1

Master Seminar

The Global Quest for FDI: Multinationals in the World Economy

Summer Term 2022

China’s Energy OFDI: Trends and Composition

Name: Ailen, Kreizer

Matriculation number: 2012548
Email address: ailen.kreizer@uni-wuppertal.de
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Paul J.J. Welfens
M.Sc Tian Xiong
Faculty: Schumpeter School of Business and Economics
Study program: Applied Economics and International Economic
Policy
Handover date: 22/08/2022
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Summary

In order to better understand the process of energy interaction between China and the rest of the
world, this study aims to analyze it based on the patterns and changes in trends that occur in the
outflow of foreign direct investment from 2005 to 2021. For this analysis a quantitative-
descriptive approach was obtained that resulted in obtaining evidence that accounts not only for
the flow and fluctuations of the sector in monetary terms, but also at a spatial level (geographical
distribution), as well as subsectors, raising the observable trend in Regarding the preference for
conventional energy investments, that is, oil, coal, and natural gas, as opposed to those based on
renewable sources. Finally, it is proposed what kind of strategies have been preferred in this
timeline (Greenfield vs. Mergers and Acquisitions).
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Table of Contents
List of Figures .................................................................................................................................. 3
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................... 3
1. Introduction. ................................................................................................................................. 4
2. Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 6
3. Data and methodology ................................................................................................................. 7
4. Results and Analysis .................................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Energy sector .......................................................................................................................... 9
4.2 Geographical distribution .................................................................................................... 10
4.3 Sub sectorization................................................................................................................... 12
4.4 Strategies .............................................................................................................................. 13
5. Conclusions and Discussion ....................................................................................................... 15
5.1 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 15
5.2 Recommendations and Limitations ...................................................................................... 15
6. References .................................................................................................................................. 17

List of Figures

Figure 1 Worldwide investment in renewable energy. .................................................................... 5

Figure 2 China's total OFDI compared to OFDI in the energy sector, from 2005 to 2021 .............. 9
Figure 3 Chinese OFDI by Region. ................................................................................................ 10
Figure 4 Geographical distribution of the Energy OFDI ............................................................... 11
Figure 5 OFDI distribution within Energy subsector ..................................................................... 12
Figure 6 OFDI Composition: Greenfield versus Merge and Acquisition ...................................... 14

List of Tables

Table 1 China's OFDI sectoral breakdown. .................................................................................... 9

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1. Introduction.

The rapid economic growth that China has experienced during the last four decades since the
reform and the opening of the market in 1978 have also led to the accelerated integration into the
globalization process, which can be seen reflected in the constant and rapid growth both in the
entry as in the outflow of foreign direct investment (OFDI). The latter have become increasingly
significant in the last two decades, reaching their peak with more than 196 billion U$S in 2016,
becoming in 2020 the largest direct investor in the world (153.7 billion U$S) for the first time in
history. while, in turn, world FDI fell, affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. And everything seems
to indicate that this trend will increase, although the future development of FDI flows will be
strongly influenced by national and international political factors as geopolitical tensions increase
and concerns about national security and strategic asset protection increase (Statista, 2022)

In this context, international energy security and national energy scarcity is one of the biggest
concerns of China's policymakers since, together with its spectacular economic growth, it has also
become the world's largest energy consumer. placing its demand today at 3562 Mtoe, well above
the United States (2123 Mtoe) and India with almost fourth of this amount with 927 Mtoe, thus
representing 25% of global energy consumption in 2021. And although China's economic growth
has slowed in recent years, with a consequent slowdown in demand growth from the energy sector,
the growth rate of energy consumption remains at 1.5%, making it the highest in the world and
thereby maintaining the position of the largest incremental energy market in the world for 15 years
consecutively (Enerdata, 2022 and Tan, et al. 2021).

This growing demand has caused the gap between national energy production and consumption to
widen year after year. Therefore, the external dependence on energy has been increasing. In
addition to this, China is a net importer of the 3 types of conventional energy: oil since 1993, natural
gas since 2008 and coal since 2009. This need has been remarkable when in 2017 the country
surpassed the United States in annual gross crude oil imports, importing 8.4 million barrels per day
compared with 7.9 million for the US. In 2019, the dependence on oil and natural gas abroad
reached 70.8% and 43.1%, respectively (Tan, et al. 2021 and Yang, 2022).

From a global point of view, the current variations in the global prices of energy products have
intensified because of the instability of the world economy, which has increased production costs
and commercial risk as well as increased potential hazards in politics and energy security. In such
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circumstances the use of OFDI in the energy sector has developed into a significant means for
China to explore foreign energy markets (Tan, et al. 2021).

Figure 1 Worldwide investment in renewable energy.

Source (Lin, 2018)

As a response to this threat in 2005, China's National People's Congress passed the Renewable
Energy Law and since then China's renewable energy development has moved into the fast lane,
following the steps of the others developed countries. Since then, the total amount of investment
in the renewable energy sector has grown rapidly, from 2.4 billion US$ in 2004 to more than 59.6
billion US$ in 2012. China in turn overtook Europe and the United States as the top renewable
energy investors in the world in 2013, as we can see in Figure 1. (Zhang, 2016) . In this sense,
China is not only the largest producer and exporter of renewable energy products, but also has the
largest installed capacity of renewable energy in the world with a total 1.06 billion kilowatts at the
end of 2021, accounting for 44.8 percent of the total installed power generation capacity. Wind
farms and photovoltaic stations both saw capacity exceed 300 million kW (Central Energy, 2022).

Specifically, this article will seek to examine the following questions: what the investment trends
in the energy sector have been, if the international instability has been reflected in the geographical
distribution. As well how has been the behavior in within the sector (Conventional vs renewable
energy), ending with the study of the patterns of their composition: as the strategy was to
investment more taking the form of acquisition of existing assets (Mergers and Acquisitions -
M&A) or as new assets (‘greenfield’).
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2. Literature Review

Energy not only acquires relevance as a fuel by itself but is also considered a special commodity
since it also counts as an important raw material for the industrial production of goods. In addition,
it also has patrimonial and geopolitical attributes. In this way, the relevance of the energy sector as
the preferred destination of the Chinese FDI is not only reflected in the statistics, but also in the
extensive literature that somehow covers this subject. For example, some authors have oriented
their analysis from a more strategic political approach, such as Zhao et al. (2020); Rajavuori &
Huhta (2020) or Gong (2022) who with their studies try to explain how the Asian country tries not
only to safeguard its national political/economic interests, but also uses its financial power as tool
to extend its international influence.

On the other hand, we also find purely economic/commercial approaches such as Gallagher et. al
(2016) which provides an estimate of China's global development finance institutions in general
and China's policy bank lending to foreign governments for energy. In the work of Tan (2013) on
the other hand, the reasons, implications, and scope of the investment flow in this sector are
analyzed in a quite complete way. Yang Yu (2022) has aimed in his work to investigate and analyze
the pattern and changes in the energy and commercial interaction between China and the rest of
the world from a transition perspective from traditional energy resources (oil, coal and natural gas)
versus those renewables, such as solar and wind) and the trade balance (export/import) of products
and technologies related to them. And it is based on these works that we will seek to deepen and
expand them, either in time extension (updating) or in terms of the breadth of topics analyzed.

Finally, Kittilaksanawong, W. et al (2014) in his work Acquisition versus Greenfield: The Strategy
of Chinese Privately Owned Investors in Developing Countries has served as the basis for analyzing
the strategy used, in said work two very different ways of foreign investment: greenfield
investment, in which foreign investors build a new production unit from scratch, and mergers and
acquisitions (M&A), in which foreign investors acquire existing assets. While the former involves
an accumulation of capital, the latter is a transfer of property. This has influence when explaining
the objectives pursued, which can be the search for the market, the search for strategic assets, the
search for efficiency and the search for natural resources.
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3. Data and methodology

In this case following the approach of Tan (2013), the absence of precise and trustworthy official
data is a significant obstacle to doing a thorough analysis of China's OFDI. There are significant
limits to the official statistics released by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), those
are also the one reported to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
First, MOFCOM lacks the institutional framework necessary to track and evaluate every cross-
border transaction. This implies that many modest investments are not accounted for in the
statistics. Second, some Chinese businesses engage in a game of back-and-forth by reporting their
offshore funds in tax havens like Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands before remitting them to the
Chinese mainland.

Given these two details, the data offered by MOFCOM do not represent a valid and precise
reflection of China's actual foreign investment. The China Investment Tracker of the Heritage
Foundation and the World Investment Report of the UNCTAD are two more sources that follow
China's OFDI. The research cannot use the UNCTAD data since they are not segmented by industry
or destination. For this reason, the American Enterprise Institute's (AEI) and Heritage Foundation
create the database “China Global Investment Tracker” (CGIT). This is the only comprehensive
publicly available data set that documents China's building and investment activities both
independently and jointly. The CGIT comprises more than 3700 big transactions in the energy,
transportation, technology, real estate, and other sectors, with data going back to 2005 to the
present. The list also contains the Chinese parent business (and its percentage of participation), the
host nation (and mainland subregion), the sector with a further subdivision, and the investment
approach employed, in addition to the numbers. The Tracker dates investments from the time they
are announced rather than when (or if) actual investment flows occur. However, there is evidence
that the Tracker is a reasonable indicator of large-scale Chinese investment.

And in order to carry out the corresponding study and interpret said data, an empirical study was
carried out, with a quantitative approach, insofar as they used different tools that allowed collecting
and organizing information from economic databases (which show us amounts, subsector and
investment methodology), and descriptive, insofar as an interpretation of these data is made to
explore and understand the behavior of investment in the energy sector in China, in order to analyze
and describe the evolution that it has had over the years .
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For this purpose, it was grouped to achieve a greater comparison between the subsectors to the
same in the type of energy that the country was investing: conventional (oil, natural gas, and coal)
and renewables (alternatives and hydro), leaving out those investments in the sector that could not
be categorized, either because they cover more than one subsector or because they are not related
to generation but to energy transport.

Taking this into consideration, it is that for the comparative analysis of the chosen strategies
(Greenfield vs M&A) only the energy sector as a whole has been taken into account, thus avoiding
alterations that may be caused by this lack in the data. In this instance considering that the data of
the IEA only indicate whether the investment has been Greenfield or not, so in this work everything
else has been interpreted as M&A.
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4. Results and Analysis

4.1 Energy sector

Although different data sources lead to different Table 1 China's OFDI sectoral breakdown.
Source: (American Enterprise Institute & Heritage
figures, the common conclusion is that the Foundation [CGIT], 2022). Author’s own
energy sector is and has been the main elaboration Total
investment, Share of
destination of Chinese foreign direct
Sector 2005-2021 total; %
investment. As we can see in Table 1 from 2005 Energy $ 426.190 32,24% to
2021, this sector attracted a total of US$426 Metals $ 160.920 12,17%
Transport $ 145.700 11,02%
billion, which represents 32% of China's total
Real estate $ 104.930 7,94%
OFDI in the analyzed period; that, of 14 Finance $ 83.110 6,29%
subsectors surveyed by the tracker, a third has Agriculture $ 82.240 6,22%
Technology $ 70.210 5,31%
been assigned only to this sector. This is
Entertainment $ 58.120 4,40%
consistent with some other reports Other $ 57.070 4,32%
commissioned by investment banks. For Tourism $ 45.930 3,47%
Logistics $ 44.310 3,35%
example, according to a report published by Health $ 24.970 1,89%
France's Credit Agricole, about 53% of China's Chemicals $ 12.400 0,94%
OFDI went to the energy/resources sector in Utilities $ 5.660 0,43%
Total $ 1.321.760
2004 (CGIT, 2022 and Tan X. , 2013).

The following graph represents the country's total OFDI compared to OFDI in the energy sector,
from 2005 to 2021.
China's OFDI Total vs Energy Sector
200000
180000
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Figure 2 China's total OFDI compared toTotal
OFDIFDIin the energy sector,
FDI from 2005
in Energy Sectorto 2021
Source: (CGIT, 2022). Author’s own elaboration
 10

Even so, and as can be seen through the data obtained; The absolute amounts have remained stable
in a range between 20 and 40 billion US$ from 2008 to 2019, where in 2020 we can observe a drop
of more than a third, going abruptly from 37.72 billion to 11.23 billion US$, a figure quite similar
to that record the following year.

In relative terms, this stability in the absolute amounts indicates that the fluctuations of China's
OFDI have not had a significant influence within the sector in particular, or in other words, China
has not adapted its sector strategy, so much so that with similar amounts invested in energy these
have registered their maximum point with 66% in 2005 and the lowest in 2007 with only 10%.
Beyond this, this minimum value has been one of the few exceptions, since, in the 17 years
observed, only 4 registered a value less than 25%.

4.2 Geographical distribution

The regional dispersion of these investments is another consideration. In general, North America,
except for Mexico, and Europe are the primary recipients of Chinese FDI worldwide. According
to data from China Power (2021) the nations companies spend US$624.4 billion in North America
and Europe from 2005 to 2019, making up slightly over half (50.9%) of total Chinese FDI outflows
during this time.

Figure 3 Chinese OFDI by Region.

Source: (China Power, 2021)
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With 188.94 billion US$, or 15% of all Chinese outflows between 2005 and 2019, the United States
is the largest recipient of Chinese FDI globally. The distribution of Chinese FDI flows to Europe,
which totaled 399.470 billion US$, is not a minor point. The majority of this (US$162.1 billion)
and (US$127.3 billion) went to Western and Northern European nations, which are typically
wealthier than their Eastern and Southern European counterparts (CGIT, 2022 and China Power,
2021).

However, this situation differs notably if we analyze the destination of investments at the sectoral
level (Figure 4), China's need for energy has largely fueled its investment priorities, not only
observing a preponderance towards underdeveloped or developing regions but has also followed a
diversification strategy. For example, in Central Asia and West Asia, oil-rich regions, the energy
sector attracted 88.6% and 66.4% of all Chinese FDI in those subregions. South Asia (42.3 percent)
and Southeast Asia (35.2 percent) also saw much of their FDI from China go to the energy sector.

Geographical Distribution
45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Sub-Saharan Africa South America Arab Middle East and North Africa
Australia Europe East Asia
West Asia USA North America

Figure 4 Geographical distribution of the Energy OFDI

Source: (CGIT, 2022). Author’s own elaboration

At a strategic level, it has also increased its presence significantly since 2005, from where it went
from investing in 5 subregions, notably Western Asia with 66% and South America with 22%, to
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expanding to another 4 more, presenting a much more diversified portfolio. In this sense,
throughout the period analyzed, South America has been the recipient of 18% of the total, followed
by Western Asia with 16% and Eastern Asia with 12%; followed by North America and Europe
both with a 14% share.

This diversification strategy is consistent with the protection of its interests in an increasingly
unstable international market, having its investments distributed almost equally around the globe
makes it less vulnerable to possible regional conflicts that could endanger production and/or
supply, and consequently this economy.

4.3 Sub sectorization

Now, if we look carefully within this sector, we can see the interest in those energy sources from
fossil resources, that is, oil, coal, and natural gas, continues to be predominant, presenting its
highest values just after the country became an exporter. net of these 3 resources in 2009. Here it
is also necessary to clarify that even within this category, those destined for the oil sector have
dominated the scene (CGIT, 2022 and Yang, 2022).

Conventional vs. Renewable

35000
30000
25000
20000 Renewable
15000 Conventional
10000 Other
5000
0
2007

2020
2005
2006

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

2021

Figure 5 OFDI distribution within Energy subsector

Source: (CGIT, 2022). Autor’s own elaboration

However, a slow downward trend is shown, counteracting with those investments destined to the
generation of clean energy. These data are also consistent with the indicated by Lin (2018) where
China takes the leadership worldwide in terms of the amount allocated to renewable energy. A
trend that seems to follow what is published in the media, where government representatives
indicate that the combination of clean fuels and fossil fuels tries to balance energy security, while
 13

achieving their climate change objectives. AS the National Development and Reform Commission
of the People's Republic of China said: "We will accelerate the adjustment of the energy structure
and promote energy supply security and low-carbon transformation at the same time" (Reuters,
2022)

In this way, China has established itself as a country whose commitment to renewable energy has
been reinforced over the years. Renewable energy is also part of China's broader goal of developing
an "ecological civilization," a multisectoral strategy to reduce pollution and fossil fuel use, mitigate
climate change and increase energy efficiency.

These charts have exhibited a reversal pattern showing that the conventional type of energy sector
has maintained a relative downward trend in terms of absolute numbers from its peak in 2010 at
28.69 billion to 1.5 billion US$ in 2020. In percentage terms the numbers have fluctuated without
following a definite trend.

However, it is important to note that 87 of the 443 investments allocated to the sector have not been
ordered in any subcategory, most of them destined for the construction of state electricity networks,
among others. These investments add up to a value of US$ 142.69 billion, thus representing 33%
of the total, which notably hinders an appropriate comparison between the 2 chosen groups.

4.4 Strategies

In this section we have tried to analyze the strategy chosen when deciding how to make the
investments. Figure 6 shows, on the one hand, the general development of those investments made
in the form of Mergers and Acquisitions (bars) during the period between 2005 and 2021 versus
those made as Greenfield (lines), comparing the total invested in each modality with the trend
pursued in the sector analyzed in this research, the energy.

Based on the trend shown by the bar charts, the number of M&As conducted by Chinese
multinational companies increased significantly until reaching a peak in 2017, followed by a rapid
decline in subsequent years. Beyond this, energy investments in this format have shown a
downward trend (amounts in slight detriment, in relation to the total with a strong fall.
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Greenfield versus M&A

180000
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

M&A Total M&A Energy GF Energy GF Total

Figure 6 OFDI Composition: Greenfield versus Merge and Acquisition

Source: (CGIT, 2022). Autor’s own elaboration

On the other hand, the country does show a constant within the Greenfield modality, where
although not the most chosen in general terms, the majority within this category belongs to the
energy sector, we can also observe that as of 2018 this sector was dominated by M&A, a situation
that was reversed in 2018, being 10.8 billion against 11.57 billion US$ for GF.

This would seem to agree with Kittilaksanawong et al. (2014) with the preposition that Chinese
companies are much more likely to invest in other developing countries through greenfield
investments (rather than acquisitions) to search for natural resources. For the search for natural
resources, greenfield investments are preferred because most Chinese ports of entry are SMEs and
are subject to restrictions regarding organizational resources and management capacity.

However, this is a singularity that has been developed in the last 4 of the 17 years analyzed and so
far, only 181 of the 443 projects have been in greenfield format. Therefore, cannot be concluded
that this was the main reason for making their investments
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5. Conclusions and Discussion

5.1 Conclusions

This report has shown, on the one hand, that over the years the Energy sector has maintained an
undisputed preponderance as a destination for the Chinese FDI, rather it is a stable trend that has
not accompanied or been affected by the factors that have originated the fluctuations that are
observed at a general level.

At the same time, it clearly shows a strategy of geographical diversification in what refers to this
sector, thus protecting itself from possible instabilities that may occur at the regional/country level
and, in turn, a preference for developing countries, contrary to what was observed with the rest of
the sectors, where industrial countries seem to be the biggest beneficiaries.

As for the fate of the same, focusing on their sub sectorization, China has not only followed the
world trend by increasing preference for renewable resources, but conventional sources have been
losing weight even in the face of the country's growing dependence. This is due in part to a political
strategy that seeks not only to cover the demand for energy and provide national security, but also
seeks to achieve a balance between this need and its environmental objectives.

The last point analyzed proves once again that Greenfield is a strategy used mainly in investments
related to natural resources, proof of this is that investments in this format have not only followed
the general trend, but also represent more than 50% of the same (total Greenfield) within the
analyzed period. Even so, M&A, the most chosen strategy in general, has prevailed over GF not
only in amounts allocated but also in the number of projects that fall into this category.

5.2 Recommendations and Limitations

The limitations of this study can also provide several valuable ideas for future research. The fact
that 87 of the 443 investments in the energy sector (33%) means that, at least with the source used,
it is not possible to make a correct comparison in the sub-sectorization of the OFDI, it would also
be limiting when evaluating whether the type of energy in which it has been invested has some
kind of relationship with the strategy used.
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Finally, it is believed interesting to extend this research by deepening the geographical analysis (by
region), and emphasizing the subsectors seen, in order to identify if there is any type of pattern or
trend according to the level of development of the chosen destination. This taking of course in
account the same limitation mentioned above.

In addition, also following a territorial perspective, try to distinguish if there is a preference in the
chosen investment format. In this way, the hypothesis is raised that the modality may be influenced
by the destination and the objective conditioned to it, that is, if, depending on the region, what
drives the flow of investment may not be the search for natural resources, such as is mainly assumed
in this work, but can be addressed for other reasons such as the search for the market, the search
for strategic assets.
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6. References

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