Strategic Analysis

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Examining China's Hydro-Behaviour: Peaceful or

Assertive?

Uttam Kumar Sinha

To cite this article: Uttam Kumar Sinha (2012) Examining China's Hydro-Behaviour: Peaceful or
Assertive?, Strategic Analysis, 36:1, 41-56, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2012.628487

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 Strategic Analysis
Vol. 36, No. 1, January 2012, 41–56

Examining China’s Hydro-Behaviour: Peaceful or Assertive?

Uttam Kumar Sinha

Abstract: China is a thirsty country desperately in need of water—a lot of it. In order
to meet its water and energy requirements in the densely populated and fertile northern
plains, it is successively making interventions in the Tibetan rivers in the southern
part through dams and diversions. While China is well within its riparian rights to do
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so, a set of externalities involving the principles of water-sharing and lower riparian
needs—stretching from Afghanistan to Vietnam—raise concerns. Politically control-
ling Tibet and thereby having control over the mighty rivers that originate there allows
Beijing to overcome its uneven water distribution but also importantly gives its lead-
ers strategic width and diplomatic clout for dealing with its neighbours. Based on the
theoretical framework of power and hydro-hegemony this article examines how China’s
hydro-behaviour on the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Ysangpo) could impact power relations
with India and what India’s counter-hydro-hegemony strategy should be.

Introduction
hina’s ‘peaceful rise’,1 a phrase propounded with subtlety by Chinese officials and
C scholars since 2003, has always intrigued the outside world. The ‘rise of China’
has almost become conventional wisdom among international relations scholars and
Chinese experts and has led to a vast body of high-quality work examining China’s rise
and its implications for the international system. The inquiry continues.2 The questions
are familiar and now almost rhetorical: How will China behave as it rises? Will it be
responsible and cooperate or as it gains economic power and builds military muscle
will it be confrontationist, thereby creating challenges and threats? In this context this
article queries China’s hydro-behaviour and specifically examines its actions on the
Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) and its behaviour on the Mekong (Lancang) to infer
certain hegemonic tendencies.
While it can be argued that many of the diversion projects on the Yarlung are eco-
nomically unfeasible and hence anxieties over them are excessive and alarmist, it can
equally be argued that the proposed series of dams on the Yarlung, some of which
may not be run-of-the-river, could potentially give China significant capacity to pres-
surise its neighbours and shape outcomes. Water experts such as B.G. Verghese view
China’s diversions on the Yarlung as unrealistic and a non-starter and India’s reaction
as one of ‘uninformed people asking ignorant questions’.3 Others like Ramaswamy
Iyer take a more cautious position, suggesting to ‘keep questioning China on their
plans constantly’.4 Brahma Chellaney, on the other hand, is not too impressed with the
‘run-of-the-river’ projects, the impression being that China is a benign upper riparian.5
Run-of-the-river projects are based on the principle that waters are returned to the

Uttam Kumar Sinha is a Research Fellow at IDSA and Adjunct Professor at the Malaviya Centre for
Peace Research, Benares Hindu University.

ISSN 0970-0161 print/ISSN 1754-0054 online

© 2012 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.628487
http://www.tandfonline.com
 42 Uttam Kumar Sinha

river after they pass through the turbines, but what if they are not? In a mistrustful
neighbourhood the ‘trust but verify’ means of assessment is far more rational than
mere statements of assurance.
While the debate is interesting and lively, this article asserts that China, being
an upper riparian, has all the leverage and, as argued, its policies on trans-boundary
rivers are not indicative of the ‘peaceful’ nature of its rise. Recent awareness on
China’s hydrological position and water utilisation has led to widespread expressions
like ‘hydro-arrogance’ and ‘hydro-egoism’. A commonly used phrase that captures
China’s rise and corresponding behaviour is ‘non-confrontationist aggression’. While
all these attributes might seem provocative, there is evidence regarding China’s discreet
water utilisation (not sharing hydrological data or being selective) and non-committal
approach (reluctance to enter into an agreement or treaty) to water-sharing.
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One strong pointer is China’s behaviour towards Tibet. The hydro-relevance of

Tibet suggests that it is the lifeline of China. This frames Beijing’s maximalist orien-
tation towards harnessing water resources and therefore dams and diversions are being
built to mitigate its food and energy requirements and overcome its uneven distribution
of water. Large shifts of water from Tibet will be a continuous part of China’s devel-
opment plans. This is an unquestionable necessity but it also has strategic significance
as the Tibetan plateau is the source of Asia’s 10 major river systems, which include
the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Irrawady, Salween and Mekong. It covers 11 countries
and 2 billion people, stretching from Afghanistan to the Ganga–Meghna–Brahmaputra
basin in South Asia to the Mekong in the southeast, depend on these rivers.
China’s policy on Tibet can be understood from a ‘resource-dependence’ perspec-
tive, in this case water, the procurement of which is an important strategic tenet. The
2005 report entitled Tibet’s Water Will Save China by Li Ling, an ex-military man,
reflects an ‘idea with a long pedigree’6 of damming the rivers in the Tibetan plateau.
Tibet’s vast water resources are key to sustaining China’s northern region, revitalising
its deserts and the Yellow river itself, as well as being crucial to its Himalayan strategy.
China’s need and the water requirements of the other lower riparian countries set up a
contesting and conflictual situation often prompting analysts to say that ‘China’s thirst
will leave others thirsty’.
China’s rise not being peaceful could have various connotations. In relation to water
issues, given its enormous requirement China will be far less accommodative and in
the realist sense will be the ‘guardian of its own security and independence’.7 This
makes China a ‘rational egoist’ interested in its own utility as well as a ‘defensive
positionalist’ firm in maintaining relative capabilities. Therefore one needs to contin-
uously study the impact of China’s actions particularly on the peripheral states, which
it always considers as being rivals.
In the regional context China’s ascendancy has a more far-reaching significance
than from a Western perspective, which views China’s rise as a challenge to a ‘Western-
dominated international society’. Some Western writings, particularly of the English
school, are largely pessimistic about China’s ability to ‘continue rising peacefully’.
Others argue more specifically that its peaceful rise over the next 30 years will be chal-
lenged by domestic reforms and cracks will emerge as China transits from a command
to a market economy. On the other hand, David Shambaugh argues that Beijing’s diplo-
macy is far more adept than actually appreciated and as a result, ‘. . . most nations in
the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful lis-
tener and a non-threatening partner’.8 However, Shambaugh’s positive views on China
can be contested in relation to its water needs. This article contends that from a water
 Strategic Analysis 43

perspective, China is seen as neither a reasonable nor a non-threatening neighbour. All

in all, these arguments, contested as they are, make for a fascinating debate on the rise
of China.
Like it or not, China does matter.9 It is home to nearly a quarter of the world’s
population but finds itself with disproportionately less arable land, water and oil. Its
economy, while galloping at a pace that is undoubtedly impressive,10 has had a telling
impact on the environment. There are limits to China’s resources that can restrict its
ability to be self-sufficient in food. Being food secure equally means optimising water
resources. A hungry China is equally a thirsty China. It is a compelling reminder that
no engagement with China can afford to ignore its resource dilemmas.
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Nature of trans-boundary rivers

Trans-boundary rivers originating from, flowing through and draining into territori-
ally defined boundaries are a significant part of the freshwater biome, contributing
roughly 60 per cent of the world’s freshwater, excluding Antarctica.11 There are about
260 river basins home to 40 per cent of the world’s population, with roughly 145 shar-
ing agreements/treaties in existence.12 Clearly the rivers make the international system
busy with an array of cooperation and shared benefits. However, rivers have a peculiar
tendency that can be referred to as the unsettlement of the settled. Water relations
can never be permanently settled since flows in rivers are not constant. The flows in
turn are determined by seasonal variations and usage, particularly those that are non-
consumptive in nature. In addition, interventions and diversions on rivers impact the
flow. Political relations, therefore, can easily be impacted by the changing quantitative
and qualitative nature of the rivers.
Varied interpretations on the use of rivers have resulted in differing claims between
riparian countries.13 ‘Limited territorial sovereignty’, however, allows each riparian
state to use the flow of the shared rivers within its territory provided that such utili-
sation does not impinge on the rights of the co-riparian and that nations retain their
entitlement to a ‘reasonable share of water’. But until there is a legally binding inter-
national treaty on water-sharing, riparian relations will remain hostage to individual
states’ current needs and future requirements.14 As major parts of the globe experience
high levels of water stress, riparian relations will become contentious.
Although rivers are visible, they are not transparent. This makes for a difficulty in
monitoring and measuring the flows and this lack of knowledge gives rise to suspicion
and conflicting positions. Since rivers physically link upstream and downstream users,
knowledge can also be ‘constructed’ to suit the riparian state’s interests. The posses-
sion or capture and control of water resources can result in aggressive tendencies and
can readily translate into power and dominance. Water thus can assume hegemonic
attribution.

Power and hegemony

This article conceptualises the role of hegemony and power in trans-boundary water
to understand power asymmetries and the hegemonic nature of riparian relations.
Steven Lukes’ study on power is a common tool for analysing and understanding
a state’s behaviour.15 Some studies have already applied power and hegemony to
trans-boundary water, particularly while analysing hydro-relations between Turkey and
Syria over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.16
 44 Uttam Kumar Sinha
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Indian activists hold placards and a banner that reads ‘Save Brahmaputra’ as they march past the
Brahmaputra River in Gauhati, India, Thursday, January 6, 2011. The activists were reacting to news
reports that China is constructing dams in the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra River—or the
Yarlung Tsangpo as it is known in Tibet—to begin construction of a hydropower project. (AP Photo/
Anupam Nath).

Power is not easy to define and is highly contested. It is ‘less about what power is
than about what power does’.17 Lukes’ formulation of the three dimensions of power
is interesting when seen through the prism of water.18 The first form of power is the
state’s military and economic superiority or ‘structural power’, also referred to as ‘hard
power’. It can be reasoned that a state’s riparian position and its control of water can
fall under structural power. Here the hydro-hegemon can employ structural power in
a coercive way. The second form of power refers to the setting of the agenda, dic-
tating the discussion and the ability to shift the goalposts. The stronger party gives
very little choice or option to the weaker party. This is referred to as the ‘bargaining
power’.19 The third form of power occurs when the hegemon takes the initiative of
depoliticising the issue and becomes a kind of a guarantor and regulator of affairs, a
‘dean’ or ‘guide’ so to speak. This is referred to as ‘ideational power’ or ‘psychological
power’.20 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner describe hydro-hegemony as ‘hegemony at
the river-basin level achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource
capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of
tactics (e.g., coercion/pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled
by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institu-
tional context’.21 Eventually all international river basins are determined by ‘who gets
how much water, how and why’.22
China’s continued water development, now proceeding at a rapid pace with suc-
cessive interventions on the rivers, is in keeping with its internal compulsions and is
therefore self-driven. China’s upper riparian position gives it the hydrological advan-
tage to use and control the waters from a nationalist perspective, in other words pursue
 Strategic Analysis 45

self-preserving policies. This can translate into enormous power (structural). Power
also determines who the hegemon is. It has been observed by experts that water-related
tensions are not so much related to ‘water stress per se’,23 but rather to upstream
unilateral attempts to intervene on rivers. Recently, Wen Jiabao in an interview with
Malaysian and Indonesian media stressed the fact that China would never seek hege-
mony when it becomes a developed country.24 Such a calm and assured statement is
typical of China, but one cannot dismiss the fact that China will not strive to become a
regional hegemon (domination).25
China’s effort to dominate Asia has to be understood in relation to two important
geopolitical features of Asia—the continental and the maritime. To be a true hegemon,
China will have to dominate both the continental and the maritime. Its continental
domination can be achieved first by taking the space vacated by the Soviet Union,
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its prime continental challenger, after its collapse; and second by becoming solidly
secure with its physical control over the waters of Tibet. China’s maritime dominance
continues to be challenged by countervailing powers like the US in Asia’s littoral and
India in the Indian Ocean.26 It can be argued here that China’s continental hegemony is
predominantly hydro-hegemony. With roughly 10 major rivers flowing out of China’s
territory to 11 countries and none coming in, it is a resource dominance of significant
proportion.

Chinese civilisation and water management

The Chinese civilisation flourished around the mighty river systems of the Yellow and
the Yangtze.27 The emergence of agriculture was first seen during the Hemudu culture
dating back 6000–7000 years.28 Large-scale harnessing of rivers and development of
water conservancy projects led to the advancement of farming techniques, particularly
rice cultivation, along the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze. These great rivers
also caused widespread flood destruction and flood prevention became a priority issue
of successive dynasties.
The history of the Chinese civilisation is in many ways a history of hydraulic engi-
neering, canal-building and water conservation. Modern day projects such as the Three
Gorges and the South-to-North Water Project (SNWP) are in the distinctly Chinese tra-
dition of taming the rivers which goes back nearly 5000 years when Yu the Great of the
Xia Dynasty (2205 BC) dredged the vast flood plains of ancient China (see Map 1).29
The Yu period marked the beginnings of Chinese water projects and water control.
Other famous water projects of ancient China include the Dujiangyan irrigation sys-
tem, the Ling Canal and the Grand Canal. The Dujiangyan Irrigation System, built in
the 3rd century BC on the Min river, a major tributary of the Yangtze, is regarded as
the oldest water project in the world.30 It still serves Chengdu inhabitants. Li Bing
who built the project acquired a mythic status, representing man’s struggle against the
forces of nature and its ultimate triumph (see Map 2). Bing left behind a legacy of
water planners and builders who are revered and commemorated in China. The Ling
Canal and the Grand Canal represent the engineering feats of linking rivers. China’s
recently revived political direction of building ‘a harmonious society’, ‘harmony with
nature’ and a ‘harmonious world’ is not robustly reflected in its current water man-
agement policies and, though not frequently, concerns are being raised. For example,
environmental minister Zhou Shengxian said in February 2011, ‘In China’s thousands
of years of civilisation, the conflict between humanity and nature has never been as
serious as it is today’.31
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46

Map 2.
Map 1.
Uttam Kumar Sinha
 Strategic Analysis 47

The promotion of large-scale, capital-intensive water projects with slogans like ‘big
diversions, big irrigation’ became part of the popular political consciousness and gath-
ered momentum soon after the foundation of the People’s Republic (PRC) in 1949,
and by the dawn of the 21st century nearly half of the world’s large dams were in
China. Leaders from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to Mao Zedong reclaimed the hydraulic mindset,
portraying it as the courage of the leader and the struggle of the labouring people
against the elements of nature. Mao’s historic swim in 1956 across the Yangtze in
Wuhan was a demonstration of the supremacy and dominance of humans over nature.
In the poem Swimming (1956), Mao expresses his unrelenting desire to build dams
on the Yangtze with a conqueror’s mindset towards nature.32 ‘Humans must conquer
nature’ became the core of Mao’s ‘grain first’ campaign that set the country on a trail
of dam-building and enthused new hydraulic learning.33 The next line of leaders, such
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as Li Ping, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, rode on the ‘winds and waves’ of Mao’s
China. While today’s fourth generation leaders including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao,
both trained hydraulic engineers, have adopted a sustainable and holistic approach to
development, they equally understand the strategic value of the control and dominance
of water resources.34
Mao believed in mass campaigns as the ultimate means of achieving ‘socialist
transformation’ and he carried this ideology to tame and transform nature to serve
human needs.35 Mao’s thinking acquired a certain invincibility, particularly after the
defeat of the Kuomintang and the successful creation of the PRC, and this was reflected
in the ways he looked at water resource development.

Thirsty and hungry China

According to the water resources ministry, the total water resources in China in
2007 amounted to 2469.6 billion cubic metres, of which the surface water resources
were 2376.4 billion.36 The figures become very interesting when we observe that the
amount of water that flowed into Chinese territory from outside was only 15.7 billion
cubic metres. In comparison, the water that flowed out of the territory was 569.9 bil-
lion cubic metres. China has much in the total volume of water resources but less in
per capita volume. The available water resources per capita were 1869 cubic metres on
average. What is to be noted is that the total amount of water resources is decreas-
ing. The amount of total water supply in 2007 was 578.9 billion cubic metres, of
which surface water was 470.4 billion (81.2 per cent) and groundwater 105.8 billion
(18.3 per cent).37
China is expected to face a 25 per cent supply gap in the projected water demand
by 2030, with two-thirds of its cities already facing difficulty in accessing water.
Having put in place the structures as part of its strategic objective, China in December
2010 decided to accelerate the reform and development of water resources, as per the
No. 1 Document in 2011. The document focuses on three ‘red lines’: over-exploitation,
usage efficiency, and pollution.38
These facts suggest that China is water insecure and its insecurity primarily relates
to the disproportionate availability or uneven distribution of waters within its territory,
the majority of which are in the south (Tibet) with the north and west excessively
water stressed. The region south of the Yangtze river, which accounts for roughly
36 per cent of Chinese territory, has 81 per cent of water resources. The territories
north of the Yangtze, where much water is required, make up 64 per cent but have a
meagre 19 per cent of water capacity.
 48 Uttam Kumar Sinha

Without Tibet, China’s hydrological supremacy would be overturned. It would go

from being entirely water-independent to being water-dependent. Had it not been for
Tibet, China would not have been the world’s most independent riparian country.39 In
fact, Beijing’s total control over Tibet in effect is its ‘total’ control over the water
resources. ‘Absolute territorial sovereignty’ over the waters gives an added strate-
gic sharpness to China’s regional approach. The classic lines read, ‘He who holds
Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont,
threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may
well have all of South-East Asia within his reach, and all of Asia’.40
China has no significant bilateral riparian treaties on any water allocation or water
utilisation,41 an indication of it being hydro-hegemonic. Its water resource ministry
website, however, states that ‘. . . China has built cooperation relationships with more
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than 60 countries, and signed water cooperation agreements and memorandum of

understanding with 40 countries’.42 In fact, China was one of the three countries43
that did not approve of the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Waterways.
In order to overcome this hydrological unevenness, projects like the ‘south-to-north
water diversion’, first proposed by Chairman Mao in 1952 to ease water shortages in
cities like Beijing and Tianjin, have become a national priority. In fact, Mao had made a
seemingly innocent remark: ‘the south has a lot of water, the north little . . . if possible,
it is ok to lend a little water’.44 Since then it has spawned a whole breed of Chinese
leadership who think hydrologically.
The SNWP, which started in December 2002, was designed to take water from
China’s largest river, the Yangtze, to the arid northern regions. It is expected to be com-
pleted by 2050 and will eventually divert about 44.8 billion cubic metres of water to
the north annually.45 The northward-bound water has three routes—an eastern route,
a middle route and a western route. The project started with the construction of the
eastern route in 2002. The construction of the middle route followed in 2003 and
will come into service after the 2014 flood season. It is expected to handle 9.5 bil-
lion cubic metres of water annually.46 By the end of 2010, 115 billion Yuan had been
spent and 40 projects had been started, setting a new annual record.47 The western
route is controversial owing to political and strategic ramifications for China’s riparian
neighbours, particularly on the Mekong and the Brahmaputra rivers. However, in spite
of the sensitivity, China has not said that it will not go ahead with the western route.
Though still in the planning stage, it involves working on the Qinghai–Tibet Plateau
(3000–5000m above sea level). Once completed in 2050, the western route project will
bring four billion cubic metres of water from the Tongtian, Yarlung and Dadu rivers
across 500 km to northwest China.48
There has been a recent debate within China regarding the feasibility of gigantic
water diversion projects. The delays and the costs of the first two routes—eastern and
middle—have resulted in a growing opposition to the western route, which is tech-
nically challenging and requires huge investment. While the top Chinese leaders like
Hu Jintao and former president Jiang Zemin back the project, many in the party eche-
lons, including the former water resources minister Wang Shucheng, consider it to be
risky, unnecessary and unfeasible.
More than anything else, the water shortage becomes an impediment to China’s
goal of meeting food production and questions the leadership’s claims of self-
sufficiency in food grains. Water deficiency, prolonged drought and below average
rainfall in the nine provinces (including the six major wheat-producing provinces) of
 Strategic Analysis 49

the northern and eastern region have resulted in a surge of grain imports not experi-
enced in the last 15 years.49 Reduced self-sufficiency is dangerous for a country with a
population as large as China and therefore its search for water becomes an aggressive
and often desperate imperative.
Electricity is equally crucial for China’s economic development. With a GDP grow-
ing at the rate of over 10 per cent a year, China’s energy requirement is projected to
increase by 150 per cent by 2020.50 Its ever increasing demand for energy requires
it to look for various sources. While resource rich in coal and a net importer of oil,
both climate unfriendly, China is compelled to develop hydroelectricity as a clean and
renewable source. China already has half of the world’s large dams, including the Three
Gorges. Its exploitable hydropower is estimated to be around 378 GW with an annual
power supply of 1.92 trillion KWh.51 Huge hydroelectricity projects for energy and
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water diversion schemes for food sufficiency are strategic to China’s growth path.

The Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra

China was successful in damming the Yarlung Tsangpo52 on 12 November 2010.53 The
fascination for building a massive hydro-project on the Yarlung is a well-established
fact. In 1972 a comprehensive study led by Guan Zhihua of the Chinese Academy
of Sciences calculated the hydro-potential of the Yarlung as second only to that of
the Yangtze but the highest in terms of power-generating potential per unit of length.
In 1998 Chen Chuanyou of the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources
Research proposed building a reservoir on the middle reaches of the Yarlung to raise
the water level and then drill a 16-km tunnel to carry the water. The proposal estimated
that a drop of 2300 metres would allow for three mega hydropower stations. It is now
estimated that the hydro-potential of Yarlung is 114 GW with a concentrated capacity
of 38 GW near the great bend in Metok county of Tibet.54
The 510 MW Zangmu run-of-the river hydroelectricity power station is being built
on the middle reaches of the Yarlung between the counties of Sangri and Gyaca. As a
long-term objective of capturing the flow, China has ensured that there are no free
flowing rivers in Asia.55 The hydropower development is expected to lead to a devel-
opment boom with increased activities in mining and rapid growth in road and railways.
The Zangmu dam marks the beginning of a new era in Chinese engineering and con-
struction capability. Yan Zhiyong, general manager of China Hydropower Engineering
Consulting, has been quoted as saying: ‘By about 2020 most of China’s hydropower
projects outside of Tibet will have been completed, and the industry’s focus will shift
to the Jinsha, Lancang, the upper reaches of the Nujiang river and the Yarlung’.56 The
riparian dynamics is set to become far more contentious and controversial, creating
greater nervousness among the lower riparians.
The Chinese leaders now have a water mine in Tibet to exploit.57 Chinese hydro-
obsession as seen in the Three Gorges will drive mega projects on the Yarlung.
Small-to-medium hydropower stations do not excite the Chinese leaders. Many
40–50 MW projects on the Yarlung were not carried out because of river silt issues.
The hydropower plans for the Yarlung come at a time when other infrastructural devel-
opment has taken place or will soon be completed. By 2012 the electricity grid in
Tibet will be connected to the national grid through Qinghai. The Qinghai–Tibet rail-
way has now made it possible to move materials for building large dams on the Yarlung.
The Chinese now have a clear policy direction on the Yarlung and with energy supply
becoming ever more pressured, the time and conditions are ripe to develop the rich
 50 Uttam Kumar Sinha

hydropower resources of Tibet and adopt a no-holds-barred approach for taking total
and complete political control of Tibet.
The most disturbing and controversial project is the Shoutian (or ‘reverse flow’)
Canal, announced by Jiang Zemin in 1999 as the ‘xibu da kaifa’ (the Great Western
Extraction). The plan proposes to transport 206 billion cubic metres of water from the
Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), or roughly 33 per cent of the flow, into the Yellow
river and then supply it to the northwestern part of China.58 The fact that these great
transfers and projects have been conceived by the Chinese army—the brainchild of
Guo Kai, a general in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—adds to apprehensions
regarding military designs, though it cannot be doubted that such projects stem ‘from
a supply first mentality’ for ensuring water for increased food production.59
Guo Ki inspired Li Ling’s book How Tibet’s Water Will Save China, and suggesting
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the Shoutian Canal as the solution for chronic water shortages in China’s dry north and
northwest. The plan proposes that:

A dam at Shoumatan Point will back up water that will plunge 2,000m through 15km of tunnels
near Dagmo and discharge through 26 of the world’s biggest turbines into a tributary rejoining
the river bed and reservoir of the storage dam north of Medog. At twice the capacity of the
Three Gorges, the 40GW pumped storage facility will be the world’s largest hydroelectric
facility. After diverting the original 33 per cent, the volume of returned water will determine
the residual river flow from the holding dam.60

The dam at Shoumatan Point (the Great Bend) in all likelihood will not take off,
given the escalating costs, technical challenges and seismic risks. However, this is
not to proclaim that water diversions will vanish from China’s water planning. New
diversion plans and proposals will always be thought of and considered given China’s
extreme water crisis. It is not surprising that the water resource ministry is considering
a proposal, which has the backing of many scientists,61 to shift the waters of the
Yarlung further upstream along a course that follows the Tibet–Qinghai railway to
Golmud and then finally to Xinjiang in the northwest.62 This only reinforces the point
that the Chinese legacy of an engineering-centric and supply-side dominant mindset is
hard to break.
Over the years, China’s great technology leap in the area of water development has
given it strategic width in the region. While it is easy to deplore the dams, however
convincing the argument is, such structures and the benefits that accrue from them are
attractive for development. China’s expertise and knowledge of dam building helps
to enhance its power and influence and importantly weakens lower riparian coalition.
Chinese banks and firms are involved in the construction of 251 dams in 68 different
countries.63 Dam building is an industry and the state-owned Sinohydro Corporation,
the world’s largest dam builder, has 107 hydro-projects in 49 countries.64

Similarities on the Mekong/Lancang

China is only a dialogue partner in the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which
was formed in 1995 to address the concerns of four lower riparian countries—Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Twenty-two per cent of the river is located in China
and it withdraws 26 per cent of the waters annually from the Lancang (Mekong) and
plans to harness about 15 GW of power from the river.65 Though China’s non-binding
participation in the Mekong basin has increased, it is unthinkable that it will join the
 Strategic Analysis 51

MRC as an active member. Sitting on the sidelines and not being committed to any
formal arrangement gives China the power to observe and comment without being
bound or responsible. Moreover, China’s hydropower development on the Lancang
(Mekong) is typically based on restricted information and no transparency. China plans
15 dams on the river, of which at least two will be of mega size. The Xiaowan dam is to
be completed in 2012 and will be second only to the Three Gorges.66 Clearly the dams
will have a widespread impact on the lower riparian states. Also, the western route of
the ‘south-to-north’ diversion project involves diverting water from the upper Lancang
to the Yangtze river.
The Mekong lower riparian countries remain suspicious of China’s power game and
upstream hydroelectricity projects. China as the upper riparian player would like the
water debate in the lower Mekong basin to intensify between the lower riparian states
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just as it likes the water debate in Pakistan and Bangladesh to be with India, without
highlighting its own hydro-projects either on the Indus or the Yarlung Tsangpo. For
China, not being transparent on its dams is a ploy, despite the fact that under interna-
tional law countries downstream of a river are entitled to be fully informed. China’s
dams and water diversions are important components of its hydro-hegemony. On the
one hand, they can be an effective bargaining tool for dealing with countries like India,
with whom China has testy political relations. On the other hand, hydro-diplomacy
through partnership on dam construction and infrastructural development helps it to
widen and deepen its influence and weaken lower riparian coalitions.

Counter-hydro-hegemony strategy
Power asymmetry is a fact of realpolitik but it need not be completely subjugating.
Counter-hegemonic tactics and strategies can move a disadvantaged riparian party into
a position where it can change the rules of the game or bring in a level of parity.
However, dealing with a superior riparian player requires a fully thought out approach.
China’s hegemonic path is currently ‘dominance by coercion’. In the next 30 years it
would aspire to be a regional leader buttressed by authority and respect. It must also be
noted that China has been successful in effectively mixing ‘cohesion and compliance’
with ‘attraction and intimidation’, what Gramsci termed ‘a mix of force and consent’.67
To counter-balance China’s hydro-hegemony, it is critically important to under-
stand its intentions and accordingly frame policies that are not reactive but perceptive.
China is aware of its supreme riparian position, and it also frames it strategically. India,
given its power parity, is the rightful counter-balancer in spite of its position as a lower
riparian.
A typical recourse is to advocate the principles of international water law, however
non-binding they are. Raising concerns through such norms alerts and sensitises the
international community in spite of the fact that issues of ‘equitable utilisation’ and
‘limited sovereignty’ are always difficult and uncomfortable to agree upon. The prin-
ciple of ‘information exchange, notification and consultation’ is crucially important in
dealing with China given the nature of the dams and water diversions. For example,
withholding data on the flows of the rivers or on plans for building storages or dams or
projects that divert water comes under the ‘no harm rules’. India’s own water-sharing
structures with its neighbours, Pakistan and Bangladesh, are quite exceptional and take
due consideration of the ‘no harm rules’. There is a high moral ground here that India
can take but it has to shrug off its defensive stance over China’s water development on
the Tibetan rivers for which India also has a rightful use.
 52 Uttam Kumar Sinha

Importantly, India is not only one river downstream with China. This makes India’s
riparian relations with China exceptional and critical. India is multi-river dependent on
the Brahmaputra in the east and the Indus and the Sutlej in the west. The Ganges, which
originates in India, has nine tributaries joining it from Nepal, three of which—Karnali,
Gandaki and Kosi—arise in Tibet. Some figures indicate that about 354 billion cubic
cubic (bcm) metres of water flows into India from Tibet, of which 131 bcm is accounted
for by the Brahmaputra (the low-end figure is 78.10 bcm). If the goal of diplomacy is to
turn potential water conflict into constructive engagement, then a water dialogue with
China is necessary. Jairam Ramesh, India’s environment minister, reacting to the run-
of-the-river project at Zangmu remarked that any upstream project ‘would be difficult
for India to accept . . .’. He further said, ‘we don’t have a water-sharing treaty but we
have now begun the process of discussions on the exchange of hydrological data. This
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is the first step forward. India needed to continue discussion on water issue’.68
Critical for India is the fact that it has to articulate its middle riparian position to
change the perception in the neighbourhood that India is a ‘water hegemon’. A con-
structive response for India would be to increase its storage capacity. Water storage per
person (in cubic metres) in India is about 200, which can store about 30 days of rain-
fall. The US has roughly 6000 cubic metres per person and China almost 2500.69 India
needs to strengthen its storage capacity to a reasonable and sustainable level based
on proper environmental impact assessment and not by entering into a dam race with
China on the Yarlung/Brahmaputra. This is important, as India needs to take into con-
sideration the concerns of Bangladesh. India’s counter-diplomacy should be to isolate
China as an unreasonable upper riparian at the regional and global level.
Any counter-strategy in relation to China has to be well nuanced and not always
framed in legalistic terms. Some would argue that India should play the power game
through managing and engaging China.70 This has significant political value when
dealing with China over the Tibetan water resources. By raising the issue, however
contested it might be, that China alone cannot be the stakeholder of the waters in Tibet,
gives India the opportunity to reconsider its Tibet policy. Rajiv Sikri notes: ‘India could
state that it considers Tibet, as an autonomous region, to be a part of the territory
of the People’s Republic of China—the implication being that it is only if Tibet is a
truly autonomous region that India recognises it as a part of China’.71 If China wants
to keep its relationship with India adversarial then India should keep its Tibet policy
ambiguous. Sujit Dutta says: ‘India’s repeated reiteration that Tibet is a part of China
has not helped to clinch the territorial bargain. There has neither been corresponding
reciprocity from China nor has it helped in building trust. India thus needs to nuance
its current strategy’.72
Tibet has also to be viewed from an ecological perspective and the glacial melting
has added new concerns and challenges. There are crucial sustainability and ecologi-
cal issues that can potentially affect millions of people downstream. Terming the water
resources in Tibet as a ‘commons’ would draw international attention and possibly
prompt China into a water dialogue with the downstream countries on ways to preserve
and share the benefits of the waters of Tibet.73 It needs to be remembered that China
has a strong environmental constituency with activists, scientists and journalists, who
despite odds, are sensitising local people and authorities to ecological concerns. Tibet’s
ecology has been a key issue for civil society and powerful environmental groups like
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) to campaign for Tibet as a
vulnerable area to be protected from rampant resource exploitation. In fact in 2003,
 Strategic Analysis 53

7.1 million hectares in Yunnan province, where the upper reaches of the Yangtze,
Lancang and Nujiang run parallel, was declared a World Heritage site. Interestingly,
China has ratified the Convention on the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage which was adopted by the UNESCO in 1972.74

Conclusion
China’s upper riparian position and its enormous domestic requirement make water
a strategic resource in the region and as such evokes different levels of fear and
misperception are seen. China values water and its utilisation as fundamental to
its development, its greatest achievement being to lift more than 400 million people
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out of abject poverty in three decades through economic growth at breakneck speed.
It will need to continue with that and therefore will continue needing water. Dams of
course are one thing, water diversion schemes another and India has to be watchful.
Diplomatically, India needs to draw China into a water dialogue and raise the issue
not only bilaterally but also multilaterally by involving Bangladesh. The principle of
‘information exchange, notification and consultation’ and the principles of ‘no harm’
are sound points on which to engage with China.
For China diversions perhaps are necessary but what will be critically important for
the leadership is to weigh up their potential economic, social and environmental effects.
This is China’s great internal paradox. Externally, however, Beijing will continue to
perceive its peripheral states as potential rivals and any counterpoint, for example
raising the pitch by demanding that the Tibetan rivers be treated as ‘commons’, will
undoubtedly be anathema to the Chinese leadership. In a realist perspective, China’s
water development approach in Tibet is unilateral, allowing little space for dialogue
and accommodation, and is bound to affect downstream riparians both in terms of
water flow and ecological considerations.

Notes
1. ‘Rise’ gave a negative connotation and the Chinese leaders deliberately changed it to ‘Peaceful
Development’ of China in 2005.
2. See Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’, The Chinese
Journal of International Politics, 3(1), 2010, pp. 5–36. See the correspondence ‘Debating
China’s “Peaceful Rise”?’, between Zhang Xiaoming and Barry Buzan, The Chinese Journal
of International Politics, 3(4), 2010, pp. 447–460.
3. For the full length interview see Isabel Hilton, ‘A Mistrustful Neighbourhood’, Chinadialogue,
at http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/3639.
4. Ramaswamy Iyer, cited in Ananth Krishnan, ‘India, China and Water Security’, The Hindu,
October 20, 2009, at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article36468.ece.
5. Brahma Chellaney, cited in Krishnan, ‘India, China and Water Security’.
6. Isabel Hilton, ‘Land of Blue Gold’, New Statesman, January 18, 2010, at http://www.
newstatesman.com/asia/2010/01/india-china-tibet-chinese.
7. J. Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analysing International Politics, 3rd edition, Praeger
Publishers, New York, 1978, p. 11.
8. David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International
Security, 29(3), 2004–2005, p. 64.
9. A phrase taken from Gerald Segal’s, ‘China Does Matter’, Foreign Affairs, 78(5), 1999,
pp. 24–36.
10. Since 1978, China has averaged 9.4 per cent annual GDP growth, one of the highest growth
rates in the world. This is impressive because in 1978 it accounted for less than 1 per cent of the
world economy. However, it can be debated whether China’s development has been broad and
 54 Uttam Kumar Sinha

even. See Zeng Bijian, ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’, Foreign Affairs, 84(5),
2005, pp. 18–24.
11. Claudia Sadoff, Thomas Grieber, Mark Smith, and Ger Bergkamp, Share: Managing Water
across Boundaries, IUCN Report, Gland, 2008, p. 6.
12. Ibid. Also see Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon University, at http://www.
transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/interfreshtreatdata.html.
13. Riparian nations, those nations ‘across which or along which a river flows, have legal rights to
use the water of river’. ‘Law, International Water’, at http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/LaMi/
Law-International-Water.html.
14. While this is enshrined in the UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses (1997), it is not binding because the convention is not in force, with only 24 coun-
tries having ratified it (as of 17 July 2011). To come into force it requires ratification of
35 countries. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved the UN Convention
by 104–3 in 1997. There is also the ‘no-harm rule’ in the convention, which states that riparian
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nations are to take all ‘appropriate measures’ to prevent causing harm to other watercourse
nations.
15. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005.
16. See in particular Marwa Doudy, ‘The Water Divide between Syria, Turkey and Iraq:
Negotiation, Security and Power Asymmetry’, CNRS Editions, Paris.
17. S. Guzzini, ‘The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis’, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 33(3), 2005, pp. 495–521.
18. The London Water Research Group (LWRG) led by Mark Zeitoun and J.A. Allen at the LSE
and SOAS since 2005 has, through the participation of experts, examined and interrogated the
concept of power and hegemony to trans-boundary water. The LWRG applied Steven Lukes’
concept of power. See Mark Zietoun and J.A. Allan, ‘Applying Hegemony and Power Theory
to Transboundary Water Analysis’, Water Policy, 10 Supplement 2, 2008, p. 7. Also see Keith
Bowding, ‘Three-dimensional Power: A Discussion of Steven Lukes’ Power: A Radical View’,
Political Studies Review, 4, 2006, pp. 136–145.
19. Zeitoun and Allen, ‘Applying Hegemony and Power Theory to Transboundary Water Analysis’.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-hegemony: A Framework of Analysis of
Transboundary Water Conflict’, Water Policy, 8, 2006, p. 435.
22. Ibid., p. 435.
23. Sandra Postel and Aaron Wolf, ‘Dehydrating Conflict’, Foreign Policy, 126, 2001, p. 61.
24. ‘China Will Never Seek Hegemony, Says Premier Wen’, Malaysian National News Agency, at
http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsgeneral.php?id=581905.
25. China for some time has been viewed as a ‘potential hegemon’ and, as John Mearsheimer
notes, only seeks to achieve domination when the costs are low. John Mearsheimer, “Back
to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15(1), 1990,
p. 37. Orville Schell writes in Asia Society about how to work with a more combative
China. See http://asiasociety.org/blog/reasia/orville-schell-tarnished-us-needs-learn-how-work-
more-combative-china.
26. See Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘China as Regional Hegemon?’, at http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/
Godwin,%20China%20as%20a%20Regional%20Hegemon.pdf.
27. See Andrew Lawler, ‘Beyond the Yellow River’, Science, 325(5943), August 21, 2009, p. 325.
28. ‘Formation of the Chinese Civilisation’, at http://www.china.org.cn/e-gudai/2.htm.
29. ‘River Dynasties in China’, at http://cdaworldhistory.wikidot.com/river-dynasties-in-china.
Also see ‘Ancient History of China’, at http://folk.uio.no/huut/xia.html.
30. See UNESCO World Heritage Convention Site, at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1001. Also see
Marta Ponseti and Jordi Lopez-Pujol, ‘The Three Gorges Dam Project in China: History and
Consequences’, at http://www.raco.cat/index.php/HMiC/article/viewFile/57768/67739.
31. Cited in Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s Growing Water Crisis, World Politics Review, August 9,
2011, at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9684/chinas-growing-water-crisis.
32. The full verse of Swimming along with Mao’s other poems can be found on Wikipedia, at http://
maoist.wikia.com/wiki/Selected_Poem’s_of_Mao_Zedong. Also see Jonathan Spence, ‘Mao
Zedong’, Time, April 13, 1998, at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988161-
1,00.html; and Richard Solomon, ‘The Chairman’s Historic Swim’, Time, September 27, 1999,
at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054250,00.html.
 Strategic Analysis 55

33. For a wide coverage of human nature understanding during Mao, see Judith Shapiro, Mao’s
War against Nature: Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2001.
34. Hu Jintao was a hydraulic engineer having worked on the construction of the Liujiaxia hydro-
electricity station in the 1960s. Wen Jiabao’s professional background is in geology and
engineering.
35. Peter Ho, ‘Mao’s War against Nature? The Environmental Impact of the Grain-First Campaign
in China’, The China Journal, 50, July 2003, p. 34.
36. Data and figures are from the Ministry of Water Resources, People’s Republic of China, Annual
Report 2007–2008, pp. 9–10, at http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/2007-2008.doc.
37. Ibid.
38. The CPC Central Committee and the State Council’s Number 1 Document for 2011 (unofficial
translation), at http://gain.fas.usdo.gov/Recent%20GAIN%.
39. ‘Independent’ in terms of rivers originating in its territory and not being ‘dependent’ on the
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headwaters from other countries.

40. See George Ginsburg and Michiel Mathos, Communist China and Tibet: The First Dozen Years,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.
41. Except for being a dialogue partner in the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The Lancang
River begins in the northeastern side of the Tanggula mountains in Qinhai province, flows
through Tibet into Yunnan province, and is called the Mekong River when it flows out in Mengla
county in Yunnan province. The Mekong runs all the way through Myanmar, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam and empties into the South China Sea
near Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. The Lancang–Mekong River is 4880.3 km long; the section of
the Lancang River in China is 2161.1 km long. So far, 25 major projects have been listed—
14 projects inside China, four inside Laos, four along the borders of Laos and Thailand and
Laos and Cambodia and three projects inside Cambodia. These dams are estimated to produce
70 per cent of China’s current electricity needs.
42. http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/gjjl.html.
43. The other two were Turkey and Burundi.
44. Cited in James Nickum, ‘The Status of the South to North Water Transfer Plans in
China’, at http://hdr.undp:org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/james_nickum_china_water_
transfer.pdf.
45. See ‘South-to-North Water Diversion Project’, at http://www.water-technology.net/projects/
south_north/.
46. Xinhua news report, April 27, 2011, Ministry of Water Resources, The People’s Republic of
China, at http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/Medianews/201104/t20110406_258052.html.
47. Xinhua, January 24, 2011.
48. Ibid.
49. See People’s Daily online, at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7275037.
html.
50. Gal Luft, ‘Fueling the Dragon: China’s Race into the Oil Market’, at http://www.iags.org/china.
htm.
51. See http://www.our-energy.com/china_hydropower_as_the_right_solution.html.
52. The Yarlung originates in the Jima Yangzong glacier near Mount Kailash in Tibet and enters
into Arunachal as Dihang. It then flows southwest through the Assam valley as the Brahmaputra
and south through Bangladesh as the Jamuna. There it merges with the Ganges and then splits
into two two—the Padma and the Meghna Meghna—to form a vast delta, the Sunderbans.
53. He Haining and Jiang Yannan, ‘A New Era for Tibet’s Rivers’, Chinadialogue, at http://www.
chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4055-A-new-era-for-Tibet-s-rivers.
54. Chinese research and study has always delved into the possibility of building the world’s
largest hydropower station in Tibet. For example, Chen Chuanyou’s article, ‘Could the World’s
Biggest Hydropower Station be Built in Tibet?’ in Guangming Daily in 1998, cited in Claud
Arpi, ‘Damming the Brahmaputra’, Uday India, February 2011, at http://www.udayindia.org/
content_12Feb2011/focus.html. In 2002 Chen published another paper in Engineering Sciences
looking at the positive impact of the hydro-development in the Great Bend in the south-
east Asian region, cited in Jiang Yannan and He Haining, ‘A New Era for Tibet’s Rivers’,
Chradialogue, January 17, 2011.
 56 Uttam Kumar Sinha

55. Yannan and Haining, ‘A New Era for Tibet’s Rivers’. Zangmu will be the fourth in a row of
five on the Sangri to Gyaca stretch of the river. Several well-known Chinese hydropower firms
have already made their way into Tibet.
56. Yannan and Haining, ‘A new era for Tibet’s river’.
57. See Chinese 11th Five Year Plan (2006–2010), at http://www.gov.cn/english/special/115y_
index.htm.
58. M.S. Menon, ‘China’s Power Play’, The Tribune, January 28, 2011. Also see Jonathan Watts,
When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind, Faber and Faber, London,
2009. Also see Arthur Thomas, ‘Diverting the Brahmaputra’, Australia e-Journal of Social and
Political Debate, May 2, 2008, at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=7310.
59. Molly Walton, ‘The Importance of Ecological Security for Protective Security’, Josef Korbel
Journal of Advanced International Studies, p. 61, at http://www.du.edu/korbel/jais/journal/
volume2/volume2_walton.pdf.
60. See Arthur Thomas, ‘Diverting the Brahmaputra’. See also ‘Controversial Plan to Tap Tibetan
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Waters’, China.Org., at http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/177295.html.

61. One of the scientists is Wang Guangqian from the Chinese Academy of Sciences. See ‘China
Considers Diverting the Brahmaputra’, 2point6billion.com, June 8, 2011, at http://www.
2point6billion.com/news/2011/06/08/china-to-consider-diverting-the-brahmaputra-river-9430.
html.
62. ‘Diversion Debate’, Chinadialogue, June 13, 2011, at http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/
show/single/en/4349-Diversion-debate.
63. ‘China’s Global Role’, at http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/china/chinas-global-role.
64. ‘China’s Leading Hydropower Dam Company’, at http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/china/
chinas-global-role/sinohydro-corporation.
65. CSCAP meeting on ‘water resources security’ in Hanoi, March 23–24, 2011. Presentation
by Zhou Shichun, deputy secretary general ESCIR (Ecosystem Study Commission for
International Rivers). Also see ‘China Hydropower Dams in Mekong Give Shocks to
60 Million’, Bloomberg, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-26/china-hydropower-
dams-in-mekong-river-give-shocks-to-60-million.html.
66. Michael Richardson, ‘Rivers Know No Borders, But Dams Do’, Yale Global, July 16, 2009, at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/dams-china-turn-mekong-river-discord.
67. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (translated by Quintin Hoare and
Geottrey Nowell Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971. See also Mark Zeitoun,
Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner, ‘Transbounderry Water Interaction II: The Influence of
“Soft Power”’, International Environment Agreements, 11, 2011, p. 164.
68. The statement was quoted in The Hindu, May 10, 2010.
69. World Bank, ‘Shoring up Water Infrastructure’, at http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,contentMDK:20668507~page
PK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:295584,00.html.
70. Sujit Dutta, ‘Managing and Engaging Rising China: India’s Evolving Posture’, Washington
Quarterly, 34(2), 2011, pp. 127–144.
71. Rajiv Sikri, ‘India Needs to Change its Tibet Policy’, rediffnews, March 27, 2008, at http://
www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/27guest.htm.
72. Sujit Dutta, ‘China’s High Risk India Gamble’, IDSA Comment, September 3, 2010, at http://
www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasHighRiskIndiaGamble_sdutta_030910.
73. Uttam Kumar Sinha, ‘Tibet’s Watershed Challenge’, The Washington Post, June 14, 2010.
74. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1083.