EFRAIM C. GENUINO, ERWIN F. GENUINO AND SHERYL G. SEE VS. HON. LEILA M.

DE LIMA
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018
REYES, JR., J.

Facts:
The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary
Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. The Petitioners questions the constitutionality of this DOJ
circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel.

On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular
No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18 .

After the expiration of GMA's term as President of the Republic of the Philippines and her subsequent
election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her before the DOJ,
particularly, for plunder, malversation, and/or illegal use of public funds, graft and corruption, violation
of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft.

In view of the foregoing criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against GMA
pursuant to her authority under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA's name
in the Bureau of Immigration (BI) watch list.

Meanwhile, on October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the
OEC were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo.

Following the filing of criminal complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and
Miguel Arroyo, with a validity period of 60 days, unless sooner terminated or otherwise extended.

Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against Genuinos, among others, after
criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections 3(e), (g), (h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioners requested that the HDO against them be lifted. This plea was however denied.

Issue:
WHETHER THE DOJ HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 41

Ruling:
No. Guided by the foregoing disquisition, the Court is in quandary of identifying the authority from
which the DOJ believed its power to restrain the right to travel emanates. To begin with, there is no law
particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the only ground of the
former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary
investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee on the complaint for
electoral sabotage against them.

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the
scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere
administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the provisions of an enabling law which the
former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to the
agency's rule-making powers provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292
and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.