PEOPLE VS FELICIANO JR.

May 5, 2014

Facts:

On December 8, 1994, around 12-1:30 in the afternoon, seven members of Sigma Rho
Fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen at the University of the Philippines
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some
members were injured. However, Dennis Venturina, one of its members died from his injuries.

An information for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder was filed against several
members of Scintilla Juris Fraternity. Some members were convicted while others were
acquitted.

One of the issues raised on appeal was the presence of conspiracy since the Court of Appeals
declared other accused as only liable for attempted murder.

Issue: W/N there was conspiracy.

RULING: YES.

The presence of conspiracy

makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder

In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of
Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro
Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate court, however, modified their
liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted murder only against
Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.

It is the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased
by the attackers,"  it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and
157

from inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make
them suffer pain by slightly injuring them."  It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston
158

"was too shallow to have been done with an intent to kill."159

Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.

This is erroneous.

It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants  and the appellate court sustainedthis finding.
160 161

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their
degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as
though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that

... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of
the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason
of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.  (Emphasis
162

supplied)

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover, but the
others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already present at the
moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike when the
presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of their
attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical
injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the
attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-
appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.
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For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
 PEOPLE VS OLOVERIO
MARCH 18, 2015

Facts:

Oloverio was charged with the crime of murder for allegedly stabbing Gulane
treacherously. In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident,
Gulane had been accusing him of having an incestuous relationship with his mother
and continued mocking him in a loud voice despite repeated requests by the former
for the latter to go home. Moreover, Romulo Lamoste, the Brgy. Captain of
Belen, Pamplona, Leyte testified that prior to this insult, Oloverio confided to him
that Gulane told Oloverio’s daughter that he wanted to touch her private parts.
Oloverio admitted that he stabbed Gulane because he could no longer bear the
insulting remarks against him.

The trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not
present in this case since it could not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only
mitigating circumstance it found present was of voluntary surrender

The Court of Appeals found that Oloverio failed to establish with clear and convincing
evidence that Gulane "committed an unlawful act which sufficiently caused him to act
with passion and obfuscation."

The Court of Appeals found that Gulane’s act of insulting Oloverio before the stabbing
was unsupported by evidence.

Issue: W/N Passion and Obfuscation is present in this case

Ruling: YES

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation 42 is present in this case.

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and

obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements:

1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
and

2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator
might recover his normal equanimity.

In People v. Lobino:
It has been held that "[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed
due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or
due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."

"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which
naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or
excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive
him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must
necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense."

Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused
might have recovered his normal equanimity.

There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The
provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a
reasonable length of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed
down and be able to reflect on the consequences of his or her actions. What is
important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when he
committed the crime.

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be

examined on a case-to-case basis.

In People v. Caber, Francisco Caber was seen chasing Teodoro Ramirez with a bladed
weapon, locally known as a pisao, and stabbing Ramirez twice, which resulted in his
death.

Caber tried to argue that he stabbed Ramirez in a fit of passion and obfuscation and
alleged that Ramirez raped his wife three (3) days before the incident. This court
rejected the claim:

Even assuming, however, that he really killed Ramirez because of passion or

obfuscation in order to avenge the wrong done to his wife by the victim, still he cannot
be credited with this circumstance as he would then have acted "in the spirit of
revenge." Furthermore, although accused-appellant's wife was allegedly raped by
Ramirez on November 17, 1994, the stabbing incident in question took place three days
later or on November 20, 1994. Thus, the act which was supposed to have caused
passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused-appellant was so far removed from
the date of the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala, the Court ruled that the lapse of
more than 24 hours, reckoned from the commission of the act which produced the
passion or obfuscation up to the time of the commission of the felony, constituted a
considerable period of time after which such circumstance would no longer be deemed
present.
 BACERRA VS PEOPLE
JULY 3, 2017

Facts:

Alfredo and his family  were sound asleep in their home on November 15, 2005. At about 1:00 a.m.,
8

he was roused from sleep by the sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living
room andpeered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his
neighbor and co-worker, Bacerra.

Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your mother." Just as he was about
to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now." Bacerra then left.

Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down beside the window.
At around 4:00a.m., he heard dogs barking outside.  Alfredo looked out the window and saw
19

Bacerra walking towards their nipa hut, which was located around 10 meters from their house.

Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it.  Moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut
22

burning.

Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. Edgar contacted the authorities for
assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents were completely destroyed. The local
authorities conducted an investigation on the incident.

On the other hand, the defense presented its own version of facts:

At around 11:00 p.m. of November 14, 2005, Bacerra was at the house of his friend, Ronald
Valencia. The two (2) engaged in a drinking session with Alex Dacanay and a certain Reyson until
1:00 a.m. of November 15, 2005.

Bacerra asked Dacanay to take him to his grandmother's house. Dacanay conceded but they found
the gate closed. Embarrassed to disturb his grandmother, Bacerra asked Dacanay to bring him to
Jocelyn Fernandez's house instead. However, Dacanay was already sleepy at that time. Hence,
Bacerra requested his brother-in-law, Francisco Sadora (Sadora), to accompany him to Fernandez's
house, which was located one (1) kilometer away.

Bacerra and Sadora arrived at Fernandez's house at around 1:30 a.m. Fernandez told Bacerra to
sleep in the living room. She checked on Bacerra every hour. At around 7:00 a.m., police officers
who were looking for Bacerra arrived at Fernandez's house.  Knowing that he did not do anything
35

wrong,  Bacerra voluntarily went to the police station with the authorities.
36

The trial court found Bacerra guilty of the crime of Arson. Bacerra raised on appeal his conviction
and the penalty imposed considering that he voluntarily surrendered despite the absence of a
warrant of arrest.

Issue: W/N Bacerra’s voluntary surrender can be counted as a mitigating circumstance

Ruling: NO.

Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity. The

accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the acknowledgment of
guilt or a desire to "save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his [or her]
search and capture." 114

Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's act of submitting his person to
the authorities was motivated by an acknowledgement of his guilt.
 CORONEL VS PEOPLE
MARCH 13, 2017

FACTS:

On May 19, 2010, PDEA, in coordination with the PNP, implemented a search warrant
in Pasig City. Upon announcing that they had a search warrant, a PDEA agent shouted
that a person jumped out and immediately used a battering ram to open the door. Three
persons were found inside the room while three other persons, Coronel, Permejo, and
Villafuerte were apprehended after trying to escape the window. During the search, the
team recovered, among others, transparent plastic sachets, aluminium foils, containers
of white crystalline substance and white powdery residue, disposable lighters,
improvised plastic scoops.

Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez were arrested and apprised of their
constitutional rights.20 The confiscated items were also inventoried, photographed, and
marked in their presence, as well as in the presence of the Barangay officials and the
Department of Justice and media representative

The arrested suspects were brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and
mandatory drug testing, together with the seized objects, one of which was identified
as shabu. Coronel, Villafuerte, Permejo, and Olivarez tested positive for shabu.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court found Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte,
and Olivarez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Sections 7 (knowingly
visiting a drug den) and 15 (Use of illegal drugs) of Republic Act No.
9165.oblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: W/N petitioners were correctly convicted for violating Section 7 of RA 9165.

Ruling: No. They are not correctly convicted.

Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes the act of knowingly visiting a drug
den:

Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of

imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon:

(a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort, who is aware of the nature of the place as
such; and

(b) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of the next preceding
paragraph, is aware of the nature of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the
same.
Before a person may be convicted under the foregoing provision, it must be shown that
he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place despite
this knowledge.

True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs some time
before their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug
den before their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged
drug den, or how long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no
basis to assume that petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest,
and thus, at the location of the arrest.

Assuming that persons who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is
not sufficient to show that they were aware of the nature of the suspected drug den
before visiting it, absent any other circumstantial evidence.

There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den,
or even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in
possession of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested, nobody was found "in the act
of using, selling or buying illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding nor transporting the
same."60 There were no acts alleged or evidence found, which would tend to show a
familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den.

The crime of knowingly visiting a drug den under Article II, Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9165 carries with it a minimum penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and one (1) day,
and a maximum of20 years. It is not to be taken so lightly that its elements can be
presumed to exist without any effort to show them. Given the dearth of evidence in this
case, we are constrained to acquit petitioners of this particular charge.
 PEOPLE VS QUINTOS
NOVEMBER 12, 2014

FACTS:

Enrique Quintos was charged with two (2) counts of rape for allegedly raping a 21-year
old girl with a mental age of 6 years and two months and an IQ of 38. The victim testified that on
several occasions, Quintos inserted his penis in her vagina despite her protests. For his defense,
Quintos claimed that he could not have raped her since there was no resistance coming from the
victim.

The RTC convicted Quintos for 2 counts of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: W/N Quintos is properly convicted of rape.

RULING: YES.

Resistance is not an element of the crime of rape.  It need not be shown by the
prosecution.  Neither is it necessary to convict an accused.  The main element of rape is
“lack of consent.”

“Consent,” “resistance,” and “absence of resistance” are different things.  Consent

implies agreement and voluntariness.  It implies willfulness.  Similarly, resistance is an
act of will.  However, it implies the opposite of consent.  It implies disagreement.

Meanwhile, absence of resistance only implies passivity.  It may be a product of one’s

will.  It may imply consent.  However, it may also be the product of force, intimidation,
manipulation, and other external forces.

Thus, when a person resists another’s sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous
to say that that person does not consent to any sexual activity with the other.  That
resistance may establish lack of consent.  Sexual congress with a person who
expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or
psychologically through threat or intimidation.  It is rape.

Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent.  However, that is not always the
case.  While it may imply consent, there are circumstances that may render a person
unable to express her resistance to another’s sexual advances.  Thus, when a person
has carnal knowledge with another person who does not show any resistance, it does
not always mean that that person consented to such act.  Lack of resistance does not
negate rape.

Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is
committed when a man has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by
means of force, threat, or intimidation.  It enumerates at least four other circumstances
under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking advantage of a person’s deprived
reason or unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent machination; (3) by taking
advantage of a person’s age (12 years of age) or demented status; and (4) through
grave abuse of authority.  Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in
circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.

Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is
unconscious, deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or young either in
chronological age or mental age.

The circumstances when rape may be committed under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code should be defined in terms of the capacity of an individual to give consent. 
An unconscious person cannot rationally respond to stimuli or perform acts such as
giving consent or offering resistance because he or she is either unaware, asleep, or in
a coma.

Meanwhile, when a person is a victim of fraudulent machination or manipulation, such

as when she is induced to have carnal knowledge to treat a person’s disease that he or
she does not really have, she is not in full control of his or her decisions.  He or she acts
without full or with false knowledge of the circumstances from which he or she bases
his or her actions.  Therefore, any consent he or she gives is either false or not his or
her own.  Any lack of resistance may not be interpreted as voluntariness.

The term, “deprived of reason,” is associated with insanity or madness.  A person

deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning and
perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and
give consent.

The term, “demented,” refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called
dementia.  Dementia refers to the deterioration or loss of mental functions such as
memory, learning, speaking, and social condition, which impairs one’s independence in
everyday activities.68

We are aware that the terms, “mental retardation” or “intellectual disability,” had been
classified under “deprived of reason.” 69  The terms, “deprived of reason” and
“demented”, however, should be differentiated from the term, “mentally retarded” or
“intellectually disabled.”  An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of
reason or demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. 70 
However, his or her maturity is not there despite the physical age.  He or she is
deficient in general mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and
practical functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. 71  Because of such
impairment, he or she does not meet the “socio-cultural standards of personal
independence and social responsibility.”72

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as
capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of
35 and a mental age of 7.  Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent
because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives
them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving
sexuality.  Decision-making is a function of the mind.  Hence, a person’s capacity to
decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is
determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. 
Therefore, in determining whether a person is “twelve (12) years of age” under Article
266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological
age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental
age if intellectual disability is established.

In all the above circumstances, rape is ensured because the victim lacks the awareness
or presence of mind to resist a sexual abuse.  The unconscious, the manipulated, the
reason-deprived, the demented, and the young cannot be expected to offer resistance
to sexual abuse for the simple reason that their mental statuses render them incapable
of doing so.  They are incapable of rational consent.  Thus, sexual intercourse with
them is rape.  No evidence of force, intimidation, or resistance is necessary.
 PEOPLE VS CORPUZ
JULY 3, 2017

FACTS:

Corpuz was charged with four (4) counts of Rape before the RTC of Pangasinan when,
by means of force, had sexual intercourse with a victim of fourteen (14) years of age with a
mental age of five (5) years old. Quintos denied the allegations and insisted that all the charges
against him were merely fabricated by the victim’s father.

The RTC found Corpuz to be guilty of 4 counts of rape committed against a mental
retardate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: W/N Corpuz was properly convicted of rape.

Ruling: Yes. Corpuz was properly convicted of rape

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. — Rape is Committed —

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances: 
....
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis provided) 

In People v. Quintos y Badilla,120 this Court emphasized that the conditions under

Article 266-A should be construed in the light of one's capacity to give
consent.121 Similarly, this Court clarified that an intellectually disabled person is not
automatically deprived of reason.122 Thus, We are aware that the terms, "mental
retardation" or "intellectual disability," had been classified under "deprived of reason."
The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented", however, should be differentiated
from the term, "mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled." An intellectually
disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. This court
had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. However, his or her
maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in general
mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical
functioning relative to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such
impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural standards of personal
independence and social responsibility." 123 (Emphasis provided, citations omitted)

In Quintos,  this Court also clarified that one's capacity to give consent depends upon
his or her mental age and not on his or her chronological age. 124

Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as
capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of
35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent
because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives
them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving
sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person's capacity to
decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is
determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental
age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under
Article 266-A (1) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the
chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or
the mental age if intellectual disability is established. 125(Emphasis provided)

If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused
remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. 126 The reason
behind the rule "is simply that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of
age is rape, it must thereby follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental
age is that of a child below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape." 127