Legal and Judicial Ethics October 21 2020

LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (OCTOBER 21, 2022) FINALS
1. A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016 - ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE
G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016
ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took on the case that he had intervened in
during his incumbency on the Bench. The complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in the case. The
charge specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal practice of law, conduct
and (sic) becoming as a former member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the canons of
legal ethics with prayer for disbarment"
Antecedent
The antecedents summarized in the Report and Recommendation submitted by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)2 are as follows:
Complainant alleged that respondent was the former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 35,
Ozamis City and retired as such. But before his appointment as RTC Judge, he was the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities 10th Judicial Division, Tangub City where he presided [over] a Forcible Entry
case docketed as Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Ronald Rupinta vs. Sps. Pacifico Conol and Malinda Conol."
Complainant was the counsel of Rupinta and the decision was rendered against him by respondent.
Sometime on 24 November 1994 and while respondent was still the Presiding Judge of MTCC, Tangub City,
another civil complaint was filed by Ronald Rupinta with his mother, Anastacia Rupinta, as co-plaintiff, against
Carmen Alfire and Pacifico Conol, docketed as Civil Case No. 357, for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages
with Petition tor the Appointment of a Receiver. Complainant represented the plaintiffs and the complaint was
heard by respondent as Presiding Judge of MTCC, 10th Judicial Region, Tangub City. When the case was
already scheduled for trial on the merits, respondent suspended the scheduled hearing "motu proprio" for reason
that there was still affirmative defenses raised by the defendants, like the issue of lack of jurisdiction which
prompted the plaintiff to file a Manifestation and Memorandum which made respondent to (sic) inhibit himself
from trying the case.
Since 17 January 1996, the aforesaid case hibernated and respondent was appointed Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 35, Ozamis City. Sometime on 23 March 2006, the newly appointed Presiding Judge of MTCC 10th
Judicial Region, Tangub City, Judge Rodolfo L. Vapor, issued an Order informing the parties on the aforesaid
case whether they were amenable for him to render judgment on the case of which complainant's client agreed
and filed their Memorandum. However, complainant was surprised when he received a Manifestation from the
defendants that they are now represented by respondent, the former judge who once presided over the aforesaid
case.
Plaintiffs, through complainant, filed their Memorandum within 30 days. However, Judge Vapor, instead of
rendering judgment based on the merits and evidences (sic) already presented, issued an Order dated 26 May
2006, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the complaint being denominated as an annulment of a Deed
of Sale, is by nature a claim beyond pecuniary estimation, hence the court has no jurisdiction. xxx
The Decision dismissing the complaint was appealed to the RTC, Branch 16, Tangub City presided by Judge
Sylvia Singidas-Machacon who directed the appellant to submit their Memorandum. Despite the warning of the
complainant that the appearance of respondent is highly illegal, immoral, unethical and adverse to the interest of
the public, respondent, being the previous presiding judge, continued on with his appearance for the appellees
by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Memorandum. On appeal, Judge Machacon, reversed the
Decision of Judge Vapor sustaining the stand of the client of respondent that the original jurisdiction of the case
is vested with the MTCC, Tangub City.
While the aforesaid appealed case was pending before Judge Machacon, complainant filed a Motion to Expunge
from the Court Records the Memorandum filed by the Defendants-Appellees through their counsel Ex-MTC
and RTC Judge Felipe G. Zapatos, on the ground that as the former presiding judge of the MTCC, Tangub City,
he is, disqualified to appear as counsel for the defendants. For allegedly failing to attend the hearing of the
above-mentioned Motion, the same was denied by Judge Machacon despite the fact that respondent admitted in
his Comment to the said Motion the allegations of complainant. Respondent raised as his defense that he cannot
be charged nor penalized of any violation as the counsel of the defendants because when he rendered the first
judgment in the Forcible Entry case, he believes he was completely in absolute neutrality. Respondent, likewise,
justified his appearance as counsel for the defendants on the ground that he is encountering extreme poverty due
to the absence of adequate income and as a source of livelihood he was constrained to handle the aforesaid case.
Respondent admits that complainant filed Civil Case No. 330 entitled "Rupinta vs. Conol" before the MTCC,
Tangub City where respondent was the presiding judge. As a result of that case, respondent rendered a decision
dismissing the same on 23 September 1993. After the aforesaid case was dismissed, complainant, as counsel of
Anastacia Rupinta Largo and Ronald Rupinta, filed Civil Case No. 357 for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Reconveyance of Ownership, Accounting of Rents and Fruits and Attorney's Fees and Damages
with [Petition for the] Appointment of a Receiver and Civil Case No. 356 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Perfecto Rupinta, Petition for Letters of Administration, Mrs. Anastacia Rupinta Largo,
Petitioner". Respondent as Presiding Judge inhibited himself from conducting the trial of the two (2) cases as
provided for in his Order dated 17 January 1996 on the ground that complainant as counsel for the plaintiffs and
petitioner in the aforesaid cases have doubted the absolute neutrality or impartiality of respondent.
After inhibiting himself from these cases, respondent was promoted as Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch
35, Ozamis City on 28 October 1997 until he retired from the Judiciary on 14 November 200 I. Thereafter, on
account of the fact that respondent needs income in order to survive or he would die of starvation, he engaged in
the private practice of law. Four (4) years after he retired from the judiciary and more than ten (1 0) years after
he inhibited himself from conducting trial on Civil Case No. 357, respondent filed a Manifestation for the
defendants in Civil Case 357.3
Ignoring the warnings of the complainant, the respondent persisted in his representation of the defendants in
Civil Case No. 357. Hence, the complainant commenced this administrative case.
After being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his comment, to which the complainant filed a
rejoinder. Thereafter, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Report and Recommendation

of the IBP-CB
After the parties submitted their position papers, the IBP-CBD issued its Rep01i and Recommendation dated
July 9, 2008,4 whereby it found and held the respondent guilty of violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law and as a member
of the Bar for one (1) month. It observed that under Rule 6.03, "a lawyer shall not, after leaving the government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service;" and that the words or phrases any matter and he had intervened qualifying the prohibition were
very broad terms, and included any conceivable subject in which the respondent acted on in his official
capacity.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403 adopted on August 14, 2008,6 the IBP Board of Governors approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-4347 denying the respondent's
motion for reconsideration, and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-2008-403.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the records to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice or law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
This rule, according to Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, traces its lineage to
Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.
To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must be
shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his judicial
office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. That showing was
sufficiently made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of Tangub City, presided
over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted
intervention within the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length of the intervention
in the particular case or matter. It is also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, supra, from which the canon
was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the Bench from handling any case upon which he had
previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this context, he not only exercised the power to influence the outcome
of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the
power to rule on it.
The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The respondent could not accept work or employment
from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf
of the body or authority that he served during his public employment. The restriction as applied to him lasted
beyond his tenure in relation to the matters in which he had intervened as judge. Accordingly, the fact that he
was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the private practice of law when he was engaged
for the case was inconsequential.
Although the respondent removed himself from the cases once his neutrality and impartiality were challenged,
he ultimately did not stay away from the cases following his retirement from the Bench, and acted thereon as a
lawyer for and in behalf of the defendants.
The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his plight of "poverty." Although we can
understand his current situation and symphatize with him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they
contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In any case,
his representing the defendants in the civil cases was not the only way by which he could improve his dire
financial situation. It would not be difficult for him, being a lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to
accept clients whom he could ethically represent in a professional capacity. If the alternatives open to him were
not adequate to his liking, he had other recourses, like serving as a notary public under a valid commission. His
taking on of the defendants' civil cases despite his previous direct intervention thereon while still a member of
the Bench was impermissible. He should have maintained his ethical integrity by avoiding the engagement by
the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule
6.03 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of this decision, with warning that a similar
offense by him will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of the respondent and be entered in his file in the
Office of the Bar Confidant; and be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
lower courts in the country, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
2. A.C. No. 11550. June 04, 2018 ]

MANUEL B. TROVELA, COMPLAINANT, VS. MICHAEL B. ROBLES, ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR; EMMANUEL L. OBUNGEN, PROSECUTOR II; JACINTO G. ANG, CITY
PROSECUTOR; CLARO A. ARELLANO, PROSECUTOR GENERAL; AND LEILA M. DE LIMA,
FORMER SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers charged with
administrative offenses involving the performance of their official duties.
The Case
The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City Assistant Prosecutor Michael B. Robles
(Robles) of Pasig City for issuing a resolution dated September 29, 2011 recommending the dismissal of his
complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code against Carlo L. Katigbak
(Katigbak), Carlos Pedro C. Salonga (Salonga) and Barbara B. Reyes (Reyes) for insufficiency of evidence; and
against Prosecutor II Emmanuel L. Obuñgen (Obuñgen) and City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang (Ang), both of
Pasig City, for approving the recommendation of dismissal.
The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano (Arellano) and
former Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima (De Lima) for allegedly incurring inordinate delay in issuing their
resolutions resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Antecedents
On May 25, 2011, the complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes with estafa under Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant stated that he became the Employee Relation Director of Sky Cable
on November 1, 2004; that he later on received a termination letter dated July 6, 2006 signed by Salonga
informing him of his relief from work and of his compensation being paid until the effective date of his
termination; that his payslips for the periods from July 16, 2006 to July 31, 2006 and from August 1, 2006 to
August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of his savings contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and
Loan Association (MESALA) amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that withholding taxes of P4,509.45
and P4,235.70, respectively, were also deducted from his compensation; that he discovered that such deductions
were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky Cable did not
reimburse the amounts of his unremitted deductions despite demand.[1]
In his resolution dated September 29, 2011,[2] Robles recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.
Obuñgen and Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal on October 11, 2011.
The complainant filed his petition for review dated November 3, 2011 to appeal the dismissal of his complaint.
[3]
On February 12, 2013, Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error in the September 29, 2011
resolution of Robles, hence, affirming the dismissal of the complaint.[4]
The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by Secretary De Lima on April 21,
2015.[5]
Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents, insisting thusly:
I.
THE PREMISES CONSIDERED BY THE OPCP IN NOT FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE IN THE CASE
ARE VERY MUCH CONTRARY TO LONG STANDING JURISPRUDENCE HOLDING THAT DEMAND
IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE CRIME OF EMBEZZLEMENT
WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY OTHER PROOF AND THAT FAILURE TO ACCOUNT, UPON
DEMAND, FOR FUNDS OR PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST IS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
MISAPPROPRIATION.[6]
II.
BUT WHILE THE APPLICATION OF THESE RULINGS HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY, REPEATEDLY
AND UNEQUIVOCABLY MADE IN MORE RECENT CASES, IN ACTING ON MY 3 NOVEMBER 2011
PETITION FOR REVIEW AND ON MY 13 MARCH 2013 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,
RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE LIMA STILL SUSTAINED THE WRONG
PRESUMPTIONS MADE BY THE OPCP, ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.[7]
III.
TOGETHER WITH SUCH OMISSIONS, THE INORDINATE DELAYS ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENTS ARELLANO AND DE LIMA IN COMING OUT WITH THEIR SEPARATE
RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE MERELY ANCHORED ON THE GROSSLY ERRONEOUS FINDINGS OF
THE OPCP NEGATE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THEY ACTUALLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE AND THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE PRESENTED AND INDICATED THEIR LACK OF
RESOLVE TO SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE.[8]
IV.
WHILE THE PRESENCE OF THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION AND OTHER
ANOMALOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PERJURY AND UNJUST JUDGMENT CASES, THE
MANIPULATIVE SCHEMES EMPLOYED BY SKY CABLE IN CERTAIN OF ITS PLEADINGS (sic) AND
THE INORDINATE DELAYS IN ALL THE RELATED CASES ARE VERY OBVIOUS, RESPONDENT DE
LIMA, DESPITE BEING THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THEN, TOTALLY IGNORED THE SAME.[9]
V.
ABOVE ALL, RESPONDENT DE LIMA TOOK ACTION ON THE ESTAFA CASE AHEAD OF THE
OTHER CASES WITHOUT CONSOLIDATING THEM DESPITE THE FACT THAT ALL INDICATIONS
CLEARLY POINT TO SUCH CONSOLIDATION.[10]
VI.
THAT SAID, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT ALL OF THE RESPONDENTS HAD NOT ONLY RENEGED
ON THEIR SWORN DUTY TO UPHOLD THE LAWS OF THE LAND, BASICALLY AS LAWYERS AND
AS PROSECUTORS OR DISPENSERS OF JUSTICE, WHICH COMPROMISED THE EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, BUT THEY ALSO COMMITTED GROSS VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN
LAWS THEMSELVES.[11]
Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the complainant?
Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the administrative case against the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen and Ang committed grave errors
of facts and law that require an inquiry into their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar; and that
Arellano and Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of dereliction of duty or gross inexcusable negligence for
belatedly resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. He specifically prays that the Court
grants the following reliefs, namely:
xxxx
1. Finding prima facie cases against them for violation of Art. 208 of the RPC and R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
a.k.a. the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and referring the matter to the appropriate governmental agency
for the prosecution thereof;
2. Imposing appropriate disciplinary action against them, including their disbarment and/or removal from office,
for gross violation of the canons of the legal profession or for unprofessional conduct that casts serious doubt
upon their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar and as prosecutors;
3. Awarding costs of suit hereof in such amounts as may be commensurate with the extent and degree of
misconduct committed by each of them and recommending that I be awarded corresponding actual, as well as
moral, exemplary and compensatory damages; and
4. Providing such other reliefs as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.[12]
xxxx
The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as
prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang
and Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima,
the authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office
of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to
Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability of
respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always
to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate them as such lawyers.
The Court has recently made this clear in Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay[13] by holding as follows:
Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," prescribes the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.
The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible
for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the
evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson v.
Restrivera, the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure.
Consequently, acts or omissions of public officials relating to the performance of their functions as government
officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no jurisdiction over government
lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving their official duties. In the present case, the
allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty. Zema, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor,
which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2) failure to evaluate documentary evidence presented
to the CSC; and (3) non-service of CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge
of their official duties as government lawyers working in the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over
Alicias' complaint. These are acts or omissions connected with their duties as government lawyers exercising
official functions in the CSC and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the
Office of the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint filed against all the respondents for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
July 2, 2018
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs /Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in
the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 2, 2018 at 1:38 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court
3. A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014

[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a complain for disbarment1 on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty
filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos (Aida), and their children, Alistair R.
Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).
Antecedents
Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.
In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan, Agusan del Sur
from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in Alistair’s name. Alistair
was then a student without an income and a capacity to buy the property. In 2006, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued in Alistair’s name. Meanwhile, Alistair got married and
his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo’s house until 2008.2
On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Branch 7, a
Petition3 for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that during the first few days of their
marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual intercourse with his wife. He alleged
that he is a homosexual. He also averred that Aida experienced severe pain when she delivered Alistair.
Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear children. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.
On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss4 wherein he represented himself as the owner of
the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the owner’s certificate of title
which used to be in his files. On September 15, 2008, he caused the annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy
of OCT No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No
Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted Eliseo’s
representations.
On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan, Agusan del
Sur a complaint for perjury8 against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 was in his
possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately and maliciously asserted a falsehood.
In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-
28258. Eliseo continued:
That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be registered in the name of [Alistair], who was still
single, as I have some other properties (land) under my name;
That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;
That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;
That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is now pending before the [RTC] of Bayugan, I
offered to my wife as a settlement to have our properties settled. One of [these properties] is this lot, which I
asked to be sold and its proceeds be divided between us. I have learned that my wife refused to have that
property sold claiming that I could not sell the house and lot as it is in the name of our son, herein complainant
Alistair R. Campos;
xxxx
That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the Lot has long
been in his actual, physical and personal possession, is utterly false, as the title was previously in our possession
in our files as the property is undersigned's own exclusive property. x x x
That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to apply for a loan making the title of the lot as
collateral, I decided to file a petition for cancellation of the title under my son's name Alistair R. Campos, and
asked Mrs. Azucena A. Ortiz, to get a certified copy of the title from the Register of Deeds to be used in the
filing of a petition for cancellation of the title in my son’s name;
That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the Register of Deeds, that I have to execute an affidavit of
loss so that I can be given a certified copy. Since the title is not in my possession after I left my residence and I
cannot find it from my files, I let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of loss and I signed it. I have also instructed her
to [cause the annotation of the affidavit on the certificate of title] to protect my interest as the real owner of the
lot, to counter or stop my wife and son from using the titles as collateral of a loan;
x x x x.10
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable cause
Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo.11 The resolution, which dismissed the complaint, in part, reads:
"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought was missing and could not be found in his files, he
did the proper actions to protect his rights thereto by executing an Affidavit of Loss.
x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a loan using the title as collateral without his
consent and to protect his right as owner of the property, he went to the Register of Deeds to cancel his son’s
ownership over the lot in question with the intent to revert back its ownership in his name. However, when
asked to produce a copy of its duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present the same as it was already lost and
could not be retrieved from his files. To prove its loss, an Affidavit of Loss was executed by [Eliseo] attesting to
the fact of its unavailability.
x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo] in executing
the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt assertion of falsehood since there was a firm belief that indeed, the
title is not anymore found in his files. It could not be located and the title is kept by [Alistair] who took sides
with [Aida] who has plans to enjoy the benefits from the title using it as a collateral in obtaining a loan from the
lot covered by the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful to Eliseo, the former could have informed the latter of
the] whereabouts of the title and could have sought permission from his father when he took the copy of the title
from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing [Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such Affidavit and neither
can he be found guilty of perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x x x."12 (Citation omitted)
On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint13 for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of Conjugal
Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a homosexual. However,
Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to Alistair and Charmaine that he was then
intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise claimed that Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped
giving support to their family.
On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) an
administrative complaint14 for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against Eliseo. Formal
investigation was thereafter conducted.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint against Eliseo, he resigned from his
judicial post on July 1, 2009.15
On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge Casals) called the parties
for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle ensued inside the chamber. The police blotter filed promptly after the
incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box but failed to hit Alistair.16
On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment17 against Eliseo. They
alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in (a) causing the issuance
of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot
covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September
10, 2008 that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with
Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit
admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and (e) choking and boxing his
children on September 14, 2009.
After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he interposed the
following defenses: (a) the complainants are engaged in forum shopping in view of pending administrative and
civil cases in all of which the issues of immorality and homosexuality have already been raised;21 (b) the
complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a consequence of his refusal to provide a monthly support of
Php60,000.00 to his wife and children;22 (c) he has no extra-marital relation but he once told Alistair and
Charmaine in jest that due to Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live separately with another woman who may be
more caring and loving than his wife;23 and (d) to protect his rights and prevent the complainants from using as
a collateral for a loan the house and lot covered by OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of Loss on
September 10, 2008 as a pre-requisite to his filing of an action in court for the registration of the property in his
name.24 Further, Eliseo refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the scuffle which occurred on
September 14, 2009 inside the chamber of the judge hearing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Eliseo insists that if Alistair and Charmaine’s claims were true, they could have presented independent
witnesses to corroborate their version of the incident, and medical certificates to prove that they indeed
sustained injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what had transpired:
[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the judge called the parties to his chamber for a
conference. [Aida] however was reluctant to go unless her children would join her. The judge then called all of
them to the chamber. Once there, the Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for settlement. While [Eliseo]
was explaining to the judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising her voice uttering unprintable words to [Eliseo].
[Eliseo] requested her to calm down reminding her that they were still in court. But she continued her tirade at
[Eliseo] with greater intensity even calling him a bad father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine had
already been ejected by the judge out of the court for lack of decorum and respect. The order for her removal
arose after she interrupted the court several times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was already outside the
court premises, she was even heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that [Eliseo] should watch out after the
hearing as she was going to attack him. The prior incident (where she was thrown out of court) made her angrier
in the chamber. So when she continued with her unpleasant and scandalous utterances by again interrupting
[Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to talk about his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo] walked to her and held
her by her shoulder to put some sense to her that she really had to calm down out of respect [for] the judge.
There was no choking of Charmaine. But, this sight of holding Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed
differently by [Alistair] who flung with force and recklessness a bag containing an unknown hard object to
[Eliseo]. [Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point, Charmaine suddenly held [Eliseo] from behind so he could
not defend himself from the onslaught of Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him. [Eliseo] was forced to
elbow Charmaine to break free from her hold. There was a brief exchange of punches between Alistair and
[Eliseo] before the Presiding Judge broke the fray. This incident could not have happened if not for
Charmaine’s own misdemeanor and initial provocation.25
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener Sansaet came
to represent them. Eliseo appeared on his own behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as collaborating counsel.
During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of (a) immorality and psychological
incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in the execution of the Affidavit of Loss
need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since they are already the subjects of other
pending cases.26 He also expressed his doubt that Alistair is his biological son.27 He also alleged that Aida, who
had served for three terms as a Provincial Board Member, had a lover, who was likewise a political
figure.28 Aida harbored the impression that Eliseo’s filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage caused the downfall of the former’s political career.29
The Report and Recommendation of the CBD
On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted his Report and
Recommendation30 to the IBP Board of Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the
instant disbarment complaint against Eliseo for lack of evidence. Commissioner Din, Jr. ratiocinated that:
The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not [Eliseo] committed serious misconduct sufficient to cause his
disbarment. The determination of [Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the following: 1. whether or not [Eliseo]
was dishonest with regards to the statements he made in his Petition for Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not
[Eliseo] is guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or not the statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss
concerning the certificate of title of the Campos’ property were untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo] choked
his daughter, Charmaine, during the amicable settlement of the annulment case in the (sic) Judge Casal’s (sic)
chambers.
The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or serious misconduct has been defined as "any inexcusable,
shameful and flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of justice
which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of a cause, a conduct that is
generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose (Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA
457).
As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct has been held to be "a ground for the imposition of the penalty
of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the
practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty. Paita-Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June
27, 2008).
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent
to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M.
Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008).
In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of [Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the incongruence of his
homosexuality and the extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for annulment compared with the
complainants’ allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that he has a mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and
the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite knowledge of the fact that the certificate of title was with
[Alistair] who is the registered owner of the subject property taken on their own is a valid ground to find
[Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.
However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and every single allegation of the complainants making the case
at fore a battle of opposing narration of facts.
More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are insufficient to prove their claim
beyond the degree of evidence required of them by law to satisfy and overcome.
Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise
the disciplinary power only if the former establishes the case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."
xxxx
In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the complaint, no other evidence was presented by the
complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the statements made in the complaint, no other corroborative or
collaborating evidence documentary or testimonial from independent, third person was presented to convince
this Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that [Eliseo] is guilty of the allegations contained
therein.31 (Citation omitted)
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the Extended
Resolution issued on March 20, 2013, the Board suspended Eliseo from the practice of law for two years. Thus:
[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds sufficient evidence to sustain misconduct on the part
of [Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing an Affidavit of Loss of Title to Real Property which Title was in
the name of Alistair, his son, and which was in the latter’s possession, substantiated with annexes and affidavits.
The same holds true for the alleged choking incident in the Judge’s chamber which was caused to be blottered,
Annex "G". [Eliseo] also admitted his infidelity albeit he postulated the defense of homosexuality. All these,
taken together, fall short of the ethical standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32
Issues
Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in:
I.
Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;
II.
Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258;
III.
Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner's
copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair;
IV.
Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to
his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and
V.
Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

This Court’s Ruling
Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the chamber of
Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is compelled to once
again impose a fine upon Eliseo for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar.
This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned for his
unbecoming behavior.
In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of suspension from the practice of law,
the IBP Board of Governors considered all the three charges of immorality, dishonesty and misconduct against
the former.
However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon Eliseo a fine
of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name when
the subject property actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a) immorality in engaging in extra-marital
affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand,
dismissed by the Court after finding either the evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the issues raised
being already the subjects of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored upon
almost the same set of facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on September 14,
2009 is raised as well. This Court does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same acts especially since they
pertain to his private life and were not actually committed in connection with the performance of his functions
as a magistrate before.
In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative cases against
justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as
a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for
the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution."
xxxx
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause
why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar."
xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should
not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is
the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to
avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against
a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule.
Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an
administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a
judge of a first- or second-level court.34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a lawyer when an
administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant
disbarment complaint should have been consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note
that Samson v. Caballero35 was promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the
instant disbarment complaint on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are
replicated in the instant disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the
latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.
In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that
not one of the parties had presented even one independent witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber
of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took place is a fact, but the question of who started what
cannot be determined with much certainty.
While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense
on his part.36
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands that the
successive acts of the parties during the tussle were committed at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be
excused for comporting himself in such an undignified manner.
Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand, is instructive anent what constitutes unbecoming
conduct, viz:
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."39
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his own children
inside the chamber of a judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social behavior. Besides, the courtroom is
looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and
conflicts settled, and justice solemnly dispensed.40 Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its
sanctity and dignity.41 Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum
and restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court and lend
credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.
Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the hearing
conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son.42 As a lawyer, Eliseo
is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted for that specific
purpose is nothing short of defamation.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted
himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with his own children in the
chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his doubt anent the legitimacy of his
son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby imposed upon him, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

Associate Justice
4. 5. A.C. No. 10031 July 23, 2014
RAUL M. FRANCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. REYNALDO V. ABDON, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
In a verified complaint1 dated December 4, 2007 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Committee
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), Raul M. Francia (complainant) prayed for the disbarment and imposition of other
disciplinary sanctions on Labor Arbiter (LA) Reynaldo V. Abdon (respondent) for violation of the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On February 4, 2008, the respondent filed his Answer2 vehemently denying the allegations in the complaint.
On August 13, 2008, both parties appeared at the mandatory conference. Upon its termination, the parties were
required to submit their respective position papers afterwhich the case was submitted for resolution.
In his position paper,3 the complainant alleged that in November 2006, he had a meeting with the respondent at
the Makati Cinema Square to seek his assistance with respect to a pending case in the Court of Appeals (CA)
involving the labor union of Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative (NEECO III). The said case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 96096 and raffled to the 6th Division then chaired by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Justices
Edgardo Sundiam (Justice Sundiam) and Celia Librea-Leagogo as members. The respondent, who is a LA at the
National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando, Pampanga, told the complainant that he can facilitate,
expedite and ensure the release of a favorable decision, particularly the award of assets and management of
NEECO III to the union. To bolster his representation, he told him that the same regional office where he was
assigned had earlier rendered a decision in favor of the labor union and against the National Electrification
Administration.4 With the respondent’s assurance, the complainant yielded.
In December 2006, the complainant met the respondent to discuss their plan and timetable in securing a
favorable ruling from the CA. The respondent told him that in order to facilitate the release of such favorable
decision, the union must produce the amount of ₱1,000,000.00, a considerable portion of which is intended for
Justice Sundiam, the ponente of the case and the two member justices of the division, while a fraction thereof is
allotted to his costs.5
Shortly thereafter, the complainant met the respondent again and handed him the amount of ₱350,000.00,which
was raised out of the individual contributions of the members of the union, as partial payment for the agreed
amount and undertook to pay the balance as soon as the union is finally allowed to manage and operate the
electric cooperative. In turn, the respondent assured him that a favorableruling will be rendered by the CA in no
time.6
A week before Christmas of the same year, the complainant made several follow-ups with the respondent about
the status of the decision. In response to his inquiries, the respondentwould tell him that: (1) the decision is
being routed for signature of the members of the three-man CA division; (2) the lady justice was the only one
left to sign; and (3) the lady justice went to a Christmas party and was not able to sign the decision. Ultimately,
the promised favorable decision before the end of that year was not issued by the CA, with no explanation from
the respondent.7
On January 4, 2007, the union was advised by their counsel that the CA has already rendered a decision on their
case and the same was adverse to them. This infuriated the union members who then turned to the complainant
and demanded for the return of the 350,000.00 that they raised as respondent’s facilitation fee. The respondent
promised to return the money but asked for a few weeks to do so. After two weeks, the respondent turned over
the amount of ₱100,000.00, representing the unspent portion of the money given to him and promised to pay the
balance of ₱250,000.00 as soon as possible. The respondent, however, reneged on his promise and would not
even advise the complainant of the reason for his failure to return the money. Thus, the complainant was
constrained to give his car to the union to settle the remaining balance which the respondent failed to return.8
To support his claims, the complainant submitted the following pieces of evidence: (1) a transcript of the
exchange of text messages between him and the respondent;9 (2) affidavit of Butch Pena (Pena),10 officer of the
Association of Genuine Labor Organization (AGLO); (3) a transcript of the text message of a certain Paulino
Manongsong, confirming the respondent’s mobile number;11 (4) copy of the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
96096;12 and (5) affidavit of Shirley Demillo (Demillo).13
For his part, the respondent denied that he made any representation to the complainant; that he had the capacity
to facilitate the release of a favorable decision in the CA; and that he received money in exchange therefor. He
admitted that he had a chance meeting with the complainant at the Makati Cinema Square in December 2006.
Since they have not seen each other for a long time, they had a short conversation over snacks upon the
complainant’s invitation. In the course of their conversation, the complainant asked if he knew of the case
involving the union of the NEECO III. He told him that he was not familiar with the details but knew that the
same is already pending execution before the office of LA Mariano Bactin. The complainant told him that the
properties of NEECO III were sold at public auction but the union members were yet to obtain the proceeds
because of a temporary restraining order issued by the CA. He inquired if he knew anyone from the CA who
can help the union members in their case as he was assisting them in following up their case. The respondent
answered in the negative but told him that he can refer him to his former client, a certain Jaime "Jimmy" Vistan
(Vistan), who may be able to help him. At that very moment, he called Vistan using his mobile phone and
relayed to him the complainant’s predicament. After giving Vistan a brief background of the case, he handed
the mobile phone to the complainant, who expounded on the details. After their conversation,the complainant
told him that he will be meeting Vistan on the following day and asked him if he could accompany him. He
politely declined and just gave him Vistan’s mobile number so that they can directlycommunicate with each
other.14
Sometime thereafter, he received a call from Vistan who told him that he was given ₱350,000.00 as facilitation
fee. After their conversation, he never heard from Vistan again.15
In January 2007, he received a text from the complainant, asking him to call him through his landline. Over the
phone, the complainant told him about his arrangement with Vistan insecuring a favorable decision for the
union but the latter failed to do his undertaking. The complainant blamed him for the misfortune and even
suspected that he was in connivance with Vistan, which he denied. The complainant then asked for his help to
recover the money he gave to Vistan.16
When their efforts to locate Vistan failed, the complainant turned to him again and asked him to return the
money because the union threatened him with physical harm. The respondent, however, maintained his lack of
involvement in their transaction. Still, the complainant insisted and even threatened he would cause him
miseryand pain should he not return the money. Offended by the innuendoof collusion in the complainant’s
language, the respondent yelled at him and told him, "Ano bang malaking kasalanan ko para takutin mo ako ng
ganyan?" before he hang up the phone. He never heard from the complainant thereafter. Then, on December 18,
2007, he was surprised toreceive a copy of the complaint for disbarment filed by the complainant against him.17
In the Report and Recommendation18 of the IBP-CBD dated September 30, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended for the dismissal of the complaint, holding that there is no proof that the
respondent received money from the complainant.19 The report reads, as follows:
The case is dismissible.
There is no proof that respondent Reynaldo Abdon received any amount of money from complainant Raul
Francia.
While it is true that respondentReynaldo Abdon admitted that he introduced the complainant to Jaime Vistan,
there is no proof that the respondent received any money from the complainant Raul Francia or from Jaime
Vistan.
The attached Annex "A" of the complaint is of no moment. As pointed out by the respondent it is easy to
manipulate and fabricate text messages. That complainant could have bought the said SIM card bearing the said
telephone number and texted his other cellphone numbers to make it appear that such text messages came from
the cellphone of the respondent. Those text messages are not reliable as evidence.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit.20
Upon review of the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-545,21 reversing the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, disposing thus:
RESOLVED TO REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the SUSPENSIONfrom the practice of law for one (1) year of Atty. Reynaldo
V. Abdon and to Return the Amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos ([P]250,000.00) within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.22
On February 23, 2009, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration23 but the IBP Board of Governors
denied the same in its Resolution No. XX-2013-55,24 which reads:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-545 dated November 20, 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.25
The case is now before thisCourt for confirmation.
"It is well to remember that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and
satisfactory proof."26
In Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.,27 the Court reiterated that a preponderance of evidence is necessary before a lawyer
maybe held administratively liable, to wit:
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has
consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalty on a member of the Bar.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or
not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances
of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.28 (Citations omitted)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer subsists and the complaint
against him must be dismissed.29
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by
the complainant fell short of the required quantum of proof. Aside from bare allegations, no evidence was
presented to convincingly establish that the respondent engaged in unlawful and dishonest conduct, particularly
in extortion and influence-peddling.
Firstly, the transcript of the alleged exchange of text messages between the complainant and the respondent
cannot be admitted in evidence since the same was not authenticatedin accordance with A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC,
pertaining to the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Without proper authentication, the text messages presented by
the complainant have no evidentiary value.
The Court cannot also give credence to the affidavits of Pena and Demillo which, on close examination, do not
prove anything about the alleged transaction between the complainant and the respondent. In his affidavit, Pena,
an officer of AGLO, the organization assisting the union members of NEECO III, alleged:
THAT, sometime in the first weekof November 2006, the former workers and employees of NEECO III
informed me of their desire to engage the services of a third party to help facilitate the expeditious release of a
favorable decision from the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 96096, and that they already contacted a friend
of mine, Mr. Raul Francia, who knows somebody who can help us work on the CA case;
THAT, in succeeding separate meetings with Mr. Francia, he intimated to me on various occasions that he had
contracted a certain Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon, a labor arbiter based in San Fernando, Pampanga to facilitate the
expeditious release of a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals;
THAT, I gathered from Mr. Francia and based on the information given to me by the former workers and
employees of NEECO III, Labor Arbiter Abdon asked for [P]1 [M]illion to cover the amount to be given to the
justices of the Court of Appeals handling the case and facilitation and mobilization fees;
THAT, sometime towards the end of the first week of December, the former workers and employees of NEECO
III met with Mr. Francia at our office. They handed to him [P]350,000[.00] as downpayment for the []1
[M]illion being demanded by Mr. Abdon, the balance of which would have been payable on a later agreed
period;
THAT, the [P]350,000[.00] was sourced by the former workers and employees of NEECO III from their
personal contributions; and
THAT, soon after the meeting with the former workers and employees of NEECO III, Mr. Francia left to meet
with Labor Arbiter Abdon to deliver the money[.]30
It is clear from the foregoing thatPena never had the opportunity to meet the respondent. He never knew the
respondent and did not actually see him receiving the money that the union members raised as facilitation fee.
His statement does not prove at all thatthe alleged illegal deal transpired between the complainant and the
respondent.If at all, it only proved that the union members made contributions to raise the amount of money
required as facilitation fee and that they gave it to the complainant for supposed delivery to the respondent.
However, whether the money was actually delivered to the respondent was not known to Pena.
The same observation holds true with respect to the affidavit of Demillo, an acquaintance of the complainant,
who claims to have witnessed the transaction between the parties at the Makati Cinema Square. She alleged that
she saw the complainant handing a bulging brown supotto an unidentified man while the two were at the open
dining space of a café. Upon seeing the complainant again, she learned that the person he was talking to at the
café was the respondent LA.31
Demillo’s affidavit, however, does not prove any relevant fact that will establish the respondent’s
culpability.1âwphi1 To begin with, it was not established with certainty that the person whom she saw talking
with the complainant was the respondent. Even assuming that respondent’s identity was established, Demillo
could not have known about the complainant and respondent’s business by simply glancing at them while she
was on her way to the supermarket to run some errands. That she allegedly saw the complainant handing the
respondent a bulging brown supothardly proves any illegal transaction especially that she does not have
knowledge about what may have been contained in the said bag.
The complainant miserably failed tosubstantiate his claims with preponderant evidence. Surely, he cannot prove
the respondent’s culpability by merely presenting equivocal statementsof some individuals or relying on plain
gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination. Considering the lasting effect of the imposition of the
penalty of suspension or disbarment on a lawyer’s professional standing, this Court cannot allow that the
respondent be held liable for misconduct on the basis of surmises and imagined possibilities. A mere suspicion
cannot substitute for the convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer.
In Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia,32 the Court emphasized, thus:
Indeed, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character ofthe lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a
member of the bar. Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired. Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. However, the said penalties are imposed with
great caution, because they are the most severe forms of disciplinary action and their consequences are beyond
repair.33 (Citations omitted)
The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless. He has, nonetheless, engendered the suspicion that he is
engaged in an illegal deal when he introduced the complainant to Vistan, who was the one who allegedly
demanded ₱1,000,000.00 infacilitation fee from the union members. The records bearout that the complainant,
at the outset, made clear his intention to seek the respondent’s assistance in following up the union’s case in the
CA. The respondent, however, instead of promptly declining the favor sought in order to avoid any appearance
of impropriety, even volunteered to introduce the complainant to Vistan, a former client who allegedly won a
case in the CA in August 2006. It later turned out that Vistan represented to the complainant that he has the
capacity to facilitate the favorable resolution of cases and does this for a fee. This fact was made known to him
by Vistan himself duringa telephone conversation when the latter told him he was given ₱350,000.00 as
facilitation fee.34 His connection with Vistan was the reason why the complainant had suspected that he was in
connivance with him and that he got a portion of the loot. His gesture of introducing the complainant to Vistan
precipitated the idea that what the latter asked of him was with his approval. It registered a mistaken impression
on the complainant that his case can be expeditiously resolved by resorting to extraneous means or channels.
Thus, while the respondent may not have received money from the complainant, the fact is that he has made
himself instrumental to Vistan’s illegal activity. In doing so, he has exposed the legal profession to undeserved
condemnation and invited suspicion on the integrity of the judiciary for which he must be imposed with a
disciplinary sanction.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a "lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession." For, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members.35 It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying
trueto his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach.
Also, the respondent, as a member of the legal profession, has a further responsibility to safeguard the dignity of
the courts which the public perceives as the bastion of justice. Hemust at all times keep its good name
untarnished and not be instrumental to its disrepute. In Berbano v. Atty. Barcelona,36 the Court reiterated the
bounden duty of lawyers to keep the reputation of the courts unscathed, thus:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the endsof
justice.["] [x x x] His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, ["]not
to promote distrust inthe administration of justice." [x x x] Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.
For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people." [x x x] Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."37
A strong and independent judiciary is one of the key elements in the orderly administration of justice. It holds a
revered status in the society as the public perceives it as the authority of what is proper and just, and abides by
its pronouncements. Thus, it must keep its integrity inviolable and this entails that the members of the judiciary
be extremely circumspect in their actions, whether in their public or personal dealings. Nonetheless, the duty to
safeguard the good name of the judiciary is similarly required from all the members of the legal profession. The
respondent, however, compromised the integrity of the judiciary by his association with a scoundrel who earns a
living by dishonoring the court and maliciously imputing corrupt motives on its members.
The Court reiterates its directive tothe members of the Bar to be mindful of the sheer responsibilities thatattach
to their profession. They must maintain high standards of legal proficiency, aswell as morality including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For, they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of publicopinion and
community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private – fails this scrutiny
would have to bedisciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.38
WHEREFORE, for having committed an act which compromised the public’s trust in the justice system, Atty.
Reynaldo V. Abdon is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH effective
upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator which shall circulate the same in all courts in the country, and attached to the personal records of
Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
5. A.C. No. 5179

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment1 against respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on
December 10, 1999.2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along
Sarvida Street in Surigao City.3 Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent
allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent
proceeded to slap complainant, and then left.4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's
car.5 Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member
of Surigao del Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."7 Respondent's act showed arrogance
and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross
misconduct. 8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,9 Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, 10 and a letter11 dated October
27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del
Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that respondent slapped complainant and caused him great
humiliation. 12 Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of
authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by
Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great
humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering
the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter
as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors League of
Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different
municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.14 In his Comment, 15 respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged
that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to school. 16 He further alleged that
complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's car.17 When
respondent alighted from his car to check the damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly
manner. 18 Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend himself. 19 Sensing, however, that
complainant was not making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle
suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer.20 Both parties agreed that they were both too
busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. 21 No traffic officer was present during the
incident.22
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the
Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.23 He alleged that complainant's
Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it was prepared in the English language,
which was unknown to complainant.24 Respondent was identified with those who politically opposed the
Provincial Governor.25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident
during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington,
Surigao City. 26 During the proceedings, respondent explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that
complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did.27 On the other hand, complainant
explained that he went near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car.28 As part of the
settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his
car.29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification30 dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge
Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and
was amicably settled by the parties.31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report, and recommendation.32
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20,
2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama)
noted the Certification from Barangay Washington, Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had
already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the complainant has not
been appearing in this case[.]"35 The Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent appeared.37 Hence, the
Commission proceeded with the case exparte.38
In his Report39 dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene
O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and
violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that
tends to discredit the legal profession. 40 (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping
incident.41 The slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel
Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint;42 and (2) the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter
dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and
abuse of authority and should be held administratively liable.43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution 44 adopting
and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation
of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O.
Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.45 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration 46 of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution47 dated March 22, 2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.48 He stresses complainant's
seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is
politically motivated.49
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers
with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations
of misconduct are established.50 A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or
she enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath.51 Thus, the burden of proof
still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.52
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, 53 or
evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board
of Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;56 complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit57 of a traffic aide
present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate
number.58
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,59 Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter
sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded"60 because of
respondent's act of slapping complainant.61 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly
affirmed and adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations.
Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced
complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling
nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no
longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment
committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that
disregards the human dignity of another.1awp++i1 Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa
ako?"
("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for
bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective
of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to
serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. 62 This Court has the power to impose disciplinary
sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them
unworthy to remain officers of the court. 63
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. 64 They are
neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued
as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of
being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not
indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that
are important in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar
against a finding of administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED.
Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and be furnished to
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
On Official business
ARTURO D. BRION
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DISODADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

On Official business On Official leave

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE** FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA***
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice
6. A.C. No. 5900
RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.,
RESOLUTION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Subject of this Resolution is an Anonymous Complaint1 dated May 14, 2002 against Atty. Cresencio P. Co
Untian, Jr. (respondent) for his alleged sexual harassment of students of Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro
City (Xavier).
The May 14, 2002 Complaint requested the Court to investigate the alleged sexual harassments that respondent
had committed against students of Xavier, particularly Antoinette Toyco (Toyco ), Christina Sagarbarria
(Sagarbarria) and Lea Dal (Dal). The complaint was written in the local dialect and made by an individual
identifying himself or herself only as "law practitioner." In a September 26, 2002 Letter,2 the "law practitioner"
sent copies of the complaint-affidavits3 of the victims of sexual harassment and the Resolution of the
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee on Decorum).
Toyco claimed that respondent initially expressed amorous interest when he sent her flowers anonymously
through another law student. She stated that thereafter, respondent would often text her through the phone of
another law student. Toyco noted eventually that respondent texted her through his own phone where he would
send romantic messages, poems, love notes and sweet nothings. She said that respondent also invited her to go
to Camiguin with another law student but she turned it down. Toyco explained that while she was never
sexually assaulted, respondent's unwelcome advances made her feel degraded as she could not easily ignore
respondent for fear of reprisal.
On the other hand, Sagarbarria narrated that respondent showed her a photograph revealing only the face of a
woman and asked her if she knew who the woman in the picture was. After she realized that the woman in thr
picture looked like her, respondent revealed the entire photograph revealin§, a naked woman and teased her
within hearing distance of other law students. Sagarbarria denied that she was the woman because she had a
distinctive mark on her back for the past six years. She averred that the incident caused her depression, fearing
what other law students may think of her. Sagarbarria highlighted that she was tinable to participate in a
scheduled moot court competition because she broke down in the middle of practice and cried uncontrollably.
Meanwhile, Dal recounted that in one of her recitations during respondent's class, she clarified a question
propounded to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted "What? You want me to come again? I have
not come the first time and don't you know that it took me five minutes to come, and you want me to come
again?" She later learned that respondent would narrate the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt
offended that she was subjected to such sexually charged language and the fact that her embarrassment was
retold in other classes.
In its September 5, 2002 Resolution,4 the Committee on Decorum recommended that respondent's teaching
contract not be renewed on account of the accusations of sexual harassment against him. It explained that
respondent was guilty of violating Xavier's anti-sexual harassment guidelines. The Committee on Decorum
noted that respondent's unwanted sexual advances or innuendos caused distress to the complaining students as it
created a hostile or offensive environment.
Respondent's Position
Respondent lamented that the complaints for sexual harassment was made by disgruntled students who failed
their classes for the 2001-2002 school year as manifested by the fact that the incidents happened years apart but
the complaints were made all at the same time.
Respondent denied sending flowers and text messages with romantic undertones to Toyco. He highlighted that
it was in fact her who gave him gifts during Valentine's Day in 2002. Respondent added that he texting "luv u"
and "miss u" are friendly text messages sent without malice especially considering that they were misspelled.
As to Sagarbarria's allegations, respondent countered that he confiscated the photograph from another student
and jokingly showed it to her in the spirit of their open and uninhibited relationship. He noted that Sagarbarria is
his niece and they were previously close as they would oftentimes exchange discussions on sensitive and mature
matters as adults without any malice. Respondent claimed that she was never humiliated when he showed her
the photograph because she even gamely lowered down her pants to prove that it was not her in the photograph
because unlike her, the naked woman did not have any tattoo.
On the other hand, respondent explained that Dal answered disrespectfully when she was called for recitation
uttering "Come again?" He posited that to inject humor during class, he responded "Never use slang language in
my class because you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again?' It takes me several minutes
before I come again." Respondent expounded that the joke was directed at himself and that Dal never showed
any resentment or showed any sign of humiliation as she even laughed at the joke and continued to sit in front
of the class.
IBP Proceedings
In his Report and Recommendation5 dated January 19, 2009, Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag
(Commissioner Hababag) recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
He observed that respondent was given all the opportunity to explain his side in the investigation that Xavier
had conducted. Commissioner Hababag reminded that lawyers must be of good moral character and must
continue to possess it so long as he is part of the legal profession.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2010-2896 dated April 16, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) affirmed with modification the recommendation of Commissioner Hababag. It resolved
to disbar respondent on the ground of gross immoral conduct.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. In its Resolution No. XXII- 2017-8047 dated January 27, 2017, the
IBP-BOG partially granted his motion for reconsideration. It reduced the penalty to two years suspension and
directed the Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline to prepare an extended resolution explaining its
actions.
In his June 9, 2017 Extended Resolution,8 Director Ramon S. Esguerra (Director Esguerra) explained that
respondent was not guilty of sexual harassment as defined under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 or the "Anti-
Sexual Harassment Law of 1995." He noted that there was no evidence to show that respondent demanded or
requested sexual favors from Toyco, Sagarbarria and Dal. Nevertheless, Director Esguerra expounded that
while respondent's actions do not constitute sexual harassment as defined by law, the way he interacted with his
students were unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. He stressed that being a law professor,
respondent should be worthy of emulation and should not have used his position and stature to make offensive
sexual insults on his students. Director Esguerra postulated that the penalty of two years suspension is a
sufficient sanction to protect the public and the legal profession.
The Court's Ruling
The Court modifies the recommended penalty of the IBP-BOG.
In the case at bench, some of respondent's students accused him of sexual harassment claiming that his actions
were sexual in nature and had offended or humiliated them.
R.A. No. 7877 defines education related sexual harassment as sexual harassment committed by a teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainer or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in an education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the same is accepted by the object of the act.9 In particular, it is committed:
1. Against one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender;
2. Against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender;
3. When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade, or the granting of honors and
scholarships or the payment of a stipend, allowance or other benefits, privileges or considerations; or
4. When the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the student, trainee
or apprentice. 10
The IBP-BOG opined that respondent was not guilty of violating R.A. No. 7877 because there was no evidence
to show that he demanded or requested sexual favors from the complainants. Nevertheless, it found respondent's
action unacceptable and conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession.
R.A. No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual desires of the abuser. Further, it is not
necessary that a demand or request for sexual favor is articulated in a categorical manner as it may be discerned
from the acts of the offender. 11 In addition, sexual harassment is also committed in an educational
environment when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 12 In short, it
is not necessary that there was an offer for sex for there to be sexual harassment as a superior's conduct with
sexual underpinnings, which offends the victim or creates a hostile environment would suffice.
In Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 13 the Court
explained that the essence of sexual harassment is not the violation of the victim's sexuality but the abuse of
power by the offender. In other words, what the law aims to punish is the undue exercise of power and authority
manifested through sexually charged conduct or one filled with sexual undertones. In Domingo v. Rayala, 14
the Court clarified that R.A. No. 7877 speaks of the criminal infraction of sexual harassment and without
prejudice to any administrative charge which may be filed against one who sexually harasses another.
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) in CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 defined the administrative offense of
sexual harassment in an educational environment as existing when:
SEC. 3 x x x
(b) x x x
(1) submission to or rejection of the act or series of acts is used as a basis for any decision affecting the
complainant, including, but not limited to, the giving of a grade the granting of honors or a scholarship, the
payment of a stipend or allowance, or the giving of any benefit, privilege or consideration.
(2) the act or series of acts have the purpose or effect of interfering with the performance, or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive academic environment of the complainant; or
(3) the act or series of acts might reasonably be expected to cause discrimination, insecurity, discomfort, offense
or humiliation to a complainant who may be a trainee, apprentice, intern, tutee or ward of the person
complained of. 15
In addition, CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 provides examples of sexual harassment, to wit:
SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:
(a) Physical
i. Malicious Touching
ii. Overt sexual advances
iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation
(b) Verbal, such as but not limited to, requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks
(c) Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or [written] notes with sexual underpinnings
(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing]. 16
Respondent's actions towards the students concerned definitely constitute sexual harassment as defined by R.A.
No. 7877 and the pertinent rules and regulation.
A reading of respondent's Answer would show that he substantially admitted the accusations against him,
although providing a justification for them. He stated that he showed a picture of a naked woman to Sagarbarria
only as a joke and after he had confiscated it from another student to prevent further circulation in the school.
Respondent narrated that he would text Toyco with "luv u" and "miss u" but claimed that it was a common
everyday text devoid of any romantic overtones as evidenced by its informality. Meanwhile, he clarified that the
statement he made to Dal was meant to inject humor in the classroom and to teach her not to use slang language
in class. Respondent assailed that these accusations were due to them failing in his class and that none of the
purported victims exhibited embarrassment or discomfort during the incidents in question.
Respondent's conduct towards Sagarbarria, Dal and Toyco created a hostile and offensive environment which
has no place in a learning institution. He publicly showed a lewd picture to Sagarbarria in the presence of other
students. The incident deeply distressed her to the extent that she was unable to continue with her Moot Court
practice because she became emotional and cried uncontrollably. The fact that Sagarbarria was bothered and
humiliated was even supported by one of respondent's witnesses who stated that respondent demanded that the
photograph be surrendered to him because Sagarbarria was disturbed by it.
In addition, respondent's action was reprehensible regardless of Sagarbarria's reaction. He had the audacity to
show lewd images to one of his students in the hallway where other students were present. Respondent's alleged
close relationship with Sagarbarria is not an excuse as it does not detract from the fact that he exhibited the
indecent picture in a public place. It would have been different had he shown the photograph privately to
Sagarbarria especially since he claims that as uncle and niece, they could talk about mature and sensitive topics
without malice. Respondent could have saved Sagarbarria from embarrassment in having to identify the naked
woman as herself in public.
On the other hand, respondent should not brush aside his text messages to Toyco and his joke to Dal as innocent
remarks devoid of any impropriety. He readily admits that he would text "luv u" and "miss u" but explains that
these are sweet nothings and used in everyday ordinary text messages. These are not harmless text messages
especially since it appears that these were unwelcome flirtations which made Toyco uncomfortable. In addition,
they cast a cloud of impropriety considering that respondent was Toyco's teacher when he sent them.
Meanwhile, respondent's statement to Dal during her recitation in class cannot be categorized as an innocent
joke only meant to lighten the mood of the class. When she was unable to comprehend the question propounded
to her, she asked him "to come again." In response, respondent said, "Never use slang language in my class
because you might be misinterpreted. What do you mean by 'come again'? It takes me several minutes before I
come again."
It is readily apparent that the remark is tasteless, vulgar and crude and has no place in any academic setting. It is
not a clever word play or a mere statement with sexual innuendos as its intended meaning is obviously
discernable. Respondent's attempt at humor miserably fails as his words clearly refer to him needing five
minutes to ejaculate again. Respondent's statements made Dal uncomfortable and embarrassed in front of her
classmates as it went beyond an innocent joke and was instead a gross graphic and an insensitive remark.
Clearly, respondent abused the power and authority he possessed over the complainants. His sexually laced
conduct had created a hostile and offensive environment which deeply prejudiced his students. In what was
supposed to be a safe place for them to learn and develop, they were instead subjected to unwarranted sexual
advances.
What makes respondent's act of sexual harassment even more reprehensible is the fact that he is both a professor
and a member of the legal profession.
Lawyers carry the burden of living up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility because public confidence in law and in lawyers may be tainted by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of members of the Bar.17 Those privileged to practice the legal profession are expected
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality considering that they are always
under the watchful public eye scrutinizing them both in their public and private lives. 18
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall not engage in an
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. On the other hand, Canon 7 mandates that lawyers shall, at
all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Further, Rule 7 .03 of the CPR commands
lawyers not to engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, or behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, 19 the Court emphasized on the
primacy of maintaining a high sense of morality and decorum among lawyers, to wit:
As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right
and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed
to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded _trust and confidence; he deals with his client's property,
reputation, his life, his all."
xxxx
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards. (Emphases supplied)
Much is expected of lawyers in that it does not suffice that they are persons of integrity and values, but must
also appear to be so in the eyes of the people, and of God. Notwithstanding the relativity of morality, lawyers,
as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility - they must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. 20 In other words, members of the bar are measured in a more demanding
light because their actions or inactions not only affect themselves, but also the legal profession and the public's
trust and respect for the law. As such, any errant behavior on the part of the lawyer, whether in a public or
private capacity, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.21
It must be remembered that lawyers are both preachers and stewards of law, justice, morals and fairness in that
they are duty-bound to propagate observance and deference thereto. It is not enough that they know right from
wrong, just from unjust, moral or immoral, because they must not only speak of such ideals, but must also live
by them. Lawyers, aside from being competent and adept in dealing with the intricacies of the law, must also be
individuals of honor and virtue. Legal knowledge and ability, without the guidance of morals and justice, is a
dangerous tool, which may harm, instead of uplift others.
Respondent's responsibilities and expectations are even more heightened because he is a law professor. He
should be a beacon of righteous and conscientious conduct. Respondent, as a molder of minds of soon-to-be
lawyers, should guide his students to behave and act in a manner consistent with the lofty standards of the legal
profession. Instead, he abused his position of authority creating an offensive and uncomfortable atmosphere in
school. Again, what should be a place of learning and growth had become a place of fear and distrust for the
affected students.
Further, it is even more disappointing that respondent fails to acknowledge the consequences of his actions and
disregard the hurt Sagarbarria, Toyco and Dal may have felt. He generally claimed that they did not express any
distress, embarrassment, or humiliation during the incidents complained of. It must be stressed that as their law
professor, respondent exercised moral ascendancy over them. Thus, it is within reason that the concerned
students could not have readily expressed disgust or annoyance over a person in authority. It takes courage and
strength to stand up and speak against any form of sexual harassment. This is especially true considering that in
most cases, the offender wields power, authority, or influence over the victim.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cresencio P. Co Untian, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five
(5) years and ten (10) years from teaching law in any school effective upon the finality of this Resolution, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be reflected on the records of
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, Hernando, Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier,
JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate opinion.
Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on leave.
7. A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016 - ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY.
MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for "deliberately and
repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed that the Certificate to File
Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different complaint, that is the complaint filed by
complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is
required for the filing of a civil action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato
Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free patent covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a copy of the title. She further claimed
that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To support such claim, complainant presented
Certifications from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds
in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the occupants of
the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the Roman Catholic Church,
which deed of donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch
16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.
Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x
and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of his dismissal
as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of Technology (NIT) -
University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution, and received salaries
therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him. Respondent
alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late
Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No. B-
1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel was not
furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon filing of the instant complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings favorable to his
clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However, respondent countered that he
was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent
further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary
except honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the
MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to
perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia,
complainant in the administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial
clemency filed before this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20

February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008. All these
submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B. Ruiz
noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the IBP. Respondent described
complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the
wife of that married man died." According to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear
manifestation[] of respondent's gross misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of
the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that respondent
is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by complainant in all the pleadings she
has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to
File Action which was used in a complaint filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato
Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent
covered by OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and
(3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP Commissioner's
recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B.
De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and accused
complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died."11 In his
Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth designed to debunk
complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of this
case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain from
using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in
his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in the
barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is no such
certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent
submitted was the certificate to file action in the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller,
against Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x x
was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18
October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the certificate to file action he
used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the complaint on 18 October
2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No.
B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil
Case No. B-1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued
prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action
when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead,
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent
title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy of the title
exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy of the
title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish
complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her counsel could examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact demanding an
examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside the scope of this
administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent himself orchestrated such
fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT
No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official
records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed of donation of
a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually,
respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who are occupants in the lot owned
by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs the notarial
acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats,
signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the act of
assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and conspiring
with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare allegations, without any
proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973,
which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to
present any concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and
not against the counsel allegedly favored by the judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of
Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for partiality,
with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which
is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government institution, and received compensation
therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to the
OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He
further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his
petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish between
permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary does not absolve him
from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office does not in any way
extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that
complainant in his previous administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should have declined
from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such positions.17 Clearly,
respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office imposed upon him by the
Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law
practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to comply with Court directives
constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer's suspension or even
disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a certificate to file
action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to the institution of the civil action
of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper language in his pleadings; and (3)
defying willfully the Court's prohibition on reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his
dismissal as a judge. Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and

accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the commission
of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C. J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
Caguioa, J., on official leave.
8. A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016 - THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE
REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
Complainant, v. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R. MORTA, Respondents.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER,
ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R.
MORTA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding partner,
Atty. Francisco M. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit1 before this Court. Complainant sought the disbarment
of Attys. Restitute S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It was alleged that respondents falsely and maliciously accused complainant and its
lawyers of antedating a Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October
2005.2chanrobleslaw
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with
Criminal Case No. Q-05-136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano before
Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.3 Complainant acted as the legal counsel of
Soriano in that case while respondents represented private complainant Michael M. Sandoval.4chanrobleslaw
On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC to seek
the cancellation of Soriano's scheduled arraignment.5 During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed the RTC that a
Petition for Review had been filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005. The Petition
questioned the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding probable cause to indict
Soriano for libel.6 Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the Petition for Review before the RTC, and
explained that the main copy of the Petition stamped received by the DOJ was still with the office messenger,
who had personally filed the pleading the day before.7 Citing the filing of the Petition for Review, Atty. Chavez
moved for the suspension of the arraignment for a period of 60 days pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 The RTC, however, denied the motion and proceeded with Soriano's
arraignment.9chanrobleslaw
The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge Hilario
Laqui of Branch 218 was biased against its client.10 Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18
October 2005 requesting Judge Laqui to voluntary inhibit himself from the case.11chanrobleslaw
On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the
Motion for Inhibition"12 (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following statements,
which have become the subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that
pleading:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition
COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court
respectfully states:
Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the case against the
accused when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency of a petition for review filed with the
Department of Justice.
They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment, they have filed the petition.
They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it is provided that upon
motion, the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a petition for review of the resolution of the
prosecutor is pending.
We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ on October 10, 2005, why
is it that the accused did not present a copy of the petition stamped "received" by the DOJ? Why did he not
make a manifestation that he forgot to bring a copy? He could have easily convinced the Presiding Judge to
suspend the arraignment upon a promise that a copy thereof will be filed with the court in the afternoon of
October 11, 2005 or even the following day.
Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition.13
(Emphases supplied)
The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's Motion
for Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition.
We cannot conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of lawyers will admit that on October 11,
2005 that they suddenly or temporarily became amnesiacs. They forgot that they filed the Petition for Review
the day before.14 (Emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of
antedating.15 As proof that the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005,
complainant attached to its Complaint-Affidavit a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ stamp.16chanrobleslaw
In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,17 respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
them was a mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to the Vehement
Opposition, Public Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint.18 They also contended
that the statements they had made in their pleadings were covered by the doctrine of privileged
communication.19chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.20chanrobleslaw
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP
In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,21 Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found respondents
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I petition is
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to observe civility and propriety
in their pleadings. It was somewhat irresponsible for the respondents to make such an accusation on the basis of
pure speculation, considering that they had no proof to support their accusation and did not even make any
attempt to verify from the DO.I the date and the manner by which the said petition was filed. Moreover, as held
in Asa, we will have to disagree with the respondents argument on privileged communication, the use of
offensive language in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings, constitutes unprofessional conduct
subject to disciplinary action.
xxxx
In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and improper language in her
pleadings. Considering that the respondents' accusation that the complainant and its lawyers antedated the
mailing of Bro. Eliseo Soriano's DOJ Petition is somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting
additional attorney's fees for opening doors and serving coffee, we believe that the penalty of reprimand would
be proper in this case.
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto Lazaro and
Rodel Morta be reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a warning that a repetition of
the same will be dealt with more severely.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted and
approved Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for using improper language in their pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and Atty.
Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a Warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August
2008. They argued that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following grounds: (a)
complainant's failure to implead the public prosecutor, who must be considered an indispensable party to the
case, since the pleading in question could not have been filed without her conformity; (b) as the subject
pleadings had been signed by the public prosecutor, their contents enjoyed the presumption of regularity and
legality, upon which respondents were entitled to rely; (c) respondents relied in good faith on the review,
supervision and direction of the public prosecutor in the filing of the pleading in question; and (d) the
statements in the pleading were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication.24 Respondents also
contended that Atty. Chavez should be disciplined for the derogatory statements made against them in the
pleadings he submitted during the IBP investigation.
Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition25cralawred to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January

2009.
On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the basis of complainant's
failure to implead an indispensable party:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's non-joinder
of an indispensable party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according to regulations and in good
faith in the performance of their official duties. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391 dated August 14, 2008 is
hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED with stern Warning to
be more circumspect.
To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party questioning
Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645,26 we must ultimately decide disciplinary proceedings
against members of the bar, regardless of the acts of the complainant.27 This rule is consistent with our
obligation to preserve the purity of the legal profession and ensure the proper and honest administration of
justice.28 In accordance with this duty, we now pass upon the recommendation of the IBP.
OUR RULING
After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No.
XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of the
complaint inapplicable to disbarment proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient justification to
discipline respondents for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.
In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of
complainant's purported failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was not
explained at length in its resolution, the IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to the
argument proffered by respondents. They had argued that the public prosecutor was an indispensable party to
the proceeding, and that her non-joinder was a ground for the dismissal of the case. That ruling is patently
erroneous.
In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.29
These proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal,30 but are rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of its officers.31 Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied,32 but are construed in a
manner that allows us to determine whether lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and exercise the privileges of
their office.33chanrobleslaw
We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public prosecutor has
not been joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely calls upon members
of the bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court.34 Consequently, only the lawyer who is the
subject of the case is indispensable. No other party, not even a complainant, is needed.35chanrobleslaw
In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their pleadings
contain the accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The fact that Public
Prosecutor Jaban-Fama also signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these statements is irrelevant
to the issue of whether respondents' conduct warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor as a defense
for their own misconduct.
Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts of
the public prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the pleadings subject
of the Complaint, was performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor. Hence, any impropriety in
the contents of or the language used in these pleadings originated from respondents. The mere fact that the
public prosecutor signed the pleadings after they were prepared could not have cured any impropriety contained
therein. The presumption that the public prosecutor performed her duties regularly and in accordance with law
cannot shield respondents from liability for their own conduct.
The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise
untenable. As lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility. This
obligation includes the duty to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional
colleagues, including opposing counsel. Respondents cannot disregard this solemn duty solely on the basis of
the signature of a public prosecutor and later seek to absolve themselves from liability by pleading good faith.
Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether
respondents have indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by respondents. In
the Comment36 they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent portions37 of their pleadings
that contained the allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question left for us to resolve is whether their
conduct violates the ethical code of the profession.
After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 838 and 1039 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of
pleadings, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.40 Their arguments, whether written or oral,
should be gracious to both the court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as may be
properly addressed by one honorable member of the bar to another.41 In this case, respondents twice accused
complainant of antedating a petition it had filed with the DOJ without any proof whatsoever. This allegation of
impropriety undoubtedly brought complainant and its lawyers into disrepute. The accusation also tended to
mislead the courts, as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support.
The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.
That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the scheduled
arraignment and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the Petition is not an
excuse. As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817
& 145822:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a
motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against
other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by
the justness of the cause with which they are charged.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in the
course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the
publication thereof is privileged.43 While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for
privileged statements made in their pleadings, they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary
powers for lapses in the observance of their duty as members of the legal profession.44chanrobleslaw
We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.45 Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and sternly warned that the Court will deal with future similar conduct more
severely.46chanrobleslaw
A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each and
every disciplinary action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should bear in
mind the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the integrity of the
legal profession for the sake of public interest. Needless to state, the Court will not look with favor upon a
recommendation based entirely on technical and procedural grounds.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby SET ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to use
only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in dealing
with their professional colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Bersamin, J., on official leave.
9. MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE"

C. GUEVARRA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainant Maria
Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for
alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01,
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws[2] and engaged in the specialized field of
cosmetic surgery.[3] On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio
(Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.[4]
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking site,
insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo.
Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to
Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No gold - IN
GUTS I TRUST!
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down in
Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :)
(September 22 at 11:18pm)[5]
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in
Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng
Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si
Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)[6]
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung
sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha
(August 9 at 10:31pm)[7]
Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG
MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she
hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at 3:57pm)[8]
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket demonstration
in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the story when the next
rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators
will be assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17
at 7:56pm)[9]
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that much.
Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince editors to pin me
down with something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may
tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your
burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung
mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm)[10]
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to expose
the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact that the much
needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical
Hospital and she will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at 2:08am)[11]
Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS
ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)[12]
Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just pay
Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10 at 12:08am)
[13]
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to
destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for
no fair or justifiable cause,[14] to wit:
Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of
all her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good response – 70% decrease in
her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)[15]
Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all.
With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like
liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk
of something going wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12 at
12:21am)[16]
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they nearly
killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just recently, in
flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)[17]
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki
Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not a certified
plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)[18]
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making machines, dapat convert
them into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look like Dra. Belo.
(July 11 at 2:16am)[19]
Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang
mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein Factory? (July 11 at
2:30am)[20]
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a
week to a place where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out
more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm)[21]
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)[22]
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!!
FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower
batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am)[23]
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and
comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have canceled their
lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal
obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)[24]
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened complainant
with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof,[25] as follows:
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for plunder;
Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The General
Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By October and November, some congressmen I have spoken
with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the subject - legislation regulating the
practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm)[26]
Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets
convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)[27]
Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal negligence
which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He found out that the Dr.
Belo herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not
licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at
8:54pm)[28]
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of
women,[29] to wit:
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there
nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-below
naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)[30]
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic there,
can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)[31]
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against me. to
thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like your type? at
yung preferred ko lang ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)[32]
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort money from her, as
apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:[33]
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan
ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)[34]
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred,
destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million
from her as evident from his demand letter[35] dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant
complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense,[36] respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed
right to privacy,[37] asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account
on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part.[38] He
also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint
was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant.[39] He denied that
the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against
complainant.[40] He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the
demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for
damages against her. [41] Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is,
therefore, the subject of fair comment.[42]
After the mandatory conference had been terminated,[43] the parties were directed to file their respective
position papers.[44] Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for
clarificatory hearing.[45] Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for report/recommendation.
[46]
IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation[47] dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.[48] It held respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03,
[49] Rule 8.01,[50] and Rule 19.01[51] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the above-
quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his
posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto. Moreover, the IBP-CBD
maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for
insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against complainant whose alleged crimes against
Norcio had not been established.[52]
In a Resolution[53] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the
August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[54] arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him that would
warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against him by an
employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.[55]
In a Resolution[56] dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's motion,
reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6) months suspension.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations of the verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as to the penalty
imposed on respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene
remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to
privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private account"[57] that can only be viewed by his
circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right
to privacy.
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts
and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.[58] Social media are web-based platforms that enable online
interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content. There are various classifications[59] of social
media platforms and one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as Facebook.[60]
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a
worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one
another."[61] Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other
users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A
user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on
the user's privacy settings.[62]
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by the
user. In H v. W,[63] the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa recognized this
ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that although Facebook,
as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however
not foolproof."[64]
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity - in
this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.[65]
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts
respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any
of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy
to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as
well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.[66]
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by
his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on
his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:
(1)
Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in
any conceivable way"
(2)
A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
(3)
The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4)
A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the
former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.[67]
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from
the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."[68] Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of
violation of right to privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his freedom
of speech and expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms,
is not absolute.[69] While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are among the
most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is
obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.[70] As such, the
constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others,
destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.[71]
A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack
doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name
and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a
"Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the
criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."·
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and
utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact
that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm,
and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law,
and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI's
reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to
criticism[72] does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that
it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.[73] In this case, respondent's
remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would show them to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them."[74] Accordingly, the
Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as
originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01,
and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
10. A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018 - PHENINAH* D.F. WASHINGTON, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SAMUEL D. DICEN, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 12137, July 09, 2018
PHENINAH* D.F. WASHINGTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. SAMUEL D. DICEN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative case is rooted on a Letter-Complaint1 dated September 21, 2015 filed by Pheninah D.F.
Washington (complainant) against respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen (Atty. Dicen) for "unethical practice of
law, [and] abuse of [the] privilege and power vested upon him as a lawyer."2
The Antecedent Facts
In her Letter-Complaint, complainant alleged that on August 14, 2015, she went to her house in Dumaguete
City, then occupied by the family of her niece, Roselyn R. Toralde (Roselyn), in order to perform necessary
repairs thereon after discovering that said house was in a dilapidated state and badly infested by termites.3 The
repairs, however, did not push through as planned because the police arrived in the premises and arrested
complainant and her companions.4Complainant claimed that it was Atty. Dicen, Roselyn's uncle and her first
cousin, who had ordered her to be arrested for trespassing even though she was the lawful owner of the property
in question.5
In his defense, Atty. Dicen strongly denied that he had given the police officers an order to arrest complainant,
as he had no power or authority to do so.6 He argued that complainant was arrested after she was caught
in flagrante delicto committing acts of coercion by removing the G.I. sheet roofing of Roselyn's house to force
the latter and her family to move out.7
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation8 dated January 20,2017, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) –
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Jose Alfonso M. Gomos, found no merit in the
allegations of unethical practice of law against Atty. Dicen. Nevertheless, it recommended that Atty. Dicen
be admonished "to be gracious, courteous, dignified, civil and temperate (even if forceful) in his language."9
The IBP pointed to: (a) Atty. Dicen's Manifestation10 dated October 19, 2016 where he described complainant's
actions as having "no sane purpose,"11 and meant only to "satisfy her crazy quest for revenge,"12 and even
characterized complainant as a "lunatic;"13 and (b) Atty. Dicen's Position Paper14 dated November 28, 2016
where he stated:
It is the observation of the respondent that complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has become fixated
on her illicit and immoral, if not adulterous relationship with her ex-husband, Martin Vince, (while current
husband is in the [United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner who by the latter's
manipulation caused her to be estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen clan.15
The IBP thus concluded that Atty. Dicen had failed to adhere to the duty imposed upon lawyers not to use
language "which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."16 It noted that Atty. Dicen's use of offensive
language "and his resort to gossip to prove a point, fell short of the gracious, gentlemanly, courteous, dignified,
civil and temperate (even if forceful) language required of him as a lawyer."17
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XXII-2017-118518 dated June 17, 2017, resolved to adopt
and approve the January 20, 2017 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to admonish Atty. Dicen.
The Issue
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Atty. Dicen should be held administratively liable for violating
Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for his use of intemperate language in his
pleadings.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Board of Governors.
"The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability."19
Canon 8 of the CPR in particular, instructs that a lawyer's arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both
the court and his opposing counsel, and must be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman
to another.20 "The language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."21
Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Ru1e 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
A thorough review of the records clearly shows that Atty. Dicen had resorted to the use of derogatory language
in his pleadings filed before the IBP in order to rebut the allegations hurled against him.
For instance, in his Manifestation22 dated October 19, 2016, Atty. Dicen referred to complainant as a "lunatic"
who was on a "crazy quest for revenge" against him, viz.:
That evidently, if this affidavit has also been filed with this Honorable Commission, the purpose can only be to
misle[a]d and muddle its findings of facts; otherwise, then it has no sane purpose except to persecute
respondent and satisfy her crazy quest for revenge against respondent who she wants to answer for her arrest
and detention when she was caught by police officers in the act of demolishing the house of her niece, Roselyn
Toralde;
That these puzzling moves of the complainant, i.e., demolishing (against the advice of her counsel) the house of
her niece to evict her despite the pendency of an unlawful detainer case and the filing of an administrative case
before [the] IBP x x x because she was unlawfully arrested and detained by the police for her attempt at
demolishing a house appear to be lunatic; x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied)
In the same pleading, Atty. Dicen also called complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of a certain Martin,
who he suggested was complainant's lover in the Philippines while her husband was in the United States:
That[,] in fact[,] this [sic] puzzling acts of complainant finds some rationality if eyes are set beyond the
complainant and focus[ed] on the man that has made her a puppet and a milking cow.
This man is a certain Martin, a foreigner, [living] with her in her "home alone" while her husband is in the U.S.
reportedly recuperating from some surgery. Since then[,] complainant has become aggressive in pursuing her
vendetta against all her siblings and relatives for imagined ungrateful acts, claiming that their lives have become
better because of her, and therefore should kowtow to her every whims and caprices.24
To make matters worse, Atty. Dicen continued his personal tirades against complainant in his Position
Paper25 dated November 28, 2016 where he stated that:
It is the observation of the respondent that complainant is no longer thinking on her own but has
become fixated on her illicit and immoral, if not adulterous[,] relationship with her ex-husband, Martin
Vince, (while current husband is in the [United States] reportedly recuperating from a surgery), a foreigner
who[,] by the latter's manipulation[,] caused her to be estranged from the entire Flores-Dicen Clan.
Blinded by manipulative lover[,] Martin[,] she had become so hostile and unreasonable, if not unchristian[,]
to her relatives who are members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)
The totality of these circumstances leads the Court to inevitably conclude that Atty. Dicen violated Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the CPR for his use of language that not only maligned complainant's character, but also imputed
a crime against her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was, at the time, living in
the United States.
Indeed, Atty. Dicen could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to complainant's allegations against him,
explained his participation (or the lack of it) in the latter's arrest and detention, and refrained from resorting to
name-calling and personal attacks in order to get his point across. After all, "[t]hough a lawyer's language may
be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum."27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Samuel D. Dicen is found GUILTY of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from using language that is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in his pleadings, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro** (Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza, Tijam, and Gesmundo,*** JJ., concur.
11. A.C. No. 10949 [Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3915]

CARMELITA CANETE, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. ARTEMIO PUTI, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 ( complaint) filed by Carmelita Canete (Canete) against Atty.
Artemio Puti (Atty. Puti) with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
In her complaint, Canete claimed that her husband was a victim in a criminal case for kidnapping for ransom
with double murder filed against Atty. Puti's client. Canete averred that Atty. Puti had, in numerous occasions,
appeared in court while he was intoxicated and made discourteous and inappropriate remarks against the public
and private prosecutors as well as the judge.2
Canete claimed that Atty. Puti provoked her private counsel, Atty. Arturo Tan (Atty. Tan), by calling him
"bakla" in open court during the hearing on May 9, 2013:
ATTY. MALABANAN:
Objection, [Y]our Honor. Before the witness is confronted with this question, may I ask counsel, Atty. Puti, if
that copy ... Because that is vital and substantial and this was previously marked as our exhibit in our offer of
evidence, this June 26. My point is, where did Atty. Puti get that document. That it is stated that it appears it
was on June 26, 2008, appearing on [TSN]3 May 13, 2009, when the prosecution and this representation have
the same copies, your Honor. I think it is more right and that document is wrong [or] falsified.
ATTY. TAN:
May we ask the counsel to confront the witness with a correct document. What we have is the duplicate
original, your Honor.
Atty. Puti is referring to a [photocopy].

ATTY. PUTI:
All of them, [Y]our Honor, please, are my enemies?
ATTY. TAN:
No, [Y]our Honor. We [are] just [putting] everything in the proper context.
ATTY. PUTI
"Ako muna, [hijo]. Ikaw naman para kang bakla."4 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, during the February 14, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti again became disrespectful towards Atty. Tan:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, we take exception to that statement.
ATTY. PUTI:
I am not yet through.
ATTY. TAN:
We take exception to that allegation.
ATTY. PUTI:
Atty. Tan, you can react after my argument. My goodness!
ATTY. TAN:
Making an allegation is an exception, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
That is unethical. You behave like a lawyer.5 (Emphasis supplied).
Likewise, Atty. Puti also made inappropriate remarks against the public prosecutor, as seen in the following
exchanges during the hearing on March 14, 2013:
ATTY. TAN:
Objection, [Y]our Honor. Already answered, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
No Answer! Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo.
PROS. DELOS SANTOS:
Your Honor, as lead counsel for the public and for the government, we would like the Court to please advise
counsel, Atty. Puti, to refrain from making personal statements as it will heighten the tension and stress of
everybody here inside the courtroom. We beg. I just heard him "Malaki siguro ang bayad sa inyo." May we put
that on record. That is very unprofessional. He used to be a public prosecutor!6 (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, Canete also alleged that during the May 9, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti uttered the words "to the
handsome public prosecutor" with seething sarcasm.7
Lastly, Canete averred that during the May 22, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti repeatedly bullied and threatened the
judge in open court:
ATTY. PUTI:
I object.
COURT:
[Okay], proceed.
ATTY. PUTI:
I object. Strongly object, [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
Let him proceed.
xxxx
ATTY. PUTI:
I would like to make of record that I have a continuous objection.
COURT:
[Okay]! You have a continuing objection but I will allow him.
ATTY. TAN:
Thank you, [Y]our Honor.
ATTY. PUTI:
That is an abuse of discretion on your part, [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
But let him proceed.
ATTY. PUTI:
[Okay]!
COURT:
xxxx
Let him proceed. If you do not like my ruling, you can file a
certiorari, if you want.
ATTY. PUTI:
Your Honor, this time, I am [half] objecting. Because there was no testimony from this witness. This is why I
was insisting a while ago that the witness be confronted with such testimony. Otherwise, if the Court will allow
the cross-examiner to ask that question, I will withdraw from appearing in this case because I would not like to
participate in this kind of trial, partial trial. This is an abuse of discretion.
ATTY. TAN:
Well, [Y]our Honor, first, is Atty. Puti talking about the statement made by this witness during his direct
testimony as witness for Mariano de Leon? We will not have that because the transcript [is] not ready. It is
impossible for me to confront him with the transcript of the last hearing. It is not here with us.
ATTY. PUTI
That is the reason why the Prosecutor is guessing, making false question. Because the question is improper as
there was no testimony to that effect. If he will not be confront[ed] with such testimony and then the Court will
allow that, please, I beg of this [court], I will withdraw. I will walk out.
xxxx
ATTY. PUTI:
Why does the Honorable Judge [allow] the private prosecutor to make some kind of arguments when he is
allowed to answer for an objection on legal ground?
Why [does] the Honorable Court [allow] him to argue? To [speak]?
COURT:
Because you are also arguing. You were the first one arguing.
ATTY. PUTI:
I do not want to stipulate but.
COURT:
You want to control the proceedings?
ATTY. PUTI:
I don't want to think the Honorable Court is bias[ed].
COURT:
For you to argue and for him not to argue?
ATTY. PUTI:
I am going to think the Honorable Court is bias[ed].8 (Emphasis supplied)
For his part, Atty. Puti prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against him.9 He denied ever appearing
intoxicated in court. 10 He also claimed that it was Atty. Tan who provoked him when the latter made threats
against him. 11 According to him, it was his duty to call out the judge for being biased and that he was only
discharging his duties to his client by representing him with zeal. 12
A mandatory conference was held and both parties were subsequently ordered to submit their position papers.
Findings of the IBP
The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and Recommendation13 finding Atty. Puti liable
for misconduct for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending
his suspension for two (2) years from the practice of law. 14 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professionalcolleagues. 15 Further,
his act of imputing bias on the judge was without basis and uncalled for. 16 Furthermore, his act of appearing at
hearings while intoxicated was in utter disrespect to the court.
In Resolution No. XXI-2014-785, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record
and applicable laws, and for violation ofthe Lawyer's Oath, Canon 8, Rule 10.01, 10.03, Canon 10 and Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Artemio Puti is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months. 17
Based on the records, 18 Atty. Puti did not file a motion for reconsideration despite receipt of the IBP
Resolution.
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP, with modifications.

Canete filed the instant complaint against Atty. Puti for: 1) appearing in the hearings while drunk; 2) provoking
and insulting the prosecutors; and 3) disrespecting the court. These grounds shall be discussed in seriatim.
On the allegation that Atty. Puti appeared intoxicated in court on numerous occasions, Canete claimed that these
were witnessed by several court personnel, his co-counsels, and opposing counsels. 19 Atty. Puti denied such
claim and argued that there is no evidence on record that he appeared in court while intoxicated. 20 The Court
agrees with Atty. Puti. It was not sufficiently proven that Atty. Puti ever appeared at a court hearing while he
was intoxicated - despite Canete's claim that the same was witnessed by several persons. Thus, Atty. Puti cannot
be held liable on this ground.
Regarding the second ground, the TSN of the hearings held at the trial court plainly show that Atty. Puti
employed impertinent and discourteous language towards the opposing counsels.
To recall, Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a condescending manner. To be sure, the term "bakla" (gay)
itself is not derogatory.1âшphi1 It is used to describe a male person who is attracted to the same sex. Thus, the
term in itself is not a source of offense as it is merely descriptive. However, when "bakla" is used in a pejorative
and deprecating manner, then it becomes derogatory. Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom
or in aother place for that matter. Atty. Puti ought to be aware that using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is
no longer acceptable - as it should have been in the first place. Verily, in Sy v. Fineza,21 the Court ruled that the
respondent judge's act of ruling that a witness should not be given any credence because he is a "bakla" was
most unbecoming of a judge. 22
As against the public prosecutors, Atty. Puti made the following statement: "Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki
siguro bayad sa inyo."23 Such remark was clearly unprofessional, especially since Atty. Puti used to be a public
prosecutor.24 By nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed or otherwise acting for a
valuable consideration, Atty. Puti overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor which he owes to
the opposing counsels.
For his statements against the private and public prosecutors, Atty. Puti violated the following provisions under
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive, or
otherwise improper.
As regards the final ground, the TSN of the May 22, 2013 hearing shows that Atty. Puti made several remarks
against the judge. Specifically, Atty. Puti stated in open court that the judge was abusing his discretion and
implied that the judge was partial and biased. Moreover, Atty. Puti threatened the judge that he would withdraw
from the case and walk out if his request was not granted. Again, such statements were improper.
While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to criticize the acts of courts and judges, the same must
be made respectfully and through legitimate channels. In this case, Atty. Puti violated the following provisions
in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 -A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.
As a defense, Atty. Puti claimed that he was merely doing his duty to call out the judge for being biased. He
maintained that he was only discharging his duties to his client by representing him with zeal. Such contention
deserves scant consideration.
While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from
such zeal or enthusiasm is disfavored. 25
On the penalty to be imposed, the Court disagrees with the IBP's recommendation that Atty. Puti be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months. While Atty. Puti is found to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspension from the practice of law is not a commensurate penalty. The Court has consistently
held that disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which
should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative
charges.26
Thus, while Atty. Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the opposing counsels and the judge,
such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit his suspension since his misconduct is considered as
simple rather than grave.
In Saberon v. Lorong, 27 the Court meted the penalty of fine of ₱2,000.00 for a lawyer's use of intemperate
language for referring to a party's pleadings as "a series of blackmail suits." In Bacatan v. Dadula,28 the Court
fined a lawyer for ₱2,000.00 for making unfounded accusations of partiality, bias, and corruption against the
prosecutor. More recently, in Quilendrino v. Icasiano,29 a lawyer was reprimanded for violating Canon 8, Rule
8.01, Canon 11, and Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
As applied to this case, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for Atty. Puti's infraction. The Court also
takes into consideration that this is the first administrative case against Atty. Puti in his more than three decades
in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Artemio Puti GUILTY of violating Canons 8 and 11 and Rules 8.01, 11.03, and
11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court REPRIMANDS him with STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Puti's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (on official leave), J. Reyes, Lazaro-Javier, and Zalmeda, JJ. Concur.
12. A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016 - SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J.
EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR R. NAVALES, Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10465, June 08, 2016
SPOUSES LAMBERTO V. EUSTAQUIO AND GLORIA J. EUSTAQUIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR

R. NAVALES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated January 16, 2010 filed by complainants spouses Lamberto V.
Eustaquio and Gloria J. Eustaquio (complainants) against respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales (respondent),
praying that respondent be meted the appropriate disciplinary sanction/s for failing to pay rent and to vacate the
apartment he is leasing despite demands.
The Facts
Complainants alleged that they are the owners of an apartment located at 4-D Cavite St., Barangay Paltok,
SFDM, Quezon City, which they leased to respondent under a Contract of Lease2 dated April 16, 2005.
However, respondent violated the terms and conditions of the aforesaid contract when he failed to pay monthly
rentals in the aggregate amount of P139,000.00 and to vacate the leased premises despite repeated oral and
written demands.3 This prompted complainants to refer the matter to barangay conciliation, where the parties
agreed on an amicable settlement, whereby respondent promised to pay complainants the amount of
P131,000.00 on July 16, 2009 and to vacate the leased premises on July 31, 2009. Respondent eventually
reneged on his obligations under the settlement agreement, constraining complainants to file an ejectment case4
against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 40 (MeTC-Br. 40), docketed
as Civil Case No. 09-39689. Further, complainants filed the instant case before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), contending that respondent miserably failed to
exemplify honesty, integrity, and respect for the laws when he failed and refused to fulfil his obligations to
complainants.5chanrobleslaw
Despite notices,6 respondent failed to file his Answer, to appear in the mandatory conference, and to file his
position paper.
Meanwhile, the MeTC-Br. 40 promulgated a Decision7 dated December 8, 2009 in the ejectment case in favor
of the complainants and, accordingly, ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and to pay complainants
the following amounts: (a) P139,000.00 representing unpaid rentals as of July 2009; (b) further rental payments
of P8,000.00 per month starting August 17, 2009 until the actual surrender of said premises to complainants; (c)
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00; and (d) cost of suit.8chanrobleslaw
During the pendency of the case, respondent was appointed as an Assistant City Public Prosecutor of Quezon
City.9chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation10 dated February 8, 2011, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall
be dealt with more severely.11 It was found that respondent displayed unwarranted obstinacy in evading
payment of his debts, as highlighted by his numerous promises to pay which he eventually reneged on. In this
light, the IBP Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and, thus, should be held administratively
liable.12chanrobleslaw
In a Resolution13 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution14 dated September 15, 2014 adopting
and approving the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the IBP and, accordingly,
meted respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.
As per Registry Return Card No. 957,15 respondent received the Court's order of suspension on October 16,
2014.16 Records are bereft of any showing that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and, thus, the
Court's order of suspension against him became final and executory.
Events Following the Finality of Respondent's Suspension
On September 7, 2015 and upon request from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), a Certification17
was issued by the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC-Br. 38) stating that respondent has been appearing
before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present. In connection with this, the
MeTC-Br. 38 wrote a letter18 dated September 8, 2015 to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), inquiring
about the details of respondent's suspension from the practice of law. In view of the foregoing, the OCA
indorsed the matter to the OBC for appropriate action.19chanrobleslaw
Despite due notice from the Court,20 respondent failed to file his comment to the aforementioned Certification
issued by MeTC-Br. 38.
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation21 dated February 10, 2016, the OBC recommended that respondent be
further suspended from the practice of law and from holding the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for a
period of six (6) months, thus, increasing his total suspension period to one (1) year, effective immediately.22 It
found that since respondent received the order of suspension against him on October 16, 2014 and did not move
for its reconsideration, such order attained finality after the lapse of 15 days therefrom. As such, he should have
already served his suspension. In this relation, the OBC ratiocinated that since respondent was holding a
position .which requires him to use and apply his knowledge in legal matters and practice of law, i.e., Assistant
City Prosecutor, he should have ceased and desisted from acting as such. However, as per the Certification
dated September 7, 2015 of the MeTC-Br. 38, respondent never complied with his order of suspension. In view
thereof, the OBC recommended to increase respondent's suspension from the practice of law and from holding
the position of Assistant City Prosecutor for an additional period of six (6) months.23chanrobleslaw
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, the Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the OBC and adopts the same in
its entirety.
It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. As such, when the Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must desist from performing all functions requiring the
application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position
in government requiring the authority to practice law.24 The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes
performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
In the instant case, the OBC correctly pointed out that the Court's Resolution26 dated September 15, 2014
suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months became final and executory
fifteen (15) days after respondent received a copy of the same on October 16, 2014. Thus, respondent should
have already commenced serving his six (6)-month suspension. However, respondent never heeded the
suspension order against him as he continued discharging his functions as an Assistant City Prosecutor for
Quezon City, as evidenced by the Certification27 issued by MeTC-Br. 38 stating that respondent has been
appearing before it as an Assistant City Prosecutor since September 2014 up to the present.
Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071,28 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of 2010,"
provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 9. Powers and Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor. - The provincial prosecutor or
the city prosecutor shall:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary(a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be;
(b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws
and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he/she or any of
his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of witnesses, and for this purpose
may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath before him/her, and the attendance or
evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to any trial court; and
cralawlawlibrary
(c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances
in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal
actions, subject to the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 5 hereof.
Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that the government office of Assistant City
Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law. Hence, respondent's continuous discharge of his
functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus, a clear defiance of the Court's order of suspension
against him.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case
- are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court, in Lingan v. Calubaquib,29Feliciano v.
Bautista-Lozada30 and Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya31 consistently imposed an additional six (6)-month
suspension from the practice of law to erring lawyers who practiced law despite being earlier suspended. Under
the foregoing circumstances, the Court deems it proper to mete the same penalty to respondent in addition to the
earlier six (6)-month suspension already imposed on him, as recommended by the OBC. Thus, respondent's
total period of suspension from the practice of law - and necessarily, from the holding the position of Assistant
City Prosecutor as well - should be fixed at one (1) year.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law
profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative principle. The Court, in
the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe punishment if, through it, the end
desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible."32chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar R. Navales is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional period of six (6)
months from his original six (6)-month suspension, totalling one (1) year from service of this Decision, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., on leave.

Leonardo-De Castro,**(Acting Chairperson), Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
13. A.C. No. 11754

JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified Affidavit-Complaint1 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by complainant Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era
(Atty. Era) and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas) for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine
Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa,
and Salvador Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by Era and
Associates Law Office through Atty. Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal dismissal and,
consequently, ordered them to pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full backwages and pro-rated 13th
month pay. More specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation were ordered to pay a partially computed amount
of ₱674,128 for the separation pay and full backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month pay.3 Bonifacio and
the corporation brought their case up to the Supreme Court but they suffered the same fate as their appeals and
motions were decided against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution5 was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice
of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006 was likewise issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 20087 and April 16,
20138 were later on issued, directing the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment
award plus interest and attorney's fees.
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests
entitled Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013
Decision, this Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of violating Rule
15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and entered m [sic]
his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well
as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the
business establishment was conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He
attended the public auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the
same day, a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees
who were there at that time. Armed with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling out of the subject properties
but eventually stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children for the payment of the judgment award instead of
pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty. Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue with the negotiation
in his law office. On behalf of his clients, their counter-offer for the satisfaction of the judgment award went
from ₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went back to Bonifacio's
business establishment together with their clients and several men, and forced open the establishment to pull out
the auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant administrative
complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and trespassing with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution13 dated March 31, 2014, the Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys. Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this Court sometime in
February and April, 2014 with regard to the subject labor case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant administrative complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to what
transpired on November 28, 2013 and December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present therein at that time.18
Hence, his allegations of force, threat, and intimidation in the execution of the judgment is without basis.19 In
his defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of
law as he merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated
May 3, 2006. It is Atty. Era's theory that with such SP A, he was not engaged in the practice of law in
representing his clients in the implementation of the alias writ. He added that he never signed any document or
pleading on behalf of his clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, being an associate of Era and
Associates Law Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php
6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the parties were still
on negotiation, hence, both parties are free to have their own computations, which they could respectively
accept or otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation22 dated March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing wrong with the indication of a suspended lawyer's name in a
pleading considering that the same was not signed by the latter. There was also no proof that a pleading was
prepared by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the pleadings.
There was also no proof that in doing so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty. Era in filing a pleading.
Neither the presence of Atty. Era during the public auction and the negotiations was an implication or proof that
Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law during his suspension. According to the Investigating
Commissioner, anybody, not exclusively lawyers, can be present at an auction sale or negotiation.
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated any rules/laws in the implementation of the judgment by using
force, threat, and intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner noted that complainant contradicted such
imputations by filing the following pleadings, to wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate Case23 dated
December 18, 2013, acknowledging the full satisfaction of the judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era
and Bragas' clients to take possession of the remaining machines in his business establishment; (2) a
Manifestation24 dated March 12, 2014, wherein complainant stated that he has surrendered the vehicles listed
in the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw and Motion to
Reiterate Motion to Close and Terminate Case and release of TRO Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A
Motion for Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy26 dated October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery, and Trespassing
against Attys. Era and Bragas. In fine, the Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that in acknowledging the
satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed against Attys. Era
and Bragas with regard to the implementation of the said judgment, complainant contradicted and demolished
his own allegation that the satisfaction of the judgment was improperly and unlawfully implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the administrative charges against Attys. Era and
Bragas be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its Resolution No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated April 18, 2015 reversed
and set aside the Investigating Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No. 14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo O. Era and
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
and considering Atty. Era's continuedengagement in the practice of law during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for the payment of money judgment including pegging of interest he
acted as his clients advocate instead as an agent in view of the presence also of his client in the negotiation, for
holding office and admittedly summoned the complainant's children to determine the money judgment. Hence,
Atty. Edgardo O. Era is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the unauthorized practice of law of Atty. Edgardo O. Era, Atty.
Diane Karen B. Bragas is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty. Era's argument
that he merely acted pursuant to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board explained that the invoked SP A
gave Atty. Era the authority to appear and represent the Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction and
did not include the November 28, 2013 auction. Also, while he was authorized to receive payment on behalf of
his clients, the SP A specifically stated that said payments should be made in the form of checks and not
machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no authority under the SP A to represent his clients during the
November 28, 2013 auction and to pull out and receive the corporation's machines as payment of the judgment
award. At any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's clients relied on his legal knowledge in having the
judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty. Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty. Era to engage in an
unauthorized practice of law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during
the satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed only by a member of the bar in good standing.34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the Rules, the records of the instant case were transmitted to this
Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of June 29, 2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give its final action on the instant administrative case, the issues
being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant
another disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its
disciplining authority against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations of the Board of Governors.
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v. Christian Monsod, et. al. 36
is on point. Thus, We quote herein the relevant portions of the said Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for
the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute." (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando F. Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the term practice of
law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source
of livelihood or in consideration of services. Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative
of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.39
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of his winning
clients in the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3)
secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and employees
present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the new owners of the subject
properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6)
negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the judgment award with
interest instead of pulling out the properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the same may not be
exclusively for lawyers, as opined by the Investigating Commissioner. However, in this case, as aptly put by the
Board in its Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination by a trained legal mind of the legal
effects and consequences of each course of action in the satisfaction of the judgment award.41 Precisely, this is
why his clients chose Atty. Era to represent them in the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with
the corporation arising from the labor case as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era.42 Such trained
legal mind is what his clients were relying upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact
that they agreed not to enter into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the
latter being their lawyer.43 It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being
their legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be invoked to
support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as
such SP A cunningly undermines the suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era, which We cannot
countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years in this Court's
Decision dated July 16, 2013. He performed the above-cited acts on the same year, specifically November to
December 2013. Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27,44 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional
maneuver to circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but also his
disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above anyone else, are
called upon to obey court orders and processes.45 Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their practice despite
being suspended by the Court. In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R. Magat,47this Court suspended Atty.
Magat from the practice of law for practicing his profession despite this Court's previous order of suspension.
Likewise in another case, We suspended a lawyer for continuing in her practice despite the clear language of
this Court's suspension order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty. Era guilty of
willfully disobeying the lawful order of this Court warranting the exercise of Our disciplining authority. We
also adopt the Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years
suspension from the practice of law, taking into account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise be
reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the practice of law and yet,
she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR,
specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such
duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals
found duly qualified in education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of law practice
could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence,
she should have not participated to such transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual
circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his
and/or the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the Board's recommendation as regards Atty. Bragas' guilt in the
violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this
Court's lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while
Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately
from receipt of this Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense, or a commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personal records of respondents as members of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice ANDRES B. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice
ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

Legal and Judicial Ethics October 21 2020

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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (OCTOBER 21, 2022) FINALS

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A.C. No. 7388, October 19, 2016

ATTY. RUTILLO B. PASOK, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS, Respondent.

Report and Recommendation

Ruling of the Court

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

2. A.C. No. 11550. June 04, 2018 ]

Ruling of the Court

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

3. A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014

AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,

That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;

The Report and Recommendation of the CBD

The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;

Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*

4. 5. A.C. No. 10031 July 23, 2014

The case is dismissible.

The case is now before thisCourt for confirmation.

In Alitagtag v. Atty. Garcia,32 the Court emphasized, thus:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

5. A.C. No. 5179

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

Very truly yours,

(Emphasis in the original)

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

DISODADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

On Official business On Official leave

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

6. A.C. No. 5900

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. CRESENCIO P. CO UNTIAN, JR.,

REYES, J. JR., J.:

The Court's Ruling

The Court modifies the recommended penalty of the IBP-BOG.

SEC. 5. The following are illustrative forms of sexual harassment:

ii. Overt sexual advances

iii. Gestures with lewd insinuation

(d) Other forms analogous to the [foregoing]. 16

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and

A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition25cralawred to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January

Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.

Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Chairperson), Jardeleza, Tijam, and Gesmundo,* JJ., concur.