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A Results Based Assessment of the Bayanihan to Heal as One Act

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 Published by

CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

 LEAD WRITERS

Dr. Romulo E.M. Miral, Jr.

Atty. Roentgen F. Bronce
Julius I. Dumangas
Miguel Antonio G. Estrada

CONTRIBUTORS

Health Response
Dominador M. Gamboa
Rommel V. Asuncion

Economic Response
Elsie C. Gutierrez
Ricardo P. Mira
Rosemarie R. Sawali

Social Amelioration Response

Pamela Diaz-Manalo
Dulce Diana P. Baluyot

Peace and Order Response

Juan Gabrielle R. Ignacio
Florita B. Mamhot

RESEARCH ASSISTANCE

Ma. Leni P. Lebrilla

Cynthia R. Lorenzo
John Paul S. Quieta
Jubels C. Santos
Christine Marie M. Walog
Arlene L. Tuazon

LAYOUT
Alexiz S. Taaca

CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

3/F Main Building, House of Representatives
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines
Tel. No. 8931-60-32
Fax No. 8931-65-19
e-mail cpbrd@house.gov.ph

visit our website at

cpbrd.congress.gov.ph

August 2020
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Salient Features of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 2
Expected Results of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 4
What Have Been the Results, Thus Far? 4

2. COMMUNITY QUARANTINE 6

3. BAYANIHAN HEALTH RESPONSE AND RESULTS

Testing, Tracking and Surveillance 10
Contact Tracing and Disease Surveillance 14
Treatment Capacity 18

4. BAYANIHAN ECONOMIC RESPONSE AND RESULTS

Credit and Other Liquidity Support to Firms Including MSMEs 22
Transport and Supply Chain 25
Impact on Businesses 27
Recommendations 30

5. BAYANIHAN SOCIAL AMELIORATION RESPONSE AND

Speed in Delivering the Emergency Subsidy 34
Effectiveness in Mitigating Hunger 37
Key Factors Affecting the Delivery of the Emergency Subsidy 37
Recommendations 42

6. BAYANIHAN PEACE AND ORDER RESPONSE AND RESULTS
Measures on Locally Stranded Individuals 45
Assessment 47
Recommendations 49

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 51
REFERENCES 54
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Regional Testing Capacity, July 17, 2020 11

Table 2. COVID-19 Dedicated Beds and Ventilators 18

Table 3. COVID-19 Dedicated Beds and Ventilators, as of July 20, 2020 18

Table 4. COVID-19 Dedicated ICU Bed and Ventilator and Utilization Rates (%), 19
as of July 20, 2020

Table 5. COVID-19 Bed and Ventilator Per 10,000 Population by Region (In %), 20
June and July 2020

Table 6. Status of Implementation of the SURE Aid Recovery Project, 23

as of June 23, 2020

Table 7. Number of Reporting Establishments and Number of Displaced

Workers, January-June 2020 28

Table 8. Situation of MSMEs Operations During the ECQ 29

Table 9. Status of Distribution by Number of Beneficiaries Served 35

Table 10. Regional Breakdown of SAP-AICS Coverage 36

Table 11. Social Amelioration Programs Involving Cash Assistance 39

Table 12. Selected Assistance Programs Extended to LSIs and ROFs 47

Figure 1. Daily New COVID Cases in the Philippines, March 1- July 17, 2020 9

Figure 2. Daily Individuals Tested, April 9-July 17, 2020 10

Figure 3. Test Positivity Rate, April 3-July 17, 2020 13

Figure 4. Occupancy Level of Facilities, Philippines, as of July 20, 2020 19

Figure 5. Top Food Items with the Highest Average Inflation 26

During the Quarantine Period
(Average from March 2020 to June 2020, in Percent)
The views, opinions, interpretations in this report do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the
House of Representatives as an institution or its individual Members.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 1

INTRODUCTION
O n March 24, 2020, President Rodrigo Duterte signed into law
Republic Act (RA) No. 11469 otherwise known as the “Bayanihan
to Heal as One” Act. With a limited effectivity of three months, RA
11469 declared a state of national emergency based on the serious
threat of COVID-19 to the health, safety, security, and livelihood of
Filipinos.

Following Section 5 of RA 11469, the President submitted to Congress

weekly reports of all acts performed by the government for Congress
to ensure that such acts are “within the restrictions” provided in the
said law. With the expiration of the Bayanihan Act on June 25, 2020
and the pending proposals to extend or renew the effectivity of the
policy measures contained therein, it is important to assess if the
law was able to meet its intended results or if it is in the right track
of achieving those results. A results-based assessment of the law’s
implementation can provide insights--on the effectiveness of the
policy measures adopted and the quality of their implementation--
which can be used to improve policy design and implementation. It
can also bring to fore the unintended consequences of certain policies
or acts that need corresponding attention. And finally, it can help
promote transparency and accountability for results considering the
huge government spending for COVID-19 initiatives.

This report is organized into seven sections. Section 1 discusses

the salient features of Republic Act 11469 and its expected results.
Section 2 provides a brief discussion of community quarantine which
is referred to in all the sections that follow. Sections 3 and 4 assess
the results of the health response and economic response measures,
respectively. Section 5 evaluates the results of financial assistance
to the vulnerable sectors while Section 6 discusses peace and order
focusing on the plight of stranded individuals. Section 7 concludes
with some recommendations.
2 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE

BAYANIHAN TO HEAL AS ONE ACT
RA 11469 enumerated the policy measures and the additional powers granted to the President to
effectively address the threats of COVID-19. Section 3 of the Act spelled out the government’s key
policy directions:

A. Mitigate, if not contain, the transmission of COVID-19

B. Immediately mobilize assistance in the provision of basic necessities to families and individuals
affected by the imposition of Community Quarantine, especially indigents and their families

C. Undertake measures that will prevent the overburdening of the healthcare system

D. Immediately and amply provide healthcare, including medical tests and treatments, to COVID-19
patients, persons under investigation (PUIs), or persons under monitoring (PUMs)

E. Undertake a program for recovery and rehabilitation, including a social amelioration program and
provision of safety nets to all affected sectors

F. Ensure that there is sufficient, adequate and readily available funding to undertake the necessary
measures

G. Promote and protect the collective interests of all Filipinos

To effectively and efficiently pursue the aforementioned policy directions, the Act provided the
President with the powers to implement temporary emergency measures.

To mitigate the transmission of COVID-19 and to prevent overburdening the health care system, the
Act mandated the following:

A. Prevent further spread of COVID-19 through effective education, detection, protection and treatment

B. Expedite the accreditation of testing kits and facilitate prompt testing of persons under investigation
(PUIs) and persons under monitoring (PUMs), and the compulsory and immediate isolation and treatment
of patients, which shall be shouldered by PhilHealth

C. Direct the operation of private medical and health facilities, and other establishments for COVID-19
response or takeover their operations

D. Engage temporary Human Resources for Health such as medical and allied medical staff to supplement
the current health workforce

E. Provide all public health workers with a “COVID-19 special risk allowance” and PhilHealth to shoulder all
medical expenses of public and private health workers for any work-related injury during the period of
the national emergency

F. Provide compensation of P100,000 to health workers who contract severe COVID-19 infection and
P1,000,000 to those who died

G. Liberalize the grant of incentives for the manufacture or importation of critical equipment or supplies
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 3

To ensure the availability of essential goods and services, and minimize the disruption of economic
activities and loss of livelihood, the following measures were mandated:

A. Adopt measures that will facilitate and/or minimize disruption to the supply chain of essential goods

B. Enforce measures to protect the people from pernicious practices affecting the supply, distribution and
movement of food, clothing, medicine, and other essential goods and services

C. Ensure the adequate supply, and regulate the distribution and use, of power, fuel, energy and water

D. Ensure the availability of credit to the productive sectors of the economy especially in the countryside

E. Move statutory deadlines and timelines for the payment of taxes, fees and other charges required by law

F. Provide for a minimum of 30-day grace period for the payment of loans and residential rents falling due
within the period of the enhanced community quarantine, without incurring interests, penalties, fees,
and other charges

To alleviate the condition especially of the vulnerable sectors, the Act authorized the following:

A. Provide emergency subsidy ranging from P5,000 to P8,000 a month, depending on the regional
minimum wage rates, to 18 million low income households for two months

B. Implement an expanded and enhance Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program (4Ps) by providing cash
assistance to households who have no income or savings to draw from including those who are not
currently recipients

To promote general order in carrying out the aforementioned measures and protect the collective
interest of all Filipinos, the Act authorized the following:

A. Ensure that all local government units (LGUs) act in accordance with the rules, regulations and
directives issued by the National Government to address COVID-19

B. Authorize alternative working arrangements for employees and workers in the government and
private sector

C. Regulate or limit the operation of all sectors of transportation by land, sea or air

D. Regulate traffic on all roads, streets, and bridges

And finally, to ensure adequate and readily available funding to immediately undertake the necessary
measures, the Act authorized the President to:

A. Direct the discontinuance of appropriated programs, projects or activities in the 2019 and 2020
GAA with unobligated allotments, and use the savings generated to fund measures that address the
COVID-19 emergency

B. Lift the 30% cap on the amount appropriated for the quick response fund

C. Authorize LGUs to utilize more than five percent of their calamity fund with additional funding and
support from the National Government

D. Exempt from RA 9184 and other relevant laws the procurement of goods and services that are
required to respond to the COVID-19
4 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
Expected Results of the
Bayanihan To Heal as One Act
The health responses mandated by the Act are
expected to achieve the following results:
1 The spread of the COVID-19 virus is contained
2 The capacity of the health care system is
increased and not overwhelmed
3 Proper treatment is given to sick people and
unnecessary deaths are avoided. As pointed
out by the President, saving lives is the
primordial concern
With regard to economic response, the intended
results can be summarized in terms of:
1 Minimum loss of jobs, livelihood, and economic
activities
2 Continuous and adequate supply of basic and
essential goods and services at affordable
prices. As to the social response mandated by
the Act, the intended result is that the most
vulnerable sectors of society are given timely
assistance, and their hardships and sufferings
are alleviated
Achieving the intended results would require
a whole-of-government approach. Close
coordination among, and consistency in the
policy issuances and actions of, the various
departments, agencies, and units of government
down to the lowest LGUs are of utmost
importance.
What Have Been the Results, Thus Far?
The results during the three months of
implementation of the Bayanihan Act up to the
present are a mixed of good and bad. While
the government has managed to increase its
testing and treatment capacity for COVID-19, the
number of COVID-19 cases and deaths continues
to rise at a disconcerting level.
The number of accredited COVID-19 testing
laboratories increased from initial six (6) in
April 2020 to 85 as of July 17, 2020, thereby
increasing also the cumulative individuals tested
from around 20,000 or 0.02% of the population
at the start of April 2020 to 1.05 million or 0.97%
of the population by the end of July. Meanwhile,
isolation and treatment capacity as measured
by the number of hospital beds increased from
33,000 beds in mid-April to 68,000 beds as of
July 6 (Dominguez, 2020).
However, since the first case of localized
COVID-19 transmission in the Philippines
was reported on March 7, 2020, the number of
COVID-19 cases in the country has increased
to 119,460 as of August 6, 2020, the highest
in Southeast Asia and surpassing that of
China’s 88,423 where the virus originated. The
Philippines has also reported a total of 2,150
deaths due to COVID-19 as of August 6, 2020
On the economic front, various measures have
been put in place to provide liquidity support
to firms including micro, small and medium
enterprises (MSMEs) and keep the cost of
borrowing at low levels. Low-interest credit
and wage subsidy have been given to small
businesses to keep them afloat. Still, a number
of firms have either temporarily or permanently
closed while others have laid-off portion of their
workers or forced their workers to work part-time
to stay in business. As reported by the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA), the economy as
measured by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
contracted by 0.7% in the first quarter and by
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 5

a whopping 16.5% in the second quarter of
the year. Unemployment rate surged to 17.7%
(roughly 7.3 million unemployed Filipinos) in
April 2020 compared to 5.1% in April 2019,
while underemployment increased to 18.9%
compared to 13.4% in the same periods.
another unintended result which is the disturbing
number of stranded individuals. It has prevented
many individuals from being with their families
which is foremost in the minds of Filipinos when
they think about safety and security.

Inflation rate remained stable and under control

at 2.2% in April 2020, 2.1% in May, and 2.5%
in June, although food prices registered higher
inflation rates during these months at 3.4%,
2.9%, and 2.7%, respectively. There were also a
few spikes in prices of certain basic commodities
such as fruits and vegetables whose prices
increased by 12.1% and 10.3%, respectively, in
April 2020.

As of June 26, 2020, the government was able

to disburse P99.80 billion of the P101.48 billion
allocation in financial assistance to an estimated
17.65 million beneficiaries consisting of 4Ps and
non-4Ps households, and transport workers.
However, in spite of the emergency subsidy (ES)
to low-income families and other vulnerable
sectors of society, the Social Weather Station
(SWS) reported that 16.7% or an estimated
4.2 million Filipino families experienced
involuntary hunger in its May 2020 survey. In the
latest SWS survey in July, the number of Filipino
families who experienced hunger further
increased to 20.9% or 5.2 million families. As
the average number of members of poor families
is around six (6), this translates to around 30
million individuals.

One of the most controversial COVID-19

initiatives is the imposition of community
quarantine which restricts the mobility even
of individuals who are not infected with the virus.
The government has said that the imposition of
extensive community quarantine has prevented
the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus in the
country. However, in addition to its negative
effects on the economy including the temporary
stoppage of work and even the loss of
livelihood, community quarantine has also led to
6 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
2. COMMUNITY
QUARANTINE
The COVID-19 virus causes a highly infectious
disease that targets primarily a person’s
STAY AT HOME
respiratory system. There are still no vaccines
or treatments for COVID-19. The conditions
of individuals infected with this virus range
from being asymptomatic, to showing mild to
severe symptoms, to death. According to the
World Health Organization (WHO, 17 March
2020), 80 percent of COVID-19 infections are
mild or do not show any symptoms that require
special treatment, while 15 percent are severe
and require oxygen, and 5 percent are critical
and require ventilation. Older people and those
with underlying medical conditions are more
predisposed to severe infection.
The risk of contagion for COVID-19 is very high
because it takes 1 to 14 days for people exposed to
the virus to develop symptoms, potentially giving
them more time to spread the virus before they
know that they are infected. Indeed, the number
of COVID-19 cases has spread worldwide, and
the WHO elevated the COVID-19 situation to a
pandemic on March 11, 2020.
The epidemiological curve or epi curve of
COVID-19 shows the frequency of new cases
over time based on the date of onset of disease.
It suggests that the number of cases especially
during the acceleration stage of the disease can
easily overwhelm the capacity of the health care
system of a country. As a result, more people can
die from the disease because the national health
care system cannot provide the proper treatment
due to the sheer number of sick people. Thus,
the response of the authorities in all the affected
countries is to “flatten the epi curve”.
Flattening the epi curve simply means slowing
down the rate of infection so that the national
health care system can ably cope with the
COVID-19 STAY AT HOME
number of people needing treatment. To slow
down the transmission of the virus and rate of
COVID-19
infection, physical contact between individuals
have to be minimized through social distancing.
Social distancing measures can range from
individual social distancing to social distancing
affecting multiple persons.
INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL
DISTANCING MEASURES
1 Isolation of COVID-19 positive individuals
2 Quarantine of healthy persons who have had
exposure to or contact with COVID-19 positive
individuals
3 Blanket recommendation for the public to stay
at home and avoid close contacts with people,
especially those in known high-risk groups
SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES
AFFECTING MULTIPLE PERSONS
1 Closure of educational institutions
2 Workplace closures
3 Mass gathering cancellations
4 Cordon sanitaire/mandatory quarantine of
buildings or residential areas
European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, 2020
The extent of social distancing measures does
not only bear on national health care capacity,
but also has economic and social costs. As
social distancing measures become more
encompassing, business, livelihood, social,
and educational activities are impeded, and
economic and social costs increase.
When social distancing is limited to the isolation
of infected individuals and quarantining those
who have had contact with infected individuals,

its concomitant economic costs (e.g., being
unable to work for several days) are confined to
and are largely internalized or absorbed by the
infected individuals. However, when it becomes
more drastic, as in the case of lockdown or
quarantining communities, economic and social
costs are much higher. Business establishments
are forced to temporarily close their operations
and do not generate income. Otherwise healthy
and productive individuals, and not only the
sick, are forced to stay at home and cannot work
full time or earn a living at all. Worst affected
are the low-income workers, namely, daily wage
earners and those who work under no work-no
pay arrangements. These individuals are not
expected to have savings that they can use to
tide over themselves and their families during
the quarantine period.
Almost all countries affected by the COVID-19
have enforced some form of community
quarantine or lockdown. A review by Loayza
(2020) of the various studies on the costs and
trade-offs of community quarantine showed
that lockdowns are less effective and more
costly in developing than in advanced countries.
Lockdowns are more difficult to enforce in
developing countries because a huge portion
of their population are poor and mostly in the
informal sector who are not covered by social
protection programs. The poor and mostly
those in the informal sector do not have savings
and their jobs do not conform to work-from-
home arrangements, thus, they have difficulties
in complying with quarantine requirements
and they have to go out of their homes to earn
a living. Lockdowns are also ineffective in
containing the spread of infection in crowded
cities and urban centers that characterized
many developing countries. Instead of social
distancing, they cause social compression in
these areas resulting in higher rates of virus
transmission.
Lockdowns may hurt the poor more through
their impact on the economy and the
consequent reduction in private and public
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 7
resources to provide for other vital services in
health, education and safety. These can lead to a
deterioration in education, health, nutrition and
well-being that can have long-lasting deleterious
effects especially on the poor and vulnerable
sectors (Banerjee and Duflo 2011 as cited by Loayza
2020).
Lockdowns or community-level quarantines
should therefore be seriously studied and
planned before they are imposed.
The US Center for Disease Control
and Prevention (2004) emphasized the
importance of the following measures
that should be carefully considered in the
imposition of lockdowns:
1 Provision of essential services and support
(e.g., food, household and medical supplies,
medical attention, caretaking, continuation of
work/school via telecommuting or home-based
curricula, financial support)
2 Mental health (e.g., stigma management and
prevention, psychological support)
3 Enforcement (e.g., controlling entry into and
exit from narrowly defined geographic areas;
border surveillance/monitoring; travel permits
and credentials)
Given the enormous logistic, economic, ethical,
and psychological challenges of community-
level quarantines, their imposition should be
very selective and for narrowly defined geographic
areas.
Moreover, they may be warranted only when:
1 There is a large number of cases without
known epidemiologic links (i.e. cases occurring
in persons who have no known contact with
infected individuals or exposure to a known
transmission setting)
2 Health care capacity and resources are in
danger of being overwhelmed. In general,
control measures should not be indiscriminate
or out of proportion to the situation
US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2004)
8 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

3.
BAYANIHAN
HEALTH RESPONSE
AND RESULTS
It is worth noting that the Bayanihan To Heal as
One Act did not include community quarantine
in the list of measures providing temporary
emergency powers to the President. The
community quarantine was imposed by virtue of
Proclamation 929 issued by President Duterte on
March 16, 2020, seven days prior to the passage
of RA 11469. The Act mainly complemented
community quarantine with health-related
responses such as (1) increasing the capacity of
the health care system, and (2) prompt testing,
compulsory isolation and treatment of infected
individuals and those they have contact with.
ECQ from May 16 until June 30 and the more
relaxed general community quarantine (GCQ)
for the whole of July, which was extended to Aug.
15. Certain areas in the Visayas that include the
islands of Panay and Cebu, and the provinces of
Davao del Norte, Davao de Oro, and Davao City
were also initially placed under ECQ while the
rest of the country were under GCQ. Localized
lockdowns in areas with spikes in COVID-19
cases were also enforced by local government
units (LGUs), as was done by Quezon City and
some other cities in the National Capital Region
(NCR).

The President upon recommendation of the
Inter-Agency Task Force for Emerging Infectious
Diseases (IATF-EID) imposed the ECQ from
March 16 to May 15 in Metro Manila and the
rest of Luzon. This was followed by the modified
The ECQ in the Philippines has been one of the
strictest and longest lockdowns in the world
(Lema, 2020). The country is the only one in
Southeast Asia to receive a full score of 100 in
the Stringency Index of the Oxford COVID-19

Four Gradations of Community Quarantine in the Philippines

(IATF-EID, 2020)

Enhanced Modified Enhanced General Modified General

Community Quarantine
(ECQ)
No movement regardless
of age and health status
Minimal economic
activity except for utility
services (e.g. food, power)
No transportation activity
except for utility services
Suspension of physical
classes
Community Quarantine
(MECQ)
Limited movement
within zone for obtaining
essential services and
work
Operation of selected
manufacturing and
processing plants up to
maximum of 50% of the
workforce
Limited transportation
services for essential
goods and services
Suspension of physical
classes
Community Quarantine Community Quarantine
(GCQ) (MGCQ)
Limited movement to Permissive socio-
services and work economic activities
with minimum public
Operation of government health standards.
offices and industries up
to maximum of 75% of
the workforce
Limited transportation
services to support
government and private
operations
Flexible learning
arrangements operate
at limited capacities to
cater to students

Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT)
for its strict mobility restrictions. While other
Southeast Asian countries also imposed
lockdowns, none of them received a maximum
score of 100. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam scored 80.09, 75, 85.19,
82.41, and 96.3, respectively, at the height of
their lockdowns.
One month after the ECQ, the OCTA Research
Group based in the University of the Philippines
noted that transmission rates had gone down
in NCR, with a 7-day reproduction rate (Rt)
of below 1 (David, Rye, & Agbulos, 2020). The Rt
refers to the average number of people whom an
infected person passes the virus onto. A value
lower than 1 means that the curve is “close to
flattening” and the “pandemic will soon die
out”. However, towards the end of the Bayanihan
Act’s effectivity in the last week of June when
the community quarantine was eased to MECQ,
the average Rt in NCR again increased to 1.28
(David, Rye, Agbulos, & Austriatico, 2020). Since
Figure 1
DAILY NEW COVID CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES
March 1-July 17, 2020
3,000
Enhanced Community Quarantine
(Luzon and Others)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
4/26
3/22
3/29
4/12
5/10
4/19
3/15
4/5
3/8
5/3
3/1
Note: Based on onset of symptoms or date when specimen was taken for testing
Source: COVID-19 Tracker, Department of Health
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 9
then the number of new COVID cases in NCR and
some other parts of the country had increased
significantly. With the shift to GCQ starting July,
daily new cases have been more than ten times
the average number during the ECQ (Figure 1).
As of August 6, 2020, the Philippines has
recorded 119, 460 cases which is the highest in
the Southeast Asian region, followed closely by
Indonesia at 118,753 whose population is more
than twice bigger than the Philippines. Thus,
in terms of the number of cases per million
population the Philippines ’ number is much
higher at 1,139 compared to Indonesia’s 450.
As pointed out by Abrigo et al (2020), ECQ
without other mitigation measures would merely
delay the progression of the outbreak and would
still result in high number of cases. Aggressive
testing and isolation of infected individuals,
which are among the measures mandated in
the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act, are critical to
suppress the outbreak.
New Cases 7-Day Average
General CQ
(NCR and others)
Modified
ECQ
(NCR and
others)
5/24
6/28
6/14
6/21
5/31
5/17
7/12
6/7
7/5
10 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
Testing, Tracking and Surveillance
Testing to identify infected individuals, tracking
those who have close contacts with them and
could have gotten the virus even if they are
asymptomatics, and isolating or quarantining
them are critical in containing the spread of
COVID-19.
Recall, however, that individual quarantine
should be distinguished from community
quarantine. While various studies have shown
conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of
individual quarantine, the same cannot yet
be said about community quarantine. With
individual quarantine, it is easy to ascertain that
the infected individuals are indeed separated
from the rest of the population. On the other
hand, community quarantine can only restrict
movements but it is very difficult or impossible
to ensure that only one member per household
goes out of the house and the rest of the
household members do not interact with other
households especially in densely populated
communities. Thus, containing COVID-19 would
require identifying those who are infected (i.e.,
symptomatics and asymptomatics) and isolating
or quarantining them. This can only be done
with effective and efficient testing, tracking and
surveillance.
Figure 2
DAILY INDIVIDUALS TESTED
April 9-July 17, 2020
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
4/30
4/23
4/16
5/14
4/9
5/7
Source of basic data: COVID-19 DataDrop, Department of Health
Testing
On February 7, 2020, the Department of Health
(DOH) ordered the activation of five subnational
laboratories through Department Order No.
2020-0071. These laboratories went through a
validation process conducted by the RITM prior
to opening. Thus, at the time the Bayanihan Act
was approved by Congress on March 24, 2020,
the country began with a handful of laboratories
capable of performing RT-PCR testing (i.e.,
gold standard in diagnosing COVID-19with the
Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM)
as the first COVID-19 testing center.
The DOH issued guidelines in securing a license
to operate for COVID-19 testing laboratories
on April 7, 2020 through Administrative Order
No. 2020-0014. From then on, the number
of accredited laboratories increased from the
initial six (i.e., RITM and the five subnational
laboratories) to 85 on July 17, 2020. Potential
or rated maximum daily capacity of these
laboratories went up from around 3,100 at the
start of April to about 51,000 in May and 74,000
in early July (Task Force T3, 2020). Cumulative
individuals tested increased from around 20,000
or 0.02% of the population on April 3, to 596,000
or 0.55% on June 24, and to 1.05 million or
0.97% on July 30, 2020.
Negative Positive
Individuals Individuals 7-Day Average
5/28
6/25
6/18
5/21
7/16
6/11
6/4
7/2
7/9
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 11

Figure 2 shows the estimated daily number
of individuals tested (based on the seven-day
average). From about 2,100 individuals tested
daily (7-day average) from April 16-19, , the
number increased to 4,500 by the end of April,
to 8,000 by the end of May, and to 13,400 by
June 25 when the Bayanihan To Heal As One
Act expired. The average daily figure stood
at around 22,200 by July 17 which was only
around 30% of the 74,000 maximum testing
capacity of 85 COVID-19 testing laboratories in
early July.
Of the 22,677 daily individuals tested (7-day
average) per region as of July 17, about 14,224
or 62.7% were in NCR (Table 1). Other regions
with the highest number of daily individuals
tested were Central Visayas: 1,796 (7.9%),
Central Luzon: 1,424 (6.3%), Western Visayas:
1,270 (5.6%), and CALABARZON: 969 (4.3%).
Together, these five regions accounted for
86.8% of the number of daily individuals tested.
Meanwhile, BARMM’s 25 daily individuals
tested had the lowest share to total at only 0.1%.
CARAGA did not post any output as it did not
have any accredited laboratory as of July 17.
Laboratories also reported backlogs or samples
without validated results released within 48
hours from receipt. Based on the 7-day averages,
NCR laboratories had the highest number of
backlogs at 5,622 or 51.8% of the country’s total.
Western Visayas was the only other region which
posted a significant share of test backlogs at
4,429 (40.8%).
The country was able to test daily an average
of 210 individuals per million population.
When the numbers were adjusted by regional
population, NCR posted the highest figure with

Table 1
Regional Testing Capacity as of July 17, 2020

Daily Figures Share to total (%) Daily

(7-Day Average) Individuals
Region No. of Labs tested per
Individuals Testing Average Average million
Tested Backlogs Individuals Daily population
Tested Backlogs

NCR 36 14,224 5,622 62.7 51.8 1,037

CAR 2 789 N/A 3.5 N/A 438
I-Ilocos 4 349 N/A 1.5 N/A 67
II-Cagayan Valley 1 152 N/A 0.7 N/A 42
III-Central Luzon 7 1,424 13 6.3 0.1 117
IVA-CALABARZON 8 969 160 4.3 1.5 61
IVB-MIMAROPA 2 60 N/A 0.3 N/A 19
V-Bicol 2 185 N/A 0.8 N/A 30
VI-Western Visayas 4 1,270 4,429 5.6 40.8 161
VII-Central Visayas 4 1,796 178 7.9 1.6 227
VIII-Eastern Visayas 2 317 107 1.4 1.0 67
IX-Zamboanga Peninsula 3 238 131 1.0 1.2 63
X-Northern Mindanao 3 175 3 0.8 0.0 35
XI-Davao 3 553 N/A 2.4 N/A 105
XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 3 151 203 0.7 1.9 31
XIII-CARAGA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
BARMM 1 25 N/A 0.1 N/A 6
TOTAL 85 *22,677 *10,846 100 100 210
*Sum of average daily individuals tested and daily backlogs reported per laboratory in each region
Source: COVID-DataDrop, Department of Health
12 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
1,037 individuals tested per million, followed
by CAR at 438 and Central Visayas at 227 per
million. BARMM had the lowest number at 6
individuals per million population.
The qualifications of individuals subjected to
testing are specified by the DOH testing protocol.
Initially, DOH Memorandum No. 2020-0180
(April 16, 2020) included asymptomatic persons
and health workers who had a history of travel
or contact with confirmed cases. Department
Memorandum No. 2020-0258, issued on May
29, 2020, amended the initial protocol to include
two other groups: (1) frontliners indirectly
involved in health care provision like Barangay
Health Emergency Response Teams, and (2)
other vulnerable patients with co-morbidities
(e.g., diabetes, immunocompromised state) who
will undergo surgery.
Assessment
The continuous accreditation of laboratories,
from the initial six to the 85 testing centers as of
July 17, increased the country’s testing capacity
from about 3,100 in early April, to 34,000 in
May, 51,000 in June, and 74,000 in early July.
However, considerable deviations exist between
potential maximum capacity and actual output.
Actual daily individuals tested (7-day average)
was recorded only at about 8,000 by end of May
and 15,300 by end of June – both significantly
below potential capacity.
Early in May, the DOH issued Administrative
Order (AO) No. 2020-0016, prescribing minimum
health system capacity standards for COVID-19
preparedness and response. The objectives of AO
2020-0016 include (i) achieving at least 30,000
tests per day by May 30 and (ii) having at least
one biosafety laboratory with RT-PCR testing
capacity per region. Actual figures for daily
individuals tested in May, June, and even in mid-
July fell below this target. Moreover, CARAGA
did not even have an accredited laboratory more
than two months after the AO was issued.
Backlogs point to inefficiencies in testing and
hint at inability of laboratories to completely
process samples in a timely manner. Note that
the significant number of backlogs was observed
even when testing turnaround time in the country
was reported to have improved from roughly two
weeks in April to 48-78 hours in June (Task Force
T3, 2020).
The country’s 10,846 average daily backlogs
as of July 17 is equivalent to 32.4% of the
combined figures for average daily individuals
tested and daily backlogs. Western Visayas and
SOCCSKSARGEN recorded more backlogs (i.e.,
4,429 and 203, respectively) than individuals
tested (i.e., 1,270 and 151, respectively).
Moreover, in Eastern Visayas the number of
backlogs was 55.1% of the number of individuals
tested.
Note that laboratories had been persistently
constrained by issues of inadequate testing
complements (e.g., automatic extractors,
reagents), physical facility defects, and
quarantine of health workers who contracted
COVID-19 (DOH, 2020). One instance was when
the RITM scaled down its laboratory operations
in April to due to the significant number of its
infected personnel.
The test positivity rate, which is the share of
positive individuals to daily individuals tested,
started relatively high at 22.2% and 23.8% on
April 3 and 4, 2020, respectively, followed by a
downtrend until mid-May (Figure 3). The 7-day
average rate reached the lowest point at 4.4%
on May 17, 2020. From then, the figure began
to increase, posting 6.6% by June 24, 2020. The
average positivity rate kept on increasing and
hit 11.9% on July 17, 2020. Note, however, that
high test positivity rates that go above the 3-12%
range suggested by the WHO or the 10% upper-
bound suggested by some scholars (Jha, Tsai, &
Jacobson, 2020) hint at inadequate testing and
indicate many undetected cases.

Figure 3
TEST POSITIVITY RATE
April 3-July 17, 2020
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
4/25
5/23
4/18
5/16
4/11
4/4
5/2
5/9
Source: COVID-19 DataDrop, Department of Health
Moreover, they also reflect limitations of the
country’s testing capacity as evidenced by
the need to prioritize severely ill individuals
and only those with mild symptoms who
are considered as vulnerable (e.g., elderly,
people with underlying conditions). Mildly
symptomatic persons with a history of travel
or contact, though qualified, were not in the
priority list or considered vulnerable. Also, the
increasing use of rapid antibody test kits in
conjunction with RT-PCR testing (i.e., the sole
confirmatory tool) is a recognition of testing
capacity constraints.
While the amended testing guidelines of
the Philippines maintained the provision on
prioritization of mildly symptomatic individuals
who had relevant history of travel or contact only
if considered vulnerable, countries like South
Korea and Singapore include persons with
fever and respiratory symptoms in their testing
criteria, regardless of history of direct contact
(MOH, 2020; MOHW, 2020). Moreover, with the
emergence of information on asymptomatic
or pre-symptomatic individuals (i.e., infected
but have not yet shown symptoms) who play
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 13
6/20
5/30
6/27
6/13
7/11
6/6
7/4
a major role in disease transmission (Gandhi,
Yokoe, & Havlir, 2020), the idea of casting a wider
net for testing becomes more urgent. Given
capacity constraints, it remains unclear how
many individuals from the non-priority group
are actually being tested and how effective the
country’s overall testing strategy is.
Recommendations
Though our testing capacity has improved,
several strategies may still be considered
to enhance the system’s effectiveness and
efficiency:
1 Consider alternative testing protocols
such as pooled testing that would
maximize the cost-effectiveness and
efficiency in the utilization of existing
resources
Experts suggest that this approach may be
especially helpful in areas where the rate
of infection is low and declining, and most
test results are expected to be negative. For
instance, in a community where the infection
seems to be under control and reopening is
planned, pooled testing could be an effective
strategy (Shmerling, 2020).
14 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
2 Enhance centralized monitoring of
testing complements and coordinate
national procurement or production
of needed supplies
Inadequate supply of testing complements is
among the reasons cited for the persistent
underutilization of laboratories. Given the
global shortage of these supplies, government
must have a centralized monitoring system
and develop effective mechanisms to ensure
that the country has sufficient stocks of
testing complements. It may consider
coordinating with the private sector for
domestic production.
3 Ensure protection of health workers
Laboratories should consistently uphold
infection prevention and control protocols
and provide health workers with protective
equipment. Appropriate training must also
be conducted regularly. On-site housing for
testing facility workers should be considered
to avoid exposing health workers and their
families to infection outside the testing
facility. These measures can help protect
health workers and ensure full operations of
laboratories.
4 Promote equity and adequate testing
capacity among regions
Some regions clearly fell behind others in
building their testing capacity. Government
must give special attention to regions that
have relative low testing capacity and facilitate
the accreditation of more testing facilities in
these regions. In addition, the government
may identify a minimum testing to population
threshold to ensure the readiness of each
region.
5 Maximize the use of laboratory
networks or zoning strategy to boost
testing output
A complementary approach is needed to
ensure that laboratories are fully-utilized.
Optimizing the use of zones, in which
specimens can be distributed across
laboratories based on available capacity,
should be pursued. This strategy requires
close coordination among facilities in an
area or zone. It can also help clear some
laboratories of backlogs.
6 Consider deploying swabbing booths
in strategic areas
Instead of limiting swabbing in laboratories or
health facilities, government should consider
deploying swabbing booths in strategic
locations, especially in urban centers. This
approach can make testing more accessible
to people and prevent the crowding of health
facilities. The installation of mega swabbing
centers is an example. This strategy requires
efficient logistics, in which specimens are
properly handled and transported. It can
also complement the zoning approach since
the actual RT-PCR test can be conducted by
the nearest testing facility or whichever has
available capacity as identified through a
centralized monitoring system.
7 Promote the use of telemedicine to
help facilitate the testing of possible
COVID-19 cases
The widespread use of telemedicine can help
identify possible cases and facilitate testing.
This approach can help prevent the crowding
in health facilities and guide symptomatic
individuals with adequate medical advice.
Telemedicine can also prevent symptomatic
individuals from unnecessarily leaving their
homes, risking exposure of healthy individuals
with whom symptomatic persons might get in
direct contact with.
Contact Tracing and
Disease Surveillance
The DOH issued Department Memorandum
No. 2020-0068, providing interim guidelines
for confirmed COVID-19 cases on February 3,
2020, and updated these guidelines through
Department Memorandum No. 2020-0189
on April 17, 2020. While the initial guidelines
focused on imported infections from countries
with reported COVID-19 cases, the updated
issuance provided comprehensive guidance
on the conduct of community-level contact
tracing. The mechanism relies on coordination
between the DOH’s Epidemiology Bureau (EB)
and the network of regional, provincial, city, and
municipal epidemiology and surveillance units
(ESUs). The Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) also issued Memorandum

Circular No. 2020-073 which directed the
creation of local contact tracing teams in LGUs,
the regular reporting on the number of trained
staff, and contact tracing operations.
Contact tracing is preceded by case investigation
of individuals with COVID-19. The investigation
yields information on close contacts, described
as those with (i) face-to-face interaction within
1 meter for more than 15 minutes; (ii) direct
physical contact; and (iii) direct care for patient
without using proper personal protective
equipment (PPE). Together, case investigation
and contact tracing form part of disease
surveillance and aim to interrupt the chain of
disease transmission.
City or municipal ESUs initiate case
investigations once notified about a confirmed
COVID-19 case in the locality. The guidelines
provide ESUs with a standard Case Investigation
Form and Travel History Form to profile
confirmed cases and guide the preparation of
a close contact list, which is referred to local
contact tracing teams (LCTT). Note that ESUs
are legally mandated to spearhead disease
surveillance in all LGUs. DOH, in coordination
with LGUs, is mandated under RA 11332 to
establish and ensure functional ESUs at all levels,
with trained and equipped human resource
complement to provide timely, accurate, and
reliable epidemiologic information.
LCTTs, which are local bodies co-headed by the
city or municipal health officer and the chief of
the local PNP office, and composed of workers
and volunteers from the LGU. With the help of
Barangay Health Emergency Response Teams
(BHERTS), they trace close contacts and refer
symptomatic persons to ESUs for specimen
collection and testing. They are also responsible
for the transfer of close contacts for isolation.
Daily monitoring of temperature and possible
symptoms of initially-tagged asymptomatic
contacts is done by BHERTS and contact tracing
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 15
personnel, following DOH-provided forms.
Information collected from case investigation,
contact tracing, and monitoring of close contacts
is sent daily by the local ESUs to the regional
ESUs, which transmit the information to the EB.
As of July 22, the DILG reported 69,098 contact
tracers hired (DILG, 2020). Moreover, it called on
each barangay to have its own CTT, and requested
the assistance of the Local Government Academy
and the Philippine Public Safety College in
training barangay contact tracers.
Assessment
The work of local ESUs, BHERTs, and LCTTs
can be compared to the community committees
in China, which spearhead daily community-
level monitoring of temperature and symptoms,
and transmit information to China’s CDC.
These committees are composed of a working
group elected by the community. They receive
standardized questionnaires which guide the
daily screening of temperatures and symptoms
of community members to identify potential
cases (Zhu, et al., 2020).
Data is shared daily with China’s Center
for Disease Control, and facilitates tracing,
quarantine, and treatment of symptomatic
persons. Although leaving the residence is
discouraged, community members are free to
go out once potential cases for the day are ruled
out. The committee is likewise in-charge of
providing information to community members
and delivering goods to those unwilling to go out.
Anhui, a province adjacent to Hubei (Capital City:
Wuhan), employed this community quarantine
strategy on 27 January, saw no increase in cases
as of 22 February, and discharged all COVID-19
patients on 7 March 2020 (Zhu, et al., 2020).
Unlike the community committees, however,
Philippine counterparts monitor only close
contacts. No clear mechanism exists on how
ESUs, BHERTs, and LCTTs actively check the
16 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
community for unreported symptomatic cases.
This is a possible gap even when RA 11332
mandates the conduct of population surveys and
environmental investigations as part of disease
surveillance. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 11332 likewise mandates
disease surveillance officers to promptly verify
reports coming from community rumors under
Section 7.1.b.
The flipside of the issue of active monitoring
is the gap in channels through which citizens
can actively inform government about possible
COVID-19 cases. Earlier, various government
agencies supported the launch of disease
monitoring and surveillance mobile platforms,
such as Staysafe.ph and TanodCovid. These apps
directly connect citizens to the government’s
disease surveillance system and allow the
public to self-report symptoms and stay away
from communities with relatively high number
of cases. As of July 25, 2020, there were only
about 1.3 million StaySafe.ph registered users,
equivalent to 1.1% of the population. It is unclear
how many LGUs and individuals are registered
under TanodCovid. These digital platforms
hold the potential of facilitating early detection
of cases and assisting the government in
effective disease surveillance, as demonstrated
by countries which “flattened the curve” by
integrating digital technology in their COVID-19
strategies (Whitelaw, Mamas, Topol, & Van Spall,
2020).
The preparedness and capacity of local ESUs,
BHERTs, and LCTTs are at the center of the
country’s disease surveillance strategy, given the
major role of these units in breaking the chain of
COVID-19 transmission. A year after RA 11332
was approved, it remains unclear how many
LGUs have functional, and adequately-manned,
-trained, and -equipped ESUs. The DOH directive
for provincial and regional ESUs to assume case
investigation and other functions in cities and
municipalities without established ESUs hints at
the fact that not all LGUs have functional ESUs.
This can have profound consequences on the
promptness and effectiveness of contact tracing.
The country’s “contact tracing czar”, Mayor
Benjamin Magalong, admitted that less than 1%
of LGUs have a “relatively good” contact tracing
system (Gonzales, 2020). His statement was based
on answers to diagnostic questionnaires on
contact tracing efforts which were sent to 1,900
LGUS, of which only around 600 responded. Of
the 600, only 0.68% were deemed to have a good
system in place. While many LGUs were found to
be compliant in terms of the number of contact
tracers, the personnel were found to be in need
of training. In addition, the average number of
contacts per confirmed case also needed to be
increased from 8 to a range of 30-37 to effectively
identify possible cases, especially in urban areas
(Gonzales, 2020). Setting up well-functioning LGU
contact tracing teams will require another three
weeks, according to the contact tracing czar.
LCTTs, which are newly-formed under the DOH
and DILG guidelines on contact tracing, require
capacity-building and protective equipment in
performing the risky tasks of contact tracing,
monitoring, and transfer of close contacts.
Compounding these issues is the huge demand
for contact tracers, numbering more than
60,000 as of July 22 (DILG, 2020), which the
government hopes to meet. All these imply that
the government needed to build and strengthen
its disease surveillance capacity particularly
those of LGUs, and address significant gaps in
the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Weaknesses in the country’s disease surveillance
system, particularly the capacity of ESUs and
contact tracing teams, and the failure to take
advantage of digital technology had significant
bearing over the government’s ability to promptly
and effectively perform contact tracing and
break the chain of COVID-19 transmission. This
issue brings to fore the Mandatory Reporting of

Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public
Health Concern Act which was passed a year
ago with the mandate to build an efficient and
effective disease surveillance system, grounded
on well-functioning LGU surveillance units.
One wonders whether the missed opportunity
could have made a significant difference in
bringing the number of cases to a minimum
and preventing a prolonged lockdown.
Recommendations
In order to enhance our contact-tracing efforts,
the following strategies are forwarded:
1 Complete the country-wide assessment
of LGUs’ preparedness in performing
contact tracing
More than half of the 1,900 LGUs surveyed
on their contact tracing efforts have yet
to respond to the contact tracing czar’s
diagnostic questionnaire. A comprehensive
assessment is needed to systematically
identify weaknesses to provide appropriate
solutions to enhance the country’s contact
tracing performance.
2 Fully implement the provisions of RA
11332 and empower local Epidemiology
and Surveillance Units to effectively
perform disease surveillance
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the
weaknesses of the country’s epidemiology and
surveillance capacity, especially at the LGU
level. Ensuring that every LGU has a fully-
operational ESU, providing adequate funds,
and conducting the much-needed training for
personnel are necessary for the country to
upgrade its capacity and sufficiently address
the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to prepare
for other health threats.
3 Ensure setting up of properly-functioning
LCTTs through adequate training of
contact tracing personnel
Contact tracing requires technical training
to ensure that close contacts are effectively
identified and monitored. The large number of
LGUs in need of training will require a strategic
approach in rolling out capacity-building
measures in the soonest time possible. Failure
to quickly and effectively capacitate contact
tracers means higher risk that unidentified
close contacts who have contracted the
disease will infect others.
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 17
4 Provide adequate protective equipment
for contact tracers
Contact tracing is a risky exercise that
exposes personnel to infected individuals.
The provision of adequate protective
equipment assures tracers’ safety and builds
confidence among personnel.
5 Build a reliable and user-friendly
information system for efficient national-
local government coordination
Information needs to be transmitted from
LGUs to the national government and vice
versa in a timely and efficient manner. This
will allow prompt action, such as identification
of hot spots and the immediate isolation and
treatment of COVID cases in a locality. It can
also facilitate inter-governmental assistance,
especially for LGUs overwhelmed with cases. A
reliable and user-friendly information system
will allow the smooth flow of information
6 Promote mass hiring of contact
tracers by creating more positions and
accommodating interested individuals
outside of government
Effective contact tracing requires adequate
manpower that may best be addressed by
a whole-of-society approach, including
integrating non-government personnel or
private individuals (PCP, 2020). Promoting
societal engagement by opening doors to
non-uniformed personnel or private individuals
can give a boost to contact tracing efforts
while providing livelihood to people. This
calls additional funding for the hiring of more
contact tracers.
7 Consider a more active localized approach
at disease surveillance and health
information dissemination
The community committees set up in China
and their efforts in actively monitoring the
community for symptoms and providing other
needs (e.g., information and basic goods) can
be considered as a model for LGUs’ approach
to facilitate the early identification of possible
COVID-19 cases and break the chain of disease
transmission.
18 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Treatment Capacity 1,064 ward beds, and 20 mechanical ventilators

than with the reported values on May 15, when
As of August 6, 2020, a total of 2,150 Filipinos
the government started easing the quarantine
have died due to COVID-19. Deaths can be
restrictions in some areas.
minimized, if not totally prevented, by increasing
the treatment capacity of the country’s health
care facility. Table 2
COVID-19 DEDICATED BEDS AND VENTILATORS

At the onset of the crisis, the Philippines had May 15 June 24 July 20
limited facilities for patients with COVID-19.
ICU Beds 1,299 1,300 1,371
The country has a total of 1,471 hospitals, 465 of
which are government hospitals. The population Isolation Beds 9,533 8,982 10,635
to hospital beds ratio was also dismal at one bed Ward Beds 2,702 3,211 3,766
for every 2,228 Filipinos. Mechanical 1,933 1,950 1,953
Ventilators
Based on the DOH data for July 2020, the country’s Source: COVID-19 Tracker, Department of Health
COVID-19-dedicated beds and ventilators
include 1,371 ICU beds, 10,635 isolation
beds, 3,766 ward beds, and 1,953 mechanical Table 3 shows among regions, NCR had the
ventilators. As presented in Table 2, these figures highest number and share to the total of COVID-
are higher by 72 ICU beds, 1,102 isolation beds, 19-dedicated equipment at 520 ICU beds (37.9%),

Table 3
COVID-19-DEDICATED BEDS AND VENTILATORS as of July 20, 2020

Number Share to Total %

ICU Isolation Ward Mechanical ICU Isolation Ward Mechanical
Region Beds Beds Beds Ventilators Beds Beds Beds Ventilators
PHILIPPINES 1,371 10,635 3,766 1,953 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NCR 520 2,935 1,448 744 37.9 27.6 38.4 38.1
CAR 40 337 75 33 2.9 3.2 2.0 1.7
I-Ilocos 86 412 149 62 6.3 3.9 4.0 3.2
II-Cagayan Valley 25 359 140 34 1.8 3.4 3.7 1.7
III-Central Luzon 120 869 177 206 8.8 8.2 4.7 10.5
IVA-CALABARZON 138 1,314 406 241 10.1 12.4 10.8 12.3
IVB-MIMAROPA 22 294 112 42 1.6 2.8 3.0 2.2
V-Bicol 37 241 165 26 2.7 2.3 4.4 1.3
VI-Western Visayas 54 448 101 96 3.9 4.2 2.7 4.9
VII-Central Visayas 162 1,084 488 197 11.8 10.2 13.0 10.1
VIII-Eastern Visayas 29 404 84 35 2.1 3.8 2.2 1.8
IX-Zamboanga 13 346 84 29 0.9 3.3 2.2 1.5
X-Northern Mindanao 23 319 79 27 1.7 3.0 2.1 1.4
XI-Davao 47 354 56 51 3.4 3.3 1.5 2.6
XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 36 474 105 38 2.6 4.5 2.8 1.9
XIII-CARAGA 11 208 60 86 0.8 2.0 1.6 4.4
BARMM 8 237 37 6 0.6 2.2 1.0 0.3

Source: COVID-19 Tracker, Department of Health

*With 100% (1,823 out of 1,823) of health facilities reporting
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 19

2,935 isolation beds (27.6%), 1,448 ward beds rates than the national figure (49.2%), on July
(38.4%), and 744 mechanical ventilators (38.1%). 20. Most regions saw an increase in utilization
Central Visayas and CALABARZON also have rates between June 28 and July 20. NCR and
more equipment than the rest of the country. CALABARZON posted the highest increases of
Note that those three regions have the highest 24.0 and 20.0 percentage points, respectively.
number of cases to date. Meanwhile, BARMM Of those that reduced their utilization rates,
has the lowest numbers: 8 ICU beds (0.6%), 237 Cagayan Valley recorded the most significant
isolation beds (2.2%), 37 ward beds (1.0%), and decrease at 20.5 percentage points.
six mechanical ventilators (0.3%).
Table 4
COVID-19 DEDICATED BEDS AND VENTILATORS
ICU beds and mechanical ventilators are essential
ICU Beds July June Change
in the treatment of severe to critical COVID-19 20 28
patients. The utilization rates of these provisions PHILIPPINES 49.2 34.9 14.2
are critical in determining preparedness of the NCR 65.4 41.4 24.0
system in the event of a surge in cases. Most of CAR 35.0 31.0 4.0
the facilities continue to operate at the safe level, I-Ilocos 38.4 28.4 10.0
meaning their occupancy rates are below 30%, II-Cagayan Valley - 20.5 20.5
III-Central Luzon 45.8 30.8 15.0
as shown in Figure 4. The 236 facilities in the
IVA-CALABARZON 68.1 48.0 20.1
danger level have more than 70% occupancy.
IVB-MIMAROPA 9.1 3.3 5.8
V-Bicol 10.8 2.9 8.0
Figure 4
VI-Western Visayas 20.4 10.2 10.2
OCCUPANCY LEVEL OF FACILITIES, PHILIPPINES
VII-Central Visayas 48.8 54.1 5.3
as of July 20, 2020
VIII-Eastern Visayas 24.1 10.0 14.1
IX-Zamboanga 15.4 28.6 13.2
900 Safe
X-Northern Mindanao 17.4 14.3 3.1
800 XI-Davao 46.8 51.9 5.0
822 XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 19.4 - 19.4
700
XIII-CARAGA - 16.7 16.7
600 BARMM - - 0.0
500
Mechanical Ventilators July June Change
400 20 28
Warning Danger
300 PHILIPPINES 25.9 23.2 2.7
264 NCR 40.7 31.8 9.0
200 236
CAR 6.1 15.2 9.1
100 I-Ilocos 12.9 9.1 3.8
0 II-Cagayan Valley 5.9 15.2 9.3
III-Central Luzon 16.5 17.9 1.4
Source: COVID-19 DataDrop, Department of Health IVA-CALABARZON 21.2 22.5 1.4
IVB-MIMAROPA 4.8 2.1 2.7
At the national level utilization rates for ICU beds V-Bicol 3.8 - 3.8
and mechanical ventilators were 49.2% and VI-Western Visayas 8.3 3.4 5.0
VII-Central Visayas 39.6 46.9 7.3
25.9%, respectively, in July 20. Table 4 shows
VIII-Eastern Visayas 11.4 18.5 7.1
that utilization of both equipment increased from IX-Zamboanga 13.8 6.1 7.7
June 28, when utilization rates were 34.6% for X-Northern Mindanao - 11.3 11.3
ICU beds and 18.6% for mechanical ventilators. XI-Davao 13.7 15.7 2.0
XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 5.3 - 5.3
Regarding ICU Beds, CALABARZON (68.1%) XIII-CARAGA - - 0.0
BARMM - - 0.0
and NCR (65.4%) posted higher utilization
Source: COVID-19 Tracker, Department of Health
*With 100% (1,823 out of 1,823) of health facilities reporting
Red denotes negative change
20 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Assessment
The number of beds per 10,000 population could
indicate the readiness of facilities in the regions
to treat their patients. The national figures for all
essential health equipment indicate less than one
of each for every 10,000 Filipinos. Individually,
the ratios are 0.12 (ICU beds), 0.83 (isolation
beds), 0.30 (ward beds), and 0.18 (mechanical
ventilators) as of June 28, 2020.
The ratio of hospital beds per 10,000 population
in the country increased from June to July 2020,
while the number of ventilators per 10,000
population remained constant. While COVID-19
dedicated bed ratios increased, it is important
to know how this was achieved. If a significant
portion of the increase in the ratios was achieved
by simply reassigning existing beds for COVID-19
patients, then the treatment of patients with
other illnesses could suffer.
It is also important to note that bed and ventilator
capacities vary widely across the regions.
For ICU beds, NCR (0.38), Central Visayas (0.22),
CAR (0.18), and Ilocos (0.16) all have ratios that
are above the national figure (0.13), with NCR
recording more than thrice the national value.
Meanwhile the remaining regions have ratios
that are below the national figure and that form
a wide range of values, with BARMM having the
lowest at 0.02. Likewise, only NCR, CARAGA
and Central Visayas had ventilator to population
ratios higher than the national ratio.
Government data show that occupancy rate
levels of hospital beds and ventilators remain
safe. However, the data shown are on the national
level and do not reflect infections that occur in
different regions. Moreover, the bed density and
utilization rates also vary among regions. For
example, an increasing number of hospitals,
mainly in NCR, are reporting 100% utilization
rate of their COVID-19 dedicated ICU beds.

Table 5
COVID-19 BED AND VENTILATOR PER 10,000 POPULATION BY REGION (In %)
June and July 2020

July 20 June 28
ICU Isolation Ward Mechanical ICU Isolation Ward Mechanical
Region Beds Beds Beds Ventilators Beds Beds Beds Ventilators
PHILIPPINES 0.13 0.98 0.35 0.18 0.12 0.83 0.30 0.18
NCR 0.38 2.14 1.06 0.54 0.38 1.58 0.74 0.61
CAR 0.22 1.87 0.42 0.18 0.23 1.74 0.44 0.18
I-Ilocos 0.16 0.79 0.28 0.12 0.15 0.82 0.32 0.15
II-Cagayan Valley 0.07 0.99 0.38 0.09 0.12 0.97 0.22 0.09
III-Central Luzon 0.10 0.71 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.63 0.12 0.14
IVA-CALABARZON 0.09 0.83 0.26 0.15 0.06 0.57 0.23 0.11
IVB-MIMAROPA 0.07 0.93 0.35 0.13 0.10 0.93 0.42 0.15
V-Bicol 0.06 0.39 0.27 0.04 0.06 0.49 0.18 0.04
VI-Western Visayas 0.07 0.57 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.58 0.13 0.11
VII-Central Visayas 0.20 1.37 0.62 0.25 0.14 1.27 0.67 0.20
VIII-Eastern Visayas 0.06 0.86 0.18 0.07 0.02 0.73 0.15 0.06
IX-Zamboanga 0.03 0.92 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.77 0.18 0.09
X-Northern Mindanao 0.05 0.64 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.69 0.12 0.11
XI-Davao 0.09 0.67 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.59 0.17 0.10
XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 0.07 0.97 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.82 0.28 0.08
XIII-CARAGA 0.04 0.76 0.22 0.31 0.04 0.72 0.08 0.34
BARMM 0.02 0.57 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.07 0.01

Source: COVID-19 Tracker, Department of Health


Recommendations
Several strategies may be pursued to beef up our treatment capacity:
1 Enhance the provision of hospital
logistics and personnel support
The rising number of cases of COVID-19
infections is a serious concern as there are
limits to hospital care capacity for patients
with serious conditions. University of the
Philippines (UP) experts estimate that there
will be 140,000 cases by the end of August.
If the trend continues, critical hospital care
resources would be overwhelmed. With this as
context, the DOH should continue its programs
that provide city health offices and hospitals
with additional staff and hospital equipment,
as well as those that ensure proper referral
of suspect and confirmed COVID-19 cases to
nearby hospitals with available beds.
4.
BAYANIHAN
ECONOMIC RESPONSE
AND RESULTS
To control the spread of the COVID-19 virus
which threatened the security of the nation, the
National Government adopted encompassing
and stringent social distancing measures.
Presidential issuances and IATF resolutions1
adopted prior to the enactment of the Bayanihan
To Heal as One Act on March 24, 2020, included
the following key measures which affected the
operations of many businesses and people’s
livelihood: (i) declaration of a state of public
health emergency throughout the Philippines;
(ii) suspension of classes in all levels in Metro
Manila, iii) temporary suspension of work and
formation of skeletal workforces in government
agencies; (iv) strict social distancing and
eventually suspension of public transport; (v)
suspension of domestic land, sea and air travel
to and from Metro Manila; and (vi) suspension
of mass gatherings such as movie screenings,
concerts, and other non-essential work-related
gatherings.
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 21
2 Effectively enforce complementary
measures to prevent overwhelming
of COVID-19 facilities
The national government should continue to
strive to cut down the infection rate through
strict quarantine restrictions, extensive
testing, and massive contact tracing. As the
WHO points out, it is not easy to produce and
procure the necessary equipment for providing
care to COVID-19 patients, but quarantine
measures, social distancing and minimum
health standards will help slow down infection
and give the government time to strengthen its
capacity.
Throughout Luzon, Enhanced Community
Quarantine (ECQ) was imposed to ensure that
strict home quarantine will be observed in all
households. General community quarantine
(GCQ) was also imposed in the rest of the country
similarly to limit the mobility of people. When
warranted by confirmed COVID-19 cases within
their jurisdictions, LGUs were authorized to
adopt barangay-, municipal-, city- or province-
wide quarantine. Moreover, businesses were
mandated to observe strict social distancing
in the workplace, and encouraged to adopt
alternative work arrangements such as work-
from-home, rotational work schedule, and
reduced working days, etc.
To minimize the disruption of economic activities
and the loss of livelihood, the Bayanihan To Heal
as One Act provided key measures to support
the liquidity of firms including micro, small and
medium enterprises (MSMEs) and to ensure
1
These include Presidential Proclamation Nos. 922 and 929 and IATF
Resolution Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 adopted between March 9-20, 2020
22 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
continuous and adequate supply of essential
goods and services at affordable prices. However,
restrictive transport regulations designed to
prevent the rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus
hampered the realization of these intended results
of the Act.
Credit and Other Liquidity Support to
Firms Including MSMEs
A key objective of RA 11469 is to undertake
a program for recovery and rehabilitation
including a social amelioration program and to
provide safety nets to all affected sectors. To
achieve this broad objective, Section 4 (n) gives
the President the power to ensure the availability
of credit to the productive sectors of the economy
especially in the countryside through measures
such as lowering of effective lending rates of
interest and reserve requirements of lending
institutions. In line with this broad objective,
the national government also implemented the
Small Business Wage Subsidy (SBWS) program
to maintain employment in businesses affected
by the COVID-19 pandemic.
MSMEs are considered the backbone of the
economy as they constituted 99.5% of the total
number of business establishments, contributed
35.7% of the total value-added or GDP and
generated 5.7 million jobs or 63.2% of the total
employment in 2018. In recognition of this
important role, a number of measures have been
pursued and implemented by several agencies
to ensure the availability of and access to low-
interest credit especially for MSMEs amid the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) reduced
the benchmark interest rate four times this year
by a cumulative 175 basis points (bps) (25 bps
on February and 50 bps each in March, April and
June) to 2.25%. It also reduced the interest rates
on the overnight deposit and lending facilities to
1.75% and 2.75%, respectively.
2
BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-020, 7 April 2020
3
BSP Memorandum No. M-2020-034, 28 April 2020
To ensure sufficient supply of credit to MSMEs,
the BSP (i) lowered the reserve requirement
ratio for commercial banks by 200 bps to 12% in
April 2020; (ii) assigned zero percent risk weight
for MSME loans that are covered by guarantees
from the Philippine Guarantee Corporation,
Agricultural Guarantee Fund Pool, and
Agricultural Credit Policy Council; (iii) reduced
the minimum liquidity ratio for stand-alone thrift
banks, rural banks, and cooperative banks from
20% to 16%, until 31 December 20202; and (iv)
relaxed the credit risk weight for loans to MSMEs
until 31 December 20203
The following regulatory relief measures were
also adopted by the BSP to encourage banks
to provide financial relief to their borrowers:
temporary grace period for loan payments;
suspension of all fees and charges imposed on
online banking platforms during the period
of regulatory relief; temporary relaxation of
requirements on compliance reporting, penalties
on required reserves, and single borrower limits;
and a temporary relaxation of provisioning
requirements (subject to the BSP approval).
The Small Business Corporation (SB Corp)
under the DTI launched the “COVID-19
Assistance to Restart Enterprises” (CARES)
Program, previously “COVID-19 P3-Enterprise
Rehabilitation Financing” which aims to boost
the working capital of businesses to help them
recover. The program offered loans ranging from
P5,000 to P200,000 with a minimal interest rate
at 0.5% per month, payable in 2-5 years with no
collateral requirement for small enterprises.
Based on the President’s last weekly report of the
President on the implementation of RA 11469
dated June 29, 2020, the SB Corp had approved
757 loan accounts amounting to P63.4 million,
and released P1.7 million covering 13 accounts.
As of May 28, 2020, the DTI had endorsed 3,730
loan applications under the CARES Program with
an aggregate loan amount of P653.9 million.
Around 4,736 applications were still in process
with a total loan amount of P758.1 million.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 23

Meanwhile, the Department of Trade and or cooperative/ association) may borrow up

Industry (DTI) revised the guidelines of the
Livelihood Seeding Program-Negosyo Serbisyo
sa Barangay Program (LSP-NSB) to make it more
responsive to the government directives on the
COVID-19 situation (DTI, 2020). The program
aims to provide a package of livelihood kits
and business advisory assistance and services,
amounting to P5,000-P8,000 to MSMEs affected
by health disasters arising from epidemics and
pandemics such as COVID-19. It targets to
benefit 3,592 barangays, 359,200 participants,
and 17,960 MSMEs especially those in rural
municipalities. As of June 24, 2020, the program
reported the following accomplishments: (i)
P62.0 million out of the P203 million approved
budget had been downloaded to DTI’s provincial
offices; (ii) 8,936 training participants and 4,824
MSMEs in 632 barangays across 12 regions
benefited from the program’s training activities;
1,858 livelihood kits were distributed.
The Department of Agriculture-Agricultural
Credit Policy Council (DA-ACPC) implemented
the Expanded Survival and Recovery (SURE)
Aid and Recovery Project to provide zero-
interest loans as working capital of target
40,000 marginal and small farmers and fishers
(MSFFs) and 150 agri-fishery micro and small
enterprises (MSEs) amid the ECQ. Eligible MSEs
(single proprietorship, partnership, corporation
to P10 million at zero interest, payable up to
five years. As of June 23, 2020, the project
had benefitted 23,151 MSFFs or 58% of target
(Table 6)4. Meanwhile, seventy six of 150
target MSEs were granted a total loan amount
of P538.9 million. To facilitate faster transfer
of funds to MSFFs and agri-fishery based
MSEs, the DA-ACPC partnered with financial
technology and payment services providers
(I-Pay MYEG Philippines, Inc. and Internet
Things Philippines, Inc.) and with partner
lending conduits or PLCs (e.g., Land Bank, rural
banks) for the use of cash card and e-wallet in
loan disbursement.
The Philippine Guarantee Corporation
(PhilGuarantee) approved a Credit Guarantee
Program for MSMEs which aims to provide
50% guarantee cover for loans extended by
PhilGuarantee-accredited lending banks and
financial institutions. To provide means to
support the operations of MSMEs affected by
the COVID-19 pandemic, this program aims
to provide P120 billion in working capital
loans to at least 12,000 MSMEs affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic.

Table 6
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SURE AID RECOVERY PROJECT
As of June 23, 2020

Target Number of Alloted Amount Utilized

Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Amount
Served
Marginal Small Farmers and 40,000 23,151 P1 billion P578.7 million (actual
Fishers (MSFFs) loans disbursed) P1.06
billion (transferred
to partner lending
conduits)

Agri-fishery-based MSEs 150 76 P1.5 billion P538.9 million

Source: Report to the Joint Congressional oversight Committee (29 June 2020)

4
The ACPD currently has 71 PLCs comprised of 19 banks, three NGO/MFIS and 49
cooperatives that lend the program funds to eligible beneficiaries.
24 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Pag-IBIG Fund also allocated P10 billion for

the implementation of the House Construction
Financing Line (HCFL) as an economic stimulus
to the housing industry to encourage the
construction of socialized and low-cost housing
units. The HCFL is a bridge financing facility
that would enable developers to produce more
homes, boost businesses, support suppliers, and
prevent layoffs of their workers.
The Department of Finance, in partnership with
the Social Security System, also implemented the
Small Business Wage Subsidy (SBWS) program
as a social amelioration program to help small
businesses stay afloat amid the COVID-19
pandemic. As of June 24, 2020, the program
disbursed around P45.6 billion in wage subsidies
for two months.5 For the first tranche, 3.08 million
or 99% of the 3.10 million qualified beneficiaries
received their cash grants totaling P23.52 billion.
For the second tranche, 3.05 million or 98% of
qualified beneficiaries were able to receive their
wage subsidies totaling P22.10 billion.
Assessment
While there were many programs adopted and
implemented to assist affected MSMEs, assessing
their effectiveness is difficult as most of these
are still at the early stage of implementation.
Moreover, the COVID-19 crisis is still evolving
and the number of affected enterprises and the
full extent of the impact on businesses have
yet to be established. Note, however, that the
reported number of businesses closing or filing
for temporary closure along with the number of
displaced workers continue to rise. Even with the
relaxation of community quarantines, demand
is expected to remain weak due to economic
uncertainties. A number of key issues also need
to be addressed to improve the current assistance
for MSMEs.
1 Immediate and decisive intervention
The BSP acted swiftly in implementing
measures to assist the sectors that were
affected by the COVID-19 crisis. These include
reduction in both policy rate and reserve
requirement. According to the BSP, the
impact of these actions in reducing financial
burden on loan borrowers is expected to be
fully felt over the next several quarters. A
25 bps rate cut is estimated to increase
domestic liquidity by P6.6 billion in the first
year and by P16.7 billion in the second year.
The liquidity released into the system through
monetary easing is projected to eventually
exert downward pressure on real interest rate,
which translates to lower borrowing costs for
the government as well as businesses and
households. The BSP already noted a drop in
the average quoted bank lending rates in April
2020 compared to March 2020.
2 Lag/Delay in Impact
The BSP’s immediately policy interventions
were also noted to have helped calm and
restore some level of order in the financial
market. However, the full impact of these
policies has a time lag and is difficult to assess
for now. It is important to note, however,
that the BSP reported that banks continued
to generate new MSME loans during the ECQ
reporting that P30.8 billion were reported by
end of March and another P9.8 billion by end
of April.6 Banks were also reported to have
extended amendments in financing terms with
P25.6 billion renewed loans for MSMEs and P1.8
billion were restructured for the period March-
April 2020.7 Whether these measures will
actually assist MSMEs survive the crisis remain
to be seen. There are still issues about access
of MSMEs to bank loans due to stringent
documentary requirements and collateral.
3 Low availment and satisfaction rate
The NEDA survey also indicated low availment
rate (33%) and relatively low satisfaction rate
(42%) of the availed government assistance
program. The low availment rate was
attributed to the probable lack of or limited
information about the programs or the
perceived complex prerequisites for availment.
4 Possible duplication of loan availment
The accomplishments under the Bayanihan
Law cited in the weekly report of the President
was rather fragmented with each agency
concerned making their own reports about
what they have done in helping achieve the
objectives. With this setup, simultaneous
loan availment of more than one program is
possible. For instance, a micro enterprise
may be able to avail of credit under the CARES
Program of the SB Corp as well as the SURE Aid
and Recovery Project under the DA.

5 6
14th President’s Report dated June 29, 2020
on the implementation of the Bayanihan To
Heal as One Act
7
Reported by BSP Managing Director Lyn Javier during the online hearing of the House Ibid.
Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries on 21 July 2020. Mercado, Neil Arwin
(21 July 2020) BSP: P40.6B in loans granted to MSMEs during ECQ. https://business.
inquirer.net/303121/bsp-p40-6-b-in-loans-granted-to-msmes-during-ecq
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 25

the resumption of work and businesses,

5 Targetting of beneficiaries many individuals (without their own means of
The target of 150 agri-fishery-based micro transportation) were forced either to walk to their
and small enterprises targets with P1.5 billion offices, wait for several hours to get into the train,
allotment under the SURE Aid Recovery Project
is rather conservative and raises issues on or hitch rides from trucks and private vehicles.
how these beneficiaries were identified. The
P1.5 billion lending allocation means that all
target 150 agri-fishery MSMEs would receive Disruptions in the supply chains network.
the maximum loanable amount of P10 million. The restrictions in the transport sector had
Note that micro enterprises which comprise disrupted the flow of goods across the supply
88.5% of the total number of enterprises have
chains network.9 A survey of 2,481 enterprises
an asset size of up to P3 million only.
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) showed
that 39.1 percent of enterprises faced severe
bottlenecks in the product supply chains,
Transport and Supply Chain negatively affecting more than half of their
production capacity. Slow customs clearance
RA 11469 and other government policies to
on imported goods, limited operations of local
contain the spread of COVID-19 substantially
suppliers, and shortage of trucks and drivers
limited land, sea or air transportation even as
contributed to these supply chain bottlenecks.
the national government adopted a nationwide
Meanwhile, there were several reports on
policy on the unhampered movement of all types
agricultural commodities in Benguet, Nueva
of food and non-food cargo and the passage of
Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya and other provinces thrown
personnel of business establishments permitted
away not only because of oversupply and weak
to operate during the ECQ.8 Implementation of
demand, but also due to the difficulty for farmers
transport and other regulations to implement
to bring their goods to the market.
expansive community quarantine disrupted
transport mobility and supply chains network
The port congestion which occurred in the early
and resulted in income losses not only to
stages of the ECQ in Metro Manila revealed
affected public transport stakeholders but also
key vulnerabilities in the country’s supply
businesses and their employees, among others.
chain networks. In addition to the restrictions
in business and manufacturing operations,
The total shutdown of land public transportation
restrictions in public transport resulted in the
system during the ECQ in Metro Manila brought
non-withdrawal of cargoes from the Port of
serious mobility problems especially for several
Manila by cargo owners and consignees, raising
individuals who do not have their own vehicles.
yard utilization rates of up to 100 percent.
These people find it extremely difficult to go to
work and go to markets, groceries and pharmacies
Disruptions in public transportation and the
to buy essential goods. Lack of government
supply chains network as a result of the COVID-19
provision of alternative transport services added
containment measures may have contributed
burden to frontline health workers who wanted
to higher prices of key food commodities such
to report to work.
as fruits, vegetables and fish which increased
on average by 10.8 percent, 8.7 percent and
When Metro Manila shifted to GCQ beginning 01
7.6 percent, respectively, from March to June
June 2020, several commuters were stranded in
2020. These commodities recorded the highest
the streets due to lack of public transportation.
inflation among food items especially in areas
As a result of inadequate transport services to
outside Metro Manila (Figure 5).
meet the surge in transport demand following

8 9
IATF Resolution No. 14, March 20, 2020 A supply chain is a network between a company and its suppliers to produce and distribute a
specific product to the final buyer. This network includes different activities, people, entities,
information, and resources. The supply chain also represents the steps it takes to get the
product or service from its original state to the customer (Investopedia, 2020).
26 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
Figure 5
TOP FOOD ITEMS WITH THE HIGHEST AVERAGE
INFLATION DURING QUARANTINE PERIOD IN ($)
Average from March 2020 to June 2020
12.0
10.8
10.0
8.7
8.0 7.6
6.8
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
Philippines
Source: Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA)
Assessment
What the Philippines did was similar to Vietnam
which has emerged relatively successful in
containing COVID-19. Vietnam suspended its
public transportation system at the height of
the community lockdown from April 1 to 23. It
reopened public transport on April 24 with some
restrictions (COVID-19 Policy Watch, 2020). In
contrast, Thailand carried out soft lockdowns
which allowed buses, light rails and subway
systems to continue to function except during
curfew hours from 10 pm to 4 am (FPIF 2020).
Meanwhile, Taiwan imposed stringent pandemic
response measures and health protocols by
mandating the use of masks for all passengers,
installing infrared temperature measuring
instruments, selling tickets for reserve seats
only (and cancellation of non-reserved seats),
among others, to effectively reduce the risks of
people being over-exposed to the virus in mass
transportation (PMASIA, 2020).
Key problems in the government’s transport
regulations and their implementation during the
COVID-19 community quarantine contributed
to the disruptions in the supply chain and to the
loss of income of businesses and individuals.
11.2
9.5 9.4 Fish
Fruits
8.2
7.5
7.0 Vegetables
5.4 Food Products
5.1
National Capital Region Areas Outside of
National Capital Region
1 Calibrated approach in reopening
public transportation
In response to IATF policy directives, the DOTr
observed a gradual and calibrated approach
for the resumption of public transportation
to ensure safety in the country’s public
transportation system. The agency adopted a
dual-phase reopening of public transportation.
For the first phase from June 1 to 21, it only
allowed limited operation of train systems, bus
augmentation, taxis, transport network vehicle
services (TNVS), shuttle services and point-to-
point buses, bicycles including tricycles with
clearance from LGUs. For the second phase
from June 22 to 30, it allowed public utility
buses, modern public utility vehicles (PUVs),
and UV to operate.
The limited number of public transportation
available with limited passenger capacity,
and the sheer number of public commuters
stranded thousands of individuals along Metro
Manila roads. While transportation officials
estimated that only 30 percent of Metro
Manila commuter population would need
public transportation (equivalent to 3 million
commuters) once the GCQ is implemented, the
Move as One Coalition composed of transport
industry experts already warned that there
could be more (Rey, May 27, 2020). It further
cautioned that if commuting had already been
bad in a pre-COVID-19, it was going to be worse
when the capacity of public utility vehicles and
railways will be reduced.

As an estimate of how many were affected,
note that the MRT 3 under normal times has a
capacity of about 500,000 passengers per day,
while the data from the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
showed that there were some 4,600 buses,
over 40,000 jeeps, and close to 10,200 taxis in
the National Capital Region as of June 2019.
The LTFRB had also previously set a cap on
TNVS at 65,000 units in NCR (Rey, 29 May 2020).
Needless to say, the bleak transport scenario
under a GCQ in Metro Manila as the industry
experts projected came true.
2 Problems related to the issuance of
special permits
In compliance with IATF directives, LTFRB had
required transport operators and drivers to
secure special permits to be able to operate
in areas under GCQ. The special permit was
issued to operators if they provide barriers
inside jeepneys to protect passengers from
possible COVID-19 infection and implemented
other physical distancing protocols. Although
application is online and free of charge,
applicants have complained about the limited
number of special permits. Indeed, the failure
of many operators to secure LTFRB special
permits partly explained the lack of public
transport.
Apart from the securing a valid franchise, a
passenger insurance policy, and approval by
LTFRB on road worthiness, applicants of the
special permit especially for jeepneys should
apply through a cooperative or a corporation.
Consolidation of drivers and operators is a
concept central to the PUV Modernization Plan
which requires the phase out of traditional
jeepneys 15 years and older within three
years since the program’s launched in 2017,
in favor of safer, more comfortable and more
environmentally-friendly alternatives. The
DOTr found an opportunity in the pandemic to
push the PUV Modernization which has been
met by several transport strikes and protests
in the past.10
In its previous issuances, the LTFRB had
already prioritized buses as the “preferred
mode of transport” and therefore a priority
in the granting of special permit based on
the hierarchy of priority PUVs. Transport
groups had criticized this DOTr policy as
discriminatory against traditional jeepneys
although the DOTr has maintained that such
policy is “anchored on capacity” and the
potential of public transport buses to shift to
cashless transaction.
10
The Land Bank of the Philippines estimated that each jeepney replacement will cost around P1.4 million to P1.6 million. However,
based on an interest rate of 6% per annum and a payment period of seven years, the actual cost of a jeepney could reach P2.1 million
(Wikipedia last accessed on 02 August 2020).
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 27
In other jurisdictions, the Alliance of
United Transport Organizers Province-wide
Pangasinan had also raised concerns about
seeking clearances from each town or city
covered by their route before they can start
with the special permit application. Several
drivers were not able to hit the road when the
GCQ in these areas started on May 26, 2020.
In her column, Rey (2020) revealed that the
LTFRB was able to grant special permits at a
snail’s pace, covering only over 6,000 vehicles
nationwide during the first week of the GCQ
implementation. For instance, it gave out
permits covering 3,603 traditional jeepneys
from the estimated 170,000 registered units
nationwide; and only 916 UV Express shuttles
vis-à-vis 25,000 all around the country (18,000
UV express units are in Metro Manila).
3 Discrepancies in national and local
government quarantine rules
The impact of transport restrictions on the
supply chains networks was exacerbated by
the discrepancies in the quarantine rules of
the IATF and LGUs). Some LGUs had insisted
on their own quarantine rules defying the
IATF policy on unimpeded flow especially of
essential goods like food commodities. In
Masbate, local government officials refused
the entry of 20 trucks carrying food and
medical supplies because they came from
Metro Manila, where there is a growing number
of COVID-19 infections (Ocampo, 2020).
Meanwhile, LGUs elsewhere were given
discretion to impose their own transport
guidelines. For instance, taxis and tricycles
were allowed to operate in Davao City and the
rest of Region XI as per Executive Order No.
23 and Order 2020-008 of the COVID-19 Task
Force for the entire Davao Region (San Juan
2020).
Impact on Businesses
When social distancing is limited to the isolation
of infected individuals and quarantining those
who have had contact with infected individuals,
its concomitant economic costs (e.g. being
unable to work for several days), are confined
to and are largely internalized or absorbed by
the infected individuals. However, when social
distancing measures become more drastic,
as in the case of lockdown or quarantining
28 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

communities, economic and social costs are up to 5 million, and even “possible” to reach 10
much higher. Business establishments are million as a result of the COVID-19 crisis (ABS-
forced to temporarily close their operations and CBN News 2020).
do not generate income. Otherwise healthy and
productive individuals, and not only the sick, are Table 7
forced to stay at home and cannot work full time NUMBER OF REPORTING ESTABLISHMENTS
AND NUMBER OF DISPLACED WORKERS
or earn a living at all. January- June 2020
No. of Reporting No. of Displaced
The COVID-19 virus and stringent and expansive Establishments Workers
measures to contain its spread have wreaked January 194 5,221
havoc to businesses. With the government- February 371 30,712
imposed lockdown, many businesses have
March 266 6,780
recorded substantial decline in revenues
April 269 3,979
particularly for those not considered as essential
businesses. For those which continued to May 280 7,437
operate, there was a significant drop in demand June 1,602 50,589
due to restrictions in the movement of people and July19 1,690 23,244
the absence of public transportation. Even with
Note: Figures are preliminary
the easing of the quarantine measures, demand Source: DOLE Regional Offices
continues to be weak as people are still hesitant Retrieved from: https://twitter.com/MBLeslieAquino,
to go out of their homes for fear of infection. accessed on 21 July 2020

MSMEs are heavily affected by the COVID-19

crisis. Compared to their large counterparts,
most MSMEs do not have the financial flexibility
to survive the crisis. Rhee and Kang (2020)
noted that there are some private surveys which
suggest that small businesses in Asia may have
less than three months of cash left which could
raise the possibility of defaults that could result
in closures and a surge in unemployment.
Based on the July 20, 2020 briefer of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
the month of June recorded the highest number
of reporting establishments at 2,602 with
50,589 displaced workers (see Table 7). The
DOLE also reported that 26,483 establishments
covering 1,160,663 workers implemented
flexible working arrangements and another
82,561 establishments with 1,993,314 workers
resorted to temporary closures. DOLE Secretary
Bello also said that job losses could still increase
A survey conducted by the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) showed that
more than 60% of the respondent firms stopped
operations and almost two-thirds reported
zero sales particularly those classified as non-
essential businesses during the ECQ.11
Another survey by the ADB (2020) showed a clear
correlation between business closures and firm
size.12 The report noted that temporary closures
were most widespread among microenterprises
(71.2% of total microenterprises), followed
by small enterprises (63.2%), medium‑sized
enterprises (57.4%), and large enterprises
(53.8%). For large enterprises, 7% remained
fully operational while 38.2% stayed partially
open.
Table 8 outlines the operation of MSMEs during
the ECQ.

11
While there are issues about the representativeness of the survey because it was conducted using an online platform, the results still provide
a good indication of the issues and concerns of the businesses as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Survey was conducted from April
5-8, 2020 and was participated in by more than 44,000 enterprises. We Recover as One. Inter-Agency Task Force Technical Working Group for
Anticipatory and Forward Planning (2020)
12
The survey was conducted from April 28-May 15, 2020 with 2,481 respondents using total assets to define the firm size. Source: https://www.
adb.org/publications/covid-19-impact-philippine-business
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 29

Table 8
SITUATION OF MSMES OPERATIONS DURING THE ECQ

Indicators Remarks
Change in cost of raw materials Almost two-thirds reported unchanged cost of production during the ECQ.
About 26% reported an increase in their cost of production.

Change in sales Almost two-thirds reported zero sales due to temporary closure, particularly
of non-essential businesses.

Change in working arrangements More than 60% of the surveyed firms stopped operations. Others adopted
reduced work hours (13.2%) or work from home scheme (12.4%).
Change in number of workers
Majority (74.4%) of the firms surveyed did not lay-off workers. Some firms
(25.4%) temporarily laid off workers during ECQ.

Mechanism to manage cash flow To stay afloat during the ECQ, most of the firms delayed payments on taxes
and debt (22.8%) as well as to suppliers and borrowers (17.7%). Many also
accessed loans from government institutions (12.5%), borrowed from friends
(10.2%), and requested early payments from customers (9.5%).

Assistance received Almost 77% did not avail of the existing government assistance programs.
Among those who did avail, about 42% were satisfied with the program.

Source: Inter-Agency Task Force Technical Working Group for Anticipatory and
Forward Planning (2020). We Recover as One.

Enterprises faced sharp deterioration of financial
conditions after the COVID-19 outbreak. One
third or 33.6% of survey respondents already
had no cash or savings to cover operation costs
at the time of the survey (April 28-May 5, 2020).
The most significant financial problem during
the pandemic was paying staff wages and social
security charges (37.4%), followed by repayment
of loans (17.0%), office rent (16.8%), and invoice
payments (15.0%)
To support their operations during the ECQ,
1,334 firms (53.8% of total respondents) relied
heavily on their own funds and/or retained profit
to maintain their business, while exploring
external funding to fill gaps in working capital.
The two other major sources of funds are: family,
relatives, and friends (22.3% or 553 firms),
and loans/overdrafts/lines of credit from banks
(15.3% or 379 firms). Microenterprises which
are mostly in wholesale and retail trade recorded
the largest share (66.2%) of firms borrowing
from close relatives as well as the biggest share
(61.3%) of firms borrowing from informal
moneylenders. Half of those applying for bank
loans were also microenterprises, which may
have been supported by government programs
increasing access to finance.
In terms of business prospect, the result of the
NEDA survey also pointed to a lower optimistic
business outlook across firms of different sizes
of which 31% still do not see good prospects even
after the lifting of the ECQ. Among the sectors,
the most pessimistic are in education (36%),
tourism (35%), and transport (34%), which could
be due to the recognition that social distancing
restrictions will continue even after the ECQ is
lifted.
30 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
The first quarter Business Expectations Survey
(BES)13 of the BSP conducted in April 2020
also showed that the overall confidence index
dropped to 22.3% in the first quarter from 40.2%
in the fourth quarter of last year. Respondents’
less optimism for Q1 2020 was due to the
negative effects of COVID-19 pandemic, the
African swine fever (ASF)), and the Taal volcano
eruption, among others. The report also noted
that sentiment on financial conditions, which
was already in negative territory, slipped further
to -12.2% in the first quarter of 2020 from
-5.4% in the previous quarter, the lowest since
the first quarter of 2010. This means that firms
that expect tight financial conditions increased
and continued to outnumber those that said
otherwise during the quarter.
Recommendations
Controlling the spread of a pandemic can lessen
the number of people who are infected and thus
also mitigate indirect health and economic costs
such as the diversion or depletion of resources
to provide routine care. It can also address
fears that can lead to upsurge of the “worried
well” seeking unnecessary care which could
further burden the health care system (Falcone
and Detty 2015). Note that fear-induced
behavioral changes owing to pandemics can
also indirectly damage economic activity
and growth through closure of work places,
disruption of transportation, closure of land
borders, cancellation and reduction of shipping
and cargo services, among others (World Bank,
2014).
A threat of a sustained, severe pandemic on the
scale of the 1918 influenza pandemic, could
cause significant and lasting economic damage
(Madlav, et. al. 2017). World Bank economic
simulations in 2006 indicate that a severe
pandemic could reduce world GDP by roughly
5 percent (Burns, Van der Mensbrugghe, and
Timmer 2006). This reduction in GDP was
13
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (April 2020). Business Expectations Survey.
(Please note that this survey which was conducted from January 24, 2020
to March 13, 2020 did not factor in the impact of the ECQ in Luzon.)
largely caused by aversive behavior (such as
the avoidance of travel, restaurants, and public
spaces, as well as prophylactic workplace
absenteeism), and exceeded the economic
impact of direct morbidity- and mortality-
associated absenteeism.
Similar to risks associated with conflicts and
natural disasters, economic risk of health shocks
can be managed with policies that reduce their
likelihood and that position countries to respond
swiftly when they do occur (Bloom, Caderette,
and Sevilla 2018). To do so, the World Bank
(2020) pointed out that amid Covid-19 pandemic,
the immediate priority for policymakers is to
address the health crisis and to contain the
short-term economic damage. Policies to rebuild
the economy in the short and long-term entail
strengthening health services and putting in
place targeted stimulus measures including
support for the private sector and getting money
directly to people.
Moreover, the World Bank (2020) recommended
that during the mitigation period, countries
should focus on sustaining economic activity
with support for households, firms and essential
services. The mitigation measures, therefore,
should have the following specific objectives: i)
ensure minimal disruptions in businesses and
livelihood of people; ii) ensure the production
and delivery of goods and services, especially in
the manufacturing of food and essential goods
and services; and iii) ensure that people have
access to affordable and safe essential goods and
services.
1 Credit and other liquidity support to MSMEs
A number of measures have been implemented
in terms of extending credit to help affected
business enterprises get back on their
feet. Note also that the government also
implemented several non-cash assistance
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 31

measures for MSMEs.14 However, much
still needs to be done particularly that the
COVID-19 crisis has not yet been addressed
and its full impact has yet to be established.
Government intervention is highly critical to
minimize disruption/closure of businesses.
This is particularly so because livelihoods
are at stake.
Improve dissemination campaign
of available programs
Government agencies implementing various
programs have their own information
campaign strategies. As suggested by
the NEDA (2020), it is important to ensure
consistency and unified messaging among
these agencies about the materials they
disseminate. The NEDA also recommended
linking up with LGUs to ensure consistent
and faster information dissemination at the
local level.
Continue to relax credit terms and
requirements for availment
Despite the availability of financing
programs and supposed relaxation of credit
terms, the ADB survey showed that only 10%
of the survey respondents had accessed
a loan, overdraft, or line of credit from a
financial institution to meet their working
capital needs during the first months of
the pandemic. The government should thus
continue to encourage banks to offer debt
restructuring to help businesses meet their
obligations. Financing costs should be kept
as low as possible. Moreover, qualifications
as well as documentary requirements for
availment of financing programs should
be kept as simple as possible to increase
participation in financing programs.
Consider debt forgiveness
As the crisis drags on, businesses will
continue to record low revenues as a result
of weak demand while at the same time
expenses will continue to accumulate.
Even extension of moratorium on debt and
provision of credit will not be enough to
help MSMEs recover from this slump. The
proposal of James Galbraith (2020) for the
government to pay people’s debt or the cost
of extending their term as their inability to
pay is not the fault of the debtor may also
be considered for MSMEs.15 The slowdown
in or lack of revenues was not a result of the
businesses’ own doing but of the mandatory
lockdown. Thus, the government has the
moral obligation to help these businesses
recover.
Rhee and Kang (2020) further noted that
current measures being adopted such
as encouraging loan rollovers through
regulatory forbearance and guarantees
and providing cheap lending to banks may
not be enough to save small and mid-sized
firms, given banks’ capacity and reluctance
to take on this risk. Banks are also seen to
service first their largest customers which
would leave smaller firms behind to fend for
themselves (Kang and Rhee, 2020).
Utilize digital technologies
To facilitate more effective and efficient
support to enterprises, Lee and Chatterjee
(2020) recommended the use of financial
technologies A pandemic grant stabilization
facility may be set up by the government
to provide urgent financial support to
microenterprises with digital access tools
using financial technologies to enhance
transparency (Rhee and Kang, 2020).
Promote local products
Helping MSMEs by patronizing their products
is a patriotic act everyone can do to lend a
hand to the beleaguered small entrepreneur
sector, the collapse of which would only
spread greater joblessness and hollow out
the economy some more (Inquirer, 2020).
Promote digital transactions
As enterprises transition to the new
normal, new business models that utilize
digital technology will be adopted to
minimize physical contact. In view of
this, the ADB (2020) recommends for the
government to review current regulations

14
Examples of these are the following programs of DTI: (i) “Reboot Package for Online MSME: Pantawid COVID-19 Ecommerce Program,” which provides a
package of assistance to MSMEs that wish to start an online business or expand an existing one; (ii) “CTRL + BIZ: Reboot Now!,” which offers a series of free
webinars targeted to MSMEs that need to transform their businesses digitally; (iii) “Tech Tools for MSMEs: Reinvent your Business During the COVID-19 Crisis,”
which is a free Google site developed to provide information to MSMEs on the different technology tools, applications, platforms and resources available in
coping with the challenge of the community quarantine; and (iv) “EasyBuilder Pro,” a free website building platform specifically designed to enable non-IT
professionals to create a website for their business and personal needs. Moreover, the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) are offering online
seminars and training for MSMEs, such as “food safety emergency preparedness and response,” “navigating financials through the new normal,” and a webinar
series entitled “#Bangon: Bayanihan Tungo sa Pagbangon,” which was participated by almost 300 MSMEs under the Small Enterprise Technology Upgrading
Program focused on helping MSMEs adjust and prepare for the new norms in the business playing field.
15
Cited in Wallace, Peter (16 July 2020). A new world order (1). https://opinion.inquirer.net/131801/a-new-world-order-1
32 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
to facilitate digital transactions to protect
both businesses and their customers. In
addition, the ADB (2020) recommended
that efforts should be made to encourage
firms to shift their businesses online.
Thus, assistance to businesses should
also include both financing and training on
e-commerce basics (e.g, creating a website,
uploading photographs of their products)
and linking up with e-service companies
and e-payment providers.
Promote non-bank financing
The ADB (2020) noted that nonbank
financing such as microcredit and
pawnshops could play a bigger role in
helping enterprises with their financing
requirements. These types of financing
are particularly useful for to micro and
the small enterprises which would have
difficulty accessing bank finance during
normal times.
Consider bills that may be part of
the country’s recovery plan
Including (i) the “Rural Agricultural and
Fisheries Development Financing System
Act” which seeks to remove the distinction
between agrarian and agriculture sectors
under the “Agri-Agra Reform Credit Act
of 2009”, to to free up more capital for
agriculture as a whole, and to enhance
access of rural communities to private
sector financing; (ii) the “Financial
Institutions Strategic Transfer (FIST)
Bill,” which will allow banks and other
financial institutions to dispose of
non-performing loans and assets and
transfer such loans and assets to FIST
Corporations which are similar to Special
Purpose Vehicles; and (iii) the “Government
Financial Institutions Unified Initiatives
to Distressed Enterprises for Economic
Recovery (GUIDE) Bill,” which seeks to
provide financial assistance and access to
distressed enterprises, including MSMEs,
and to strategically important companies
critical to economic recovery.
2 Transport and Supply Chain Measures
The following measures can be pursued
to stimulate economic activity even while
containing the spread of the COVID-19 virus:
Ensure adequate transport services to
address the surge in commuters
Heeding the lessons from the transport
debacle that resulted from the lack of public
transport during the shift from ECQ to GCQ
in Metro Manila, the government needs to
provide alternative means of transport to
accommodate the surge in commuters in
a bid to restart the economy under a GCQ.
More bus augmentation and government
shuttle services and gradual removal of
constraints in public transport can help
address the growing transport demand.
Encourage cashless payment
Cashless payment systems should
be implemented broadly in all public
transport systems (buses, jeepneys,
taxis, UV express) nationwide not only
for health purposes but also to promote
greater efficiency and convenience in
public transportation. Currently, cashless
payment systems are utilized in the Metro
Manila trains, point-to-point buses, and
transport network vehicle services (TNVS).
Re-think restrictions on traditional
jeepneys
The government should validate studies
saying that COVID-19 virus could spread
faster in enclosed and air conditioned
vehicles as in modern jeepneys than
in open traditional jeepneys. The
government may consider reviewing its
Jeepney Modernization Program and
allow traditional jeepneys to operate
once again to support the rising public
transport demand as the community
quarantine eases, and to provide income
to thousands of drivers and operators
amid the pandemic.
Examine recasting the
“boundary system”
The “boundary system” for public
transportation, which is the basis of
compensation for drivers, partly explains
why public utility vehicles (PUVs) like
public buses, jeepneys and UV express are
jam-packed especially during rush hours.
Getting rid of the “boundary system” and
replacing it with fixed driver’s salary will
help in decongesting PUVs. No “boundary”
means no pressure to make the most of
trips by overloading rides with passengers
(Laurel, 2020).
Resort to transport services contracting
The Move as One Coalition composed
of 134 organizations proposed that the
government should contract the services

of transport operators and drivers who
are currently unemployed. The group
estimated that such measure may require
an investment of about P30 billion for
six months. This is only a fraction of the
overall P110 billion stimulus package that
the coalition proposed in May 2020 in order
to avert a public transportation crisis. The
package would also include spending for
walking and bicycle infrastructure, as well
as investments for dedicated bus lanes and
stations in Metro Manila, Cebu and other
busy cities (Canivel and Salaverria, 2020).
Promote alternative mobility and
sustainable transport
The COVID-19 pandemic should be an
opportunity for the government to advance
sustainable transport infrastructure and
decarbonization agenda. The government
should encourage the use of alternative
mobility and non-motorized transportation
(NMT) such as bicycles, electric scooters,
e-vehicles and other forms of personal
transportation that minimize carbon
footprint (Francisco, 2016). To promote
sustainable transport, the government
should also invest in the appropriate
infrastructure (e.g., ample sidewalks,
elevated walkways and bike lanes) to
encourage the public to cycle or walk for
short distances.
Improve people’s access to basic
necessities
Where there is no public transport, ample
government support is necessary to
ensure that individuals have access to
basic commodities such as food, water,
medicines, and medical equipment.
Apart from directly providing government
transport services, government in
cooperation with the private sector
should deploy more “mobile markets” in
subdivisions and residential areas so people
will not be forced anymore to go far from
their homes to buy basic commodities.
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 33
Institutionalize the National Single
Window (NSW)
At present, the Philippine NSW is only
a project under the Bureau of Customs
established through Executive Order 482.
A Single Window system allows traders
to submit their export or import data in
a virtual location that communicates
with the relevant regulatory authorities
for obtaining permits, certificates and
approvals electronically. Note that among
Asia and Pacific countries, only Singapore,
South Korea, Japan, Australia, Thailand, and
Malaysia have operable NSW.
Expedite the set-up of digital
infrastructure and satellite
technology services.
Fast tracking the infrastructure (such as
national broadband) for the digital economy
and the further opening up of satellite
technology services could boost and
improve digital coverage especially in an
archipelagic disaster-prone country and
lower the cost of ICT services. The country’s
national broadband network should be a
carrier-neutral network service provider or
operator where multiple ISPs could connect
or lease.
Accelerate the Implementation of
the National ID System
The government should fast track the
full implementation of the Philippine
Identification System (PhilSys) Act
approved in August 2018. The PhilSys aims
to centralize all personal information of
Filipino citizens and resident aliens. It can
generate a Philippine ID and PhilSys Number
that will be used to authenticate individual’s
identity in all government and private sector
transactions. It can thus facilitate online
business transactions amid the community
lockdowns.
 34 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

5.
BAYANIHAN
SOCIAL AMELIORATION
RESPONSE AND RESULTS
Community quarantine and stringent social SAP-AICS as the banner program for distributing
distancing measures to contain the spread of the emergency subsidy (ES) amounting between
COVID-19 restricted the mobility of people, P5,000-P8,000 to a total of 17.95 million 4Ps and
suspended business operations and public non-4Ps beneficiaries.
transportation, and put the economy on a
standstill. To cover for the loss of income due As of June 26, 2020, the national government
to disruptions in work and livelihood during (NG) through the SAP-AICS extended the ES
the quarantine period and to ensure that people to a total of 17.65 million or 98% of the target
comply with the stay-at-home health protocol, the beneficiaries, and spent P99.80 billion of the
government had to provide financial assistance P101.48 billion budget allocated for the program.
to low-income families and other vulnerable Note that this performance only pertains to the
groups with little or no savings to tap during the 1st tranche distribution, even as the Bayanihan
enhanced community quarantine (ECQ). Act which already expired intended the ES to be
given for two months.
Pursuant to Section 4 (c) of RA 11469, which
mandated the provision of emergency subsidy Speed in Delivering the
to around 18 million low-income households, Emergency Subsidy
the National Government has embarked on its
Timely delivery of the financial assistance is
biggest social protection response placing many
vital in ensuring that low-income families meet
social assistance programs (SAPs) of various line
their basic needs and do not go hungry during
agencies under the umbrella of the Emergency
the ECQ period. Those already in a vulnerable
Subsidy Program (ESP). Joint Memorandum
position even before the pandemic are badly hit
Circular16 No. 1, s. 2020 (JMC 1) identified 13
considering the “no work, no pay” conditions
social amelioration programs (SAPs) involving
and livelihood that depended on daily earnings.
the provision of outright cash assistance, zero-
Although the Executive Department finally
interest loans, and livelihood support (including
reports a relatively high coverage during the 1st
cash-for-work).
tranche payout, it took three (3) months to achieve
a 98% coverage of the target beneficiaries.
This section provides an assessment of the
results of the main component of the ESP which is
Table 9 shows the performance of the SAP-AICS
the Assistance to Individuals in Crisis Situations
in delivering the ES. On April 2, nine (9) days
(SAP-AICS) implemented by the Department
after Congress approved the Bayanihan Act, the
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). A
President reported that 3.7 million or only 20.7%
total of P196 billon17 had already been released
of the total SAP-AICS beneficiaries (17,946,554)
by the Department of Budget and Management
received their ES. These beneficiaries were
(DBM) for the SAP-AICS as of 16 April 2020.
all 4Ps families (representing 87% within its
Under Memorandum Circular No. 9, s. 2020 (MC
category) who benefited from a quicker payout
9) issued on March 28, 2020, the DSWD set the

16 17
Special Guidelines on the Provision of Social Amelioration Measures Funding of P196 billion from DBM was released to DSWD on 02
by the DSWD, DOLE, DA, DTI, DILG, DBM and DOF to Most Affected April 2020 (P100 B), and 16 April 2020 (P96 B).
Residents of Areas Under ECQ (dated 28 March 2020).
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 35

Table 9
STATUS OF DISTRIBUTION BY NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES SERVED

Total Target Total Target 4Ps Total Target Non- Total Target TNVS/
No of days from Beneficiaries: Beneficiaries: 4Ps Beneficiaries: PUV Drivers in NCR:
Distribution enactment of 17,946,554 4,287,676 13,560,746 98,132
as of RA 11469
(24 March 2020) Number of % of Number of % of Number of % of Number of % of
Recipients Total Recipients Total Recipients Total Recipients Total

30-Mar-20 6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

2-Apr-20 9 3,721,833 20.7 3,721,833 86.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A
9-Apr-20 16 3,762,251 21.0 3,721,833 86.8 N/A N/A 40,418 41.2
18-Apr-20 25 4,054,360 22.6 3,721,833 86.8 617,141 4.6 40,418 41.2
24-Apr-20 31 6,266,522 34.9 3,721,883 86.8 2,504,221 18.5 40,418 41.2
1-May-20 38 10,292,435 57.4 3,806,111 88.8 6,445,906 47.5 40,418 41.2
8-May-20 45 14,254,106 79.4 3,921,378 91.5 10,292,310 75.9 40,418 41.2
15-May-20 52 16,996,999 94.7 4,134,133 96.4 12,800,838 94.4 62,028 63.2
22-May-20 59 17,458,076 97.3 4,210,622 98.2 13,185,426 97.2 62,028 63.2
29-May-20 66 17,579,395 98.0 4,222,925 98.5 13,294,442 98.0 62,028 63.2
5-Jun-20 73 17,640,907 98.3 4,235,289 98.8 13,307,486 98.1 98,132 100.0
12-Jun-20 80 17,654,832 98.4 4,239,125 98.9 13,317,575 98.2 98,132 100.0
26-Jun-20 94 17,650,872 98.4 4,241,392 98.9 13,311,348 98.2 98,132 100.0

Note: For comparability of the weekly accomplishments in ES distribution, all target numbers of beneficiaries are based on
figures reported in the 14th and last President’s Report.
Source of basic data: 1st to 14th President’s Report to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee

due to a more established system for fund had to wait for the next batch of payouts that
transfer and distribution under the regular 4Ps came much later in mid-May and 1st week of
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. June.

However, more than half a million of the total
target 4Ps beneficiaries (4,287,676) especially
those without cash cards did not receive their ES,
and the payout figures for 4Ps families remained
the same until the 5th week (as of April 24
update) of the Bayanihan Act implementation.
On April 9, sixteen (16) days after the passage
of the Bayanihan Act, about 41% or 40,418 of
the target 98,132 TNVS/PUV drivers whose
livelihoods were severely affected as result
of the government’s policy to suspend public
transportation, received the cash assistance.
Meanwhile, 57,714 unserved TNVS/PUV drivers
The non-4Ps family beneficiaries (estimated
at 13.6 million) waited the longest until they
received the emergency subsidy. As of April 18
or 25 days after the enactment of the Bayanihan
Act, only 4.6% or 617,141 of the target non-
4Ps families received the ES, thereby depriving
around 12.9 million low-income families from
getting urgent financial relief. Note that a month
after the passage of RA 11469 (or as of April 24,
2020), around 11 million or 82% of the target
non-4Ps beneficiaries still did not receive the
promised ES. The number of unserved non-4Ps
families remained high at 3.3 million even after
45 days since Congress approved the Bayanihan
Act.
36 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Table 10
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF SAP-AICS COVERAGE
Number of Informal Total ES Beneficiaries Gap Between Total
and Poor/Near Poor Target-Actual ES
Families Target Actual Beneficiaries
Region (DSWD MC No. 9)

Central Office N/A 1,730 N/A 1,730

I-Ilocos 999,531 1,003,970 983,603 20,367
II-Cagayan Valley 698,042 699,509 675,279 24,230
CAR 318,707 315,812 296,234 19,578
III-Central Luzon 1,807,929 1,811,037 1,798,191 12,846
NCR 1,788,604 1,882,860 1,880,662 2,198
IVA-CALABARZON 2,249,567 2,241,231 2,237,436 3,795
IVB-MIMAROPA 614,100 611,347 589,287 22,060
V-Bicol 1,146,914 1,141,254 1,136,046 5,208
VI-Western Visayas 1,472,683 1,476,097 1,454,346 21,751
VII-Central Visayas 1,346,613 1,346,754 1,311,182 35,572
VIII-Eastern Visayas 875,246 873,176 830,265 42,911
IX-Zamboanga 721,841 716,673 710,302 6,371
X-Northern Mindanao 892,577 896,107 892,510 3,597
XI-Davao 953,521 955,729 950,340 5,389
XII-SOCCSKSARGEN 953,853 959,901 913,719 46,182
XIII-CARAGA 492,758 495,229 493,565 1,664
BARMM 623,607 518,138 497,905 20,233
TOTAL 17,956,093 17,946,554 17,650,872 295,682

Note: The 14th President’s Report only presents the regional breakdown for non-4Ps. Regional data on
4Ps was directly sourced from the DSWD. NCR data includes the 98,132 TNVS/PUVs. Note that in the
process of reviewing 4Ps household beneficiaries, there were 1,730 identified that were no longer eligible
for payment (delisted beneficiary, not ‘active’, etc.). These “free” slots are temporarily lodged under the
Central Office in case there will be additional 4Ps HHs that would be eligible for 1st tranche.
Source of data: DSWD-MC 9, 14th President’s Report to JCOC, and the DSWD Dashboard.

Table 10 presents the shortfalls in the ES payout
by region. A total of 295,682 families based on
SAP-AICS target (as finally reported in the 14th
President’s Report) failed to receive the 1st
tranche ES as of June 26, 2020. Considering an
average family size of 54.4, the unserved target
beneficiaries could translate to around 1.48
million affected individuals.
Note that the DSWD per MC 9 originally presented
by region the number of informal and poor/near
poor families totaling 17,956,093. This is the
same estimated target beneficiaries initially
presented in the 4th President’s Report. The total
number of target beneficiaries of 17,946,554
(as of June 26, 2020) is 9,539 lower than the
estimated number of informal and poor/near
poor families presented in MC 9. Notably, there
is a large gap between MC 9 estimated number
of beneficiaries and the number that emerged
during the identification process. For instance,
NCR’s total target (including 98,132 TNVS/PUVs)
exceeded the MC 9 regional estimate by 94,256.
In BARMM, the total target was 105,469 families
lower than the MC 9 estimated regional target.
Regions with more than 20,000 unserved
family beneficiaries include the following:
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 37

SOCCSKSARGEN (XII), Central Visayas (VII),
Eastern Visayas (VIII), Cagayan Valley (II),
MIMAROPA (IV-B), Western Visayas (VI), Ilocos
(I), and BARMM. It may be noted that Regions
XII and VIII which rank 5th and 4th, respectively,
in terms of poverty incidence (among families)
posted the highest number of unserved
beneficiaries under the 1st tranche payout.
The Bayanihan Act mandated the delivery of the
emergency subsidy to around 18 million low-
income households in two tranches. However,
the target number of beneficiaries for the 2nd
tranche is only around 12.5 million18 or roughly
5.4 million less than the 1st tranche target. Of
the 12.5 million target beneficiaries19, only 1.34
million 4Ps families and 4,625 left-out families
had received their ES in the 2nd tranche (as of
June 26, 2020).
Effectiveness in Mitigating Hunger
The effectiveness of the ES delivery can be
partly assessed in terms of its contribution in
mitigating hunger. Delayed delivery of the ES
to low-income households at a time when their
livelihood is disrupted means that they would
be unable to fully meet their food requirements
and would experience hunger.
The amount of ES is also a critical factor in
mitigating hunger. Based on the total amount
of P99.80 billion actually distributed to 17.65
million family beneficiaries in the first tranche,
each household received, on average, P5,654
in emergency subsidy. This amount is 24%
(P1,874) lower than the 2018 average food
or subsistence threshold (P7,528)20 or the
minimum amount needed by a family with five
(5) members to meet its basic food requirement
for one month. Note that the average ES is also
47.3% (P5,073) lower than the 2018 average
poverty threshold (P10,727) or the minimum
amount that a family with 5 members needs
to spend to meet its basic food and non-food
requirements.
A Social Weather Station (SWS) survey conducted
on May 4 to 10, 2020 shed light on the Filipinos’
experience of hunger from March to May 2020
which is the ECQ period. Based on this SWS
Survey, about 4.2 million or 16.7% of Filipino
families experienced involuntary hunger (i.e.,
lack of food to eat) from March to May 2020,
in spite of government efforts to provide
emergency cash and in-kind assistance. Of the
16.7%, around 13.9% or 3.5 million families
experienced moderate hunger (i.e., once or a
few times) while approximately 2.8% or 700,000
families reported severe hunger (i.e., often or
always). Note that the 16.7% rate is higher than
the 8.8% figure recorded in December 2019, and
is the highest since September 2014. Mindanao
and NCR reported relatively higher rates of
24.2% and 20.8%, respectively, from 12.7% and
9.3% in December 2019.
Key Factors Affecting the Delivery of
the Emergency Subsidy
Three main processes largely affected the
speed of the delivery and the effectiveness of
the ES under SAP-AICS: (a) identification of
eligible beneficiaries, (b) downloading of funds
to program implementation conduits (e.g., local
government units); and (c) distribution of ES to
eligible beneficiaries.
Identification of Beneficiaries
Several reasons accounted for the difficulties
in identifying, and finalizing the list of, certain
types of eligible beneficiaries which contributed
to the delayed delivery of the ES under SAP-AICS.
Huge and diverse target beneficiaries. A huge
number of target ES beneficiaries were not
covered or explicitly identified by existing social

18
14th and last President’s Report to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) dated
29 June 2020.
19
This target number of ES beneficiaries includes
3.9 million waitlisted households in the 1st
tranche, which is foreseen to still increase
based on the 14th President’s Report.
20
Mapa, Dennis. (2019). Proportion of Poor
Filipinos was Estimated at 16.6 Percent in 2018.
PSA Press Release [Online: 06 December 2019]
[Viewed: 18 August 2020]. Available at: https://
psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases/nid/144752
 38 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

registries. Of the 18 million target low-income
families, only 4.4 million families (24%) under
the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)
were already identified and pre-qualified as
ES beneficiaries.21 To meet the mandate of the
Bayanihan Act, the DSWD faced a huge challenge
of quickly identifying the remaining 13.6 million
eligible low-income/non-4Ps families, and of
delivering the ES to them within weeks. The
widespread societal impact of the COVID-19
pandemic and its quarantine measures made
it difficult to identify and target only specific
sectors, communities, or individuals (e.g.,
homeless families) as ES beneficiaries. Note that
the series of DSWD MCs enumerated 18 diverse
sectors, groups and individuals with specific
characteristics to guide the identification of ES
beneficiaries. DSWD’s Omnibus ESP Guidelines
(April 9, 2020) identified two broad categories of
non-4Ps beneficiaries: (i) low-income families
and (ii) indigent families of indigenous peoples
and other vulnerable groups.
Low-income families were not qualified based on
measurable indicators of income but by sectoral
affiliation, type of employment, and individual
characteristics. Examples under category 1
include househelp who cannot report due to
the community quarantine, drivers of public
utility vehicles (PUVs), operators of sari-sari
stores, among others.22 Meanwhile category 2
includes senior citizens, persons with disability
(PWDs), pregnant/lactating women, homeless
individuals, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
DSWD guidelines provide that beneficiaries
from vulnerable groups shall be qualified as
families and not as individual members, thus the
provision of ES to any one of them will exclude
the other members of his/her declared family.
By enumerating and targeting 18 specific
sectors, groups, or individuals with certain
characteristics, the DSWD MCs consequently
demanded more information requirements
during beneficiary identification, making the
process more burdensome at the LGU level.
With undeveloped social registries for those in
the informal economy, it was difficult to quickly
identify the eligible non-4Ps beneficiaries. ES
applicants were required to present valid IDs and
other documents to prove their eligibility. Target
beneficiaries have to submit certifications from
the Barangay or other attesting organization
that they need the emergency subsidy, making
it imperative to break stay-at-home protocols in
order to apply, get and submit such certifications.
NG-LGU Coordination. There was increased
reliance on national-local government
coordination in identifying the non-4Ps
beneficiaries and delivering the ES. Such
coordination was necessary considering (i)
the national scale and urgency of the ES to be
delivered; (ii) the diversity and specificity of
eligible beneficiaries; (iii) the lack of developed
social registries for target beneficiaries; and
(iv) the undeveloped digital payment systems
for quick payouts. However, by relying more
on LGUs to identify eligible beneficiaries and
to deliver the ES more quickly, the NG had to
impose measures to ensure more transparency,
accountability and control in the use of funds by
LGUs. For instance, while the DSWD allocated
number of beneficiaries per LGU, the DSWD still
needed to validate the list of ES beneficiaries
submitted by LGUs.
Initially, LGUs had unclear policy guidance
in identifying eligible ES beneficiaries and
determining the total number that will finally be
covered by the payout. The vague definition of
“low-income family” also led to some confusion
and wider discretion in the identification of
eligible beneficiaries by LGUs. There were
complaints from certain sectors of being unfairly
excluded (e.g., small-time pensioners, and
families who used to rely on OFW remittance
but faced financial difficulties due to job

21
Section C of DSWD Memorandum Circular 007 (03 April
2020) exempts beneficiaries covered by existing NG
databases (4Ps and NHTS-PR) from the profiling using
prescribed Social Amelioration Card (SAC) forms.
22
Low-income families as defined under DSWD MC No. 9, series of 2020, also
include: (a) directly hired or occasional contract workers; (b) subcontracted
workers; (c) homeworkers; (d) drivers and operators relying on tricycles as
their only source of income; (e) family enterprise owners such as those
operating retail, food production and vending (e.g. carinderia); (f) sub-
minimum wage earners; (g) farmers/fisherfolks; and (h) stranded workers.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 39

displacement abroad). Meanwhile, because of
the lack of clear policy guidance in determining
the number of eligible beneficiaries, some
LGUs like Malabon said that it would endorse
all its households as eligible ES beneficiaries.
Quezon City, on the other hand, identified
700,000 qualified beneficiaries but the DSWD
only approved 377,000 eligible households.23
Grievance and appeals. A grievance
mechanism operationalized through the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office
allowed left-out families to appeal for their
inclusion within three days24 from the start of
SAP distribution in the barangay. This short
period to make an appeal limits the opportunity
of qualified families from being heard and
receiving the ES. Moreover, it may not be a
feasible option for those living in far-flung
areas and in ECQ areas where people faced
mobility challenges due to non-availability of
public transport. Around 3.9 million families
were admittedly left out for the 2nd tranche
distribution.
Multiple SAPs. The existence of multiple SAPs
with different units of beneficiaries, amount of
subsidy, and frequency of payout complicated
the identification of eligible ES beneficiaries.
Table 11 presents the six SAPs involving cash
assistance. Five of these SAPs (AICS, FSRF,
CAMP, CAMP-AKAP, SBWS) involved direct cash
assistance for individuals and families while
another involved cash-for-work scheme (i.e.,
TUPAD #BKBK). Note that only SAP-AICS targets
families as beneficiaries while all others cater to
affected and displaced individuals.
Multiple SAPs made the process of identifying ES
beneficiaries more complex and tedious because
of the need to exclude families with members who
already benefited from other SAPs. Also, DSWD
had to identify those that qualify for top-ups if the
cash assistance received from other SAPs is lower
than the regional threshold. The absence of an
integrated database among SAP-implementing
agencies made the cross-matching with other
SAPs’ masterlist cumbersome, thus delaying
the final list of eligible beneficiaries both for the

Table 11
SOCIAL AMELIORATION PROGRAMS INVOLVING CASH ASSISTANCE

Program Implementing Eligible Target Type of Amount

Agency Assistance

SAP-AICS DSWD 4Ps, non-4Ps families considered Two months P5,000-P8,000

as low income and most affected
CAMP DOLE Affected formal sector workers One-time P5,000

FSRF DA Small rice farmers One-time P5,000

(farm size: up to 1 ha.)
Highest minimum
TUPAD #BKBK* DOLE Not beneficiaries of other SAPs Max: 10 days wage in the region

CAMP-AKAP DOLE Displaced OFWs One –time P10,000 (USD200)

SBWS DOF/SSS Affected formal sector workers Two months P5,000-P8,000

* Involves cash-for-work
Note: The SBWS was not originally part of JMC 1 but was a replacement of CAMP which ended mid April

23
Modesto, C. (2020). DSWD eyes improved cash aid distribution
after noting ‘shortcomings’. CNN Philippines [Online: 09 April
2020] [Viewed: 13 April 2020.] Available at https://www.
cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/4/9/dswd-shortcoming-
social-amelioration.html
24
Philippine Information Agency. (2020). DSWD sets up grievance, appeal
mechanism on SAP. PIA [Online: 24 April 2020]. [Viewed: 26 April 2020].
Available at: https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1040001
40 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
1st and 2nd tranche distribution. Multiple SAPs
also meant that additional work had to be done
to process reapplications for ES of beneficiaries
from other SAPs with one-time assistance like
the FSRF.
Downloading of Funds
The President’s weekly reports to Congress on
the Bayanihan Act implementation identified
three groups of beneficiaries of the SAP-AICS:
(i) 4Ps, (ii) non-4Ps, and (iii) TNVS/PUVs in NCR.
The different speed of downloading funds to
program implementation conduits (e.g., field
offices of a national government agency (NGA),
other NGAs, and LGUs) depended on the extent
of organizational coordination needed, the
number of beneficiaries, and the presence of a
social registry and established systems for fund
transfers and electronic payments.
4Ps Families. Intra-organizational coordination
between the DSWD-Central Office and its
regional field offices (FOs), along with an
established system of fund transfers, led to a
speedy distribution of ES funds for 4Ps families.
SAP-AICS funds were downloaded to DSWD-
FOs and deposited to the accounts of 3.7 million
families with cash cards (i.e., 86.8% of the 4.3
million target 4Ps beneficiaries) on April 2,
2020, just nine (9) days after Congress passed
the Bayanihan Act on March 24, 2020. The
remaining more than half a million 4Ps families
with no cash cards experienced longer delays of
downloading and distribution of ES funds similar
to the non-4Ps beneficiaries.
Non-4Ps Families. Unlike the already existing
system for the delivery of aid to 4Ps beneficiaries,
the DSWD had to create a new distribution
scheme for non-4Ps families. Pursuant to DSWD
MC 9, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
forged between the DSWD and the LGU is a critical
step to fund transfer. The MOA shall be signed by
the DSWD Regional Director and the Local Chief
25 26
Based on DSWD’s presentation during the House
Committee on Good Government and Public
Accountability Inquiry on SAP Implementation on 22
June 2020.
Executive. This MOA shall be submitted by the
LGUs along with their budget proposal to their
respective DSWD-FO, which shall then facilitate
the transfer of funds to the LGUs within 24 hours
from receipt of the LGUs’ submission.
By April 10, 2020 or 17 days after Congress
passed the Bayanihan Act, the downloading of ES
funds only covered 700 or 45.9% of 1,526 target
LGUs.25 By April 18, 2020, a total of 1,454s MOAs
on SAPs were already completed.26 However, it
was only on 11 May 2020 or 48 days from the
passage of RA 11469 when the download of ES
funds to LGUs was reportedly completed.
Note that LGUs from the Bicol and Caraga Regions
were quicker in complying with the requirements
for fund downloading. Thus, they received 100%
of the ES funds from the DSWD by 8 April 2020
or 16 days after the passage of the Bayanihan
Act. This is indicative of the capability of some
LGUs to adapt more quickly and mobilize special
operations more systematically versus others.
TNVS/PUVs Drivers. Instead of including
TNVS/PUVs in the pool of non-4Ps, the delivery
of ES for this group of beneficiaries was through
inter-agency coordination as set in a tripartite
MOA between the DSWD, the DOTr-LTFRB,
and the Land Bank of the Philippines. The
institutional arrangement requires the LTFRB
to provide the DSWD with a list of registered
drivers as potential ES beneficiaries while the
DSWD performs the following: (i) cross-match
and validate the LTFRB list of registered drivers
as part of the de-duplication process; (ii) forward
the list of validated beneficiaries to LTFRB for
preparation of the payroll; and (iii) transfer the
ES funds to funds via Land Bank.
To give way to the cross-matching and validation
processes between DSWD and LTFRB, a “batching
system” of ES distribution was employed for this
segment of ES beneficiaries. As shown in the
4th President’s Report to the JCOC dated 20 April 2020.

weekly President’s Report, this system resulted
in regular lulls in ES distribution for drivers of
TNVS/PUVs. For instance, the reported 40,418
beneficiaries from this group that received ES
(as of April 09, 2020) stayed the same for five
(5) straight weeks until May 15, 2020 when
an additional 21,610 beneficiaries reportedly
received the ES. A 100% ES payout for a total
target of 98,132 drivers (in NCR) was reported
on June 05, 2020 or 74 days after the passage of
the Bayanihan Act.
Distribution of Emergency Subsidy
Given the developed payments system for both
the 4Ps and TNVS/PUVs drivers (i.e., through
banks or GCash), distribution was near-real-time
with the download of funds for these segments.
In contrast, the distribution of ES by LGUs for
non-4Ps families was done manually through
physical distribution which also posed health
risks to individuals distributing and claiming the
subsidies.
Payout process to non-4Ps. DSWD MC 9 provides
that, during payouts, the LGUs must conduct
a Family Profiling of Beneficiaries of ESP. This
involves the accomplishment of a simplified and
a comprehensive Social Amelioration Card (SAC)
Form. The SAC captures the family profile which
serves as a mechanism for DSWD to monitor
the eligible families’ receipt of assistance from
any government agency during this COVID-19
crisis. The ES beneficiaries must also: (i) submit
photocopies of their identification cards with
their specimen signatures; (ii) have photos taken
as evidence of their actual receipt of the ES; and
(iii) sign the certificate of payment.
After the ES payouts, LGUs must follow certain
procedures under MC 9 to promote transparency
and accountability in the ES distribution. These
include the following: (i) submit, within 15 days
from the completion of ES distribution, (a) the
encoded SAC Forms in accordance with the
DSWD-prescribed matrix and (b) the liquidation
report; and (ii) update the SAC to reflect the
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 41
assistance received by the beneficiaries after the
first and subsequent payouts. On the part of the
DSWD, it needs to validate the LGU documents
within 15 days from submission to determine
the eligibility of those who received the ES and
the duplication in the benefits granted. Per MC
9, LGU officials who granted ES to ineligible
beneficiaries will be investigated by authorities
for proper determination of administrative, civil
and/or criminal liability including the refund of
the subsidy improperly provided.
Extension of payout deadlines. DSWD MC
9 provides that LGUs shall distribute the ES
within seven (7) calendar days to families in
geographically isolated and disadvantaged
areas (GIDAs), and five (5) calendar days to
families in the rest of the LGUs upon the receipt
of downloaded funds. However, the delay in
downloads for a majority of the LGUs pushed
DSWD to set a later but uniform deadline of
30 April 2020 for all LGUs to complete the ES
distribution.
As of May 01, 2020, a day after the extended April
30, 2020 deadline for ES distribution by LGUs,
a total of 7.1 million or 52.5% of the non-4Ps
target beneficiaries were still unable to receive
their cash subsidies. Note that low payout rates
were posted by the following regions: BARMM,
NCR, Calabarzon (IV-A), Central Visayas (VII),
and Zamboanga Peninsula (IX). Four (4) out of
these five (5) regions belong to the Top 5 most
populous regions in the country, indicating that
respective contexts (e.g., population, absorptive
capacity and even topography of LGUs) can affect
the speed of distributing the ES. The inability of
a number of LGUs to meet the April 30 deadline
for ES distribution led the DSWD to extend the
deadline twice: May 4 (for regular LGUs) and May
7 (for GIDAs) during the first time, and May 10
for the second time.
Social distancing rules and quarantine protocols
which were put in place to ensure the safety of
both DSWD/LGU personnel and the beneficiaries
42 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
also factored in the delay to the already-tedious
physical distribution process. This led to
limitations in operational capacity, putting a
cap on the number of beneficiaries who could
claim their cash subsidy in a day. DSWD and
LGU on-ground personnel who were identified
to be infected by the virus also contributed to a
shortage of manpower.
Liquidation by LGUs. Many LGUs were late
in complying with the requirement to submit
the liquidation report within 15 days from the
completion of payouts. As of June 26, 2020, only
83% or 1,356 of 1,634 cities/municipalities had
submitted their respective liquidation reports.
This leaves 278 LGUs still without liquidation.
Delayed submission constrained the DSWD
from counterchecking the eligibility of those
who actually received the ES. Per MC 9, the
DSWD should be able to complete the validation
process within 15 days from LGU submission
in order to remove unqualified families and
avoid duplication in the grant of ES considering
multiple SAPS.
Late submission of LGU liquidation reports
meant delays in the download and distribution
of 2nd tranche ES. Cases of double claims in
the 1st tranche of payouts compounded the
delay already faced by the LGUs in liquidation,
especially with the need to account for all the
returns. In fact, such delays led to the exclusion
of eligible ES beneficiaries from the 1st tranche
when NG decided to distribute the 2nd tranche
ES only in ECQ areas (as of May 31, 2020). Many
LGUs were already under GCQ by the time the
2nd tranche ES was prepared for distribution.
Anomalies and irregularities. Anomalies
on the distribution also surfaced through the
grievance and appeals system set up by the
DSWD. Complaints have been reported against
barangay officials due to anomalies involving
splitting of ES, falsification of the master list,
27
DILG: 23 brgy. officials now facing criminal charges for alleged SAP anomalies, 110
more under case-build up. [Online: 18 May 2020]. [Viewed: 19 May 2020]. Available at:
https://dilg.gov.ph/news/DILG-23-brgy-officials-now-facing-criminal-charges-for-
alleged-SAP-anomalies-110-more-under-case-build-up/NC-2020-1155
granting aid to ineligible families, and getting
a cut or “tara” from the SAP beneficiaries,
among others.27 On May 23, 2020, a total of
508 complaints on alleged anomalies were
reportedly received, for which 83 officials have
already been charged criminally.28 Also, there
were reports on non-compliance with a DILG
directive for Punong Barangays to post the list of
SAP beneficiaries in conspicuous public places
within their communities like the barangay hall,
social center, gymnasium, transport terminal,
and other similar public places.
Registration for digital payouts. With the
inefficiencies experienced during the 1st
tranche payout, the DSWD in partnership with
the DICT launched the ReliefAgad System which
allows 2nd tranche beneficiaries to receive
their cash subsidies digitally via mobile money
wallets and bank accounts. This essentially
skips the bureaucratic process of funds being
downloaded to the LGUs. Also, cashless and
contactless transfer payment is a safer approach
that avoids having to transport loads of cash to
distribution sites. The challenge, however, is how
to get more of the beneficiaries to register in the
ReliefAgad System. According to the June 26,
2020 President’s Report to the JCOC, only 4.24
million out of the 12.5 million target families for
the 2nd tranche have signed up.
Recommendations
The COVID-19 crisis revealed gaps in the ability
of government to quickly and cost-efficiently
deliver the emergency subsidy intended to
address financial difficulties of Filipino families
(particularly the poor) during the community
quarantine. It provided the impetus for
government to shore up social protection systems
and long-postponed reforms (e.g., National ID
System) that can ensure preparedness for future
crises. Social protection programs should be
designed in a way that it can be readily scaled up
to quickly deliver the financial assistance when
28
9th President’s Report to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee, dated 25 May 2020.

emergencies occur. This pandemic has also
illustrated the vital role of local governments,
and the need for clear policies that could ensure
better NG-LGU coordination and bring down
accountabilities and decision-making closer to
actors on the ground.
Although this evaluation focuses on the
implementation of SAP-AICS, lessons drawn
from it to a great extent reflect the overall
performance of the ESP—the umbrella program
for social amelioration responses during the
COVID-19 crisis. Discussions below tackle three
broad areas relating to policy design, ancillary
systems critical to SAP delivery, and the
promotion of transparency and accountability.
1 Consider a simple universal social
protection program during crisis
In times of emergency, the quickest and
almost automatic option is to leverage on
existing programs that can be expanded
vertically (through top-ups) or horizontally
by incorporating new recipients. It would
normally be less costly than introducing
entirely new programs in haste. The case
of many European countries show that with
social assistance programs in place, they were
able to scale up with temporary top-ups and
deliver the emergency cash transfers quickly.
This was the case for SAP-AICS in so far as
the 4Ps beneficiaries is concerned, given
the conditional cash transfers (CCT) system
already established before the pandemic. The
payouts for the 1st tranche of the ES under
the SAP-AICS proved to be much faster for
4Ps beneficiaries, while LGUs and DSWD still
had to contend with challenges in identifying
eligible non-4Ps family beneficiaries.
Note that the existence of multiple programs
in implementing the ESP to reach the
prescribed amount of benefits (i.e.,P5,000
to P8,000) has complicated the delivery of
assistance that it required tedious cross-
matching and de-duplication across agency
SAPs to finalize the list before payout. After
the 1st tranche ES distribution, about 3.9
million waitlisted or left-out families were
added as a result of appeals. There are
also reports of double claims and refunds
29
Ozler, B. (2020). What can low-income countries do to provide relief for the poor
and the vulnerable during the COVID-19 pandemic?. World Bank Blogs [Online: 19
March 2020]. [Viewed: 05 April 2020]. Available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/
impactevaluations/what-can-low-income-countries-do-provide-relief-poor-and-
vulnerable-during-covid
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 43
from ineligible beneficiaries. These indicate
the challenge of targeting, especially in the
absence of a comprehensive and unified
database that allows government to quickly
assess families with clear targeting criteria.
Future welfare assistance programs utilizing
different units (i.e., individuals, households)
as beneficiaries should not be placed under
one umbrella program, as the case for ESP, to
avoid double claims and difficulty in tracking
availments.
During crisis when emergency subsidies
need to be quickly delivered, government
can consider setting up a simple universal
transfer rather than more complex poverty-
targeted programs. It should consider the
tradeoff between (i) rigidity of identification
and (ii) the time it takes to completely identify
beneficiaries and provide the benefits. Delays
will hurt households that are most in-need
of emergency assistance, and could lead to
negative coping mechanisms such as going
into debt or sale of assets. Note that “gains
from targeting are reduced dramatically when
so many people are in danger of falling into
poverty during the pandemic”.29
With government originally targeting 18 million
(plus 3.9 million left-out families), a total of
about 22 million practically covers close to 90%
of the 24.6 million30 families in the country.
The target coverage is almost universal, but
payouts of the emergency subsidy (especially
under AICS) was delayed because government
had to grapple with issues of targeting and
identifying eligible beneficiaries with a very
loose definition of “low income”, and the lack
of unified database that can quickly assess the
socio-economic profile of Filipino families.
One option that countries have started to
adopt in addressing the covid-19 crisis is to
give all legal residents within countries with
a basic income. Essentially, the total size of
the subsidy that a household would receive
will be adapted to its size. More importantly,
the universal basic income (UBI) is simple and
practical to implement during a crisis. For
example, Japan provided a one-time transfer
to all citizens while Singapore covered all the
adults. Universal schemes can have its variants
wherein the value of the transfer could be
the same for each individual or different by
distinct population groups (e.g., lower amounts
for children than for adults). Other universal
transfers are provided by household, like in
30
Using PSA population projections based on the 2015 Census
of Population and Housing, the projected population of the
Philippines at the start of 2020 is 108.0 million or 24.6 million
families (based on 4.4 average family size).
44 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
Timor Leste, but since the transfer is intended
to be a flat rate, “the effective transfer to
each individual will vary with larger (and more
likely poorer) households receiving less per
person”.31
2 Improve database and digital
payments system
The crisis presents opportunity to fast
track the implementation of the National ID
System (Republic Act No. 1105), which can
help harmonize databases government-
wide and readily generate data for targeting
and monitoring public service delivery. In
Pakistan, the 12 million extremely poor
families that availed of the one-time cash
assistance good for four (4) months was easier
to identify with the citizens’ ID numbers linked
to various databases, such as the National
Socioeconomic Database, and that of the
National Database Registration Authority. The
ID that is also used for tax and billing purposes
is convenient in ascertaining the poverty and
wealth status of families and individuals. 32
Amidst the COVID-19 threat, the physical
distribution of the ES proved to be challenging
as well. It was difficult to maintain social
distancing in public places during payouts,
and the speed of distribution relied heavily
on availability of manpower and logistical
support at the local level. The launching of
the ReliefAgad is expected to speed up the
2nd tranche distribution with online payment
modes via In Cash, Pay Maya, GCash or other
financial service providers. The case of
Thailand demonstrated that fully interoperable
PromptPay System allowed government to
send out payments fast to bank accounts.
It is important, however, that the digitalization
of payments does not lead to the exclusion of
vulnerable groups like those without access to
technology, the PWDs and elderly, and those
in geographically-isolated and disadvantaged
areas. Moreover, “as digitalization accelerates,
it is important to build strong institutional,
legal and technical safeguards for data
protection and privacy”. 33
31
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Addressing the COVID-19 Economic Crisis in Asia Through Social Protection. Published May 2020.
32
Nishtar, Sania. COVID-10: Using cash payments to protect the poor in Pakistan. [Online: 5 May 2020]. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2020/05/using-cash-payments-protect-poor-pakistan/
33
Rutkowski, Michal. Responding to the crisis with digital payments for social protection: Short-term measures with long-term benefits. Accessed on
31 March 2020]. Available at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/ voices/responding-crisis-digital-payments-social-protection-short-term-measures-long-
term-benefits
3 Enhance and promote transparency
and accountability
In the exercise of the President’s emergency
budgetary powers, it is important to ensure
that fund releases and payouts are reported
to assure the public that huge sums of
government funds rightly go to programs for
which they were purposed. For transparency,
funds as they are downloaded and disbursed
should be publicly reported. This can help
identify whether bottlenecks causing delay
are due to lapses at the releasing stage or at
distribution by the LGUs.
Transparency also entails the reporting
of outputs and performance. The DSWD
Dashboard for ES allows near-real-time
monitoring of payouts (although there were
observed discrepancies with that of the
President’s weekly report to the JCOC). The
disaggregated data from the dashboard
should help concerned agencies identify low-
performing LGUs that need urgent attention
and possible intervention in completing
payouts.
The grievance and appeals system is a
good mechanism to encourage feedback.
It is important, however, to improve its
accessibility (e.g., by making the grievance
hotlines toll free, and providing alternatives
to people in rural barangays who may not be
able to utilize online-based platforms like
the “e-reklamo” site). Meanwhile, ensuring
accountability requires sustained efforts in
addressing complaints in implementation and
against erring officials.
It is also important to get the oversight
bodies on board, especially the Commission
on Audit (COA). Although its regular policy
is to conduct post-audits, it may in cases
especially involving huge public funds and
executive discretion consider auditing in the
course of program implementation. The COA
also has the technical know-how to advise
how to streamline processes and facilitate
the payouts, yet remain compliant with audit
rules. Audit during program implementation
can lead to early detection of flaws in financial
procedures, and can prevent possible misuse
of funds.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 45

6.
BAYANIHAN
PEACE AND ORDER
RESPONSE AND RESULTS
The imposition of community quarantine not Measures to Assist LSIs
only restricted mobility, but also produced an
The first and main issuance on the management
unintended consequence: the stranding of
of LSIs is the National Task Force (NTF)
people. “Locally stranded individuals” or LSIs
Against COVID-19 Order No. 2020-02 (May
as they are called “include foreign nationals or
13, 2020) which introduced guidelines to
Filipino citizens in a specific locality within the
provide a “systemic and coordinated approach
Philippines who have expressed intention to
in facilitating and transporting LSIs to their
return to their place of residence/home origin.”
respective residences.” It created Task Forces
LSIs are further classified into: 1) workers; 2)
(one each for ROFs and LSIs), and defined
students; 3) local or foreign tourists; and 4) other
the duties of a number of national agencies
individuals stranded in various localities while
( including the DILG, DOT, DSWD ), regional task
in transit”.34 They include returning overseas
forces (RTFs), LGUs and the local task forces
Filipinos (ROFs) including Overseas Filipino
(LTFs) therein.
Workers-, who upon arriving in the country,
would get stranded.
On the other hand, DILG issued Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. 2020-087 (May 21, 2020) to
As of June 27, 2020, there are 127, 367 registered
facilitate the return of the LSIs to their respective
LSIs. Many of them are stranded in the Bicol
residences. It mandated all RTFs and LTFs to
Region (28, 670), NCR (16, 738) and Region IV-
organize their respective management sub-
B, Mimaropa (16, 361).35 Note, however, that the
clusters and to align their organizational structure
Social Weather Stations (SWS) has estimated that
and implementation efforts with the national
around 5.4% of all adult Filipinos or equivalent
sub-task group (STG) on the management of LSIs.
to 4.1 million individuals got stranded in May
2020 due to the strict community quarantine
Note that these issuances delineated the roles
measures.36 In July, a survey by the same outfit
of the LGU of origin and the LGU of destination.
found that 3.5 million adult Filipinos (5.1% of all
They enjoined inter-LGU coordination to manage
adult-age Filipinos) experienced stranding.37
the transfer of the LSIs, including the movement

34
Relevant issuances on the management of
LSIs and ROFs: include a) NTF Against COVID-19
Order No. 2020-02 (dated 13 May 2020) -
Operational Guidelines on the Management of
Locally Stranded Individuals (LSIs), and b) DILG
Memorandum Circular No. 2020-087 (dated 21
May 2020) - Duties and Responsibilities of Local
Government Officials, DILG Regional Directors
and Field Officers, Philippine National Police,
and Others Concerned on the Management of
Returning Overseas Filipinos and Locally Stranded
Individuals.
35 37
Office of Presidential Adviser on the Peace https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1316970/sws-
Process. Govt. on LSI travel moratorium: “Public around-3-5m-adult-filipinos-got-stranded-in-
health first” (2020), OPAPP [online]. 30 June july-due-to-quarantine, last accessed 10 August
2020, https://peace.gov.ph/2020/06/govt-on- 2020
lsi-travel-moratorium-public-health-first, last
accessed 21 July 2020
36
SWS: Some 4.1 million Filipinos got stranded due
to COVID-19 quarantines. ABS-CBN News [online].
13 June 2020 https://news.abs-cbn.com/
news/06/13/20/sws-some-41-million-filipinos-
got-stranded-due-to-covid-19-quarantines, last
accessed 19 July 2020
 46 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
of people needing passage from one LGU to
another. However, the role of the LGUs through
which the LSIs may transit is not clear, except that
the Joint Task Force (JTF) CV Shield is mandated
to assist and facilitate unhampered passage of
LSIs in Quarantine Control Checkpoints (QCP).
What starts the process of transfer is the LSI’s
notification of the barangay that he or she is
stranded. The next step is the processing and
release of documents required for the LSI’s exit
from GGCQ and Modified GCQ areas including
the (i) medical clearance certificate from the LGU
and (ii) travel authority that shall be issued by the
JTF CV Shield. All receiving LGUs are enjoined
to not deny, and instead, facilitate the entry of
the LSIs with complete requirements, provided
that prior coordination was made through the
NTF and/or RTFs, and other concerned agencies
as deemed necessary. The receiving LGUs,
however, may subject the LSIs to their respective
local health protocols and procedures, such as
14-day quarantine and rapid anti-body testing,
that are consistent with IATF policies.
To complement these national government
issuances, the JTF CV Shield also published two
travel protocol flowcharts (as of June 21, 2020)
to further guide (1) individuals travelling within
NCR, provinces or highly urbanized cities (HUCs)
and (2) individuals going out of NCR, provinces,
or HUCs.
Hatid Tulong Program
The Hatid Tulong program, led by the
Presidential Management Staff (PMS) of the
Office of the President, is the government’s
short-term transportation assistance initiative
to help stranded individuals to return to their
home provinces. It started as Hatid Probinsya,
a program created after the suspension of
the administration’s Balik Probinsya, Bagong
Pag-asa (BP2) program. It aims to prioritize all
government efforts in assisting LSIs.38 Though
there is no Presidential order on the same,
38
DILG slams Gabriela: Balik Probinsiya is meant to provide livelihood and accessible health care programs in the provinces (2020). DILG
News [online]. 01 June 2020, https://www.dilg.gov.ph/news/DILG-slams-Gabriela-Balik-Probinsiya-is-meant-to-provide-livelihood-and-
accessible-health-care-programs-in-the-provinces/NC-2020-1175, last accessed 01 August 2020
it involves multiple agencies to achieve its
objective: the NTF Covid-19, DOTr, DOT, DSWD,
DILG, and DOLE. The Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration, Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines, Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine
Ports Authority, Office for Transportation
Security, Manila International Airport Authority,
Land Transportation Office, and the LTFRB are
also involved in the implementation of the Hatid
Tulong program.
Implementation
Following the easing of lockdowns and opening
of local borders, National Government Agencies
(NGAs) and LGUs started extending various
forms of assistance to support stranded students,
construction and domestic workers, foreigner
nationals, and returning Filipinos throughout the
community quarantine period.39
As part of the administration’s whole-of-
government approach in a bid to contain
COVID-19 and mitigate its wide-ranging socio-
economic impact, NGAs such as the DILG,
DOTr, DOT, the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) offered
and extended various services ranging from
shuttle services, immigration assistance, travel
clearance facilitation, chartered and sweeper
flights, and food assistance.
Table 12 shows that the government has provided
aid to thousands of stranded individuals, both
locals and foreign nationals, who required
immediate assistance with regard to their travel
to, from, and within the country. The DFA reported
that it has repatriated more than 93,000 OFWs,
and assisted almost 4,000 foreign nationals,
while DILG so far has assisted more than 70,000
LSIs and ROFs. The DOT, meanwhile, accounted
for around 200,000 beneficiaries of its programs
for both domestic and foreign tourists in the
country.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 47

transport and of land, sea and air travel would

Table 12
SELECTED ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXTENDED TO leave people who were unprepared, didn’t have
LSIs AND ROFs the means, or simply could not travel for some
Department/ Particulars Estimated No. of reason, trapped with hardly any options on how
Agency Beneficiaries to safely return to their residences. Community
quarantines or lockdowns were never intended
Repatriation of 93,675
OFWs (as of June) to be perpetual so it would have been reasonable
Assistance in the to consider that LSIs would want or even insist to
Department of repatriation of 2,647 go home as quarantine restrictions were eased.
Foreign Affairs stranded foreign (as of May)
(DFA) nationals Foremost in the minds of many Filipinos when

Assistance in the 1,293

repatriation of (as of May)
1 Timeliness
foreign seafarers
Though stranding could have been foreseen,
Department of 70,678 the very first issuance by the NG on the
Transport of ROFs
Interior and Local and LSIs (as of June) management of LSIs was only on May 13, 2020,
Government (DILG) practically two months after the lockdown
started. It was also only in May when the DILG
Department of directed the PNP to set up help desks in all
Transport of ROFs 1,720 police stations nationwide to help LSIs. As
Transportation (as of May)
(DOTr) a result, many LGUs which depended on the
NG for policy directions also refrained from
Assistance in the 157,867 issuing guidelines on the management of LSIs
repatriation of (as of June) within their respective jurisdictions. An earlier
Department of foreign tourists policy issuance would have given agencies
Tourism (DOT)
43,993 and LGUs adequate time to prepare for the
Assistance to
domestic tourists (as of June) repatriation of LSIs.

2 Efficiency
Facilitation of 181,487
Bureau of (as of May) The program on LSIs employed a whole-
Immigration (BI) immigration
formalities of-government approach. Many NGAs and
LGUs were tasked to render services for
LSIs. They were involved in committees for
Note: The figures are based on the various agency transportation, security, assistance lead, travel
submissions reported in the President’s Report to routes, medical lead, messaging, and physical
Congress, as mandated under Republic Act No. 11469, set-ups.41
otherwise known as the Bayanihan To Heal As One Act.
Absence of a clear institutional
arrangement
The involvement of numerous agencies is
both the program’s strength and weakness.
According to Hatid Tulong Program Head and
As mentioned earlier, the Hatid Tulong
PMS Assistant Secretary Joseph B. Encabo, the program is not covered by any issuance.
government has already assisted, as of July 30, Thus, the lines of responsibility and control
are not very clear. The influx of LSIs at
2020, at least 126,000 LSIs nationwide.40 the Rizal Memorial Stadium (RMC) in the
last days of July highlighted the absence
Assessment of a clear institutional arrangement.
The government could have reasonably Manila Mayor Isko Moreno described
the management of that situation as
anticipated that the restriction on the domestic “unacceptable”. 42
mobility of people and suspension of public

39
President’s Report to Congress on May 4, 2020
40
128,000 LSI, natulungan ng Hatid Tulong Initiative Program (2020).
Philippine information Agency [online]. 30 July 2020, https://pia.gov.
ph/press-releases/releases/1049007, last accessed 01 August 2020
41
Presentation of Usec. Danilo G. Pamonag before the House
Committee on Good Government, July 30, 2020.
42
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1313858/isko-moreno-
says-management-of-lsis-in-rizal-memorial-stadium-
unacceptable, last accessed August 1, 2020
48 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
The set-up for the management of LSIs is
also a top-heavy system. Initiatives to assist
LSIs are organized at the national level.
Such a setup does not accommodate the
possibility that some fully equipped LGUs
could also organize their own repatriation
programs.
Moreover, NGAs involved in the
management of LSIs are tasked to deliver
almost similar services but for different
target beneficiaries. As shown in Table 11,
and as mentioned in the issuances, the
DILG, the DOTr and DOT offer transportation
services for the LSIs. What distinguish
their services from each other are their
target beneficiaries. The DOT, for instance,
would be in-charge of the transportation
of domestic tourists but not of stranded
construction workers. The duplication
of functions and splitting of services in
terms of target beneficiaries could also be
observed in DFA and DOT programs for the
repatriation of foreign nationals. However,
such an arrangement is not efficient as it
prevents access to an agency’s repatriation
and other services by certain beneficiaries
with same need, which is to go home to
their families.
Absence of timelines and deadlines
The issuances on LSIs did not state the
duration of processing of clearances by
LGUs. As expected, the processing time for
clearances varied across LGUs, either as
points of origins or destinations. Even JTF
CV Shield Chief Lt. Gen. Guillermo Eleazar
acknowledged the lags in LGU response
times. In a radio interview, he said that
LGUs may delay the travel authority of
individuals or travelers who would enter
their areas. While an LGU of destination
could not deny the entry of LSIs, they
could delay the travel authority especially
if their quarantine facilities could no
longer accommodate new arriving LSIs.43
The issue essentially boils down to the
presence or absence of LGU capacity to
43
Marquez, C. (2020). ‘Travel authority’ only for persons crossing provincial,
regional borders – Eleazar. Inquirer.net [online]. 03 June 2020, https://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/1285714/travel-authority-only-for-persons-
crossing-provincial-regional-borders-eleazar, last accessed 22 July 2020
44
Talabong, R. (2020). ‘Walang malapitan’: Stranded ‘probinsyanos’
feel abandoned by Duterte gov’t. Rappler.com [online]. 28 May 2020,
https://rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/stranded-probinsyanos-feel-
abandoned-duterte-government-coronavirus-pandemic, last accessed
22 July 2020
45
Influx of LSIs at Rizal Memorial Stadium brought by word of mouth.
ONE News [Facebook Video]. 28 July 2020, https://www.facebook.com/
watch/?v=1037726069977716, last accessed August 1, 2020
accommodate arriving LSIs, a critical issue
that should be addressed.
3 Effectiveness
Key issues on the efficacy of policies and
programs for LSIs include the following:
Insufficient information management
One glaring absence in the management of
information regarding LSIs is a portal that
compiles national and all LGU issuances.
The lack of available, accessible and
comprehensible information on LSIs
prompted a number of them to set up their
own social media groups to support and
help each other.44
There were also questions on the
effectiveness of the communication for
the Hatid-Tulong program. For instance,
organizers of the program explained that
the influx of thousands of LSIs at the RMC
is due to their arrival off-schedule, and that
many of them learned about the program
through word-of-mouth.45 The sheer
number of LSIs that packed the stadium
made physical distancing impossible,
and 48 LSIs eventually tested positive for
Covid-19. 46
Costly fees for medical clearances.
The issuances on LSIs did not also include
a provision on imposition of fees for the
processing of medical and travel clearances
or the prohibition of the same, much more
provide for schedule of fees, should they
be warranted. There were reports about
excessive fees for medical certificates
issued to LSIs as one of the requirements
for repatriation. Some LGUs required LSIs
to pay as much as P3,000 in exchange for
medical certificates to support their travel
authority, even without laboratory tests.
This prompted DILG Secretary Año to say
that medical certificates should preferably
be given for free since no laboratory tests
are conducted and to request all local chief
executives to review their schedule of fees
and only charge minimal amounts for the
service.47
46
Bagaoisan, A. (2020). Rizal Memorial closed for decontamination; 48 LSIs
positive in COVID-19 rapid tests. ABS-CBN News [online]. 30 July 2020,
https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/30/20/rizal-memorial-closed-for-
decontamination-48-lsis-positive-in-covid-19-rapid-tests, last accessed
August 1, 2020
47
DILG to LGUs: Don’t impose excessive fees for medical certificate
required for travel authority of LSIs (2020). DILG [online]. 26 May 2020,
https://www.dilg.gov.ph/news/DILG-to-LGUs-Dont-impose-excessive-
fees-for-medical-certificate-required-for-travel-authority-of-LSIs/NC-
2020-1167, last accessed 17 July 2020

Incoherent national and local
government responses
One of the key problems that surfaced on
the implementation of the policies to help
LSIs is the dissonance between national
and local government measures. During the
initial stage of the implementation of the
program on LSIs, the recurring news was
about the complaints of local government
officials on the lack of coordination and
communication from concerned NGAs
regarding the travel details of their
returning constituents.48 Some LGUs
expressed their disappointment, saying that
the poor coordination of NGAs with regional
and provincial offices undermined their
efforts to keep their areas COVID-19 free.49
Travel policies emanating from different
government entities also confused people.
During an online meeting (June 05, 2020) of
the Housing Committee on Transportation,
one of the issues identified pertained to
the confusing, and conflicting government
issuances on domestic travel within and
going out of LGUs. The issue highlighted yet
again the ineffective system between NGAs
and LGUs to assist LSIs during the initial
phase of the lockdowns.50
Meanwhile, there are reports that national
government guidelines on repatriation of
LSIs have not been uniformly followed by
LGUs, causing confusion among the LSIs
themselves.51 Even though the NTF has
already allowed the partial resumption
of flights after several areas started
shifting from ECQ to GCQ or MGCQ status,
some LGUs still opted to limit the entry
of individuals, especially those who come
from localities with COVID-19 outbreak.
These arbitrary and confusing regulations
resulted in the unfortunate cancellation and
rescheduling of domestic flights.52 These
differing responses occurred even as the
guidelines clearly state that LGUs shall not
deny the entry of LSIs as long as the latter
48
Bajo, A. (2020). Richard Gomez hits nat’l gov’t for not coordinating return
to provinces of quarantined OFWs. GMA News [online]. 25 May 2020. July,
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/739676/ richard-
gomez-hits-nat-l-gov-t-for-not-coordinating-return-to-provinces-of-
quarantined-ofws/story, last accessed 17 July 2020
49
Northern Samar MDRRMO appeals for improvement of gov’t repatriation
programs, postponement of Balik Probinsya Program (2020). CNN
Philippines [online]. 31 May 2020, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/
regional/ 2020/5/31/northern-samar-covid-19-balik-probinsya.html, last
accessed 10 June 2020
50
House Committee on Transportation Online Meeting. House of
Representatives {Facebook Video]. 05 June 2020, https://www.facebook.
com/ HouseofRepsPH/videos/317583379272018, last accessed 17 July
2020
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 49
have complete requirements and proper
coordination with concerned agencies was
made.
The incoherence of policies in border
controls also needs to be stressed. The
ECQ in the whole island of Luzon mobilized
the big portion of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the PNP, in addition to
LGUs’ full mobilization of their peace and
order units. In Metro Manila alone, there
were a total of 56 border checkpoints, and
LGUs down to the barangay (or even village)
levels also put up their own border control
oftentimes without proper coordination and
proper training and orientation.53
Recommendations
Although NGAs and LGUs have been adopting
measures and fine-tuning policies on the
management of LSIs, there are still opportunities
to enhance the government’s responses based
on the changing needs of the people and the
performance of the economy. It is necessary
to improve existing protocols as the country
transitions to the New Normal way of living. It
is imperative to consider the institutionalization
of measures governing the management of
LSIs and ROFs not only during the COVID-19
pandemic but also in anticipation of similar
future crises. This will allow national and local
authorities to revisit their policies and measures
and to integrate new mechanisms in managing
LSIs and ROFs.
51
Talabong, R. (2020). Walang malapitan: Stranded probinsyanos feel
abandoned by Duterte gov’t. Rappler.com [online]. 28 May 2020, https://
www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/262143-stranded-probinsyanos-
feel-abandoned-duterte-government-coronavirus-pandemic,last
accessed 03 June 2020
52
Camus, M. (2020). Travelers, airlines confused by gov’t rules. Inquirer.net
[online]. 08 June 2020, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1287825/travelers-
airlines-confused-by-govt-rules, last accessed 18 July 2020
53
Santos, A. (2020). Ghost town: Manila under coronavirus lockdown. Aljazeera
[online]. 16 March 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/
manila-turns-ghost-town-coronavirus-lockdown-200315121507679.html,
last accessed 18 July 2020
50 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

Recommendations
1 Create a clear structure that accommodates
the dynamism of LGUs
Not only should the structure for the
management of the program be clear, it should
also be dynamic enough to accommodate
functioning LGUs which can organize their own
programs along with other LGUs.
2 Improve NG-LGU coordination systems
The existing mechanisms between NGAs
and LGUs were certainly put to test during
this health crisis. Coordination systems
and channels of communication should be
enhanced to facilitate the re-integration of
LSIs into their communities.
3 Harmonize NG-related assistance programs
In order to provide efficient and unhampered
delivery of public services, concerned
government agencies should streamline their
similar programs, and eliminate duplication
of functions. This will enable their respective
agencies to focus on assistance programs and
projects that are related to their mandates.
4 Maximize the use of information and
communication technologies (ICTs)
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2020-087
mentions the creation of an Online Monitoring
System (OMS) that shall process, monitor,
and store relevant information that will be
shared to the national, regional, and local
units for the smooth coordination of affected
individuals. However, the use of OMS has not
been maximized. The use of ICTs is important
for proper coordination and information
dissemination of the status of LSIs and ROFs.
The development of a comprehensive online
system to monitor the status of ROFs and LSIs
will be helpful not only in facilitating travel
clearance requests and domestic movements
but also in analyzing mobility restriction
impacts.54 On a related matter, there should
also be policies that allow stranded individuals
to fill out application for travel forms online
and for clearances to be emailed to them.
5 Improve information management
Timely, accurate, accessible and
understandable program information on
processes and requirements involved is
vital to avoid confusion among LSIs. Public
assistance and crisis management teams of
government agencies should consider the
following practices in order to improve their
risk/crisis communication methods: a) use
of official or verified social media pages for
crisis communications; b) provision of regular
updates on crisis policies, response and
management; c) engagement or interaction
with users; d) use of native language and non-
technical terms; and e) sharing or exchanging
of information with other NGAs and with
LGUs.55
6 Improve inter-LGU coordination
LGUs should also enhance collaborative
endeavors among them. This crisis provides
a window of opportunity for LGUs to improve
coordination among themselves. Nothing
less than the Constitution encourages
this as it states, under Sec. 13 of Art. X,
that “Local government units may group
themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources for purposes
commonly beneficial to them in accordance
with law.” In particular, partnerships of LGUs
could be formed to facilitate return of LSIs
from point of origin to point of destination. In
India, a country where many have also been
stranded upon the declaration of the national
lockdown, states were encouraged to consult
with each other to allow movement by road.56
7 Ensure the safety of women and children in
control points
Given the risk of harassment, LGUs and
local law enforcement agencies may ensure
that female personnel are assigned in all
checkpoints and in temporary holding areas
and precincts to protect LSIs who are women.

54
Department of Interior and Local Government (2020) “Duties and Responsibilities of Local Government Officials, DILG Regional Directors and Field
Officers, Philippine National Police, and Others Concerned on the Management of Returning Overseas Filipinos and Locally Stranded Individuals”
Memorandum Circular No. 2020-087, 21 May 2020, https://www.dilg.gov.ph/PDF_File/issuances/memo_circulars/dilg-memocircular-2020521_
a38badf755.pdf, last accessed 16 July 2020

55
Asuncion, X. and Flores, R. (2020). Enabling Mutual Trust and Collective Action amid COVID-19 Crisis: A Rapid Assessment of Risk/Crisis Communication
of Local Government Units through Social Media. CLRG Policy Brief [online]. April 2020, http://localgov.up.edu.ph/uploads/1/4/0/0/14001967/policy-
brief_riskcrisis-communication_social-media.pdf, last accessed 05 May 2020

56
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/75451918.cms?fbclid=IwAR3L46CAZRPgWOJaNDdNC8c7WiSxp2v_
yiNvoaW622fPePGNRQsI2OuXSc&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, last accessed August 1, 2020

8 Strengthen existing task force units
The newly created Sub-Task unit on the
Management of LSIs under the NTF Sub-Task
Group on Management of LSIs should be
strengthened to be able to handle concerns on
the locally stranded individuals and ensure that
they are protected and given their new normal
life.
7. CONCLUDING
REMARKS
The paper examines the results of the
government’s key responses to the COVID-19
pandemic as mandated under the Bayanihan
Act. In the four sections discussing health,
economic, social amelioration, and peace
and order responses, it also identifies the key
factors affecting the results and the major
recommendations for moving forward.
A common thread tying the different sections of
the paper is the community quarantine in the
Philippines that a number of global observers57
regard as one of the strictest, longest and most
expansive (in terms of population covered) in the
world. Community quarantine appears to be the
primary line of defense that the government has
undertaken to contain the spread of COVID-19.
However, in spite of this drastic measure, the
number of COVID-19 cases in the country has
continued to increase at an alarming rate. Since
August 6, 2020, the Philippines has recorded the
highest number of COVID-19 cases in Southeast
Asia. Its number of daily new cases of 4,343 on
August 22, 2020 is 11th highest in the world.58
This high number is not an unusual spike
considering that it is close to the seven-day (from
August 15-21) daily average, which is around
57
These include, among others, the Economist, Reuters, BBC, Reuters, and Asia Times
58
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard. [Online: 21 August 2020]
[Viewed: 22 August 2020]. Available at: https://covid19.who.int/table
59
WHO COVID-19 Dashboard. https://covid19.who.int/explorer
A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 51
9 Fasttrack the implementation of the
National ID system
Until now, the government has no reliable data
on LSIs in the country. An effective way to
account for LSIs is the National Identification
(NID) system. Accounting for LSIs should have
been easy if there is a good database and a NID
system.
4,300 confirmed new cases per day.59 As of
August 22, 2020, the Philippines has registered
a total of 182,365 confirmed COVID-19 cases,
ranked 22nd in the world, and 2,940 deaths,
ranked 32nd in the world.
Community quarantine can only delay the
progression of, but not totally suppress, the
outbreak. Moreover, the enforcement of and
compliance to community quarantine measures
are very challenging especially for developing
countries characterized by the presence of huge
informal sector, weak social protection system,
crowded communities, and big number of
daily subsistence workers. Due to these factors,
community quarantine measures can hardly
ensure that individuals, who have unknowingly
contracted the virus and have only mild
symptoms or asymptomatics, do not leave their
houses, interact with other people, and, thus
spread the virus.
To stop the transmission of the virus infected
individuals should be isolated, and those
that they have close contact with should be
immediately quarantined. With much lower
social and economic costs compared to
52 CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
community quarantine, individual quarantine
of those infected with the COVID-19 virus can
only be made possible by systematic testing,
contact tracing, and surveillance. To date, testing
in the Philippines has largely been confined to
those who have symptoms. However, current
evidence suggests that transmission can occur
through close contact with presymptomatic
and asymptomatic carriers of the virus. Thus,
increasing testing capacity and designing
efficient and cost-effective testing and contact
tracing protocols to cover all potential carriers
of the virus are very important in arresting
the continuing rapid spread of the virus in the
country
Malaysia and Vietnam are two countries in
Southeast Asia that have relative success in
containing the spread of COVID-19. As of August
22, Malaysia with a population of around 33
million has only 9,249 total confirmed cases and
125 deaths, while Vietnam with a population
of a little over 97 million has only 1,009 total
confirmed cases and 25 deaths.60 Both countries
underscored the importance of swift testing,
contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine in
containing the spread of the virus.
Malaysia as an upper-middle income country had
more diagnostics capacity. Early on, it pursued
mass testing in areas with high number of cases
with test results completed in 2-3 days. Vietnam,
a lower-middle income country with limited
diagnostic capacity took a targeted approach
to testing, and scaled up testing in areas with
community transmission. Testing in both
countries was paralleled by extensive contact
tracing, isolation, and quarantine. In Vietnam,
contact tracing was carried out up to the third
degree of contact. Technology-based applications
have also been employed in the two countries
to further boost their contact tracing efforts.
People who have close contact with a confirmed
Covid-19 case were placed in quarantine centers
that greatly reduced transmission at both the
household and community levels (Rahman,
60
W WHO COVID-19 Dashboard as of August 22, 2020
2020; Dabla-Norris, Gulde-Wolf and Painchaud,
2020; Pollack et al, 2020.)
Other than the effect on the health of the people,
the COVID-19 pandemic has also wreaked havoc
on the economy. In addition to the uncertainty
caused by the pandemic that has dampened
consumption and production, the responses
of government to contain the spread of the
COVID-19 particularly through lockdown or
imposition of community quarantine have added
to the burden or challenges faced by workers and
enterprises. The Bayanihan Act has mandated
measures to provide wage subsidy, credit, and
liquidity support to workers and enterprises
to keep them afloat. However, the community
quarantine measures prevented the operations of
establishments that are not considered essentials,
suspended public transportation, and disrupted
the supply chains network, affecting the viability
of many businesses especially MSMEs. As a
result, many businesses decided to permanently
close or temporarily suspend operation and
lay-off their workers. Other countries had also
imposed community quarantine or lockdown,
but theirs are not as long-running and expansive
as that of the Philippines.
To cover for the loss of income due to disruptions
in work and livelihood and to ensure that people
comply with the stay-at-home health protocol,
the Bayanihan Act mandated the provision of
financial assistance to low-income families and
other vulnerable groups. However, the expansive
coverage of community quarantine substantially
increased the number of affected people, and
made the provision of financial assistance a very
challenging task considering the very limited
scope of the country’s existing social protection
programs. Government took so long to distribute
the financial assistance amidst issues of
inefficiency and corruption, contributing to the
involuntary hunger of about 5.2 million families
or around 30 million individuals.
 A Results-Based Assessment of the Bayanihan To Heal as One Act 53

Another unintended consequence of the and approach on the imposition of community

imposition of community quarantine is the
huge number of locally stranded individuals.
When Filipinos think of safety and security,
foremost in their minds is to be with their
families. The prolonged lockdown has certainly
caused sufferings and anxiety not only to the
stranded individuals but also their families.
The problem of stranded individuals could have
been minimized or totally avoided with proper
and timely communication of the government
plan to the citizenry and strong coordination
among national government agencies and local
governments.
The country’s experience in implementing
community quarantine to contain the spread
of the COVID-19 virus shows that it involves
enormous economic, social and logistical costs;
hence, its imposition should be very selective and
for narrowly defined geographic areas. Thus, the
Philippine government should rethink its policy
quarantine.
The imposition of community quarantine
somehow mirrors the highly centralized and
control-oriented approach of the government
to the COVID-19 pandemic. As the government
moves forward in improving the design and
implementation of the policies and programs
to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, it should
consider engaging the citizenry more and
empowering them. Proper wearing of facemask
and face shield, frequent and proper handwashing,
personal hygiene, and the observance of
physical and social distancing could go a long
way in controlling the transmission of the
virus. Initiatives from the private sector and the
business community should also be encouraged
and supported. Local government units should
have a more prominent role.

As Dr. Noor Hisham, Director-General of the Ministry of Health of Malaysia pointed out,

“… addressing COVID-19 is an all-of-government, all-of-society responsibility.

Effective resilience and response will take a joint effort to a shared threat
including coordinated and integrated response across all sectors, with regular
and timely communication across various sectors involved. The community’s
engagement is critical”
(Rahman, 2020, p. 11).
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