Chinese Hegemony

Security Studies
ISSN: 0963-6412 (Print) 1556-1852 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsst20
States, Nations, and Territorial Stability:

Why Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for
International Order
Ryan D. Griffiths
To cite this article: Ryan D. Griffiths (2016) States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why
Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order, Security Studies, 25:3, 519-545,
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628
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Download by: [La Trobe University] Date: 09 July 2016, At: 04:29
Security Studies, 25:519–545, 2016
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0963-6412 print / 1556-1852 online
DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2016.1195628
States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why

Chinese Hegemony Would Be Better for
International Order
RYAN D. GRIFFITHS
Downloaded by [La Trobe University] at 04:29 09 July 2016
How would a hegemonic China shape international norms related

to states, nations, and territoriality? Scholars have noted the con-
flict between the right of minority nations to self-determine and
the right of states to maintain their territorial integrity. An un-
restricted application of the former would risk considerable state
fragmentation; an unconditional acceptance of the latter would
condemn stateless nations to a subordinate status. Powerful actors
like the United States have attempted to navigate these norms by
specifying the conditions under which one norm should take prece-
dence over the other, but such decisions are difficult to make in
an international environment that lacks consensus, and the result
is an ambiguous international order where conflict is common. I
analyze the future of these norms in a Chinese-led international
order, explaining why China would champion territorial integrity
over self-determination, and why this would be better for territorial
stability.
The Crimean Declaration of Independence on 11 March 2014 brought into fo-

cus a critical normative tension in international politics: the conflict between
the right of sovereign states to maintain their territorial integrity and the
right of minority nations to determine their political fate. Although Barack
Obama and many other Western leaders defended Ukraine’s sovereignty,
Vladimir Putin supported the Crimean declaration by invoking the princi-
ple of self-determination and referencing the Kosovo precedent, in which
Ryan D. Griffiths is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International

Relations at the University of Sydney. He can be reached at ryan.griffiths@sydney.edu.au.
519
520 R. D. Griffiths
the United States supported Kosovar independence at the expense of Ser-

bian sovereignty. While Putin’s true motivations and convictions are open
to debate, his deft highlighting of Western hypocrisy was made possi-
ble on account of the gray area created by two competing normative
traditions—sovereignty and liberalism—and the fact that the most power-
ful country over the last seventy years has tried to have it both ways. I
argue that despite what are often good intentions, the United States has cre-
ated an international order that attempts, but ultimately fails, to balance the
tension between sovereignty and liberalism, and that of state and nation. I
further contend that a different power or hegemon—and specifically a Chi-
nese hegemon—would advance a different interpretation of these norms and
generate an international order in which the type of conflict we are currently
observing in Ukraine became less common.1
The rise of China has produced an extensive literature in political sci-
ence.2 Some theorists expect that its rise will resemble the violent ascendance
of earlier states like imperial Germany.3 This skeptical view led the Economist
to ask, somewhat facetiously, “[w]hy are there so few takers outside China
for its self-proclaimed doctrine of ‘peaceful rise?’”4 Others expect that China
will choose to rise within the system rather than overturn it.5 More targeted
analyses focus on specific norms related to climate change, financial regu-
lation, or intervention.6 Taken as a whole, these questions are elements of
1 I employ Robert Gilpin’s definition that a hegemon is a state that has a preponderance of power
in the international system. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981).
2 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2007); Gary J. Schmitt, ed., The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition (New York:
Encounter Books, 2009); Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang, eds., Power and Restraint: A Shared
Vision for the U.S.–China Relationship (New York: Public Affairs, 2009); Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M.
Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security
35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 7–44; Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the
Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011); Cheng-Yi Lin and Denny Roy, eds., The
Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Michael
Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter
2011/12): 41–78; Biwu Zhang, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.: An Exploration of China’s Foreign Policy
Motivations (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012); Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is
China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7–48; Avery Goldstein, “First
Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.–China Relations,” International Security
37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 49–89; Nuno P. Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
3 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Political Thought, Modern
Chinese Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why
Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 9–40; and Hugh White,
The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4 “China and its Region: The Great Game in Asia,” Economist, 29 March 2007.
5 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

6 See, for example, Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

States, Nations, and Territorial Stability 521
one of the most important debates of modern times: how will international
order be affected by Chinese ascendance?
I enter into this debate by taking a novel approach emphasizing two
related norms: territorial integrity, which advances the principle that political
borders should be preserved; and self-determination, which upholds the
right of stateless nations to govern themselves. Both norms have been a
common feature of international life since the mid-20th century, and I argue
that they have had consequences on the frequency of conquest, state birth,
and the number of states in the international system. But critically, there is
a tension between the two norms, and the result is a world where both
matter but neither is fully consolidated. After all, an exclusive emphasis on
self-determination would open the door to considerable state fragmentation;
an unconditional support for territorial integrity would condemn minority
nations to a subordinate status. It is in the collision between these two
norms, and the larger normative traditions of sovereignty and liberalism, that
great powers can influence geopolitics by effectively putting their thumb on
the scale and shifting the balance toward either states or nations.
In this paper I forecast what certain features of international politics
would look like in a time of Chinese hegemony. In making this move I
elide complex questions about China’s continued rise, like whether that
rise is sustainable, whether other actors will prevent it, or what sort of
balance of power configuration we should expect. The utility in this ap-
proach is that I can identify China’s current preferences on these norms,
examine whether they ought to change, and project them into an imag-
ined future where China has maximum potential to influence world poli-
tics. This permits me to outline an archetype of Chinese-led international
order.
I argue that in a time of Chinese hegemony the long arc of history
should bend back toward an emphasis on state sovereignty, and in many
ways the future would resemble the past. Yet the current interpretation of
sovereignty has changed from that of previous times in one crucial way:
state borders are respected and conquest is taboo. As such, I argue that
borders should be even more stable under Chinese hegemony, and this
conservative emphasis on the existing territorial grid should be supported
by other rising powers like India. In that regard, Chinese hegemony would
truly be better for international order. However, this Pax Sinica would come
at a price, for set against that increased border stability is a decreased support
for self-determination, a likely prohibition on unilateral secession, and a less
accommodating world where the rights of minority nations are concerned.
The remainder of the paper follows a temporal structure. First, I begin
in medias res by describing the international order that has existed since
1945. I provide a background to the norms of territorial integrity and self-
determination, discuss their relationship to the international power structure,
522 R. D. Griffiths
and highlight their effects on international politics. Second, I turn to past in-
ternational orders to examine how these norms developed, and locate them
within two different and often competing normative traditions: sovereignty
and liberalism. I show how past international orders balanced these norma-
tive traditions, and specify the character of these orders with respect to the
frequency of conquest and state birth, as well as the trend in the number
of sovereign states. Third, I go forward in time to outline a Chinese-led in-
ternational order. I examine China’s strategic interests and political rhetoric
with respect to these two norms and argue that China is likely to favor ter-
ritorial integrity over the right of minority nations to self-determine. I then
specify the similarities and differences between the contemporary interna-
tional order, the orders of the past, and a potential Chinese-led order in
the future, arguing that Chinese hegemony would be better for territorial
stability. I conclude with a discussion of broader implications and potential
counterarguments.
THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER SINCE 1945
International order is a slippery concept that is used by scholars in a variety

of ways.7 In this paper, I am primarily concerned with the character and
rules of the game for a given international order. More specifically, I am
interested in how sovereignty and liberal norms can shape state behavior
and produce substantive patterns with respect to the rules governing state
recognition, the frequency of state conquest and state birth, and the overall
trend in the number of states. These are core characteristics of any interna-
tional order. They are, of course, intimately connected to the structure of
international order—the distribution of power among states—but I use this
structural understanding as background. Rather than rehash debates about
what constitutes hegemony, or where we should draw the line between
unipolarity and multipolarity, I proceed from the assumption that strong
7 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,
1979); Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ikenberry, After Victory; Mikulas Fabry, Recognizing
States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010); Erik Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the West-
phalian Order,” International Organization 66, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–26; David C. Kang, East Asia
Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Bear
F. Braumoeller, The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Monteiro, Theory of Unipolar Politics; Henry Kissinger,
World Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).
states, and hegemonic states in particular, are in a better position than weak
states to shape the character of international order.8
Two norms have been key characteristics of the post-1945 American-led
international order.9 The first is the norm of territorial integrity, which holds
that states should have the right to preserve their borders. Although the
norm has been discussed since at least the French Revolution and featured
in some of the ideological imaginings of Woodrow Wilson, it was not until
after 1945 that it acquired powerful support and became a core principle
of the United Nations.10 The UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”11
The propagation of the borders norm has helped stabilize international
relations by effectively delegitimizing territorial conquest.12 Unlike earlier pe-
riods when conquest was common, the post-1945 period saw the conquest
of only two states: South Vietnam in 1975, and Kuwait in 1990.13 The inter-
national denunciation of the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, and resulting effort
to restore the state, is a testament to the strength of the norm.14 Boaz Atzilli
defines the norm as a “prohibition by most states, and by the international
community in general, of foreign conquest and annexation of homeland
territory, regardless of any internal or external conditions.”15 Overall, the in-
ternational community generally considers territorial predation to be illegal,
a radically different outlook from the type of behavior that predominated in
earlier times, when states commonly conquered and annexed territory.
The second norm, self-determination, upholds the right of a nation to
control its political destiny. Theoretically, the norm is meant to apply to all
8 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); David A.
Baldwin, Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is
the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 52–67.
9 When discussing norms I adopt the following definition: norms are a “standard of appropriate
behavior for actors with a given identity.” Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink, “International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–917. Quote
is from 891. Also see John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York:
Basic Books, 1989); Thomas Risse, Steven C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights:
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics; Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of
Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
10 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annex-
ation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

11 Charter of the United Nations.
12 Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,”
International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 215–50; Fazal, State Death; Boaz Atzili, Good Fences,
Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
13 Fazal, State Death, 23.
14 Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change.
15 Atzili, Good Fences, Bad Neighbors, 16. Atzilli prefers the term “border fixity norm.”
524 R. D. Griffiths
FIGURE 1 Sovereign States and Independence Movements (1816–2011)16

nations, however defined, but it is particularly relevant to minority nations

within larger countries. The norm is traced to 18th century Enlightenment
thinkers, but its modern variant is typically credited to Woodrow Wilson,
who posited that “all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the
utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them.”17 Wilson did not coin the
term self-determination, nor was he the first public figure to use it, but his
stature at the end of World War I helped draw significant attention to it.
As Erez Manela writes, the “Wilsonian Moment” stirred nationalist ambitions
around the world.18
A consequence of the self-determination norm was an unprecedented
wave of independence movements.19 Although such movements were rare
in the years before World War I, there was a wave of secessionism at the
war’s end (see Figure 1). Indeed, the influential role of the norm is apparent
in the rhetoric of these movements. Efforts since that time have typically
16 State data taken from Ryan D. Griffiths and Charles R. Butcher, “Introducing the International
System(s) Dataset (ISD), 1816–2011,” International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in
International Relations 39, no. 5 (2013): 748–68. Data on independence movements is taken from Ryan D.
Griffiths, “Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist
Outcomes” International Organization 69, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 731–51. An independence movement
is defined as an identifiable nation that possesses a flag, declares independence, lasts at least one week,
includes at least 100 people, and claims a territory encompassing at least 100 square kilometers.
17 Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and Self-Determination (London: Collins, 1969), 37. On the
history of self-determination, see Eric D. Weitz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea
Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” American Historical Review 120, no. 2
(April 2015): 462–96.
18 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-
colonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

19 Tanisha M. Fazal and Ryan D. Griffiths, “Membership Has its Privileges: The Changing Benefits of
Statehood,” International Studies Review 16, no. 1 (March 2014): 79–106.

referenced self-determination in their declarations of independence.20 There

were a number of nations that sought independence in the 19th century, but
they made their bid before the full introduction of the norm—at least in its
current manifestation (more on this below)—and therefore lacked the vo-
cabulary and basic template of secession that descendant groups possessed.
But despite the principles behind the norm, few states were willing to honor
demands for self-determination, and Wilson’s political defeat in 1920, along
with the American retreat into isolationism, muted the norm’s greatest advo-
cate. Consequently, the majority of demands were denied and the wave of
nationalist imaginings yielded to disappointment and conflict.21
The reemergence, however, of the United States during World War II
and subsequent establishment of the United Nations helped fortify the norm.
A priority in the UN Charter is “to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal

peace.”22 This strengthened the norm and one result was an unprecedented
wave of state birth where the number of sovereign states more than tripled
in the post-1945 era from sixty-four to over 192.23
It is when we examine the relationship between the two norms that
we obtain a more nuanced understanding of the tension between state and
nation. Self-determination has encouraged minority nations to seek inde-
pendence, and the principle of territorial integrity has both enabled and
thwarted them in their efforts. The enabling effect is that post-independence
security concerns no longer act as a deterrent to obtaining independence.24
Leaders may choose other forms of political association—such as local
autonomy—for a variety of reasons, but the fear of invasion and forced
accession is not one of them. James D. Fearon argues that the territorial in-
tegrity norm has functioned like an arms control agreement.25 This contrasts
with earlier times when leaders like Thomas Masaryk argued for increased
Czech autonomy instead of full independence by saying: “We want a federal
Austria. We cannot be independent outside of Austria, next to a power-
ful Germany with Germans on our territory.”26 These norms have effects
at the system level, and systemic changes that make conquest rare, and
by extension raise the odds of state survival, ought to increase the rate of
secessionism.
20 David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2007); Manela, The Wilsonian Moment.
21 Ibid.
22 Charter of the United Nations.
23 Ryan D. Griffiths, Age of Secession: The International and Domestic Determinants of State Birth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

24 Fazal and Griffiths, “Membership Has its Privileges.”
25 James D. Fearon, “Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order,” Security Studies 13, no. 4
(October–December 2004): 394–415, esp. 9.

26 Ezra Stern, Opinions of T. G. Masaryk (Prague, 1918), 60.
526 R. D. Griffiths
The negative consequence of territorial integrity is that while it has made

the international system less perilous and more attractive to independence
movements, it has simultaneously made sovereignty more difficult to obtain.
A consequence of the norm is that the community of states has worked to
preserve political boundaries, and that presents an obstacle to secessionists
who wish to alter them. Jeffrey Herbst argues that “state boundaries have
been singularly successful in their primary function: preserving the territorial
integrity of the state by preventing significant territorial competition and
delegitimizing the norm of self-determination.”27
I contend that neither territorial integrity nor self-determination has been
completely consolidated (that is, the relevant actors have not become fully
socialized to them) because the two norms contradict one another. An un-
restricted acceptance of self-determination would undermine the territorial
integrity norm because minority nations would be free to secede against the
wishes of the state. Conversely, full commitment to maintaining the existing

territorial grid would invalidate the right of secession for aspiring nations. It
is on account of this tension that the post-1945 international order has per-
mitted a measure of discretion when arbitrating between the right of states
and that of nations. But that discretion prevents the full internationalization
of either norm since actors are expected to balance the merits of both in any
given situation. Their application is conditional—should the state be privi-
leged or the nation? That conditionality prevents the consolidation of either
norm since their application often depends on a choice of the best solution
for a specific instance.
Recent events in Kosovo and Ukraine highlight the contest between self-
determination and territorial integrity, as well as the potential for accusations
of hypocrisy. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 against the wishes of
Serbia, and 108 countries, including the United States, have recognized it as
a sovereign state.28 Kosovo’s success in garnering international support is
regarded by many as a victory for self-determination, and by some as the
closest we have come to recognizing a remedial right to secession in the face
of human rights abuses by the larger state. In regard to the American recog-
nition of Kosovo, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated: “The unusual
combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation—including the context
of Yugoslavia’s breakup, the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against
civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN administration—are not
found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot
be seen as a precedent for any other situation in the world today.”29 Although
27Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 253.
28 Daniel H. Meester, “Remedial Secession: A Positive or Negative Force for the Prevention and
Reduction of Armed Conflict?” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18, no. 2 (2012): 151–63.
29 Condoleeza Rice, “U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State,” 18 February 2008, http:
//2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm.
the United States chose to call Kosovo a special case and not one that should
set a precedent, it at the least specified conditions under which territorial in-
tegrity should be subordinated to self-determination. In a recent execution of
normative judo, Vladimir Putin invoked the Kosovo precedent and pointed
to western hypocrisy when he supported Crimean self-determination at the
expense of Ukrainian sovereignty.30 The Ukrainian crisis is still playing out,
and it is too early to determine its effects on the strength of the two norms,
but that crisis demonstrates how the ebb and flow of the normative contest
with its resulting ambiguity and potential for hypocrisy can provide rhetorical
ammunition for political actors.31
The product of this normative tension is an international order char-
acterized by a semicontrolled proliferation of states. The international legal
community has attempted to balance the norms by specifying the conditions
where minority nations have the right to independence. The right holds when
the central government gives its consent and thus removes the home state
veto.32 The right holds in instances of decolonization, but this was always a
controlled process limited to overseas administrative units.33 The right holds
for nations of dissolved states like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, but these
are ex post determinations that in any case were not applied to all nations
(for example, Chechnya and Tatarstan). Finally, as we saw with Kosovo,
the right can hold under somewhat ill-defined circumstances when powerful
states conclude that there is cause to recognize the breakaway region. The
end result is an evolving and fuzzy set of criteria for admission to the club of
sovereign states. The gate is not wide enough to admit all claimants nor suffi-
ciently defined to cleanly sort out those who qualify from those who do not.34
30 On Russia’s view of the Kosovar case see James Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter
Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 24.
31 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1999).
32 Pål Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research
43, no. 6 (November 2006): 723–740.

33 The application of self-determination to colonized peoples was subject to the so-called “saltwater
test” and governed by the principle of uti possedetis (as you possess), and therefore limited to first order
overseas administrative units. See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations,
and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Malcom N. Shaw, “The Heritage
of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today,” British Yearbook of International Law 67 (1996):
75–154; Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States,” Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 94, no. 4 (October 1996): 590–624; Tomáš Bartoš, “Uti Possidetis. Quo
Vadis?” Australian Yearbook of International Law 18 (1997): 37–96; and Fabry, Recognizing States. Jack-
son estimates that the legal emphasis on administrative boundaries reduced the number of acceptable
independence claims in Africa from 400–500 to 40–50. Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decol-
onization: Normative Change in International Relations,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein and O. Robert Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1993), 122.
34 Øyvind Østerud, “The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States,” Review of International
Studies 23, no. 2 (April 1997): 167–84; Fazal and Griffiths, “Membership Has its Privileges.”
528 R. D. Griffiths
Although the postwar effort to balance these norms is born from good
intentions, the promotion of both has created an ambiguity and fuzziness
around the path to statehood. Jonathan Paquin effectively argues that the
United States balances the trade-off between territorial integrity and self-
determination by choosing the path that promotes the greatest regional se-
curity.35 Typically, as with Kosovo, it defends the territorial integrity of the
state in question until a point is reached where security would be greater
if it switched sides and supported the self-determination movement. It then
defends that switch with various liberal arguments and the assertion that
the case in question is sui generis, or part of a dissolved state, and not a
precedent-setting event. Unfortunately, this response to secessionism yields
unintended consequences insofar as it shapes the behavior of secessionist
movements. First, aspiring nations now have incentive to create regional in-
stability.36 Second, a perception endures from Kurdistan to Somaliland that
nations can secede if they hold out long enough.37 Research indicates that
secessionist leaders are typically well-informed, perceiving the international
recognition regime as somewhat flexible and potentially accommodating of
their demands.38 After all, powerful international supporters can apply pres-
sure on the central government to remove its home state veto, as Khartoum
did with South Sudan, or treat the instance as sui generis, as with Kosovo, and
simply recognize the breakaway region against the wishes of the sovereign.
In sum, the international order since 1945 has been characterized by
semicontrolled state proliferation, where there are three defining features.
First, states have proliferated, a reversal of the trend toward state aggrega-
tion that characterized earlier periods (see Figure 1). Second, independence
movements have also proliferated. Minority nations have responded to the
international climate by seeking independence, and new secessionist move-
ments have continued to rise and replace those who have seceded. Third,
nations sometimes secede even in the absence of sovereign consent, and
thus state proliferation is only partly controlled. David Armitage refers to
these processes as a “contagion of sovereignty,” exemplified by a prolifer-
ation of states, an increased number of independence movements, and an
attempt by existing states to limit secession.39
35 Jonathan Paquin, A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

36 Alan J. Kuperman, “The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,”
International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (March 2008): 49–80.

37 On Kurdistan, see Dexter Filkins, “The Fight of Their Lives: ISIS, Iraq, and the Kurds’ Big Oppor-
tunity,” New Yorker, 29 September 2014. On Somaliland, see “Separatism in Africa: Why Can’t We Do It
Peacefully?” Economist, 27 September 2014.
39 David Armitage, “Secession and Civil War,” in Secession as an International Phenomenon: From
America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements, ed. Don Doyle (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 2010), 49.
NORMATIVE CHANGE AND PAST INTERNATIONAL ORDERS
Before turning to a discussion of China it is useful to frame territorial in-

tegrity and self-determination within their larger normative traditions and
review how international order has changed over the preceding centuries.
Wayne Sandholtz and Kendall Stiles argue that international norms should
be treated as continuously evolving phenomena, and that norms scholars
should focus more on process than on outcomes.40 They argue that such
norms develop through a dialectic process in relation to argumentation,
power, specific events, and other contradictory norms. They further contend
that international norms generally flow from one of two traditions: liberal
norms that stress the rights of individuals, and sovereignty norms that em-
phasize the state. It is in the normative contest between these two traditions
that norms emphasizing human rights (for example, humanitarian interven-
tion, antigenocide, and the responsibility to protect citizens) conflict with the
right of sovereign states to manage their own affairs.
Of the many friction points at the intersection of these two traditions,
the tension between territorial integrity and self-determination is one of the
most salient. After all, both norms represent powerful and persuasive ideas.
Territorial integrity is meant to protect the sovereignty of states, chiefly by
prohibiting territorial aggression, and laterally by preventing fragmentation.
Self-determination encapsulates positive and negative rights for stateless na-
tions, and the liberal orientation is evident in ethical arguments for secession.
Choice theories (primary rights) stress the right of human beings or groups
of human beings to secede from the larger state, if they wish, according to a
democratic process.41 Meanwhile, just cause theories (remedial rights) posit
that groups have a right to secede when the state fails to uphold the social
contract by not providing an acceptable level of order and security.42
Importantly, there is no automatic or necessary contradiction between
the two norms. It depends on the territorial status of the nation invoking
the right to self-determine. Here we can outline three basic configurations
of the relationship between nation and state. The first is where the nation
possesses its own state—in Gellner’s terms the two are congruent—and there
40 Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change. For a similar argument see J.
Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty
in International Relations,” International Organization 48, no.1 (Winter 1994): 107–30.
41 Harry Beran, “A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World Order,” in
Theories of Secession, ed. Percy B. Lehning (New York: Routledge, 1998); Christopher Heath Wellman,
A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
42 Wayne Norman, “The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics,” in National
Self-Determination and Secession, ed. Margaret Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Allen
Buchanan, “The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say,” in States, Nations, and
Borders: The Ethics of Making Borders, ed. Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (Cambridge: Cambridge
530 R. D. Griffiths
is no conflict between territorial integrity and self-determination.43 It is in

such cases that one can refer to the self-determination of states. The second
configuration is where a nation encompasses or overlaps several states, and
may seek to unify them and make them congruent with the nation, as the
German and Italian nations did in the latter 1800s. There is a potential
normative conflict here depending on the degree to which the unification
is voluntary. If a state is involuntarily absorbed in a unifying set of states, it
could claim that its territorial integrity was violated. The third configuration
is where a minority nation is tucked inside a state. This is a more common
scenario given that the number of nations exceeds the number of states; it is
here that self-determination often comes into conflict with territorial integrity
because a minority nation demands independence and the state denies it.44
The Sandholtz and Stiles model is useful when analyzing the conflict
between sovereignty and liberalism in general, and territorial integrity and
self-determination in particular. They use a cycle model to explain normative

change as a dynamic process. The international rules and norms that exist
at any point in time are best viewed as a frame within a motion picture.45
Change occurs on account of gaps between rules and actions, which even-
tually lead to disputes. Often arising on account of war, or major political or
technological changes, these disputes are resolved through argumentation,
leading to a new or modified set of rules and norms, completing the cycle.
What determines who prevails in a given dispute? Sandholtz and Stiles
argue that the most persuasive actors are typically the powerful, especially
when they have a strong diplomatic and media presence, and those who can
successfully appeal to existing normative traditions and reference historical
precedents. The model implies that we should expect to see change occur-
ring after major events, led by powerful actors who appeal to precedent and
normative tradition, with the dominant traditions in international life being
sovereignty and liberalism. Norms are not simply epiphenomenal to power;
actors need to prevail in the contest of ideas.
This is the theoretical model I use to examine normative change and
contemplate what the future might like under Chinese hegemony. It is
pitched at a high level of generality, one fitting the subject matter, but it is
quite useful in understanding the historical ebb and flow of sovereignty and
liberalism. For example, the 2011 intervention in Libya showed how the invo-
cation of the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm could be used to overrule
the right of states to manage their internal affairs. But the subsequent failure
to stop the bloodshed in Syria showed the limits of the liberal norm when
opposed by a state with strong supporters (Russia and China). Sandholtz
and Stiles argue that power is a major determinant of normative change. The
43 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
44 Ibid., 45.
45 Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change, 2.
chief architect of the post-1945 normative order has been the United States.
It helped bolster both the territorial integrity and self-determination norms
and see them codified in the UN Charter, and it did so for both ideological
and strategic reasons.46 According to Sandholtz and Stiles, such motivations
typically drive the currents upon which sovereign and liberal norms rise and
fall.
Comparative International Orders

If we open our historical lens to the widest aperture we can discern broad
patterns in the contest between sovereign and liberal norms, and the conse-
quences of that clash for states and nations. Several periods emerge. The first
is the pre-1815 era centered in Europe but gradually influencing the globe.
In this period sovereign norms were dominant and the liberal tradition was
only beginning to be felt, most notably in the American and French Revolu-
tions. But the norm of territorial integrity was not a factor in international life
and, indeed, conquest was a common occurrence in interstate relations. The
principle of self-determination was essentially absent, and when breakaway
movements did arise, common diplomatic practice was to actually support
the monarch from which the upstart region was attempting to secede. In that
regard monarchs generally supported other monarchs, and during this time
the right of states may as well be called the right of monarchs. Finally, as
I discuss below, this was a period in which the number of sovereign states
decreased.
The second period, the age of de facto statehood, covered roughly
the 100 years from the Congress of Vienna until the end of World War I.
The major development was the rise of an early vision of the norm of self-
determination. As Mikulas Fabry recounts, self-determination came to be
regarded as a negative right, in which aspiring nations should be free to
pursue their goals without outside interference.47 Beginning with the Latin
American independence movements in the early 19th century, the UK and
United States led the development of a diplomatic practice in which third
parties should remain neutral and only recognize independence efforts once
the secessionists could show command of the field and demonstrate a work-
ing government. Anglo-American diplomats such as Lord Castlereigh, George
Canning, and John Quincy Adams argued that the sovereign right of monar-
chs to maintain their territory was invalidated once a breakaway nation could
prevail and establish de facto statehood as a self-determined fact. The ap-
proach flowed both from a position of principle—these leaders seemed to
46 Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm”; Fazal, State Death; Atzilli, Good Fences, Bad Neighbors.
47 Fabry, Recognizing States, 10. For a similar discussion see Jackson, Quasi-States.
532 R. D. Griffiths
truly believe in the value of self-determination—and a calculation of strat-

egy: their chief antagonists were the conservative monarchies of continental
Europe who sought to maintain the traditional monarchical order.
In the aggregate, these two periods had similar effects with respect to
the frequency of conquest, state birth, and the overall number of sovereign
states. A chief reason for this similarity is the absence of a norm that prohib-
ited conquest. Conquest was common, and that fact alone no doubt served
as a deterrent of sorts for potential secessionists. Furthermore, to secede a
nation had to prevail over their sovereign; this was no easy task. Taken
together, these factors effectively filtered potential and actual secessionists.
The end result was an international order where state death exceeded state
birth and where the number of states declined. This trend is visible in
Figure 1, particularly in the latter 1800s, but it appears to have extended
back into history for some time. For example, Charles Tilly notes that from
five hundred European states in 1500, the number decreased to twenty-five

by the early 1900s.48 The overall trend in these periods was toward state
aggregation.49
The Wilsonian moment following World War I marked the transition
of self-determination from a negative to a positive right.50 If previously the
principle held that a people had the right to win their sovereignty free of
outside intervention, Wilson’s contribution was to place an obligation on
the international community to assist in these efforts.51 The challenge in that
move was to identify who counts, a problem that was sidestepped in the
time of de facto statehood by pinning recognition to the success of the break-
away nation. Thus was born an international regime based on constitutive
recognition—that is, awarding independence based on agreed-upon criteria
for what groups qualified, regardless of their ability to prevail over their
sovereign. The difficulty in that approach is agreeing on who should count,
and the concern is that a lack of agreement will encourage fragmentation.
Robert Lansing, Wilson’s secretary of state, identified this problem when he
said, “[w]hen the President talks of self-determination what unit has he in
mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community? Without a
48 Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State Making,” in The Formation of National
States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975). For similar
estimates on Europe and Southeast Asia, see Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global
Context, c. 800-1830, vol. 1: Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
49 Western notions regarding the standard of civilization and what constituted a state facilitated the
expansion of European states. Where such standards were thought to be lacking, diplomats were able
to justify territorial acquisition by claiming that the land in question was terra nullius. Some modern
secessionist movements, such as the Republic of Murrawarri (in Australia), have based their demand for
independence on the misuse and unjust application of terra nullius, pointing out that the British and
Australian governments never had a proper legal claim to their land.
50 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment.
51 Fabry, Recognizing States.
definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to

peace and stability.”52
The age of constitutive statehood can be divided in two. The first period
was essentially the interwar years, a turbulent time for states and nations.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, there was a significant spike in secessionism at
the end of World War I. But as Manela notes, most of these efforts were
disappointed in an international system that was unprepared to satisfy the
full implications of self-determination.53 Aside from a number of states that
emerged from the wreckage of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, most
aspiring nations went unrecognized. Meanwhile, the norm of territorial in-
tegrity was absent and conquest remained a reality. As such, state death
occurred alongside an increased rate of state birth, and the trend in the
number of states during this brief and uncertain time was rather flat—an
initial increase after World War I, followed by a fifteen-year plateau, and
then a decline with the advent of World War II.

Two key differences distinguished that interwar period from the years
that followed. First, territorial integrity became entrenched in the UN Charter
and, at long last, conquest was largely converted into a taboo. This alone
would reduce the rate of state death. Second, the international recognition
regime changed, not in theory, but in process. It held onto the notion that
self-determination is a positive right, but, as we saw before, it began to
develop criteria for who should count. That filtering process found an ally
in the territorial integrity norm, which could now be leveled just as easily
at internal opponents as it could external. This application of the norm is
commonly used by sovereign states to prevent fragmentation.54 There were
approximately fifty-five formal independence movements in 2011 (see Figure
1) and, of course, Ernest Gellner famously estimated that the ratio of potential
to actual nationalist movements is ten to one.55 The main obstacle to these
actual and potential ambitions is the club of sovereign states, who naturally
appeal to territorial integrity in an effort at containment. The result has been
an international system in which secessionism is common and only partly
controlled, where conquest is rare, and where states have proliferated.
In his historical analysis of international order, Fabry argues provoca-
tively that the international community would be better off if it returned to the
practice of de facto recognition.56 He contends that “de facto statehood has
proved to be the only viable international standard when there is no agree-
ment among the relevant parties on who, and by what self-determination
procedure, can become a state—which has been the case for the majority of
52 “Self-Determination.” Saturday Evening Post, 9 April 1921, 7.

53 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment.
54 Herbst, States and Power in Africa.
55 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 45.
534 R. D. Griffiths
time in the last 200 years.”57 One of the chief virtues of this approach is that it
typically filters unfit states. In contrast, the constitutive process of recognition
can produce weak and semiviable states, and deny recognition to de facto
states like Somaliland even though their larger states have collapsed. Fabry
recognizes the weaknesses of a de facto system: there can still be disagree-
ment over what constitutes a de facto state, intervention may still occur, and
the application of rules can be stretched by powerful international actors.
But on balance, it makes for a better system because it provides clearer rules
for both states and aspiring nations, lowers fears over domino effects, and
reduces state failure by subjecting new states to a fitness test. Such a system
may encourage secessionists to take the field against their government when
they expect victory, but such cases ought to be limited mostly to instances
of weak statehood. Meanwhile, weak movements in stronger states are more
likely to demur when international support is unlikely.
The preceding discussion highlights the strengths and weaknesses of

a given international order with respect to states and nations. The current
order occupies a locus between the sovereign and liberal traditions, and the
norms of territorial integrity and self-determination are key characteristics of
that order. But such orders can change as one normative tradition rises in
relation to the other, and as the underlying structure of power changes. What
should we expect in a future where China is the dominant power and how
would that future be different from the current order and orders of the past?
INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN A TIME OF CHINESE HEGEMONY
The rise of China has generated a veritable cottage industry of articles and
books, and portents and predictions. Will China be content with current
international order, or, like many past rising states, aim to revise it? My anal-
ysis is guided by the Sandholtz and Stiles cycle model.58 International rule
structures are built on power and the appeal to precedent and normative tra-
dition. In imagining a future where China is hegemonic I have sidestepped
questions about what disputes may occur along the way, but I can spec-
ulate on how a preeminent China would influence the normative order. I
argue that it will aim to modify the international order but, importantly, it
will not attempt to redraw borders. It will not be revisionist in a territorial
sense. I arrive at this conclusion by examining its current preferences with
respect to self-determination and territorial integrity, and I contend that these
preferences should endure in a time of Chinese hegemony.
With respect to self-determination, Chinese policy has shown a more
limited support for minority nations. China recognizes secession when it is
57 Ibid., 219.
consensual, but when the national government in a secessionist crisis denies

the aspiring group, China argues that sovereignty should be respected and
that the outcome of the struggle should be resolved internally, without inter-
ference from the international community.59 Following Kosovo’s declaration
of independence, Liu Jianchao, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, commented:
China always believes that a plan acceptable to both Serbia and Kosovo
through negotiations is the best way to resolve this issue. The unilateral
move taken by Kosovo will lead to a series of consequences. China is
deeply worried about its severe and negative impact on peace and stabil-
ity of the Balkan region and the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic society
in Kosovo. China calls upon Serbia and Kosovo to continue negotiations
for a proper resolution within the framework of the international law and
work together to safeguard peace and stability of the Balkan region.60
China criticized the United States for recognizing Kosovo and pointed out
the danger of precedent setting. Furthermore, China took a similar position
on the recent secession of South Sudan; recognition required a formally
consensual divorce from greater Sudan.
China’s more austere interpretation of self-determination is motivated, in
part, by its domestic concerns over fragmentation. Complete acceptance of
self-determination presents a problem for multinational states. China recog-
nizes the rights of stateless nations in the limited sense that they should have
greater autonomy. And since 1958 China has recognized five autonomous
regions: Ningxia, Tibet, Guangxi, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. The state,
however, draws a line with respect to full independence. Despite the pe-
riodic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang and the international criticism China
has received in its handling of those affairs, and despite the potential war
that could arise over the Taiwan question, China adamantly defines these
issues as internal problems, and it repeatedly invokes the norm of territorial
integrity when doing so.
For China there are precedent-setting concerns when recognizing break-
away regions in the absence of government consent, and these concerns
are apparent in both the political and popular rhetoric regarding domes-
tic and foreign secessionist movements. One of the arguments for denying
Taiwanese independence is to prevent domino effects, since independence
there would embolden “the determination of Tibetan, Uighur, and Mon-
golian separatists.”61 According to Robert Art, “allowing Taiwan to become
59 Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, 47–48.
60 Liu Jianchao, “Remarks on Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence,” 18 February 2008,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/fyrth/t408032.htm.
61 Alastair Iain Johnston and Daniella Stockman, “Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and
Americans, in Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 157–95.
536 R. D. Griffiths
independent would set a disastrous precedent.”62 In a 2006 speech, Chair-

man of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) Jia Qinglin stated, “we will never tolerate Taiwan In-
dependence. We will unswervingly oppose and curb secessionist forces and
their activities.”63 These domestic concerns are visible in public opinion. A
recent article in the China Post stated that “Southern Sudan’s nearly certain
secession from the Arab-dominated north is likely to set a dangerous prece-
dent in an Arab world looking increasingly fractured along sectarian and
ethnic lines.”64
Overall, in a time of Chinese hegemony the recognition of new states
would be pinned to state consent and therefore less frequent. China currently
interprets the norm in a more constrained manner, and there is little indica-
tion that the government has internalized the norm in any meaningful way.
In addition, it has frequently disagreed with the United States, and other
Western powers, over cases like Kosovo. The norm of self-determination

should endure under a preeminent China, but it would be more constrained.
Understanding China’s support for territorial integrity is complicated by
the Janus-faced nature of the norm. Although the norm was envisioned as
a prohibition on conquest and territorial aggression, it has all too often
been used as a bulwark against internal nations who attempt to secede. The
preceding discussion laid bare China’s embrace of the internal importance of
the sovereignty norm. There is little doubt that China regards its sovereignty
as an important and personal matter. L. H. M. Ling states that since “China has
suffered foreign imperialism on its own shores, it cannot tolerate international
(especially Western) violation of sovereignty, no matter how well-justified,
and the separation of a part (Taiwan) from the national whole. China needs
to uphold both its sense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”65
The preservation of borders is clearly something the state holds dear. It is
also clear that there is strategic value behind this position since denouncing
unilateral secessionism abroad is consistent with, and therefore reinforces,
the denial of movements at home.
China’s acknowledgement of the external meaning of territorial integrity
is a contested topic. The cynical view holds that a predominant China will try
to expand and redraw political borders because rising states are revisionist
and territorial expansion is par for the course. Such behavior would clearly
undermine the territorial integrity norm. But I contend that although China
will increasingly insist on a hegemonic relationship with its neighbors, it
62 Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” Political
Science Quarterly 125, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 359–91. Quote is from 374.
63 Xing Zhigang and Liu Li, “‘We’ll Never Tolerate Acts of Secession,” China Daily, 4 March 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/04/content_526655.htm.
64 Hamza Hendawi, “South Sudan Secession a Risky Precedent,” China Post, 25 January 2011.
65 L. H. M. Ling, “Borders of Our Minds: Territories, Boundaries, and Power in the Confucian Tradi-
tion,” in States, Nations, and Borders, ed. Buchanan and Moore, 97.
will do so with an eye on preserving the territorial integrity of states. It

might press its current territorial claims, but it would not strip states of their
sovereignty and transform them into Chinese possessions.
My position is built on two related arguments. First, China’s territorial
disputes are not based on claims over other sovereign states, in total, nor
are the disputes over key sections of their landmass. There are important
disputes to be sure, such as with India, but these do not lay claim to vital
sections of the Indian state. More importantly, the trend has been toward
reconciliation rather than escalation.66 Indeed, China has shown a proclivity
toward negotiation, especially when it is strong. One might challenge my
argument by pointing to Taiwan and arguing that China’s territorial claim
threatens the very existence of a sovereign state. But in this case China actu-
ally invokes territorial integrity and treats Taiwan as an internal matter. Since
it has never recognized the sovereignty of Taiwan, its claim is framed as a
matter of sovereignty—an intrastate rather than an interstate issue. Overall,

the real flashpoints in Chinese territorial disputes are maritime in nature, pit-
ting it against its neighbors over control of sea-lanes and various uninhabited
islands like the Spratlys or the Senkakus/Diaoyus. These contests are long
running, their rightful ownership is debated, and increased assertiveness over
them is unlikely to challenge the territorial integrity norm.
Second, China has a strong interest in maintaining the territorial integrity
norm and this is unlikely to change. Although its chief application of the
norm is aimed at internal regions, it has to take the norm in full. It cannot
appeal to the norm in its dealings with internal nations while also engaging in
conquest and blatant territorial aggression. Winning the normative argument
in these internal disputes requires that it raise territorial integrity above self-
determination. The purpose of the borders norm is to promote stability by
emphasizing the existing territorial grid. In all, China regularly invokes the
norm, and its full weight should continue to shape Chinese policy regarding
territory.
This discussion raises the interesting question of how the territorial sta-
tus quo is determined. After all, the government of Taiwan rejects China’s
denial of Taiwanese sovereignty on the basis of territorial integrity. Does this
ambiguity imply that the norm can be stretched to cover all claims and that
the powerful can casually determine whose integrity is threatened? The an-
swer is no. The existing territorial grid has already been determined through
diplomacy, war, and the other practices, both fair and unfair, which shape
international relations. Of course, conflicting claims over territory do exist on
the margins of that grid—Taiwan being one of the most prominent—and it is
precisely in cases such as these, where territorial integrity can be invoked by
both sides, that conflict becomes more likely. But these cases are limited in
66 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial
Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

538 R. D. Griffiths
number, rooted in history, and not simply conjured whole cloth. The existing
territorial grid would shape China’s ability to call on the territorial norm.
To conclude, a hegemonic China ought to influence international order
by shifting the balance from self-determination toward territorial integrity. Its
insistence on supporting territorial integrity in the internal sense is significant,
and only in instances of consent would the state recognize independence
claims. As such, the prohibition on conquest should endure during a time
of Chinese hegemony, but the rate of state birth would decrease. State pro-
liferation would be controlled relative to the partly controlled international
order that has characterized the post-1945 period.
The Pax Sinica

How would a future period of Chinese hegemony compare with the cur-
rent international order or orders of the past? I have argued that Chi-
nese hegemony would privilege territorial integrity at the expense of self-
determination. The result would be an international order that would resem-
ble earlier periods in some ways and be unique in others. Sovereign norms
would once again be dominant and liberal norms would be subordinated to
the right of states. One result of this shift would be a decline, if not disap-
pearance, in nonconsensual secession. However, since a Chinese hegemon
is likely to hold on to the territorial integrity norm, conquest would also
remain rare. The overall result would be a surprisingly stable international
order, a Pax Sinica.
To consider this argument it is useful to place this Pax Sinica in historical
perspective (See Table 1). Given its emphasis on sovereignty and its internal
fragmentary pressures, China would shift the normative balance to a point
where secession is only legal in the presence of sovereign consent. Impor-
tantly, that move would jettison the constitutive process of statehood, since
self-determination would be elevated to a positive right only in the presence
TABLE 1 Periods of International Order
Right of De Facto Constitutive Constitutive

Monarchs Statehood Statehood Statehood Right of States
(pre-1815) (1815–1917) (1918–45) (post–1945) (Pax Sinica)
Sovereign or Sovereign Mixed Mixed Mixed Sovereign

Liberal
Dominant?
Frequency of Common Common Common Rare Rare
Conquest
Frequency of Rare Rare Less common Very common Less common
Secession
Trend in No. Declining Declining Flat Fast prolifera- Slow prolifer-
of States tion ation
of consent. The difficult decision of choosing who counts would be simpli-

fied by effectively allocating that choice to sovereign states. Not unlike the
pre-Napoleonic era, sovereignty would prevail and the arc of history would
bend back toward the right of states.
Importantly, this would not simply be a return to the 1800s.67 The politics
of recognition in the 19th century possessed a liberal undercurrent and, as
Fabry argues, the United States and UK would often disregard the sovereignty
of states when recognizing breakaway regions that had prevailed over their
central governments.68 In truth, Chinese hegemony would resemble the 18th
century more than the 19th, when states hewed closely to the sovereign
principle that recognition should only be given in cases of consent. The
notion that minority nations should be able to self-determine, that individuals
selecting into a group should have rights, was not yet on the map. The liberal
tradition was only just emerging and the sovereign tradition was relatively
unchallenged. The Pax Sinica would bear those same conservative features.
However, Chinese hegemony would also bear modern features. The
main difference is the very conception of sovereignty and the corollary de-
velopment of the norm of territorial integrity. Should the norm of territorial
integrity be supported by a Chinese power, state death would remain a
rare occurrence. Unlike the 18th and 19th centuries where the number of
states was gradually reduced through conquest and accession, very few states
would exit the system unless they voluntarily chose to unify with other states.
Thus the Pax Sinica would be rather stable. The number of states may grad-
ually increase, but it would be limited to those cases where the sovereign
gave its consent—that is, controlled proliferation.
This anticipated focus on territorial stability under Chinese hegemony
is consistent with both contemporary and historical political doctrine. The
Confucian emphasis on a strong and stable state is echoed in recent po-
litical slogans like “Stability and Harmony.”69 There are conservative, statist
overtones in China’s policies without any commensurate emphasis on liberal
norms. Unlike the United States, Chinese exceptionalism does not promote
a set of universal values in its foreign policy.70 Meanwhile, recent scholar-
ship has looked into the past to examine what previous periods of Chinese
regional dominance say about patterns in international order.71 One com-
mon finding is that imperial China tended to emphasize patterns of informal
67 Krishnan Srinivasan, “Conflict and Cooperation in the 21st Century,” in Towards the New Horizion:
World Order in the 21st Century, ed. James Mayall and Krishnan Srinivasan (New Delhi, India: Standard
Publishers, 2009).
69 Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order.
70 Biwu Zhang, Chinese Perceptions of the U.S.
71 Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Elizabeth J. Perry, “Chinese Conceptions of ‘Rights’: From
Mencius to Mao—and Now,” Perspectives on Politics 6, no. 1 (March 2008): 37–50; Ringmar, “Performing
International Systems.”
540 R. D. Griffiths
rule where other polities remained sovereign, yet informally subordinate.

Indeed, David C. Kang finds that the China-centered international order that
existed in East Asia from the 14th to the 19th centuries—the so-called Trib-
ute System—was characterized by stable borders and infrequent wars of
conquest, at least where recognized political units like Vietnam and Korea
were concerned.72 The hegemon showed little tolerance for unrecognized,
tribal, and/or institutionally dissimilar groups, especially on the western and
northern frontiers. Of course, past behavior is not a perfect indicator of future
performance, but that approach to international order privileges recognized
states and emphasizes the sovereign territorial grid in a manner where the
hegemon can exert power and influence without formal conquest. Essen-
tially, there is continuity between China’s imperial past and what this paper
predicts for the future should it become a hegemon.
I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for
international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms

emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in several ways. How
often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign bor-
ders through violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How
much international discord is there on the topic of secession and recognition?
This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945
American-led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics
might point to a number of ways in which Chinese hegemony would be
worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under
Chinese leadership. I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better
in all ways—there are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there
are net benefits where territorial stability is concerned.
Analyzed under these terms the key differences between the Ameri-
can order and the imagined Chinese order have to do with the politics of
secession and sovereign recognition. International order matters because it
determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets the rules of the
game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has attempted to
balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by establish-
ing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes,
that is an enormously challenging project because developing clear rules that
separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states derive agreed-upon
criteria in a constitutive process.73 Given the politics and conflicting princi-
ples of international life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments),
inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are unavoidable. The
resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist move-
ments over when self-determination applies and when it should be subordi-
nated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a shadow
72 Kang, East Asia Before the West.

over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects dou-

ble standards in American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for
annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in Karabakh.”74 Such
uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change
the incentives for key actors, and increase the chance of conflict.
Secessionist civil war is a common feature of contemporary times. Schol-
ars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945 have involved
secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief
source of violence in the world today.75 Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan
find that secessionism is one of the few (if only) forms of political protest
where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent.76 Meanwhile, Tan-
isha Fazal and I identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and
record that many of these movements feel they have a reasonable chance of
gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surround-
ing recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists

operate, where violence can be effective and where sovereignty is thought
to be obtainable, it should come as no surprise that conflict is common. In
regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary times is not tradi-
tional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation.78 This
is where Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order.
That is not to say secessionist conflict would completely disappear dur-
ing the Pax Sinica. Some committed groups may fight the state because they
hope to pressure the government into giving concessions ranging from full
sovereign recognition to lesser forms of local autonomy to increased polit-
ical participation. Some disillusioned groups may even redirect secessionist
efforts toward regime change. Many of the causes of civil war would re-
main. The difference is that secessionists would no longer perceive that they
could bypass the central government and convince the international com-
munity that they meet one of the criteria for recognition. This possibility has
very real implications. For example, a secessionist conflict on the island of
Bougainville during the 1990s resulted in the deaths of an estimated twenty
thousand people (ten percent of the population). During that period the se-
cessionist leadership networked with other secessionist movements like the
East Timorese and explored different ways to secure international recognition
74 “Nagorno-Karabakh: A Mountainous Conflict,” Economist, 6 September 2014.

75 For the estimates, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90; Jason Sorens, Secessionism:
Identity, Interest, and Strategy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012). For the claim regarding
secessionism and global violence, see Barbara F. Walter, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist
Conflicts Are So Violent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.
76 Erica Chenowith Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent
Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

78 Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm”; Fazal, State Death; Atzilli, Good Fences, Bad Neighbors.
542 R. D. Griffiths
that would circumvent the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG).79 They
first highlighted their imperial/administrative history, trying to make the case
that they were eligible for independence via the rules surrounding decolo-
nization. When that failed they mounted a publicity campaign that aimed to
win international sympathy, especially in Australia, by documenting civilian
casualties. That campaign, and the international pressure it brought to bear
on the PNG government, helped Bougainville to win a peace agreement in
2001 that promised autonomy and a future referendum on independence.
Although every conflict has a local dimension, the strategies and tactics em-
ployed, and the very willingness of groups to continue fighting, are shaped
by the possibilities inherent in the international recognition regime. Relative
to a consent-based order, the current constitutive regime creates incentives
to challenge the state in ways that can yield both wanted and unwanted
violence.
One could argue that I undervalue the merits of flexibility and ambigu-
ousness, and that from a design perspective the ideal international recog-
nition regime ought to temper a clear set of rules with a degree of lati-
tude to cover exceptional cases. After all, every independence movement is
unique in its own way and it will be difficult if not impossible to develop
a decision rule that is fair to all. I concede that the ideal regime would
balance clarity with flexibility, but the contemporary regime does not meet
this ideal. The current order is not the design of some normative architect,
but the product of the push and pull of politics and diplomacy. Ultimate
recognition is not bestowed by some overarching legal body; it rests in
the hands of individual sovereign states with diverse interests. The Chinese
order I forecast is far from ideal, but it has advantages over the current
order.
By necessity this is a somewhat conjectural argument because gross
comparisons of international orders, especially orders in the future, do not
permit tight counterfactual analysis. In that sense, mine is a thought experi-
ment not unlike Fabry’s comparison between a recognition regime based
on de facto statehood and one built on a constitutive process.80 I ad-
vance a plausible argument by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses
of different international orders, and argue for the superiority of one over
the other given a specified ledger of comparison. A strengthening of the
territorial integrity norm, and a clear, unambiguous set of rules that re-
moves the constitutive process of recognition, and permits independence
only in cases of sovereign consent, would make for a better international
order.

CONSIDERATIONS AND POTENTIAL CRITICISM
The preceding analysis highlighted several periods of international order

where the constellation of power and norms shaped the frequency of con-
quest, state birth, and the overall trend in the number of states. More gradual
than discrete, the transition from one period to another constitutes what
Robert Gilpin called systemic change: “change in the form of control or
governance of a system.”81 I argue that despite fears of revisionism and ex-
pansionism, Chinese hegemony would change international order for the
better insofar as it would enhance territorial stability. The current constitu-
tive recognition regime would be replaced with an emphasis on sovereign
consent, much like the pre-1815 period in Europe. Meanwhile, the territorial
integrity norm would play an even more central role in international affairs,
with its prohibitions on external aggression and internal fragmentation. This
doubling down on the existing territorial grid would yield benefits, and one
of them would be a less ambiguous set of rules for how aspiring nations
can become independent. As a result, secessionists would no longer have
incentive to hold out and/or continue fighting on account of a belief that
recognition may one day come. In regard to territorial stability, this would
truly be a Pax Sinica.
It is, however, important to point out that this improvement in territorial
stability would come at the expense of liberal rights. A rollback of the self-
determination norm consistent with the position that sovereignty should
only be recognized with the consent of the central government would put
minority nations in a more vulnerable position and subordinate their interests
to that of the state. Indeed, such an international regime could give states
greater license to treat internal groups as they please. Moreover, as Sandholtz
and Stiles argue, the retreat of one norm can ripple through other parallel
norms within the same tradition.82 As such, other human rights norms like
R2P should weaken as sovereignty norms rise in relation. Held to a different
standard, Chinese hegemony could be worse for international order.
There are a number of potential critiques of my argument. One is that
it would not be so easy for China to simply roll back the advancement of
the self-determination norm and, potentially, other corollary liberal norms.
I contend that while a number of states might resist, China is not alone in
its normative outlook. On the tension between sovereign territory and self-
determination, China generally sees eye to eye with India, another powerful,
ascendant state and the other key member of the so-called Asian Century.
Indonesia is another rising star that is keen to support territorial boundaries
and prevent breakaway ambitions. And although the long-term effects of the
81 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 40.

544 R. D. Griffiths
recent Crimean crisis are unclear, Russia has historically been quite conser-
vative where sovereign norms are concerned.83 These shared worldviews
are important because, as Sandholtz and Stiles argue, normative change is
driven by both power and persuasion.84 Thus, China’s ability to emphasize
sovereign norms at the expense of liberal norms will turn on its ability to
persuade other states and prevail in the contest of ideas. That task would
be more daunting if the Chinese view ran against the common view. But
that is not the case here, for in fact, China represents the lead example in a
pro-sovereignty trend.
A second potential criticism is that it is difficult if not impossible to
infer a rising state’s future preferences or intentions from its current behav-
ior because what a state wants or believes tends to change in accordance
with power. As Robert Kagan stated in an essay about China’s rise: “Power
changes nations. It expands their wants and desires, increases their sense of
entitlement, their need for deference and respect. It also makes them more
ambitious. It lessens their tolerance to obstacles, their willingness to take
no for an answer.”85 Similarly, in his book on the rise of the United States,
Fareed Zakaria argued that capabilities shape intentions.86 Although I agree
with the general claim that increased power tends to increase a state’s sense
of importance and willingness to think and act globally, I do not believe
that the natural result is a state that will aim to expand territorially. On the
contrary, territorial revision and expansion is simply one way that powerful
states can act; it is not inevitable. During the post-1945 period the United
States has expanded its political and military reach and forged relations of
informal empire across the globe.87 But its last formal territorial acquisition
was the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in 1947, a region that it came
to administer in the aftermath of World War II, and one in which the United
States eventually oversaw the birth of three sovereign states: the Marshall Is-
lands, Micronesia, and Palau.88 A Chinese hegemon that abides the territorial
integrity norm ought to behave similarly.
Finally, critics may contend that China will gradually come to embrace
the liberal tradition because China is modernizing and liberal values are
ultimately universal and modern. Therefore, a modernized and hegemonic
China would not be so quick to invalidate nationalist demands in the interest
of sovereignty. This is a fine argument, fascinating to speculate upon, and it
83Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession.

84Sandholtz and Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change.
85 Robert Kagan, “Ambition and Anxiety: America’s Competition with China,” in The Rise of China,
ed. Schmitt, 2.
86 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

87 David A. Lake, “The New American Empire?” International Studies Perspectives 9, no. 3 (August
2008): 281–89.
88 Jaroslav Tir et al., “Territorial Changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and Data,” Conflict Management
and Peace Science 16, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 89–97.

may be true. However, it could also be true that modernization can occur
in the absence of liberal values—at least where they run up against the
right of states—and that the belief that the one necessarily follows the other
is really a form of Western optimism, if not conceit. I am agnostic on this
issue.89 If China does come to embrace liberal norms, we can still expect
it to tack closer than the United States to the sovereign tradition given its
greater concerns over internal fragmentation. If it does not and the sovereign
tradition prevails in the Pax Sinica, then the last two hundred years would
look like more of an historical aberration. The arc of history would be
bending back to a time when the sovereign right of states was once again
dominant.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks Boaz Atzili, Ahsan I. Butt, Lai-Ha Chan, Mikulas Fabry,
Ben E. Goldsmith, David S. G. Goodman, Seva Gunitsky, Jonathan Hassid,
Justin V. Hastings, Adrian H. Hearn, Burak Kadercan, Ian Steven Lustick,
Harris Mylonas, Chris Ogden, James Reilly, David Schak, Nadav G. Shelef,
Jingdong Yuan, and Ariel Zellman for their useful feedback.
FUNDING
The author would like to thank the Department of Government and Inter-
national Relations and the China Studies Centre at the University of Sydney
for funding my research.
89 On this topic see James Mayall, “Secession and International Order,” in The Ashgate Research
Companion to Secession, ed. Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan (Burlington, UK: Ashgate, 2011).

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States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why

How would a hegemonic China shape international norms related

The Crimean Declaration of Independence on 11 March 2014 brought into fo-

Ryan D. Griffiths is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International

the United States supported Kosovar independence at the expense of Ser-

Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER SINCE 1945

International order is a slippery concept that is used by scholars in a variety

ation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

FIGURE 1 Sovereign States and Independence Movements (1816–2011)16

nations, however defined, but it is particularly relevant to minority nations

colonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Statehood,” International Studies Review 16, no. 1 (March 2014): 79–106.

referenced self-determination in their declarations of independence.20 There

of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

(October–December 2004): 394–415, esp. 9.

The negative consequence of territorial integrity is that while it has made

wishes of the state. Conversely, full commitment to maintaining the existing

43, no. 6 (November 2006): 723–740.

McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (March 2008): 49–80.

NORMATIVE CHANGE AND PAST INTERNATIONAL ORDERS

Before turning to a discussion of China it is useful to frame territorial in-

is no conflict between territorial integrity and self-determination.43 It is in

self-determination in particular. They use a cycle model to explain normative

Comparative International Orders

truly believe in the value of self-determination—and a calculation of strat-

five hundred European states in 1500, the number decreased to twenty-five

definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is dangerous to

then a decline with the advent of World War II.

52 “Self-Determination.” Saturday Evening Post, 9 April 1921, 7.

The preceding discussion highlights the strengths and weaknesses of

INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN A TIME OF CHINESE HEGEMONY

consensual, but when the national government in a secessionist crisis denies

independent would set a disastrous precedent.”62 In a 2006 speech, Chair-

Western powers, over cases like Kosovo. The norm of self-determination

will do so with an eye on preserving the territorial integrity of states. It

matter of sovereignty—an intrastate rather than an interstate issue. Overall,

Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

The Pax Sinica

TABLE 1 Periods of International Order

Right of De Facto Constitutive Constitutive

Sovereign or Sovereign Mixed Mixed Mixed Sovereign

of consent. The difficult decision of choosing who counts would be simpli-

rule where other polities remained sovereign, yet informally subordinate.

international order. In making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms

72 Kang, East Asia Before the West.

over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects dou-

ing recognition.77 Given the strategic environment in which secessionists

74 “Nagorno-Karabakh: A Mountainous Conflict,” Economist, 6 September 2014.

Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

79 Fazal and Griffiths, “Membership Has its Privileges.”