Journal of Personality Assessment

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Developmental Contributions to Emotional

Awareness

Ryan Smith, Donald Quinlan, Gary E. Schwartz, Anna Sanova, Anna Alkozei &
Richard D. Lane

To cite this article: Ryan Smith, Donald Quinlan, Gary E. Schwartz, Anna Sanova, Anna Alkozei
& Richard D. Lane (2018): Developmental Contributions to Emotional Awareness, Journal of
Personality Assessment, DOI: 10.1080/00223891.2017.1411917

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2017.1411917

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JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2017.1411917

Developmental Contributions to Emotional Awareness

Ryan Smith,1 Donald Quinlan,2 Gary E. Schwartz,3 Anna Sanova,1 Anna Alkozei,1 and Richard D. Lane1
1
Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona; 2Department of Psychology, Yale University School of Medicine; 3Department of Psychology,
University of Arizona

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) has received considerable support as a reliable and valid Received 22 April 2016
measure of individual differences in emotional awareness (EA) since the original report involving 40 Revised 28 September 2017
participants (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990). However, the hypothesized developmental
nature of EA (conceptualized as a cognitive skill) has thus far only been examined in that 1 early study.
Here we report multiple regression analyses on the entire sample of 94 participants who completed the
LEAS as part of that original study, as well as the same developmental and affective measures used in the
original report. We first observed that different developmental measures, including the Object Relations
Inventory and the Sentence Completion Test of Ego Development, accounted for unique portions of the
variance in LEAS scores. We also observed that higher LEAS scores were associated with greater within-
category variance in the self-reported positive and guilt- and shame-related emotions people reported
experiencing on a typical day. Based on these findings, we introduce a 3-dimensional cognitive-
developmental framework that LEAS scores plausibly track, including (a) the transition from focusing on
external/physical to internal/psychological characteristics, (b) greater conceptual complexity, and (c) self–
other differentiation. We then discuss the implications of this framework for understanding the nature of
EA and for future research.

It is a commonplace clinical observation that there are substan-
tial individual differences in people’s awareness of their own
emotions. Specifically, some individuals appear to be highly
capable of understanding, and clearly articulating, the emotions
they are feeling; in contrast, others appear to have considerably
less verbally reportable understanding of their own emotional
state. As a result of this observation, various attempts have
been made to explain the underlying deficit in those who lack
this ability (i.e., low emotional awareness [EA]), including the
constructs of “infantile personality” (Ruesch, 1948), “pens
ee
op
eratoire” (Marty & de M’uzan, 1963), alexithymia (Taylor,
2000), and most recently, affective agnosia (Lane, Hsu,
Ritenbaugh, Locke, & Stonnington, 2015; Lane, Weihs, Herring,
Hishaw, & Smith, 2015; Smith & Lane, 2016).
The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) was origi-
nally created to facilitate the study of this phenomenon (Lane,
Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990; Lane & Schwartz,
1987). It was based on the theory of levels of emotional aware-
ness (tLEA; Lane & Schwartz, 1987), which posited that EA
involves a cognitive skill that develops throughout childhood.
Very low EA was therefore suggested to involve an arrest in the
developmental progression toward emotional maturity. This
developmental conceptualization has been informed by clinical
theories and observations suggesting the important role of care-
givers (more typically mothers) in helping children to attend to,
conceptualize, and label their own feelings (Gergely & Watson,
1996). The tLEA also incorporated insights from other theoreti-
cal and empirical work in the field of cognitive development,
particularly that of Piaget (1937) and Werner and Kaplan
(1963). Piaget, focusing on the developing child’s evolving
understanding of the external world, theorized that the struc-
ture of cognition progressed through four developmental peri-
ods, beginning with a sensorimotor period, followed by
preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational
periods. Cognitive development can here be understood as a
progression toward greater levels of abstraction in thought
(Cowan, 1978). Werner and Kaplan instead discussed develop-
ment as a continuum (i.e., as opposed to discrete periods or
stages); they also focused on ways in which symbolic processes,
such as concept acquisition and representation, could influence
the nature of perceptual experience. The tLEA attempted to
integrate these views and apply them to knowledge or experi-
ence of the internal emotional states of self and other (as
opposed to knowledge or experience of the external world). In
doing so it proposed a continuum of five levels of EA, each
with structural characteristics similar to Piaget’s developmental
periods, and scores on the LEAS could assess the level at which
a person was functioning.
By conceptualizing EA as a cognitive skill, developmental
approaches to cognition became applicable to at least one

CONTACT Ryan Smith rsmith@psychiatry.arizona.edu University of Arizona, Department of Psychiatry, 1501 N. Campbell Avebue, PO Box 245002, Room 7304B,
Tucson, AZ 85724-5002.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.

© 2018 Taylor & Francis

2 SMITH ET AL.
component of emotion—emotional awareness—and the LEAS
provided a means of gathering empirical support for this con-
struct. Presently, empirical support for the construct of EA, as
measured by LEAS, is considerable. For example, higher LEAS
scores (reflecting higher EA) have been associated with greater
empathy ability (r D .23; Ciarrochi, Caputi, & Mayer, 2003;
also see Barchard & Hakstian, 2004), greater emotion recogni-
tion ability (r D .43; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, &
Kaszniak, 2000; Lane et al., 1996, also see Wright, Riedel, Sechr-
est, Lane, & Smith, 2017), greater openness to experience (r D
.33; Lane et al., 1990), lower impulsivity (Br
ejard, Bonnet, &
Pedinielli, 2012), and a greater sense of general well-being irre-
spective of current mood (Ciarrochi et al., 2003) and greater
emotion-focused working memory capacity (Smith et al.,
2017). In the study of clinical groups, LEAS scores have been
shown to be significantly lower (reflecting lower EA) in patients
with borderline personality disorder (d D 1.5; Levine, Marziali,
& Hood, 1997), eating disorders (d D .71; Bydlowski et al.,
2005), posttraumatic stress disorder (d D .67; Frewen et al.,
2008), depression (d D .72; Donges et al., 2005; also see Ber-
thoz, Ouhayoun, & Parage, 2000), and disorganized attachment
style (Subic-Wrana, Beetz, Paulussen, Wiltnik, & Beutel, 2007).
A children’s version of the LEAS has also been created (Bajgar,
Ciarrochi, Lane, & Deane, 2005), and its utility has received
additional empirical support from a study in Belgium (Veir-
man, Brouwers, & Fontaine, 2011). The strong psychometric
properties of the LEAS as a measure of emotional awareness
have led to its inclusion in the Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) matrix (domain: social processes; construct: perception
and understanding of self; subconstruct: self-knowledge; see
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/units/self-
reports/151126.shtml).
However, longitudinal studies assessing the progression of
LEAS scores over childhood development have not yet been car-
ried out. There are also some possible reasons to question the
strong developmental basis of EA posited by tLEA. One reason
is that Piaget’s developmental theory of cognition, on which
tLEA is partially based, has itself been challenged in various
ways. For example, different cognitive skills appear to progress
at different rates (Fischer, 1980), and the advanced cognitive
abilities associated with later stages might begin to develop
before more basic abilities are maximally developed (Cowan,
1978). Further, since the creation of the tLEA, there have been
important theoretical advances regarding the developmental
processes that contribute to theory of mind (ToM; also called
mentalization) abilities, which overlap considerably with the EA
construct (Beebe & Lachmann, 2014; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009;
Luyten, Houdenhove, Lemma, Target, & Fonagy, 2012). These
advances have stressed the role of early relational interactions
(e.g., parental attachment style, parent–child affect matching) in
promoting the ability to consciously recognize and reflect on the
emotions of self and others, and therefore also challenge the
more individualistic Piagetian view of development. A final rele-
vant consideration is that there are now multiple other related,
empirically supported constructs associated with emotion differ-
entiation and granularity (reviewed in Kashdan, Barrett, &
McKnight, 2015), and these have not all been theoretically situ-
ated in developmental terms. If these related constructs do not
need to be understood developmentally, it would suggest that
the levels of EA might not require a developmental explanation
either.
Despite these challenges, the tLEA can be understood as
entirely consistent with these new developments. For example,
the tLEA only appeals to nonproblematic aspects of a Piagetian
approach, including (a) the idea that emotions have a bodily
(sensorimotor) foundation, (b) the idea that there is a progres-
sive increase in the differentiation or complexity of emotional
experience with development, and (c) the idea that language
might facilitate the ability to learn and represent more fine-
grained emotion concept representations. In contrast, the tLEA
does not assume the solitary or individualistic aspects of the
Piagetian approach, but instead suggests that social interactions
during development (and especially early interactions with
parents) might be highly important for learning to conceptual-
ize and label emotions in fine-grained (and sometimes cultur-
ally specific) ways (as also suggested by a large body of work
reviewed in Barrett, 2017). In fact, the tLEA can be seen as a
more specific application of the previously mentioned ToM
and mentalization theories; that is, whereas these theories apply
to representing mental states generally, the tLEA simply has a
narrower focus on representing emotions. Thus, overarching
consistencies can be found between tLEA and more recent pro-
posals; however, the developmental aspects of tLEA remain to
be fully supported.
With regard to tLEA specifically, the strongest evidence for a
developmental contribution to LEAS scores appears to be the
evidence presented in the first study of the LEAS involving 40
participants (Lane et al., 1990); this study demonstrated that
LEAS scores were positively correlated with two independent
measures of cognitive development: the Object Relations Inven-
tory (ORI; Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979; Huprich,
Auerbach, Porcerelli, & Bupp, 2016) and the Loevinger Sen-
tence Completion Test of Ego Development (SCT; Loevinger &
Wessler, 1970; Loevinger, Wessler, & Redmore, 1970). Concep-
tual level (CL) scores on the ORI are a measure of the cognitive
maturity of an individual’s description of his or her parents,
and higher scores are given to descriptions that characterize
parents in terms of their own thoughts, feelings, and values
(i.e., internal, mental terms that reflect an awareness of the
minds of others). Low CL scores reflect descriptions that char-
acterize parents in terms of physical attributes and activities or
their functional role in meeting the needs of the person provid-
ing the description. The SCT, in contrast, is based on the com-
pletion of sentence stems and is a more general measure of
cognitive complexity. The fact that LEAS scores correlated sig-
nificantly, but only modestly, with each of these developmental
measures supported the idea that the LEAS measured a cogni-
tive-developmental continuum, but also suggested it was not
identical to these other measures. However, these findings did
not address whether these two developmental measures
accounted for overlapping or unique portions of the variance
in LEAS scores. Other theoretically important questions were
also not addressed. In particular, the original study (Lane et al.,
1990) also gathered data on the range of emotions a person
experienced on a typical day, using the Differential Emotions
Scale (DES; Izard, 1972); however, it did not address a key pre-
diction of the tLEA, that higher LEAS scores should be associ-
ated with greater variance in self-reported emotional

experience within broad emotion categories. For example,
whereas a person with low EA would be expected to treat all
“bad” emotions synonymously, a person with high EA should
distinguish between different (i.e., semantically, experientially)
types of bad emotions. More generally, recent advances within
the cognitive sciences since the formulation of the tLEA have
raised the question of how the construct of EA should be
understood within leading models of large-scale cognitive
architecture.
In this article we therefore have two related aims. First, we pres-
ent results of further analyses on 94 participants (which included
the 40 participants of the aforementioned Lane et al., 1990, study).
These analyses allowed us to address additional questions not
answered in the original study, and offer additional support for the
construct of EA as a cognitive-developmental ability. Second, we
discuss a theoretical framework inspired by these results that con-
ceptually clarifies the multiple developmental dimensions that
plausibly contribute to LEAS scores.
Method
Participants
Ninety-four undergraduate volunteers (44 female; freshman,
sophomore, or junior year) from the subject pool in the Yale
Department of Psychology were asked to anonymously com-
plete multiple assessments. The mean age of this group was
19.29 years (SD D 1.36; range D 17–27 years). This group
included the 40 original participants of the aforementioned
Lane et al. (1990) study (i.e., first analyzed between 1987 and
1988), as well as 54 additional individuals who also participated
at that same time and location, but for whom no results have
yet been published (i.e., data from these 54 individuals were
first scored and tabulated in the early 1990s and analyzed
between 2015 and 2016). Data from this more complete group
are used here to provide a large enough sample size to allow for
the more sophisticated analyses we describe next.
Measures
Unless otherwise indicated, the measures and methodology
used were identical to that described in the original study on
the preliminary sample of 40 participants (Lane et al., 1990).
Thus, we are brief in our descriptions, and that study should be
consulted for more detail.
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale
Trait EA was assessed using the 20-item LEAS (Lane et al.,
1990). Each item consists of a written two- to four-sentence
description of a social situation involving two people. One
item is presented per page, followed by two questions: “How
would you feel?” and “How would the other person feel?”
Participants were instructed to write their responses on the
remainder of the page, and to use as much or as little of the
page as needed to answer the two questions. Participants
were permitted to leave any item blank on this measure (as
well as on the other measures described in what follows). If
a participant left an item blank, scores for that participant
EMOTIONAL AWARENESS AND DEVELOPMENT 3
were prorated (at least 17 scorable responses were provided
by every participant).
The situation descriptions in the LEAS are designed to elicit
four types of emotion (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) at
five levels of complexity. Each item response is scored sepa-
rately for self, other, and total score. Scores are given based on
the EA level (from 0–3) assigned to the words participants pro-
vide in their responses. The lowest scores (Level 0) are given to
nonfeeling words. Level 1 scores are given to feeling words
related to physiological sensations (e.g., tired), whereas Level 2
scores reflect feeling-related actions (e.g., punching) or simple
valence discriminations (e.g., bad, good) that have inherent
approach or avoidance tendencies. Level 3 scores are given to
single emotion terms (e.g., happy, sad). Level 4 scores are given
when at least two terms from Level 3 are used (conveying
greater emotional differentiation than either word alone).
Thus, each self- and other-related response was given a score of
0 to 4. A total score was also given for each of the 20 LEAS
items; this score reflected the higher of the self- and other-
related scores, unless a score of 4 was given for both. In that
case, a total score of 5 was given for the item, so long as the
self- and other-related responses were differentiable (for more
detail, see Lane et al., 1990). The LEAS has been shown to have
good interitem reliability (LEAS total, a D .89; LEAS self, a D
.85; LEAS other, a D .80) and good discriminant validity when
compared to measures of personality, self-esteem, and emo-
tional intelligence (Ciarrochi et al., 2003).
A single, highly experienced expert rater with this measure
(the sixth author) did the scoring for the LEAS. However, we
asked a second trained rater (the fourth author) to blindly and
independently rescore 40 randomly chosen participant
responses (i.e., 20 from the original 40 and 20 from the unana-
lyzed 54 participants) to provide an estimate of interrater reli-
ability. An intraclass correlation (ICC) analysis (two-way
random effects model, average measures of rater consistency)
confirmed that the LEAS scores had high interrater reliability
(ICC D .94, p < .001).
Object Relations Inventory
The cognitive maturity of an individual’s description of his or
her parents was assessed using the ORI (Blatt et al., 1979). The
ORI consists of two items presented on a single page that states
“Describe your mother” at the top and “Describe your father”
roughly halfway down the page. No further instructions were
given. The written descriptions were blindly rated according to
the manual for the CL of the description on a scale from 1 to 9.
The lowest CL scores (Level 1) are given to concrete descrip-
tions referring to physical attributes and activities or the
parent’s role in meeting the needs of the person providing the
description, whereas the highest CL scores (Level 9) are given
to descriptions involving complex psychological characteristics
that highlight the uniqueness of the individual being described.
Studies have shown that CL scale scores on the ORI have
good concurrent validity and can be reliably rated by indepen-
dent raters (r D .84; Blatt et al., 1979). A single rater (the sixth
author) did the CL scale scoring for the ORI; this rater has pre-
viously established high interrater reliability with another
expert rater (i.e., corrected ICC for two raters D .76; as detailed
in Lane et al., 1990).
4 SMITH ET AL.

Sentence Completion Test of Ego Development were completed in a quiet lecture hall. An assistant was present
Level of ego development was assessed using the SCT to answer questions and prevent interactions among partici-
(Loevinger & Wessler, 1970; Loevinger et al., 1970). The pants. Assessments were given in the following order: LEAS,
SCT consists of 36 sentence stems (e.g., “I am …” and “Rules SCT, DES, and ORI.
are …”) printed on two pages, with the instruction, “Please
complete the following sentences.” No other instruction is
provided, and participants simply complete the sentences in Analyses
the manner they choose. Scoring was performed by a very Within SPSS 20, we first ran a stepwise multiple regression
experienced scorer based on the printed manuals (Loevinger analysis that tested whether ORI CL scale scores and SCT TPR
& Wessler, 1970; Loevinger et al., 1970); scoring rules are scores accounted for significant independent portions of the
based on Loevinger’s model of ego development, which variance in LEAS scores. This was done to examine whether
assumes nine developmental stages (ranging from impulsive ORI CL and SCT TPR scores track progression along indepen-
to integrated), each representing progressively greater self- dent developmental dimensions, both of which contribute to
awareness as well as more complex ways of coping. There increases in EA.
are two scores generated: The item sum is an item-based As higher LEAS scores track, in part, the use of emotion
score in which each item is scored separately and the cumu- terms that are more complex and differentiated, we also
lative sum is calculated. The total protocol rating (TPR) ran a second stepwise multiple regression analysis to test
involves considering all of the item responses together and the relationship between LEAS scores and the variance in
assigning a score based on the entire protocol according to DES item scores. As the DES is not a developmental mea-
established scoring rules. Previous studies (reviewed in Loe- sure, this analysis was run separately from the one using
vinger, 1979) have found the SCT to have good construct scores from the ORI and SCT described earlier. For this
validity, test–retest reliability, and internal consistency (a D second analysis, LEAS scores were again used as the out-
.91). In this report we chose to focus on the TPR scores, as come variable, but the variances (standard deviation) in
they represent a more nuanced, global measure of cognitive item scores within the various DES categories were entered
maturity and complexity. The TPR score was selected in this as predictor variables (with the hypothesis that greater
context because it gives greater weight to scores reflecting within-category variance would be associated with higher
higher level functioning in that any instance of higher func- LEAS scores). Results for all analyses were considered sig-
tioning is itself an achievement and deserving of extra credit. nificant at p < .05.
A single, highly experienced expert rater with this measure Within supplemental materials, we also describe analyses in
(the second author) did the TPR scoring for the SCT; this these 94 participants that demonstrate consistency with the
rater has attained good to excellent reliability for this mea- findings in the original sample of 40 participants (Lane et al.,
sure in previous studies (e.g., Frank & Quinlan, 1976). 1990). In supplemental material we further provide full correla-
tion matrices describing the relationships among all of our vari-
Differential Emotions Scale ables (Tables S1 and S2).
The DES (Izard, 1972) consists of a list of 67 emotions (e.g.,
enthusiastic, ashamed, bashful), and instructs raters to indi-
cate the intensity with which they feel each feeling on a Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
typical day (using a 5-point scale). Global summary scores
Measure Mean Standard Deviation Range
included the mean and standard deviation of positive and
negative emotion item scores, respectively. Subscale scores LEAS Total 72.07 8.27 54–94
included the mean and standard deviation of item scores ORI-CL Total1 13.29 2.00 8–18
ORI-CL Father1 6.69 1.06 3–9
within the Interest-Excitement, Enjoyment-Joy, Surprise- ORI-CL Mother1 6.62 1.36 2–9
Startle, Distress-Anguish, Disgust-(Mixed), Anger-Disgust- SCT-TPR2 5.19 0.90 2–7
Contempt, (Shame)-Guilt, (Shame)-Shyness, Fear-Terror, DES_Positive Emotions 3.55 0.754 2.31–4.69
DES_Negative Emotions 1.93 0.866 1.17–3.37
Contempt-Scorn, and Fatigue-Sleepiness categories. The DES_Interest-Excitement 3.73 0.693 2.67–4.67
majority of the DES subscales have been shown to have DES_Enjoyment-Joy 3.39 0.636 1.71–4.71
good test–retest reliability, internal reliability (mean a D DES_Anger-Disgust-Contempt 1.79 0.676 1.00–3.56
DES_(Shame)-Guilt 1.75 0.492 1.00–4.00
.81), and good construct and discriminant validity (Boyle, DES_(Shame)-Shyness 2.16 0.449 1.00–5.00
1984; Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974). Unfortu- DES_Fear-Terror 1.79 0.634 1.00–4.25
nately, data regarding 2 of the 67 items—the “delighted” DES_Contempt-Scorn 2.66 0.602 1.00–5.00
DES_Fatigue-Sleepiness 2.62 0.535 1.00–4.00
item (within the Enjoyment-Joy category) and the “feeling DES_Surprise-Startle 1.85 0.487 1.00–4.00
of aversion” item (within the Anger-Disgust-Contempt cate- DES_Distress-Anguish 2.22 0.754 1.00–4.43
gory)—were not obtained, and so the DES scores we report DES_Disgust-(Mixed) 1.52 0.511 1.00–3.75
here were calculated omitting those items. Legend: LEAS D Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; ORI-CL D Object Relations
Inventory – Conceptual Level Scale; SCT-TRP D Sentence Completion Test – Total
Protocol Rating; DES D Differential Emotions Scale.
Procedure 1
Data available for 92 participants (52 new and 40 from the original 40).
2
Data available for 59 participants (20 new, 39 from the original 40; unfortu-
Participants were recruited via newspaper ad, and they were nately, the other 35 scores were missing from the data archives for unknown
offered payment for study participation. All study assessments reasons).

Table 2. Stepwise multiple regression results predicting LEAS Total scores using ORI-CL Total scores and SCT-TRP scores.
Predictor R R2
ORI-CL Total .324 .105
SCT-TPR .436 .190
Legend: LEAS D Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; ORI-CL D Object Relations Inventory – Conceptual Level Scale; SCT-TPR D Sentence Completion Test – Total
Protocol Rating.
Results
Table 1 lists the mean, standard deviation, and range for scores
on the LEAS, ORI CL, SCT TRP, and DES. In our stepwise
regression analysis of developmental measures, greater LEAS
scores were best predicted by higher ORI CL scale total scores
and higher SCT TPR scores (see Table 2). ORI CL scale scores
accounted for 10.5% of the variance, and SCT TPR scores
accounted for an additional 8.6% of the variance in LEAS
scores. The overall model accounted for 19% of the variance in
LEAS scores.
In our stepwise regression analysis of DES category variance,
the model that best fit the data (in terms of predicting LEAS
scores) included higher variance in the (Shame)-Guilt and Posi-
tive Emotions categories, and lower variance in the Disgust-
(Mixed) category (see Table 3). Higher variance in (Shame)-
Guilt item scores accounted for 6.8% of the variance, higher
variance in positive emotion item scores accounted for an addi-
tional 4.4% of the variance, and lower variance in Disgust-
(Mixed) item scores accounted for an additional 4.2% of the
variance. The overall model accounted for 15.5% of the vari-
ance in LEAS scores.
Discussion
The relationship between LEAS, ORI CL, SCT TPR,
and DES scores
In this study, we observed that scores on two performance-
based developmental measures—the ORI (CL scale scores) and
the SCT (TPR scores)—each account for significant, indepen-
dent portions of the variance in LEAS scores (i.e., a perfor-
mance-based measure of EA). Separately, we also observed that
higher LEAS scores are associated with greater variance in mul-
tiple self-report-based DES item scores, reflecting the way peo-
ple use emotion terms pertaining to positive emotions and guilt
or shame when describing their typical emotional experiences.
Thus, the validity of the LEAS was supported by observed rela-
tionships with both performance-based and self-report-based
assessments (although, perhaps unsurprisingly, the three per-
formance-based measures showed stronger and more interest-
ing relationships). In general, we suggest that these findings are
consistent with the idea that EA is a cognitive skill that devel-
ops over time in childhood.
More specifically, we first suggest that, based on the nature
of the ORI CL and SCT TPR measures, their unique contribu-
tions to LEAS can each be fairly straightforwardly understood.
ORI CL scale scores can be thought of as tracking a continuum
from representing individuals in terms of externally observable,
physically or functionally (instrumental, means–end) focused
properties (low scores) to instead representing individuals in
terms of their own values, thoughts, and feelings (high scores).
EMOTIONAL AWARENESS AND DEVELOPMENT 5
R2 change Beta P-value Cohen’s f2
— .307 .015
.086 .293 .020 .230
For example, parental descriptions referring to their actions,
and to how those actions meet one’s own needs and desires are
given low scores, whereas parental descriptions referring to the
parents’ own desires and concerns would be scored highly. As
LEAS scores also reflect (in part) a transition from external or
physical representations of emotion (bodily states, action ten-
dencies) to internal or psychological representations of emotion
(concepts like sadness and joy), it appears plausible that ORI
CL scale scores might relate specifically to this external-to-
internal (or physical-to-psychological) dimension of EA. Relat-
edly, ORI CL scale scores might also index the greater ability to
differentiate self from other, which higher LEAS scores are also
thought to track (Lane & Schwartz, 1987). In contrast, we sug-
gest that SCT TPR scores are better understood as a measure of
general cognitive complexity; that is, they reflect the general
level of maturity or complexity of the concepts used during sen-
tence completion. Unlike in the ORI, the content of the sen-
tence stems does not always relate to specific, familiar
individuals (e.g., “Men are lucky because …”). Therefore, SCT
TPR scores plausibly track general conceptual complexity to a
greater degree than they track (as we suggest the ORI CL scale
scores do) the specific use of internal or psychological concepts
over external, physical, or functional concepts.
Our analyses of the DES further support the idea that greater
LEAS scores might be associated with greater complexity and
differentiation within typical emotional experience. Specifically,
those with higher LEAS scores appear to conceptualize their
positive emotional experiences generally, and their experiences
of guilt and shame, in more nuanced and differentiated ways.
In contrast, those with lower LEAS scores had less variance
across the items in these categories, suggesting they do not dif-
ferentiate the meanings of the emotion words within each of
these categories as much as do those with higher LEAS scores.1
The fact that those with higher LEAS scores draw more mean-
ingful conceptual distinctions within the emotional domain is
related to the idea of greater cognitive complexity (discussed
earlier in relation to the SCT); however, it is specific to the
internal and emotional domain. This might also help explain
why, as reviewed in the introduction, higher LEAS scores are
associated with greater empathy (Barchard & Hakstian, 2004),
emotion recognition ability (2000; Lane et al., 1996), openness
to experience (Lane et al., 1990), and sense of general well-
being irrespective of current mood (Ciarrochi et al., 2003).
That is, making a larger number of conceptual distinctions in
the emotional domain would plausibly facilitate recognition
1
One might be concerned that greater variance could also reflect careless or ran-
dom responding. However, it should be highlighted that the possibility of care-
less or random responses is equally consistent with a person selecting items in a
low-variance (e.g., selecting 3s on all items) or high-variance (e.g., alternating
between selecting 1s and 5s) manner.
6 SMITH ET AL.
Table 3. Stepwise multiple regression results predicting LEAS Total scores using DES category variance.
Predictor DES category R R2
(Shame)-Guilt .261 .068
Positive Emotions .336 .113
Disgust-(Mixed) .393 .155
Legend: LEAS D Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale; DES D Differential Emotions Scale.
and understanding of the nuanced feelings others might have in
particular situations, and in turn reduce the chances of frustra-
tions arising from misunderstanding another’s thoughts, feel-
ings, and intentions.
It is worth highlighting, however, that LEAS scores require
imagining how one would feel in particular situations, and
therefore measure the ways they can conceptualize their inter-
nal experience. This does not necessitate that they will always
actually have such emotional experiences on a typical day, as
would be reported on the DES. This distinction between the
thoughts and feelings a person is capable of having from the
ones he or she happens to actually have (in part as a function
of day-to-day circumstances) could explain why the LEAS does
not correlate more highly with variance in all DES categories
(i.e., the fact that LEAS scores predicted variability in some
DES negative emotion subscales and not others can appear
somewhat arbitrary; also see Table S2). In this context it is per-
haps important to consider that the LEAS was specifically
designed to address a very important limitation of self-report
measures: The structure of experience in such measures is con-
strained by the terms and rating system used. In contrast, the
LEAS enables the individual to reveal how much structure (dif-
ferentiation) is used to describe experiences. Therefore, these
differences between self-report measures and the LEAS might
further account for the lack of a relationship observed between
EA and other DES subscales.
It is also interesting that higher LEAS scores were further
associated with lower variance in the Disgust-(Mixed) item
scores. Although unexpected, as this category includes fairly
undifferentiated negative items such as sickened, feelings of
revulsion, and quarrelsome, perhaps the greater understanding
associated with higher LEAS scores simply reduces the extent
to which these emotions are experienced. Indeed, the use of
such Level 1 and Level 2 terms would themselves result in lower
LEAS scores.
A three-dimensional model of emotional awareness
More generally, this discussion highlights the need for more
specific theoretical considerations of the different, potentially
independent factors that might contribute to LEAS scores (as
well as to the broader construct of EA more generally). As ORI
CL scale and SCT TPR scores in this sample can together
account for only »20% of the variance in LEAS scores, it is
likely that other unidentified, independent factors also explain
other portions of this variance. Here we suggest that a general
account of variance in LEAS scores should include at least three
trait-like dimensions that could plausibly explain independent
portions of the variance in LEAS scores, along with multiple
other state-related factors (Smith, Killgore, & Lane, 2017).
R2 change Beta P-value Cohen’s f2
— .307 .003
.044 .250 .013
.042 ¡.213 .037 .18
The first trait-like dimension could be thought of as one’s
disposition to think of individuals (both self and other) using
externally or physically versus internally or psychologically
focused concepts. A person’s location along this dimension, as
we said earlier, is probably an important aspect of what is mea-
sured by both the LEAS and the ORI CL scale. That is, the
higher one’s scores on both of these measures, the more likely
one is to think about individuals in terms of mental as opposed
to physical or functional attributes—an ability that is plausibly
learned in part via social interactions with others (Bower, 1977;
Colvert et al., 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Klinnert, Emde,
Butterfield, & Campos, 1986; Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera,
1996; Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985; Walden &
Baxter, 1989; Yagmurlu, Berument, & Celimli, 2005). One
might therefore predict associations between LEAS scores and
measures of externally oriented thinking, which has been
observed (r D –.19; Lane et al., 1996), and psychological
mindedness (Nykl
ıcek & Denollet, 2009), which has not yet
been tested.
The second trait-like dimension that we suggest contributes
to LEAS scores could instead be thought of as the degree to
which one is able to differentiate between self and other.
Although this has clear conceptual connections to the first
dimension (i.e., internal or psychological vs. external or physi-
cal concept use), it might still be thought of as orthogonal to it.
For example, if an individual incorrectly inferred that another
person was a fast runner, and this was because they themselves
are a fast runner, then this would be a case in which that indi-
vidual used external or physical concepts and did not differenti-
ate well between self and other. On the other hand, if an
individual incorrectly inferred that another person was happy
simply because they themselves felt happy, then this would be a
case in which a person used internally or psychologically
focused concepts but still failed to differentiate self from other.
In recent years, a large amount of empirical and theoretical
work has emerged on these ToM-related self–other differentia-
tion processes. For example, one line of thought—the “simula-
tion” theory—suggests that to understand the thoughts and
feelings of others, people tend to use their own minds as a
model (e.g., “if I were in that situation then I’d feel sad, so they
must feel sad”; see Friston & Frith, 2015; Niedenthal, 2007;
Preston & de Waal, 2002; Singer et al., 2004). However, another
line of thought—the “theory” theory—has also stressed that the
simulation strategy is insufficient when applied to dissimilar
others; thus, when another individual has traits that are suffi-
ciently different from one’s own, successfully understanding
that person’s thoughts or feelings will require that one deploy
more effortful cognitive processes to use explicit knowledge of
that person’s traits and preferences (Preston & Hofelich, 2012).
Although the tLEA remains neutral about many of the specific
aspects of the debate between these different lines of thought

on ToM, we suggest it is most plausibly this “theory” theory-
related ability in particular—in which a person must differenti-
ate one’s own thoughts and feelings from those of another—
that LEAS scores also measure. Specifically, for an individual to
get a Level 5 score instead of a Level 4 score on the LEAS, a per-
son must use words that refer to differential blends of emotion
concepts in descriptions of self and other. Previous studies also
support the idea that learning such ToM abilities might in part
depend on close bidirectional social interactions with parents,
other adults, and peers (Bower, 1977; Colvert et al., 2008; Fuji-
sawa, Kutsukake, & Hasegawa, 2008; Hertenstein & Campos,
2004; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Moses, Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tid-
ball, 2001; Much, 1997; Yagmurlu et al., 2005).
The third trait-like dimension that likely contributes to
LEAS scores is a person’s cognitive complexity in describing
feelings. Cognitive complexity, in the sense we intend, refers to
the number of distinct concepts that a person has acquired
(and uses) within a given content-specific domain. This type of
complexity is related to the notion of expertise, in that experts
in a given domain will often make more finely grained concep-
tual distinctions than novices do in that domain. For example,
a bird expert will possess concepts for, and thus be capable of
perceptually identifying, many different specific species of
birds, whereas a novice would be capable of identifying consid-
erably fewer. Similarly, in the domain of feelings, a novice
might only be able to identify good versus bad feelings, whereas
an expert would be capable of distinguishing among several dif-
ferent good (e.g., happiness, excitement, joy, contentment,
peacefulness) and bad (e.g., anger, fear, shame, guilt, contempt)
feelings. A person with more feeling-related concepts would
therefore have greater feeling-related cognitive complexity; that
is, they would be more of an expert in the feelings domain.
According to current theories of emotion concept learning, this
expertise plausibly depends on repeated exposure to others
(e.g., one’s parents during childhood) who model appropriate
use of fine-grained and culturally specific emotion concept
terms (Barrett, 2017). As LEAS score differences between Levels
2 and 5 are (in part) based on the conceptual specificity of the
emotion terms one uses, it is fairly clear why higher scores
would also act as an index for this third dimension.2
Earlier we also suggested that SCT TPR scores might plausibly
offer a general summary measure of cognitive complexity. Because
it is not specific to the feelings domain, however, its major relation
to LEAS scores is probably best explained in terms of a general abil-
ity to learn conceptual distinctions with higher specificity (and the
ability to use them reliably). Unlike the SCT, variance in DES items
does pertain to cognitive complexity specifically within the internal
or emotional domain, but as highlighted previously, because it
probes differentiation within typical experience, scores need not
covary perfectly with the amount of emotion differentiation a
2 State-dependent influences on emotional awareness
It should be highlighted, however, that a person could, in principle, have higher
or lower conceptual complexity even within Level 1 (e.g., making more or less
specific conceptual distinctions about bodily feelings that are not explicitly affec-
tive), but this would not directly affect LEAS score. On the other hand, one might
predict that greater complexity at one level would tend to correlate with greater
complexity at another. In support of this possibility, an ecological momentary
assessment study demonstrated that higher LEAS scores are in fact associated
with greater differentiation in the ratings of somatic symptoms (i.e., lower soma-
tization, r D –.38; Lane, Carmichael, & Reis, 2011).
EMOTIONAL AWARENESS AND DEVELOPMENT 7
person is cognitively capable of. It bears mentioning that there are
also several other measures of emotion differentiation (or emotion
granularity) that exist, and that can plausibly measure the location
of a person’s abilities on this dimension (Kashdan et al., 2015). Fur-
ther, however, it is also important to note that many measures of
this dimension, including the LEAS and SCT, will be sensitive to a
person’s word knowledge (vocabulary) as well. For example, even if
a person possessed several distinct feeling concepts, these would
need to be capable of being expressed verbally to result in higher
scores. This is supported by the positive correlations previously
observed between LEAS scores and three different measures of ver-
bal ability (including Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale vocabulary
scores; see Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, & Schwartz, 2000).
These findings, and the model we have described to account for
them, might therefore deepen our understanding of emotional
awareness as a cognitive skill that develops over time; it could also
have implications for assessment and training in several contexts.
For example, although longitudinal studies of the development of
emotional awareness have not yet been done in children, this
model suggests that three different developmental processes could
be at work (i.e., along the physical/external–psychological/internal,
self–other differentiation, and simple–complex dimensions). From
the perspective of intervention in normative contexts, our model
suggests that psychoeducational programs that aim to train EA,
whether in children or adults, should therefore consider instruction
in each of these three dimensions.
In clinical settings such as psychotherapy, a major goal of
insight-oriented or experiential modalities is also to promote
EA (Allen, 2013; Barlow et al., 2011; Greenberg, 2002, 2010). In
this context, our model appears to dovetail with established
techniques within mentalization-based therapy (Allen, 2013),
in which regular and repeated emphasis is placed on helping
the client to focus on his or her feelings, put them into words
with ever increasing specificity, and differentiate what he or she
was feeling in a given situation from what the other person was
feeling. The three-dimension model of EA might therefore be a
useful heuristic for trainees in psychotherapy.
It should be highlighted, however, that these experimental find-
ings only reflect relationships between LEAS scores and other
developmental variables at a single time point. Thus, although
they suggest a particular relationship between LEAS scores and
development, they do not support conclusions about the develop-
mental course of EA or of the three dimensions we have proposed.
It is also not known whether development advances in each
dimension independently or interdependently, or what changes
contribute to the development of EA at different ages. It should
also be highlighted that the sample of this study had fairly limited
scope (e.g., ages 17–27, all undergraduate students, etc.); future
research will therefore need to examine whether the pattern of
results we observed will generalize to other demographics.
Beyond these three trait-like dimensions, however, it is impor-
tant to highlight that state-related factors also likely explain
portions of the variance in LEAS scores. One important state-
related factor that contributes to EA is arousal level. For exam-
ple, the recently proposed neural model of affective agnosia
(Lane et al., 2015), which involves a deficit in EA, has drawn on
8 SMITH ET AL.
research linking LEAS scores to medial prefrontal cortex activa-
tion (Frewen et al., 2008), and other research linking medial
prefrontal cortex activation with arousal (Lane, Ryan, Nadel, &
Greenberg, 2015; McRae, Reiman, Fort, Chen, & Lane, 2008).
The resulting model entails that EA (and hence LEAS scores)
should be highest during a state of moderate arousal, and that
it should decrease during states of extremely high or low
arousal. This is because extreme arousal is associated with inhi-
bition of the medial prefrontal functions on which EA is
thought to depend.
Another state-related factor pertains to the salience or goal-
relevance of emotional information. Several cognitive or neural
models suggest, for example, that large amounts of sensory input
remain unconscious, despite the fact that unconscious recogni-
tion occurs (e.g., Dehaene, 2014; Prinz, 2012). Thus, even if a
person’s brain recognized that another individual (or the self)
was feeling a highly specific emotion (e.g., contempt), this infor-
mation might remain unconscious (i.e., but perhaps still produce
detectable priming effects; see Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsi-
mons, 2007) if it was not sufficiently relevant to the person’s cur-
rent needs or goals (e.g., it would not be attended to, gated into
working memory, etc.). Because LEAS scores depend on the con-
scious use of emotional information (i.e., to generate the written
descriptions), it follows that a person’s scores would be lower if
he or she was sufficiently distracted by other concerns in a given
context. Conversely, if the content of probes to describe one’s
feelings are especially salient, higher LEAS scores might be gen-
erated. Manipulation of state variables such as these and their
effect on LEAS scores has not yet been undertaken.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the evidence presented within this article pro-
vides support for multiple, independent developmental contri-
butions to EA. This strengthens the case that EA is an ability
that improves through development, and also highlights the
need for further investigations of the independent developmen-
tal factors that might contribute to it. We have therefore dis-
cussed several theoretically plausible factors that could make
independent contributions to LEAS scores, and these should be
tested in future research.
Funding
This study was funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (MH-
14235, MH-30929) and the National Science Foundation (BNS-8318984).
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