Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance

Author(s): SHANNON TOW
Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3 (December 2004), pp. 434-459
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
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Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004): 434-59 ISSN 0219-797X
Southeast Asia in the

Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance
SHANNON TOW
In his article "The Geography of Peace", Robert Ross

postulates that a bipolar regional power balance has emerged
in East Asia. This theory is premised on the assumption that
smaller Asian states will seek to compensate for their own
vulnerability by clearly aligning with either China or the
United States. In the case of Southeast Asia, however, stable
but competitive Sino-U.S. relations have provided ASEAN
states with considerable strategic leverage. Although these
states maintain a close relationship with their respective
geopolitically dominant great power, this leverage allows
them tomanoeuvre between and to strengthen their autonomy
vis-a-vis China and the United States. Closer examination of
the 1998 addendum to the 1990 U.S.-Singapore Memorandum
of Understanding, the 1999 U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces
Agreement and the 1999 Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21st
Century demonstrates these trends.
Introduction
Throughout much of the post-Cold War period, the dynamics of the

Sino-U.S. relationship have been a critical factor in Southeast Asian
states' foreign policies. Southeast Asia has traditionally been a site of
great power competition for regional dominance, due to its strategic
location as a bridge between continental and maritime East Asia. To
manage this competition and to enhance their own subregional
autonomy, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
434
Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance 435
Nations (ASEAN) engaged in a number of regional institutionbuilding

initiativesduring the early 1990s. This "institutionalise agenda led to
speculation thatASEAN could become thehub of a nascent regional
security community.1
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, however, the prospect
that ASEAN could act as an autonomous entity to mitigate Sino-U.S.
geopolitical pressures seemed increasingly tenuous. Weakened by
and economic instability, intra-regional disputes and a
political
simultaneous expansion of itsmembership, ASEAN has come to question
itsown identity. This has only further
underminedASEAN-led regional
security initiativessuch as theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).More
frequently, Southeast Asian states have favoured bilateralism and have
looked to external powers to realize their security interests.2
These changing subregional dynamics have, in turn, prompted
renewed efforts by China and the United States to cultivate influence
within Southeast Asia. China's attempts to gain support for its "new
security concept" and US efforts to secure additional access and
infrastructure agreements along the "East Asian littoral" are illustrative.
To some extent, Sino-U.S. geopolitical competition has been modified
by strategic cooperation resulting from the "war on terror". Yet China
still remains wary ofU.S. attempts to engage Southeast Asia in countering
global terrorism.3
These trends have, in turn, compelled analysts to reconceptualize
the Southeast Asian security landscape in a balance of power context.
Principal among these exponents is Robert Ross. In his article "The
Geography of Peace", Ross argues that as the two most geopolitically
dominant regional actors, China and the United States preside over
their own separate but complementary spheres of regional influence.
He asserts that continental Southeast Asian states have aligned with
China and maritime Southeast Asian states have aligned with the
United States.4 The geographic position of China and the United States,
and the evolution of their interests and military capabilities accordingly,
make it unlikely that either country would seek to project power into
the other's respective sphere. Ross therefore postulates that the emerging
bipolar structure is likely to be a stable and enduring one. This portrayal
of Sino-U.S. relations has been acknowledged by recent literature on
Asia-Pacific security.5 However, Ross' depiction of how Southeast Asian
states respond to this relationship has been subject much less to
theoretical analysis.
One contending school that has emerged argues thatASEAN states
have adjusted to great power geopolitical competitionby pursuing a
"hedging strategy"rather than by aligningwith eitherChina or the
United States. Gaye Christofferson specifically seeks to refute Ross'
436 Shannon Tow
argument by asserting that the Southeast Asian states maintain a position

of equidistance between the great powers. She attributesthis to the
ASEAN states' general distrust of great powers and theirdesire to
maintain the delicate Sino-U.S. regional balance.6 Inmaking this case,
however, Christofferson fails to account for exactly how the Southeast
Asian states overcome Sino-U.S. geopolitical pressures and under what
conditions hedging prevails.
These weaknesses are, to some extent, addressed by Avery Goldstein
and Amitav Acharya. Both analysts place greater emphasis on the
smaller Southeast Asian states maintaining closer external ties with
one power while engaging the opposing power.7 They also allude to
geopolitical factors that constrain Southeast Asian states'
manoeuvrability. Goldstein, for instance, acknowledges that geographic
proximitysignificantlyinfluencesAsian states' foreign
policy behaviour
but does not elaborate how or consider this constraint in the context of
a competitive bipolar environment.8
Acharya surmounts this latter problem by arguing that Southeast
Asian states pursue policies of "counter-dominance", geared towards
preventing the hegemony of either power over the region.9 He concedes
that these strategies may be constrained by ongoing U.S. defence ties or
China's unwillingness to engage on ASEAN's terms. Yet in making
these assertions, Acharya still does not fully examine the extent to
which these factors delimit Southeast Asian hedging strategies, under
what circumstances these constraints have greater significance and
how the relative geographic positions of Southeast Asian states affect
their overall security postures. Southeast Asian states' decisions to
abandon "counterdominance" strategies are ultimately contingent on
their perceptions of the regional security environment.10 Geographic
proximity is likely to weigh heavily into these calculations. Because
the "hedging" school does not systematically address the impact of
geographic position and Southeast Asian strategic choices, its critique
of Ross' theory is not entirely persuasive.
This article will seek to overcome these conceptual challenges by
examining the specific interrelationship that exists between Southeast
Asian perceptions of a proximate geopolitically dominant great power
and their subsequent national security strategies. It argues that although
Southeast Asian states seek a close relationship with the great power
they perceive to be geopolitically dominant at a given time, they do not
actually align with that power. They instead seek to maximize their
manoeuvrability and hedge against what they view as regional
domination by any one state. They will adopt this policy approach,
however, only so long as they believe that the Sino-U.S. relationship
affords them sufficient leverage and strategic latitude to do so. Thus the
main flaw of Ross* argument lies not in his effortsto highlight the
centrality of geopolitics to regional states' security calculations, but in
his reductionistview of small state foreignpolicy behaviour and his
assumptions pertaining to the implicationsof a stablebut competitive
great power relationship for those states. Geographic proximity informs
Southeast Asian states' foreign policy behaviour more than the "hedging"
theorists suggest, but its relative influence on such behaviour is
contingent on their ongoing perceptions of the Sino-U.S. relationship.
Ross' geopolitical assertions relating to the Sino-U.S. relationship
will be initiallyexplored.His assumptions regardingsmall state foreign
policy behaviourwill thenbe reviewed and placed within thebroader
literature on this subject. These assumptions will be empirically tested
by enlistingthreecase studies. These include: (1) the 1998 addendum
to the 1990 U.S.-Singapore MOU; (2) theU.S.-Philippines Visiting
Forces Agreement and (3) the Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21st
Century. Each of these agreements represents a clear and important
posture shift in the respective Southeast Asian states' foreign policies
and is symbolic of strengthened relations with the most proximate
great power. As such, these particular case studies present appropriate
tests of Ross' theory of subregional bipolarity. In the final section,
conclusions will be drawn by cross-comparing the findings of these
cases, contemplating their possible applicability to other possible
cases and briefly examining their implications for China, the United
States and the ASEAN states.
Ross' Conceptualization of the Sino-U.S. Relationship

In his theoryof regional bipolarity, Ross makes three geopolitical
assertions pertaining to the nature of contemporary Sino-U.S. relations.
First, he argues that China is the dominant land power while the
United States is the primary maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region.11
These two countries are the only regional actors that possess sufficient
material and non-material means to competitively project power into
the Asia-Pacific.12
Second, Ross asserts that the relationship between China and the
United States will be an inherently competitive one.13 He assumes a
similar pattern of geopolitical competition to that expounded by the
classical geopolitical theorist Nicholas Spykman: both continental and
maritime powers seek to dominate Asia through control of "the marginal
arc crescent".14 Recent Sino-American rivalry in Southeast Asia supports
this proposition.
In order to secure its southern borders and counter what it perceives
as Washington's attempts "to set up a U.S. dominated security system
438 Shannon Tow
in Southeast Asia", China has actively promoted its "new security

concept" during bilateral visits to Southeast Asian states and at various
Asian multilateral forums.15 This concept is predicated on opposition
to "hegemonism" and "power politics" and is frequently discussed in
conjunction with Chinese disapproval of the U.S. regional alliance
system.16 To counter U.S. security ties in the region, China has concluded
bilateral frameworks for all-round cooperation with every Southeast
Asian state and forgeda "strategicpartnership"with ASEAN in 2003.
The United States, meanwhile, has become increasingly sensitive
to growing Chinese power and the challenge itmight pose. This
sensitivity is evident in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which
acknowledges "[t]he possibility ... that a military competitorwith a
formidable resource base will
emerge in the [Asia-Pacific]" and that
this could "threaten stability in [a] region ... critical toU.S. interests".17
The Review subsequently urges enhanced U.S. efforts to secure
additional access and infrastructure agreements in the East Asian littoral.
manifest indeliberations surroundingtheUnited
This strategyis further
States Global Defense Posture Review. While the United States is
repositioningforces to be more efficientlydeployed to various global
flashpoints, officials continue to emphasize the importance of
maintaining a regional forward basing presence so as to "deter attacks
on regional friends and allies".18 They have also reiterated the need to
preposition capabilities "along major transportation routes to facilitate
movement to the fight".19 The East Asian littoral therefore continues to
play a critical role in U.S. grand strategy.

U.S. interests in Southeast Asia lie primarily inmaintaining freedom
of navigation at the subregion's Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs).
Unhindered navigation through these sealanes is necessary for the U.S.
to maintain access to its allies and regional markets as well as for
passage of ships to more distant contingencies.20 The "global war on
terror" (GWOT) has also increased the priority of Southeast Asia in U.S.
foreign policy with Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist cells harbouring in the
subregion. Accordingly, the U.S. has increased its strategic presence in
the Philippines and other ASEAN locales via greater intelligence sharing
with regional states, expansion and multilateralization of joint military
exercises with subregional partners, and designation of "non-NATO
ally" status to Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand.
Third, though the Sino-U.S. relationship is a competitive one, Ross
argues that China and the United States'
complementary geopolitical
strengths simultaneously prevent them from forcefully interfering in
one another's respective sphere of influence.21 Chinese naval capabilities
remain limited due to ageing weapons systems, inferior technology and
inadequate training of personnel.22 Furthermore, China is principally
concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional

stability in Southeast Asia.
A stable Southeast Asia is also desired by theUnited States.
Americans are aware that China's
cooperation is needed in areas of
counterterrorism and missile proliferation. Washington, moreover,
remains wary of U.S. engagement in any Asian land war.23 Thus while
China and the United States compete for influence in each other's
sphere by use of non-military means, neither has an incentive to resort
to conflict. Sino-American compromises on regional issues of mutual
interest throughout the 1990s play to Ross' argument that the Sino-U.S.
relationship is an essentially stable one.
Small State Foreign Policy Behaviour

Ross' assumptions pertaining to how small powers in Asia respond to
the Sino-U.S. relationship are more contentious. These assumptions
are based on principles expounded by balance-of-power theorists such
as Stephen Walt. Like Walt, Ross assumes that limited capabilities and
a narrow margin for error will induce small states to align with a great
power in order to ensure their security. This is particularly the case
when a small state is proximate to a great power and could be the first
victim of expansion.24 Thus Ross asserts that the small states of the
Asia-Pacific will "free ride" and that great powers will accept the
responsibility of preserving regional order.25
Inmaking these assertions, however, Ross overlooks critical aspects
of small state foreign policy behaviour. In particular, he understates the
value that small states attach to their own strategic independence.
Small power theorists such as Robert Rothstein, David Vital and Annette
Fox argue that small states seek to secure their independence by
enhancing their policy manoeuvrability and adopting polices of non
alignment.26 Fox observes that "[The small state's] main hope [is] to
ride out the storm represented by a particular crisis, rolling and pitching
but not slipping [its] moorings".27
However, small power theorists have also recognized the limits to
small state manoeuvrability. Of particular significance, they observe, is
the strategic latitude provided by great powers. Non-alignment policies
can only succeed if great powers are willing to let them do so. Rather
than constraining small state behaviour and always giving rise to spheres
of influence, as Ross argues, stable but competitive great power
relationships can actually facilitate policies of non-alignment by
providing small states with strategic leverage. Small states enjoy greater
freedom to "pick and choose" the areas in which they cooperate with
each of the great powers and can play them off against one another, so
440 Shannon Tow
a
long as both great powers seek to cultivate regional influence and
general balance is maintained between them.28 Accordingly, Ross*
argumentof sub-regionalbipolarity and its applicability to Southeast
Asia, in light of the stable but competitive Sino-U.S. relationship,
warrants reexamination.
IfRoss* theory is to prove valid, four specific criteria must be met
in each of the three cases assessed below. First, the Southeast Asian
country in question must be able to clearly identifya geopolitically
dominant power with which to align. Second, geopolitical dominance
must be a key factor propelling the Southeast Asian country to form the
agreement in question. Third, this agreement must be symbolic of, or
result in the great power's increased influence over the Southeast Asian
country under review. Finally, in order for spheres of influence to
emerge, the Southeast Asian country's interactions with the other great
power must be limited and by no means challenge the strategic interests
or dominance of the geopolitically proximate great power. Unless these
are found ?
specific intervening variables linking geopolitical
dominance with Southeast Asian countries' alignment behaviour ?
Ross' assumptions will require modification. The following three case
studies will seek to test Ross' theory.
Addendum to the 1990 US-Singaporean Memorandum

of Understanding
The 1998 addendum to the U.S.-Singapore Memorandum of

Understanding underscored the high priority Singapore currently
attaches to its bilateral ties with Washington. This agreement provides
for U.S. aircraft carriers, submarines and other warships to berth at
Singapore's newly constructed Changi naval base and further builds on
those arrangementsinitiallyreached in 1990 forSingapore tohost the
a point of
logistical component of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. By providing
anchorage from which the U.S. Navy could project operations into the
Indian Ocean and theMiddle East, as well as monitoring the East Asian
littoral, this agreement clearly supports U.S. geopolitical capabilities in
the region. Indeed, Changi is the only Southeast Asian port in which
the United States is permitted to berth aircraft carriers. Whether
Singapore's posture constitutes bandwagoning behaviour as envisioned
by Ross, however, is doubtful.
Geopolitical dominance: The U.S. Identity
Singapore's decision to host U.S. naval vessels was, to some extent, a

functionof itsperceptions that theUnited States is the geopolitically
dominant maritime power. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong

has observed that, "[American] pre-eminence is the key geopolitical
fact of the post-Gold War world ... [and] is to be seriously
unlikely
challenged by any other countryor group of countries fora very long
time".29 Singapore is convinced of America's determination tomaintain
"a strong commitment and interest to restoring stability to this part of
the world".30 This is largely attributable to sustained U.S. interests in
preventing interdiction of those Southeast Asian sealanes surrounding
Singapore. These geopolitically-based U.S. interests are likely to
transcend the war on terror and other more issue-focused aspects of
U.S.-ASEAN relations that could, in future, become subject toAmerican
domestic political pressure.
The willingness of the United States to remain engaged in the
region, so long as Singapore and other regional states provide sufficient
military support facilities has reinforced Singapore's perception that
theUnited States is not only amilitarily preponderantregional power
but also a credible and benign one. Because of the United States'
unique status as the global unipolar power and a regional offshore
balancer, it is regarded by Singapore as the best candidate for regional
leadership. As Lee Hsien Loong stated in his former role as Deputy
Prime Minister, "Generous American policies and the history of U.S.
engagement since the Second World War have earned America a deep
reservoir of goodwill and respect throughout Asia. Neither China nor
Japan can replace the U.S. in this pivotal role".31
Geopolitical Dominance: Incentives for Collaboration
These geopolitical perceptions were instrumental to Singapore's decision

to accommodate the United States by hosting its naval vessels. As a
city-state with little strategic depth available for its own defence,
Singapore's foreignand defence policy is guided by its own sense of
strategic vulnerability.32 This vulnerability is exacerbated by Singapore's
often volatile relations with its largerMalay neighbours and by ASEAN's
relative impotence in thewake of theAsian financial crisis. Singapore
has subsequently sought to secure a strategic balance thatwill not only
assist it in addressing local security concerns, but will allow it to
preserve its independence in a regional balance of power.
As such, it looks to the United States to counterbalance the
geopolitical pull of China. While Singaporean leaders widely believe
that China can ultimately be socialized into the existing regional order,
considerable uncertainty still surrounds China's long-term strategic
intentions. Singaporean policymakers have subsequently sought to
preserve a regional balance of power in order to simultaneously constrain
China and steer it into this socialization process.33
442 Shannon Tow
Defence Minister Tony Tan has specifically linked the Changi

agreementto thispurpose. During the signingof theaddendum to the
U.S.-Singapore MOU, he observed that"... it is no secret that Singapore
believes that thepresence of theU.S. military in thispart of theworld
contributes to the peace and stability of the region. To that extent, we
have facilitated the presence of U.S. military forces".34 In some ways,
the 1998 addendum to the U.S.-Singapore MOU justifies Ross'
assumptions pertaining to small state behaviour. In line with Ross*
theory, this agreement is representative of Singaporean efforts tomaintain
friendly relations with a geopolitically dominant state so as to reduce
its own vulnerability. But such an approach is still subordinated to
Singapore's overall policy strategy to balance or hedge its relations
with the great powers.
Geopolitical Dominance: The Extent of Influence
The 1998 addendum to theMOU has also certainlyhad some spillover

effects. Since its signing, defence cooperation has significantly increased
with Singapore's status as a "non-NATO ally" allowing it greater access
to U.S. defense technology. Singapore has also become a participant in
U.S. regional military exercises such as Cobra Gold and continues to
train and deploy fighters on U.S. soil under the Peace Carvin III
programme. Signed in October 2003, the U.S.-Singapore Framework
Agreement for a Strategic Cooperation Partnership in Defense and
Security provided for even further cooperation in areas of defense
technology, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogue.
This reflects U.S. influence on Singapore to the extent that the latter
expresses deference to and admiration of the U.S. in areas of military
technology and seeks to consolidate its relationship with the U.S.
through this avenue.
It is debatable, however, whether the 1998 addendum to the U.S.
Singapore MOU has imposed on Singapore the level of U.S. influence
that Ross' theory of regional bipolarity projects. Indeed, Singapore
has tailored those areas in which it cooperates with the United States
tomeet its own more narrowly defined national interests. Singapore's
policymakers make reference to the defence relationship not in terms
of its value in strengthening U.S.-Singapore ties, but with regard to
the national advantages Singapore will accrue through such
cooperation.35
Singapore's strategic vulnerability has, moreover, rendered it
sensitive to encroachments on its independence and wary of openly
aligning with any single power. To this end, the city-state seeks to
maximize its manoeuvrability by pursuing a deliberate strategy of
Southeast Asia in the Sino~U.S. Strategic Balance 443
hedging against both China and the United States. As Singapore's

Foreign Minister Jayakumar has observed, Singapore has "excellent
bilateral relations with the U.S. But that does not mean that we are
subservient to the U.S. or that we agree with everything that the U.S.
does, or says, or requests, without regard to our own national interests".36
Singapore continues tomaintain self-reliance as its preeminent defence
goal and has devoted 6 per cent of its annual GDP towards maintaining
this capability.37
It has also emphasized thatU.S. berthing access at Changi does not
constitute a permanent American military basing presence. Singapore
remains wary that such access might be interpreted by China as an act
of encirclement and has reiterated that Changi port may be made
available to other navies on request.38 As noted earlier, Singapore seeks
to preserve a regional balance of power so as to constrain China and
socialize it into the existing regional order, but not so as to actually
limit that power's growth.39 This is in direct contrast to what Ross
outlines as U.S. strategic priorities of containing Chinese continental
power. U.S. and Singaporean interests are therefore complementary but
are not necessarily identical or deferential. Because Ross focuses on the
future of the Asian strategic order from the perspective of the great
powers, he does not fully account for small states efforts to maintain
their strategic independence and shape their external environment
under conditions of stable but competitive great power relations.
The Other Power: Maintaining Engagement

Rather than balancing against China, Singapore attaches considerable
importance to its ties with that power and has sought to deepen bilateral
cooperation with the PRC simultaneously to enhancing its relations
with the United States. While the rise of China does pose some strategic
challenges, it also provides a number of economic opportunities. Indeed,
Sino-Singaporean cooperation is most intense in the economic arena.
This is an area of influence that Ross largely ignores but that does affect
U.S. strategic interests of securing access to regional markets and
cultivating political influence so as tomaintain itsmaritime dominance.
Although cautious about the implications of China's acceptance
into the WTO, Singapore generally recognizes that China's economic
growth will have a positive influence on Singaporeans.40 Due to the
complementarity of the Chinese and Singaporean economies, bilateral
trade has increased at an average of 14 per cent per annum since
1989.41 Singapore has also been a major source of foreign direct
investment in southwest China through joint projects such as the
Suzhou Industrial Park.
444 Shannon Tow
This burgeoning economic cooperation is underpinned by a

broadening Sino-Singaporean political relationship. Since the onset of
the Asian financial crisis, there has been a significant increase in
bilateral diplomacy between political and military officials that
culminated in the 2000
Sino-Singaporean Framework for Bilateral
Cooperation. Through such diplomacy, Singapore seeks to further
enmesh China within the international system. Policymakers
consistently note that Singapore's interests lie with a stable and
successful China rather than a struggling one.42
There remains good reason, however, for Singapore to hedge against
Chinese power. While China does not enjoy the same stature as the
United States in Singaporean perceptions of geopolitical strength, it is
still regarded as a credible regional challenger thatcould potentially
alter the East Asian balance of power in thirty or forty years. Singapore
recognizes that China's regional dominance is by no means
predetermined, due to the potential for internal instability in that
country arising from problems of governance.43 Nevertheless, the
potential fluidity of the Asia-Pacific power structure both necessitates
and enables Singapore to pursue a deliberate hedging policy so as to
ensure its short-term strategic independence and long-term security.
Whether Singapore continues to do so, is predicated on its
perceptions of the strategic latitude afforded to it by competitive but
stable Sino-U.S. relations. Although Singaporean policymakers welcome
Sino-U.S. competition in Southeast Asia because of the leverage it
provides, concerns exist that Sino-U.S. tensions will escalate to a point
where they "have to choose between being friends either with the U.S.
or China".44 Thus Singaporean politicians have consistently urged the
United States tomaintain good relations with China during periods of
more acute Sino-U.S. tension.45 This has particularly been the case with
regard to Taiwan. While recognizing the limits of its own influence,
Singapore has often tried to position itself as an objective interlocutor
between China and the United States on such issues.46
Singapore's reluctance to align with either great power, so long as
itperceives that sufficient strategic latitude exists, presents an important
challenge to Ross' theory of bipolarity in East Asia. It instead reinforces
the argument of classical realists such as Fox and Rothstein that small
states calibrate and qualify their relationship with a geopolitically
proximate great power within the context of great power competition as
it evolves in their own region.
U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement
The 1999 U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is the

most significantturningpoint in Philippines foreignpolicy since the
Southeast Asia in the Sino~U.S. Strategic Balance 445
onset of the Asian financial crisis and marks a resuscitation of U.S.

Philippines securityrelations.These relations fell intodisrepair after
the Philippines Senate the renewal of U.S. basing
rejected leases in
1991 and as differences emerged over the legal status of U.S. military
personnel operating in the Philippines. The VFA goes some way towards
redressing these difficulties. It specifies conditions under which U.S.
troops are again allowed to enter the Philippines for the purpose of
bilateral military exercises and provides for renewed U.S. naval access
to Philippine ports. The VFA has been an integralcomponent ofU.S.
reengagement with that country and within Southeast Asia more
generally.47 The Philippines maintains a closer relationship with the
United States than most other ASEAN countries. However, Manila's
foreign policy posture towards Washington has been much more
ambiguous than analysts such as Robert Ross allude.
Geopolitical Dominance: The U.S. Identity

In line with Ross' theory, geopolitical imperatives played an important
role in Philippine policymakers' decision to conclude theVFA. The
United States' deployment of the Seventh Fleet continues to make it
Asia's dominant maritime power in terms of overall military capabilities.
During the early 1990s, however, Manila was skeptical as to the
credibility of U.S. power in a Southeast Asian context. The United
States, as the world's unipolar power, seemed largely preoccupied with
Northeast Asia at this time and continually reiterated its neutrality
towards competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.48
Philippine requests to link the islands
Washington rejected intermittent
to Article 5 of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defence Treaty, thereby
decoupling its security guarantee to the Philippine mainland from the
Spratly Island dispute.
Itwas only afterChina occupied Mischief Reef in 1995 that the
United States expressed a more active interest inmaintaining Southeast
Asian stability.Coupled with China's rapid naval build-up during the
mid-1990s, Beijing's efforts to further consolidate its claims in the
South China Sea were viewed as a potential threat to U.S. interests in
Southeast Asia.49 In 1998, U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Joseph
Prueher testified to the U.S. House of Representatives that the
Philippines occupies a "geographically important position in the
region" and warned that "some Asia-Pacific nations assert excessive
maritime claims" which could potentially challenge that freedom of
navigation critical to regional stability.50 Since then, the United States
has frequently offered to mediate between disputants and has
strengthened its own presence in the South China Sea through bilateral
and multilateral military exercises. This expression of U.S. resolve
446 Shannon Tow
Washington's credibilityas
has, inPhilippine perceptions, reinforced
the geopolitically dominant Asian maritime power.
These geopolitical perceptions ultimately propelled Manila to ratify

the VFA in 1999. From the Philippines' vantage point, China has
consistently followed a strategy of "creeping assertiveness" with regard
to the South China Sea. It asserts and consolidates its claims in these
waters but does so in an incremental manner thatwill not provoke U.S.
or ASEAN resistance.51 These tactics have continued in spite ofManila's
diplomatic protests and confidence-building measures implemented to
the dispute. Because the Philippines is a weak military actor
modify
and ASEAN remains divided over the issue, China is able to approach
South China Sea territorial claims from a position of strength.
In view of U.S. maritime dominance, Manila thus came to regard
the revitalization of theU.S.-Philippines alliance as integral to deterring
Chinese aggression and ensuring Philippine security. As one Philippines
Senate report stated, the VFA "will convey to any power harbouring
hegemonist ambitions in the East Asian region that small countries like
the Philippines are not entirely isolated and helpless in the face of
expansionist designs".52 Policymakers recognized that the VFA would
ultimately "enhance the [United States"] tentacles of power' in the Asia
Pacific and ensure "a balance of power", as China adopts a more
assertive security policy.53 The Philippines case therefore reaffirms
Ross' assumption that small Asian states will seek closer ties with a
geopolitically dominant great power to reduce their own vulnerability.
Whether these ties give rise to regional spheres of influence, however,
is less certain.
The VFA has indeed led to some expansion of U.S. influence over the
Philippines. Through this agreement, Manila has sought to consolidate
its relationshipwith theUnited States by capitalizing on superior
U.S. technology and military capabilities. The VFA provides for
enhanced U.S.-Philippines defence interaction, including the delivery
of military aid and surplus defence equipment to the AFP. In recent
years, the AFP has purchased Knox class frigates, Cyclone-class patrol
boats and C-130 military planes. These military acquisitions are
imperative in view of the Philippines military's own modest
capabilities.54 The Philippines also currently engages in a number of
annual bilateral military exercises with the United States. These
exercises are designed to enhance AFP interoperability with U.S.

forces and facilitate information exchange.55
Under the auspices of the VFA, these exercises have served as the
basis forthePhilippines' participation in theU.S.-led GWOT. As part
of the global war on terror,Washington and Manila have expanded
bilateral military exercises so as to assist theAFP in eliminating the
Philippines' Abu SayyafGroup. In the 2004 Balikatan exercise, the
United Statesdeployed 2,600U.S. troopsto trainthePhilippinesmilitary
in counterterrorism.56 Ongoing bilateral cooperation has also resulted
in the signingof aMutual Logistics SupportAgreement in 2002,which
allows the U.S. commercial access to Philippines bases in exchange for
military hardware.
The Philippines' active participation in the GWOT is, in part,
indicative of its deference to U.S. strategic imperatives. While the
primary purpose of the alliance forManila is to counter what it perceives
as China's irredentistambitions in the South China Sea, Philippine
policymakers simultaneously recognize that Washington's strategic
agenda has changed since September 11 to more specifically address
issues of terrorism.57 So as to preserve the alliance and the geopolitical
benefits thatthePhilippines accrues fromit,Philippine policymakers
have adjusted the relationship to more closely correspond with
Washington's own current strategic interests. This is best
perhaps
exemplified by Philippines President Gloria Arroyo's announcement
that "the Philippines was ready to pay a price to support its ally's anti
terrorist campaign".58
Expansion of U.S.-Philippine cooperation has only occurred,
however, to the extent that it is in Manila's own interests. The
Philippines' limitedmilitary capabilities render itunable tomanage
its own internal security threats
adequately. Yet Philippines
policymakers have been continually
wary of provoking a domestic
nationalist backlash against the U.S. alliance. For these reasons, Manila
has ensured that the U.S. military presence in the Philippines remains
within clearly specified guidelines that accord with thePhilippines
constitution and do not impinge on national sovereignty.59 The VFA
does not provide for permanent U.S. military bases and American
troops on Philippines soil are only allowed to operate in a training
capacity. In 2003, Philippines President Gloria Arroyo rejected U.S.
President George Bush's offer to send in additional U.S. troops to
engage in direct combat against Abu Sayaff.60 Stringent terms of
reference have also been observed. These require that Philippine
commanders retain overall authority during joint military exercises.61
Through such measures, policymakers have sought to demonstrate, to
both domestic audiences and toWashington, that the Philippines is
448 Shannon Tow
not merely a client of the United States. This is further underscored

by Philippine attempts to reassure China that the increased U.S.
presence in thePhilippines is not directed against Beijing.62
Manila's efforts to curtail U.S. influence so as to retain its own
and manoeuvrability are not explained by Ross' theory.
independence
Examining thefuturestrategicorderofAsia largelyfrom theperspective
of greatpower geopolitical strategies,he does not fullyexamine both
the domestic and strategicimperatives thatmight lead the individual
Southeast Asian states to adopt a more nuanced foreign policy posture.
Maintaining Engagement: The Other Power
Although theVFA was initiallyforgedto deterChinese power,Manila

has also been conscious of the need to maintain good relations with
China. This is evidenced by Philippine policymakers' effortstodelimit
territorial disputes from the overall Sino-Philippines relationship. As
President Arroyo observed during a visit to Beijing in October 2001,
"Both China and the Philippines have agreed that this one irritant not
be the main characteristic of our relationship because we have many
other good things going between us".63 Beijing and Manila continue to
engage in regional dialogues and joint confidence-building measures to
mitigate chances of conflict over these issues. This is most recently
exemplifiedby theASEAN-China Code ofConduct fortheSouth China
Sea drawn up in November 2002.
Yet China and
the Philippines have also endeavoured to build a
more positive framework for mutual relations independent of these
territorial disputes. The Sino-Philippines Framework for Bilateral
Cooperation in the 21st Century, signed in May 2000, is illustrative.
This agreement provides for enhanced all-round cooperation and extends
a burgeoning bilateral economic relationship. trade with
Philippines
China has grown at an annual average rate of 8.56 per cent over the past
five years.64 China and the Philippines have also enhanced cooperation
through increased defence exchanges and by jointly combating
transnational crime.
In part, this challenges those U.S. objectives that Ross isolates of
containing Chinese geopolitical power and maintaining hegemony over
the Southeast Asian maritime sphere. As Philippines foreign policy
... relations
analyst Rommel Banlaoi observes, "Enhanc[ed] Philippines
with China ... serves as a counterweight to thewell-entrenched strategic
influenceof [the]Pentagon inPhilippine foreignand securitypolicy".65
Moreover, like Singapore, Manila
recognizes that while the rise of
China poses geostrategic challenges, it also presents a number of
economic opportunities. The Philippines purposes are therefore best
served by adopting a hedging strategy. This strategy also reflects
Manila's recognition that the current Asia-Pacific regional order could

become increasingly fluid over time. Under these circumstances, a
policy geared towards maximizing Manila's manoeuvrability would

render more gains than clear alignment with either power.
The extenttowhich Manila is able to continue implementingthis
strategy, however, ultimately depends on its perceptions of the strategic
latitude afforded by Sino-U.S. relations. Philippine policymakers
recognize thattheybenefitfromgreatpower competition.Responding
to a RAND Corporation study thaturgedWashington to exploit the
Philippines' strategic position so as to contain Chinese power, Arroyo
has indicated that the Philippines "would not be a pawn in [a Sino
... additional
U.S.] struggle" but that "itmight find leverage in relations
with the two powers".66
The Philippines case therefore challenges Ross' theory. Rather
than leading to alignment with a geopolitically dominant power, the
stable but competitive Sino-U.S. relations that Ross describes have, in
fact,engendered the opposite effect:a Philippines policy of qualified
manoeuvrability. Because Ross has not sufficiently addressed the
primary desire of small states to retain their own autonomy, his
theory does not reflect themore subtle nuances of Philippines' foreign
policy behaviour.
Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21st Century
The Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21st Century iswidely regarded as
the clearest indicator of Thailand's changing strategic priorities in the
post-Asian financial crisis period. Signed in February 1999, this
agreement was the first of its kind forged between China and a Southeast
Asian country. It provided formutual cooperation in areas of trade and
investment, defence and security, judicial affairs, and science and
technology. Most significant for Thailand, as a U.S. ally, was the
inclusion of a clause stating that both parties recognized the importance
of establishing a new multipolar security order. This signified Thai
sensitivity to a key principle of China's own emerging worldview and
illustrated Bangkok's recognition of China as a potentially dominant
continental power in Asia.67 More contentious, however iswhether the
Plan of Action for the 21st Century is symbolic of Thailand's entry into
a Chinese sphere of influence.
Geopolitical Dominance: The Chinese Identity

In line with Ross'
theory, this agreement is broadly reflective of
geopolitical imperatives. Thailand is conscious of China's rising power
and of the need to develop strategies to cope with this trend.68Although
450 Shannon Tow
China has always occupied an important place in Thai calculations

because of its geographic proximity, this has intensifiedsince 1997.
China's commitment to not devalue the yuan during the Asian financial
crisis and US$1 billion contribution to the IMF bailout fundwas
indicative of its economic strengthrelative to its fledglingSoutheast
Asian neighbours. More importantly, China's quick response to this
crisis symbolized itswillingness to bear the responsibilitiesof a great
power bymaintaining regional order.This is innoted contrasttowhat
Thailand perceived as U.S. policy delays in granting monetary rescue
packages throughthe IMF and theaccompanyingharsh conditions that

it imposed on the Thai government.69
Coupled with China's effortsto cultivate greater influence in
Myanmar and Indochina, these events significantly altered Thailand's
perceptions of its regional security environment. Thailand's 1997 defence
white paper postulated that as Thailand's strategic importance to the
United States declined, China would fill the power vacuum.70 Beijing's
institutionalleadership in theASEAN+3 and its effortsto develop its
relations with Southeast Asia through military aid and a network of
general bilateral agreements, have shaped Thai perceptions that, as the
emerging geopolitically dominant continental power, China's presence
in Southeast Asia is likely to be an enduring one.
The Plan of Action for the 21st Century reflects Thai policymakers'
recognition of these changing dynamics. Throughout history, Thailand
has relied on bilateral partnerships with great powers to ensure its
security. Thailand's choice of strategic partner, however, has never
been predetermined. Rather, itmoves adroitly between great power
benefactors, as the circumstances dictate, so as to reduce its vulnerability,
maximize its relative gains and avert dependency.71
In thewake of theAsian financial crisis and the relative impotence
of ASEAN in addressing it, Thailand's traditional preference for
bilateralism resurfaced. Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa and C.R. Neu
observe that Thailand's decision to forge closer tieswith China resembles
past patterns of Thai foreign policy of ensuring national security by
cultivating dominant regional powers.72 This is further reflected by one
Thai foreign policy official's comments that the 1999 Sino-Thai Plan of
Action would "at least ... remind China of [its] commitment with
Thailand when it becomes the centre of world attention".73 Bangkok
regards such institutionalized cooperation as integral to preventing
China from becoming a resentful and more belligerent security actor.
Thailand also stands to realize more immediate and specific security
benefits as well. In view of Beijing's close relationship with Rangoon,
Thai policymakers regard tieswith China as critical to ameliorating

subregional narcotics flows from Myanmar.74 The Thai government
also hopes to capitalize on China's economic growthby tapping into
the large Chinese market. This was a key consideration in 1998 and
1999 as the Thai economy recorded negative growth rates.75 Addressing
these issues, the Plan ofAction is indicative of Thai effortsto build
friendly relations with a geopolitically dominant continental power so
as to reduce its vulnerability and compensate for its own relative
weakness. To this extent, Ross' precepts pertaining to Thai foreign
policy behaviour are valid.
Since the Plan of Action was signed, China's influence in the Sino
Thai relationship has increased concomitantiy with Thailand's growing
respect for Chinese power. China has recently been referred to by the
Thai government as a "strategic partner" and Sino-Thai defence
exchanges and discussions on cooperation in defence technology
have notably expanded. Growing Chinese influence is further manifest
in the economic sphere. In the past four years, China has become
Thailand's fourth largest trading partner.76 Trade figures are projected
to further increase as China reduces its tariffs on Thai agricultural
products.77 These factors are indicative of Thailand's calculated
deference to key Chinese interests of secure land borders and Asian
continental dominance.
It is important to note, however, that although Thailand has been
influencedby China, ithas not actually alignedwith thatpower. This
directly challenges Ross' theory of subregional bipolarity. Thailand has
engaged China but remains wary of becoming a Chinese satellite and
has adjusted its strategies accordingly. One way inwhich Thailand has
sought to counter Chinese continental influence, is by deepening
ASEAN's ties with India and by advocating Myanmar become a member
ofASEAN in 1999.78 Perhaps even more indicative of Bangkok's attempts
to limitChinese influence are Thailand's effortstomaintain theU.S.
alliance. This is particularly noteworthy in light of China's frequent
criticisms of the U.S. alliance network and Thailand's endorsement of
China's "multipolarization" worldview.
The Other Power: Maintaining Engagement

Rather than bandwagoning with China, as Ross projects, Thai foreign
policymakers recognize that their long-term interests are best served by
cooperating with both powers. The United States remains Thailand's
largest trading and investment partner.79 Moreover, Thailand's alliance
452 Shannon Tow
with thatcountryprovides itwith a numberof securitybenefits.Thailand

considerable value on the U.S. relationship because of the
places
technologicallyadvanced military capabilities it is able toacquire. The
vastmajority ofThai weapons systemsoriginatefrom theUnited States
and Thailand's military is eager to adopt U.S. surveillance and
communications equipment in future.80 Thailand also values its
participation in U.S. bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Most

notable among these is Cobra Gold. Through these exercises, Thailand
not only enhances its own armed forces' skills but preserves regional
stabilityby providing for an active and visible U.S. presence in the
region. By providing theUnited States with a toehold in continental
Southeast Asia, this presence balances any Chinese effort to establish a
continental hegemonic sphere.
This policy direction can be more broadly linked to changing
Thai perceptions of U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia. During the
period inwhich thePlan ofAction forthe 21stCenturywas signed, the

United States was perceived by Bangkok as globally dominant but its
policy credibility in Southeast Asia was by no means assured.
Perceptions of the United States' delayed reaction to the Asian financial
crisis only reaffirmed these convictions and persuaded many Thai
that America could not always be relied upon as a guarantor
analysts
of Thai interests.81
Since the GWOT, however, these perceptions have altered slightly.
As the United States reengages in Southeast Asia to counter terrorism,
ithas again come to be regarded by Bangkok as an important Southeast
Asian security actor. Thailand and the United States have initiated a
new exercise called Known Warrior,
bilateral for example, devoted
exclusively to counter-terrorism missions. They have also increased
intelligence and special operations coordination. Thai appreciation of
the American link is reinforced by the unilateral and decisive use of
American military power to remove regimes harbouring terrorists and
tacit Chinese support for U.S. global objectives during this campaign.
While China is still perceived by the Thais as the long-term
dominant power in continental Asia, an increased U.S.
geopolitically
presence has affected Thailand's foreign policy. Thailand continues
to hedge against the United States, as evidenced by its continued
efforts to spearhead regional institutional initiatives such as the Asian
Cooperation Dialogue. Yet an increasingly visible U.S. presence has
enabled Bangkok to more efficiently manoeuvre between the great
powers and maintain its strategic independence.
Whether Thailand can continue to pursue a hedging strategy is
largely dependent on the leeway Bangkok believes the Sino-U.S.
relationship will afford. Thai commentators have expressed concern in
recentyears thateitherChina or theUnited Stateswill enlistASEAN as

a political tool against the other power, forcingThailand to more
with one side.Nevertheless, theyargue thatthecountry
clearly identify
should court both China and the United States so long as Sino-U.S.
tensions remain subdued.82
Thailand's unwillingness to align with either great power under
circumstances of stable but competitive Sino-U.S. relations, draws into
question Ross' theoryof regional bipolarity.Although Thailand has
sought close relationswith China ithas not actually alignedwith that
power because of its desire tomaintain itsmanoeuvrability in a fluid
strategic environment. Ross' theory is therefore useful in highlighting
thepull of geostrategicinfluencesbut does not explain the conditions
under which these forces are most operable.
Conclusion
These three case studies empirically challenge Ross' theory of sub

regional bipolarity. This theory is based on assumptions that smaller
states will be primarily concerned with reducing their own vulnerability
and will unconditionally alignwith a single geopolitically dominant
great power to those ends. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis,
ASEAN states have increasingly favoured bilateral over multilateral
approaches to security.83
Yet no clear bipolar structure has emerged. In each of the three
case studies examined, the interrelationship between relative geographic
positionality Southeast Asian
and states' foreign policy behaviour
operated differently from Ross' projections. Southeast Asian countries
retain a close relationship with a geopolitically dominant power to
reduce their vulnerability but do not actually align with that power.
Instead, they seek to enhance their manoeuvrability and anticipate
that the Sino-U.S. relationship will afford them sufficient strategic
latitude to do so.
This supports the classical realist argument that weaker states
will qualify their alignment behaviour in accordance with the dynamics
of great power competition. Whereas Ross assumes that stable but
competitive Sino-U.S. relations will engender two clearly defined
spheres of influence, it appears that the very nature of this great
power relationship has, in fact, encouraged the opposite outcome.
Ross' theory must therefore be modified since actual empirical evidence
is present for only two out of those four causal variables on which it
is premised. Although Southeast Asian states identified and sought
closer relations with a proximate geopolitically dominant great power,
there is little evidence to support Ross' claims that this geopolitical
454 Shannon Tow
strength translates into unquestioned regional influence or clear

policies of alignment.
Singaporean, Philippine and Thai policymakers all alluded to
dominance as a principal factor in their decisions to forge
geopolitical
agreements with the great powers. These countries were propelled by
their own vulnerability to accommodate great power geopolitical
dominance and freeride on the securitybenefits thisprovided.While
these agreements did have some spillover effects, all three Southeast
Asian countries imposed limits on this influence when itwas perceived
as contrary to their own national interests or foreshadowing an emerging
dependency relationship. Moreover, these countries simultaneously
sought to enhance theirautonomy bymaintaining their tieswith the
other great power.
To gain a fuller understanding of Southeast Asian geopolitical
dynamics, the interrelationship between geographic proximity and
Southeast Asian states' individual foreign policy needs to be more
precisely defined. Further research is warranted on exactly what point
individual Southeast Asian countries perceive their strategic latitude is
sufficiently narrow to justify a greater strategic commitment to a
particular large power. Empirical investigation of the other seven
Southeast Asian countries' foreign policy behaviour could also yield
important indices that might further refine this article's hypothesis.
A number of other potentially relevant cases, such as Vietnam and
Myanmar, have not been weighed here. Because of the relative paucity
of available literature on these states and the lack of transparency
regarding leadership motivation in foreign policy decision-making,
examination of these cases would involve a high level of deduction and
would not represent the most valid test of Ross' theory. Whether these
states are clearly maritime or continental (and thus which of the great
powers should be looked to as geopolitically dominant), is also subject
to contention. On the surface, these states appear to defer more often to
China than the United States. Yet Vietnam has notably expanded ties
with the United States in recent years. Myanmar has also strengthened
its ties with India, so as to provide greater leverage in its bilateral
relations with China. These trends are still not easily reconciled with
Ross' bipolar delineation of the Southeast Asian geostrategic landscape.
Like the Philippine, Singaporean and Thai case studies undertaken
here, however, they would suggest the need to employ a more nuanced
approach thanthoseadopted bybothRoss and his criticswhen analysing
Southeast Asian security dynamics. ASEAN states are not necessarily
powerless but the degree to which they can exercise what power they
have is frequently contingenton theirperception of the dynamics of
great power relationships.
This has substantialpolicy ramificationsforboth ASEAN states

and the great powers. Southeast Asian countries have a greater stake in
theirrelationshipwithwhat theyperceive as thegeopoliticallydominant
power. Yet theymust continue to develop bilateral ties with both
powers if they are to preserve their autonomy and maximize their
benefits fromthis relationship.Meanwhile, Washington and Beijing
will confrontdifficultiesin cultivatingdecisive influenceamong these
countries of the leverage
because the ASEAN states derive from
competitive Sino-U.S.
relations. Although China and the United States
could neutralize Southeast Asian tactics of manoeuvrability by acting
in ways that decrease ASEAN countries' perceptions of their relative
strategic latitude, caution must be exercised not to destabilize the
overriding and relatively stable power equilibrium in the region.
NOTES
1 Amitav Acharya, Constructinga SecurityCommunity in Southeast Asia: ASEAN
and theProblem ofRegional Order (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 184.
2 Robyn Lim, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand", Contemporary
Southeast Asia 20, no. 2 (August 1998), pp. 116-26. Avery Goldstein, "Balance of
Power Politics: Consequences for Asian Security Order", in Asian Security Order:
Instrumentaland NormativeApproaches, edited byMutthiah Alagappa (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 188-95.
3 Mohan Malik, "Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Strategic Gains and Tactical
Losses after September 11", Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (August 2002),
p. 273.
4 Robert Ross, "The Geography of Peace", International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring
1999), pp. 84-86.
5 Goldstein, op. cit., p. 187; Aaron Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past be Asia's Future?",
42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), p. 154.
Survival
6 Gaye Christofferson, "The Role of East Asia in Sino-US Relations", Asian Survey
42, no. 3 (May/June 2002): 380.
7 Goldstein, op. cit., p. 176; Amitav in the Dragon's
Acharya, Seeking Security
Shadow: China and Southeast Asia in the Emerging Asian Order (Singapore:
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), pp. 17-21.
8 Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 179-81.
9 Acharya, "Seeking Security", op. cit., pp. 17?19.
10 This paper adopts a similar approach to that of Robert Jervis. Jervis argues that
international relations is determined not by any single "objective reality" but rather
by states' perceptions of that reality. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
World Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 3.
11 Ross, op. cit., pp. 84-86.
12 Russia's withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay coupled with itsmore Eurocentric
in 2002,
foreign policy orientation and limited resources, have crippled it as an Asian

strategic actor. Similarly, Japan's weakening economy and commensurate reductions
inOverseas Development Aid (ODA) have jeopardized thatcountry'skey avenue of
applying power in the region.While India is increasinglyreplacing Japan as a
456 Shannon Tow
source of investment, trade and technology, its slow economic liberalization has
not allowed it to compete on the same level as China and theUnited States. Ian
James Storey and Carlyle Thayer, "Cam Ranh Bay: Past Imperfect, Future
Conditional", Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 3 (December 2001), p. 461 and
Lam Peng Er, "Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Trading Places", Comparative
Connections 4, no.
1 (April 2002), <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/020lQoa.html>,
accessed on 4 August 2003.
13 Ross, "The Geography of Peace", op. cit., pp. 101-08.
14 Cited in Saul Cohen, Geography in a Divided World (New York: Random House,
1963), p. 46.
15 Dao Shulin and Shang Qianheng, "China-ASEAN relations", Contemporary
International Relations 12, no. 11 (November 2002), p. 16.
16 Michael Yahuda, "Chinese Dilemmas in Thinking about the Regional Security
Architecture", Pacific Review 16, no. 2 (June 2003), p. 193. Carlyle Thayer, "China's
'New Security Concept' and ASEAN", Comparative Connections 2, no. 3 (October
2000), accessed on
<http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/003Qchina_asean.html>
16 July2003.
17 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 2001), <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>, accessed
on 3 July 2003, p. 12.
18 Cited in "Troop Level Reports: Nothing but Speculation Rumsfeld Says", American
Forces Press Service, 25 March 2004, U.S. Department of Defense website at
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n03252004_200403258.
html>, accessed on 2 April 2004.
19 Cited in "Global Military Posture's Part in Transformation", American Forces Press
Service, 2 December 2003, U.S.
Department of Defense website at <http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/Dec2003/nl2022003_200312022.html>, accessed on
2 April 2004.
20 Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa and C.R. Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S.
Strategy Toward China (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pp. 5-11.

21 Ross, op. cit., p. 99.
22 You Ji, "The PLA's Blue Water Illusion: Legacies, Models and Realities", CAPS
Paper 32 (2001), p. 24.

24 StephenWalt, The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca:Cornell University, 1987), p. 23.
26 RobertRothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University
Press, pp. 28, 34-37; David Vital, The Inequality
1968), of States (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967), pp. 120-21; Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States: Diplomacy
in World War Two (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 180-83.
27 Fox, op. cit, p. 183.
28 Fox, op. cit, p. 185.
29 Goh Chok Tong, "East Asia after Iraq", Remarks to the Asia Society Gala Dinner at
the Fairmont Hotel, Washington D.C., 7 May 2003, <http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/
data/pr/2003050707.htm>, accessed on 6 August 2003.
30 Tony Tan and William Cohen, "DoD News Link, 15 January
Briefing", Defense
1998, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Janl998/t01221998_t0115tan.html>,
accessed on 29 July 2003.
31 Lee Hsien Loong, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asia", 25 May 1999, <http://
www.gov.sg/sprinter/>, accessed on 24 September 2004.
32 Derek Da Cunha, "Defence and Security: Evolving Threat p. 133; in
Perceptions",
Michael Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London:

Routledge, 2000) and Tim Huxley, Defending theLion City: The Armed Forces of
Singapore (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), p. 36.
33 Evelyn Goh, "Singapore'sReaction toRising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic
Readjustment", InstituteforDefence and StrategicStudiesWorkingPaper 67 (2004),
p. 9.
34 Singaporean Defence Minister Tony Tan, quoted by Michael Richardson, 'Singapore
Welcomes U.S. Air Craft Carrier', International Herald Tribune, 22 March 2001,
20Pages/Link%20Folders/0lPf/iht220301.html>,
<http://www.sfdonlme.org/Link%
accessed on 8 July 2003.
35 Huxley, op. cit., p. 37.
36 S. Jayakumar, "Remarks in Parliament by Singaporean Foreign Minister Prof S.
Jayakumaron StrategicReview in theWorld, including the Situation in Iraq

and Asia-Pacific Region", 14 March 2003, <http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/
2003031405.htm>, accessed on 6 August 2003.
37 SingaporeMinistry ofDefence,Defending Singapore in the21stCentury (Singapore:
Ministry of Defence, 2000), p. 51.
38 Tony Tan andWilliam Cohen, "DoDNews Briefing:SigningCeremonywith Secretary
of Defense William S. Cohen and Minister of Defense Tony Tan, Republic of
Singapore", Defense Link, 10 November 1998, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Novl998/tlll01998_tll0sing.html>, accessed on 29 July 2003; Michael Richardson,
op. cit.
39 Goh, op. cit, p. 9.
40 George Yeo, "Transcript of Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo's Interview
with the BBC", 29 July 2002, <http://www.gov.sg/singov/interviews/290702gy.htm>,
41 Goh Chok Tong, "Speech byPrimeMinister Goh Chok Tong at theBanquet Hosted
in Honour of His Excellency Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China", Remarks at the Istana Hotel, Singapore, 29 November
1999, <http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/1999112902.htm>, accessed on 6 August
2003.
42 Goh Chok Tong, "East Asia after Iraq", Remarks to the Asia Society Gala Dinner
at the Fairmont Hotel, Washington D.C., 7 May 2003, <http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/
data/pr/2003050707.htm>, accessed on 6 August 2003. Also see Simon Tay, "China,
ASEAN and East Asia: Partnershipwith a Rising Power" (Paper presented at the
"Asia-Pacific Roundtable", Kuala Lumpur, 2-6 June 2002), <http://www.
siiaonline.org/article/china-asean-APR.doc>, accessed on 14 August 2003.
43 Lee Hsien Loong, "Power Shifts in Asia", Fortune Global Forum, Washington D.C.,
12 November 2002, <http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/2002111301.htm>, accessed
on 5 August 2003.
44 Ibid.
45 Christofferson, op. cit., pp. 393-94.
46 Goh, op. cit., p. 7.
47 Rommel Banlaoi, "The Role of Philippines-American Relations in the Global
Campaign against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security", Contemporary

Southeast Asia 24, no. 2 (August 2002), p. 200.
48 Ian James Storey, "Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South
China Sea Dispute", Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 1 (April 1999), pp. 109
10.
49 Renato Cruz de Castro, "The Revitalized Security Relations", Asian
Philippine-U.S.
Survey 43, no. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 978.
458 Shannon Tow
50 Cited inGregAustin, "UnwantedEntanglement:The Philippines SpratiyPolicy as

a Case Study inConflictEnhancement?",SecurityDialogue 34, no. 1 (March 2003),
p. 47.
51 Storey, op. cit., pp. 99-101.
52 Cathy Yamsuan, "U.S. Adrniral: VFA No Security Blanket", Philippines Daily
24 May 1999, accessed on
Inquirer, <http://archive.inq7.net/search/index.php>,
5 June 2003.
53 AFP spokesperson quoted by Austin, op. cit., p. 50.
54 Sheldon Simon, "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An
Assessment and Projection", NBR Analysis 14, no. 2 (August 2003), accessed at
pp. 33-34.
<http://www.nbr.org/publications/analkysis/voll4no2/142.pdf>,
55 Carlos Agustin,MilitaryExercises in theContextofPhilippine SecurityRequirements
(Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines, 2002), <http://
www.ndcp.edu.ph/ppapers/BALIKATAN%20PAPER%20FOR%20
CLA%202.htm, accessed on 30 June 2003.
56 Balikatan Starts; New Venues Added", Manila Times, 24 February
"Philippines:
2004, accessed on 2 March
<http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/cgi-bin/isearch>,
2004.
57 Cruz de Castro, op. cit., p. 987.
58 Ibid., p. 980.
59 "Dead in the Water, Drilon Says of U.S. Bases in RP", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
11 June 2003, accessed on
<http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/cgi-bin/isearch>,.
6 August 2003; "Balikatan Exercises Postponed as RP, U.S. Debate Ground Troops
Role", Manila Times, 3 June 2003, <http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/cgi-bin/isearch>,
accessed on 5 August 2003; compilation of personal interviews (Tow) conducted
with regional officials, Canberra, 4 July 2003.
60 David Wurfel, "The Philippines: Collateral Damage in the War on Terrorism",
CANCAPS Bulletin 33 (May 2002), p. 2.
61 Sheldon Simon, "Southeast Asia and the U.S. War on Terrorism", NBR Analysis 13,
no. 4
(July 2002), <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/voll3no4?War%
20on%20Terrorism.html>, accessed on 4 August 2003.
62 Rommel Banlaoi, "The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Strategic Implications
for Philippine-China-US Relations" (Paper presented at the Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, University, Guanzhou China, 7 January 2003), <http://
Zhongshan
accessed on
www.apan-info.net/terrorism/terrorism_view_article.asp7ids48>,
14 July 2003, p. 13.
63 Philippines President Gloria
Arroyo, quoted by Carlito Pablo, "Singing in Beijing:
Jiang Meets his Match in Ate Glo", Philippines Daily Inquirer, 1 November 2001,
<http://archive.inq7.net/search/index.php>,
64 Archimedes Gomez, "China-Philippines Economic and Trade Cooperation", paper
at the International Seminar on China-ASEAN Trade, Investment
presented
and Development Cooperation, Kunming China, September 2002, <http://
www.ecdc.net.cn/newindex/chinese/page/sitemap/focus/proceedings/englishg/
part%20two/01.htm>, accessed on 29 September 2003.
65 Banlaoi, op. cit., p. 14.
66 Philippines President Gloria Arroyo cited in Christofferson op. cit., p. 388. See also
Zalmay Khalizad et al., The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy
and Force Posture (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).
67 William Tow, Assessing US. Bilateral Security Alliances in the Asia-Pacific's
"Southern Rim": Why the San Francisco System Endures" (Stanford: Asia-Pacific
Research Centre, 1999), pp. 15-16.
68 Kusuma Snitwongse, "The Thai-United States Bilateral Alliance", in Bilateralism

in aMultilateral Era: The Future of theSan Francisco Alliance System in theAsia
Pacific, edited byWilliam Tow, Russell Trood and Toshiya Hoshino (Brisbane,
Australia: Centre for the Study of Asia-Australia Relations, 1997), p. 116.
69 "This is No Way forU.S. toTreat Staunch Ally", The Nation, 19 January1998,
p. A4.
70 Tow, op. cit, p. 16.
71 Chulacheeb Chinawanno, "Thailand and Regional Security:The Search forSecurity
paper presented at Conference on to Security
Cooperation", "Evolving Approaches
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific", Singapore, &-10 December 2002.
72 Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu, op. cit., p. 35.
73 Anonymous Thai foreignpolicy official,quoted by,SaritdatMarukatat and Nussara
Saratsawong, "Sino-Thai Relations Move into the New Century", Bangkok Post,
1 February 1999, <http://search.bangkokpost.co.th/bkkpost/1999/bpl9990205/
050299_news30.html>, accessed on 4 2003.
April
74 Kulachada Chaipipat, "China and the Delicate Task", The Nation, 21 May 2001.
75 Ban Kanemi et al., "An Eastern Asian Microeconometric Link Model", Economic
and Social Research Institute (April 2002), <http://www.esri.go.jp/index-e.html>,
accessed on 4 April 2003.
76 Montira Narkvichien, "Thai-Chinese Trade Continues to Grow", The Nation,
6 December 2002.
77 "Sino-Thai Trade: Sales Team to Hit the Road", The Nation, 24 July 2003.
78 Kusuma Snitwongse, "Thai Foreign Policy: Principal or Profit?", Contemporary
Southeast Asia 23, no. 2 (August 2001), p. 204. Also see Faizal Yahya, "India and
Southeast Asia: Revisited", Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 1 (April 2003),
p. 96.
79 SakthipKrairiksh,"Speech byH.E. Mr. Sakthip Krairiksh,Ambassador ofThailand
to the United States, at a Business Luncheon Hosted by the World Trade Center,
Atlanta", 5 March 2002, <http://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/statemnt/ambstmn/
wtcatlanta030502.html>, accessed on 2 June 2003.
80 Sheldon Simon, "Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S.-Pacific Command: An
Assessment and Projection", NBR Analysis 14, no. 2 (August 2003), <http://www.
accessed on 15 December 2003,
nbr.org/publications/analysis/voll4no2/142.pdf>,
p. 30.
81 "This is no way for U.S. to Treat Staunch Ally", op. cit.
82 "China Must Drop Threats of War", Bangkok Post, 12 March 2000; "U.S. Attitude
on China Will Affect the Entire Region", Bangkok Post, 4 September 2001,
<http://search.bangkokpost.co.th/bkkpost/2000/bp2000_mar/bp20000312/
120300_newsl5.html>, accessed on 13 June 2003; and Snitwongse, op. cit., p. 207.
83 Goldstein, "Balance of Power Politics", op. cit., p. 191.
Shannon Tow is currently a Research Assistant at the School of Political

Science and International Studies, University ofQueensland in Brisbane,
Australia.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)

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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)

Southeast Asia in the Sino-U.S. Strategic Balance

Southeast Asia in the

In his article "The Geography of Peace", Robert Ross

Throughout much of the post-Cold War period, the dynamics of the

Nations (ASEAN) engaged in a number of regional institutionbuilding

argument by asserting that the Southeast Asian states maintain a position

Ross' Conceptualization of the Sino-U.S. Relationship

in Southeast Asia", China has actively promoted its "new security

play a critical role in U.S. grand strategy.

concerned with modernizing its economy and therefore desires regional

Small State Foreign Policy Behaviour

Addendum to the 1990 US-Singaporean Memorandum

The 1998 addendum to the U.S.-Singapore Memorandum of

Geopolitical dominance: The U.S. Identity

Singapore's decision to host U.S. naval vessels was, to some extent, a

dominant maritime power. Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong

Geopolitical Dominance: Incentives for Collaboration

These geopolitical perceptions were instrumental to Singapore's decision

Defence Minister Tony Tan has specifically linked the Changi

Geopolitical Dominance: The Extent of Influence

The 1998 addendum to theMOU has also certainlyhad some spillover

hedging against both China and the United States. As Singapore's

The Other Power: Maintaining Engagement

This burgeoning economic cooperation is underpinned by a

U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement

The 1999 U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) is the

onset of the Asian financial crisis and marks a resuscitation of U.S.

Geopolitical Dominance: The U.S. Identity

Geopolitical Dominance: Incentives for Collaboration

These geopolitical perceptions ultimately propelled Manila to ratify

Geopolitical Dominance: The Extent of Influence

exercises are designed to enhance AFP interoperability with U.S.

not merely a client of the United States. This is further underscored

Maintaining Engagement: The Other Power

Although theVFA was initiallyforgedto deterChinese power,Manila

Manila's recognition that the current Asia-Pacific regional order could

policy geared towards maximizing Manila's manoeuvrability would

Sino-Thai Plan of Action for the 21st Century

Geopolitical Dominance: The Chinese Identity

China has always occupied an important place in Thai calculations

packages throughthe IMF and theaccompanyingharsh conditions that

Geopolitical Dominance: Incentives for Collaboration

Thai policymakers regard tieswith China as critical to ameliorating

Geopolitical Dominance: The Extent of Influence

The Other Power: Maintaining Engagement

with thatcountryprovides itwith a numberof securitybenefits.Thailand

participation in U.S. bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Most

period inwhich thePlan ofAction forthe 21stCenturywas signed, the

recentyears thateitherChina or theUnited Stateswill enlistASEAN as

These three case studies empirically challenge Ross' theory of sub

strength translates into unquestioned regional influence or clear

This has substantialpolicy ramificationsforboth ASEAN states

foreign policy orientation and limited resources, have crippled it as an Asian

Strategy Toward China (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pp. 5-11.

Paper 32 (2001), p. 24.

Michael Leifer, Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London:

Jayakumaron StrategicReview in theWorld, including the Situation in Iraq

Campaign against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security", Contemporary

50 Cited inGregAustin, "UnwantedEntanglement:The Philippines SpratiyPolicy as

68 Kusuma Snitwongse, "The Thai-United States Bilateral Alliance", in Bilateralism

Shannon Tow is currently a Research Assistant at the School of Political

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