Enrile V Sandiganbayani

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD

DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J : p
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and

during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and
August 8, 2014 3 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with
several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied
his Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and
several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their
purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). 4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion 5 and
Supplemental Opposition, 6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to
post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were
heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated
Opposition. 7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying
Enrile's motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered
or been placed under the custody of the law. 8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital
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following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, 11 and his Motion to Fix Bail , 12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were
heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014. 13 In support of the motions,
Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not
a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution
denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
. . . [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-
bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.
In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his
bail.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail
because while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty
that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No.
7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70)
years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be
said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit. TIADCc
xxx xxx xxx

. . . [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances
will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after
trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix
his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must
also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused's age, physical condition and his being
a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior
showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce
Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed

resolution to deny Enrile's motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July
14, 2014 resolution. 15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for
certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as
a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the
exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong. cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile's guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile
is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
xxx xxx xxx
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk .
16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled

to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has
failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances
— his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong;
and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he
is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment, 17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile's right to bail
is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted
bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to
bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. 18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to
be released on bail, 19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused. 20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes. 21 The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused's interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the society's interest in assuring the
accused's presence at trial. 23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
. . . All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the
Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under
the law existing at the time of its commission and the application for
admission to bail, may be punished with death. 25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted
of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers
of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. 26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized. 27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior
to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon
conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or SDAaTC
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma , 30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing
called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic,
therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to
the Prosecution. 31 The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been
aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz.: 32

. . . Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court
already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al . that a hearing is
mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged
with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting
bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for
its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis
of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not
one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned
ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
xxx xxx xxx
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for
the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the
nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Ru les of Court) It is
highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal
is neither present nor heard. AaCTcI
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the

discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary
hearing means: —
. . . such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to
be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.
33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.acEHCD
3. n
Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in hisMotion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his
favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. 35
Enrile's averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution,
whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that —
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that
might be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to
the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state
that the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also
not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated
in the accused's favor. 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile's
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle
him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusion perpetua, 37 simply because the determination, being primarily
factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile's petition for certiorari, the Court is
guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines'
responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
. . . uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty
and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. 38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant
of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. 39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court
indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly
unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition
of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. 40 With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history's judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile's health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the
Director of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a
geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted
at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels
on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of
the following: SDHTEC
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

carotid and vertebral artery disease; (Annexes 1.4,
4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of
the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes
3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens.
(Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged
prostate on recent ultrasound). 42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they
could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity,
dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with
asthma or COPD. 43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile's advanced
age and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement at the
PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, 44 was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that
medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police
Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON: AScHCD
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give

him the best.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart
of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the
facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear .
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency
situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but
probably if the condition of the patient worsen, we have no
facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45
xxx xxx xxx
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented.
The Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The People's Court: 46
. . . This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
. . . [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by
law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case,
is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless
of the charge and the stage of the proceeding,
influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail; 47 . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon
Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from
minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic,
granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen
similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the
treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into
consideration that the petitioner's previous petition for bail was
denied by the People's Court on the ground that the petitioner was
suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the People's Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon
Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition
of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering
from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said People's Court
has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our
above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases
against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No.
3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the
ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New
Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life;
it is evident and we consequently hold that the People's Court acted
with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner on
bail. 48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will
then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to
defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of
bail — whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly
the subject of judicial notice — that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the
same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored
the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the
trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health
and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction. 50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. 51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES
the writ of certiorari ANNULLING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238
on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE
of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of
a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause. AcICHD
No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., join the dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., for humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., * J., is on official leave.
Reyes, ** J., is on sick leave.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, *** J., took no part, prior OSG action.
Separate Opinions
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. —
CONST., art. III, sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.
—
The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France,
French novelist (1844-1924)
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the
Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper. Bail is not a
matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder and the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan
when it failed to release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian
reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was not the basis
for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail 1 filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this Petition on his
medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before
the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The
Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not shedding their neutrality and
impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a
better argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution and the
people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical conditions that
require very special treatment is a question of fact. We cannot take judicial
notice of the truth contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This
doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be subjected to
both direct and cross-examination so that he can properly manifest to the
court the physical basis for his inferences as well as the nature of the
medical condition of petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented
by the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be proper before
the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was considered by the
Sandiganbayan because petitioner insisted that he was entitled to bail as a
matter of right on grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority's opinion — other than the invocation of a
general human rights principle — does not provide clear legal basis for the
grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian considerations
is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute
or provision of the Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a
privilege ad hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that
will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of
humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without
guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age,
hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide
whether this is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged
with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple
incestuous rape, serious illegal detention, and other crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. They will have to decide whether
this is applicable only to those who are in special detention facilities and not
to the aging or sick detainees in overcrowded detention facilities all over this
country. caITAC
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on the basis of
personal discretion causing petitions for certiorari to be filed before this
court. This will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on clear
legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely grounded
on the presence or absence of human compassion on the day that justices of
this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also undermines the
legitimacy and the stability of our entire judicial system.
I
On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) was charged with
the crime of plunder punishable under Republic Act No. 7080. 2 Section 2 of
this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. — Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion before the
Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to post bail if the Sandiganbayan
should find probable cause against him. 3 On July 3, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity
since no warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the same
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile's arrest. 4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and served, Enrile
proceeded to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the
Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City. 5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that his
alleged age and voluntary surrender were mitigating and extenuating
circumstances that would lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.
6 He also argued that his alleged age and physical condition indicated that
he was not a flight risk. 7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court
allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail pending
determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b) uncontroverted
mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old and voluntary
surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal;
and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic]. 8
The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the Motion to Fix
Bail dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a Reply 10 dated July 11, 2014.
9
Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile filed a Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital 11 dated July 4, 2014, arguing that
"his advanced age and frail medical condition" 12 merit hospital arrest in the
Philippine National Police General Hospital under such conditions that may
be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan. 13 He also prayed that in the event of
a medical emergency that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National
Police General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside medical
facility. 14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court
temporarily place him under hospital confinement at the PNP General
Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing authority
given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise his
professional medical judgment or discretion to allow Enrile's
immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical facility
outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity, secured
with appropriate guards, but after completion of the appropriate
medical treatment or procedure, he be returned forthwith to the PNP
General Hospital. 15
After the prosecution's submission of its Opposition to the Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital, the Sandiganbayan held a hearing on
July 9, 2014 to resolve this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order allowing Enrile to
remain at the Philippine National Police General Hospital for medical
examination until further orders of the court. 16
This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital is not the subject of this Petition for Certiorari. Enrile
did not ask that this Order be declared invalid or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the Resolution 17 denying
Enrile's Motion to Fix Bail for being premature, 18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and
the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt
is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter
of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the
amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.
In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his
bail. 19
Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 20 reiterating that there were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would modify the imposable
penalty and that his frail health proved that he was not a flight risk. 21 The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8, 2014. 22 Hence,
this Petition for Certiorari was filed. ICHDca
II
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the Motion to Fix Bail for prematurity. It was following entrenched
and canonical procedures for bail based upon the Constitution and the Rules
of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the Sandiganbayan — acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused through his or her arrest. 23 The consequent
detention is to ensure that the accused will appear when required by the
Rules and by order of the court trying the offense. 24 The provisions on bail
provide a balance between the accused's right to be presumed innocent on
one hand and the due process rights of the state to be able to effect the
accused's prosecution on the other hand. That balance is not exclusively
judicially determined. The Constitution frames judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly provided in our
Rules of Court. The grant of bail is ordinarily understood as two different
concepts: (1) bail as a matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion.
Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide: cDHAES
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in

custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted
the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution .
(Emphasis supplied)
The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of bail
when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are
held when an accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. TCAScE

The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first addressed in the
1945 case of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira 25 where this court ordered the
People's Court to conduct a bail hearing despite the accused being charged
with a capital offense. 26 This court reasoned that "the hearing is for the
purpose of enabling the People's Court to exercise its sound discretion as to
whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force[,] petitioner is
entitled to provisional release under bail." 27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the People's Court and
gave the following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does
not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a
general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release
after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special
prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to
ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer
any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a
disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing
the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and
when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General,
who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the
direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the
trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not
want to introduce — provided, of course, that such refusal shall not
prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. 28
The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo v. Bernabe: 29
We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons , that

all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge
is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general
rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not yet
charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional release
on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital
offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At the hearing
of the application for bail, the burden of showing that the case falls
within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule 110,
section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee case, a matter of judicial
discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or
produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of
judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to
the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of
their contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay
evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. 30 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, etc., et al.
31 and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.
32
We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this court's

instructions on the application of the constitutional provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 33 outlines these administrative cases
promulgated from 1981 to 1996. 34 Unfortunately, there were still
administrative complaints filed against judges for failing to hold a hearing for
bail even after the promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral, 35 this court ordered Judge Catral to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with capital offenses.
36 This court could only lament on the deluge of these administrative cases,
stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be
besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring
judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on
the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself,
through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures
on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that
as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case
an application for bail is filed:
"1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Ru les of
Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or
not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section
19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied." cTDaEH
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules
of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much
too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail
having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to
discharge their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench
cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles. 37
The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as administrative cases
continued to be filed against judges who failed to hold hearings in
applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas, 38 the accused was charged with
murder. 39 Judge Bugtas initially denied the accused's petition for bail but
granted his motion for reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing. 40
As a result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 41 for
being "grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying
bail[.]" 42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores, 43 the erring judge was ordered to
pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting bail to the accused charged with rape
without a hearing. 44
In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe, 45 Judge Cabebe was
fined P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the requisite hearing, to the
accused charged with possession of illegal drugs. 46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not filed an
application for bail or the prosecutor already recommends an amount for
bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante: 47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal

Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is
separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be given a chance
to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a violation of due
process occurs.
xxx xxx xxx
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail
hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he
could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with the
hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the rules. 48
In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists that this court
justify that bail be granted without any hearing before the Sandiganbayan on
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitioner's
Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail should be
based only on their failure to establish the strength of the evidence against
him. 49 The prosecution had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence
based on the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan correctly denied
petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail for being premature. The denial is neither
"capricious, whimsical, arbitrary [nor] despotic" 50 as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the
Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's
Motion to Fix Bail. ITAaHc
III
The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
failed to release petitioner on bail for medical or humanitarian reasons.
Petitioner did not ask that bail be granted because of his medical condition
or for humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as
respondent developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan
or in this court to establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of
bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner's grant of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter
of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only
upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of
guilt is strong.
• It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile falls within the exception and
exclusion from the right; and not the burden of Enrile to
show entitlement to his right.
• The prosecution failed to establish that Enrile's case falls within
the exception; hence, denial of his right to bail by the
Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
• The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty
prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law itself for the crime of
plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but also the penalty
next lower in degree (or reclusion temporal) by
"consider(ing) the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code."
• Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating
circumstances is a needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile's guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
• Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert, hence
failed to raise in issue, in its Opposition to Enrile's motion
for bail, that evidence of guilt is strong, in the light of the
prosecution's continuing muteness to the defense's
repeated challenge for the prosecution to produce any
"single piece of paper showing that Enrile received even a
single peso of kickback," the Sandiganbayan nonetheless
insisted that Enrile must first initiate, and formally apply
for, the formal proceedings ("bail hearing") before the
prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty of
proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
• The exception to, or exclusion from, the right ("shall be
bailable") does not become a prohibition ("shall not be
bailable"). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory right
("shall") is a permissive right ("may").
• A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights to
presumptive innocence and non-deprivation of liberty
without due process, and the theory behind the exception
to right-to-bail.
• Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to Enrile
(i.e., Enrile is demonstrated not being a flight risk), then
bail may be granted to him.
• Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age, frail
physical and medical condition, and having voluntarily
surrendered.
• Circumstances of official and social standing shows that Enrile
is not a flight risk.
• Other circumstances negating Enrile's disposition to become a
fugitive from justice are also present. CHTAIc
• The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court

show that at this stage of the proceeding, Enrile is entitled
to bail a matter of right. 51
The prayer in his Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that the
Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and SET ASIDE the
Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated July 14, 2014, and the
Resolution dated August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT
BAIL in favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief as may
be just and equitable. 52
IV
This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion among the
justices of this court in and out of formal deliberations. As provided by our
rules and tradition, the discussion was triggered by the submission of the
member in charge of a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted the
legal arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court taking
judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic mitigating circumstances
that would lower the penalty to be imposed even before trial or a hearing for
the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong happened
before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member submitted their reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments
were vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member adopted the
common position that there was no grave abuse of discretion and, therefore,
the Petition should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could be
treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or application for bail as in all
cases where the statutorily imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death,
or life imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member differed only in the treatment of mitigating circumstances and the
interpretation of Bravo, Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al. 53
When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc
session on August 11, 2015, the member in charge (now the ponente)
proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to
whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on
"humanitarian" grounds. The member in charge committed to circulate a
draft for the consideration of all justices. This member expressed that he
was open to listen to all arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the
medical condition of petitioner was circulated on August 14, 2015. After
considered reflection, this member responded with a letter addressed to all
the justices, which stated:
In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the
revisions in the proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out
thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when an
accused charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua
should be released on bail "for humanitarian reasons."
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the
Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical
interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the contents
of the certification of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we suspending
our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross examination and
not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be or have been
presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
in appreciating the facts relating to the medical condition of the
accused? Or, are we substituting our judgment for theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the
Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused to be brought to any
hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot be
treated by the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial requirements
to the court? Are we also declaring that the Sandiganbayan's
decisions in relation to their supervision of the detention of the
accused were tainted with grave abuse of discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases
on bail? Or, if we are able to hurdle the factual issues and find that
there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention rather be
modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for hospital or house
arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so
that his medical condition can be attended to, should he be returned
to detention when he becomes well? If he reports for work, does this
not nullify the very basis of the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We have
established rules on what to consider when setting the amount of
bail. In relation to the accused and his circumstances, what is our
basis for setting this amount? What evidence have we considered?
Should this Court rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this
discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the medical
condition of the accused entitles him to treatment different from all
those who are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder?
Is it simply his advanced age? What qualifies for advanced age? Is it
the medical conditions that come with advanced age? Would this
apply to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique debilitating
disease which cannot be accommodated by the best care provided by
our detention facilities or hospital or house arrest? Are there sufficient
evidence and rules to support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international law
provisions, other than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which specifically compel the release of an accused in his condition?
Or, are we now reading the general tenor of the declaration of human
rights to apply specifically to the condition of this accused? What
entitles the accused in this case to a liberal application of very
general statements on human rights? 54 EATCcI
The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August

18, 2015. The member in charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more
extensive written reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he
thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015
circulated draft centering on release on bail on humanitarian
grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail was a
matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration
of the existence of two mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of August 18,
2015. The only amendment to the majority opinion accepted by the member
in charge was the increase of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who was
the member in charge, emerging as the ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P.A. Sereno, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case or at about 3:00
p.m., the ponente passed around a final copy of the majority opinion
which was not the version voted upon during the morning's
deliberation . Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the
August 14, 2015 circulated version granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioner's entire argument,
stating that: ISHCcT
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not

Enrile's averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged
against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply
because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is
ideally to be made by the trial court. 55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all
members of the court at the time that the case was voted upon. But because
the final version for signing was not the version voted upon, this member
had to substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of mitigating
circumstances and bail as a matter of right was no longer the basis of the
ponencia, Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously offer
her points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to abandon her
filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the
submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, section 7 of A.M. No.
10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion. — A Member who
disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions, and the
disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or Division
Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the reason or reasons
for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the result of the case,
but based on different reason or reasons may submit a separate
opinion; a concurrence "in the result" should state the reason for the
qualified concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion,
but opts to express other reasons for concurrence may submit a
concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring opinion
must be submitted within one week from the date the writer of the
majority opinion presents the decision for the signature of the
Members. (Emphasis supplied)
But this member endeavored to complete his draft incorporating the
ideas and suggestions of other dissenting justices within two days from the
circulation of the majority opinion. DHITCc
In the meantime, media, through various means, got wind of the vote
and started to speculate on the contents of the majority opinion. This may
have created expectations on the part of petitioner's friends, family, and
counsel. The Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting that
the Decision had as yet not been promulgated and served, made
announcements as to their readiness to receive the cash bond and process
the release of the accused even if August 19, 2015 happened to be a holiday
in Quezon City, which was the seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the announcements
regarding the vote and the date of promulgation of this judgment.
V
Despite brushing aside all of petitioner's arguments, the majority,
instead of denying the Petition for Certiorari, grants it on some other ground
that was not even argued nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail merely on the
basis of the certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14,
2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is
suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. 56 This certification was
submitted as an annex to a Manifestation 57 before this court regarding the
remoteness of the possibility of flight of the accused not for the purposes of
asking for bail due to such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based
on judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively
suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and
authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing
whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative
detention is possible.
Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
In State Prosecutors v. Muro: 58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three

material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 59
Petitioner's medical ailments are not matters that are of public
knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not
a matter of general notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are relevant issues
for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any
evidence that may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process requires that
we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales' findings and
to ensure that that is still the condition that prevails at present.
That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant provisional
liberty to one who is obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the
presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without
the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-examine the
evidence, and without consideration of any rebutting evidence that may
have been presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our
neutrality and objectivity. cEaSHC
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-

entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the
matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be
examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a petition
for bail is filed by the accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any,
should be pleaded and heard.
VI
Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from illnesses that
require immediate medical attention, this court has not established clear
guidelines for such releases. The closest that the majority opinion reaches
for a standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the
crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during trial. 60 (Emphasis in the
original)
To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it down to its
premises:
Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to their health OR whose lives are endangered due to
incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that detention prisoners
are humanely treated. Under A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC, 61 judges of lower courts
are mandated to conduct monthly jail visitations in order to "[e]nsure the
promotion and protection of the dignity and well being" 62 of detention
prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be released to a medical facility on
humanitarian grounds "if their continuous confinement during the pendency
of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their life." 63
In many instances, alternative detention — whether temporary or
permanent — is granted upon a clear showing before the trial court or the
Sandiganbayan that the physical condition of the accused, as proven
through evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring medical
attention that could not be accommodated within the current custodial
arrangements. Care should, however, be taken that such alternative
custodial arrangements do not take place more than the time necessary to
address the medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the Sandiganbayan
should ensure that alternative custodial arrangements are not borne by the
state and, therefore, should be sensitive to the possibility that these
alternatives are not seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or powerful
detainees.
On July 9, 2014 64 and July 15, 2014, 65 the Sandiganbayan already
issued Resolutions allowing accused to remain at the Philippine National
Police General Hospital and continue medical examinations until further
orders from the court, subject to reportorial requirements and at accused's
personal expense. In particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states: IAETDc
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales's report], the Court will

hold in abeyance action on accused Enrile's motion for detention at
the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to remain thereat
until further orders from this Court. The Director or Administrator of
PNP General Hospital is GRANTED AUTHORITY to allow accused
Enrile to access another medical facility outside Camp Crame only (1)
in case of emergency or necessity, and (2) the medical procedure
required to be administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or
cannot be provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital,
ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE . After
completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside Camp
Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the PNP General
Hospital. The said director or administrator is DIRECTED to
submit a report to the Court on such visit/s of accused Enrile
to another medical facility on the day following the said
visit/s. 66 (Emphasis in the original)
The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales,
and/or any his duly authorized representative/s from the Philippine
General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the medical
examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit a report and
recommendation to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof. The necessary medical examinations and/or procedure/s as
determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have the
appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical apparatus
and competent personnel to undertake the procedure/s, ALL AT THE
PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Pending
the completion of the aforesaid medical examinations and/or
procedure/s and submission of the required report and
recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile is allowed to remain at
the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject to conditions
earlier imposed by the Court in its Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED . 67
These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that authorize
accused to be brought to any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms
that cannot be treated at the Philippine National Police General Hospital
subject only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting bail to
petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the Sandiganbayan's decisions in
relation to its supervision of the accused's detention were tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this Petition for
Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as presented to it,
accused does not seem to be suffering from a unique debilitating disease
whose treatment cannot be provided for by our detention facilities and
temporary hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the majority
arrived at a conclusion different from the Sandiganbayan has not
been thoroughly explained. Neither did this issue become the
subject of intense discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all those who have
similar conditions and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear
whether petitioner's incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his
medical conditions are simply conditions which come with advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that the medical
condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment different from all those who
are now under detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no
showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to the facilities that
are made available to him. There is also no showing as to whether any of his
medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If
his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his detention that is
the most significant factor or cause for such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would make
detention in the hospital necessary, courts do not grant bail. They merely
modify the conditions for the accused's detention. There is now no clarity as
to when special bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should
be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special bail based on
medical condition is applicable only to those of advanced age and whether
that advanced age is beyond 90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to
whether this is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no
guidance in the majority's opinion as to whether this is only applicable to the
medical conditions or stature or titles of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard
for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons. In People v.
Fitzgerald: 68
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There may
also be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of
older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as
age increases. 69
VII
Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the conditions for
this special kind of bail. Thus, the majority asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial. 70
Before the ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this
dissent has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already
strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This strongly
indicates that the majority's inference as to the existence of very serious
debilitating illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to whether
bail then can be cancelled motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance
as to whether that motion to cancel bail should be filed before the
Sandiganbayan or before this court. DcHSEa
The crime charged in petitioner's case is one where the imposable

penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail
can only be granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical
conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to
go about his other duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional
liberty on the basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the
medical emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially
tailored for petitioner.
VIII
There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of P1,000,000.00 as
the amount for bail. The original proposal of the member in charge was
P100,000.00. This was increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal
circulated on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member who
voted with the majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting the amount of
bail. 71 The majority opinion is sparse on the evidence it considers for setting
this particular amount. Again, the more prudent course of action would have
been for the Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in
setting the amount of bail.
IX
There are no specific and binding international law provisions that
compel this court to release petitioner given his medical condition. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is
a general declaration 72 to uphold the value and dignity of every person. 73 It
does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on lawful causes nor does
it prohibit the detention of any person accused of crimes. It only implies that
any arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and humane
manner. SaCIDT
The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr . 74 as basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian reasons. 75 However, Government of Hong Kong does not
apply to this case because the issue was on whether bail could apply to
extradition cases. This court stated that because of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, whose principles are now embodied in the Constitution,
bail applies to all instances where an accused is detained pending trial,
including administrative proceedings such as extradition. This court,
however, does not state that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
mandates that bail must be granted in instances where the accused is of
advanced age and frail health.
Petitioner's remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that safeguard his fundamental right to liberty are qualified by the
Constitution. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail
is available to all persons before conviction "except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong[.]" Even Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the same document used by the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong was wary to
grant bail without evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.
For this reason, it remanded the case to the trial court 76 instead of
applying the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
categorically stating that based on these principles alone, the accused was
entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on both the
respect for human dignity and the protection of human rights. These rights
are applicable to those who, during the dark days of Martial Law, were
illegally detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared. There is, of
course, no reason for these rights and the invocation of human dignity not to
be applicable to Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of human rights
is not shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about the
existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms in
our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights does not mean that
the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion
or result that we want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the
Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more conscious and
rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate specific binding human
rights norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic part of our
humanity to fight for it and ensure that it allows all of us to lead the kind of
lives that we will consider meaningful. This applies to petitioner as accused.
Yet it also applies with equal force to all the individuals in our communities
and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our individual and
collective meaningful existence, is put at risk if justice is wanting. Special
privileges may be granted only under clear, transparent, and reasoned
circumstances. Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us who
are elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are those among us who are
powerful and networked enough to enjoy privileges not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled with discomfort
with the consequences of the majority's position. It cannot accept any form
of impunity. cHECAS
X.
Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with the imposable
penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal
Code, the following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum penalty:
(1) Parricide; 77
(2) Murder; 78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention; 79
(4) Robbery with homicide; 80
(5) Robbery with rape; 81
(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries; 82
(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide; 83
(8) Rape; 84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old; 85
(10) Sexual assault; 86 and
(11) Incestuous rape. 87
Under special laws, the following crimes, among others, carry the
maximum penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape; 88
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and purity; 89

(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10 grams or more
of cocaine, 50 grams or more of shabu, 500 grams or more of
marijuana, or 10 grams or more of ecstasy; 90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams of shabu; 91
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of heroin,
cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy; 92
(6) Child prostitution; 93
(7) Child trafficking; 94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use begging as a
means of living; 95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in drug trafficking
or pushing; 96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any illegal activities;
97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious

physical injuries of a child under 12 years old. 98
If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it should be that there
are those accused of murder, trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs,
incestuous rape, rape of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious
illegal detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities all over our
country. We know this because the members of this court encounter them
through cases appealed on a daily basis. Many of them suffer from diseases
that they may have contracted because of the conditions of their jails. But
they and their families cannot afford hospitals better than what government
can provide them. After all, they remain in jail because they may not have
the resources to launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the creativity
of well-networked defense counsel. After all, they may have committed acts
driven by the twin evils of greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the
other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The application of the law to
them is often brute, banal, and canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment
by courts. AHDacC
Our precedents show that when there are far less powerful, less
fortunate, poorer accused, this court has had no difficulty denying a motion
to fix bail or motion to set bail where the crime charged carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we
have had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of Article III, Section 13 of
t h e Constitution. With those who are less fortunate in life, there are no
exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the right, just, and
legal result. In my view, it is not right, just, and legal to grant bail, even for
P1,000,000.00, without clearly articulating why the Sandiganbayan's actions
were arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with law and with
sufficient compassion. It did not gravely abuse its discretion. Thus, this
Petition should be dismissed.
XI
Those that read a decision which does not fully respond to the legal
issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision
is the result of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one powerful
public official at the cost of weakening our legal institutions. If it is pro hac
vice, then it amounts to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket
manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the administration of
justice because the judicial standards are not clear.
Without further clarity, our signal to the various divisions of the
Sandiganbayan hearing these complex and politically laden plunder cases
can be misinterpreted. Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or
favor, the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the demands of
those who have political influence. After all, in their minds, even if they do
what is expected of them, this court may still declare that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed within the
bounds of the Constitution. Our duty is to ensure the realization of the Rule
of Law even in difficult cases. This case does not really present any kind of
legal complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is complex
only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any determination
of whether the evidence of guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous
text of the Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own
opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental rights,
liberties, and obligations should be. It may be that, as citizens, such opinions
are founded on our wealth of knowledge and experience. cAaDHT
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the exact textual
formulation of the fundamental document written and ratified by the
sovereign. This fealty to the text of the Constitution will provide us with a
stable anchor despite the potential political controversies that swirl over the
legal questions that we need to decide. It is also this fealty to the text of the
Constitution that gives this court the legitimacy as the final bastion and the
ultimate sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the Rule of Law, the
court from whom all other courts — like the Sandiganbayan — should find
inspiration and courage, we should apply the law squarely and without fear
or favor. We should have collectively carried the burden of doing justice
properly and denied this Petition.
Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However, mercy and
compassion should never replace justice. There is injustice when we, as the
court of last resort, conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing the
Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous, deliberate, and
conscious analysis of the issues raised by the parties. There is injustice when
we justify the result we want with ambiguous and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us as justices of
this court. It also fails us in our own humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The Motion to Fix Bail
should be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition for bail under Rule
114, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. IDSEAH
Footnotes
*On official leave.
**On sick leave.
***No part.
1. See Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations
of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 78,
Issue 1 (2009), pp. 307-309.
2. Rollo , pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and
concurred in by Associate Justice Samuel R. Martires and Associate Justice
Alex L. Quiroz.
3. Id. at 89-102.
4. Id. at 107-108.
5. Id. at 103-157.
6. Id. at 163-192.
7. Id. at 193-221.
8. Id. at 222-241.
9. Id. at 241.
10. Id. at 242-243.
11. Id. at 244-247.

12. Id. at 249-256.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 84-88.

15. Id. at 89-102.
16. Id. at 16-19.
17. Id. at 526-542.

18. Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
19. Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,
September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623 where the Court said that the
constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt; see also Shima Baradaran, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72 (2011), p. 728.
20. Baradaran, supra note 19, at 736.
21. Id. at 731.
22. Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358 SCRA 564,
572.
23. Leviste v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619,
628.
24. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

25. Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
26. Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra note 19, at
693.
27. Id.
28. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released
on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
29. Section 5, Paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
30. A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.
31. Gacal v. Infante , A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (Formerly A.M. No. I.P.I. No. 03-1831-
RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32. A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.
33. Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279 SCRA 1, 11.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Rollo , pp. 252-253.

36. Id. at 260.
37. Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in People v.
Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a criminal
prosecution for parricide in which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code , appreciated the
concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and consequently
lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion temporal in its
medium period.
38. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr. , G.R.
No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis).
39. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17 , G.R. No. 157977, February
27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.
40. Rollo , pp. 559, 571-576.

41. Id. at 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).
42. Id. at 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
43. Id. at 334-335, 374-375.
44. Id. at 244-247.

45. Id. at 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).
46. 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case against the
petitioner was for treason.
47. Id. at 462.

48. Id. at 465-466.
49. Bravo, Jr. v. Borja , No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, where the
Court observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a
consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but
also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There
would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge would be
just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively
observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the
purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending trial.
50. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006,
484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc. , G.R. No. L-
40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.
51. Angara v. Fedman Development Corporation , G.R. No. 156822, October 18,
2004, 440 SCRA 467, 478; Duero v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 131282,
January 4, 2002, 373 SCRA 11, 17.
LEONEN, J., dissenting:

1.Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.
2. An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7659 (1993).
3. Ponencia, p. 2.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.
10. Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

11. Petition for Certiorari, Annex H.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.
17. Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

18. Id. at 6 and 10.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

21. Id. at 3-5.
22. Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.
23. See Fiscal Gimenez v. Judge Nazareno , 243 Phil. 274, 278 (1988) [Per J.
Gancayco, En Banc].
24. See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.

25. 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
26. Id. at 644.
27. Id.
28. Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons , 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946) [Per J.
Hilado, En Banc].
29. 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per C.J. Moran, En Banc].
30. Id. at 58.

31. 112 Phil. 781, 782-783 (1961) [Per J. Natividad, En Banc].
32. 149 Phil. 241, 247 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
33. 336 Phil. 214 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
34. Id. at 221-227, citing People v. Mayor Sola, et al. , 191 Phil. 21 (1981) [Per C.J.
Fernando, En Banc], People v. Hon. San Diego, etc., et al. , 135 Phil. 514
(1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc], People v. Judge Dacudao , 252 Phil.
507 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division], People v. Calo, Jr. , 264
Phil. 1007 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos , A.M. No. RTJ-
89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v.
Nano, G.R. No. 94639, January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third
Division], Pico v. Combong, Jr. , A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992,
215 SCRA 421 [Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang , A.M. No. RTJ-
89-306, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v.
Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per
J. Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco , A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097,
August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1
[Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052,
October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal v.
Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J.
Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v. Judge Reyes, Jr., etc. , 310 Phil. 176 (1995)
[Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v. Judge Ofilada , 315 Phil. 11
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v. Biteng , 313 Phil. 398 (1995) [Per
J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Velasco , 323 Phil. 724
(1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
35. 344 Phil. 415 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
36. Id. at 430-431.

37. Id., citing Basco v. Judge Rapatalo , 336 Phil. 214, 237 (1997) [Per J. Romero,
Second Division].
38. 448 Phil. 45 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
39. Id. at 48.
40. Id. at 49-50.

41. Id. at 56-57.
42. Id. at 56.
43. 389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

44. Id. at 375 and 388.
45. 486 Phil. 605 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
46. Id. at 611 and 618.

47. 674 Phil. 324 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
48. Id. at 340-341, citing Directo v. Judge Bautista , 400 Phil. 1, 5 (2000) [Per J.
Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores, 389 Phil. 372,
381 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
49. Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.
50. People v. Sandiganbayan , 490 Phil. 105, 116 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
Second Division], citing People v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 144332, June
10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson
Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431
SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Matugas v.
Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc], Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 467 Phil.
541, 553 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite Club
Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission , 380 Phil. 660, 667
(2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
51. Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.
52. Id. at 64.

53. 219 Phil. 432 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].
54. J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.
55. Ponencia, p. 10.

56. The enumeration of diseases on page 12 of the ponencia is based on the
certification of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the purpose of
determining whether hospital arrest can continue. The hearing was not for
the purpose of determining whether bail should be granted on the basis of
his medical condition.
57. Rollo , p. 373.
58. A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per Curiam, En
Banc].
59. Id. at 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v. Gallun, et al.,
109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.

61. Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines are stated
in OCA Circular No. 107-2013.
62. A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), sec. 1 (3).
63. De la Rama v. People's Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria, En Banc].
64. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.
65. Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

67. Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.
68. 536 Phil. 413 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
69. Id. at 428, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro in Non-Bailable Offense ,
419 Phil. 567, 581 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Judge Gako, Jr. ,
401 Phil. 514, 541 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Ernesto
Pineda, THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 193 (2003) which
in turn cited De la Rama v. People's Court , 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J.
Feria, En Banc], Archer's case, 6 Gratt 705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim.
Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela
Entzel, ELDERS, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 233-234
(2000).
71. See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 9, which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued the warrant or
granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering
primarily, but not limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72. In Republic v. Sandigan bayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc], this court stated: "Although the signatories to the Declaration did
not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the
Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State."
73. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 1 states that "[a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights."
74. 550 Phil. 63, 72 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
75. Ponencia, pp. 10-11.
76. See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia,
Jr., 550 Phil. 63, 77 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc]. The
dispositive portion reads: "WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This
case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of 'clear and convincing
evidence.' If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition
proceedings with dispatch."
77. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 246.
78. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 6,
and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
79. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec. 8,
and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.

80. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 294 (1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993), sec.
9.
9.
9.
83. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.

84. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
85. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 266-A (1) (d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997),
sec. 2.
86. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 266-A (2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997),
sec. 2.
87. REV. P EN. CODE, art. 266-B (1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997),
sec. 2.
88. Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
sec. 20 and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), sec. 1.
89. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 5.
90. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 1st par. (3) (4) (5) (7) (8).
91. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).
92. Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 5.
94. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 7.

95. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (1).
96. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (2).
97. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (3).

98. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document. No. "3"
should read as "4."

Enrile V Sandiganbayani

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Enrile V Sandiganbayani

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and

xxx xxx xxx

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second assailed

xxx xxx xxx

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled

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The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with

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Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in

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We have held in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons , that

We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this court's

Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal

• The following illustrative cases decided by the Supreme Court

The points in my letter were raised during the deliberations of August

Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or not

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three

The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-

Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales's report], the Court will

The crime charged in petitioner's case is one where the imposable

The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong Special

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(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious

11. Id. at 244-247.

14. Id. at 84-88.

17. Id. at 526-542.

24. As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.

35. Rollo , pp. 252-253.

40. Rollo , pp. 559, 571-576.

44. Id. at 244-247.

47. Id. at 462.

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

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10. Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

17. Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

20. Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

24. See REV. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 114, sec. 3.

30. Id. at 58.

36. Id. at 430-431.

40. Id. at 49-50.

43. 389 Phil. 372 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].

46. Id. at 611 and 618.

52. Id. at 64.

55. Ponencia, p. 10.

60. Ponencia, p. 14.

66. Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

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83. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 297.

94. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 7.

97. Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), sec. 10 (e) (3).

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