‘by the same anthor P. F. STRAWSON ee INDIVIDUALS An Euay on Ran Gq of Pare Reson ‘An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics suEcr AND R ownon and New YORKFt pled in 99 Repel ee “el (i publ ae ninety Paper 966 Teal cn ne Tere prin 18, 196 “rade te Fe Lane Ld EC UE Pil ce Oy ‘ow 29 e350 ow York NYY 1001 © 19598 & Semen itd in Gras by abel oe True, Wire Alvis re Nop of is bsk may bent Srnec frm enon ncn er man von afr eid, Ud peng nd eon ono formaon "moar neal om wal pra ‘Pom ae Lb Capig eatin Dt "Aewlaps codes bok haat Tomiie rh Libewy ary Cone Calin in Pein De ‘Retaloge esd forth book sate fom the rary Cnge 1s0N onset PREFACE, “This book is based on lectures which were originally given in (Oxford University in 1954-5 and were later used as material fora seminar in Duke University, N. Carolin in 1955-6.1 am grateful forthe help I received in discussion from my colleagues at Duke: sod I wish aso to acknowledge my great indebiedness to Miss ‘Ruby Meager, Professor H. L. A. Hart and Profesor Gilbert Ryle, all of whom read pate or the whole of the book in manu- script and gave me much helpfl and feiendly advice, which I have generally tried t follow. ‘Much of Chapters is a sevised and expanded vession of aa aticle which appeased in Vol. Il of the Mints Stade in the Poilrophy of Sco, edited by Heber Feigl, Michael Seriven and Grover Maxwell and published by the University of Minnesota Press in 3958. Parts of Chapters 5 and 6 are taken, with substantial ‘modifications, from papers which appeared in the Praceings of the “Arista Scety for 1955-4 and 1957. Uhave to thank the editors 4d publishers of these volumes for permission to make ute of this matter agua PRS.‘CONTENTS axrRopucrion De 9 PART I: PARTICULARS 1 The Identcation of Particulars 5 (1) Weide paris in ph Te iia of ome id of petal me ped spn te sie iy of ter ds % 2) rn ch ae sibly prt. " ifein of fairs bc ar no omy re entra trl ren. lon ” 1), The gra ions of pertain. Tht ‘oni ar ste bee ola of pret Soom a wilt fe ipatocenert crac 4s 2. Reideateation ” a) A eon of pring ch come of ov ports 10 ey patna Sep (im abet rideifecion ro 1 Rederiet of plas, as 5+ Basie Particulars {G1 A oma en so thet mati oie coc jetnars fom te pisos of evita 98 Ui). Agente heme fom be nao ifr Cag ef parr © souxos 9 (e) esata of matali a ai pert eg len eh ll rf {a Tac of es chp. § [3]. The maf etry mr Te proof rai Ing the coun of «mn sopiricotnem “ 5f 5 Contents Li] Wy arta ofenconmasasrbed te omtig? ond yt be same tig os oro aracisia? [a] The ania pasion of te pronl bod in perpinl xpress de wat ans te usin. [3] Coron and 'No sone ins. The merece of 1h Newey iw. Lol, Aion ofthe arin of tats of eosin 0 eis byt crib the to ster. The bere of ‘he Cartan sie.” The prints of the emp of @ pes (5). The sige barat of fondant las of prone pres. {GTi centred impute of proites ering ction. Thee of reop mind (o) Diemer PART 11; LOGICAL SUBJECTS Ii) he dion bowen pein a als aly t's wh oy of eg te mand pot ohms ad a 1. The Grammatal Cetron (1 Darin sof te pect bet Deeds rapist ir pbepion i Ou pine erry fig ed hasnt Sie oat, Pala Finer pommel eden ed Piece tonn of the variables of quantifi Ca i of te ie of at LS tat tof ed cnr iy) Plc peo ites de et she ae iT oe bia peo i pe alditincontngh iro Samant eter tear i ero (1th puna pa apie bt hate pete 9 nie ico ‘ou ial cle 8 pee! oie 6 " o * 9 49 an 1 Contents “The Category Criterion (8) Cheractrcing,intantil nd trie tft lent ney in barter ond winrtlfr a ale (bel in sero. 9) A sew rerio fr ajc ad pray bated onthe (formes bwer farinlrt ad arial at rnp of ‘lation of terms i arrtone. Theme eto usa? ‘he traditional easton ben thet tin, ‘Tensions and Afiites between these Criteria 6) Hen he prammain open of bets pr matin deanna a i tepals pti pe Cy Pema pte pe 6. susjecr AND pReDicaTH (2): LooreaL suajecrs ‘AND PAREICULAR OnjeeTs . The Introduction of Peticularsiato Propositions [i]. The ination of partner in props re felon ferent te eb rt TS] Affinity bree he grammatical and cate rtria Jor st and predstcespresons in part explained by @ ‘mediating dntion boven “opin edie sei? Onc th fname sition beer te ee Probate and pariorsnivril dina ih iia ‘eid, ther extension of thf dination may bos (pled by eli e {3] "Footer explosions of hides of romps: the he ppp of eco tre porte ) Consideration and rejection of simplified form of the Ua Ge ition of a simplified form of ‘The Introduction of Particulars into Discourse i]. Con se aboe ast of te condos of intodcing ort int propaston be rpplnanted with on itor then of ecg arteadarr ite icri? Tht ‘omdtins of resi ny rab temp 7 167 6 16 190 98 98Contents. PIaullgse pr ANGE Spat tt et fe tcalars and the : Bataan ti to date ee ear es A a aay inp Oy earners Teh rp lin a Oc ot oe fe ei, rer eer olor (3) Thee fmf te min ie. Qt ti, raat eed propio. a4 a7 236 a6 we ae 39 246 ar INTRODUCTION “Metaphysics has been often sevisionary, and less often deseip- tive, Desctiptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary meta- physics is concerned to produce a better stricture. The produc- tions of revsionary metaphysics remain permanently interesting, and not only as key episodes inthe history of though. Beeause oftheir articulation, and the inteasity of their partial vision, the best of them ate both intrinsically admieable and of ending philosophical uty. But this lat merit can be asexibed to them ‘aly because there is another kind of metaphysics which needs a0 justification at all beyond that of inguiy in general. Revisionary ‘metaphysics isa the service of descriptive metaphysis. Pechaps ‘no actual metaphysician has ever been, both in intention and eect, wholly the one thing or the other, But we can distinguish ‘broadly: Descartes, Leibni, Beskeley are sevisionary, Aristotle sand Kant descriptive. Hume, the izonist of philosophy, is more difficult to place. He appeats now under one aspect, aow under another, ‘The idea of descriptive metphysics is lable to be met with scepticism. How should i difer fom what i called philosophical, ot logical, oF conceptual analysis? Ie does not difer in kind of intention, ut only in scope and generality. Aiming to lay bare the most general features of ous concepeal structure, it ca take far less for granted than a more limited and paral conceptual Inquiry. Hene, also, a ceraiadiference ia method. Up toa point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way ia philosophy. But the lisriminations we can make, andthe consexions we ean establish, 9Introduction in this way, ae not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the fll metaphysical demand for understanding. For when we ask how we use this or chat expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, ae apt to assume, snd not 19 expose, those general elements of structure which the metaphys- Clan wants cevealed. The strcture he seks does not readily dix play ite on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He ‘must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him a fr a8 he wishes 0 go. “The idea ofa descriptive metaphysics might be assailed from another direction. For it might be held that metaphysics was ‘essentially an instrument of conceptual change, a means of furthering or registering new ditections or styles of thought. Certainly concepts do change, and aot only, though manly, on the specialist periphery; and even specialist changes react on ordinary thinking. Certsnly, too, metaphysics has been largely ‘concerned with euch changes, in both the suggested ways. But it would be a great blunder to think of metaphysics only inthis historia style, Por there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history—or none recorded in histories of thought; there aze categories and concepts which, in thee most fandamental character, change not at all. Obviously these are fot the specialities of the most refined thinking. They are the ‘commonplaces ofthe leet refined thinking; and are yet the indie ppensable core of the conceptual equipment ofthe most sophist- fated human beings. Ite with these, their interconnexions, and the strucrre that they form, thata descriptive metaphysis will be primarily concerned ‘Metaphysics has a loag and distinguished history, and it i ‘consequently unlikely chat there ae any new truths to be dis ‘covered in descriptive metaphysics. But this does not mean that the task of descriptive metaphysics hasbeen, or canbe, done once for all It has constantly to be done over again. If there are no fnew truths to be discovered, there are old truths to be redis- covered. For though the central subjecematter of descriptive ‘metaphysics does not change, the critical and analytical idiom of philosophy changes constantly. Permanent relationships are Intrdecton described in an impermanent idiom, which reflects both the ages Climate of thought and the individual philosopher's personal style of thinking. No philosopher understands his predecesrors until bbe has ee-hough their thoughe in his own contemporary terms; and iis characteristic of the very greater philosophers, like Kant and Aristotle, that they, more chan any others, epay this effort of rethinking ‘This book is in pat, and in a modest way, an esay in desrip- tive metaphysis. Only ina modest way —for though some of the themes discussed are sufficiently general, the discussion is under- taken from a certain limited viewpoiat and is by ao means eom- prehensive; and only in part—for some of the logieal and lin- [Buisticclasfcations around which discussion turns in the second part may well be of relatively loal and temporary significance. ‘On my method of testment of these cisications I may make ‘now one general comment. It is often admitted, in the analytical, tucatment of rome fly specific concep, thatthe wish to undee stand is les likely to be served by the Search for a single strict statement of the necesary and suficient conditions of its appli tion than by seing its applictions—in Wittgensei’ssimile—as Fouming a family, the members of which may, pechaps, be geouped around a central paradigm case and linked with the later by vatious direc or indirect links of logical connexion and analogy “This principle of tolerince in understanding can, ¥ thik, be as usefully invoked inthe attempt to understand general logical and grammatical structures as in that analysis of specie concepts ‘hich i undertaken in, «ay, the philosophy of perception or the philosophy of mind It seemed to me natural t divide the book into two pars. The Gest past sims at establishing the central position which materia bodies and persons occupy among particslas in general It shows that, in our conceptual scheme ai is, particulars of these two categories are the basic or fundamental partiulss, that the con- cepts of other types of pariculae must be seen as secondary in elation to the concepts ofthese. Ta the secoad par ofthe book the sim isto establish and explain the connexion between the ideaIntroduetion of a particular in general and that of an object of reference ot logical subject. The link berweea these two notions and, with it, the explanation of the status of the particular a6 the paradigra logieal subject is found in 2 eersi idea of ‘completeness’ which is expounded in the fest half of the second chapter of this part. ‘This is the crucial passage ofthe second part ofthe book. The ew parts ofthe book ate aot, however, independent of each other. ‘Theses of the Grstpaetareat many poins presupposed and at some points extended and farther explained, by arguments of the second par. I doube if is posible for ws fully to understand the rain topics of either part without consideration of the main topies ofthe other. PART ONE PARTICULARSBODIES [1] We think ofthe wosld as containing particlar things some of which are independent of ourselves; we thal ofthe woeld’s Istory as made up of particular episodes ia which we may ot may not havea pat; and we think of these particalae things and eveats ss included in the topes of our common discourse, as things about ‘which we can talk to each other. These ace remarks about the way wwe think of the world, about our conceptual scheme. A more recognizably philorophical, though ao clearer, way of expressing them would be to tay that oi ontology comprises objective particulars. It may comprise much elie besides. ‘Pat of my sim eto exhibit some general and structural featores ‘of the conceptual scheme in term of which we think about par- ticular things I shal speak, to begin with, ofthe identification of particulars. I shall not, at che moment, ry to give a general ex- planation of my use of che word ‘identify’ and asocited words, fof of my use of the word ‘particular’. This Iter word ceranly has familias core, o central area, of philosophical use, even if the outer boundaries of ie application are vague. SoallT need say forthe moment is that my ate of ii in no way eccentric. Fos n= stance, in mine, as in most familiae philosophical utes, historical occurrences, matesal objects, people and their shadows ae all particulars; wheceas qualities nd properties, numbers and species fate not. As forthe words ‘dena’, “identifeation’, &c, these 1 shall use ina numberof diferent, but closely connected, ways and T shal try to explain each ofthese uses a5 ¥ introduce it. “The application of the phrase “dentifcation of particulars’ ‘which I shall frst be concerned with is this. Very often, when two 6Partiouars people are talking, one of them, the speaker, refers to or mentions some particular of other. Very often, the other, the hearer, knows what, or which, particular the speaker i talking about; but some- times he doesnot. I shall express this alternative by saying thatthe hearer either is, ori not, able to identify the pariculae referred t0 by the speaker. Among the kinds of expressions which we, a8 speakers, use to make references to particlats ae some of which standard function is, in the ciecumstances of their we, to enable 1 hearer to identify the particule which is being referred to. Expressions ofthese kinds include some proper names, ome pro- nouns, some descriptive phates beginning with the definite ail, and expressions compounded of there. When a speaker ses such an expression to eefer to a particular, I shall say that he sakes an ieifying reference to a particles It does not follow, of ‘courte, ftom the fact that a speaker, on a given accasion, makes an identifying reference to a particule, tht is hearer does in fact identify hae particular. I may mention someone to you by name, land you may not know who iti. But when a speaker makes an identifying reference ta partiala, and his hearer does, oa the strength oft identify the pasicalar referred t, thea, I shall say, the speaker not only makes an identifying reference t, but also ‘dais, that paniclas. So we have 2 hearers sense, anda speaker's sense, of “identify Te isnot merely 2 happy accident that we ate often able, as speakers and hearts, wo identify the particulars which eater into ‘our discourse. That it shouldbe possible to identity pastculas of a given type seems a necesary coadition of the inclusion of that ‘ype in our ontology. For what could we mesa by claiming to acknowledge the existence of a class of particular things and to talk to each other about members of thie clas, i we qualded the claim by adding that it was in principle impossible for any one of us to make any other of us understand which member, o¢ men bers, ofthis class he was at any time talking about? The qualifies tion would seem to stulify the claim. This reflexion may ead t0 another. I often enough happens thatthe identification of a par. ticular of one kind is made to depend on the identification of another particular of another kind, Thus speaker may, in re 6 Bodies ferting to 4 certain particular, speak ofa He thing of certain general kind which uniquely stands in a certs specified relation toanother particular, He may, for example, fer toa house a ‘the house that Jack built’ or to a man as “the asasin of Abeabam Lincola’. Ja such cases, the hearer’ identification of the frst particular depends on his identification of the second. He knows ‘what particular is teferre to by the identifying phrase as whole because he knows what particular is referred to by a part of it “The fact thatthe identification of one paticula often depends in this way on the identiiation of another is aot very sigafcant ia itself. But it suggests the possibility that the idemtifabilty of particulars of some sors may bein some gral way dependent on the identifiability of particulars of othee Sorts. If eis were 80, the fact would have some significance for an inguiy into the general steutute of the conceptual scheme ia tems of which we think bout particulass. Suppose, for instance, it should tara out that there is type of particulars, such that particulars of type ‘cannot be identified without reference to particulars of another type, whereas particulars of type a can be identified without reference to particulars of type P. Then it would be a general characteristic of our scheme, that the ability to lk about £- particulars a all was dependent on the ability to talk about o- particulars, but not vice vers. This fact could reasonably be expressed by saying that in our scheme a-particolars were onto- logically prior to fepartcalars, or were more fundamental oF ‘more basic than they. I seems, perhaps, unlikely that dependence, in respect of member-identifubility, of one type of particulass on nother, should take the diect and simple form I have just sug- gested, unlikely, that, that it should be generally imposible to make identifying references to particulars of the relatively de- pendent type without mentioning particulars of the relatively Independent ype, But there may be other and less direc ways in ‘which the identifiability of one type of pariculat is dependent ‘on that of another. [+] What ae the tests for hearer’sidentifeation? When shall we say that a hearer koows what particular is being referred to by @ "7Particulars speaker? Consider fst the following ase. A speaker tells a story which he elaims to be factual Ie begins: ‘A man and a boy were standing by a fountain’ and it continoes: “The man had a dink Shall we say thatthe heacer knows which or what particular is being referred toby the eubjec-expestion in the second sentence? ‘We might say #0, For, of certain range of two particular, the words ‘the maa! serve to distinguish the one being seferred to, ‘by means ofa description which applies only to him. But though ‘this ina weak sense, a case of identification, I sal all it only wry rilaite, or, for shor, a rato identiation. For itis idnti- fication only relative to & range of particulars (a range of two members) which is itself identiied only asthe range of parsculas being taleed about by the speaker. That isto #4, the hearer, hearing the second sentence, knows sich particular creature is being refered to of te tu particular ereaaes bing talked about by ‘Be speaker; bathe does not, without this qualifeation, know what particular creature is being refered to, The identification is Within a certain story tld by a certain speaker. Ie is identifation within his story; but noe identifcation withia history. ‘We need a requirement stringent enough to eliminate eelatve , ‘enication. The hearer, inthe example is able to place the par ‘cular referred to within the piture painted by the speaker. This ‘metre thatin a sense he can place the pacicula in his own general picture of the world. For he can place the speaker, aod hence the speakee’spitute, in that general picture of his owa. But he canaot place the figures, without the fame, ofthe speakers picture i his ‘own general picture of the word, For this reason the fll quire: ‘ment for hearers idensiScaton is not sais. ‘A suficient, but not necessary, condition of the fall require: sment’s being satsied isto state it loosely at first—that the hearer can pick out by sight or hearing or touch, of can otherwise sensibly discriminate, the particular being refered to, knowing. thatieis that particular. Ths condition I shall slighty liberalize to cover certian cates where one cannot atthe very moment of reference sensibly discriminate the particulae being referred to— ‘owing, for example, to its having ceased or disappeared-—but ‘ould do s0 a moment before. Such cases will be among those in 6 Bade ‘which ‘that’ is a more appropriate demonstrative than ‘this; a8 ‘when one says “That cat was going very fas or "That noe was ‘eafening’. In general, then, this suiclent condition is satisfied “only inthe cate of particulars which one can perceive now, or at Teast could perceive a moment ago. It is obvious that there are many eases of identification falling wader this condition. An ex preston is used which, given the setting and accompaniments of fts use, can propel, of at least naturally, be taken s then used, t0 apply only to a certain single member of the range of particulars ‘which the heare is abe, of moment before was able, sensibly to isesiminste, and to nothing outside that range. Case of this kind ate the cates, par exec, fo the use of demonsteatives, whether helped out by descriptive words or not; though, of cours, the tse of demonstatives is not confined to cases of this kind, and expressions of other kinds may also be used in these cases I shall sy, when this frst condition for identification is satsied, that the hearer sable directly nee the paticla zefered to. We may also speak of these cases a5 cases ofthe demonsratieideifaton of partcolars, Ie is obvious that not all cases of identification of particulars are cases of demonstrative identieation in the sense which T have just given to this phrase. In this fact ies the ground of an old ‘worry, which is both practically and theoretically basles. The reasons for its pritical and its cheoreticalbuselessness ae in the cad the same, The natute ofthis worry and che reasons for is baselesness must now be made plan Demonstrative identification of a particular is not always an ‘easy matter. The scene may be bluered, is elements confused. Different sections ofthe scene may he very like eachother, and so may the items tobe discriminated andi is easy to make mistakes in applying such descriptions as ‘the twelfth man from the left in the fifteenth row from the top’. Nevertheless one thing atleast s clear in demonstrative identification: vi. the ideniy of the ange fof particulars, of the sector of the universe, within which the Identification isto be made I is just the entice scene, the entre range of partculas now sensibly presen. (Ie may be sid that ts limits may be diferent for epeaker and heater. I leave the reader 9Particular to solve any problems srsed by this fact) There can be no quet- tion 25 to whic ene we are talking about, though there may be question enough 45 to which part of, which element in which part of it, and s0 on. These are questions which we have the linguistic means of eetling. ‘Bat now consider the cases where demonstrative identification, inthe sense Ihave given to this phrat, is not possible, because the particular to be identifed is not within the range of those sensibly present. What linguistic means of identification have we available? We can use descriptions or names of both. But itis 20 ‘good using 2 name for a particular unless one knows who of ‘what is referred to by the use ofthe name. A name is worthless ‘without a backing of descriptions which ean be produced on demand to explain its application. So, it may seem, in the n0n- demonstmtive identification of particulars, we depend ultimately ‘on description in general tems alone. Now one may be very wel, informed about paricuae sector ofthe universe, One may kaow ‘beyond any doubr that there is ony one particular thing or person in that sector which answers to 4 certain general description, But this, ic might be argued, does not guarantee thatthe descrip tion apples uniquely. For there might be another particular, answering tthe same description, in another sector of the ui verse. Even if one enlarges che description so that it incorporates description ofthe salient features ofthe sector of the universe concerned, one stil lacks a guarantee that the destiption in- dividuates. For the other secor might reproduce these features too, However much one adds to the description of the sector one ‘knows about—its internal detail and its exteral relationt—thie ‘possibilty of massive reduplication remains open. No extension of one’s knowledge of the world ean eliminate this possibilty, So, however extensive the speaker's knowledge and however ‘extensive the hearers, neither can know thatthe Former’sidenti- fying description infact applies uniquely. ‘To this argament it may be replied that iti aot necessary to know thatthe identifying descripion applies uniquely. Al that is necessary, in order for identification to be secured, is thatthe Ihearer should come to know, on the strength of the speaker's Badies ‘words, what, oF which, particular the speaker is in fact eeferring to, Now for speaker to use the words of a description with a certain reference, and fora hearer to understand them as making 2 ceria refetence—whether or not the intended reference and the understood seferece are in fact the same—itis at least re= _quted that each should know of «particular which the description fie, (Or the heatee may at that instant lear, from the speaker's ‘words, of sucha particular) But each may know of only ane such particular; and each may have conclusive reason to suppose that the other knows of only one such particular, and thatthe par- ticulae the other knows of is the same asthe particular he himself knows of. Or, even if this condition isnot satisfied in fll, each ‘ay sill have conclusive reasons for thinking that the particular ‘which one is refering isthe same asthe particular which the other take im tobe refeting to. ‘Thie reply is adequate to show the practical baseessness of doubts about the poribilty of aon-demoasteative identication, ‘where such doubts have their ground in che foregoing argument. But the seply concedes too much and explains too litle. Ie does ‘ot expla the possiblity of our having the conclusive reasons we ‘may have. Ie yeldeno clues to the general structure of out think- ing about identification, Ie is beter, if we can, to meet the arga- ‘ment on is own theoretical terms; for by doing so we may earn something of that general structure "To meet the argument on its ows teems, it is suficient to show how the siteition of nondemoasteative identication may be linked with the stwation of demonstrative identification. The argument supposes that where the particular to be identied tannot be dicetly located, its identification must rest ultimately ‘on description in purely general terms. But this supposition is false, For even though the particular in question canaot itself be demonstratively ideatifed, it may be identified by 2 desrip- tion which relates it uniquely to another paticule which can be demonstratively identified. ‘The question, what secor of the universe it occupies, may be answered by relating. that sector uniquely to the sector which speaker and hearer them- selves curtently occupy. Whatever the possibilities of massiveParticulars reduplication in the universe, these possibilities create, From the point of view of identification, no theoretical diticulies which ‘cannot theoretically be overcome inthis way. Now we can see why the previous reply conceded to0 much Ik conceded, in the face of the argument feom the possibility of| teduplicaton, that, where non-demonstatve idenifeation was Jn gvestion, we could never be sure that an identifying description in fact applied voiquely; and then claimed chat this did 2ot matter, in view of other things we could be sure of. The reply ddd not say exactly what these other things might be. But now, in seeing what they might be, we sce also that the argument from the possibilty of reduplication bar n0 force at all to show ‘that we cannot be suse thit an identifying description in fact applies uniquely. For non-demonstative identification may rest securely wpon demonstrative idendifcation. All identifying de scription of particulars may include, ulimately, a demonstetive clement. “The soltion ruses a further question. I i plausible co suppose unless indeed we ae o fll back oa relative identification —that fof every particular we may refer t0 there is some description ‘uniquely relating ito the patcipans in, or the immediate seting ‘of, the conversation in which the seference is made? The par ticulars we fer to are so very diverse. Can we plausibly claim that there is single system of relations in which each has apace, and ‘which includes whatever particulars are dizeetly locatable? To this question the reply, very genenl at fist, may run as follows. For all particulars in space and time, itis not only plausible to claim, i is necessary to admit that there is just such a system: the system of spatial and temporal relations, in which every pae- ticular i uniquely related to every other. The universe might be _epeitive in various ways. But this fat is no obstacle ia principle to supplying descriptions of the kind required. For by demon- tative identification we ean determine a common refetece point sand common axes of spatial direction; and with these at ous di posal we have also the theoretical possibility of a description of ‘very other paticslar in space and time as uniquely seated to our reference point. Pethaps not all pariclass are in both time and Bodies space. But it is at lest plausible to assume that every patiular ‘hich nf, uniquely related in some other way to one which [b1 This is « theoretical solution toa theoretical problem. We do notin fact regard ourselves as faced with the possiblity of ‘massive reduplications of patterns of things and events. Neverthe less, the fact thatthe theoretical solution is available, is 2 very important fact about our eoaceptual scheme. I shows something of the seractore of that scheme; and it has a connexion with out practical requizements in identification. “The connexion may not be obvious. Ie scems that che general requirements of heareridentifcation could be regarded as fal filled if the hearer knew thatthe particular being refereed to was ideatcal with some particular about which he knew some ir dividuating fact, of facts, other than the fact that it was the paricular being referred t0. To know an individuating fat about 4 patiola is to know that such-and-such a thing is true ofthat particular and of ao other particular whatever. One who could inake all his knowledge articulate would satisfy ths condition for panticularidentifcation only if he could give a description which applied uniquely to the particular in question and could non- ‘autologically add thatthe particular to which this description applied wis the same at che parcular being currently referred to; but we need not init thatthe silty to make one's know ledge articulate ia just this way isa condition of really knowing ‘who, or what, a speakeris referring to. This, then, isthe general condition for heater identification inthe non-demonstatve ease; tad its obvious tha, if a geauine reference is being made, the speaker, too, mutt satisfy «similar condition. To rule ost merely ‘story-clative identification, we must add aforther requirement: ‘iz, thatthe known individaatng fact must not be such that is statement essentially involves identifying the particularin question by reference to someone's discourse about it, or about any other particular by reference to which itis identi "Now how are these conditions satsfed in practice? We may note, to begin with, that they would be amply satisfied by anyone ‘who could give such descriptions as would alleviate the theoretical 8Partcnars anxieties discussed in section [2]. The conditions just laid down are formally les exacting than those anxieties: whatever would allay the later in a particular ease would alto meet the former. But we ‘an conclude nothing decisive from this; it was admited that ‘those anxieties were, in practice, unreal, So the connexion berween ‘our theoretical solution and the stifiction of our practical ‘requirements ie sill not obvious. Temight seem, indeed, remote Surely we do not know, or need to know, of every particular we refer to of understand anothers reference to, an individvating fact which eclates it uniquely to the present situation of reference, to objects or people which figure in that sitvaton? Bue we must consider whether this sog- _gestion is really as absurd asi sounds. OF course we do not often, in practice, expliily relate the particulars of which we speak 1 ‘ourselves or 10 other items inthe present situation of reference. ‘But this fact may show no more than a justifed confidence that there is no aced for such explicit indications; since the cizcum- stances of a conversation, the participants’ knowledge of each ‘other's background, are in general such that a lot may be taken for granted. Again we may sometimes be content with ‘story- relative’ identifications, not caring for anything more, not wishing, atleast at the moment, to fit the spoken-of particulars directly into the framework of our knowledge of the world and its istry ‘Yet it cannot be denied that each of ws is, at any momen, in posession of sucha famework—a unified framework of know ledge of particulars, in which we ovrsclves and, usually, ovr immediate surroundings have their place, and of which each clement i uniquely related to every other and hence to ourselves and our surroundings. It cannot be dened tat tis framework of knowledge supplies « uniquely efficient means of adding identi- fied particulars to our stock. This framework we use for this purpose: not just occasionally and advenitiouly, but always and ‘essentially. Teis a necessary truth that any new patiular of which ‘we learn is somehow identifyingly connected with the framework, even if only though the oceasion and method of our leaaing of it Even when the identifaton is ‘story-elative’, the connexion 4 Bodies ‘withthe Framework remains, through the identity ofthe story- teller. When we become sophisticated, we systematize the fame: ‘work with calendars, maps, co-ordinate systems; bat the use of such systems turns, fundamentally, on our knowing our own, place in them; though a man can lose his place, and have tobe told it, Such systems, developed or embryonic, help us to exeape from story-telatve identification to fll identification, Of eourse, noth- ing ia what I say has the consequence that a maa is unable t0 identify a particular unless he ean give precse spatiotemporal locations for it. This s by no means sequived. Any fact uniquely ‘eating the particular to other, identified elements inthe feeme- ‘work wll serve as an individuating fact. A description, itselfia no ‘way locating, may be known to individuate withira vey extensive spatiosemporal range of particulars; all that is then required is ‘that that range should itself be located ia the framework at lege. But why, it may be asked, acord any pre-eminence to zpato- ‘enporal relations to common point of reference? Are there not ‘other kids of elation enough which will erve the same purpote? ‘All that is formally required isa kind of eelation such that, given ‘an aleady idenied object, O, i is posible for us to know that there is, infact, only one thing answering to acertan description which is related by that relation to O. Does aot almost any rla- tion which one thing may have to another thing satisfy this not ‘very exacting requirement? Indeed, some relations carry a guacin- tee that there is oa one such thing. Thus, though we may indeed know, peshaps by being told that therein fact only one bridge across a certain strech of river, we know without being told that there cannot be more than one man who ie a certain man’s paternal grandfather, ‘To this it may be replied tha the system of spatiotemporal rela- tions has a peculiar comprehensiveness and pervasiveness, which ‘qualify ic uniquely to serve a the framework within which we can organize out individusting thought about particular. Every partcula ether has its place in this eprtem, or is of a kind the members of which eanaot in general be identified excep by eefe- cence to paniclars of othe kinds which have thie place init; and every particular which has its place in the system has a unique 3Particulars place there. There is no other system of relations between par- Wicalas of which ll hiss true, Indeed any antithesis betweea this and other systems of relations between particulars would be a false anthesis. Though we may freely depend on heterogeneous ‘lations in framing identifying descriptions, che system of spato- temporal relations remains the groundwork of thee additions; most other relations between parcslare incorporate spat temporal elements, involve or are symbolized by spatio-temporal transactions, the relative movements of bodies. A general doubt may remain. The formal conditions of ident- fication are satisfied fan individuating faces known aboot the pat ticular concerned. But why should such an individuating fact be such ato relate the particular concerned in any way to other items in that unified framework of knowledge of particulars of which cach of us has part in is possesion? Descriptions can be famed ‘which begin with phrases ike ‘the only..." ofthe fret. and thus proclaim a it were, the uniqueness of thee application. Let vs call chem ‘logically individuating descriptions’. No doubt, ia {geceral, logically individaating desriptions will lso incorporate proper names of persons, of placenames, or dates, snd thereby selate the particulars they apply to to other items inthe unified ffamework of knowledge of particulars; or, if they contain none of these, they will in general incorporate demonstrative indica- tions, of will ely in some way on the setting of their use to asst in determining theis reference. But we can also fre logically indviduating descriptions which ae altogether feee fem such featases. Let us eall these ‘pure indviduating descriptions, “The frst boy inthe class not a pute indviduating desctption, fort depends oa the context ofits se to determine ite application. "The fst dog co be born in England in the nineteenth century’ is ‘20t a pure individuating description, for it contains a date and a place-tame. But ‘the frst dog to be born asa’ a pute individ sting description; s0 is “the only dog to be born at sea which subsequently saved a monarch’s lif’ Besides pate individvating escriptions we may recognize a cats of quasi-pateindividuating escrptions, which depend on the setting of thee utterance to fying the « itis of, yet lt would not ia general be posible to identify Be unless it weee in general possible to identify 25. For we could not speak of a we do speak of them, or have the concept wwe do have of fis, unles we spoke of 9s; and we could not speak of s unless it wer in principle possible wo identify ana. So, ina senerl sense, Bs show identifiablty-dependence on as. ‘But now the amended angument seems to prove too much. For if we say tha baving the concept we do have of a bisth entails Inaving the concept we do have ofan animal, oa the ground that ‘This a birt entails Tore ire ena of which hi he hrt, we must it seems, also say that having the concept we do have of aa animal entails having the concept we do have ofa births for Tae i an arial nails Tere some birth bch iste birt ofthis animal. ‘Whence, by parity of resoning, the argument shows a mutual deniialty-dependence berween beths and animals. And so the argument is useless to us. For we ae interested only in non-sym- ‘metscal relations of dependence. "Neveitheler, I think the amended argument can be restated s0 18 to avoid this consequence. For there is afer alla cern asym- etry in the relations berween the concept ofan animal and the concept of a birth Ii tue that TAi iran animal entails There is ‘me birth bib i the bird of ti. Bur this etalment adits ofthe following paraphrase: Ti ir av axa etals This war bon. Now ‘while it may seem reacoable to maintain that our concept of an snimal would be diferent if we could aot express the entailment in the second form, italso sem reasonable ro deny that our concept nParticles ‘of an animal would be diferent if we merely lcked means of ‘expressing the enalment in its fst form, In other words, it can ‘reasonably be maintained that in order to speak of animals with the sense which cis word in fact has for us, we must find place in our discourse for the concept beng brn; bu there is no reason, to conclude from the fac that we speak of animals with the sense this word has for us, that we mast aio find a place in our dit course forthe idea ofa certain range of particular, vz. births, Whether we alio do this or not is ivnaxt to out having the ‘concept of an animal that we do have. Here there is real atym- ‘metry. For there is no corresponding paraphrase of the eatail- ment fom This airtbvo Theres on animal of wich hic ithe ith ‘Wecan pacaphrate one eatailment sos to eliminate what logicians sight call quantification over births; but we cannot paraphrase the ‘other so as to eliminate quantifcation over animale nother words, the admission into our discourse of the range of particular, birts, conceived of as we conceive of them, dacs require the audmisson ino ous discourse ofthe range of particular, enimal Dut the admission into our ditcoure ofthe range of particular, animal, conceived of ss we conceive of them, does not require the admission into out discourie of the range of particulars, irk, As finally amended, the argument, think, is sound. A large ass of particular states and conditions, events and procestes, ace conceived of as necessarily states and conditions of, of at pet formed or sufered by, particulars of other types, notably things ‘which are or have material bodies. The argument establishes general and one-way identifiability dependence of the former sate the relations of identfability-dependence berween the avall- able major categories, the categories we actualy possess; and the ‘category of proces: things is one we neither have nor need. We do infact distinguish between a thing and is history othe phases of| its history; we cannot appropriately speak of one in the ways spproprate to the ther; and we do not speak of ether in ways appropriate to the category of procestthings. Granted the dis tinction we do deaw, chere is at we have already seen, « general identifiabiiy-dependence of processes which things undergo upon the things which undergo them, and not vice vers. This is par, though aot only, because, granted that distinction, its the things themseves, and not the processes they undergo, which fate the primary scapir oF space, the possessors not only of spatial postion, but of spatial dimension. IF one tried to give the Spatial dimensions of such a proces, say a death or a bate, one could only trace the outline of the dying man or indicate the extent ofthe grand the batle was fought oves. "A more tentative, yet more serous, objection might be ad- ‘vanced. We begun by considering a cerain typeof speech-situx tion, that in which identifying references to particulars were made and understood. We were t0 consider the conditions of succesefal identification in this kind of situation. Yee it is far from obvious how the very general and theoretical considerations advanced in the course of thee arguments bear upon oF reflect four actual speech-procedures, and correspondingly far from ‘obvious in what sene, fin any, ithas relly been established that ‘material bodies and things possessing them enjoy a primacy from the point of view of identification, “This objection must, ia a sense, be allowed to stand. Te would bbe tatk of enormous complesty to show exactly how these general considerations are related to our actual procedures in 7Particulars learning and specch fwe aterptedit, we should lose the general. ity in the deal. Buta point may be made in mitigation of the refusal to attempt it Clearly we do no, in ordinary conversation, make explicit the referential frameworks we employ. We do indeed often use demonstrative i reference to things in ove immediate surroundings. But when out talk tanscends them, we do not claborutely sclate the things we speak of to the things we set. ‘The place of che explice relational framework is taken in pat by that linguistic device which has so often and eo justly absorbed the anention of logicians—the proper name, Demonstratives of quasi-demonsteatives apart, its proper namee which tend tobe the resting: places of reference to particular, the points on which the descripuve phases pivot. Now, smong pariculats, the bests par excallace of proper names are persons snd places. Ite a con- cxptual truth, a5 we have seen, that places are defined by the relations of mateil bodies; and it ie also a conceptual truth, of which we shall see the significance more fully hereafter, that persons have material bodes 8 SOUNDS {1] Claiming «special staas for one class or category of entities 15 opposed to others is very common in philosophy. Ie i the philosophical phenomenon of category-preference. 1 have been exhibiting category-preference in claiming that materia bodies are, in a cern sense, basic in relation to other eategores of particulars, Bu I should like to emphasize the point that there are ‘certain ways ia which category-preference may be exhibited, in ‘which Tam not exhibiting i. Suppose as are the favoured type of entity. Then sometimes preferences manifested by the declaration that the word ‘exist hae a primary cense or meaning, and that ‘only as exist in this snse, othe things only ina secondaey sense; rometimes by the declatstion that only as ate rel; and sometimes by the declaration that other things are reducible to a, that to talk about other things is an abbreviated way of talking about as. want to emphasize that in saying that material bodies are basic among particulars, atleast in our conceptual scheme ats, Tam fot saying any of thew things. The meaning given to the term "basi is serely i tem of partcular-identfeation. On the other hand, I believe thatthe facts Thave tried to indicate may underlie and explain, if not unt, some ofthe more striking formulations, hich disavow, ofthe eategory-peference which acknowledge ‘eseems to me also unobjectionable to use the expression, ‘onto- logically prior’ in such a way thatthe claim that material bodes are basic particulars in our conceptual scheme is equivalent tthe claim that material bodies ae ontologcally prior, in that scheme, to other types of particule. ‘These things, Ihave maintained, are tue of our conceptual scheme a5 itis. The next thing I want co consider is whether, and 9Partioulars if so how, it could be otherwise. Could there exist a conceptual fcheme which warlike our in that it provided for a system of objective and identifiable particulars, but was alike ours in that material bodies were not the basic particulars of the system? ‘When Tsay, ‘Could there exis sucha scheme?” I mean ‘Can we ‘make intelligible to ourselves the idea of such a scheme?" Thave spoken of two sdes, or aspects, of identification. They sight be called the distinguishing aspece and the reidentifying ‘spect. The second has aot, ia the preceding exposition, been at all closely tied to a speech-siuation involving a speaker and a ‘heme. Reidentifcation may involve merely thinking of a partico- lar encountered on one occasion of thought of in respect of one cceasioa, a che same at a particular encountered on another, oF ought of in respect of another. Now such thinking cleaely Jnvolves distinguishing, in thought or observation, one paticulat from others, So the distinguishing aspect of identification is quite fondarsental, But so far in the exposition the idea of dis- tinguishing one particular from others has been closely tied t0 ‘the situation in which 2 hearer idenies a particular as the one currently referred toby a speaker. This te I want aow to loosen, ‘while preserving the conclusion that material bodies are, in our actual conceptual scheme, basic to ous thinking about particular: identication. I may legitimately do so; for itis not tobe upposed that che general structure of such thinking is different when we are concerned to communicate with each otherin speech and when ‘we ae not, The assertion that material bodies are basic particulars in our actual conceptual scheme, thea, is now tobe understood as the assertion chat, a things ae, identifying ehugh about particu lars other than material bodies rests in general on identifying ‘howgh about material bodes, but not vice versa; and the question have just mised, viz. ‘Could we conceive of a scheme providing for identifiable particulars in which material bodies were not bisie?, must be understood in a corespondingly revised and. ‘more general sense. Ths loosening ofthe te with actual speech: situations gives moze freedom of mancuvre in the next stage of the inquiry, without prejudicing the possiblity that the con- ‘exion may ultimately have to be tightened up agein, 6 Sounds Te gives mote freedom of mancvre inthe following way. So Tong as “idetifenton’ means ‘speaker-heacer identification’ any {goestion about the general conditions of + scheme providing for ‘dentifiuble particulars isa question about the general conditions ‘of speaker-Hearer identcation of particulars, So itis a question ‘which can only arse given that we atleast have speakers and ‘hearers communicating with exch other. But we can, or at leas it seme that we ca, rasta similar question without any such prior assumption of speakers and heaters. For each of us ean think identiyingly sbout partculas withovt talking about them. Now fof course ie may be thatthe ability to chink identifyingly about particulats i logically dependeat oa the ability to talk idenify- ingly to othess aboot parculars. But this if so, is atleast not ‘obviously so. We donot waat to prejudge the question whether it js 40 or noe; and we may, without prejudging it, ase a more ‘general question about the conditions of the possibilty of ‘identifying thought about particulars. ‘Bot how general do we want our question to be? I am going, to impose one limit on its generality. In one’s own identifying thought, and indeed in one's own idenifying talk, about par- ticlass, oe can certainly recognize a certain distinction: vz. the sisinction beeween those purticlar occurences, process, states for conditions which are experiences or stats of consciousness of fone’s own, and thore particulars which are not experiences of states of consciousness of one’s own, of of anyone else's either, though they may be object of such experiences. Thus fa tre is struck by lighting, that one kind of happening; and if Tsee the tree being struck by lighting, that is another kind of happening. “The knife enteriag my flesh is one kind of event, and my feling the pain is another. The limit T want impose on my general {question is this: that I intend it as a question about the eondi- tions of the possibilty of identifying thought about particalas distinguished by the thinker from himself and from his own fexpetiences or states of mind, and regaeded as actual or possible objets of those experiences. 1 shall henceforth use the phrase, “objective particulars’ at an abbreviation of the entire phrase, ‘particulars distinguished by the thinker ec’. Now it may be that © 6