Journal of Contemporary China

ISSN: 1067-0564 (Print) 1469-9400 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjcc20

Hedging and Geostrategic Balance of East Asian

Countries toward China

Suisheng Zhao & Xiong Qi

To cite this article: Suisheng Zhao & Xiong Qi (2016): Hedging and Geostrategic
Balance of East Asian Countries toward China, Journal of Contemporary China, DOI:
10.1080/10670564.2015.1132684

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132684

Published online: 02 Mar 2016.

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 Journal of Contemporary China, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132684

Hedging and Geostrategic Balance of East Asian Countries toward

China
Suisheng Zhaoa and Xiong Qib
a
University of Denver, USA; bXiamen University, China

ABSTRACT
While most East Asian countries have opted for a hedge strategy to preserve
a maximum range of strategic options in response to the rise of China,
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some countries have engaged in geostrategic balance through collective

bargaining and strategic alignments with the US and with each other. The
divergent threat perceptions and complicated historical animosities among
East Asian countries, however, have set a limitation on the geostrategic
balance. Therefore, to bandwagon with China could be a realistic choice for
many countries. Historically, the most successful rising powers have been
those which attracted the greatest number of bandwagoners. China cannot
rise successfully without winning the support of its Asian neighbors. The
long term peace and stability in the region, therefore, depends not only
on whether China’s neighbors can work together to balance China but also
whether China can balance its relationships in its own backyard so that its
neighbors find bandwagoning a positive choice.

While China has reassured that it will never seek hegemony and rise peacefully, the wariness about
China’s great power aspiration is increasingly pervasive among many of China’s neighbors, who have
witnessed China’s muscular behavior in defense of its core national interests, during the territorial dis-
putes in the South and East China Seas. But a proximate and increasingly powerful China is a matter of
geopolitical fate. The asymmetric distribution of power severely limits the choice of China’s neighbors.
While very few are willing to live under China’s shadow, none of them can match China’s resources and
potential to balance Chinese power by building up their own capabilities or forming countervailing
military alliances. Most Asian countries have opted for a hedge strategy to maximize benefits from
engaging China, while preserving a maximum range of strategic options.
However, some of China’s neighbors have engaged in geostrategic balance, which, similar to the
soft balance or ‘institutional balance’,1 focuses on diplomatic maneuvers, making collective bargaining
and strategic alignments with the US and with each other, to channel China’s power aspiration through
international institutions and norms. One step harder than soft balance, which is limited, tacit and
indirect in a low intensity of competition with China,2 geostrategic balance confronts China directly
to check China’s ambitions for territorial aggrandizement. The countries in the territorial disputes with
China have been mostly active in pursuing geostrategic balance, but the divergent threat perceptions

CONTACT Xiong Qi plove250@live.cn

1
Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, ‘Waiting for balancing, why the world is not pushing back’, International Security 30(1), (2005),
p. 125.
2
Kai He, ‘China’s peaceful rise and multilateral institutions: in search of a harmonious world’, in Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard,
eds, Harmonious World and China’s New Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), p. 67.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
 2 S. Zhao and X. Qi

and complicated historical animosities among East Asian countries have set a limitation on the geo-
strategic balance. To bandwagon with China, therefore, could be a realistic choice for many countries.
Historically, bandwagoning with a rising power is common because of potentially great relative gains.
The most successful rising powers have been those that have ‘attracted the greatest number of band-
wagoners’.3 China cannot rise successfully without winning the support of its Asian neighbors based on
mutual trust, respect, cooperation and the rule of international law. The long term peace and stability
in the region, therefore, depends not only on whether China’s neighbors can work together to balance
China’s great power aspiration but also whether China can balance its relationships in its own backyard
so that its neighbors find bandwagoning a positive choice.

Regional hedge and minimum deterrence

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, China implemented a good neighboring policy which empha-
sized shared interests and replaced a weak and isolated position regarding neighboring countries. This
policy significantly improved relations with most of its neighbors in the last two decades of the twentieth
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century, but a more powerful China in the twenty-first century has become more willing to leverage
its capabilities and more likely to develop malicious intentions to forcefully pursue its expanded core
interests. The statement by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) that ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact’ unnerved
its neighbors about the prospect of China seeking to regain its historical preeminence in the region.4
Worrying about whether China will try to establish its exclusive sphere of influence, a Chinese ver-
sion of the Monroe Doctrine, China’s neighbors have to make a strategic choice. At the two ends of the
spectrum are to bandwagon with the giant, and to build military capacities to deter China. When China
implemented the good neighboring policy, some of China’s neighbors were prepared to make some
type of bandwagon to accommodate China, as they saw China’s rise had no significant negative impli-
cations for the regional order. China’s new pattern of assertiveness, however, brought back the memory
of China’s historical predominance and raised the question about feasibility of the bandwagon choice.
Very few, if any, Asian countries, wish to live under a Pax Sinica, but most of them hesitate to confront
China directly because China’s economic dynamism is so central to the prosperity of the region. Torn
between the economic benefits and the sense of security threat from China, most Asian countries have
cultivated a middle position, or hedge strategy, for contingencies in which they cannot decide upon
straightforward alternatives, and thus avoid having to choose one stance at the expense of another.
Constrained by limited resources, the delicate hedge starts from building minimum deterrence or a
moderate denial capability. The countries in territorial disputes with China are most active in building
minimum deterrence. Although Article 9 of the Japanese constitution explicitly renounces Japan’s
right to wage war as a means of settling international disputes and outlaws the maintenance of an
offensive military force, Japan has steadily loosened the constraints on its security policy and strived
to build a respectable deterrence to deal with possible contingencies on its southern islands facing
China’s military presence. After the 1995 Defense White Paper publically mentioned, for the first time,
growing Chinese military might, Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) described
China’s military modernization and ‘expanding maritime activities in the region’s surrounding waters’
as a matter of growing concern. The strategic outlook driving the NDPG portrayed a security environ-
ment in which the United States was less capable of providing deterrence in the ‘gray zones’ of Japan’s
disputed territories and waters, necessitating Japan to step up its own defense capabilities. Building
‘dynamic defense capabilities’, Japan was able to shift the defense focus from the north, where the
Soviet Union was the threat during the Cold War, to the southern island chain, which includes the

3
Randall Schweller, ‘Rise of great powers: history and theory’, in Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, eds, Engaging China: The
Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 10.
4
John Pomfret, ‘US takes a tougher tone with China’, Washington Post, (30 July 2010), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html (accessed 13 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  3

disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and develop a mobile and flexible force structure better coordinated
in response to contingencies. A substantial transformation of Japan’s weapons platforms was called
upon, with considerable reductions in tanks and artillery, while bolstering the number of submarines,
Aegis destroyers, surface to air missiles, fighter aircraft and air transport.5
The cost of reconstruction and decontamination in Japan’s Northern provinces due to the earth-
quake, tsunami and nuclear disaster in early 2011 increased constraints on defense budgets, but Japan
showed no signs of changing the direction of military transformation. Japan’s 2011 Defense White
Paper expressed strong concern about China’s growing maritime activities that could arouse ‘anxiety
about its future direction’ as exemplified by its ‘overbearing reactions’ to Asian neighbors. The military
transformation gained new momentum after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to office in 2012. The
Defense White Paper in July 2013 listed territorial defense against Chinese military activities as a key
rationale for the 0.8% defense budget increase for the first time since 2003. The defense priority was
now ‘independence’ rather than ‘peace and safety’ that was stressed before.6
Japan’s ambition to transform its military force, however, faces serious constraints. Japan has one of
the most rapidly aging populations in the world, which means not only that its tax base is shrinking and
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its pension and healthcare costs are mounting, but also that it has a shrinking pool to draw soldiers from
and a squeezed government budget for defense spending. The increase in the 2013 defense budget was
tiny, coming after years of decline due to the country’s economic malaise. A decade of budget cuts and
a struggling economy had weakened Japan’s military capacities. Although Washington prodded Tokyo
on sharing the defense burden and not being a free rider of the US-led regional security arrangements,
Japan held zero budget growth for many years although inflation and growing personnel costs had
eaten away its ability to procure new platforms. With the highest per-soldier defense spending in Asia,
personnel costs accounted for around 45% of Japan’s total defense expenditures after 2000. Japan’s
lifetime employment policy made layoffs and pension cuts virtually impossible. The hard constraints
on personnel expenditure squeezed the equipment procurement budget. Extending the life of military
hardware, maintenance costs skyrocketed.7
It is therefore hard for Japan to match the resources of and keep pace with China’s military mod-
ernization. Even accounting for the 0.8% increase in the 2013 budget, Japan’s annual defense budget
declined over 5% in the decade. Sustaining double-digit budget increases for more than two decades,
China overtook Japan as Asia’s top spender in 2005. In US dollar terms, Japan’s defense budget was
63% larger than China’s in 2000, but barely one-third the size of China’s in 2012. One survey estimated
that the Chinese held a vast advantage in sheer numbers of vessels and planes: China had 970 ships
and 2,580 aircraft while Japan had 141 ships and 410 aircraft. Although China’s numerical superiority
does not necessarily translate into operational superiority, as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
remained ahead in technology and the experience and expertise of its personnel, the edge is certainly
fading. The modernization of China’s navy, and the emphasis on maritime strength by the Chinese
government, made the Japanese ‘very nervous’.8
Many Southeast Asian countries also launched defense self-reliance efforts after the end of the
Cold War, initially fearful of the security vacuum created by the planned withdrawal of the US forces
and then of China’s military modernization, which was bound not only to consolidate its superiority
vis-à-vis Southeast Asian countries but also to erode the US security umbrella. The Asian financial crisis
of 1997–1998 dampened their military expenditure and weapons acquisitions for a while but their
increase in defense expenses resumed after the crisis. What was new in this wave of military build-up

5
Kentaro Kawaguchi, ‘Defense policy shifting focus to China’s military’, Asahi Shimbun, (11 December 2010), available at:
http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/defense-policy-shifting-focus-to-chinas-military.html (accessed 1 November 2015).
6
Toshiya Takahashi, ‘Japan’s 2013 defense white paper stirs tensions with China’, East Asia Forum, (31 July 2013), available at: http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/31/japans-2013-defence-white-paper-stirs-tensions-with-china/ (accessed 13 October 2015).
7
Philippe de Koning and Phillip Y. Lipscy, ‘The land of the sinking sun, is Japan’s military weakness putting America in danger?’, Foreign
Policy, (5 August 2013), available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/30/the-land-of-the-sinking-sun/ (accessed 1 November
2015).
8
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013, (14 March 2013), available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/
publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2013-2003 (accessed 13 October 2015).
 4 S. Zhao and X. Qi

was that it went far beyond the simple replacement of the obsolete weaponry with more sophisticated
versions, scrambling to add new capacities by buying submarines and jet fighters to protect maritime
resources and offshore territories.
One prominent case is Vietnam, which embarked an ambitious military modernization to trans-
form a traditionally land-based force and build a naval and air force amid rising tensions with China.
Nothing better illustrates the Vietnamese desire to upgrade its military capacity than the purchase of
six diesel–electric Kilo-class submarines at US$2.4 billion from Russia in 2010. The decision to procure
six Kilos, which are among the quietest available and exceptionally stealthy vessels for spying as well
as hunting and attacking rival ships and submarines, demonstrated the intent to establish a fully oper-
ational capability that could offer continuous naval presence otherwise difficult with a smaller fleet.
Vietnam also signed a contract with Canada to purchase six DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 aircraft and
purchased radar, helicopters and army transport aircraft from France. Although this capability will not
fundamentally alter the naval balance of power given the growing overall edge of China’s submarine
capabilities, Vietnam sought to build a ‘Least Limited Sea Control Capabilities’, the components of an
‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) capability.9
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Similarly, the Philippines have tried to modernize their armed forces (AFP), which were initially
organized primarily as an internal security force against the secessionist insurgencies. The Philippines’
Congress approved the Military Modernization Act in 1996, focusing on acquisition and upgrade of
essential naval and aerial materiel to transform AFP into a territorial and maritime defense force. The
rampant corruption in the military and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, however, derailed the plan.
The Philippines found themselves as one of the weakest members of ASEAN in both military capability
and defense expenditure. While most Philippine fighter jets dated from before the Vietnam War, most
of the country’s tiny naval and coast guard fleet dated from World War II. As an archipelagic country
comprising 7,107 islands, the navy badly needs ships to patrol its vast territorial waters.10
In the midst of the tensions with China over the disputed waters, the Benigno Aquino administration
assumed office in July 2010 and vigorously pursued defense modernization. In his first months as pres-
ident, Aquino disbursed more than US$395 million on AFP modernization projects compared with an
average of only US$51 million annually during the previous 15 years. Some 140 procurement projects
valued at US$1.8 billion, including plans to reopen air and naval bases at Subic Bay and build Oyster
Bay, were allocated in 2013. This increase in defense spending is a big leap from its previous poorly
funded status. A joint task force was set up to formulate the AFP Long-Term Capability Development
Plan, which envisioned the Philippines Navy (PN) obtaining multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol
craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Specifically, it involves the upgrade of
the PN for ‘joint maritime surveillance, defense, and interdiction operations in the South China Sea’.11
Some other Southeast Asian countries have also increased defense capacities. Malaysia paid more
than US$1 billion for two diesel submarines from France. The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) created a
marine corps and established a new naval base in Bintulu, located 60 miles from the James Shoal, an
area in the South China Sea claimed by both Malaysia and China. It also bought from the US the landing
platform deck USS Denver in 2014. A Time magazine article refers to these high profile maritime defense
acquisitions as an ‘unprecedented shopping spree’.12
None of the Southeast Asian countries, however, can afford the extremely high costs to match China
for military build-up. Although the Vietnam navy has made notable strides in acquiring new hardware
to replace the aging equipment, the force modernization is primarily to deny an adversary access to

9
Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘Lessons from the battle of the Paracel Islands’, The Diplomat, (23 January 2014), available at:
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/lessons-from-the-battle-of-the-paracel-islands/ (accessed 13 October 2015).
10
Ava Patricia C. Avila,‘Philippines’defense build-up: revival of the self-reliant posture’, RSIS Commentaries no. 125, (12 July 2012), available at:
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1787-philippines-defence-build-up/#.VczaN7d0yM8 (accessed 13 October 2015).
11
Renato De Castro and Walter Lohman, ‘US–Philippines partnership in the cause of maritime defense’, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder no. 2593, (8 August 2011), available at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/08/US-Philippines-
Partnership-in-the-Cause-of-Maritime-Defense (accessed 19 October 2015).
12
Andrew Marshall, ‘Military maneuvers’, Time, (27 September 2010), available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/arti-
cle/09171201953400.html#ixzz15xzrdY5z (accessed 19 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  5

the disputed zone and does not suggest an ability to secure Vietnam’s own access.13 While Vietnam
purchased Kilo-class submarines in 2010, China has operated the Kilos since the 1990s and possesses a
huge submarine fleet that stands poised to further widen the gap with Vietnam. Hanoi knows it could
never match the Chinese navy, but the acquisition of new equipment will make them think very hard
before any attempt to, for example, drive Vietnam off some of their Spratly Islands holdings, ‘to factor
in losing ships’.14 The Vietnamese bought the offensive submarines and ramped up its minimum air
and sea deterrent capabilities to say ‘We’re serious’.15
The AFP also faced many barriers in the transformation to territorial defense of its maritime waters.
Considerable resources are required but the Philippine Congress is reluctant to allocate its limited
budget for a major military overhaul. In 2010, the PN announced its plan to acquire seven vessels to
conduct patrols in the nearby waters. With 70% of the PN’s annual budget eaten up by personnel sala-
ries, maintenance and operating expenses, the planned purchase was delayed due to the unavailability
of funds. Far behind Chinese military, the AFP may never catch up by its own resources. China spent
US$129 billion on its armed forces in 2011, 58 times as much as the Philippines, and the gap has been
widen. Plagued by the limited resources, the Aquino administration declared its strategic objective as
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a minimum credible defense posture and modest deterrent capacity: a comprehensive border patrol
system, not an aggressive naval war-fighting capacity. The PAF’s capabilities are designed for joint
operations in maritime defense and interdiction operations. Facing the problem of army dominance,
the PN could not afford to acquire multifunctional vessels for sea patrol, command and amphibious
operations. Rather, it merely complements the naval war-fighting deterrence provided by US forward
naval deployment and bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific.

Multilateral negotiation and arbitration

With a clear limitation in how far China’s neighbors can rely on their own armed forces to confront China,
they have to consider the dangers of causing a war that they can hardly win. Building military capacities
only to the level of minimum deterrence is primarily to convey the message that they are willing to
invest in the national defense in support of their strategic objectives. Some countries have, therefore,
conducted geostrategic balance of multilateral negotiations, which give China’s smaller neighbors the
power of collective bargaining to enhance their position by ‘embedding China in a web of multilateral
structure’.16 ASEAN has engaged China to negotiate a Code of Conduct (COC) to commit all signatories
to peaceful resolutions of outstanding disputes and generate a rule-based maritime order or ‘rules of
the road’ for actions by ships, aiming to minimize the risk of a misstep that could lead to conflict. China
participated in the multilateral negotiation of the code but insisted on bilateral negotiation on territo-
rial disputes between the parties directly involved because its sheer size and strength gives China an
advantage to exploit divisions among the ASEAN states.
The negotiation started in the wake of a series of crises between China and the Philippines in the
South China Sea during the late 1990s but has been difficult, long and daunting. The ‘Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (DOC) in 2002 failed to establish a ‘code’ and only expressed
interest in working toward its eventual attainment. The DOC even consented to China’s position that
‘territorial and jurisdictional disputes’ should be resolved ‘through friendly consultations and negotia-
tions by sovereign states directly concerned’. A joint China–ASEAN working group was formed in 2004
to formulate recommendations to implement the DOC but no progress was made. When the tensions
between China and Vietnam/the Philippines threatened to escalate into major conflicts in 2010–2011,

13
Ngo Minh Tri and Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘Lessons from the battle of the Paracel Islands’.
14
Greg Torode, ‘Vietnam buys submarines to counter China’, South China Morning Post, (17 December 2009), available at: http://
www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/vietnam_buys_submarines_SCMP.htm (accessed 1 November 2015).
15
Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Vietnam solution: how a former enemy became a crucial US ally in balancing China’s rise’, The Atlantic,
(June 2012), available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/the-vietnam-solution/8969/ (accessed 19 October
2015).
16
Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, ‘China’s rising influence in Asia: implications for US policy’, Strategic Forum
no. 231, (April 2008), p. 5.
 6 S. Zhao and X. Qi

they accused each other of violating the DOC. Such accusation became one obstacle to a binding
code as China stressed that countries must first show good faith by abiding by the DOC. Binding code
would be meaningless if earlier agreements were not upheld. The negotiation in July 2011 produced
the Guidelines of Implementing the DOC in the South China Sea, which still did not go beyond existing
clauses in the DOC.
After President Xi Jinping came to office, Beijing pursued a policy of charming offensive to selec-
tively upgrade its relations with some of the ASEAN states. Admitting that territorial disputes ‘have an
impact on China–ASEAN relations’, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced China’s willingness
to commence ‘official consultations’ on the COC in September 2013. Using the term ‘consultations’ as
distinct from ‘negotiations’, Wang introduced four new points of guiding approach toward the COC.
The first is reasonable expectations, meaning ‘no quick fix’. The second is consensus through negotia-
tions, meaning that ‘Wills of individual country or of a few countries should not be imposed on other
countries’. The third is elimination of interference, a warning not to involve the US and other outside
powers. The fourth is step-by-step: ‘The formulation of COC is stipulated in DOC. COC is not to replace
DOC, much less to ignore DOC and go its own way’.17 ‘Wang’s statement signaled that consultations
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on the COC would take considerable time and that China would use the principle of consensus to veto
any proposal with which it did not agree.’18
China has the upper-hand in the negotiations partially because ASEAN member states have failed
to reach a consensus about the threat perception of China and how to negotiate with China. ASEAN
states have divergent interests along littoral vs. maritime lines, more vs. less developed, claimant vs.
non-claimant to the disputes on top of various bilateral differences. The disputes with China involve
only four ASEAN countries as claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei) and the oth-
ers are non-claimants. While non-claimants are divided between those who are concerned parties,
including Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand, and those who are not, claimants are often divided with
overlapping claims and have failed to cooperate among themselves to define dispute areas. Although
the disputing nations are wary of Chinese behavior, ASEAN countries are divided in their view toward
China because some of them have enjoyed strong economic relations with China, ASEAN’s largest
trading partner since 2009. For every story of Southeast Asian concern over China, there are other ones
pointing to vacillation and deference to China. Talking with China to assure that the territory disputes
in the South China Sea won’t escalate into a confrontation, ASEAN’s top priority is to achieve a peaceful
solution. China’s assertiveness is not sufficient to galvanize ASEAN to stand up as a whole against China.
ASEAN’s internal disunity erupted into public view at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and
ASEAN Summit in 2012, when the Philippines wished to record the discussion of the stand-off between
its naval vessels and Chinese ships at the Scarborough Shoal, and Vietnam wanted a statement of
China’s alleged violations of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the final communiqué. Cambodia as
chair of the meeting refused to comply with the wishes, insisting that such disputes were bilateral and
any mention would compromise ASEAN neutrality. Following the traditional ASEAN way of discrete,
non-conflict cooperation, by which unresolved issues are not included in the final communiqué, for the
first time in the 45-year history, a communiqué was not released at the end of the AMM.
The ASEAN way of decision-making by consensus, which gives a single member state essentially a
veto power, was partially responsible for the failure, as it made it possible for China to court individual
member states and successfully kept the South China Sea off the agenda. Continental Southeast Asian
countries with no claims to maritime territory were most vulnerable to China’s courting. With ample
economic influence to throw around, Beijing provided billions of dollars for infrastructure in Cambodia
over the decade, symbolized by the Peace Palace, built with Chinese funding and which served as the
venue for the ASEAN summit. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Phnom Penh prior to the summit with
promises of millions of dollars in investment and assistance, setting the background that Cambodia

17
‘Foreign Minister Wang Yi on process of “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”’, (5 August 2013), available at: http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1064869.shtml (accessed 25 November 2015).
18
Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘New commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea?’, NBR Commentary, (9 October 2013), available
at: http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=360 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  7

refused the request of the Philippines and Vietnam on the maritime issues. The ASEAN’s failure to speak
as one voice in relations with China not only made it ineffective in managing the serious security crisis
but also left in limbo the status of negotiations on the Code of Conduct.
Frustrated over the diplomatic stalemate, the Philippines made its case in the sphere of global
public opinion by filing a Notification and Statement of Claim at the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS) in January 2013. Arguing that Chinese claims within the nine-dash line are contrary
to the UNCLOS, the Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario said that the Philippines made the
move because it had ‘exhausted almost all political and diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated
settlement of its maritime disputes with China’. He hoped that the legal step ‘shall bring this dispute to
a durable solution’.19 A five-member panel of the tribunal was established in April 2013 and sent draft
rules of procedure to the Philippines and China on 11 July. China replied in a note verbale stating that it
did not accept the legal action and would not participate in the tribunal’s proceedings because Beijing
optionally excluded itself from compulsory arbitration under UNCLOS when it ratified the convention
in August 2006. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang criticized the Philippines’ unilateral move as a betrayal
of the 2002 DOC pledge to peacefully handle the South China Sea issue through ‘consultations and
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negotiations between the countries directly concerned’.20 An international tribunal ruled in October
2015 that it can take on a case between China and the Philippines over disputed territory in the South
China Sea, overruling objections from Beijing that the arbitration body has no authority to hear the
case. China reiterated its position of not accepting or participating in the arbitration.
Declining to take part in the arbitration, China claims that UNCLOS lacks jurisdiction because the
case necessarily implicates ‘territory’ that might be vindicated. China administers half-a-dozen land/
geological features in the South China Sea. Given that sovereignty over these features and their legal
status as either rocks or islands is in dispute, the tribunal can only provide rulings about the nature
of rock formations, with implications for any territorial claims under the convention. If the arbitration
tribunal decides that the Philippine claim necessarily involves a ‘territorial dispute’, it will dismiss the
claim. Even if the court reaches a final ruling, it cannot be enforced and at most carries only a moral
and perhaps political victory for the Philippines. Given Beijing’s objections and the complicated nature
of the disputes, the Philippines’s internationalization of the dispute may end up as little more than a
publicity stunt. Bringing the arbitration against China under the UNCLOS system, the Philippines used
international law, often the weapon of the weak, for its defense, but did not gain public support from
other ASEAN governments. After the Philippines filed the case, its ASEAN partners went silent. The
Philippines press reported that Singapore supported the action, a claim that Singapore vehemently
denied.21 Only Vietnam was sympathetic and filed a brief with the tribunal. Looking back at history,
because of divisions within ASEAN, the record of ASEAN at managing disputes beyond its borders is
dismal and it has never been successful in standing up in unity to balance the challenge of outside
powers.22

Strategic alignments with the United States

One key element of geostrategic balance is to keep the US, the core security partner of many East Asian
countries, in the regional security arrangements. This is a hard decision because most Asian states
have tried to avoid being pawns in the US–China chessboard. In addition, some Asian countries had
an ambivalent feeling for the United States when the George W. Bush administration single-mindedly

19
Jim Gomez, ‘Philippines taking S. China Sea fight to tribunal’, Jakarta Post, (22 January 2103), available at: http://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2013/01/22/philippines-taking-s-china-sea-fight-tribunal.html (accessed 19 October 2015).
20
Zhang Yunbi and Li Xiaokun, ‘Li rebukes unilateral moves’, Xinhua, (11 October 2013), available at: http://europe.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2013-10/11/content_17022192.htm (accessed 1 November 2015).
21
Andrew Billo, ‘Co-operate and share: a way to peace in the South China Sea’, Global Asia 8(3), (2013), available at: http://www.
globalasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/467.pdf (accessed 1 November 2015).
22
Walter Lohman, ‘The South China Sea and the lessons of history’, National Interest, (4 October 2013), available at: http://nationa-
linterest.org/commentary/the-south-china-sea-the-lessons-history-9179 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 8 S. Zhao and X. Qi

focused on the war on terror while China’s good neighboring policy emphasized shared interests. At the
APEC Summit in September 2007, when President Bush addressed an audience of Pacific Rim business
elite on the war on terror, Chinese President Hu Jintao talked about the business opportunities from
China’s growth. One reporter captured this moment and suggested that the messages ‘underscore how
Washington and Beijing are now being perceived in the Asia–Pacific region, where the US role seems
to be slipping, while China is seen as the power of the future’.23
The images of China and the US reversed after 2009 when China grew less cautious and restrained
in pursuance of its core interests. Many countries took fright of the giant neighbor as an anti-status quo
power and came to appreciate the US as a stakeholder in the region or, at the worst, the devil that does
not have any territorial claim in the region. They begin to see the American presence with new eyes
as a benighted power, which played a key role in regional peace, prosperity and stability. ‘Distancing
yourself from America no longer looked quite so attractive. America’s warts seemed less ugly, less
unappealing—while, viewed close up, China’s faults and blemishes seem much more off-putting.’24 As
a result, many countries shifted their concern from how to manage the US presence to how to manage
China’s rising power aspiration.
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Worrying that the regional security order built upon American primacy could become history, East
Asian countries had to decide what kind of regional order they would like to see in the place of the US
dominance. Although a contested order framed by strategic rivalry between the US and China could
be risky for many Asian states that have long been reluctant to choose between the two powers, the
rivalry would be more undesirable than a China dominated order. Given the power gap between China
and its neighbors and the still low level of security cooperation in the region, many Asian countries
found the US presence an indispensable factor to maintain regional peace and stability, should China
act more aggressively in the future. As a result, an increasing number of China’s neighbors welcomed
a reinvigorated American presence and made efforts to seek close diplomatic and military ties to the
US. The Philippines, Vietnam and Japan, caught in maritime territorial disputes with China, have made
special efforts to renew or strengthen their ties with the US.
The Philippines has essentially been an American protectorate for much of its history since inde-
pendence in 1946. The Military Bases Agreement between the United States and the Philippines in 1947
provided the US military for national defense and the AFP was reduced to police functions primarily on
counter-insurgency efforts. The Philippines signed a mutual security treaty with the US and came under
the US treaty protection in 1951. Although the United States was forced to abandon Clark Air Force
Base and Subic Naval Base in 1991, the Philippines looked for US support again amid the increasing
tensions with China.
During his trip to Washington in June 2011, Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert Del Rosario told the
Americans that
Maritime security is our problem, but it is also your problem. We do not expect the US to fight our battles for us, but
we count on the US’s strong and unwavering assistance in building the strength and resources of the Philippine
military to meet the new challenge.25
At the first ‘two-plus-two’ dialogue among the US and Philippine foreign and defense secretaries in
May 2012, he announced that the Philippines were to reopen to the US the naval and air facilities in
Subic, Zambales and Clark Field, which would give the US a greater ‘rotational presence’ in the country
and fit well with the US military’s strategy of ‘places not bases’ in the Pacific, whereby American ships
and planes can regularly visit foreign military outposts for repairs and resupply without the need for
formal, politically sensitive basing arrangements to save the costs and sensitivities of base maintenance.

23
Charles Hutzler, ‘Hu’s up, Bush down at Pacific Rim Summit’, The Washington Post, (7 September 2007), available at: http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090701568_pf.html (accessed 19 October 2015).
24
Walter Russell Mead, ‘In the footsteps of the Kaiser: China boosts US power in Asia’, The American Interests, (26 September 2010),
available at: http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/09/26/in-the-footsteps-of-the-kaiser-china-boosts-us-power-in-
asia (accessed 19 October 2015).
25
Paul Eckert, ‘Philippines wants US diplomacy, aid in sea dispute’, Reuters, (23 June 2011), available at: http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/06/23/us-usa-philippines-maritime-idUSTRE75M6CX20110623 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  9

Shortly before President Obama’s visit to the Philippines in April 2014, the two countries signed a ten-
year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which involves stationing American troops,
planes and ships in the country on a rotating basis.
Looking for options to reduce its vulnerability to the Chinese threat, Vietnam also turned to its
Cold War enemy. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the US in 1995, the same year it joined the
ASEAN, Vietnam has steadily built its partnership with the US. After the start of annual port calls by US
naval vessels in 2003, the military to military cooperation intensified. The two countries inaugurated an
annual strategic and security dialogue in 2008. On the 15th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic
relations, the USS George Washington aircraft carrier docked in the central port city of Dan Nang on
8 August 2010 and cruised off Vietnam’s coast, where Vietnam officials boarded the carrier to observe
operations. The following week, Vietnam received the destroyer USS John S. McCain at the same port
for the first ever training exchanges. ‘A steady progression of careful gestures has eroded the enmities
of the Vietnam War, built a basis of increasing trust and turned the two nations’ attention, in large part,
from issues of the past to the present.’26 Like the Philippines, Vietnam offered the US access to the Cam
Ranh Bay naval base, one of the finest deep-water anchorages in Southeast Asia and a major base of
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operations for the US military during the Vietnam War. Cam Ranh Bay could also play perfectly into the
Pentagon’s ‘places not bases’ strategy. These overtures paid off. Vietnam was very pleased that Secretary
of State Clinton said at the July 2010 ARF in Hanoi that the US has a national interest in the South China
Sea, is ready to participate in multilateral efforts to resolve territorial disputes there, and that maritime
claims should be based on land features on the reach of continental shelves, a concept contradictory
to China’s historic line. At the 20th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations, Nguyen Phu Trong,
the de facto leader as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam despite holding no official
government post, was invited to a high profile visit to Washington and held an unprecedented meeting
with President Obama in July 2015.
Japan also made efforts to renew its alliance with the US. In light of the Mutual Defense Assistant
Agreement of 1954 and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, Japan has provided
military ports and bases for the US, conducted joint military exercises regularly and supported joint
operations, including providing refueling assistance to coalition vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian
Ocean during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. When the Democratic Party of Japan replaced the Liberal
Democratic Party in 2009, however, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama took a radical overhaul of foreign
policy to have a more independent and equidistant position between the US and China. But China’s
hardline behavior in the September 2010 diplomatic showdown over the collision between a Chinese
trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels changed the dynamics as it demonstrated not only Japan’s
vulnerability in its relationship with China but also the difficulty in conducting an independent foreign
policy without the US. Forcing Tokyo to stand down in the diplomatic row, China pushed many Japanese
from an anti-US position toward a more even and favorable view. Prime Minister Hatoyama sought to
distance Japan from the US but his successor Noda Yoshihiko was forced to see the security treaty with
the US as vital in dealing with tensions related to the territorial disputes.
After Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to office in 2013, he took bold steps to boost the alliance.
Announcing Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, Abe started a
national debate on revising the restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense by
the peace constitution so that Japan’s Self-Defense Force could assist the US in regional contingen-
cies. Moving to reinterpret the constitution in a way that would recognize limited forms of collective
self-defense, Abe pressed the security bills, which will allow this reinterpretation to be implemented,
to pass the lower house vote in July 2015 and the upper house of parliament two months later, despite
widespread voter opposition and mass protests. Clearing the way for a policy shift that could allow
troops to fight overseas for the first time since the end of WWII, the bill will allow the SDF to use force
in the aid of the foreign country in a close relationship with Japan if the following three new conditions

Seth Mydans, ‘US and Vietnam build ties with an eye on China’, New York Times, (12 October 2010), available at: http://www.nytimes.
26

com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13vietnam.html (accessed 19 October 2015).

 10 S. Zhao and X. Qi

are satisfied: the attack threatens the Japanese people’s constitutional right; there are no other means
to repel the attack; and the use of force is limited ‘to the minimum extent necessary’. The bills will also
expand the scope for the SDF to provide logistical support to friendly countries, and respond to ‘grey
zone’ infringements of Japanese territorial waters and airspace short of an armed attack. In addition,
as a result of the review of the 1997 defense alliance guidelines with the US for the first time, Japan
agreed in the new US–Japan Defense Guidelines signed in April 2015 to operate more closely with, and
possibly even fight alongside, US forces, which ‘injects a dose of equality into the bilateral relationship
that potentially reduces Japan’s over-dependence on the United States and charges of “free-riding”
that threaten the relationship’.27
Abe’s efforts paid off. Although framing security concerns vis-à-vis China was always an area of
divergence between Tokyo and Washington as the US tried to avoid publically denouncing China in
relations with Japan, the 2014 Joint Statement of the US–Japan ‘two-plus-two’ Security Consultative
Committee meeting for the first time explicitly called China to embrace greater openness and trans-
parency in its military capability as well as its defense spending. Barack Obama as the first sitting US
president explicitly declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are subject to the Japan–US Security
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Treaty during his April 2014 visit to Japan. During the week-long visit to the US in April 2015, meeting
with President Obama and enjoying a state dinner, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to
address a joint session of Congress. Sending a clear message that Japan is America’s willing ally, Abe
took particular pleasure when Obama repeated his statement that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fall
under the ambit of the Mutual Security Treaty.28
Working hard to keep America fully engaged in the region, the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan
each has its own problems with the US. While most Filipinos welcome cooperation with the US facing
a powerful China, many remain distrustful of unequal relations with the former colonizer. In spite of
the enthusiasm of the Aquino administration to line up US military assistance, there is still an internal
division about how far the Philippines could rely on the US to bolster its territorial defense and allow
more American troops to rotate through the Philippines. After the Aquino administration signed the
EDCA with the US in April 2014, a group of Philippine lawmakers, academics and activists charged that
the agreement amounted to a treaty and would require separate ratification by the Philippine senate
although the administration insisted that the EDCA was an executive agreement that merely raised the
scope of, and therefore fell within the legal boundaries of, the two countries’ Mutual Defense Treaty. In
addition, due to the US failure to deter China during the Scarborough Reef standoff in April–June 2012,
Manila can hardly take Washington’s support for granted when it comes to possible confrontation with
China. Although the US helped broker a deal for a simultaneous withdrawal, the Chinese remained in
control of Scarborough Reef after the Philippines departed. The ‘Scarborough Model’ explored strategies
of ‘extended coercion’ through which China could pressure US allies while keeping Washington at bay.29
Having lost Scarborough Shoal to the Chinese and struggling to keep a handful of Philippine troops
on Second Thomas Shoal supplied with basic necessities, the Aquino government has had a hard time
proving the efficacy of seeking US assistance in its South China policy, facing the 2016 election, while
the level of Chinese coercive diplomacy continues to rise.
In the case of Vietnam, it cannot embrace and completely trust the United States, not only because
it is too dependent on and interconnected with China to become completely estranged from its giant
neighbor, but also because the US has continued to put pressure on human right violations in Vietnam
and demand progress in return for better ties. Although Vietnam joined the TPP negotiation, the US
congress would not support the TPP deal with Hanoi without ‘demonstrable progress on human rights’.30

27
Grant Newsham, ‘US–Japan defense guidelines—well done, but only half done’, PacNet no. 45, (5 August 2015), available at: http://
csis.org/publication/pacnet-45-us-japan-defense-guidelines-well-done-only-half-done (accessed 19 October 2015).
28
Scott Snyder, ‘Prime Minister Abe’s very good visit’, Asia Unbound, (5 May 2015), available at: http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2015/05/05/
prime-minister-abes-very-good-visit/ (accessed 19 October 2015).
29
Ely Ratner, ‘Learning the lessons of Scarborough Reef’, National Interest, (21 November 2013), available at: http://nationalinterest.
org/print/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarborough-reef-9442 (accessed 19 October 2015).
30
Greg Rushford, ‘Obama’s “déjà vu” Vietnam diplomacy’, Rushford Report, (28 August 2013), available at: http://rushfordreport.
com/?p=347 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  11

Washington has used the annual security dialogue that is supposed to discuss political–security issues
of importance to raise its concerns about human rights violations in Vietnam. The US ban on the sale
of lethal weapons to Vietnam due to human rights concerns has not been lifted, making some in the
Vietnamese military hesitant to endorse a closer relationship with Washington. Some Vietnamese leaders
are suspicious that the US long-term goal is to erode the Vietnamese Communist Party’s monopoly on
power. For them, the survival of the Communist Party’s rule is as important as hedging against China.31
Japan also has its own problems with the US. After Abe assumed office, he intended to make his first
overseas visit to Washington in January 2013, but President Obama turned him down with the excuse
of a busy schedule. When Abe finally made it to the US in February, President Obama set aside less than
two hours to meet with him. Although President Obama reiterated the US–Japanese alliance based
on the Security Treaty and shared democratic values, he quietly asked the Japanese government to
exercise restraint to prevent tensions from rising in the East China Sea. The United States also has con-
cerns regarding Japan’s stance on historical issues and expressed disappointment over Prime Minister
Abe’s 26 December 2013 visit to the Yasukuni shrine, which honors Japanese war dead, including the
14 A-class war criminals. Using unusually blunt language, the American Embassy in Tokyo stated that
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‘the United States is disappointed that Japan’s leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate
tensions with Japan’s neighbors’,32 a rare case of criticism directed at one of its closest allies. Daniel
Russell, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, compared the challenges to helping Japan to deal
with the historical issues with the challenge of China’s territorial disputes and North Korea’s nuclear
and missile programs.33 Prime Minister Abe’s homage to Japan’s war criminals smacked of denial of
his nation’s wartime aggression, not only strengthening China’s hand in disputes with Japan but also
driving wedges into the coalition of the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Building security relations with each other

Enhancing security ties with each other is also an important part of geostrategic balance. Japan has
taken a lead in cultivating strategic ties with like-minded countries in the region, particularly Southeast
Asian states. For many years, Japan played a major economic role in the region but never translated its
economic prowess into strategic influence. This passive stance has changed. A full-dialogue partner
since 1977, Japan underlined its priorities toward ASEAN with the appointment of a resident ambas-
sador in 2010, the first dialogue partner to do so. The Mission of Japan to ASEAN was established in
Jakarta in 2011. In the meantime, Japan significantly increased its profile to participate in joint military
exercises, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, networking,
communications and security cooperation with Southeast Asian states.
Seeking to promote strategic use of official development assistance (ODA) to help build the defense
infrastructure and security capacity of Southeast Asian countries, Japan eased the restrictions on over-
seas transfers of defense equipment in cases related to contributing to peace and advancing inter-
national cooperation in December 2011. One month before this decision, the Japanese government
pledged US$25 billion to promote flagship projects for enhancing ASEAN connectivity at the Japan–
ASEAN Summit. At the Japan–Mekong Summit in April 2012, Japan pledged US$7.4 billion in aid over
three years to help five Mekong states’ infrastructure projects.
After taking office, Prime Minister Abe set top foreign policy priorities to nurture closer ties with
Southeast Asian nations. Visiting Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand in January 2013, his first foreign tour
as Prime Minister, Abe visited all ten ASEAN countries at least once in his first year. Reaching out to many
potential markets in Southeast Asia, Abe encouraged the stream of Japanese investment away from

31
David Brown, ‘Vietnam: playing with fire’, Asia Sentinel, (7 July 2013), available at: http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/vietnam-
playing-with-fire/ (accessed 19 October 2015).
32
US Embassy, ‘Statement on Prime Minister Abe’s December 26 visit to Yasukuni Shrine’, (26 December 2013), available at: http://
japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20131226-01.html (accessed 19 October 2015).
33
Yuka Hayashi, ‘US seeks Abe assurance he won’t visit war shrine’, Wall Street Journal, (23 January 2014), available at: http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304757004579331951101919562 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 12 S. Zhao and X. Qi

China and into Southeast Asia that was already taking place largely due to China’s rising labor costs.
Focusing on expanding universal values such as freedom, democracy and human rights and keeping
sea lanes free and open in line with international law, Abe constantly referred to a set of shared values
and proposed to promote maritime cooperation in his dialogue with Southeast Asian leaders.34
Japan’s initiatives were welcomed by many ASEAN states. Japan and ASEAN commemorated 40
years of friendship and cooperation with a Summit in Tokyo in December 2013, coinciding with Beijing’s
announcement of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Their joint statement empha-
sized the importance of principles of international law and enhancement of cooperation to ensure the
freedom of overflight and civil aviation safety in accordance with the universally recognized principles
of international law. Cambodia this time closed ranks with its neighbors and joined a pledge to work
together to protect freedom of aviation. On the fringes of the meeting, Japan and all participants
announced they had upgraded the status of their relationship to a strategic partnership. The summit
capped a successful year of diplomacy for Abe to win hearts and minds and open doors for Japanese
companies with promises of billions of dollars in aid and investments in Southeast Asia.
China’s assertive stance advanced Japan’s courtship, soothing backlash across Southeast Asia against
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Japan’s own rising military profile. Emerging as one of the most nationalistic politicians of his generation,
Abe spoke openly of rewriting Japan’s pacifist constitution and upgrading its armed forces and even
contested the idea that Japan’s brutal wartime assault on its neighbors was an invasion. Only a few
years ago, such an agenda by a Japanese leader would have sent tremors around the whole region, but
worries about a revival of Japanese militarism among some Southeast Asian countries were trumped
by concerns about China’s power aspiration. According to a Pew Research Center survey in 2013, about
half or more of the publics in five of seven Asia–Pacific nations had a favorable view of Japan. Eight-
in-ten Malaysians, and nearly as many Indonesians (79%), Australians (78%) and Filipinos (78%) saw
Japan in a positive light.35
Japan invaded and brutally occupied the Philippines during World War II, but the two countries
have since grown closer due to trade and investment and China’s assertiveness. The convergence of
their geostrategic and economic interests helped overcome the bitter memories of brutal Japanese
occupation. Aquilino ‘Nene’ Pimentel, the former president of the Philippine Senate, recalled that as a
boy during the war, his family escaped Japanese troops by hiding in banana groves. For years, his atti-
tude toward Japan was ‘one of fear and hatred. Now we see Japan’s resurgence as a balancing factor in
what otherwise would be China’s dominance in this region’.36 Philippine officials said their nation does
not share the concerns of others in Asia, notably China and South Korea, about Japan’s military past.
The survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery in the Philippines urged President Aquino to bring
up their demand for an official apology with Abe, but President Aquino did not delve into the issue of
comfort women during their bilateral meeting and even suggested that the Philippines had moved on
from its historic conflict with Japan.37
Complaining about Chinese bullying in the contested waters, the Philippines consider Japan a
counterweight to China, and maritime cooperation with Japan and the US part of the Philippines’
broader strategy of intensifying defense cooperation to compensate for its limited military capability.
The Japan–Philippines strategic partnership was established in 2011 to facilitate economic exchanges
and maritime security cooperation. Other than the United States, Japan is the only strategic partner
of the Philippines and the only country given access to the Subic Naval Base. One month before Abe’s

34
Dennis D. Trinidad, ‘Abe’s ASEAN tour’, East Asian Forum, (6 September 2013), available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/06/
abes-asean-tour/ (accessed 19 October 2015).
35
Survey Report, ‘Japanese public’s mood rebounding, Abe highly popular
China and South Korea very negative toward Japan’, Pew Global, (11 July 2013), available at: http://www.pewglobal.
org/2013/07/11/japanese-publics-mood-rebounding-abe-strongly-popular/ (accessed 19 October 2015).
36
Andrew Browne, ‘Cambodian shift highlights regional tensions’, Wall Street Journal, (23 December 2013), available at:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304475004579276121757526130 (accessed 19 October 2015).
37
Julius Cesar I. Trajano, ‘Japan–Philippines strategic partnership: converging threat perceptions’, RSIS Commentary 146, (5 August
2013), available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/2034-japan-philippines-strategic-pa/#.VczfW7d0yM8 (accessed
19 October 2015).
 Journal of Contemporary China  13

visit to Manila in July 2013, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera pledged to help the Philippines
defend its remote islands because they ‘face a very similar situation in the East China Sea of Japan’.38
During his visit, Abe affirmed Japan’s assistance towards the capacity building of the Philippine Coast
Guard by providing ten patrol vessels through the ODA program. Following the visit, Japan mounted
its largest ever peacetime deployment of its Self-Defense Forces for disaster aid after Typhoon Haiyan
devastated the southern Philippines, killing more than 6,000 people, displacing 4.1 million and leaving
behind a trail of destruction that overwhelmed under-equipped and ill-prepared Filipino authorities
in November 2013. Tokyo sent aid and rescue missions and pledged US$287 million to the Philippines
while Beijing was widely criticized as slow and grudging when it initially offered a modest US$100,000
in government aid along with another US$100,000 through the Chinese Red Cross.39 In June 2015,
President Aquino made a state visit to Japan and signed a Joint Declaration to provide a strategic vision
to the two countries’ evolving security partnership. During the visit, Aquino announced that the two
countries would soon start talks on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would allow the Japanese
Self-Defense Force access to Philippine military bases.
While Japan tries to play a leading role in the regional security network, its engagement faces serious
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challenges. For one thing, ASEAN does not want to be Japan’s balancing tool against China. A deeply
conservative and consensual body, ASEAN has no wish to pick a fight with Beijing. Moreover, Japan’s
continuing painful relations with some East Asian nations over historical animosities still jangle regional
nerves, lingering in Tokyo’s ties with its neighbors. Some countries that suffered Japanese occupation
remained wary over the potential for a resurgence of Japanese militarism because of Japan’s inability,
at least in the eyes of some of its neighbors, to accept responsibility for its wartime atrocities.
In particular, Japan’s difficult relations with its immediate neighbor South Korea have worked in
China’s favor. The Tokyo–Seoul relationship was always tough but North Korea’s increasing aggression
once prompted Japan and South Korea to resume high-level defense exchanges through the Trilateral
Coordination and Oversight Group with the US in the 1990s. Cautiously moving toward a closer rela-
tionship, particularly after North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan ship and artillery bombardment of a
South Korean island, the two countries signed a joint declaration in 2010 to emphasize the need for
settling issues related to the colonial era and the importance of a future-oriented partnership. The
United States, Japan and South Korea conducted the first joint naval exercise in the seas southwest of
the Korean Peninsula in May 2012. One month later, South Korea announced that it was ready to sign
the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the first military pact between the
two governments since the end of the Japanese colonization of Korea in 1945, to share and protect
sensitive military and other sensitive data on their common concerns. Kazuo Ogura, former Japanese
Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, was very optimistic that ‘the two countries seemed to overcome at
last the negative legacy of the past and to put their bilateral relations on a “future-orientated” course’.40
But the advancement of the relationship made a sudden down turn in 2012 as the announcement
of GSOMIA aroused a flurry of anti-Japanese sentiments and triggered a political firestorm in South
Korea, highlighting deep-seated mistrust of the nation’s former colonizer. ‘It is perceived that sharing
classified data on South Korea’s military capabilities could be disadvantageous to it in the event of a
conflict with Japan.’41 The signing of GSOMIA was put off indefinitely. To calm the domestic backlash,
President Lee Myung-bak made an unprecedented visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands contested
between South Korea and Japan in August 2012. Tokyo responded by recalling its ambassador and
cancelling a planned visit by its finance minister to Seoul.

38
‘Japan says it will help Philippines amid China Sea row’, Agence France-Presse, (27 June 2013), available at: http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1270276/japan-says-it-will-help-philippines-amid-china-sea-row (accessed 19 October 2015).
39
Facing the questions about Beijing’s small offering considering the scale of the disaster and the criticism, China upped its offer and
sent a total of 10 million yuan (US$1.64 million) in relief supplies. ‘China provides relief goods to typhoon-hit Philippines’, Xinhua, (13
November 2013), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/13/c_132885344.htm (accessed 19 October 2015).
40
Kazuo Ogura, ‘Strategy sharing rather than reflection sharing: a principle for proactive relations with Korea’, AJISS-Commentary
no. 184, (September 2013), available at: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en_commentary/201309/11-1.html (accessed 19 October 2015).
41
SarahTeo,‘Japan–South Korea military cooperation: implications for Northeast Asia’, RSIS Commentaries no. 115, (4 July 2012), available at:
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1777-japan-south-korea-military-coo/#.VcveBLd0yM8 (accessed 19 October 2015).
 14 S. Zhao and X. Qi

From there on, the Japan–South Korea relationship moved to an all-time low since the normalization
of diplomatic ties in 1965. While Korea’s classic ‘shrimp among whales’ strategy between Asia’s major
players, by which Seoul avoided openly regarding China as a rival and sought instead to cultivate a
middle position, was partially responsible for the strained state of the relationship, Japan’s denying of
the war-time crimes is a major obstacle to forward-looking Korea–Japan relations as Koreans are still
resentful of Japan’s colonization. Any sign of Japan’s growing military role has been met with deep
suspicion. The Korean media is filled with editorials warning it must keep a close watch on Japan
rearming and going nuclear. Shared democratic values, geographical proximity, affiliation to the US
alliance network and shared concerns about China’s great power aspiration, are not sufficient to build
a Japan–ROK partnership.
The fissure in the Japan–South Korea relationship helped improved China–South Korea relations,
which became strained in 2010 after North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and
the shelling of a border village, as China refused to denounce North Korea for escalating tensions. Many
South Koreans believed that China should have adopted a sterner approach toward Pyongyang for
its outrageous provocations. South Korea and China, however, embarked on a rapid rapprochement
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thereafter, due to the shared perception of an unabashedly aggressive Japan under Abe. President Park
Geun-Hye made her first state visit to China in June 2013 and proposed to President Xi the erection of a
memorial stone for Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean national hero who assassinated Hirobumi Ito, a founding
father of modern Japan, on the station platform of Harbin in China’s far north and was hanged in a
Japanese prison in 1909. This was a bold suggestion as only a handful of foreign nationals were honored
in such a way in China. Looking for ways to assail Abe’s government, China jumped on the idea. A full-
scale museum to Ahn opened in January 2014. A plate glass window at one end overlooks the spot on
the platform where Ahn fired the fatal shots. This development underscores how complicated it is for
Japan to work with South Korea to overcome the predicament in its geostrategic balance against China.

Conclusion
Realists argue that one of the primary functions of the state is to protect itself from the potential
predation of others. The lack of any supranational authority leads to an unresolvable uncertainty with
regard to the long term intentions of rising powers and there is no legal assurance that they are bound
by their international commitments. Under such conditions of anarchy, small and weak states in East
Asia have hedged and struggled between bandwagon and balance of power to survive China’s rising
power aspiration. While Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam have made up their minds in conducting
geostrategic balance, many other countries have not followed up and continue their hedging strategy.
Meeting no formidable resistance, China has pushed its power deep into the maritime heart of the
West Pacific, causing fear that the region is falling back to the future when ‘the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must’. For Beijing to prove it is not going to seek hegemony and rise
peacefully, it has to work with its neighbors to diffuse the fear.
China’s key problem is how to convince its neighbors that it has no intention to move from being assertive to being
aggressive. It does not seek to replace American with Chinese dominance. Its national interest lies in creating an
environment in which China will not be feared as a superpower but respected for its wealth and creativity, necessary
conditions for a modern civilization.42
The setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and President Xi Jinping’s two Silk Roads
strategy may be meant to offset political anxieties by offering economic opportunity to China’s
neighbors. While the world is watching how China implements the promise behind these initiatives,
China’s assertive actions in territorial disputes certainly don’t help China win respect. If China cannot
work together with its neighbors to establish a rule-based regional order, the region may repeat the

Wang Gungwu, ‘Singapore’s “Chinese dilemma” as China rises’, The Strait Times, (1 June 2015), available at: http://www.straitstimes.
42

com/news/opinion/more-opinion-stories/story/singapores-chinese-dilemma-china-rises-20150601 (accessed 19 October 2015).

 Journal of Contemporary China  15

tragic history before the Pacific War, but this time with Japan and other Asia countries in the defensive.
This is certainly not a scenario that China and its neighbors would like to foresee.

Notes on contributors
Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Director of the Center for China–US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of
International Studies, University of Denver and Editor of the Journal of Contemporary China.
Qi Xiong is a Ph.D. candidate at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University. She was a visiting
scholar at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver during December 2014–December
2015.
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