16 +Parental+Authority

TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Q: What do you mean by parental authority (patria potestas)?
 “the mass of rights and obligations which parents have in relation to the person and property of their
children until their emancipation, and even after this under certain circumstances.” (Manresa)
 Parental authority under the Family Code includes parental “responsibility.”
 It is the right and duty of parents to protect their children, to care for the in sickness and health, and
do whatever may be necessary for their care, maintenance, and preservation.
 Purpose: The physical preservation and development of children, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect, and education of their heart and senses.
Parental authority and responsibility includes (1) the caring for and rearing of the children for civic
consciousness and (2) the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
(Art. 209)
Q: Can parental authority and responsibility be renounced or transferred? Parental authority and
responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law because the
upbringing of the children is a sacred duty entrusted to the parents. (Art. 210)
Q: Between the mother and the father, who can exercise parental authority over common children? The
father and the mother can jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. However, in
case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
(Article 211)
Q: Does Article 211 apply only to legitimate children? No. Article 211 applies also to illegitimate children
provided that the following requisites concur: (1) the father is certain; and (2) the illegitimate children
are living with the said father and the mother, who are cohabiting without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage not falling under Article 36 and 53.
If the parents are not together, the following rules shall apply:
Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of
the mother In the event that the mother is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her the child, Article 214
of the Family Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or
judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:"
Article 216. x x x
(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
It is thus only when number 1 and 2 is not available that the father can have custody over the child.
Q: In case of separation of the parents, who can exercise parental authority?
In case of separation of the parents, parental authority will be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over even years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit (Article 213). However, this designation does
not mean that parental authority of the other parent is terminated or suspended. Parental authority
shall only be terminated ONLY if the court so decrees on the basis of the causes provided by law.
Q: In case of separation of the parents, who can exercise parental authority to children under seven (7)
years of age?
As a general rule, no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Article 213) Some of the compelling reasons are: (a)
when the mother is insane; (b) when she suffers from a communicable disease that might endanger the
life or health of the child; (c) when is maltreating the child; or (d) has another child by another man who
lives with her. [NOTE: Prostitution and infidelity to husband does not make a mother unfit as parent].
Q: In case of separation of the parents, who gets custody of minor children in legal separation? In case
of separation of the parents, the innocent spouse gets custody of minor children in legal separation.
Q: Will death of one of the parents terminate the parental authority of the surviving parent over their
children? No. The death of one of the parents will not terminate the parental authority of the surviving
parent over their children. Upon remarriage of the surviving parent, the parental authority over the
children will not be affected (Article 212). Moreover, the new spouse, by virtue of his or her remarrying
the surviving parent, does not automatically possess parental authority over the children of the surviving
parent unless such new spouse adopts the children.
Q: In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, who can exercise substitute parental
authority over the children?
In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority will be exercised
by the surviving grandparents. Grandparents are the most natural, suitable, and logical persons to
exercise parental authority. Hence, the grandparents have the legal preference in the matter of
substitute parental authority.
Q: What are the RIGHTS of parents upon their children?
The following are the rights of parents upon their children: (1) to have them in their custody; (2) to
represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (3) to demand respect and obedience and impose
discipline on them; (4) administer the property of a child for his/her support and education, unless
title/transfer provides otherwise; administer the fruits and income (ONLY) of the children’s property
primarily to support the child and secondarily to use for the daily needs of the family; (5) to give or
withhold consent on marriage, pre-nuptial, donation propter nuptias, adoption, and employment; and
(6) to disinherit them for just cause.
Q: What are the DUTIES of parents upon their children? The following are the duties of parents upon
their children: (1) support and upbringing in accordance to their means; (2) educate, instruct, and
provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, and love and understanding; (3) defend them against
unlawful aggression; (4) answer for damages caused by their fault or negligence, and for civil liability for
crimes committed by them; and give their lawful inheritance.
Q: What is the liability of parents for torts committed by their minor children? Parents and other
persons exercising parental authority are civilly liable for the torts of their unemancipated children
provided that: (1) they are living in their company; and (2) he/she observes the “diligence of a good
father of a family” (bonus paterfamilias) to prevent the damage. In addition, this liability of the parents
and those exercising parental authority over the child is solidarily, primarily and directly liable, not
subsidiary.
Q: If the minor is not living with the parents but has been entrusted to the care of other persons, or is an
intern in school, does liability apply to them? No. It does not apply. (NOTE: Always go back to the
REQUISITES to check whether or not parents or other persons exercising parental authority are liable for
torts committed by their children.)
SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Q: In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, what is the order of preference as to the
persons who shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child?
In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) the surviving grandparent (as provided in
Article 214); (2) the oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, (unless unfit or disqualified);
and (3) the child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, (unless unfit or disqualified).
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardianship over the property of the child becomes necessary,
the same order of preference shall be served. (Article 216)
Q: What constitutes substitute parental authority? Persons who have substitute parental authority over
a child will have the same rights and authority of the parents (enumerated in Article 220). In addition,
they will also be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by acts and omissions of the
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority.
Q: Is the order of preference enumerated in Article 216 mandatory? No. The order of preference
enumerated in Article 216 is NOT mandatory. Always, the paramount interest of the child must be the
basis of custody and care.
Q: In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated,
who can exercise parental authority over them?
In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages
and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
Q: Differentiate one form the other: foundling, abandoned child, neglected child, abused child and
dependent child.
A foundling is a newborn child abandoned by its parents who are unknown. An abandoned child is one
who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose parents or guardians have desserted him for
a period of at least six continuous months. A neglected child is one whose basic needs have been
deliberately unattended or inadequately attended. An abused child, on the other hand, are those who
are maltreated, raped, or seduced, exploited, overworked or made to work under conditions not
conducive to good health, made to beg in the streets or public places; those who are in moral danger,
exposed to gambling, prostitution and other vices- in short, those who suffer emotional neglect. Lastly, a
dependent child is one who is without a parent, a guardian or custodian, or one whose parent, guardian,
or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his case and custody; and is dependent upon
public for support.
Q: Who may exercise SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY? Special parental authority may be exercised by (1)
the school, its administrators and teachers, or (2) individual, entity, or institution engaged in child care
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of school, entity or institution. (Article 218)
Q: Differentiate SUBSTITUTE parental authority from SPECIAL parental authority. Substitute parental
authority is exercised in case of death, absence, or in case of unsuitability of parents. On the other hand,
a special parental authority is exercised concurrently with the parental authority of the parents and
rests on the theory that while the child of the person exercising special parental authority, the parents
temporarily relinquish parental authority over the child to the latter.
Q: What is the liability of their exercising special parental authority over the child? Persons exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the minor child while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. HOWEVER, the
liability is subject to the defense that the person exercising parental authority exercised proper
diligence. On the other hand, the parents and persons judicial guardians are only subsidiarily liable for
said acts and omissions of the minor.
EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN
Chapter 3 [basically] only enumerates the rights and duties of the parents to their children and the
duties of children to their parents. Discussions on the liabilities are already discussed in the preceeding
chapters.
EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN
a) The father and the mother shall, jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. [Article 225] b) In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. [Article
225] c) Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00,
the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine,
but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. [Article 225] d) The ordinary rules on
guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under special parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall
apply.
Two cases where the parent cannot be the administrator of the property of his or her children: a. When
he is a disinherited parent (e.g. A disinherits B (son of A) thus, C (son of B) inherits A’s properties) [Art.
923, Civil Code] b. When he is incapacitated (e.g. B accused his father A of murder making B
incapacitated due to unworthiness.) [Art. 1035, Civil Code] Note: B will not enjoy the usufruct and
administration of his children’s inheritance.
PROCEDURE IN THE APPROVAL OF THE PARENT’S BOND [ART. 225] a) A verified petition for approval of
the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides. b) If the child resides in a
foreign country, the petition shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the property or any
part thereof is situated. c) The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding. The court
shall determine the amount of the bond, but shall not be less than 10% of the market value of the child’s
property or of his annual income.
OWNERSHIP OF CHILD’S ACQUISITIONS [ART. 226] The property of the unemancipated child earned or
acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership
and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and education, unless the title or transfer
provides otherwise.
PARENT’S USUFRUCT [ART. 226] The right of the parents over the fruits and income (not the property
itself) of the child’s property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and secondarily to the
collective daily needs of the family.
Note: If the child’s property is more than sufficient to maintain the said child, the said properties may be
used to defray the collective daily needs of the family. It must likewise be emphasized that a child is
obliged to support his or her parents in accordance with Article 195 of the Family Code and from his or
her separate property can be taken the support to be given to the parents if the same needs it and if the
child can afford it.
WHEN PARENTS ENTRUST THE MANAGEMENT OF THEIR PROPERTIES TO A CHILD [ART. 227] a) If the
parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child,
the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. Note: The unemancipated child shall first
be given a monthly reasonable allowance taken from the gross proceeds of the property for the said
month. Exception: When the parent-owner just decides to grant the entire proceeds to the child b) The
child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner
would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner grants the entire proceeds to the
child. c) In any case, the proceeds thus given in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child’s
legitime.
SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY PARENTAL AUTHORITY TERMINATES

PERMANENTLY: 1. Upon the death of the parents; [Article 228] 2. Upon the death of the child; [Article
228] 3. Upon emancipation of the child; [Article 228] 4. If the person exercising parental authority has
subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently
deprived by the court of such authority. [Article 232] Note: Parental authority cannot be revived if the
parents or the persons exercising parental authority are found to have subjected the child or allowed
him or her to be subjected to sexual abuse. Hence, if a father subjects his daughter to sexual abuse, he
can be permanently deprived of his parental authority over the said abused daughter. If the father
reforms for the better and there are indications that he might not do the same abusive act again, his
parental authority cannot be revived even if the reformation of the father is authentic.
Note: In the case of death of parents, there is no absolute termination of parental authority because
while the child is still a minor, the grandparents, brothers and sisters, or a guardian may exercise
substitute parental authority over the child [Art. 216]
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY WHICH CAN BE REVIVED BY FINAL JUDGMENT Article 229.
Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: 1. Upon adoption
of the child; Note: In case the adoption decree is rescinded, such rescission of the adoption shall
extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters andthe adopted arising from the
relationship of parent and child. 2. Upon appointment of a general guardian; Note: A guardian
appointed by the court shall generally have the care and custody of the person of his or her ward and
the management of his or her estate (Section 1, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines). 3. Upon
judicial declaration of a. Abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; b. Absence or
incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. 4. Upon final judgment of a competent court
divesting the party concerned of parental authority;
PARENTAL AUTHORITY IS SUSPENDED: 1. Upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the
same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically
reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. [Article 230] 2. Treats
the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; [Article 231] 3. Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel
or example; [Article 231] 4. Compels the child to beg; [Article 231] 5. Subjects the child or allows him to
be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. [Article 231]
Culpable Negligence The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
Example: If a stepfather forces his stepson to beg and the mother acts indifferently or does not care
about such act of the stepfather, she can be considered culpably negligent, warranting the suspension of
parental authority
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive
the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the
circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a
case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased
and will not be repeated. [Art. 231]
SCOPE OF SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY Article 233. The person exercising substitute
parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case
shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care and exercising special parental
authority, inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
While a teacher may be administratively or civilly liable in the event that he or she inflicts corporal
punishment to a student, it has been held that where there was no criminal intent on the part of the
teacher xxx and where the purpose of the teacher was to discipline a student, the said teacher cannot
be held feloniously liable for the criminal offense of slight physical injuries. (Bagajo v. Marave, 86 SCRA
389).
RA 7610 – CHILD ABUSE LAW Children – persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those but are
unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;
FORMS OF ABUSE: 1. Child prostitution and other sexual abuse; 2. Child trafficking; 3. Obscene
publications and indecent shows; 4. Other acts of abuse; a. An ascendant, stepparent or guardian of a
minor who shall induce, deliver or offer the minor to: i. Any one prohibited to keep the minor or ii. Any
one prohibited to have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who is ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension
house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer penalties
and imprisonment.
Note: Those not prohibited to have in his company such minor in any of the mentioned places: anyone
who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local
custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty. 5. Circumstances which
endanger child survival and normal development.
CASES
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. vs. CA and LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA (G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995) FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in
Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
PARENTAL CUSTODY/ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL , G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
NOTE:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority,
she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Facts:
Briones alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with Loreta P. Miguel. He was
born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
On November 4, 1998 Briones caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could
take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, Briones enrolled him at the
nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.
On May 2, 2001, Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of Briones in Caloocan
City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring
the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him
back in the afternoon, to which Briones agreed. However, they did not bring him back as promised by
them hence Briones filed a writ of Habeas Corpus and prayed that the child be given back to him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the
absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, the Family Code states
that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. In this case, since the
child is illegitimate, the mother is entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate child,
notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive
them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such authority
and care.
The father can only have continued custody under the following condition:
In the event that the mother is found unfit or unsuitable to care for the child, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised in the following order:
(1) The surviving grandparent, chosen by the court; If none
From the foregoing, it is only when the two others are not available that the father, who is the actual
custodian of the child, can be awarded custody of his child.
Custody and Parental Authority of Legitimate children in case of Separation:
The following order of preference shall be observed in the award of provisional custody in case of
separation of husband and wife:
(a) Both parents jointly;
(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over
seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over
seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;
(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or
disqualified; or
(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for
the minor.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children, namely, Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an
understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal conflict began
when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition
was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which
she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
a. The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. “Parents
have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their
proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and
responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment
to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this
affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”
b. The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the Family
Code). The biological father however, has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of
the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right
is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002

WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY PENDING GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING
Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar
V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a
registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court
granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. Dinah is questioning the court’s
decision contending that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as
the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of
seven. When the case was already with the Supreme Court, the child has already reached twelve years
old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?
Ruling:
The father has to retain in the meantime parental custody over the child.
Although the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of
their mother and that “no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, the same
admits certain exemptions if it is for the best interest of the child.
Inasmuch as in custody disputes, the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child, the
child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment
away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Note: This is just temporary custody. The Court has yet to determine who shall be entitled to custody
over the child. Now, considering that the child is now 12 years old, the option now belongs to the child
to whom she will go, taking into consideration of course the best interest of the child.
Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of
Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right
to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to
the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported
by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be the
guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article
214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she
admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she
will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators
or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that
there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
CASES
1. Silva v. Court of Appeals
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
2. Tonog v. Court of Appeals

3. Vancil v. Belmes
4. Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
5. Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals
6. Sombong v. Court of Appeals
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
1. Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals

2. Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
3. Santos v. Court of Appeals
4. Golangco v. Court of Appeals
5. David v. Court of Appeals
6. Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
7. Perez v. Court of Appeals
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court

2. Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
1. Aquinas School v. Inton

2. St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
3. St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
4. Amadora v. Court of Appeals
5. Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
6. Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals
7. Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
8. Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals
9. Sombong v. Court of Appeals
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
Parental authority over illegitimate child / rights of the father
Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two children, namely, Ramon
Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually separated. Silva and Suzanne had an
understanding that Silva would have the children in his company on weekends. The legal conflict began
when Silva claimed that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of Quezon City. The petition
was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which
she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of
Silva giving him visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays.
The court however explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without the written
consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. In the
meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She eventually immigrated to Holland with
her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA stated that as alleged by
Suzanne, Silva’s womanizing would have a negative influence on the children.
Issues:
a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.
b) Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Quezon City RTC’s
decision favoring Silva’s visitation rights on weekends with Suzanne’s written permission. The Supreme
Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. The Court clarified:
“Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to
their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility
may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents
are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring
remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or
imminent threat to the well-being of the child.”
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of the Family
Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the
constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children. This right is personal
to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may
have won with the Supreme Court’s upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not
prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from immigrating to Holland with
her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to pay child support are distinct and separate. If the
mother and the father of the illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation,
then there will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition asking
the court to settle the terms and conditions.
TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002
Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar
V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a work as a
registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court
granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. When the mother learned this,
she filed an opposition thereto contending that her child being below 7 years old, parental authority
should be vested in her.
Issue:
During the pendency of the guardianship proceeding, who should be granted temporary custody over
the child?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is
created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general rule
is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from
her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to
state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by
disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate
court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a
strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in a petition for
review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position to assess the
parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that
inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a
fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the
custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
VANCIL vs. BELMES, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in 1986. During his
lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.
Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are
permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of
Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to
disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of
petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right
to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by
law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions
of the courts but derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian
of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the
Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be
able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she
admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she
will merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this
question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that
there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
BONDAGJY vs. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on
February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. On October 21, 1987, or four
(4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion. However, the conversion was
not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Out of their union, they begot
two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989, and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990.
The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner,
respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced.
After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati City. In 1990, the
parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street,
Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even
with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City
On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names
changed from Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage
Selina Artadi. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd
hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such
clothing are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children
sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever
Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car.
Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of
marriage, custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said
court. On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999,
Fouzi filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both
parties were Muslims, Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that it has jurisdiction of the case because the spouses were not
yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. The Shari'a
Court found that respondent Fouzi was capable both personally and financially to look after the best
interest of his minor children.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the
determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling
consideration on the issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent
are: [1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and [2]
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.
The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim
laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is
incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she
is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy
environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the parents. Article 211 of the Family Code provides that
the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.
Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not divorced or legally separated, the father
and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority and fulfill their responsibility
over their legitimate children.
SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
Facts:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple
stayed with Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children namely Leslie and Angelica.
Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her
parents at Teresita's house. Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her
mother's place but Teresita prevailed and entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her
mother's house and stayed with Leslie. Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-
American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to US. Teresita, however, resisted by
way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old and accused Maria of
having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause
the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Teresita has the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home
or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of
her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not
constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
SOMBONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111876, January 31, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir
John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money
to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.
Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty,
who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty.
She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The
petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.
Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be
their guardian. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint,
filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in Quezon city. When
Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed
the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella.
On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the
child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The
propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child
subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the
effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of
the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody.
Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
Ruling:
Yes, but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A
prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part
of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty.”
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although
the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and
again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will.
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the
writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on
the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the
minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of
petitioner and not that of the respondent.
RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE, VS. RICKY JAMES
RELUCIO, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
Facts:
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with
Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the
relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody
of her father, Ricky James.
Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents)
took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's
parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn
granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James
filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC
(petition a quo).
A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the
desire for her daughter to remain in her custody.
Question:
Who can have the custody over the child?
Ruling:
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate
children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's recognition of the child. In the exercise of that
authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and
the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness
to exercise such authority and care.
In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family
Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or judicially
appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
the order indicated:"
Article 216. x x x
(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
It is thus only when number 1 and 2 is not available that the father can have custody over the child.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 174485, July 11, 2007
Facts:
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City,
while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When Agnes came to their conjugal home in
Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati
City for a brief vacation she has an intention not to come back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA
issued a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued ordering that Simone be
brought before said court. CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody in utter
disregard of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and below.
Ruling:
The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the
minor child to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption" under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mother’s custody. Sole custody over Simone Noelle Hirsch is
hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO, G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005
Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody.
Issue:
WON the mother should be deprived of her custody over the child because of lesbian relations.
Ruling:
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent to whom custody is given by the court. The court shall take
into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.” No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents
separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213
takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care,
custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such
measure.
Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her
moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending
spouse from exercising proper parental care.
It is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the
presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development.
Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s
alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No., March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18,
1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia. The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work and that
Leouel is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household,
where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in
Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-
parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of
the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his
minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family
Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead,
absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by
private respondents.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him
and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also
held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the
natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all
grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher
J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae
on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six
years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back
the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
Issue:
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.
Ruling:
Yes. Daisie is entitled to custody of the child and she can avail of the remedy of the writ of
habeas corpus. The "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his
father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority
of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by
the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age,
the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed
preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown
that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him.
ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Facts:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed
by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left
for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel
Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. In 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese,
was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and
upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald
Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had
to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. The trial court dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald
and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be
agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. Teresita elevated the case to the CA and
the CA awarded the custody of the children to the mother relying on the tender age presumption.
Issue:
Was the CA correct in relying merely on the tender age presumption?
Ruling:
The CA committed an error in awarding the custody of the children to the mother based solely on the
ground that both children are below 7 years of age.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be
overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court
is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
The record shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic
effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it
was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. The argument that
moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is
neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their
clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is
not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become
final.
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They
understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person
under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of
attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.
PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse.
After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II
in New York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she
became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all
had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and
promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the
Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was
supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no longer on
good terms. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her
husband’s meager income of P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could
raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here
since they have their own home and a car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to
reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their son to her. The trial court issued an
Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s order and held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best
interest and welfare.
Issue:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?
Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: “SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child
whose parents are separated. Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and
apart from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of
their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody,
and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent
it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of
the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor.”
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use
of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court
connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother
finds its reason in the basic need of a child for his mother’s loving care. Only the most compelling of
reasons shall justify the court’s awarding the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother,
such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been
considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child provides: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have
demonstrated that they have ample means. Nerissa’s present work schedule is not so unmanageable as
to deprive her of quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from
home for longer periods of time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles
judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does
not detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture,
children are often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Ray’s is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care
that a mother gives to his child.
LIBI vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R.No. 70890, September 18, 1992
Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until the former broke up with the latter after she
found out that Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not
granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, they were found dead from a single
gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a
civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s *vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are
under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent Court to
make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and
knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by means of the gun which was
freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly checked whether the gun was still
under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.No. 85044, June 3, 1992
(please see discussion in the topic adoption)
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. INTON, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011
Facts:
In 1998, Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). One
of his teacher is Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin) in religion. One day Jose Luis left his seat and went
over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent him back to his seat.
After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin approached Jose
Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s
seat. She also made the child copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the floor. Because of
this incident, the parents of Jose Luis filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against
the teacher. The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610
to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for damages, the
Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt
that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victoria’s personal claims but ruled in
Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages
of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. The parents elevated the case to
the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas school solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Issue:
Is the school solidarily liable with the teacher for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
Ruling:
No, on the premise that the school had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect
to allowing sister Yamayamin to teach at the school.
The school directress for its defense insist that it should be the congregation to which sister Yamyamin
belongs who is solidarily liable. The directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion
teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. It was the congregation who sent sister
Yamyamin and thus it did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. Nevertheless, Aquinas
still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to
teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the
occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. They showed records,
certificates and diploma that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question that she came from a
legitimate congregation of sisters. They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the students. They
pre-approved the content of the course she wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation program
for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.
ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, AND ROSALINDA TABUGO, G.R. No. 182353,
June 29, 2010
Facts:
While inside the premises of St. Joseph’s College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged was
conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron fillings under the tutelage (the
teaching of an individual student by a teacher) teaching of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and
the employee, while the adviser is Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test
tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close
and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a
result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, his
wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was
working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego
her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00.
The decision of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA is this:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to
reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to
pay [Jayson's] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said amount of P26,176.36 from
the P77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Issue:
WON all the respondents are solidarily liable to the damage caused to the child and whether or not the
award for damages is correct.
Ruling:
Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jason’s injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a
good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers
despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of what should have been
a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable
for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to
students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals.
More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers.
The liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and
solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent employee.
The applicable law to wit:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Jason’s contributory negligence should mitigate the respondent’s liability. The proximate cause of
[Jayson's] injury was the explosion of the heated compound independent of any efficient intervening
cause. The negligence on the part of [petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the science experiment
was correctly conducted was the proximate cause or reason why the heated compound exploded and
injured not only [Jayson] but his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is partly responsible for his own
injury, hence, he should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the
consequences of his own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by their negligence.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school
year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part
of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the school St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
Ruling:
The school is not liable for the death of Sherwin but the owner of the jeepney. The Court held that for
the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligence was
the proximate cause of the injury caused. The negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.
Here, the proximate cause of the accident was due to detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Therefore it was the owner of the jeepney who failed to exercise the diligence required of a good
father of a family by not maintaining the good condition of his jeepney. The accident would not have
happened if the jeepney was in a good condition.
AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Facts:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While
they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito
Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against
the students was later dropped.
Issue:
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of
Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the
school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise
the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the
school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
The law reads:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
Considering that Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning, it is only the teacher who should be liable and not the heads of the school.
Nevertheless, the teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent
in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of
the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered
against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.
The school cannot be held directly liable under Article 2180 because only the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice.
Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has
been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
But how about the fact that the student was inside the school premises, should the school not be held
liable for that?
It is important to know as to when to consider the student to be under the custody of the school. Is it
only during the semester? At the start of the enrolment up to the end of the finals? As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180. However, the complaint was filed under Article 2180. It was held that the
teacher or the head of the school is not liable, so the liability likewise of the school does not exist.
(But how about Article 2176?)
SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. L-70458, October 5, 1988
Facts:
Jimmy Abon was a commerce student at Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also appointed as armorer
of the school’s ROTC Unit. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from
the AFP. He received orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee
(officer) of the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., at the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon
shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former
took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon
was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C.
Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus
Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
Ruling:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is
that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is]called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the [student]. "So long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory
custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students, for as long as
they are at attendance in the school , including recess time.", they are under the control and supervision
of the teacher. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains
within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for
damages resulting from his acts.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 84698, February
4, 1992
Facts:
(The issue elevated to the Supreme Court is only pertaining to cause of action as against the
respondents, not based on the merits of the case. The court a quo was ordered to continue with the
case to determine the liability of the school)
Carlitos Bautista was a third-year student at the Philippine School of Business Administration. Assailants,
who were not members of the school’s academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed
Bautista to death. This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and the following school
authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas
(Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security)
due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the complaint states no cause of action against
them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed and was affirmed by the
appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.
Ruling:
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis.
Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants
of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. But it does
not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the
safety of the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide
by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
The Supreme Court ordered the continuance of the case in the RTC to determine the liability of the
school under its contractual obligation. It further stated that it is not unmindful of the attendant
difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a
common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is especially true in the
populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been
reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case,
the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons,
time and place.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN (G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010)
Facts:
Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995. In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree
from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the Illinois
court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to Sharon sole custody of Stephanie
and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie. In 2004,
Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over Stephanie
contrary to their agreement. The trial court dismissed the case saying that (1) it is precluded from taking
cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce
decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is
binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the
Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the child.
Held:
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain Herald’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of the suit and call for the
remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie's custody.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner's suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner
went to the right court.
The refusal of the RTC to take cognizance of the case because the Illinois court's divorce decree stripped
it of jurisdiction is misplaced. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
"jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution." Petitioner's suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone
of the Illinois court's so-called "retained jurisdiction."
The court however cannot enforce the agreement because the same contravenes the policy of the
Philippine law that children under 7 years old will be with the mother subject only to the unfitness test.
In this case however, instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner's suit, the logical end to its lack of
cause of action, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to settle the question of
Stephanie's custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit
of the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the
default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child. As the question of custody
is already before the trial court and the child's parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed
inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the
parties to take advantage of the court's jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best
serving Stephanie's interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with
the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child's best
interest.
HORACIO& LIBERTY LUNA VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL, G.R. No. L-68374 June 18, 1985
Facts:
Maria Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides are the parents of Shirley Luna Salumbides. When Shirley
was two or four months that was on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to spouses HORACIO LUNA and
LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with
love and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them
"Mama" and "Papa". Shirley calls her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy."
When Shirley reached the age of four (4) years in 1979, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in
Quezon City, where she is now in Grade 3. A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and
"Papa" decided to take Shirley abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America.
Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited about it. However, when the spouses Luna asked for
the parent’s written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the parents refused to give it, to
the Luna's surprise. As a result, the spouses Luna had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the
parents. The spouses Luna, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from
Maryknoll College every school day.
When the spouses Luna returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the parents had transferred
Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private parents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither
did the said parents allow Shirley to visit the Spouses Luna. In view thereof, the spouses Luna filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, against the parents to
produce the person of Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. The spouses Luna’s petition
waw granted and Shirley was given to them. The parents appealed the case with the CA. The CA
reversed the RTC and ordered the award of custody to the parents. This was appealed to the SC but the
SC sustained the decision of the CA. The decision became final and execution of judgment was now
being asked by the parents.
The execution of the judgment was vigorously opposed by the spouses Luna who filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order and to set aside the writ of execution on the ground of supervening events
and circumstances, more particularly, the subsequent emotional, psychological, and physiological
condition of the child Shirley which make the enforcement of the judgment sought to be executed
unduly prejudicial, unjust and unfair, and cause irreparable damage to the welfare and interests of the
child.
The psychologist testified that Shirley has only grown more embittered, cautions, distrusting of her
biological parents. She threatens to kill herself or run away if given to her biological parents. She claims
she would be very unhappy with her biological parents since they do not understand her needs are
selfish to her, and don't know how to care for her. Presently, she is very difficult to encourage in seeing
her biological parents in a different light.
Issue:
WON the writ of execution of final judgment can be stayed
Held:
It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is returned to the lower court, the
only function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court
cannot vary the mandate of the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor
review it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it further than to
settle so much as has been demanded. However, it is also equally well-known that a stay of execution of
a final judgment may be authorized under the following:
a. whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as when there had been a change in
the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable; or
b. when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of the court; or
when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued; or
c. that it is defective in substance; or
d. is issued against the wrong party; or
e. that the judgement debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or
f. when the writ has been issued without authority.
In the instant case, the manifestation of the child Shirley that she would kill herself or run away from
home if she should be taken away from the herein petitioners and forced to live with the private
respondents, made during the hearings on the petitioners' motion to set aside the writ of execution
and reiterated in her letters to the members of the Court dated September 19, 1984 and January 2,
1985, and during the hearing of the case before this Court, is a circumstance that would make the
execution of the judgment rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 9417 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal. Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions
relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even
the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of
the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts
can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her
right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The
threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her
with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling. and moral and material security. But
what if the threat is for real.?
Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish
and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child
psychologist, Shirley has grown more embittered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents.
To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment
which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the
child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her future.
ZENAIDA MEDINA VS DRA.VENANCIA MAKABALI, G.R. No. L-26953, March 28, 1969
Facts:
On February 4, 1961, Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali
Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single,
who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third child with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as
her own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he
recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited
her child, and never paid for his expenses.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other
children apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides
elsewhere, albeit the offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes
about P400.00 a month as a mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a
witness. He never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court
informed him that his real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or
the respondent. The boy pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him, "Why do
you choose to stay with your "Mammy?" He answered, "She is the one rearing me." This confrontation
was made in the presence of the two women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra.
Makabali, in open court.
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when
he reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster
mother and denied the writ prayed for.
Issue:
WON the child should be given to the mother considering that he is still under the tender age.
Held:
The foster mother should retain custody of the child. The mother has been proven to be remised in the
sacred duties to provide adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic training and
development. While the law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not
lose sight of the basic principle that in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the
children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount (Civil Code, Article 363), and that for compelling
reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother. This is as it should be, for
in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from the jus
vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel
of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines.
The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now “there is no power but a task;
no complex of rights of parents but a, but a sum of duties: no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor.
MIGUEL UNSON III VS HON. PEDRO NAVARRO AND EDITA ARANETA, G.R. No. L-52242 November 17,
1980
Facts:
Miguel and Edita were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage a child named Teresa, was
born on December 1, 1971. However, on August 23, 1974 a legal separation was filed and on July 13,
1974 they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they
have in fact been living separately since June 1972. The agreement was approved by the Court but there
was no pronouncement as to the custody of the child as the husband and wife would have their own
private arrangement in that respect.
When Maria Teresa started pre-school in 1976 at the Early Learning Center in San Lorenzo, very near the
father's residence, and later, when she started school at Assumption College, Maria Teresa she would
stay with her father during school days and spend weekends with her mother, but there were times
when her mother would not even bother to pick her up during non-school days.
In the early part of 1978 Miguel personally acquired knowledge that his wife Edita Araneta has been
living with her brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, and that they had children. Aside from this, he likewise
found out that this Agustin whom his wife was living with was confined twice at the Makati Medical
Center for "Manic Depressive" disorder.
With this, the father filed a case in court to gain exclusive custody over his child as he was afraid that the
stay of their daughter in the mother’s company would not be for the best interest of the child.
Issue:
WON the mother should be deprived of her parental authority over her child.
Held:
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
Never has this Court diverted from that criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest
of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the
situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral
and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The
fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was
still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions
about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of
her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be
expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown
in the record, the Court finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than visitorial
rights over the child in question.
MARIA TERESA CUADRA, REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, ETAL VS ALFONSO MONFORT, G.R. No. L-
24101 September 30, 1970
Facts:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three
other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly
she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the
object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her
right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The
next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice,
first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days,
for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria
Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. A civil suit for damages was then instituted by
the parents of the victim minor as against the father of Monfort.
Issue:
What is the exact degree of diligence of a good father of a family requires? and how does a parent prove
it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his
absence or outside his immediate company?
Held:
Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is
the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
“that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on
the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it
in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his
absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to
determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise
of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary,
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the
injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably
on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
YLARDE V. AQUINO, G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

Facts:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan.
Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the school had several concrete
blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to
help clear the area so he gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton
concrete block in order to make a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished so the
following day he called 4 of the 18 students including Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation.
Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see Banez for the key to the school
workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the children not to
touch the stone. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete
block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries
which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners,
filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.
ISSUE: Whether both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for damages?
HELD:
As held in Amadora v. CA, “it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, which is the general rule. However, in cases of establishments of arts and trades,
it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as
principal cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did
not give any instruction regarding the digging.
A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students should make sure that the children are protected
from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk and should not be placed
under the category of Work Education such as school gardening, planting trees, etc. Aquino acted with
fault and gross negligence where instead of availing himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized
his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the
concrete block adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay
damages to the petitioners.
BRIONES vs. MIGUEL , G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Facts:
Briones alleged that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P.
Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The
respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
He alleged that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that
he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled
him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the
nursery course.
On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the
petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that
they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him
that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the
respondents did not bring him back as promised by them.
He tried to take back the child but to no avail so he filed this case to have a joint custody of his son and
suggested that whenever the mother is away in Japan, the son should stay with him. During the
pendency of the case however, the child was already brought by the mother to Japan.
Issue:
WON the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of
the mother who is away.
Held:
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and
Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
admits paternity.
BAR QUESTIONS
2019 Question (A.3) Custody
Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr. Reyes
cohabited with another woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz's illicit relationship, a child
named C was born. In C's birth certificate, "Cruz" appears as the child's surname, although Mr. Reyes
expressly acknowledged C as his child.
In 2018, Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a petition in court
for parental custody and change or correction of C's surname in the child's birth certificate from "Cruz"
to "Reyes." At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.
(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)
Suggested Answer:
Considering that the child is already 10 years old, the choice of the child is important in determining to
whom the child prefers to stay. If the child chooses the father, then that should be respected by the
court taking into consideration the best welfare of the child. If staying with the father will be for the
best interest of the child, then custody should be awarded to him, otherwise, it should remain with the
mother.
Parental Authority; Child under 7 years of age (2006)
Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Explain the rationale of this provision. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The rationale of the 2nd paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code is to avoid
the tragedy of a mother who sees her baby torn away from her. It is said that the maternal affection and
care during the early years of the child are generally needed by the child more than paternal care
(Hontiveros v. IAC, G.R. No. 64982, October 23, 1984; Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code, Volume One, pp. 718-719). The general rule is that a child below 7 years old shall not be
separated from his mother due to his basic need for her loving care (Espiritu v. C.A., G.R. No. 115640,
March 15,1995).
Parental Authority 2006
Give at least 3 examples of "compelling reasons" which justify the taking away from the mother's
custody of her child under 7 years of age. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The mother is insane

2. The mother is sick with a disease that is communicable and might endanger the health and life
of the child;
3. The mother has been maltreating the child;
4. The mother is engaged in prostitution;
5. The mother is engaged in adulterous relationship;
6. The mother is a drug addict;
7. The mother is a habitual drunk or an alcoholic;
8. The mother is in jail or serving sentence.
(Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 296-297)
Parental Authority; Special Parental Authority; Liability of Teachers (2003)
If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the school corridor, a 7 year
old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ball pen during a fight, causing permanent blindness
to the victim, who could be liable for damages for the boy’s injury: the teacher, the school authorities, or
the guilty boy’s parents? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody (Article 218, FC). They are principally
and solidarily liable for the damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor unless
they exercised the proper diligence required under the circumstances (Article 219, FC). In the problem,
the TEACHER and the SCHOOL AUTHORITIES are liable for the blindness of the victim, because the
student who cause it was under their special parental authority and they were negligent. They were
negligent because they were chatting in the corridor during the class period when the stabbing incident
occurred. The incident could have been prevented had the teacher been inside the classroom at that
time. The guilty boy’s PARENTS are subsidiarily liable under Article 219 of the Family Code.
Parental Authority; Substitute vs. Special (2004)
Distinguish briefly but clearly between: Substitute parental and special parental authority.
SUGGESTED ANSWER: In substitute parental authority, the parents lose their parental authority in favor
of the substitute who acquires it to the exclusion of the parents. In special parental authority, the
parents or anyone exercising parental authority does not lose parental authority. Those who are
charged with special parental authority exercise such authority only during the time that the child is in
their custody or supervision. Substitute parental authority displaces parental authority while special
parental authority concurs with parental authority.
Liability; Special Parental Authority (2010) No.XII.
On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to school a car, a gift
from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go on a field trip, his teacher requested
him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4) of his classmates because the van rented by the
school was too crowded. On the way to a museum which the students were scheduled to visit, Rozanno
made a wrong maneuver, causing a collision with a jeepney. One of his classmates died. He and the
three (3) others were badly injured.
(A). Who is liable for the death of Rozanno’s classmate and the injuries suffered by Rozanno and his 3
other classmates? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a minor, Art 218 of the
Family Code applies. Pursuant to Art 218, the school, its administrators and teachers shall be liable for
the acts of minor Rozanno because of the special parental authority and responsibility that they exercise
over him. The authority applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. The field trip on which occasion Rozanno drove the car, was an authorized
activity, and , thus, covered by the provision. Furthermore, the parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable
pursuant to Art 219 (FC), and principally liable under Art 221 (FC), if they are negligent.
(B). How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the damages caused to the jeepney, only Rozanno should be held liable because his
negligence or tortuous act was the sole, proximate and immediate cause thereof.
(C). Under the same facts, except the date of occurrence of the incident, this time in mid-1994, what
would be your answer? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the middle of 1994,
Rozanno have been 21 years old at the time. Hence, he was already of legal age. The law reducing the
age of majority to 18 years took effect in December 1989. Being of legal age, articles 218, 219, and 221
of the Family Code are no longer applicable. In such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible
for all the consequences of his act unless his school or his parents were themselves also negligent and
such negligence contributed to the happening of the incident. In that event, the school or his parents
are not liable under Art 218, 218 or 221 of the Family Code, but will be liable under general provision on
the Civil Code on quasi-delict.
-----end-------

16 +Parental+Authority

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

16 +Parental+Authority

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TITLE IX

 Parental authority under the Family Code includes parental “responsibility.”

Q: In case of separation of the parents, who can exercise parental authority?

Q: What are the RIGHTS of parents upon their children?

SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN

EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN

SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY PARENTAL AUTHORITY TERMINATES

PARENTAL CUSTODY/ILLEGITIMATE CHILD

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL , G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

(1) The surviving grandparent, chosen by the court; If none

Custody and Parental Authority of Legitimate children in case of Separation:

(a) Both parents jointly;

a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.

Tonog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002

Vancil v. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001

1. Silva v. Court of Appeals

WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY

2. Tonog v. Court of Appeals

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

1. Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

1. Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

1. Aquinas School v. Inton

CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Parental authority over illegitimate child / rights of the father

a) Whether or not Silva has visitation rights.

TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 122906, February 7, 2002

VANCIL vs. BELMES, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001

Who can have the custody over the child?

(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;

SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No., March 16, 1995

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the child.

Was the CA correct in relying merely on the tender age presumption?

Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child?

TAMARGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.No. 85044, June 3, 1992

(please see discussion in the topic adoption)

The decision of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA is this:

2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;

3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees;

4. To pay the costs of suit.

The applicable law to wit:

The law reads:

(But how about Article 2176?)

Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

WON the writ of execution of final judgment can be stayed

YLARDE V. AQUINO, G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL , G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004

(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)

Parental Authority; Child under 7 years of age (2006)

Explain the rationale of this provision. (2.5%)

Parental Authority 2006

1. The mother is insane

(Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 296-297)

Parental Authority; Special Parental Authority; Liability of Teachers (2003)

Parental Authority; Substitute vs. Special (2004)

Liability; Special Parental Authority (2010) No.XII.

(B). How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)

You might also like