Karen S.

Sio PA 245
2009-52280 May 23, 2020

Analyzing the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic in the

Prism of Policy and Program Implementation

I. Introduction

The Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19) started to feature in the international news in

December 2019 (Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières [ESSF], 2020). Back then, some countries

warily keep a close eye on its development while others dismiss it as mere black propaganda.

Fast forward six months after, the whole world scrambles to manage and eliminate the Covid-19

pandemic. As of May 22, 2020, the Word Health Organization (WHO) recorded 4,993,470 total

worldwide cases and of those, 327,738 died (WHO, 2020). In the Philippines, 13,777 total cases

and 863 deaths were recorded as of May 23, 2020 (Department of Health [DOH], 2020).

Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, this global health crisis led to the deepest recession since the

Great Depression (Partington, 2020).

Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic is unprecedented and most of the governments were

caught off guard by its exponential spread. Still, what makes some countries successful in

flattening and eliminating the curve than others? This reflection paper argues that the primary

factor is a country’s public policy and its subsequent implementation. Using the knowledge

learned in class, the author will analyze the Philippines’ response to the Covid-19 pandemic in

the prism of policy and program implementation. The paper is divided into four subsequent

sections. The next segments provide a brief context on the Covid-19 pandemic and the

corresponding actions the Philippine government had made thus far. It is immediately followed

by the policy and program implementation analysis using the top-down approach, specifically

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through the preconditions of perfect implementation by Howard and Gunn (1984). The

succeeding section then provides a more strategic discussion on the matter. Finally, the paper

finishes with the synthesis and limitation of the reflection paper.

II. The Covid-19 Overview

Various strands of the coronavirus have long infected mammals. The most common of

which is the virus that causes the common cold. Strands that also entered history books due to

their impact on human lives are the acute respiratory syndrome history (Sars) and the Middle

East respiratory syndrome (Mers) (McKie, 2020). However, six months ago, Sars-CoV-2, the

virus that causes Covid-19, emerged as the deadliest coronavirus known to mankind.

First observed in Wuhan, China, the Sars-CoV-2 is speculated to be originating in bats

(McKie, 2020). According to WHO (n.d.), the virus is primarily transmitted via saliva droplets or

nose discharge from the infected person. Symptoms of the virus in humans vary. Some

experience mild to moderate symptoms such as fever, dry cough, and tiredness while others,

most of whom are with existing medical conditions, suffer serious illnesses such as shortness of

breath, chest pain, and loss of speech or movement (WHO, n.d.). Now considered as both a

global health crisis and an economic recession, the Covid-19 pandemic affected all continents

except Antarctica (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.).

III. Philippines’ Response to Covid-19 Pandemic

The first two cases of Covid-19 in the Philippines were recorded on January 30 and

February 02, 2020, respectively. Both were Chinese nationals and the latter was recorded as the

first fatality outside mainland China. The first Covid-19 case without travel history was

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confirmed on March 5, 2020. The DOH then raised the alert system to Code Red Sublevel 1 and

confirmed the local transmission of the virus. The President declared a State of Public Health

Emergency throughout the country on March 8, 2020 through the Proclamation no. 922. Said

issuance facilitates the implementation of the Republic Act (R.A.) no. 11332 or the Mandatory

Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act. On March 12,

2020, the whole country was declared under Alert Level 4 Code Red Sublevel 2 (Office of the

Presidential Spokesperson, 2020).

The Luzon-wide lockdown was implemented from March 17 to April 13, 2020. Labeled

as enhanced community quarantine (ECQ), it specifies the following: (1) suspension of classes

and school activities until April 14, 2020, (2) prohibition of mass gatherings, (3) strict home

quarantine, (4) work from home arrangement for the bureaucracy except for the defense and

health sectors, (5) operation of private establishments providing basic necessities and activities,

(6) suspension of mass public transportation system, and (7) restrictions of land, air, and sea

travel (Office of the Executive Secretary, 2020). 24 cities and provinces in Visayas and

Mindanao also implemented various forms of quarantine (Monsod et. al., 2020). As a response

to the health crisis as well as the impending economic recession, the President signed the

Republic Act (R.A.) 11469 or The Bayanihan to Heal as One Act on March 25, 2020. Said

legislation has given the President extra powers to reallocate and realign the National Budget to

address the challenges posed by the pandemic (ESSF, 2020).

On April 7, 2020, the ECQ was extended until April 30, 2020. With the recommendation

of the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Management of Emerging Infectious Diseases (hereby

referred as IATF), the ECQ was further extended until May 15, 2020 in Metro Manila, Central

Luzon and other identified high-risk provinces (Presidential Communications Operations Office,

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2020). The IATF then released the Ombinus guidelines stipulating three types of community

quarantines: (1) modified enhanced community quarantine (MECQ), (2) general community

quarantine (GHQ), and (3) modified general community quarantine (MGHQ). The MECQ shall

be strictly imposed on Metro Manila, Laguna, and certain parts of the Central Luzon (Laguna,

Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Zambales, Angeles City) from May 15 to 31, 2020

(Ranada, 2020).

IV. The PH Covid-19 Response: Policy and Program Implementation Analysis

The presentation of information and discussion shall be guided by the top-down model of

policy implementation. Specifically, the ten preconditions necessary to achieve perfect

implementation by Howard and Gunn (1984) in Hill (1997: 130-131) shall be used to analyze the

implementation of the Covid-19 pandemic response. The paper adopted said model because a

national emergency of this scale requires the national government to be at the helm. While local

government units (LGUs) are at ground zero, their actions are guided by national directives and

policies (UP Covid-19 Pandemic Response Team, 2020a). Hereunder is the analysis of the

Philippines’ response to the Covid-19 pandemic:

Precondition Remarks
1. Circumstances external to the implementing agency do not impose No
crippling constraints.
2. Adequate time and sufficient resources are made available to the No
programme.
3. Not only are there no constraints in terms of overall resources but also, at No
each stage in the implementation process, the required combination of
resources is actually available.
4. The policy to be implemented is based upon the valid theory of cause and No
effect.
5. The relationship between cause and effect is direct and there are few, if No
any, intervening links.
6. There is a single implementing agency which need not depend upon other No
agencies for success or, if other agencies must be involved, the dependency

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 Precondition Remarks
relationships are minimal in number and importance.
7. There is a complete understanding of, and agreement upon, objectives to be No
achieved; and these conditions persist throughout the implementing
process.
8. In moving towards the agreed objectives it is possible to specify, in Yes
complete detail and perfect sequence, the task to be performed by each
participant.
9. There is perfect communication among, and coordination of, the various No
elements involved in the programme.
10. Those in authority can demand and obtain perfect obedience. Yes

It must be noted that these two preconditions emerged only after the confirmation of local

transmission and not at the start of the pandemic. Due to the declaration of the State of Public

Health Emergency, initial confusion, and alleged disobedience of the populace, the President

opted to use the security force to enforce the policies [Precondition No. 10]. He also threatened

to impose Martial Law should the public continue to resist the community quarantine. The

subsequent days were then sprinkled with news of some citizens detained due to quarantine

violations. Detailed plans with the corresponding role of various National Government Agencies

(NGAs) and LGUs were produced only after missing the bullet’s eye [Precondition No. 8]. At

the onset of the pandemic, the national government had delegated full responsibility to the LGUs.

But only a few days after the start of the community quarantine, the President warned the local

executives against disobeying the national government’s directives (Parco, 2020). This was

triggered by the request of Pasig City Mayor Vico Sotto to allow tricycles to ferry passengers

despite the suspension of public transportation.

The absence of eight preconditions can be unfortunately attributed to the reactive nature

of the government’s overall response. Perhaps the most limiting factor on policy implementation

are the external circumstances [Precondition No. 1]. Foremost are the challenges in responding to

a pandemic, namely: limited health facilities, shortage of health workers, and scarcity of testing

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kits (David, Rye, and Agbulos, 2020). Likewise, in any pandemic, time is of the essence. Due to

diplomatic considerations, the Philippines only imposed travel restrictions after the WHO

declared Global Health Emergency (ESSF, 2020). Another major restricting variable is the

limited time and resources available for the Philippine government [Precondition Nos. 2 and 3].

Planning and preparation were conducted in a very short period since the government focused on

the Covid-19 only after the confirmation of local transmission. Moreover, the 600 billion PHP

budget for the Covid-19 pandemic is insufficient as the demand for government support

continues to grow because of the extended restriction of movements of people and goods.

Currently, financial assistance for Filipino workers is inadequate. The Department of Labor and

Employment requested an additional 9.4 billion PHP budget to be able to provide financial aid to

all Filipino workers, both local and abroad (Rey, 2020).

Different degrees of lockdown had been found to be effective in mitigating and

suppressing the spread of the virus (Sault, 2020). In the Philippines, the best available data shows

that the ECQ had slowed down the number of infected Filipinos (UP Covid-19 Pandemic

Response Team, 2020a). Nevertheless, the reflection paper posits the absence of a clear cause

and effect theory in policy implementation due to the lack of mass testing or even an alternative

thereof [Precondition No. 4]. Despite the WHO’s pronouncement that mass testing is of vital

importance, the Philippines is yet to heed the call (Costello, 2020). While it can be argued that

mass testing as an option is only available to well-off nations, the Philippines still failed to

institute mechanisms and execute chronological and interrelated actions. Vietnam, a country with

comparable characteristics, had successfully managed Covid-19 despite limited resources. It

established and executed interrelated actions clustered to leadership, government transparency,

legitimacy, and planning and preparedness to make up for the limited budget and absence of

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advance healthcare system (Abuza, 2020). Because of this shortcoming, there is no direct

relationship between cause and effect [Precondition No. 5]. The hundreds of Covid-19 positive

reported daily despite the community quarantine denotes that the Philippine government has

missed some important considerations in the pandemic response.

The pandemic cannot be managed and, ultimately, eliminated by a single government

agency [Precondition No. 6]. Before the establishment of the IATF, the DOH was overwhelmed

by complex challenges not necessarily under its jurisdiction such as travel restrictions and

economic implications, among others. The IATF now takes the gargantuan tasks of leading the

whole bureaucracy against Covid-19. The pandemic also proved that government agencies and

instrumentalities are highly dependent on each other. The action of one has externalities to

another. For instance, while the Department of Agriculture ensures the supply of fresh produce,

the inadequate budget for cash assistance by the LGUs and the Department of Social Work and

Development (DSWD) partly render the effort of the former ineffective. A good example of

vertical dependency is the conduct of testing by LGUs. Marikina City had set up a testing center

in the early stages of the pandemic and perhaps only because of the public clamor, before the

DOH granted the approval for operations. These mishaps are also related to the lack of effective

and efficient communication and coordination [Precondition No. 9]. Aside from the contradicting

statements of various officials on the guidelines and restrictions, the big variance between the

local and national data of affected persons shed doubt on whether the Philippines had been

completely addressing the pandemic. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2020; UP Covid-19

Pandemic Response Team, 2020b).

V. Discussion

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 Former Socioeconomic Secretary Ernesto Pernia’s statement perfectly captured the

situation: "when the orchestra is not well-orchestrated, then you have a little problem" (Palatino,

2020). The presence of only two preconditions indicates that response to the Covid-19 pandemic

is problematic from the start. The paper also posits that there is a large implementation deficit

leading to partial attainment of the goals. Indeed, it is laudable that the Philippine government

was able to slow down virus transmission to ensure that the healthcare capacity will not be

exceeded. However, the unwritten and obvious goal of every country is to eliminate the Covid-

19 curve. With the current trend in the Philippines, making this a reality soon seems bleak.

Unlike other policies, response to the Covid-19 pandemic is dispersed into various small

policies. Hence, it is unsurprising that the approach to the pandemic is considered “defensive and

reactive” (ESSF, 2020). The closest coherent policy of the government for Covid-19 is The

Bayanihan to Heal as One Act. However, it must be noted that crucial policy actions such as

types of community quarantine and restrictions to be implemented were not covered by this

legislation. One cannot comprehend the whole situation without understanding all policies and

official statements. Furthermore, since new issuances render the old policies obsolete, one should

be always up-to-date to follow the guidelines.

In terms of implementation structure, establishing the IATF was the right move. This is

almost identical to the strategy adopted by Taiwan which created a team composed of well-

trained and seasoned officials (Wang, Ng, and Brook, 2020). Despite this, the existing

bureaucratic structure and values limited seamless coordination and encouraged silos. The

whole-of-government approach must be implemented to eliminate policy gaps and ensure the

achievement of goals.

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 Thirdly, managing the pandemic requires recognition of outside interference. The attempt

of the Philippine government to maintain its close relationship with China backfired immensely.

The travel restrictions were imposed on flights from China, Hong Kong, and Macau on February

2, 2020 only upon the confirmation that two Chinese tourists were Covid-19 positive (ESSF,

2020). In addition, the temporary restriction of flights coming from Taiwan, which is in

adherence to the "one China" policy, greatly severed our relationship with the country with one

of the best Covid-19 responses. Likewise, the attention given by the government to the

Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGO) had garnered public criticism since the actions

seem to imply that Chinese nationals are prioritized over Filipinos.

Finally, in terms of control over implementing actors, the government has direct control

over the Philippine National Police, DSWD, and DOH, among others. The existing politico-

administrative system made this easy to comply with. Still, it must be noted that government

officials and employees as individual actors sometimes digress from the existing laws, rules, and

regulations relevant to Covid-19. Perfect instances are Senator Pimentel accompanying his wife

to the hospital despite being tested positive and the quarantine violation by the Manila Police

Chief by conducting a birthday party. This denotes that improvements for the enforcement of the

law can still be applied.

VI. Conclusion

The Covid-19 pandemic is considered as a "pink flamingo" event: something that is

glaringly obvious but people, particularly world leaders, turned away and ignored (Abuza, 2020).

Governments that paid attention early on are now reaping the benefits while those who did not,

including the Philippines, are struggling to contain the pandemic. To answer the question posed

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in the introduction, the reflection paper postulates that the success of the policy implementation

lies not unto the regime type or economic standing of the countries but on its ability to recognize

the threat of the virus and its policy implementation rigor (Abuza, 2020).

How do we address the large implementation deficit? The reflection paper put forward

simple yet difficult to execute solutions. First, the Philippine government must institute all

required mechanisms for the ten preconditions of perfect implementation. It is also untrue that

there is no benchmark for best practices. Other countries' experiences are good references for

evidence-based decision-making and policy implementation. In Southeast Asia, the policy model

of Vietnam stands out as the perfect architype for the Philippines. We may opt to implement

selective quarantine and affordable effective testing due to resource constraints (Chowdhury, and

Sundaram, 2020). Lastly, contrary to popular belief, Covid-19 is not an invisible enemy because

it leaves behind traces of its impact (UP Covid-19 Pandemic Response Team, 2020c). Traces

which can be used for evidence-based policymaking to predict what is yet to come and prepare

all necessary corrective actions (UP Covid-19 Pandemic Response Team, 2020c).

While the findings and discussion imply grim results, this reflection paper must be taken

with a grain of salt. First, In Vivo analysis had been used to complete the paper hence, it is only

applicable to the situation as of writing. Second, the manifold nature of Covid-19 and the

robustness of available information limited the paper to focus on the Philippine context. It would

have been ideal to include a comparative analysis of successful and unsuccessful responses by

different countries. Nonetheless, the paper ends with a note that the experiences from the first

two months of the Covid-19 response should be used as lessons learned to institute more

effective and efficient response mechanisms. We are still at war against the Covid-19 pandemic.

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We should not falter by the early blunders instead, we should continue to fight until victory is

ours.

VII. References

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Chowdhury, A. and Sundaram, J. (2020, April 18). Vietnam winning Covid-19 war.
Inquirer.Net. Accessed through https://opinion.inquirer.net/128994/vietnam-winning-
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Costello, A. (2020, March 25).Mass testing is the only way to stop the virus -it’s long overdue.
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Department of Health. (2020). DOH Covid-19 Bulletin #70

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Hill, M. (1997). Implementation. In The Policy Process in the Modern State. 3rd Edition. New
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McKie, Robin. (2020, April 30). Coronavirus: what do scientists know about Covid-19 so far?
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