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 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 1988, 2 (4), 281-300

Knowledge and Appraisal in the

Cognition-Emotion Relationship

Richard S. Lazarus and Craig A. Smith

University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.

Recently there has been considerable theoretical and empirical work attemp-
ting to identify specific cognitive dimensions that shape the emotional
response. However. this work has almost universally neglected an important
theoretical distinction between two types of cognition relevant to emotion:
knowledge and appraisal. Knowledge has to do with the facts of an adapta-
tional encounter, whereas appraisal defines the personal significance of an
encounter for well-being. In the shaping of an emotion, knowledge is a distal
variable which requires an additional process of appraisal to produce an
emotion: appraisal is a proximal variable which directly intluences whether
an emotion will be generated. and if so. its kind and intensity.
In this article we examine the distinctions between knowledge and apprai-
sal that arc relevant to the emotion process. and how the failure to consider
them muddies theoretical and empirical work. We examine a number of
putative appraisal dimensions prominent in current theoretical systems.
examine why they often constitute knowledge rather than appraisal, and
discuss some of the appraisal dimensions in the emotion process. In addition.
the major techniques used to study the cognition-emotion relationship arc
examined and their potential for providing evidence of appraisal rather than
knowledge is evaluated.

.-
INTRODUCTION
Although interest in the relationship between cognition and emotion has
been stimulated by recent interchanges (e.g. Baars, 1981; Ellis. 1985;
Kleinginna & Kleinginna. 1985: Lazarus, 1981, 1982. 1984: Scheff, 1985:
Slife. 1981; Zajonc. 1980, 1984), the nature of this relationship has been

Requests for reprints should he sent to Richard S. Lazarus. Department of Psychology.

University of California. Berkeley. CA 94612. U.S.A. Preparation of this article was
supported in part bv National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH09445 to the second.
author. We wish to thank Phoebe Ellsworth. Philip Tctlock. and Daniel Weinberger for their
helpful comments and suggestions. -

© 1988 Lawrence Erlhaum Associates Limited

CE ~/4-A
282 LAZARUS AND SMITH
and remains a very important and unresolved issue (see also Bolles. 1?74;
Hilgard, 1980). There is currently an extraordinary volume of w~1t.mg
about cognition-emotion relationships and some brand new empmcal
research. · .
A number of attempts have been made to theorise about emotion which
centre on the process of cognitive appraisal. Some, such as those of Arnold
(1960), Epstein (1983), Lazarus (1966; Lazarus & Folkm~n, 1984), ~nd
Leventhal (1984), conceptualise emotion from the standp?mt of a~pra1sal
without systematically attempting to detail the appraisals involved m each
kind of emotion. Others, such as Frijda (1987), Roseman (1984), Scherer
(1984a,b), Smith and Ellsworth (1985), and Weiner (1985, whose wmk on
attribution and emotion is partly derived from earlier analyses by He1d~r'
1958), have attempted to link specific kinds of cogn~tive activit.y to specific
kinds of emotion. And if we included analyses of smgle emotions such as
guilt. fear, anger, or hope, the number of citati?ns relevant. to the
cognition-emotion relationship would overwhelm this mod.est article.
To advance the argument beyond assumption and assertion a~out h~w
cognitive activity shapes emotion. there must also be program~at1c empir-
ical efforts to identify the chapter and verse of the appraisal facto~s
necessary and sufficient for each emotion. Such efforts, alt~oug.h st1.ll
infrequent. now appear to be underway, some of them .appeanng m. ~his
Journal (e.g. Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Fn1da.
1987). - .
However, a troubling feature of this research is widespread confusion
about what is meant by appraisal, and about the differenc~s b~twe~n t~o
kinds of cognition: knowledge and appraisal. The confusion 1s pnma~1ly
theoretical but it also has methodological ramifications. The theoretical
confusion arises because both kinds of cognition, and the way they
influence emotions, are different, yet in practice these cognitive constructs
tend to be regarded as interchangeable. For example, "appraisal" and
"attribution" (which is a form of knowledge) are often ~re.ate~ as the same.
Our purpose in this article is to examine t.he d1stmct1ons betw~en
knowledge and appraisal from both a theoretical and methodological
perspective. and to explain why the~ are ~mportant to a proper understand-
ing of the cognition-emotion relat1onsh1p and the design of research.
THE THEORETICAL CONFUSION
In a nutshell, knowledge, whether concrete and primitive or abstract and
symbolic. consists of cognitions about the way things a~e and h?~ they
~ork. In contrast, appraisal is a form of personal meanmg cons1stmg of
evaluations of the significance of this knowledge for well-being. If pe.rsonal
stakes are not implicated in an adaptational encounter. knowledge is cold
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 283
cognition, to use a well-known metaphor. Appraisals, in contrast, involve
such stakes and reflect how adequately we are managing the encounter.
They are therefore warm or hot. Although the distinction has been made
often (cf. Abelson, 1963; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976; Lazarus & Folkman,
1984), and can even be traced to classical writings, the two kinds of
cognition are commonly confused for obscure reasons.
Knowledge in Emotion
Much that can be said about knowledge is outside the scope of this article.
However, certain distinctions between it and appraisal are fundamental to
our arguments. As we are using the term. knowledge consists of our
understanding of both the way things are and work in general. and the way
things are and work in a specfiic context. Thus we can speak of general
knowledge and contextual knowledge: General knowledge includes estab-
lished attitudes. beliefs, and intuitive theories about ourselves (including
our self-concepts) and the world (cf. Epstein, 1983; Ross, 1977); contex-
tual knowledge concerns the who, what, where. when, and how of any
particular encounter. and is directly derived, in part. from the perceptual
information presented to us by our immediate situation. However. in
constructing contextual knowledge we also draw on general knowledge
through a diverse array of attributional and inferential strategics (Heider,
1958; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).
Sometimes knowledge is verbalisable, but it can also be tacit (cf.
Polanyi. 1966), and even unconscious, either in the less controversial sense
of simply being unnoticed or unnoticeable, or in the Freudian sense of
being kept out of awareness in defence of the psychological system.
Knowledge. both general and contextual, can be elemental. concrete, and
limited. or complex, abstract, and broad; it can also be accurate or
inaccurate.
To the extent that theories postulate that emotion is sometimes (or
always) a reaction to the significance (e.g. harm or benefit) of what is
happening for well-being, knowledge is a necessary factor. Only if we
comprehend how things work in general. and in a particular context, can
we appropriately evaluate the significance of encounters with the environ-
ment for our well-being and. therefore, react with specific emotions based
on this significance. However. knowledge. per se, does not result in
emotion. Another process. called appraisal. is required. which consists of
an evaluation of whether and how what is happening is personally harmful
or beneficial. Whereas knowledge. although necessary, is not by itself
sufficient to produce an emotion, the appraisal of the personal significance
of the encounter. based on this knowledge, is both necessarv and sufficient.
Each positive emotion reflects a particular kind of apprai;ed benefit, and
each negative emotion reflects a particular kind of appraised harm.
284 LAZARUS AND SMITH
Appraisal in Emotion
Thus, although knowledge is a vital part of the cognitive stuff of which
personal meaning is made, it does not constitute an appraisal until its
implications for personal well-being have been drawn. Kreitler and
Kreitler (1976, p. 78) have described the types of issues that when evalu-
ated provide the essence of personal (and hence emotional) meaning:
... meaning generation is regulated by two focal questions: 'What does it
mean?' and 'what does it mean to me and for me?' Whereas the first question is
an elaborate form of the central question 'What is it?' that guides meaning
action, the second question is new and specific to meaning generation. It raises
the issue of personal relevance, but only insofar as action is concerned. For the
sake of clarifying this question it seems advisable to present it also in some
rephrased forms, such as, 'Does it affect me at all?', 'In what way does it affect
me?', 'Am I concerned in any way?', 'Should I be involved?', 'Is any action
required on my part?', 'Am I to act or not?' Foreshadowing concepts and
processes explained and discussed later, we venture to introduce yet another
more technical rephrasing of the same question: "In which sense(s) does it or
may it affect (or concern) my goals, my norms, my beliefs about myself. and
my beliefs about the environment or any of its aspects?' Evidently, the
formulation 'What does it mean to me or for me?' is merely a label
summarizing these different variants of the question.
Personal meaning as discussed by Kreitler and Kreitler is closely related
to the concept of appraisal. Lazarus and his colleagues (e.g. Lazarus, 1966;
Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) have written
about primary appraisal, which addresses whether and how the encounter
is relevant to the person's well-being, and is similar to Kreitler and
Kreitler's question about whether the situation affects one at all. Primary
appraisal is "primary" not because it necessarily comes first in the appraisal
process; it often does not. It is primary because it provides the "heat" in a
transaction, based on personal relevance, which is what makes knowledge
potentially emotional. An appraisal that an encounter touches upon goal
commitments provides personal relevance and hence the potential for
emotion.
However, primary appraisal is not sufficient by itself to determine
whether and in what ways harm or benefit is involved. Secondary appraisal
of coping resources and options further defines the adaptational signi-
ficance of is happening and, therefore, the specific emotions to be experi-
enced (Lazarus. Kanner, & Folkman, 1980). It is similar to Kreitler and
Kreitler's question about whether action is required and if so. what kind.
For example, when a person has a personal stake in a transaction. if that
person's coping resources are evaluated as adequate to manage the poten-
tial threat. or if the person believes that somehow things will work out,
I
I
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION
emotional reaction is more likely than a negative one. If, however, the
285
then the encounter will be appraised as benign or beneficial, and a positive
person is uncertain about the possibilities of coping effectively, the encoun-
ter will be appraised as a threat and an emotion relevant to this appraisal,
I
for example, anxiety, will ensue. And if coping resources suggest helpless-
ness or hopelessness in the face of threat, the resulting emotion will accord
with this evaluation, as in, for example, sadness or depression. Particular
I' combinations of primary and secondary appraisal, based on knowledge,
f provide the emotional significance of any encounter and lead to appropri-
ate kinds and intensities of emotion.
An important feature of appraisal is that the personal meaning which
underlies the emotional reaction refers to a particular relationship between
the person and the environment. Personal meaning cannot be defined
without simultaneous reference to both the person and the environment.
Thus, in any adaptational encounter, the process of appraisal must recon-
cile two often contradictory sets of forces: The goals and beliefs (to which
one is committed) that are brought to the encounter by the person; and the
environmental realities affecting the outcome. This reconciliation cannot
go overboard in either direction, because to overemphasise personal
agendas is autism and to overemphasise environmental realities is to
abandon one's personal commitments. Survival or well-being is en-
dangered when appraisal fails to fit the environmental requirements or fails
~to take personal agendas into account (Lazarus, in press).
In emphasising the distinctions between contextual knowledge and
appraisal. and the dependence of appraisal upon knowledge, we arc in no
sense implying that the appraisal process follows predefined sequences or
stages (as does, for example, Scherer, 1984a, in his concept of ev~luation
checks). Nor do we imply that the cognitive processes involved are
necessarily conscious, verbally accessible, deliberate, or rational (cf.
Lazarus. 1982, 1984). We assume that emotions are elicited quickly,
automatically, and concretely, in ways often outside of consciousness,
which is akin to what Leventhal (1984; Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) has
termed "schematic processing". That is, the personal significance of an
encounter is often appraised automatically, and nearly instantaneously, on
the basis of past experiences with similar encounters.
In automatic or schematic processing, it is not necessary to view apprai-
sal as following in a temporal sense the knowledge upon which the appraisal
might depend. If knowledge has been consistently appraised in particular
ways by an individual, perhaps as a result of experienced positive or
negative outcomes. some connections between knowledge and appraisal
may become functionally inseparable and seemingly fused over the course
of development. What then might happen is that knowledge and appraisal
would seem to be aspects of one instantaneous process. Nevertheless.
 286 LAZARUS AND SMITH
despite this seeming temporal fusion, the conceptual distinction between
knowledge and appraisal remains inviolate because they are different kinds
of cognition, with appraisal always involving an evaluation of what is
known or understood with respect to its implications for personal well-
being. Because people have different appraisal histories, they can make
quite different appraisals of the same knowledge base, leading to quite
different emotions despite common understandings of how things work.
In addition to simple automatic or schematic processing, complex know-
ledge structures and appraisals also shape emotions through abstract,
conscious, and deliberate cognitive processes, which Leventhal (1984) has
termed "conceptual processing". Here, the appraisal process might follow
pre.defined sequences, though this too may be problematic. For example,
dehberate secondary appraisal of coping options may occur even before
primary appraisal of threat has occurred, as when we check hotel exits in
the event of fire even when fire is not an imminent prospect and we do not
feel in danger.
In any case, we are saying that the elicitation of an emotion can occur on
m?re than one cognitive processing level, and knowledge and appraisal
might be separable in time or fused into one complex process. This view of
n:iuiti~le levels of cognitive processing accords well with recent neurophy-
s1olog1cal approaches to the evaluative aspects of emotion such as Le
Doux's (1986; see also Lazarus, 1986) in which evidence is provided for an
evaluation process at the subcortical level of the amygdala.
RECENT THEORY ANO RESEARCH ON
APPRAISAL
Having set forth the theoretical distinction between knowledge and
appraisal, we draw upon this distinction in a critical analysis of recent
resea~ch and thought on the cognitive dimensions that result in particular
emotions. Recent research has, without a doubt, successfully identified a
number of cognitive dimensions that are causally relevant to the emotional
reactions studied. However, for both theoretical and methodological
reasons many of these dimensions have to do with knowledge, and the
consequent neglect of appraisal leaves us without an adequate anchor for
understanding and predicting emotion.
In order to illustrate concretely the nature and extent of this confusion it
will be instructive to examine some of the best known cognitive dimensions
recently proposed and studied empirically. Some of these are, in our view,
perceptual information, which is an aspect of knowledge, not appraisals;
some are features of the emotional reaction itself rather than being
antecedent cognitive processes shaping emotion; some refer to knowledge
rather than appraisal: and some are, we think, appraisals, or at least
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 287
succeed in coming closer to personal meaning as intended by the appraisal
concept.
Perceptual or Sensory Information
Scherer's concept of intrinsic pleasantness nicely illustrates the gap be-
tween sensory information and appraisal. He (1984a, p. 307) defines it as
having to do "with the inherent pleasantness or unpleasantness of a
stimulus, and is not dependent on the relevance to the goals of an organism
at that particular moment". Included here are pleasant and unpleasant
sensations (e.g. being touched in a particular way or muscle fatigue).
Precisely because this dimension is, in Schercr's own words, independent
of the organism's goals, it should be regarded as perceptual information to
be evaluated as to its personal significance rather than an appraisal.
Pleasure and pain are sensory states, not emotions; they lead to emotions
when their significance is evaluated and the quality of the resulting emotion
depends on the outcome of this evaluation. Muscle fatigue and pain, for
example, are often appraised positively and lead to positive emotions for
the athlete who believes this is a desirable goal of exercise or practice (as in
the expression, "go for the burn") but are appraised quite negatively and
lead to negative emotions when some other goal is involved, as when one is
struggling to finish a contest in the best position possible, or when pain or
distress signifies physical impa~rment or illness to the person.
Features of the Emotional Response
Quite distinct from the intrinsic pleasantness of a stimulus, a second more
global dimension of pleasantness is found in the work of Frijda (1987) and
Smith and Ellsworth (1985). This dimension has had a considerable
research history (e.g. Frijda & Philipszoon, 1963; Osgood, 1966; J. A.
Russell. 1980; Schlosberg, 1952) as reviewed in Smith and Ellsworth
(1985). Using Ellsworth and Smith's (1988b) definition and measure-
ment strategy, global pleasantness refers to "how pleasant or unpleasant [it
was] to be in the situation'', and thus appears better to describe subjective
affect. a feature of the reaction itself, than to describe the process of
appraising the significance of what is happening for personal well-being.
Similarly, attentional activity is concerned with attempts to attend to or
think about the ongoing situation, which is also part of the emotional
response rather than an antecedent of it. These reactions can provide
important information which, in turn, is available for subsequent appraisal.
From this standpoint, level of activation/arousal and depth of experience
are also best regarded as features of the emotional response rather than
appraisals.
288 LAZARUS AND SMITH
Knowledge
The vast majority of cognitive dimensions studied by emotion researchers
deal with causal attributions about the encounter, or contextual know-
ledge, instead of appraisals. These include Weiner's (1985) attribution
dimensions of locus of causality, stability, controllability, intentionality,
and globality, as well as analogous ones such as causal agency (Roseman,
1984; Scherer, 1984a), locus of responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985),
the probable motives of the causal agent (Scherer, 1984a), perceived
fairness or legitimacy (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984a; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985). and locus of control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). All refer to
knowledge or beliefs about the causation of events. Bv themselves. these
belids do not have the same implications for well-bei~g for everyone.
Consider. for example, the locus of causality, which clearly has rele-
vance for the emotion process. and for the type of emotion generated. In
several studies (e.g. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b; Weiner, Graham, &
Chandler, 1982). attributing causality to someone else has been linked to
anger. whereas attributing causality to oneself has been linked to guilt.
However, the locus of causality is not directly responsible for these
emotions without an accountability judgement about who is to be blamed,
if anyone, for harm or threat, or who deserves credit for a benefit.
Although locus of causality and accountability are closely related con-
structs, they are by no means identical, as recently demonstrated by
McGraw (1987) and Shaver (1985).
For adults at least, many additional knowledge dimensions, including
intentionality. legitimacy, and controllability, are often combined with
locus of causality in complex ways to determine accountability or blame.
For example. under conditions of harm people are held less accountable to
the extent that their harmful actions are perceived as unintentional, just,
and/or unavoidable (Shaver. 1985; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette,
1987). In the 1950s and 1960s a host of studies of frustration, intentionality,
and arbitrariness in the generation of anger made a similar point (cf.
Pastore. 1952). A judgement of blame, which often contains more than a
trace of resentment, is much closer to what we mean by appraisal than a
mere attribution of causality; attributing causality is often cool, but blame
implies one has been harmed. and that the person doing the harm could
and should have acted otherwise. Yet attributional and appraisal theorists
(e.g. Roseman. 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985: Weiner, 1985) tend to use
the two constructs interchangeably, producing theoretical confusion. and
leading to difficulties in the interpretation of research results.
Folkman (1984) has made the same type of analysis with the concept of
controllability in pointing out that although being in control is often
appraised as favourable for well-being, there are numerous occasions when
--------------
I KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 289
it is more threatening to have control than not to have it. If, for example,
we can choose to have a radical mastectomy, a modified radical, or a
lumpectomy, we are also in the unenviable position of having to take the
blame for the negative consequences of that decision. Many people would
rather have someone else decide because, for them, control is appraised as
a double-edged sword.
Finally, Scherer (1984a) has proposed a cognitive dimension, novelty,
which seems similar to the so-called orienting response. Although he
regards it as a dimension of appraisal, we consider novelty to have few or
no clear significations for well-being. It operates at a very low level of
cognitive functioning, and serves to call our attention to anything that is
sudden. different, or unexpected, to enable the further appraisal of its
relevance for well-being and action. This cognitive dimension might be
important as a first step in the appraisal process, as suggested by Kreitler
and Kreitler ( 1976). However, by itself it contributes little to the personal
meaning, and hence the emotion. that may be generated by further
cognitive exploration.
Components of Appraisal
A number of cognitive dimensions appear to us to represent true appraisal
processes. These have to do with specific molecular questions concerning
the person-environment transaction, the answers to which combine to
produce the molar personal meanings that lead directly to specific emo-
tions. In ongoing research we have identified six: two related to primary
appraisal. four to secondary appraisal. Most of these can also be found in
one form or another in the cognitive dimensional analyses of Frijda ( 1987),
Roseman (1984), Scherer (1984a.b) and Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1987).
The two primary appraisal dimensions are importance or motivational
relevance. and motivational congruence. Motivational relevance refers to
the extent to which the encounter touches on personal goals and concerns.
that is. issues the person cares about or has a stake in (see Frijda. 1987;
Scherer, 1984a; and Smith & Ellsworth. 1987). Motivational congruence
refers to the extent to which a transaction is consistent or inconsistent with
what the person wants. that is. either thwarts or facilitates personal goals.
It corresponds closely to Roseman 's ( 1948) concept of motive consistency,
Scherer's ( 1984a) goal conduciveness, and Smith and Ellsworth's (1985)
perceived obstacle. In combination, motivational relevance and motiva-
tional congruence define the encounter as one of potential harm or benefit.
The four cognitive components of secondary appraisal -are accowztabi-
lity, which we discussed earlier. problem-focused coping potential. emotion-
focused coping potential. and future expectancy. In contrast with locus of
control. which determines the person's knowledge of who or what is
~ -----------·-
290 LAZARUS AND SMITH
currently controlling events in the encounter, problem-focused coping
potential has to do with evaluations of whether and how the person is able
to manage the demands of the encounter and actualise the personal
commitments that are brought to it. Emotion-focused coping potential has
to do with the prospects of regulating the emotional state which harmful or
threatening consequences generate (cf. Folkman & Lazarus, 1980, 1985;
Folkman et al., 1986; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Problem-focused coping
potential is closely related to the concepts of power as discussed by
Roseman (1984), and control and power as discussed by Scherer (1984a).
Emotion-focused coping potential appears closely related to Scherer's
concept of adjustment, which he defines as "the potential for adjustment to
the final outcome via internal restructuring" (Scherer. 1984b, p. 39).
Future expectancy refers to the possibilities for changes in the psychologi-
cal situation, which could make the encounter more or less motivationally
congruent.
Core Relational Themes
Considered separately, the components of appraisal identified above are
not sufficient to define the personal meanings about harmful and beneficial
relationships with the environment that distinguish among the disparate
emotions. The level of analysis is, in our view, too molecular to stand by
itself. Molar cognitive constructs are also needed, which combine the
molecular primary and secondary appraisal components into basic rela-
tionships between the person and environment having emotional signi-
ficance. These relationships correspond to the diverse emotions such as
anger. anxiety, shame, guilt, happiness, pride, and so forth.
The term we suggest, core relational themes, expresses a very old idea in
which each emotion category is considered to be a reaction to distinctive
kinds of harm or benefit. Thus, anger can be said to involve an offence
against the person or those with whom the person is identified. Aristotle's
concept of anger as reaction to the thought that the person has been
insulted, demeaned, or slighted, illustrates this theme. For anxiety, the
core relational theme is potential or future harm. especially of a vague and
perhaps symbolic sort (Lazarus & Averill, 1972). For sadness it is unavoid-
able and irrevocable loss. For happiness or satisfaction it is personal gain in
the context of an overall sense of security. As implied above, this approach
treats the emotions as relational categories, each of which not only
describes a different kind of psychophysiological reaction. but also defines
a different person-environment relationship implying a particular kind of
harm or benefit.
Extending this argument further. for each negative emotion the cogni-
tive-relational research questions to pose have to do with understanding
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 291
both the necessary and sufficient core relational themes as well as the
appraisal components that combine to produce them. Each emotion de-
pends on how one evaluates several cognitive-relational components hav-
ing to do with benefit, harm (or loss), threat, coping potential. and blame.
Negative emotions are characterised collectively by primary appraisals of
high levels of motivational-relevance (or stakes) and motivational incon-
gruence. Secondary appraisal components, however, are necessary to
distinguish one from another. When someone else is blamed (other-
accountability), for example. anger is more likely; when self is blamed
(self-accountability), guilt is more likely; when nothing can be done (low
coping potential; helplessness), sadness is more likely; when one's ability
to prevent or ameliorate an actual or potential negative outcome is
uncertain (uncertain coping potential and/or future expectancy), anxiety is
more likely. Each cognitive component contributes to the production,
explanation, and prediction of the emotional state. Thus, consideration of
appraisal in terms of both molecular components and molar themes
provides a clearer perspective on appraisal-emotion relationships than
either would yield in isolation.
THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM
Researchers have a limited number of ways to study the relationships
between cognition and emotion, and quite apart from the theoretical
confusions we examined earlier, it is not always clear whether appraisal or
knowledge is being studied with these research methods. The available
methods, as well as the strengths and limitations of each from the perspec-
tive of what we have been saying, are addressed later.
In the research literature we have examined, roughly seven types of
method are used, which are briefly described below. However, it is worth
noting that methods other than these can also be found, but tend not to be
used by psychologically oriented emotion researchers with whom we are
familiar. For example, content analyses of literary and historical docu-
ments can be made to trace the contextual and cognitive antecedents of
emotion. One can also make systematic analyses of emotion terms in
ordinary language. illustrated perhaps by Lakoff and Kovecses' (1983)
model of anger as inferred from American English usage.
In the seven types of method examined here, researchers ask subjects to:
(1) judge the similarities among the meanings of emotion words such as
sadness. anger. and anxiety (e.g. Conway & Bekerian. 1987, Study 2); (2)
judge the cognitive properties of such words (e.g. Frijda. 1987, Studies 1
and 2); (3) reveal their understanding of the cognitive properties of
emotion words through the use of priming tasks (e.g. Conway & Bekerian,
1987, Studies 5. 6, and 7); (4) guess the reactions of hypothetical characters
292 LAZARUS AND SMITH
to experimenter-supplied emotional vignettes (e.g. Roseman, 1984;
Weiner, Russell, D., & Lerman, 1979, Experiment 2): (5) state their own
likely or imagined reactions (imagery/role playing) to such vignettes (e.g.
McGraw. 1987, Experiment 1; Russell D., & McAuley, 1986, Study 1;
Smith, 1987; Weiner et al., 1982, Experiment 2); (6) provide retrospective
memories about how they thought, felt, and acted in real-life adaptational
encounters (e.g. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a. 1988b; Folkman & Lazarus,
1988; Lazarus & Folkman, 1987; McGraw, 1987, Experiment 2; Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner et al., 1979, Experiment 1; Weiner et al.. 1982,
Experiment 1); and (7) report current thoughts and feelings during an
ongoing encounter (e.g. Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Lazarus et al., 1970;
D. Russell & McAuley, 1986, Study 2; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987).
Several of these methodologies (methods 1, 2, and 3 above) study
cognitive-emotional relations in an abstract (that is, knowledge) sense. For
example, Conway and Bekerian (1987, Study 2) asked subjects to rate how
similar in meaning each of several emotion words was to other emotion
words. and Frijda (1987, Studies 1 and 2, p. 119) had subjects indicate
whether particular cognitive components (e.g. pleasant, unpleasant. ex-
pected, unexpected. etc.) "usually applied to the conditions leading to., a
number of emotions. As implied by J. A. Russell (1987), when questions
like these are asked in the abstract, it is unlikely that appraisal, as we have
defined it, is being examined. At best. such questions reveal subjects'
generalised knowledge or intuitive theories about cognition-emotion rela-
tions. And with global similarity ratings. such as those used by Conway and
Bekerian (1987, Study 2), even more doubt about what is being measured
exists because there is no a priori way to know on which features of
emotion knowledge (i.e. antecedents, sensations. action tendencies, etc.)
the judgements are based.
If one agrees that the abstract judgement tasks used by Frijda (1987) and
Conway and Bekerian (1987) reveal the contents of generalised knowledge
about emotion, the priming tasks used by Conway and Bekerian (1987.
Studies 5, 6. and 7) seem to reveal formal or structural ways in which
generalised knowledge about emotion is organised and stored in memory.
For example. when they examined how priming by an emotion word
influences the latency of images of emotional encounters, they established
that emotional concepts in memory are closely associated with common
situational antecedents.
The contents of generalised knowledge about emotion, and the organisa-
tion of this knowledge in memory, are interesting research topics in their
own right. There is an emerging developmental literature on what children
of different ages know about emotion and social relationships (e.g. Gnepp.
Klayman. & Trabasso. 1982), and there is a separate cognitive psychology
literature that examines the organisation of emotion knowledge in memory
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 293
(e.g. Bower, 1981). However. the issues being examined in both these
literatures are quite different from those concerning how personal mean-
ings (appraisals) produce emotional reactions. In order to study actual
appraisals and the emotions they generate, in contrast to generalised
knowledge. it is necessary to question subjects about appraisals and
emotions in specific encounters and to test, when possible, whether more
than detached or abstract thought (that is, personal or involving meaning)
about emotions is involved.
In our view the final four methods listed above (4, 5, 6, and 7) come
closer to the process of appraisal in specific life encounters than the first
three. Whether or not past studies have used these methods effectively, the
theoretical confusion between appraisal and knowledge could more easily
be avoided in the future by explicitly questioning subjects about their
appraisal components and core-relational themes.
These four methods are not equal, however, in the probability that
subjects' answers reflect personal meanings and involvements. We think
that the weakest in this respect is to ask subjects to predict likely reactions
of hypothetical others to experimenter-supplied vignettes (method 4)
because the focus is on the reactions of someone other than the subject
giving the report. As they are not speaking for themselves personally,
subjects will almost certainly derive their answers from abstract knowledge
or intuitive theories about emotion instead of from personal meanings. It is
possible. of course, that subjects will sometimes take the role of the
hypothetical other and convert the abstract task into one of personal
imagery/role-playing, and thus might respond on the basis of what the
vignette means to them personally. However. without direct checks on the
actual cognitive pr:_ocesses. and on what the vignette means to them
personally, the method is quite ambiguous with respect to the theoretical
confusion.
Although our judgement could be controversial. we think that imagery/
role-playing methods, retrospective reports of actually experienced emo-
tional encounters. and reports of ongoing emotional encounters (methods
5, 6, and 7) have the best potential for studying the appraisal process.
Nevertheless, if the question asked in the imagery/role playing method is to
"say how you would probably feel in this situation" rather than "how you
did, or do feel", or "respond to the situation ... as strongly and as deeply
as you can" (cf. Smith. 1987). the findings are apt to draw more on
~eneralised. abstract knowledge than on personal meaning. Role-playing
mstructions probably elicit more than intellectual responses. and engage
the emotions to some degree. as evidenced by patterned physiological and
facial expressive responses to imagery (e.g. Carroll. Marzillier. & Merian,
1982; Fridlund. Schwartz. & Fowler. 1984: Lang. 1979; Smith. 1987:
Smith. McHugo. & Lanzetta. 1986). A drawback. however, is that there is
 294 LAZARUS AND SMITH
no guarantee that subjects appraise the imagery/role-playing situations in
the same ways they did or do when their adaptational encounters have real
personal consequences.
Retrospective reports of past encounters also probably reflect appraisal-
relevant-hence emotional-processes, though one cannot be certain
without other evidence. Although subjects are describing encounters that
probably happened, there is always the danger of (often unintentional)
retrospective falsification (cf. Owens, Bower, & Black. 1979; Shweder &
D' Andrade, 1980), leaving room in the process for intuitive theories and
abstract knowledge. Nevertheless. it would be an extreme and untenable
position to argue that such memories are totally or even largely confabu-
lated. a position that would preclude any use of retrospective reports.
Given the problems posed by all methods of studying cognitive-emotional
activity, retrospective reports, particularly of salient and recent encoun-
ters, should be a valuable-some would say the richest-source of data on
appraisal and emotion (cf. Ellsworth & Smith, 1987; Lazarus & Folkman,
1987).
The strongest methodology for studying appraisal and emotion is, when
possible, to collect reports from subjects during an ongoing encounter, as
has been done, for example, at various stages of a college examination
(e.g. Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; D. Russell & McAuley, 1986, Study 2;
Smith & Ellsworth. 1987). However, this can only be accomplished with
"captive audiences" who are co-operative. Folkman and Lazarus (1985)
point out that they could not obtain assessments during the exam itself
because subjects would not be willing to jeopardise their exam perform-
ance in order to answer research questions. To the best of our knowledge
the experimental variant of this method-namely to systematically "man-
ipulate·· appraisal by controlling situational contingencies and to monitor
the emotional consequences-has not yet been adequately exploited. The
one exception is the earlier programmatic psychophysiological research of
Lazarus and his colleagues (cf. Lazarus, 1968; Lazarus et al., 1970).
However, this research was limited to the unidimensional stress reaction
and did not concern itself with emotion quality or content. Naturally,
· ethical and practical considerations limit the potential strength and ecolo-
gical validity of such manipulations, but when theory driven the method
could prove valuable in testing specific causal hypotheses about the emo-
tion process.
All of the above methods are dependent on self-report. However, we are
reluctant to criticise this dependence, not because there are no problems,
but because we believe this criticism has been constant and overdrawn.
There exists a double standard in which the equal or often even greater
problems in making inferences from physiological and behavioural data are
constantly overlooked or understated compared with those inherent in
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 295
self-report. Actually, no alternative methods are more reliable and demon-
strably more valid than self-report, carefully used, in getting at the rich
panorama of mental activity involved in human emotion (see also
Ellsworth & Smith, 1987; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, 1987; and Leventhal,
1984; for extended discussions of this issue). Along with many others we
assume that multi-level and multi-method research will ultimately be
needed to cope with the problem of method variance (cf. Smith, 1987).
However, using alternative measures fruitfully is not as simple as is often
assumed. We know so little about the behavioural (e.g. facial display) rules
(cf. Ekman & Oster, 1979; Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1987) and physiolo-
gical patterning in emotion that it is hazardous to use these types of data to
validate self-reports without serious qualification. To do so would be to try
to verify one response modality whose significance is obscure by means of
another modality whose significance is equally, if not more, obscure.
Given the necessary reliance on self-report, researchers can and should
take precautions to maximise the likelihood that reports will reflect actual
appraisals and emotions rather than generalised knowledge. As detailed by
Nisbett and Wilson (1977), a person is far more likely to have introspective
access to the products of cognitive activity than to the processes them-
selves. In the current context this implies that subjects are better able
veridically to report what they are thinking and feeling than why they are
thinking and feeling this way, or how their thoughts are influencing their
feelings. Researchers questioning subjects about specific, personally in-
volving encounters (methods 5, 6, & 7; e.g. Folkman & Lazarus, 1985,
1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Weiner et al., 1979, 1982) have been
aware of this. In these studies subjects have been asked to report almost
exclusively on the contents of their thoughts, actions, and feelings, and the
researchers have used statistical/analytic techniques to-infer the underlying
processes. Lazarus and Folkman (1987) make the same point about the
assessment of coping and ask subjects only to describe their thoughts and
actions rather than to interpret them. There is reduced danger of distortion
when the researcher, and not the subject, makes the interpretive infer-
ences.
When all is said and done, none of the methods used by investigators in
their attempts to examine the cognitive activity in emotion is ideal or free
from uncertainties. Some methods. however, are more likelv to reveal
knowledge about cognition and emotion, whereas others are m~re likely to
reveal personally involving cognitive-emotional processes. Researchers
I should use the methods most suitable to the purposes of the particular
investigation, keeping in mind the theoretical distinctions we have been
I
making.
I
\....,___________....,.....,_______________ ,.
296 LAZARUS AND SMITH
CONCLUDING THOUGHT
A final implication for theory and research strategy flows from the distinc-
tions we have drawn between knowledge and appraisal. It is that know-
ledge constitutes a somewhat distal variable with respect to emotion
compared with appraisal, which is more proximal. The linkages between
knowledge and the emotional reaction are looser and more variable than
those between appraisal and emotion (cf. House. 1981; lessor, 1981).
Thus, the distinction we have made between knowledge and appraisal is
more than an intellectual curiosity and can be tested empirically. It should
be possible to demonstrate that the relations between appraisal and
emotion arc necessary and more dependable as predictors than the rela-
tions between knowledge and emotion. and, in fact, that appraisal medi-
ates the latter relations. We are saying. in effect, that the theoretical
linkages between appraisal and emotion are invariant, whereas there is
considerable variation in the linkages between knowledge and appraisal,
and hence between knowledge and emotion.
It is noteworthy that Weiner (1985, p. 564) acknowledges that attribu-
tion-emotion relationships (i.e. knowledge-emotion relationships) can
vary, thereby implying the essential role of individualised, therefore proxi-
mal, appraisals and their personalised determinants. He writes: "A word
of caution ... is needed ... Given a causal ascription, the linked emotion
does not necessarily follow .... Hence, the position being espoused is that
the attributional dimension-affect relations are not invariant, but arc quite
prevalent in our culture, and perhaps in many others as well".
Looking more deeply into what Weiner has implied, one realises too that
there are cultural as well as individual differences in the ways causal
attributions are appraised with respect to their personal significance for
well-being (cf. Ryff, 1987; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). For example, the
personal implications of attributing failure on a school exam to lack of
effort or ability by, say, Western and Japanese subjects, appear to be quite
different. with consequent differences in the emotional response. Similar-
ly, although many people within the same culture share a tendency to
interpret one or the other of the attributions as damaging or supportive,
there are probably substantial variations in the evaluation of their personal
significance. It is also likely that the personal implications of these attribu-
tions will change in a given individual over the life-course. What we are
saying is. incidentally. compatible with social constructivist approaches
(e.g. Averill. 1980) which emphasise diversity rather than universality of
emotional experience across cultures and individuals. To truly understand
and predict the emotional response requires that we favour (proximal)
appraisals over (distal) knowledge.
KNOWLEDGE, APPRAISAL, AND EMOTION 297
Recent research by McGraw (1987), who found that self-blame (an
appraisal-centred construct) is more strongly linked to guilt than are self
attributions of causality (a knowledge-centred construct), suggests that the
distinctions we have been making are being taken to heart. Careful
consideration of their data has also led both Roseman (1984) and Ellsworth
and Smith ( 1988b) to reconceptualise several of their cognitive dimen-
sions to more closely resemble appraisal concepts. For example, Roseman
has proposed a cognitive dimension of self-power (closely related to our
appraisal component of coping potential) to replace his original dimension
of legitimacy. Similarly, Ellsworth and Smith have reconceptualised their
uncertainty dimension as uncertainty about coping ability to give it a
clearer personal relevance.
What is fundamental in our analysis-the bottom line, so to speak-is
that an emotional reaction is always based on personal meaning, and the
specific meaning of an appraisal is the significance of what is happening for
one's well-being. Appraisal is quite different from knowledge about what is
going on in the encounter and the way things work. It is this personal
meaning. inherent in the concept of appraisal, that must be studied to
permit us to grasp how an emotion is brought about.
Manuscript received 12 January 1988
Revised manuscript received 16 March 1988
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