73. KING OF KINGS ET AL vs.
MAMAC On November 26, 2001, respondent received a
DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 166208 June 29, 2007
KING OF KINGS TRANSPORT INC., CLAIRE
DELA FUENTE and MELISSA LIM, petitioners,
vs.
SANTIAGO O. MAMAC, respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner KKTI is a corporation
engaged in public transportation and managed
by Claire Dela Fuente and Melissa Lim.
Respondent was a conductor for Don Mariano
Transit Corporation (DMTC). He was one of
the few people who established Damayan ng
mga Manggagawa, Tsuper at Conductor-
Transport Workers Union. Pending the union’s
certification election, respondent was
transferred to KKTI. The KKTI employees later
organized the Kaisahan ng mga Kawani sa
King of Kings (KKKK) which was registered
with DOLE. Respondent was elected KKKK
president.
Upon audit of the October 28, 2001
Conductor’s Report of respondent, KKTI noted
an irregularity. It discovered that respondent
declared several sold tickets as returned
tickets causing KKTI to lose an income of eight
hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregularity
report was prepared on the October 28, 2001
incident, KKTI nevertheless asked respondent
to explain the discrepancy. In his letter,
respondent said that the erroneous declaration
in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report was
unintentional. He explained that during that
day’s trip, the windshield of the bus assigned to
them was smashed; and they had to cut short
the trip in order to immediately report the
matter to the police. As a result of the incident,
he got confused in making the trip report.
letter terminating his employment effective
November 29, 2001. The dismissal letter
alleged that the October 28, 2001 irregularity
was an act of fraud against the company. KKTI
also cited as basis for respondent’s dismissal
the other offenses he allegedly committed
since 1999.
After that, he filed an action for illegal
dismissal, among other claims. He denied
committing any infraction and alleged that his
dismissal was intended to bust union activities.
Moreover, he claimed that his dismissal was
effected without due process.
KKTI averred that it had observed due process
in dismissing respondent and maintained that
respondent was not entitled to his money
claims such as service incentive leave and
13th-month pay because he was paid on
commission or percentage basis.
LABOR ARBITER: he was validly dismissed
NLRC: Affirmed. CA held that there was just
cause for respondent’s dismissal. It ruled that
respondent’s act in “declaring sold tickets as
returned tickets x x x constituted fraud or acts
of dishonesty justifying his dismissal.”
ISSUE: WON respondent was given due
process (procedural)
HELD: NO. There was failure to observe the
requirements of due process
Due process under the Labor Code involves
two aspects: first, substantive––the valid and
authorized causes of termination of
employment under the Labor Code; and
second, procedural––the manner of dismissal.
Section 2(d) of Rule I of Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
provides:
SEC. 2. Standards of due process;
requirements of notice.––In all cases of
termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:
For termination of employment based on just
causes as defined in Article 282 of the Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for
termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain
his side.
(b) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence, or
rebut the evidence presented against him.
(c) A written notice of termination served on the
employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify his
termination.
The first written notice to be served on the
employees should contain the specific causes
or grounds for termination against them, and a
directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation
within a reasonable period. “Reasonable
opportunity” under the Omnibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management
must accord to the employees to enable them
to prepare adequately for their defense.15 This
should be construed as a period of at least five
(5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to
give the employees an opportunity to study the
accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence,
and decide on the defenses they will raise
against the complaint. Moreover, in order to
enable the employees to intelligently prepare
their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the facts
and circumstances that will serve as basis for
the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly,
the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or
which among the grounds under Art. 282 is
being charged against the employees.
After serving the first notice, the employers
should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be
given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify
their defenses to the charge against them; (2)
present evidence in support of their defenses;
and (3) rebut the evidence presented against
them by the management. During the hearing
or conference, the employees are given the
chance to defend themselves personally, with
the assistance of a representative or counsel of
their choice. Moreover, this conference or
hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
After determining that termination of
employment is justified, the employers shall
serve the employees a written notice of
termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the
employees have been considered; and (2)
grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.
Respondent was not issued a written notice
charging him of committing an infraction. A
verbal appraisal of the charges against an
employee does not comply with the first notice
requirement.

The court observed from the irregularity reports
against respondent for his other offenses that
such contained merely a general description of
the charges against him. The reports did not
even state a company rule or policy that the
employee had allegedly violated.
No hearing was conducted. Regardless of
respondent’s written explanation, a hearing
was still necessary in order for him to clarify
and present evidence in support of his
defense. Moreover, respondent made the letter
merely to explain the circumstances relating to
the irregularity in his October 28, 2001
Conductor’s Trip Report. He was unaware that
a dismissal proceeding was already being
effected. Thus, he was surprised to receive the
November 26, 2001 termination letter
indicating as grounds, not only his October 28,
2001 infraction, but also his previous
infractions.
74. PNB v Velasco
Check file
75. PAL v NLRC
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al
JULY 11, 2010 ~ VBDIAZ
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al
G.R. No. 132805
Feb. 2, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was
employed as flight surgeon at petitioner
company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical
Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the
afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the
evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his
dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-
minute drive away. A few minutes later, the
clinic received an emergency call from the PAL
Cargo Services. One of its employeeshad
suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr.
Eusebio, called private respondent at home to
inform him of the emergency. The patient
arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and
Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the
hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at
around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had
already left with the patient to the hospital. The
patient died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical
Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to
conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr.
Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-
minute meal break; that he immediately left his
residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio
about the emergency and he arrived at the
clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio
panicked and brought the patient to the
hospital without waiting for him.
Finding private respondent’s explanation
unacceptable, the management charged
private respondent with abandonment of post
while on duty. He denied that he abandoned
his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he
only left the clinic to have his dinner at home.
In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the
evening upon being informed of the
emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the
answer of private respondent, he was given a
suspension for three months effective
December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision declaring the suspension of private
respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to
pay private respondent the amount equivalent
to all the benefits he should have received
during his period of suspension plus
P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal
after finding that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and
the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month
suspension by the NLRC erroneous.
2. WON the awarding of moral damages is
proper.
HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The portion of the assailed decision awarding
moral damages to private respondent is
DELETED. All other aspects of the decision
are AFFIRMED
1. The legality of private respondent’s
suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night
only to have his dinner at his house, which was
only a few minutes’ drive away from the clinic.
His whereabouts were known to the nurse on
duty so that he could be easily reached in case
of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr.
Acosta’s condition, private respondent
immediately left his home and returned to the
clinic. These facts belie petitioner’s claim of
abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a
full-time employee, private respondent is
obliged to stay in the company premises for not
less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not
leave the company premises during such time,
even to take his meals. We are not impressed.
Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83.
Normal hours of work. — The normal hours of
work of any employee shall not exceed eight
(8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and
municipalities with a population of at least one
million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics
with a bed capacity of at least one hundred
(100) shall hold regular office hours for eight
(8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week,
exclusive of time for meals, except where the
exigencies of the service require that such
personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight
(48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled
to an additional compensation of at least thirty
per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work
on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article,
“health personnel” shall include: resident
physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory
technicians, paramedical technicians,
psychologists, midwives, attendants and all
other hospital or clinic personnel. (emphasis
supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. — Subject to
such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may
prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer
to give his employees not less than sixty (60)
minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7,
Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code further states:
Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. — Every
employer shall give his employees, regardless
of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for
regular meals, except in the following cases
when a meal period of not less than twenty
76. Smart Communications v Solidum
(20) minutes may be given by the employer
provided that such shorter meal period is Facts:
credited as compensable hours worked of the
employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual
work in nature or does not involve strenuous Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) hired
physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment Jose Leni Solidum (Solidum) as Department
regularly operates not less than sixteen hours Head of Smart Prepaid/Buddy Activations
a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending under the Product Marketing Group. Existing
emergencies or there is urgent work to be company procedures provide that a...
performed on machineries, equipment or department head shall approve project
installations to avoid serious loss which the proposals coming from his marketing
employer would otherwise suffer; and (d) assistants and product managers/officers.
Where the work is necessary to prevent
serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods
or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty he was charged with violating "various
(20) minutes shall be considered as company policies by misrepresenting and...
compensable working time. Thus, the eight- using his position and influence in his grant plot
hour work period does not include the meal to defraud Smart by conceptualizing fictitious
break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred marketing events, appointing fictitious
that employees must take their meals within advertising agencies to supposedly carry out
the company premises. Employees are not marketing events and submitting fictitious
prohibited from going out of the premises as documents to make it appear that the
long as they return to their posts on time. marketing events... transpired."[
Private respondent’s act, therefore, of going
home to take his dinner does not constitute
abandonment. 2. The award of moral Issues:
damages: Not every employee who is illegally
dismissed or suspended is entitled to
damages. As a rule, moral damages are The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring
recoverable only where the dismissal or illegal the second preventive suspension
suspension of the employee was attended by imposed by petitioner Smart upon the
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act respondent.
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy In the case at bar, there is no showing
Whether or not the public respondent Court of
that the management of petitioner company
Appeal's Decision dated April 4, 2011 and
was moved by some evil motive in suspending
Resolution dated July 14, 2011, ruling that the
private respondent. It suspended private
appeal of private respondent Smart filed with
respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous,
public respondent NLRC was well taken within
belief that private respondent’s act of leaving
the reglementary period, is in accordance with
the company premises to take his meal at
law,... rules and prevailing jurisprudence.
home constituted abandonment of post which
warrants the penalty of suspension. Under the
circumstances, we hold that private respondent
Ruling:
is not entitled to moral damages.
The petitions must be denied.
Solidum's 2nd preventive suspension is valid
On the other hand, Solidum claims that his
preventive suspension of 20 days is an
extension of his initial 30-day suspension and,
hence, illegal and constitutes constructive
dismissal.
https://www.scribd.com/document/
323724716/Smart-v-Solidum-Gr-No-197763
77. LEO T. MAULA, Petitioner,
v.
XIMEX DELIVERY EXPRESS, INC.,
Respondent
GR No. 207838 January 25, 2017
TOPIC: serious misconduct, totality of
infractions, preventive suspension
PONENTE: Peralta
FACTS:
Petitioner Maula was hired by respondent as
Operation Staff. His duties include, but are not
limited to, documentation, checker, dispatcher
or airfreight coordinator.
Petitioner’s employment was uneventful until
came February 18, 2009 when the
respondent’s HRD required him and some
other employees to sign a form sub-titled
“Personal Data for New Hires.” When he
inquired about it he was told it was nothing but
merely for the twenty-peso increase which the
company owner allegedly wanted to see. He
could not help but entertain doubts on the
scheme as they were hurriedly made to sign
the same. It also appeared from the form that
the designated salary/wage was daily instead
of on a monthly basis.
On February 25, 2009, petitioner, together with
some other concerned employees, requested
for a meeting with their manager together with
the manager of the HRD. They questioned the
document and aired their side voicing their
apprehensions against the designation “For
New Hires” since they were long time regular
employees earning monthly salary/wages and
not daily wage earners. The respondent
company’s manager, Amador Cabrera,
retorted: “Ay wala yan walang kwenta yan.”
On March 25, 2009, in the evening, a
supposed problem cropped up. A misroute of
cargo was reported and the company cast the
whole blame on the petitioner. It was alleged
that he erroneously wrote the label on the box
– the name and destination, and allegedly was
the one who checked the cargo. The
imputation is quite absurd because it was the
client who actually wrote the name and
destination, whereas, it was not the petitioner
but his co-employee who checked the cargo.
The following day, he received a memorandum
charging him with “negligence in performing
duties.”
On April 2, 2009 at 4:00 p.m., he received
another memorandum of “reassignment”
wherein he was directed to report effective
April 2, 2009 to Omalza and Marzan in another
department of the company. But then, at
around 4:30 p.m. of the same day, he was
instructed by the HR manager to proceed to his
former office for him to train his replacement.
He went inside the warehouse and at around
6:00 p.m. he began teaching his replacement.
At 8:00 p.m., his replacement went outside. He
waited for sometime and came to know later
when he verified outside that the person
already went straight home.
When he went back inside, his supervisor
insisted to him to continue with his former
work, but due to the “reassignment paper” he
had some reservations. Sensing he might
again be framed up and maliciously accused of
such as what happened on March 25, 2009, he
thus refused. Around 10:30 p.m., he went
home.
The following day, an attempt to serve another
memorandum was made on him. This time he
was made to explain by the HR Manager why
he did not perform his former work and not
report to his reassignment. It only validated his
apprehension of a set-up. For how could he be
at two places at the same time (his former work
is situated in Sucat, Parañaque, whereas, his
new assignment is in FTI, Taguig City). It bears
emphasizing that the directive for him to
continue discharging his former duties was
merely verbal. At this point, petitioner lost his
composure. Exasperated, he refused to
receive the memorandum and thus retorted
“Seguro na-abnormal na ang utak mo” as it
dawned on him that they were out looking for
every means possible to pin him down.
Nonetheless, he reported to his reassignment
in FTI Taguig on April 3, 2009. There he was
served with the memorandum suspending him
from work for 30 days effective April 4, 2009 for
alleged “Serious misconduct and willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work.”
On May 4, 2009, he reported to the office only
to be refused entry. Instead, a dismissal letter
was handed to him.
Petitioner Maula filed a complaint against
respondent Ximex and its officers for illegal
dismissal and other money claims. LA and
NLRC found that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. CA reversed the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language
constitutes serious misconduct which warrants
his dismissal.
HELD: NO
Petitioner’s outburst did not constitute serious
misconduct
The Court held that respondent manifestly
failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged act
constitutes serious misconduct.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is
the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within
the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of
such a grave and aggravated character and
not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for
misconduct or improper behavior to be a just
cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it
must relate to the performance of the
employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that
the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.
While this Court held in past decisions that
accusatory and inflammatory language used by
an employee to the employer or superior can
be a ground for dismissal or termination, the
The Court held that respondent cannot invoke
circumstances peculiar to this case find the
the principle of totality of infractions
previous rulings inapplicable. The admittedly
considering that petitioner’s alleged previous
insulting and unbecoming language uttered by
acts of misconduct were not established in
petitioner to the HR Manager on April 3, 2009
accordance with the requirements of
should be viewed with reasonable leniency in
procedural due process. In fact, respondent
light of the fact that it was committed under an
conceded that he “was not even censured for
emotionally charged state. We agree with the
any infraction in the past.”
labor arbiter and the NLRC that the on-the-
spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he
having reached his breaking point, was due to
what he perceived as successive retaliatory It admitted that “the March 25, 2009 incident
and orchestrated actions of respondent. that petitioner was referring to could not be
Indeed, there was only lapse in judgment construed as laying the predicate for his
rather than a premeditated defiance of dismissal, because he was not penalized for
authority. the misrouting incident when he had
adequately and satisfactorily explained his
side. Neither was he penalized for the other
memoranda previously or subsequently issued
Further, petitioner’s purported “thug-like”
to him.”
demeanor is not serious in nature. Despite the
“grave embarassment” supposedly caused on
Gorospe, she did not even take any separate
action independent of the company. Likewise, Penalty of dismissal too harsh
respondent did not elaborate exactly how and
to what extent that its “nature of business” and
“industrial peace” were damaged by This Court likewise found the penalty of
petitioner’s misconduct. It was not shown in dismissal too harsh. Not every case of
detail that he has become unfit to continue insubordination or willful disobedience by an
working for the company and that the employee reasonably deserves the penalty of
continuance of his services is patently inimical dismissal because the penalty to be imposed
to respondent’s interest. on an erring employee must be commensurate
with the gravity of his or her offense.
Petitioner’s termination from employment is
Doctrine of totality of infractions not applicable also inappropriate considering that he had
been with respondent company for seven (7)
years and he had no previous derogatory
record. It is settled that notwithstanding the
Respondent contends that aside from
existence of a just cause, dismissal should not
petitioner’s disrespectful remark against
be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty, if the
Gorospe, he also committed several prior
employee had been employed for a
intentional misconduct, to wit: erroneous
considerable length of time in the service of his
packaging of a cargo of respondent’s client,
or her employer, and such employment is
abandoning work after logging in, failing to
untainted by any kind of dishonesty and
teach the rudiments of his job to the new
irregularity.
employees assigned to his group despite
orders from his superior, and refusing to accept
the management’s order on the transfer of
assignment.
Petitioner was not accorded procedural due
process
The Court held that the Memorandum dated
April 3, 2009 does not contain the following: a
detailed narration of facts and circumstances
for petitioner to intelligently prepare his
explanation and defenses, the specific
company rule violated and the corresponding
penalty therefor, and a directive giving him at
least five (5) calendar days to submit a written
explanation.
No ample opportunity to be heard was also
accorded to petitioner. Instead of devising a
just way to get the side of petitioner through
testimonial and/or documentary evidence,
respondent took advantage of his “refusal” to
file a written explanation. This should not be
so. An employer is duty-bound to exert earnest
efforts to arrive at a settlement of its
differences with the employee. While a full
adversarial hearing or conference is not
required, there must be a fair and reasonable
opportunity for the employee to explain the
controversy at hand.
Finally, the termination letter issued by
respondent miserably failed to satisfy the
requisite contents of a valid notice of
termination. Instead of discussing the facts and
circumstances to support the violation of the
alleged company rule that imposed a penalty of
dismissal, the letter merely repeats the self-
serving accusations stated in Memorandum
dated April 3, 2009.
Preventive suspension imposed was not
justified
The Court held that preventive suspension is
justified where the employee’s continued
employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or
of the employee’s co-workers. Without this kind
of threat, preventive suspension is not proper.
Here, it cannot be said that petitioner posed a
danger on the lives of the officers or
employees of respondent or their properties.
Being one of the Operation Staff, which was a
rank and file position, he could not and would
not be able to sabotage the operations of
respondent. The difficulty of finding a logical
and reasonable connection between his
assigned tasks and the necessity of his
preventive suspension is apparent from the
fact that even respondent was not able to
present concrete evidence to support its
general allegation.
Rules on Preventive Suspension: Sections 8
and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code
SEC. 8. Preventive suspension. – The
employer may place the worker concerned
under preventive suspension if his continued
employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or
of his co-workers.
SEC. 9. Period of suspension. – No preventive
suspension shall last longer than thirty (30)
days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate
the worker in his former or in a substantially
equivalent position or the employer may extend
the period of suspension provided that during
the period of extension, he pays the wages and
other benefits due to the worker. In such case,
the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the
amount paid to him during the extension if the
employer decides, after completion of the
hearing, to dismiss the worker.
78. Aris (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC [G.R. No.
905501. August 05, 1991]
16
AUG
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.
FACTS:
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who
were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by
management’s failure to attend to their
complaints concerning their working
surroundings which had become detrimental
and hazardous, requested for a grievance
conference. Private respondents lost no time in
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due trial,
Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate
within ten (10) days from receipt private
respondents to their former respective
positions or any substantial equivalent
positions if already filled up, without loss of
seniority right and privileges but with limited
backwages of six (6) months. Private
respondents filed a Motion For Issuance of a
Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of
R.A. No. 6715. Petitioner and complainants
filed their own Appeals.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for
execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No.
6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be
applied retroactively to cases pending at the
time of its effectivity because it does not
expressly provide that it shall be given
retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect
to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would
not only result in the imposition of an additional
obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its
right to appeal since it would be burdened with
the consequences of reinstatement without the
benefit of a final judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision under Section 12
of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. The
validity of the questioned law is not only
supported and sustained by the foregoing
considerations. As contended by the Solicitor
General, it is a valid exercise of the police
power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an
employer to freely discharge his employees is
subject to regulation by the State, basically in
the exercise of its permanent police power on
the theory that the preservation of the lives of
the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is
more vital than the preservation of corporate
profits. Then, by and pursuant to the same
power, the State may authorize an immediate
implementation, pending appeal, of a decision
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee
since that saving act is designed to stop,
although temporarily since the appeal may be
decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing
threat or danger to the survival or even the life
of the dismissed or separated employee and its
family.
Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the
NLRC can validly be given retroactive effect.
They are procedural or remedial in character,
promulgated pursuant to the authority vested
upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the
rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in
rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be
made applicable to cases pending at the time
of its enactment.
79. Lagrosas v Bristol-Myers Squibb Phil
https://www.scribd.com/document/
361623447/Lagrosas-v-Bristol-Myers-Squibb-
digest-docx
80. Technol Eight Phil v NLRC
Check other file
81. Roquero v Pal
https://www.scribd.com/document/
178326586/Roquero-vs-Pal
82. Chua Qua vs. Clave, August 30, 1990
G.R. No. 49549 – 189 SCRA 117 – Labor Law
– Post-Employment – Grounds for Termination
– A teacher having a relationship with a
student is not per se immoral
Evelyn Chua was a teacher at Tay Tung High
School, Inc. By 1975, she had been teaching
there for thirteen years. By that time also,
Evelyn, who was thirty years old, developed a
romantic relationship with one of her students,
a sixteen years old Grade 6 student named
Bobby Qua. In December 1975, Evelyn and
Bobby legally married each other (the old Civil
Code allowed such marriages then). Due to the
marriage, the school applied for clearance from
the Department of Labor to be allowed to
terminate the services of Chua on the ground
that her having an affair with a student 14
years younger than her is immoral and a
violation of the Code of Ethics for Teachers
which provides that a “school official or teacher
should never take advantage of his/her position
to court a pupil or student.”
The Labor Arbiter ruled that though there is no
direct evidence that Evelyn and Bobby did
immoral acts while inside the classroom, “it
seems obvious xxx that such a happening
indeed transpired within the solitude of the
classroom after regular class hours. The
marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby
Qua is the best proof which confirms the
suspicion that the two indulged in amorous
relations [during class hours].” The Labor
Arbiter gave clearance for the school to
terminate the employment of Evelyn. The
National Labor Relations Commission reversed
the ruling of the labor Arbiter. The Minister of
Labor reversed the ruling of the NLRC. Then
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave
affirmed the ruling of the Minster of Labor.
Evelyn now comes to the Supreme Court
questioning the ruling of Clave.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid ground to
terminate the services of Evelyn Chua-Qua.
HELD: No. As per the evidence presented, the
school failed to prove that Evelyn and Bobby
engaged in immoral conduct. It was wrong for
Clave to adopt the findings of the Labor Arbiter
which had no basis in the first place. With the
finding that there is no substantial evidence of
the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the
alleged violation of the Code of Ethics
governing school teachers would have no
basis. The school utterly failed to show that
Evelyn took advantage of her position to court
her student. If the two eventually fell in love,
despite the disparity in their ages and
academic levels, this only lends substance to
the truism that the heart has reasons of its own
which reason does not know. But, definitely,
yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is
not to be so casually equated with immorality.
The deviation of the circumstances of their
marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot
be considered as a defiance of contemporary
social mores.

However, since Evelyn’s relations with the

school is already strained, reinstatement is no
longer feasible. She is however entitled to
separation pay and backwages.

83. Leus vs. St. Scholastica;s College

Westgrove, January 28, 2015

Check file

84. St. Luke’s Medical Center vs. Sanchez,

March 11, 2015

https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/saint-
michael-college-of-hindang-leyte-inc/bachelor-
of-secobdary-education/3-st-lukes-medical-
center-inc-vs-sanchez/21775280