was
indeed about Africa, despite the fact that it also drew on resources and support from external continents. The
mandate, as already demonstrated about Article 4 (h) was African, “… the panellists were African, and the
style of the negotiation (albeit with a nod to Anglo Saxon legal practice) was as African as a village council,
including the joshing respect paid to the Elder, even if he was called a “fox” and a “dictator”. The Kenyan
mediation is thus a pure case of how African commitment, experience and expertise combined to enrich
peacemaking processes on the continent. For this and other reasons, the AU PANEAP (2013) continuously
argue for the uniqueness of the Kenya mediation process, positing that no matter how successful it, was, and no
matter the enriching experiences and seasoned personalities involved, “… the mediators, the process they
adopted, and the instruments they used, might not be transferable to another continent.” (Ibid: 236)
4.6.1.5 Tact and prioritisation of issues
Exercising tact and swift prioritisation of issues are also important pre-determinants for mediation success. The Panel
employed a deductive sequential approach to some sensitive issues, prioritising what one observer called “low hanging
fruit”. (Ibid) These low hanging fruits refer to Agenda Items 1 and 2 (on ending the violence and organizing a
humanitarian response) that were agreed within days (on 1 and 4 February 2008). Letting Kofi Annan strategically
exercise some ‘interest-based’ mediation skills by taking the lead to discuss the election and its outcome, helped by
Craig Jenness, towards a conclusion that he had lobbied and advocated the international community and the AU for
before embarking on the mediation process, and that was the need to negate the recount or a rerun and opt for a peace
settlement; while astutely assigning controversial issues to bodies created to address them. This enabled the creation of
commissions for investigating post-election violence, reviewing the election and electoral arrangements, establishing
accountability for crimes, structuring a new constitution, and performing other relevant acts. This thus prevented the
panel from getting involved in arguing out sensitive issues, which could have caused problems to the process.
In doing this, the mediation team managed to address the root causes of the violence, producing an agenda or
‘Road Map’ for the dialogue that ensured the mediation was tackled in a sequence of manageable steps. (Kofi Annan
Foundation, 2009) This road map was divided into four ‘Plans’: Agenda One focused on immediate action to stop
violence and restore fundamental human rights and liberties; Agenda Two focused on immediate action ‘to address the
humanitarian crisis’; Agenda Three aimed to overcome the short-term political crisis; and Agenda Four dealt with the
long-term, underlying issues that had caused the violence (Ibid: 10). The mediation team also adopted a very strong

76
communications strategy, and all agreements and timelines were swiftly publicised throughout the process, providing
the Kenyan public, the international community and Kenya’s political players with a ‘clear framework and indicators of
success’ to work with. (Kanyinga and Walker, 2008)
The mediation team’s immediate and accurate prognosis of the root of prevailing problems in Kenya, as well as
their ability to accurately prescribe relevant solutions to it, as opposed to spending unnecessary time on election results,
saw them giving precedence to the broader crisis of the political system and its related institutions, and the need to
revamp them, for example the police and the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK). Positively taking the violence as
an indicator for measuring the incapacity of local institutions to respond to such insecurities, the team used this
experience as a chance to focus on addressing the long term political, economic, social and ethnic challenges the
country was facing. This removed the focus from the politics of personalities, and from arguments over who actually
won the elections, focusing more on establishing a firmer ground on which to build a possible sustainable peace for the
country. Worth mentioning is also the mediation team’s push for Police Reforms, to make the police answerable to a
statutory body as opposed to politicians, and making these reforms a Constitutional issue. This decision was against a
background of impunity and incompetence among the police, with allegations of failing to contain the violence acts of
2007-8, for reasons partisan. This gave confidence to the population that the violence of the 2007-8 was indeed going
to be contained under rule of law as provided for by the reforms.
Overall, the combined acumen and ‘fit for purpose’ strategy employed by both Kufuor and Annan fits this
mediation into “… a successful process of interest-based mediation.” (Ibid) Proponents of interest-based/integrative
negotiation as already noted, argue for the need to focus on benefits for the disputants rather than on their positions, and
this refers more to the needs of the parties that spin off positive welfares as opposed to personally perceived solutions to
the problems. The two authors advise on extricating the people from the problem, and on discovering and
recommending new resolutions whilst still meeting diverse interests. (Ibid) The major objective here is to encompass
the concerns of all parties, and help them collectively couch solutions that will satisfy all the sides of the dispute, as well
as establishing a follow-up system mechanism to continuously observe implementation, as well as to address arising
challenges as need be. For these reasons, Kofi Annan becomes more of an interest-based rather than a manipulative
mediator. Key also to note are Annan’s persuasion skills, which positively inspired contending parties to settle for
conflict resolution. Kofi Anna’s invitation of Tanzanian Jakaya Kikwete to join the mediation team allowed him to
share his lived experiences of a power sharing deal and this raised the confidence and hope of the disputants to concede
for a government of national unity. (Ibid: 12).
Also tied to this argument is the fact that mediation processes that focus on the structural causes of conflict tend to
be more successful than those that mistake triggers for causes. They also turned the lessons learnt from the severity of
the political crisis into the basis for building a full political solution, and keyed into this as the main product of the
negotiation process. As noted above, while elections triggered the conflict, the lack of faith in the ethnically neutral

77
nature of the government along with basic mistrust in state institutions fostered by decades of discontent with disparity
and impunity caused some members of communities around the country to turn to violence. (Nathan, 2011)
The mediation team also succeeded by paying attention to specific historical realities of Kenya, and thus the KNA
was born out of specific demands of the Kenyan political certainties on the ground. Noting that among everything else,
the major point of interest for both disputants was power and inclusion, and guided by the need to create new and
alternative options that can fulfil the interests of all stakeholders and give place to a sustainable and durable agreement,
a new position of power, that of Prime Minister, which did not exist in the country since 1964 when Jomo Kenyatta, the
first President of Kenya, held it for a short time, was created.
The “Agreement on the principles of partnership of the Coalition Government” states: “There will be a Prime
Minister of the Government of Kenya, with authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and
affairs of the Government of Kenya.” (KNA, 2008) The power-sharing accord implied as well that the two main parts
would share executive power and the positions in the Cabinet, taking into account “the principle of portfolio balance”
and reflecting “their relative parliamentary strength”. In this way, the main interests of the disputants were addressed,
and this way, the mediation team created a possibility for the peace agreement to quell the polarisation, and answer not
only to the needs and fears of the political parties, but also to those of the population. Proof to its success is also the fact
that while in 2002 Odinga and Kibaki had a power-sharing deal formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding, and
Kibaki refused to implement it after the elections, this time the agreement was indeed implemented and implementable.
4.6.1.6 The power of hybridisation of mediation
The Kenya process also demonstrates how success can be wrought by the hybridisation of mediation through
the combined efforts of the International body - the UN, the regional body - the AU and other local
development partners working together as in the case of the UN and the AU. The UN spared its capacity to
support the Panel without hesitation, with the UN Secretary General constantly calling on the UN system to
respond positively to any Panel request. A good example of the UN’s response was the visit of Craig Jenness,
head of the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division, whose expertise and technical support helped to convince the
negotiators against the infeasibility of recounting or rerunning the election choosing to move towards a peace
agreement. Likewise the AU and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue also supported the process with their
experienced secretariat for combined effort. Emphasis on collegiality as opposed to nationality also
demonstrates the democratic nature of the whole process. (Ibid)
By virtue of his position as former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan has been criticised for manipulation
and agenda setting, and the power sharing result his team achieved for Kenya has been linked to a precedent
for the power sharing following flawed elections, that later took place in Zimbabwe and Cote d’ Ivoire,
following closely after Kenya. However, the positive thing to note about the Kenya process, which also set a
good precedent for protecting a coalition agreement in Zimbabwe was the fact that the power-sharing was not

78
made an end in itself, as the parties further committed to a compulsory and complimentary reform agenda that
was intended to create conditions for peace and prosperity and prevent recurrence of violence.
These conditions, despite the fact that some of the reforms were not implemented, in both Kenya and
Zimbabwe, set a precedent for promulgation of gender sensitive Constitutions, five years on. Contrary to this
argument, the Kenya process also presents a good example of the AU’s understanding of the link between
mediation and peacebuilding, and taking mediation not as an event but a process with the peacemaking and
peacebuilding processes. This is so when the AU decided to extend the Panel’s mandate to six years on, to
assist Kenyans with needed professional support to implement the reform programme articulated in the
Accords followed by establishment of the Coordination and Liaison Office (CLO) in Nairobi, whose presence
kept reminding the Parties of the obligations they had assumed.
The Kenya mediation also highlights the need for a mediation funding on the continent. This is so because
the panellists were not compensated for the time they devoted to Kenya, and this impacts on sustainability.
While the AU PANEAP (2013) has argued for international actors to provide funding for mediators, this essay
proposes an African specific fund to minimise the degree of influence when processes, especially personnel are
funded by outsiders, as this could come with some exertion of soft power to influence their thinking and
execution of duty.
4.6.1.7 Taking gender as a key mediation consideration
As noted already, UNSC1325 on Women, Peace and Security calls for active participation of women in peace
processes. The composition of the mediation team with Graca Machel on the panel raised hope for further inclusion of
more women, especially women from civil society who had a better understanding of the effects of violence on
women. However, this was not to be the case, as no women saw it to the mediation table. It is nonetheless important to
note that the composition of the delegates that sit at the negotiation table is decided by the conflict parties, not by the
mediators, although they, (the mediators) can suggest various consultation formats or working groups to broaden the
participation. (Alberg, 2008)
In Kenya, when violence broke out, rape and gender based violence reportedly increased, and statistics from the
Nairobi Women’s Hospital showed a sharp increase in admission and treatment for rape, culminating in increased cases
of HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies. (ACCORD, 2009) In addition to this, women
constitute the majority of the population in Kenya, yet they were excluded from mediation talks in 2008. (Women’s
Organisations, 2008) Kenyan women sought to find a solution to this, and through a Committee nominated by the
Women’s Organisation, they presented a memorandum to the international mediation team in Nairobi on 25 January
2008 arguing against institutionalized discrimination against women through the following recommendations:
 That there should be a mechanism for accountability by the mediation team to Kenyan women on the progress
of the mediation, and that such mechanisms should be spelt out in a public mediation agreement.
 That there should be continued engagement with women as key stakeholders in all stages of mediation.

79
 That a local gender advisor be appointed to provide the necessary expertise to the team of mediators, using existing
sufficient expertise within the women’s movement in Kenya in the fields of gender, children’s rights and peace and
conflict transformation.
 Political parties should have women represented on their teams in keeping with the enabling instruments.
 That the mediation continues until such time as peace is restored in Kenya. (ACCORD, 2009)

To conclude this section, reality is that where women have been included in formal peacemaking processes, they have
recorded substantive contribution, and a case in point is the women of Liberia who took an active role in ensuring the
signing of a peace agreement that brought peace to this country.
In Northern Ireland women’s groups were instrumental in building and nurturing the trust between Protestants and
Roman Catholics while in Bosnia women bridged the ethnic divide to rebuild working coalitions in parliament.
(ACCORD, 2009) Because they are most affected by conflict, women are most likely to be better equipped to mediate
and likely to possess patience and empathy, and women mediators are more likely to be attuned to the needs of the
most vulnerable groups in societies affected by conflict. (Ibid)
However, critics also contest that these same qualities could inadvertently work against women as perceived
masculine characteristics such as assertiveness are more respected of effective within patriarchal settings. (ACCORD,
2009) Whether this be true or not, the main argument that sustains is that a balance of women and men brings both
sets of qualities to the mediation table for the benefit of society, so in sum, women need to be represented in mediation
teams, and it is a strategic imperative for the AU to practically mainstream gender and promote gender equality in the
official plan to build its mediation capacity.
The first conclusion that may be drawn is that regional peacemaking efforts are still limited in their success due to
the strong devotion to national sovereignty held by Africa’s leaders. Anthoni van Nieuwkerk (2004: 46) argues that
‘redesigned structures will not make any difference to Africa’s security if Africa’s ruling elites do not develop the
political vision and will to effectively promote human security on the continent’. Leaders must move away from a
vision that promotes state security and sovereignty, towards one that promotes human rights and freedom from
insecurity for all citizens. Although shifts in thinking are taking place, the continuing defence of sovereignty and unity
in African politics, especially in Southern Africa, cannot be ignored when considering the (in) effectiveness of regional
peacemaking.
The UN and its partners must reconsider and strengthen the principles of their relationship and the shared decision-
making process for peacemaking in Southern Africa. The process currently allows too much room for personal and
national interests to dominate peacemaking processes, rather than ensuring that the best suited strategy and mediation
team, as determined by the principle of comparative advantage, is actually put in place. Achieving peace in Southern

80
Africa has been for many years a hard-to-attain goal. While there is a lot of potential for creating effective partnerships
that leverage the advantages of the UN together with local partners, they are currently not effectively realised.
This section concludes that there are still major limitations on the successful regionalisation of conflict management
efforts in Southern Africa and that the UN and its partner organisations need to clarify and improve their working
relationship to improve their chances of facilitating successful peacemaking.
4.6.1.8 Managing participating groups as a pre-determinant for mediation success
Critics (see Lindenmayer, 2009) have also accused Kofi Anna of excluding the majority of local actors in the
mediation process. Rightly so, Åberg (2008) sees participation [as] an important element of mediation, and one that
entails questions of inclusiveness, representation, decision-making power, and procedures, as well as competence on
the part of the negotiation delegations which determine if the process itself will be an inclusive one or an exclusive one.
(Ibid) Inclusive mediation processes are legitimate and if successful, often yield sustainable results.
This analysis has already recorded the active participation of civil society, the diaspora and artists, especially in the
pre-consultation phase, although it may hold water that those involved were few as compared to the population of
Kenya. However, given the difficulty of managing group dynamics, such mediation processes may also be more
complicated and hard to manage as it is more difficult for 100 people to talk with one another than it is for two people,
but if the 100 can agree on a solution, the outcome is more solid and sustainable. (Ibid) She further argues that if there
are only two people talking, both of whom are heads of states and are legitimate representatives of their respective
people, such an exclusive process may be more effective and democratic than an inclusive process with hundreds of
people who wield no decision-making power and no heavy influence. (Åberg, 2008)
While non-governmental actors can play a pivotal role as facilitators, sometimes, for purposes of ensuring order
and a quick solution to the problems on the ground, the mediation team can work out a plan that clearly delineates the
stages and levels of involvement for civil society. While some critics believe that the Kenyan process was exclusive,
thus this essay contends that Kenyan civil society was indeed involved in the process to some extent, through the
important role that they played in the process by working towards peace at the grassroots level, although they were in
actuality not represented in the talks.
The role that the local actors play, that of providing an understanding of local history, politics, cultures and
personalities from the point of view of the population as really played out during their earlier consultations with the
various parties that helped in convincing the parties to come together for negotiation. Civil society actors took the
initial lead, during the political impasse immediately following the December elections and in early January 2008.
(Murithi, 2008) Ideally, civil society actors should also be included in the mediation process to provide a watchdog
window to the whole process. However, continuously involving civil society would have unnecessarily increased the
budgets while also taking the time for negotiations.

81
 4.6.1.9 Political insight
The mediation team led by Kofi Annan demonstrated political and process foresight of the need to maintain
impetus and ensure finalisation of the agenda as well as preparations for effective implementation of the peace
agreement as the panel left the country after signing of the peace agreement is also a good lesson to learn from.
This was achieved by appointing a Panel, and also appointing Oluyemi Adeniji, a former Foreign Minister of
Nigeria – to be Chair of this Panel and it’s ensuing sessions, and assigning him to maintain and support
effective sustenance of the negotiations in Kofi Annan’s absence and, specifically, to assist an agreement
between the parties on Agenda Item 4 (long-term issues and solutions), as well as foster the conditions
necessary to implement Agenda Items 1, 2 and 3. (Brink).
Rightly so, on 4 March, a day after Kofi Annan’s departure, the Session established the frameworks for a
constitutional review, a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), and an Independent Review Committee (IREC), a clear indication of the
Parties willingness to ensure that the KNDR was concluded. After the Panel concluded its formal mediation
role, and the implementation matrix, on 29 July 2008, it continued to support the reform agenda by fulfilling its
formal responsibilities under the KNDR agreements and engaging politically with the two Principals and other
key implementation agents. Through its Coordination and Liaison Office (CLO), the Panel supported efforts to
build institutional capacity and continued to monitor and engage in the political process by making regular
visits to Kenya and issuing statements on important issues, from 2008 until 2013.
Although there were major delays in drafting and operationalising the agreements, with the negotiating
team meeting only 4 times between 4 March and 29 July as opposed to the 19 times they had met between 29
January and 3 March, a statement on long-term issues and solutions, finally agreed on 23 May 2008, was
initially circulated as a draft to the parties on 17 April 2008, and the matrix on implementation in the same
agreement was finalized two months later on 29 July, signalling the conclusion of mediation. (Brink) Major
arguments to exonerate the negotiation team for these delays have been that it would be simplistic to draw
conclusions about the panel based on dates alone because issues of the agreed position on the KNDR’s
standing and role were also of importance. It had been agreed on during negotiations that Parliament was the
right forum with responsibility to discuss the formation of the various commissions and prepare the legislation
required, with support from relevant ministries. On this view, implementation was a matter for Parliament and
did not require continuous sessions of the KNDR; occasional sessions would be sufficient. Against this, it was
argued that the wisdom of the Panel would be of value as the commissions were formed, especially its advice
on structures and timelines. (Ibid)

82
 4.6.2 Balancing the arguments - Kofi Annan committed some of
Brahimi’s deadly sins of mediation, the of Haste
As an attempt to balance this analysis of the Kenya mediation process, highlights of what some critics have
labelled as failure of the Kofi Annan led mediation are also presented in summary below:
One of Brahimi’s deadly sins of mediation is haste, and the Kenyan mediation is indeed testimony of this sin.
Whatever the specific causes and features of a given conflict, the parties regard each other with deep mistrust and
animosity and believe that their differences are irreconcilable (Nathan, 2011) and as such, there is need for mediators to
take their time pursuing unrushed resolution as a way of enhancing trust and confidence. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi (2008)
argues that the psycho-political dynamics of conflict and the underlying structural problems preclude simple solutions
and rapid progress, while Nathan (2009) in turn contends that where the scope of the conflict is national and there is a
history of violence, [like in Kenya], impediments to peacemaking are much increased.
Likewise Bercovitch (2009) argues that a good analysis and a thorough understanding of all aspects of the conflict
are important prerequisites for successful mediation in stubborn conflicts, and obviously a thorough analysis and
understanding as required would have taken more time than did the Kenyan mediation process. The interest of
international mediators to fix a quick solution played against the need for a meticulous process, and the result was an
underestimation of the complex nature of the conflict, and the effects were indeed felt in the prolonged stalemate the
continued after the signing of the agreement, as well as the continued failure to fulfil the requirements of the agreement.
(Ibid) Critics contend that the core causes of the conflict remained unresolved as the political settlement was pushed
through rapidly, helping halt the immediate violence but leaving little time to develop a working partnership between
Kibaki and Odinga.
Nathan (2005) critiques international mediation in national conflicts for relying too much on power-based
diplomacy, attempting to make progress by exerting pressure on the disputant parties through declarations,
admonitions, threats and punishment, all strategies that should be replaced by a confidence-building approach to
mediation, and as such, haste partially explains why agreements that have been concluded later fail to resolve crucial
underlying political issues and subsequently unravel. (Brahimi & Ahmed, 2008)
The Kenya peace agreement in general managed to put a stop to the worst forms of conflict by addressing
immediate steps that could be taken to resolve the violence and killings that were ongoing as well as promote
reconciliation and healing, the formation of the Coalition Government, improvement of the electoral process, (Amman,
2008) investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding acts of violence that followed the disputed general
elections, (Ibid) Constitutional review, (The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2009) and the formation of a
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission. A number of reforms were also implemented, including increased
quotas for women’s participation in parliament and the establishment of peace committees by the IEBC. Constitutional
reforms enabled by the KNA, as well as the associated reform of electoral bodies and the judiciary, were an essential
foundation for regaining the confidence of the Kenyan people.

83
These reforms in turn facilitated a range of local conflict prevention efforts helped build a broad-based desire to avoid
the violent scenario of the previous election. These efforts involved, for instance, early warning response mechanisms,
District Peace Committees, small arms and light weapons control schemes, interethnic dialogue, as well as an emphasis
on collaborative leadership. Prevalence of ‘peace messaging’ appears to have influenced popular discourse in the lead
up to the 2013 election and afterwards, and appears to have been effective in preventing conflict boil over into violence.
(Lumsdane et al, 2013) In particular also, devolution, a keystone of constitutional reform, necessitated a systematic
reorganization of power through the reorganisation of the provincial administration. Chapter 11 of the Constitution
provided for a two-level devolved governance: the national government and the county, which in turn effectively
replaced the existing eight provinces with 47 counties to provide a second level of governance after the national
government (Murray, 2013 as cited in Lumsdale, 2013).
Such a measure was expected to constitute a major success of constitutional reform, particularly in light of the
European Union findings that “the centralization of power and therefore control of public resources and decisions-
making in the institution of the presidency” is a clear and direct cause of post-electoral violence eruptions in Kenya, as
it fosters “cutthroat competition during elections and worsens the existing ethnic divisions” (EU-KAS Report, 2009:
20). The lack of clarity in the language of the mediation and of the KNA remained ambiguous on some key issues, and
becomes the source of failure to some extend because it paved a way for future complications and lack of agreement
between the parties.
The powers of the new Prime Minister remained unclear as the agreement stipulated that the Prime Minister would
“co-ordinate and supervise” affairs of government, without specifying exactly what power and authority would be
vested in the position and how executive powers would be divided between the Prime Minister himself and the
President. (Horowizt, 2008) The KNA also remained also silent on the length of the Coalition Government and on
what would happen if it collapsed even before the next election in 2012 (Ibid) leaving everything to the mercy of two
political parties that were still in disagreement largely.
Some critics have pushed an argument that the Kenyan process was a failure, pointing to the spates of violence that
occurred soon after signing of the peace accord as the reason for this judgement of failure. On the contrary however,
given the nature of nature of ethnic politics in Kenya, these spates of violence may not denote failure perse, and this is
so because the nature of the conflict in Kenya, especially those issues to do with ethnic politics would mean in reality
that some ethnic groupings would still exhibit violent actions despite the stability exhibited by the rest of the population.
Other critics also argue that the root causes of the conflict were not addressed in the rushed pursuit to achieve a
mere agreement and stop the violence, and as such the process undermined politics, thus creating a possibility for
possible conflict to arise anew. (The Daily Nation, 2009) This point, in the context of this analysis, is somewhat
exaggerated, because a few sparks of violence do not necessarily translate into another conflict [that would] arise anew.
These arguments call for the need to continuously explore issues of failure and success, is success just an agreement, or

84
is it more than that and more to do with the ability for the process to eradicate all forms of violence, structural and
cultural.
In concluding this section, the Kenya mediation and peace implementation outcome exhibits a unique example of
sustained high-level political intervention for a reform process, showing at the same time that external support to
implement peace agreements is not uncommon, particularly when international mediation has been involved. In saying
this, the arguments in this essay do not propose that the tactics and strategies used by the panel were unique and specific
to Kenya, and were entirely their own. These tactics are obviously not new, and neither are they specific to an African
culture and geographical space, but they can indeed be ascribed to Kofi Annan and his team because of their ability to
calculate and use the tactics with excellent timing, and tailor making all steps in the mediation to [Kofi Annan’s} prior
plans before the start of the mediation. “… 26 February provides perhaps the best example. Kofi Annan announced the
suspension of talks to a shocked and unprepared room of negotiators, then made an immediate public declaration in
which he insisted that this was not bad news but a necessary change of gear. He had precisely planned his actions,
including the vital invitation to President Kikwete to join Annan and Mkapa in the Principals’ meeting the following
day. It was at once a display of authority and a calculated gamble. Fortunately, it worked. Kofi Annan said
subsequently that he was confident the Principals would realize they had little choice, although he went on to say that if
they had not cooperated he would have had to resign.” (AU PANAEP, 2013:240)
4.7 Lessons learnt from the Zimbabwe and Kenya Mediation Processes
This section presents key lessons learnt from both the Zimbabwe and Kenya mediation processes:
A good understanding of the underlying historical issues of the context is a good precedent to good coordination of
planning effort for successful mediation. The Kenya mediation process demonstrates the value of good coordination
between local and international organisations in conflict prevention. The international community approached the
crisis with a unity of purpose and a highly legitimate response because of the guidance they received from the panel of
African leaders as well as from local structures such as traditional elders and civil society in Kenya. This gave
ownership of the process to the local people. As a result, the UN could only exercise a lot of reflexivity to ensure that
they align their interests and expertise to the interests and expectations of Africa.
Embedded in this lesson is also the fact that strategic coalitions with the international community add benefits to
mediation processes. In this case the international community acted quickly to prioritise conflict prevention, mobilising
support and funding behind the best mediation solution whilst keeping pressure on for rapid conclusions to the enquiry
commissions.
The Zimbabwean experience proffers a lot of lessons regarding third party mediation. In Africa, third party
intervention is not only motivated by the desire to resolve internal conflict, , but also to resolve regional differences
whilst upholding regional political interests. Third party mediation also it also involves a substantial measure of self-
interest as in the case of South Africa (Mandara and Pooe, 2013), but of importance is the fact that these self-interests
embrace regional security agendas and concerns. Thus, third party mediation provides good opportunities for regional

85
leaders to attend to and solve some outstanding regional issues of concern. While South Africa’s mediation style was to
an extent informed by personal, national and regional concerns as seen in the discussion, the most important fact is that
the mediators were tactful enough to nurture a perception of impartiality towards the cause of the parties to the conflict
to enhance the success of the mediation.
Trust, shared historical perceptions and good relations are good tools for effective mediation and for lasting results.
Although South Africa’s mediation in Zimbabwe came at a time when the conflict had reached unprecedented levels
with no signs of a ‘hurting stalemate’ on either side of the contending parties, the facilitators, given their historical
relations with Mugabe and with the continental power, managed to employ preventive diplomacy and crisis
management strategies, among them the establishment of direct communication links between the parties to the
conflict, which partly contributed to the de-escalation of the conflict as a result of direct engagement by the parties,
which could not have been possible without this previous existing relationship between South African and Zimbabwe.
(Ibid) Likewise in Kenya, the eminence seen in Mkapa, Chissano, Masire and Kaunda motivated the rivalries to agree
to a peace settlement despite failure of earlier efforts by Desmond Tutu to influence same.
Mediators should be committed to the process, extending their role beyond the mere signing of the peace
agreement because, as Mandara and Pooe (2013) contend that complicated problems have no quick-fix solutions;
hence mediation cannot be a short-term commitment South Africa’s informal facilitation started in 2000, and the formal
facilitation started after 27 March 2007 and stretched a little after the 31 July 2013 harmonised elections.
South Africa’s approach further demonstrates the importance of coordination among key stakeholders in resolving
a conflict that attracts diverse local, regional and international interests. The partnership between South Africa, SADC,
the AU and the UN bestowed some sense of responsibility on the negotiating parties to respect the mediation process,
even where no party to the standoff was obliged to declare commitment to accept the mediator’s ideas and
recommendations. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013) Likewise in Kenya, the team’s decision to exercise what may be
criticised as haste without adhering to theoretical process design perse helped to halt a dangerous conflict, and this is a
good lessons learnt.
Mediation theoretical process is only an instrument to guide an aid the process and facilitators should be able to
single out only those aspects of mediation theory that are of outmost importance to the facts on the ground, whilst using
their personal acumen and influential powers to convince conflicting parties to close ranks and agree to collaborate,
especially in situations where there are high levels of mistrust and huge political differences as between ZANU PF and
the MDC. (Mandara and Pooe, 2013)
The Zimbabwe situation presents a good learning point for the distinction between cessation of hostilities and
conflict transformation. For many critics of the GNU, an inclusive Government was ‘miraculously’ expected to
provide the expected conflict transformation in the country. This exaggerated expectation has seen many scholars
wrongly criticising the Zimbabwe GNU as a failure, and alleging that it did not transform conflict. This long essay
argues to the contrary, noting that a mere peace agreement and formulation of a NGU was indeed a good tool to

86
influence cessation of violence and provide an entry point for progressive reforms in the country, as already noted
above.
However, for effective conflict transformation to take place, a more sustainable peace building strategy with well-
defined players and means was indeed required to reinforce the efforts of the GNU, and this includes support from the
international community, which was largely lacking in Zimbabwe as the West maliciously withdrew support, largely
because their expecting of putting an end to ZANU PF rule had not succeeded. The nature of the GNU itself,
including the language of formation of that GNU also determined the success or failure of the conflict transformation
process to follow. It was not enough to leave the Zimbabwe GNU which had come out of a complex political, social
and economic malaise to work on its own and expect full achievement of post conflict state reconstruction.
Agreeably, SADC was the guarantor of the GNU from 2009-2013, and JOMIC also accompanied the
implementation of the political agreement. However, the two bodies could have done even more in terms of aiding
transformation on all fronts in Zimbabwe if there had been enough financial support for their initiatives. Given the
financial constraints, the two bodies could only do so much. When the GPA was enforced on 15 September 2008,
Zimbabwe was facing hyper-inflation, sustained period of negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates,
massive devaluation of the currency, low productive capacity, and loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, massive de-
industrialisation and general despondency..
The obtaining economic meltdown had reduced capacity utilisation to below 10% while all savings and pensions
were wiped out due to inflation. The new Inclusive Government in Zimbabwe took Office in the context of an
economy that had many challenges. At the epicentre of the economic crisis were unprecedented levels of hyper-
inflation, sustained period of negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, massive devaluation of the
currency, low productive capacity, loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, massive de-industrialisation and general
despondency.
The obligation of the Inclusive Government to buttress the issues of economic recovery is set out in the GPA under
Article 31(a) which stated inter-alia that, “The parties agree to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and
growth in Zimbabwe. The Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an economic recovery
strategy and plan. To that end, the Parties are committed to working together on a full and comprehensive economic
programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy which will urgently address the issue of production, food security,
poverty and unemployment and the challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate.”
As part of its compulsion to address the economic crisis, GoZ came up with the present Short Term Emergency
Recovery Programmes, STERP 1 and STERP2. STERP was an emergency short term stabilisation programme, whose
key goals were to stabilise the macro and micro-economy, recover the levels of savings, investment and growth, and
lay the basis of a more transformative midterm to long term economic programme that managed to turn Zimbabwe
into its current progressive developmental mode. STERP was, thus, part of implementation of the GPA that sought to
address the key issues of economic stabilisation and national healing, whilst at the same time laying the foundation of a

87
more comprehensive and developmental economic framework for transformation which saw the economy achieve a
real Gross Domestic Product growth of 10, 6% in the four years since 2009 when the inclusive government became
operational following the signing of the GPA. (Kubatana, 2009)
For this achievement, Zimbabweans can indeed be hailed for trying their best within constrained resources and lack
of other necessary support to ensure that the country’s economy was restored to its current stable state. The UN and the
AU as noted above, should come up with a pool of both financial and human resources to aid conflict transformation
post elections, working tirelessly with the government of Zimbabwe and other stakeholders and providing checks and
balances. At the same time efforts of local players and civil society, including the private sector and foreign investors
would also be attuned to the agenda of post conflict transformation. It is not enough to say that Zimbabwe failed to
address the political and electoral reforms that formed the root cause of the governance problems in the country,
without proffering insights of the kind of support that was needed to guide the parties into achieving this, especially
given the background of hostilities that existed between these parties prior to the GNU.
Based on this analysis, the GNU in Zimbabwe managed to provide a conflict prevention mechanism with the
propensity to the much-needed democratic space for citizens and a leeway through which citizens can embark on the
national healing processes, (Ibid) but needed sustained mechanisms emanating from consolidated efforts of both
regional and global players in the peace building arena for establishment of a sustained peace building and conflict
transformation mechanism beyond these efforts.
This essay argues that on their own, post conflict states cannot manage to establish these sustainable mechanisms,
and within this framework, the UN can also be held accountable for failing to prevent post conflict states in Africa from
relapsing into a state of fragility. The success of a mediation effort is therefore underwritten by the willingness of the
parties to the conflict, as well as the willingness of other internal and external players, to accommodate each other’s
demands, and second, to embrace the mediator’s suggestion, and finally, to support efforts on the ground for post
conflict reconstruction and conflict transformation. The extreme positions adopted by the Zimbabwean parties in their
negotiations over the election roadmap undermine the success not only of South Africa’s mediation, but also of the AU
and the UN’s coordination levels for conflict transformation in Africa.
This analysis positions GNUs within Lund’s (2011) Conflict Curve conundrum as fragile, acrimonious, usually
transitional arrangements with a high risk of disintegrating at the slightest opportunity and further degenerating into
conflict. Lundi posits that GNUs are thus an attractive vehicle for reducing tension and managing differences within
the polity that have proven popular in many jurisdictions, including Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, during World
Wars I and II, and the United States, during the American civil war when President Abraham Lincoln, a Republican,
chose Andrew Jackson, a Democrat, as his Vice President, further contending that if properly instituted, GNUs are a
form of democracy in that people of various political parties are able to bury their political, ethnical, and tribal
differences and strive to build a democratic society where people enjoy freedoms and rights as enshrined in their
constitution.

88
However, given the varied historical experiences of African countries, and the limited support available to propel
GNUs to viability for effective conflict transformation, it could further be argued that the institution of GNU formations
should be regarded as an exception rather than a norm, otherwise a significant number of the active conflicts in the
world [risk remaining] old conflicts re-ignited; [that] were resolved only to fall back into old patterns of violence.
(Lund, 2011) Needless to mention that peace is more than just the absence of war, but, in effect, a hybrid of political
and development activities targeted at the sources of conflict. (Ibid)
The analysis also found that the international community did focus strongly on state-building for at least two years
post-crisis, listening to Kenyan voices and its own contextual analysis. However, the decision to pursue technical
development programmes and reduce the focus on political reforms may not have been correct, given the deeply-
rooted issues in Kenya’s political economy that caused the last crisis. This suggests the need for persistent engagement
by the international community in long-term structural state-building issues if we are to begin to address the deep-
rooted causes of conflicts that make political settlements fragile. Continued engagement in state-building issues after
every election would establish a strong foundation for sustainable peace and democratic governance.
Lastly, the final lessons learnt is that mediation success cannot be limited to a specific epoch or stage in the
mediation process, and neither can it be limited only to long term aftermaths. Mediation success is measured against the
mediation process’ original intentions and outcomes starting from the interim, but also moving beyond the interim, and
beyond the adoption of a peace treaty, right through to the implementation stage and beyond satisfaction of the
obligations and requirements of the pact.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, this analysis notes a number of key issues viz;
For mediation success to prevail on the continent, specific processes and mechanisms have yet to be consolidated at
both the AU and REC levels. Part of these mechanisms include the highlighted lack of trained human capacity,
inadequate financial resources and the need for adequate frameworks/mechanisms at the AU to enable mediation
processes to take an institutionalised approach as opposed to the improvised or reactive approach that characterises it,
where only specific key personnel in the region are eligible to handle mediation of conflicts. These limitations have
specific implications that in some instances run contrary to the requirements of human rights, such as the glaring
shortage of female mediators at country level, through the RECs to the AU itself.
Increasing allocations for, and making the peace fund sustainable will ensure that mediation is funded from Africa,
to help minimise the value laden support currently typifying post conflict reconstruction agenda on the continent, and
this can be improved on by setting specific peace funds at country and at REC levels to compliment the AU peace
fund. As ACCORD notes, it is indeed critical to ensure that the AU possesses the capacity to fulfil its mediation
mandate. (ACCORD, 2009) However, this essay further argues that for peacemaking processes that do not require the
mandate of the UN and the AU perse, there is need for the RECs and the member countries concerned to be highly
self-sustainable as this will help ensure that the mediation agenda is free from conditional tied influences, as well as
ensure independent mediation agendas.
89
The absence of specialised mediators in the RECs may give rise to what Nathan (2009:12) in ACCORD: 2009) terms
the sub-optimal approach to peacemaking, which in turn gives rise to specific problems such as appointment of poor
mediators who can in turn create confusion and even exacerbated conflicts. As such there is need for countries and
RECs to train mediators as part of peace building contingency, who can always be on standby to ensure effective
conflict prevention. Doing this will also prevent international organisations from imposing mediators in complex and
protracted conflicts without consent from host countries. Often, African countries are faced with a situation where they
have to accept imposed mediation plans because of lack of resources.
Mandara and Pooe (2013) recommend the SADC to institute a mediation division under a broader conflict
prevention, resolution and management structure. This unit should be a perfect model for provision of needed expertise
for future mediation processes, including planning, intelligence gathering on the changing circumstances of the conflict,
coordinating multi-track diplomatic initiatives and tactical and strategic guidance on the overall processes. (Ibid) This
essay further recommends the setting aside of a specific mediation fund at REC levels to ensure that mediation efforts
are well coordinated with the patience they deserve without worrying about resources, as many a time mediation
processes are rushed through and in some instances decisions are enforce prematurely because of resource scarcity. It
is also recommended that RECs tap into the expertise and resources of the regional and global efforts for peace
building, with the AU and the UN both ensuring coordinated efforts and supply of condition free resources that RECs
can utilise for effective mediation.
This essay also concludes that in the context of effective peacemaking in Africa, there is no coherent concept or
doctrine of mediation, and thus the style of mediation is largely dependent on the personality of the mediator and the
habit of repeating what was done previously.” (ACCORD; 2009) Given the specific nature of conflicts, it is not
possible for the AU to design a generic ‘mediation strategy’, hence the need for mediation to be flexible and to be
pursued through different strategies and according to the unique circumstances of each case.
Nonetheless, it is possible for the AU to define and adopt a ‘strategic approach to mediation’ – which is based on
the principles of the organisation, the experience of peacemaking on the continent and the goal of forging sustainable
peace agreements. (ACCORD, 2009) However, the following recommended principles (Ibid, 2009:17) suffice for
consideration as the AU continues to develop a strategic approach to mediation: the parties must own the agreement;
mediations and negotiations should be inclusive of all significant political actors; Civil society must be involved in the
mediation and negotiations; instead of sticking to theory on process design, mediators must be flexible, creative,
responsive and adaptive and finally, the drafting and implementation of the peace agreements should be properly
linked.
The issue of who takes the lead in mediation between the AU and the RECs often brings tension between these
institutions because of the complex and fragile nexus between them. While such tension was exhibited in the Kenyan
scenario, it was not so in the Zimbabwean case because it was quite clear that SADC would take the lead. In the case
of Kenya, because of many regional organisations that Kenya belonged to (IGAD, EAC, COMESA etc), perhaps it

90
was prudent for the AU to become more centrally involved. The UN Report of the high-level panel on threats,
challenges and changes (United Nations, 2004) recommends that the UN be in charge of all regional peace operations,
and recommends that authorisation should always be sought from the UN Security Council (UNSC) for carrying out
all cases of regional peace operations.
Likewise, as seen from the mandate of the APSA already discussed, the AU has also sought to establish itself as
the coordinating and mandating organisation for the continent. Despite all this however, this essay argues that
mediation is a peacemaking process, and one that does not require use of force, which would fall under the UN
Charted, and as such, there is no cause for the UN to coordinate the response on a simple and typical peacemaking
operation. Therefore, while a clear cut working relationship amongst the UN, AU and the RECs is required for
cooperation on peacemaking, the specific RECs should still remain with the highest and ultimate mandate to decide
and determine the scope and manner of mediation efforts on the continent. This being the case, the need for RECs and
member states to step up efforts for financial and technical autonomy remains the concluding emphasis of this essay.
Nathan (2009 cited in ACCORD, 2009) similarly notes that the tension amongst these organisations is unavoidable
owing to the different political perspectives and agendas; however, it is very necessary to improve coordination and
cooperation between these two organisations. (Nathan, 2009 cited in ACCORD, 2009) Nathan further argues for an
agreed procedure for determining which body will be the lead in mediating a certain case, and this should be context
specific rather than a fixed on prescriptive rules and procedures, but rather guided by principles, the overarching
standard being that whenever a REC acts, it is acting on behalf of the AU. (Ibid) Invariably, whichever of these
organisations is deemed best suited to undertake the responsibility of the lead mediator (in any given case) will depend
on the circumstances, the resources available to the organisations, the views of their member states, in some instances,
the parties’ preference for a mediator.” (Ibid)
This essay still argues that the decision to determine whether the UN or the AU should take the lead in any
mediation in the member states in Africa should lie with the relevant REC, in consultation with the member state,
except in cases of serious violation of human rights, and in situations where control is out of the scope of the REC and
the member state, then the AU and the UN should be called upon to exercise their responsibility to protect (R2P). The
call for R2P should however be exercised with caution, and not be done in a rushed and adhoc manner as in the case of
Kenya, where critics still opine that the calls for the involvement of the UN were rushed. This is subjective however,
because where loss of lives is involved, and where there are threats for conflict to cause regional disintegration, the
need for immediate intervention cannot be avoided.
RECs, though established for economic cooperation, now have a big role to play in peace and security matters, and
this role should take precedence as there cannot be economic development without peace. Agreeably, SADC played a
very big role in the peace and security agenda of Africa, by paying a determined role in the mediation process from
2013. However, the economic disparity issues in the SADC region remains worrying, hence the need for RECs to also
establish strategic economic coalitions for peace building, and these should also include a contingency fund for

91
mediation purposes. This is where the AU and the UN come in, for coordination and financial support purposes
respectively. This essay further contends that if a UN funding modality for peace building is established through the
RECs, and co-cordinated by the AU, there will be limited changes for external agenda setting on the part of the UN, as
the AU and RECs will still remain with full mandate for decisions on use of funds for mediation processes on the
continent.
This essay further recommends the need for the AU and the RECs to establish strategic partnerships to respond
expediently to the face of new crisis; and establish medium and long-term conflict prevention and management
processes, and the continental early warning system should also play a leading role in this. (Ibid) In this regard, the
African working group of experts (Govender and Ngandu, 2009) have identified the principle of comparative
advantage as a key element in determining who should take the lead, and the guidelines for considering who has the
comparative advantage was proposed top include: intimate knowledge of the conflict and history, personal relations
with the parties that will ease contact, unity or cohesion of the organisation in relation to the conflict, and acceptance
from disputant parties. Based on Ngandu’s framework, the RECs would obviously have intimate knowledge of the
dynamics of the conflict, so the argument still sustains that while the RECs should lead, the AU and the UN can
provide the much needed support based on their comparative advantage.
Finally, this essay also highlights that while mediation is guided by the need to create and implement peace in the
end, how to achieve this should remain the guiding principle, and always in consideration of the context rather than in a
one size fits all manner. As already noted, self-determination is the fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that
the mediation process rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, unforced agreement. For areas of further
research, this essay concludes with a proposal for a study on the role of a local level early warning system in mediation
processes in the two countries, Kenya and Zimbabwe. This study should include an analysis of the various components
of a local level early warning system, especially drawing to the centre the women, civil society, community level
authorities and other often marginalised groups who in reality are the worst hit by conflict.
6.0 REFERENCES
Abdi, Dekha I. (2008). “Working for Peace in Conflict Systems in Kenya: Addressing the Post-Election Crisis 2008”.
An Interview with Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, Berghof
Handbook Dialogue No. 6
Åberg, Annika Laederach, Sabina, David Lanz, Jonathan Litscher, Mason, Simon J A & Damiano Sguaitamatti
(2008). Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes. Centre for Security Studies: Zurich,
Switzerland.
ACCORD & African Union (2014). African Union Mediation Support Handbook, Revised Edition.
African Union (2002). Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union. Addis Ababa: African Union.
Ahmed, Salman & Brahimi, Lakhdar (2008). In pursuit of Sustainable Peace, The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation.
Centre on International Cooperation: New York.
92
Ancas, Sarah (2011). The Effectiveness of Regional Peacemaking in Southern Africa-Problematising the United
Nations - African Union - Southern African Development Community Relationship.
Aworosegbe, Jeremiah O. (2011). “Reflections on the Challenge of Reconstructing Post-Conflict in West Africa:
Insights from Claude Ake’s Political Writings.” Discussion paper 54, Nordiska Africa Institute, Uppsala, Lightning
Source: UK Ltd.
Badza, Simon (2009). Zimbabwe’s 2008 Harmonizes Elections Regional and International Reaction. In Eldred
Masunungure (ed.), Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe 2008 Elections (pp. 149-175): Weaver Press and
Konrad Adenauer Foundation: Harare.
Bercovitch, Jacob and Houston, Allison. (2000). ‘Why Do They Do It like This? An Analysis of the Factors
Influencing,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol.44, No. 1
Bernd, Brian. (2012). ‘International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias,’ Conflict Management and
Peace Science. Vol.29, No. 4
Borger, J. (2008). ‘Mugabe: African Union calls for national unity government in Zimbabwe,’ The Guardian, 2 July.
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1996). “Introductory Note to an Agenda for Peace.” In Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict
(eds.) United Nations, Divided World: The UN’s Roles in International Relations. 2nd Edition, Oxford: Clarendon.
Bouvier, Virginia M. (2012). Mediation Strategy/Process Design DPA/OAS Gender and Mediation
Training, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations: New York
Brown, Sheryl J. and Shraub, Kimber M. (eds.) (1992) Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era. US
Institute of Peace: Washington DC.
Brookings Institution (2008). “Towards a Lasting Peace: Addressing the Political and Humanitarian Situation in
Kenya.” Seminar Paper Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, March 14, 2008.
Brookings Institution: Washington.
Cheeseman, Nic and Tendi, Blessing-Miles (2010). ‘Power‐sharing in comparative perspective: the dynamics of ‘unity
government’ in Kenya and Zimbabwe.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 48, No. 2
Chitiyo, K and Kibble, S (2014) Zimbabwe’s International Re-engagement. The Long Haul to Recovery: Chatham
House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (1990). Grounded theory method: Procedures, canons, and evaluative
criteria. Qualitative Sociology. Vol.13, No.1.
Cooperrider, David L. (1990). “Positive Image, Positive Action: The Affirmative Basis of Organizing.” In Srivastva,
Suresh and Cooperrider David L (Eds.) Appreciative Management and Leadership: The Power of Positive Thought
and Action (p.29-53) Revised Edition. Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco.
Cooperrider, David L. and Srivastva, Surech (1999). “Appreciative Inquiry in Organizational Life.” In Cooperrider,
Chikane, Frank (2013). The Things That Could Not Be Said: From Aids to Zimbabwe. Picardo Africa: Johannesburg.

93
Chikwanha, Barbara (2007). The Anatomy of Conflicts in the East African Community (EAC): Linking Security with
Development Theme for 2007 - Development Policy and the Security Agenda for Africa, Reassessing the Relationship.
Keynote speech to Development Policy Review Network-African Studies, Institute, Leiden University: The
Netherlands
Farnia, Mary (2014) ‘A Thematic Analysis of Graffiti on the University Classroom Walls – A Case of Iran.’
Department of Foreign Languages and Linguistics, Payame Noor University, Iran. (online) Available:
https://www.academia.edu/6526939/A_Thematic_Analysis_of_Graffiti_on_the_University_Classroom_Walls
Gevisser, Mark (2007). Thabo Mbeki: The dream deferred. Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town.
Godwin, Peter (2010). The Fear: The Last Days of Robert Mugabe. Picardo: London
Glaser, Barney & Strauss, Anselm (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative
Research. Chicago: Aldine.
Govender, Kruschen and Ngandu, Yvette (2009). Towards Enhancing the Capacity of the African Union Mediation. A
report based on a seminar organised by the African Union (AU) Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 15 – 16 October
2009. ACCORD, Durban: South Africa.
Gurr, Ted (2000). Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, United States Institute of Peace Press.
Gwinyayi, Albert Dzinesa (2012). ‘Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Reform Process: Challenges and Prospects,’ Institute
for Justice and Reconciliation: South Africa.
Horowitz, J. (2008). “Power Sharing in Kenya.” Centre for the Study of Civil War PRIC Policy Brief 3/2008.
University of California: San Diego.
Hoste, Jean-Christophe and Anderson, Andrew (2010). Conference Report: Dynamics of Decision Making in Africa.
Leriba Lodge, 8-9 November 2010, Pretoria: South Africa.
IDASA (2008). Negotiations, Democratic Space, and Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections. Research and Advocacy
Unit, and States in Transition Observatory. Institute for Democracy in South Africa: South Africa
Khaled, Mohammed Aman (2008). “Mediation: A Viable Mechanism in Africa’s Political Crisis - A Case
Study of Kenya’s Post-Election Crisis 2008.” Retrieved from
http://www.asiapacificmediationforum.org/resources.pdf
Kleiboer, Marieke (1996). ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation:’ The Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Vol. 40, No. 2
Kniss, Michael (2010). “Walking Kenya Back from the Brink: A Micro-Level Study of Horizontal Inequity and Civil
Conflict Prevention.” CISSM Working Paper. CISSM Maryland School of Public Policy: University of Maryland.
Kressel, Kenneth and Pruitt, Dean G (1985). ‘Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict.’ Journal of Social Issues.
Vol. 41, No. 2
Lakhdar Brahimi & Salman Ahmed (2008). “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation.”
Boulder, CO [etc.]: Rienner

94
Langis, Theresa De (2011). Across Conflict Lines: Women Mediating for Peace 12th Annual Colloquium
Findings. Retrieved from https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/ Report_FINAL.pdf.
Lijphart, Arend (1971). ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.’ (p. 682-693). The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3.
Lindenmayer, Elisabeth & Kaye, Josie Lianna (2009). “A Choice for Peace? The story of Forty-One days of mediation
in Kenya.” International Peace Institute: New York.
Mama, Amina (2000). “Transformation Thwarted: Gender-based Violence in Africa’s New Democracies.” African
Gender Institute Newsletter No. 6. AGI; Cape Town
Mangongera, Charles (2008). The Military Versus Democracy (p.67-77). In Bratton, Michael and Masunungure,
Eldred (2008). ‘Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,’ Journal of Democracy. Vol. 25, No. 24.
Marx, Karl (1976). Capital: a critique of the Political Economy. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Mazurana, Dyan and McKay, Susan (1999). “Women and Peace building.” International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development: Montreal
McGhie, Meredith Preston and Wamai, Njoki E (2011). Uncovering the story of Women's Participation in the Kenya
Mediation Process. Retrieved from http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/New-publication-Uncovering-the-
story.pdf
Mbondenyi, Morris K (2008). “The Curse of Ethnic Belonging: An Analysis of Kenya’s 2007 Post-Elections Conflicts
in the Light of Democracy and Human Rights.” Retrieved from http://works.bepress.com/morris_mbondenyi/8
McKinley, Dominic (2006). ‘Commodifying Oppression: South African Foreign Policy towards Zimbabwe under
Mbeki’ in Roger Southall 9ed0 South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa, Cape Town:
HSRC Press.
Mhango, George Abel (2012). ‘Is Quiet Diplomacy in Consonance with Meaningful Peacemaking in SADC? Lessons
from Zimbabwe,’ Southern African Peace and Security Issues. Vol. 1, No. 1
Mlambo, Alois (2013). ‘Becoming Zimbabwe or Becoming Zimbabwean: Identity, Nationalism and State-building,’
African Spectrum. Vol. 48, No. 1
Mlambo, Alois and Raftopoulos, Brian (2010). ‘Zimbabwe’s Multi-layered Crisis,’ CMI Brief, Vol.9, No.3.
Moyo, Sam (2000). The Political Economy of Land Redistribution in Zimbabwe 1990-1999. Journal of Southern
African Studies. Vol. 26, No.1.
Murithi, Tim (2006). Towards a Symbiotic Partnership: The UN Peace building Commission and the Evolving African
Union/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework. (p.250-251) In Adebajo, Adejoke, A and Scanlon, Helen
(Eds.) A Dialogue of the Death: Essays on Africa and the United Nations. Jacana: Johannesburg.
Murithi, Tim (2010). “Kenya’s Constitutional Renewal: A Post-Referendum Analysis” (online) Available:
http://www.currentanalyst.com/index.php/conflictsregional/136-kenyas-constitutional-renewal-a-post-referendum-
analysis

95
Government of Zimbabwe (2008). The Global Political Agreement.
Mutisi, Martha (2011). ‘Beyond the signature: Appraisal of the Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement (GPA) and
Implications for Intervention.’ Policy and Practice Brief, Knowledge for durable peace. ACCORD: South Africa
Mutisi, Martha (2011). “Countering the Currents.” In Cheldelin, Sandra I. and Eliatamby, Maneshka (Eds.) Women
Waging War and Peace: International Perspectives on Women’s Roles in Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction.
Continuum International Publishing Group: New York, (p. 117 – 138).
Mutisi, Martha (2011). ‘Peace Implementation in the Post-2005 Era: Lessons from Four Peace Agreements in Africa.’
Policy and Practice Brief: Knowledge for Durable Peace, ACCORD.
Nathan, Laurie. (1999). “When push comes to shove: The Failure of International Mediation in African Civil Wars.”
Track Tow, Vol. 8, No. 2.
Nathan, Laurie (2005). “Mediation and the African Union’s Panel of the Wise.” Discussion Paper No. 10. Crisis State
Discussion Papers: London
Nathan, Laurie (2006). “No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement.” CSRC Working Papers. Crisis State
Discussion Papers: London.
Govender, Kruschen and Ngandu, Yvette (2009). “Plan of action to build the African Union’s Mediation Capacity.” A
report based on a seminar organised by the African Union (AU) Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. ACCORD:
South Africa.
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Sabelo J. (2011). Reconstructing the Implications of Liberian Struggle History on SADC Mediation
in Zimbabwe,’ Occasional Paper No. 92, South Africa Institute of International Affairs: South Africa.
NEPAD (2010). African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework. NEPAD Secretariat: Governance Peace and
Security Programme.
Okoth, Godfrey P. (2008). Conflict Resolution in Africa: The role of the OAU & AU. In Nhema, Alfred and
Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe (eds.) The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict
Resolution & Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Oxford: James Currey.
Okumu, Wafula (2008). Can the AU intervene in Zimbabwe? Institute for Security Studies: ISS.
Paffenholz, Thania (2013). ‘International peace building goes local: analysing Lederach’s conflict transformation
theory and its ambivalent encounter with 20 years of practice.” Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies, Centre of Conflict, Development and Peace building (CCDP), Geneva: Switzerland.
Phimister, Ian and Raftopoulos, Brian (2007). ‘Desperate Days in Zimbabwe’ Review of African Political Economy.
Vol. 34, No. 113.
Porto, Joao Gomez (2013). UNECA Study on Mediation and the Architecture of Peace Processes: Best Practices and
Lessons Learned.
Pruitt, Dean G.; Robert, Peirce S.; Neil, McGillicuddy B.; Gary, Welton L and Castrianno, Lynn M (1993). ‘Long-
Term Success in Mediation,’ Law and Human Behaviour,

96
Problematising the United Nations‐African Union-Southern African Development. Community relationship.’
ACCORD: South Africa.
Raftopoulos, Brian (2011). ‘The Global Political Agreement as a ‘Passive Revolution: Notes on Contemporary Politics
in Zimbabwe.’ Solidarity Peace Trust.
Rupiya, Martin (2012). ‘A review of the African Union’s experience in facilitating peaceful power transfers:
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, Libya and Sudan: Are there prospects for reform?’ African Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Vol. 12, No. 12.
SADC (2014). Southern African Development Community: Towards A Common Future.
Sivuyile, Bam (2006). SADC’s Security Architecture: Policy-based Research and Capacity Building. (p.29-32) In
Hendricks, Cheryl From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa Policy Research and Capacity Building
Challenges, ISS Monograph 122, April 2006. Retrieved from https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/122FULL.PDF
Slaughter, Barbara and Nolan, Stuart (2000). Zimbabwe: Referendum defeat for Mugabe shakes ZANU-PF
government. World Socialist Website. Retrieved from https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/02/zimb-f22.html
Steiner, Henry J & Alston, Phillip and Goodman, Ryan (1996) International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics,
Morals. Third Edition, Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Stedman, Stephen John (1991). Peacemaking in the Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980.
Boulder, Lynne Rienner: Colorado
Strauss, Anselm & Corbin, Juliet (1994). "Grounded Theory Methodology." In Denzin, Norma K. and
Lincoln, Yvonne S. (Eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Triche, Ryan (2014). Pastoral conflict in Kenya: Transforming mimetic violence to mimetic blessings between Turkana
and Pokot communities. African Journals Online: Vol.14, No.2.
United Nations (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.
United Nations (2009a). Report of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities,
UN doc: S/2009/189, 8 April.
UN Women (2014). Zimbabwean Women in Conflict Transformation and Peace Building: Past Experiences and
Future Opportunities. UN Women: Zimbabwe
Van Onselen, Charles (1976). Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933. London: Pluto Press
World Bank Report (2014). Retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org
Wanjiku, Rebecca (2010). ‘Kenyan bloggers outline political solutions.’ Retrieved from http://globalvoicesonline.org
Zartman, William I. (1996). ‘Bargaining and Conflict Resolution’ in Kolodziej, Edward A. and KANET, Roger E (eds.)
Coping with Conflict after the cold War. Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore
Zartman, William (1989). Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa New York: Oxford University Press.
Zartman, William I. (2001). ‘The Timing of Peace Initiative: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe moments,’ The Global
Review of Ethno politics. The Global Review of Ethno-politics. Vol.1, No.1.

97
98