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Multiculturalism challenges, and the culture of fear in the Balkans regarding

former Yugoslavia
Article · August 2020

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© 2020 IJRAR August 2020, Volume 7, Issue 3 www.ijrar.org (E-ISSN 2348-1269, P- ISSN 2349-5138)
Multiculturalism challenges, and the culture of fear in

the Balkans regarding former Yugoslavia
Hadžić Faruk
Independent researcher, BSc Psychology, Economics, MSc Security studies/Criminal justice, MBTA Diploma,
Mindfulness-based Transactional Analysis
Abstract
Although the trend of democratization is a reality, there are still great antagonisms and oppositions towards adapting the nation-state to
different forms of diversity, be they ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, or cultural. In the region, people live with the consequences of
ambitious modernization projects that have been carried out superficially and incompletely. Ethnopolitics and religious exclusivism as
hegemonic projects conducted under the auspices of "one people, one state, one religion," lead directly to conflicts between ethnic groups, as
an inapplicable rule in the ex-Yu. No pure model can succeed in multiple and divided countries, but patiently building a mixed model that
will respect both national and civic. Any future joint work on mutual respect and coexistence of members of different cultures, i.e.,
ethnoreligious communities, must fully consider the existence of an indisputable political dimension in the religious traditions. Regardless of
the origin of fear and how "objectively" it is grounded or not, national collectives affected by fear are - dangerous collectives, potentially
destructive and self-destructive. One could learn the lesson of ideologies of internal discord and destruction as an inapplicable historical fact
in this region: the fear of the other (minority/majority discourse) is the greatest enemy of all communities. Collective fear and sense of threat
to the collective identity occur when events are interpreted in public discourse, particularly when political actors instrumentalize it.
Keywords: ex-Yugoslavia, peace and conflict, multiculturalism, identity politics, the culture of fear, pluralism
Introduction
Culture is a demiurge of human reality, a tool of human social reproduction, a determinant, and an indicator of social development. All other
social relations (economic, political, class, ideological, moral, educational, and aesthetic) arise from cultural relations. Although the socialist
order in the historical sense lasted in this area for a relatively short time, all research shows that it has left lasting traces in values and cultural
patterns. As a cultural space, Yugoslavia had great wealth that followed as a result of diversity. Moreover, that multinational, multiethnic
environment provided great opportunities for the lives of people willing to participate in it. After the "violent" collapse of socialism, the
ethnocentric conception of reality was revived, and multiculturalism was interpreted as a remnant of the former system. It follows from these
indications that today the multiculturalism of this region must be viewed in the light of internal legal and political dynamics, pace, ways of
adapting to European structures, and readiness to find a balance between remembering history and the institutional necessities required by
the future. No matter how popular it is today to say that diverse societies cannot survive, the fact is that no globally significant culture is
uniform. Both creativity and freedom arise as a result of communication. After Tito's death, the biggest problem was that civil democracies
did not replace communism, but ethnonational ones.
Taylor distinguishes two traditions in liberal democratic theory, the policy of equality according to which all individuals deserve equal
respect and equal rights, and on the other, the policy of diversity is based on recognizing the unique identities of individuals and groups.
Although these two perspectives seem incompatible, Taylor believes that both are based on the notion of equal respect, and he views
multiculturalism as a logical extension of the policy of equal respect and the policy of recognition. (Taylor, 1994:29) Multiculturalism failed
integrations and consequent "parallel societies" have been talked about among those familiar with the Western world for 20 years, but the
echoes of this important debate are in the Balkans, reinforced by the discourse "minority/majority“ and „fear of the other." At the same time,
unstable societies, including the societies of the former socialist countries of Central and Southeast Europe, are mainly marked by
discussions about the political structure and political processes. The political reality in the Balkans is far from radiant and organic
multiculturalism. The region is one of the most volatile in Europe - the multiethnic states divided there exist in a state of constant conflict,
and thousands of peacekeepers are needed to prevent a return to violence. This problem has two causes. The first is that a minority
population does not want to live in a foreign state if it means they will be second-class citizens. The second is that the majority of the
population does not want the minorities to get the land they live in because it belongs to them. (Less, 2017)
Wherever the transformation into modern society has taken place, the experience has been painful. In the Balkans, the consequences are even
stronger because the process took place very quickly and did not occur until the end. All retrograde movements in politics, from nationalism
to flight into ethnic and religious identities, are, in fact, negative reactions to half-finished modernization. At the intra-social level, in the
circumstances of capitalism, in most Balkan societies, there is no visible more developed institutionalized social solidarity, and some class
compromises if we problematize that "class peace" is achieved by coercion of primitive and brutal capital, which imposes unquestioning
obedience to wage labor. The historical moment of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism opened the renewal of the
ideologies of internal discord and destruction in this area. Former Yugoslavia political culture - values, beliefs, and orientations are far from
democratic-liberal norms. Political leaders are conflicted, fragmented, and rule ad hoc coalitions based on mutual conditionality, sometimes
cooperating in network systems of mutual support, often nepotistically, further complicating the effectiveness of states'
actions.(Hadžić,2020) In addition to the apparent problems of inequality, corruption, and fear politics faced by societies, in terms of the
development of participation political culture, there are also historical narratives that affect the development of voter awareness of processes
within the country that are critical. A fundamental characteristic of civil society from the socialist-communist period is that it was functional
in resolving specific common issues and served as a means of political control.
IJRAR2002606 International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR) www.ijrar.org 812
On the other hand, security is a basic need and an important requirement. However, the discussion of the politics of fear should be extended
to the overall value and normative framework, to the discursive and social conditions that enable it, to the politics of identity, the
combination of knowledge and power. We can problematize that the most vulnerable groups show well where we stand as a society - is an
opening discourse of solidarity as a critical concept. The tragic circumstance for all Balkan nations and states is that peace, more precisely
non-warfare between them, now as in the past, is guaranteed only by the great powers. Nevertheless, that kind of guarantee leads to colonial,
protector, and occupation "peace." These societies, structurally destroyed and antagonized1, must be very conflicted so that there is no
necessary "infrastructure" of a culture of peace. The Balkans in geographical form through the ex-Yu2, except Slovenia, has become a frozen
entity in history due to the prevailing ethnonational and religious differences and circumstances between and within borders (nationalism,
sovereignty, and identities) opposing democratic peace. The most critical question is how all the ruling systems that have emerged on the
scene are, in their essence, ethnopolitics. The answer to that question lies in the constitutive role of war for every policy. The existence of
more ethnic nations implies more narratives of power and circulation in public opinion.(Bhabha,1990:128) Fear of losing identity within
multinational communities, such as Yugoslavia, after disintegration led to the sudden "emergence" of antagonistic individual national
identities, becoming indivisible, and exclusive. Thus, a specific (extremely negative) characteristic of the post-Yugoslav space is that
religions are identified with nations (majority). In this way, the confession is accepted as a political doctrine, so that the national interest of
ex-Yugoslav ethnopolitics can be subordinated to the confessional one. When nations and religions identify and consequently marked others
as potentially dangerous, a policy that considers itself called to "affirm" and "protect" its people and their faith, which in regional historical
and current circumstances, necessarily implies antagonism to the most dramatic conflicts. At the same time, the entire public discourse was
more about affirming the "natural" right to express one's identity, and satisfying the long-suppressed need to recognize that identity.3
In a broader socio-political sense, nationalisms, i.e., the main proponents of the ideology of exclusion, "very quickly became allies in the ex-
Yu",(Papić,2002) which further weakened and impoverished all others did not support such discourses. Today, nationalist ideologies and
identity politics affect socioeconomic stalemate; economic migrations from the ex-Yu are among the highest in the EU.4 Many of the
symptoms of the crisis that European democracies are currently experiencing have been developed, expressed and consolidated for years in
the southeast of the continent: the crisis of democracy in Southeast Europe is visible to everyone and "the idea of the liberal-democratic
consensus no longer exists" (Bieber, 2017). Nowhere is a "culture of hope" is difficult and slow to be created as in the Balkans, especially in
BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina), where the winds of historical humiliation, fear, and hatred among nations still flow. The "culture of fear" that
was ammunition all built and brought to perfection in this area grows into a powerful inspiration for the "culture of hatred" which always
quickly and effectively grows into a "culture of violence." The existence of a "minority and majority"5 or "friend and enemy" relationship
(the enemy is always that of another ethnicity) is the foundation of the symbiosis of the political, religious, and ethnonational in the ex-
Yugoslav communities, filling part of the personal space of human intimacy, becoming the dominant form of behavior that marked new
generations. At the same time, the discourse of denial of war crimes and genocide has always existed in the Balkans and is constantly
modified.6
Although Balkan countries are multicultural, they are reluctant to admit it, because the area is intertwined with national and administrative-
political borders, with different cultures, nations, and religions, but also inherited inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts. At the same time,
one political community can contain two or more groups of people of different cultures, languages, and cultural traditions. Such a picture is
found in a multicultural state, i.e., in culturally plural states. (Kymlicka, 1995) Fear of an „open society“ in the Balkans is evident in two
cases. One is especially characteristic of right-wing populism, where the so-called establishment is under attack. The second is left-wing
populists who implicitly oppose social homogeneity to the destructive role of an open society.
The notion of liberalism in the Western Balkans is imitative and limited. This supremacy of nationalism is precisely in the special form of
state and nation-building in this region. The nationalization of nations had nothing to do with the kind of gradualness and spontaneity
characteristic of Western Europe. The nation's nationalization is the cause of a kind of nationalism, which was uncontrolled, violent,
destructive in this area. It is a fact that the social positions of religion and religious communities are stronger if they help determine identity.
The stronger their influence on the creation of identity, the greater their influence on political life. Traditionalism means greater religiosity
and acceptance of religious norms in the regulation of everyday life. The rule of liberal democracy, therefore, proves to be the final form of
human rule and, therefore, the end of history. (Fukuyama, 1997:19) The Balkans' events precisely prove that the universalization of liberal
democracy is still far from over and that political reality has proved the error of Fukuyama's theory.
Fear is inherent in human society, but it is equally valid that it is a strange feeling. “Fear is what I fear most; it transcends every other
feeling” (Montaigne,1946:42). Fear underlines the uncertain structure of human existence: we fear death, gods, power, loss, strangers, and
the unknown. Both nations and individuals are often gripped by fear and panic. Delumeaux, an excellent researcher of the history of fear (in
1
On the 25th anniversary of the beginning of the war in BiH, the Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel published an extensive article entitled 'What
is the situation in the Balkan countries today?', In which it also deals with Croatia. Conclusion? Poverty, corruption, kleptocracy, nepotism,
ethnically instrumentalized nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism threatens the Western Balkans' social peace. Paunović P.
https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/nijemci-skenirali-ex-yu-drzave-25-godina-nakon-pocetka-rata-u-bih-gdje-je-tu-hrvatska-20170403
4.4.(2017)
2
Former Yugoslavia
3
Although, Croats, Serbs have been discussed almost continuously for the past twenty years. This view is an eloquent example of how the
demand for free democratic expression, when fulfilled, results in post-communist societies mostly in something as weak as the expression of
(collective) identity.
4
Eurostat, Migration and migrant population statistics,2017
5
All three communities in areas controlled by the three armies during the wars (still in charge) built up almost the status of a state
denomination. In contrast, in the other two areas, they found themselves in a "minority" position, with the majority of the population making
no critical distinction (still, i.e. today) between ethnic/confessional/national identities.
6
The fight against revisionism is an ongoing process. This is evident in the example of the Holocaust. In the case of Bosnia, that story
intensified in 2006. and continues to this day. However, now these agents of revisionism have organized and strengthened institutionally.
the West), finding that "groups that history has not particularly cared about ... are becoming dangerous to society," he writes: " or loss of
critical spirit, decline or disappearance of a sense of personal responsibility, underestimation of the opponent's strength, its tendency to
abrupt transition from a state of fear to a state of elation and approving cries of death threats. (Lovrenović,2019) One of the most severe
problems of this region (particularly multhietnic BiH) it is not always capable of political self-reflection, of realizing one's division - its
historical origin, nature, modern typology, and the possibilities of democracy in this type of societies. Although essential battles with fear are
disputable, in the ex-Yu spaces, fear is institutionalized (especially politically) by exploiting destructive and irrational fears.There are
compelling reasons why a society in which fear is unknown does not exist, and there are other reasons - equally compelling - why such an
outcome, even if slightly possible, would be undesirable.When we as a community face fear, whether that threat is dangerous to all or only
part of the community, people feel fear more intensely, feel threatened by collective identity, and, consequently, tend to behave or support
others' behavior protecting collective identity. However, this collective fear and sense of threat to the collective identity occurs when events
are interpreted in public discourse, particularly when political actors instrumentalize it. Once such an interpretation is adopted - that we
should be afraid because people are physically or identically endangered - a culture of fear can emerge. However, social identity, and the
internalization of group values and the perception of the external group as a threat, and in the political aspect, the acceptance of more
conservative political ideologies that propagate the protection of these same group values, are the primary sociopsychological mechanisms of
phenomena. Integrated threat theory is a social psychological theory that primarily deals with threat perceptions. The theory is a recent
theoretical postulation on this subject and provides a useful and integrated framework for understanding prejudice and negative attitudes
towards outgroups or minorities (Ngwayuh, 2017). It focuses on the perceived threat, and not with the actual threat posed by outgroups.
Because of all of the above, national identity is an essential component of integrated threat theory. Furthermore, the constant fabrication of
dangers (a stimulant) that threatens an ethnic group's alleged survival creates a psychosis of fear and uncertainty, defensive internal
cohesiveness, making it impossible to discern the danger to peoples' existence. It is rapidly transferred from one religious group (nation) to
another in which the same processes take place, creating a chain of imagined interethnic threats.
1.Multicultural and open society
A special kind of division between nationalism and liberalism and in which nationalism is the basic form of shaping collective identity, and
liberal universalism a form of shaping individual autonomies and constitutionalization of political power, has never taken root in this region.
The notion of liberalism in this area is imitative and limited. The reason for this supremacy of nationalism is precisely in the special form of
state and nation-building in this region. The nationalization of nations had nothing to do with the kind of gradualness and spontaneity that is
characteristic of Western Europe. The nationalization of the nation is the cause of a kind of nationalism, which was uncontrolled, violent,
destructive in this area. In the study of nationalism, scholars deal with either majority or minority nationalism. Both approaches have evolved
over time. New insights led to new research within the latter, and vice versa, acts both of these approaches, apart from nationalism itself, is
the fact that nationalism became ethnicized in the late twentieth century. It is believed that ethnic identity together by an objective
relationship that stems from a common culture and origin. National identity, however, is a reflection of the issue of social organization, and
especially loyalty to the institutions of society - states. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) found that in societies with a socialist order, greater
emphasis was placed on conservative values and hierarchy, and less on intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and (master's) main status. It
cannot be automatically accepted that the consequences of the socialist order will disappear because that order no longer exists, because the
consequences of different religious cultures remain even when society is secularized. As the Balkans are burdened with a nationalist notion,
it should be emphasized that national identity can be seen as a combination of two dimensions: civic (territorial - political) and cultural -
ethnic, or combination of liberal and illiberal elements. (Kymlicka, 1999) That is why it is necessary to transform the national identity, ie. its
ethnic component, which is achieved by building, developing and strengthening institutional, legal-political and civil mechanisms, or in
other words, nationally coloring liberal values, thus establishing a balance and preventing excessive strengthening of ethnicity.
Thus, unstable societies, which include the societies of the former socialist countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, are mainly marked
by discussions about the political structure and political processes. However, their democratic consolidation will be doomed in advance, or
the process will remain permanently unfinished if it persists, as before, in the widespread tendency to discredit the issue of culture. Of
course, in this neglected problem area, political culture occupies a particularly important place, understood as a time-changing set of beliefs,
values, knowledge, feelings, and attitudes of members of society towards political objects, processes, and goals the actions of historical
tradition are responsible, the structure of political institutions and principles of functioning of the political system. Consequently, it was not
realistic to expect that in the first phase of democratic transition of ethnically divided, but politically united and focused on building a mono
national society, integrative multiculturalism would become the dominant social pattern. In the former Yugoslavia, political polarization is
carried out on a confessional/nationalist bases: Muslims support Bosniak candidates, Catholics support Croats, and Orthodox candidates
support Serbs. The Balkan area, more precisely the area of the Western Balkans, basically follows the process of nationalization of nations.
All this in Balkan societies gives birth not only to a special kind of asymmetry in political development, but at the same time, nationalism is
established as the strongest and most expansive force in this region. These societies do not know the kind of identity between nations and
states that classical European states know, which is why in these societies, enlightenment universalism and liberalism never acquired the role
they had in the old nation-states. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the main role of the ruling elites, of course, and the acquisition and
consolidation of power, was the construction of national identity but accompanied by great violence based on the most terrible, most
aggressive expression of the rebirth of nationality.
To paraphrase Tolstoy, we can say that every society is sick in its way. Sociology is a distinct discipline in that, unlike other disciplines, it
still deals with questions that were asked at the time of the discipline's emergence. This moment was marked by the entry into force of the
modern way of life, with all the great changes implied: capitalism, rapid progress in science and technology, secularism, mass democracy,
urban life, and family transformation. Mostly all these changes were seen as progress, and then people like Marx, Durkheim, Weber came
and asked, when everything is better, why don't people feel good? Each of them came to a similar conclusion: people feel uncomfortable in
modern society because, no matter how effective the new system is in solving technical and material problems, it does not meet human
needs, or because it creates great inequality between people, or because that people do not find their place in a complex society, or because a
system based on the desire to minimize uncertainty by rationality ignores spiritual and emotional needs. For Taylor, multiculturalism is more
of a historical and political issue than an epistemological one.
All retrograde movements in politics, from nationalism to flight into ethnic and religious identities, are, in fact, negative reactions to half-
finished modernization. No matter how popular it is today to say that diverse societies cannot survive, the fact is that no globally significant
culture is uniform. Both creativity and freedom arise as a result of communication. It is clear how much Yugoslavia has provided in the
cultural field when one looks at the current exclusive, closed, frightened cultural establishments in the states that inherited the Yugoslav
space. We can problematize the presence of fear of everything different, while at the same time poor respect for what is considered
supposedly their own. Instead of the pluralistic political model characteristic of liberal democracies, they construct a dualistic vision of the
political system in which they try to portray themselves as "direct representatives of the people" and portray all other politicians as
preventing the will of the "people" from being implemented, along with democratic institutions built.
The Balkans lack the most basic elements of the functioning of multiethnicity. The weak tradition of constitutional liberalism means that
minorities do not trust institutions. The history of violence and atrocities among national groups has destroyed trust among them. Endemic
corruption (especially political corruption) and widespread poverty keep people on edge. The conclusion is that the optimal solution would
be to move to nation-states based on the principle that political borders should correspond to the demographic reality as much as possible.
The rule of liberal democracy, therefore, proves to be the final form of human rule and, therefore, the end of history. (Fukuyama, 1997:19)
The Balkans' events precisely prove that the universalization of liberal democracy is still far from over and that political reality has proved
the error of Fukuyama's theory. Nowadays, a precedent from the region tells us that only a solid international border would work.
Culture (more precisely cultures) is a link that realistically integrates individuals of one territory. Culture can be seen as the foundation of the
identity of certain ethnic groups and the backbone of identity differences that can be a prerequisite for cooperation and prosperity, not just
mutual repulsion and intolerance. Long-term integration can only be achieved by nurturing the cultural diversity of all ethnic communities,
and repulsion always occurs by insisting on cultural unification and monolithic, which is automatically associated with the loss of one's own
identity. (Božilović, 2004) On the other hand, multicultural civic identity is a pragmatic response to cultural mediation between citizens and
institutions. An identity that recognizes the existence of different cultures within its community based on tolerance and equality allows
citizens to use minority languages in accessing institutions, which is a common practice in democratically governed states at the local level.
The starting point of the multicultural form of citizenship justifies the commitment of individuals to ethnicity, emphasizing that total and
uncritical positioning towards nationalism also means denying the basic postulates of liberalism. The freedom of individuals means that he
can simultaneously have the right to life, the realization of his goals, freedom of speech, opinion, but also the need of an individual to
express his own identity cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, national feelings that connect history and origin play one of the main roles
in determining identity and provide a social framework for the functioning of a liberal state, especially democratic institutions. (Kymlicka,
2001) J. Tamir sees opposition to ethnocentric nationalism, not in complete denial of national interests, but an alternative national
understanding. As nationalism will not simply disappear, the question is whether it is a form of dangerous ethnocentrism or a version guided
by liberal values. (Tamir, 1993:260)
The Balkans can be seen as an area of intercultural cooperation because there are many factors common to all states. Some of them are the
similarity of language, common myths of the heroic past, presence of equal stereotypes, non-acceptance of Balkanization and aspiration to
Europe, peripheral capitalism (underdevelopment of most Balkan countries) (Todorova, 1999), common transition trend, the legacy of
totalitarian (patriarchal) mentality, domination nationalism in terms of national romanticism and international conflicts. In the early 1990s,
the multiethnic tradition did not resist the nationalism that came through all the pores of decaying communism. Consequently, various anti-
communist and nationalist elements began to gain increasing influence. Therefore, it should be no surprise that all institutionalized religions
(Serbian Orthodoxy, Croatian Catholicism, and Bosnian ulema) have taken on the roles of ethnonationalism leaders. However, in the
Balkans, in the ex-Yu, in the constellation of socio-political relations, the current political elites are not clear with national, religious, and
ethnic identities. Serbian is simultaneously Orthodox, Croat, and Catholic synonyms, just as Bosniaks are Muslims. The stumbling blocks
are the different religious profiles of ethnicity.
Fear of an open society, or fear of multiculturalism in the Balkans is evident in two cases. One is especially characteristic of right-wing
populism, where the so-called establishment is under attack. The second is left-wing populists who implicitly oppose social homogeneity to
the destructive role of an open society. Traditionalism means greater religiosity and acceptance of religious norms in the regulation of
everyday life. It is, therefore, the acceptance of gender inequality, submission to authority, and the like. Modernism is the opposite of that
and consists of secularism, individualism, acceptance of gender equality, and rights for all minority groups (such as LGBT). Otherwise, the
ideology of an open society is established by K. Popper, who, generalizing his tragic experiences ("his cosmopolitanism arose from Jewish
marginality and reflected the dilemmas of assimilated Jews"), left several dilemmas. Among other things, Popper did not explain "how
national and cosmopolitan identities will coexist," so the abyss remained among them, resulting in "utopian cosmopolitan identities." The
philosophical theories of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism provide a cognitive framework that allows the mentioned subjects of
conflict to be viewed together. Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are elegant political theories that always develop their arguments
and models to create just political orders based on comprehensible premises. On one side are names like Habermas, Held, and Singer, and on
the other, Miller, Taylor, and Walzer. Even this short list clearly shows that there are significant differences within these camps.
Within the philosophical and socio-political discourse of the "nation state to the state of citizens", according to some, it directly attacks the
sovereignty and identity of ex-Yu nation-states, which, with the true support of international factors, is an indispensable condition for
building a sovereign civil-democratic community. Domestic opponents believe that, under these auspices of the state, they are systematically
and persistently geostrategically and economically devalued. Wouldn't it be like a colony of so-called of the new world order fell under the
complete control of the world's political (in) visible structures? Beyond foreign conspiracy theory, the continuation and continuity of
domestic structures are primarily at work, which did not understand or wanted to accept the historical and political fact that without
independent states, the survival and independence of peoples (nations) is endangered.
From the elements of coexistence that we had in the ex-Yu, parallel societies emerged in all post-Yugoslav countries, with all minorities in
the majority environment suffering much more, especially real minorities, i.e., national minorities who were doubly punished. Then, the
culprits are the religious communities that have entered into collusion with politicians, which has done terrible damage to religion, not to
mention politics, coexistence, and multicultural society. In any case, the death of multiculturalism in the post-Yugoslav countries occurred.
Therefore, the practice of constant mobilization, ie, collectivist homogenization, takes the place of democratic legitimacy, providing
political-elites with a base of power outside institutions and democratic procedures. By instrumentalizing the issue of radicalization of
political discourse, leads to ethnic homogenization, and the result is that ethnopolitical parties remain in power. Mobilization induces and
spreads a sense of homogeneity and equality and a sense of security and power in the collective "We." The emphasis on nationalism by
ethnic elites is not exclusively a consequence of policy failure, but the result of apathy, apoliticism of citizens. Consequently, many surveys
show that citizens do not trust state institutions or politics in general in the ex-Yu. Policies in public speech are often tied to the attitude of
the younger generations towards the whole policy or politics as such. However, once citizens mobilize, Gagnon (2004) shows that citizens
are not prone to nationalism and chauvinism, but quite the opposite, to more moderate and more left-wing initiatives.
Furthermore, BiH is the most critical area of ex-Yu goslavia multiethnic discourse.7 In the background of the fierce discussions about the
political situation and the political future of BiH, in which domestic and in the international, especially European actors participate, it seems
that the political elites of current, ex-Yu states are haunted by a specter - the specter of a „civil state“. The Constitution defines Bosniak-
Croat-Serbs as a constituent people (Serbian is simultaneously Orthodox, Croat, and Catholic synonymous, as are Bosniak Muslims). At the
same time, the citizen is mentioned only in the preamble, denying "others" the opportunity to participate in the newly established power
sharing system. In addition to placing most powers under the auspices of entities defined in discriminatory ethnic categories, the Constitution
copied the model of "ethnic control over political power" to state institutions, guaranteeing their Constitution on a tripartite basis.
(Smajić,Turčalo,Beridan,2018:153) Schnecken emphasizes that post-war societies face multidimensional problems, which is why
"peacebuilding" as a process should aim to address the political, economic, social, and psychological consequences of war, as well as to
eliminate the structural causes of conflict. (Schnecken,2006:26) In that case, BiH society can serve as an example. Thus, the name "Others"
is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious divided society in the formulation of "hybrid" identities (mixed ethnic
marriages, other ethnic ones, and those declared as Bosnians). Those who do not belong to one of the three religious groups or do not want to
show affiliation are considered a type of foreign element; they cannot elect representatives and are barred from running at any state level.
Several decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 8 have never been implemented.
It seems that the idea of BiH as a common civil state, according to the bitter statements of some ethno-nationalist leaders, as well as the deep
ignorance of European envoys, is the greatest danger to the stability of the state. According to the leader of the Croatian ethnonationalist
party, advocating for a civic state is equal to advocating for nothing less than an Islamic state. From an 'ethnocratic' perspective (Howard
2012), the non-ethnic political option undermines the very equality of the constituent collectives. There are two main and interrelated
objections to this option. Thus, the contemporary narration of nationalists about the „bogeyman“ of the „civil state“ proves to be a
convenient instrument of ideological mobilization for all three ethnonationalism elites, with the Serb and Croat elites portrayed as victims of
Bosniak hegemonic and unitary pretensions. In contrast, the Bosniak elite develops the victim's theme—separatist activities of the other two.
This victimological stance is the „zero point“ of ethnic mobilization on all sides, creating a „win-win“ context that encourages the production
of separate realities, societies, and, ultimately, separate territorial and political entities, „ethnopolitical space“, or cores of future monoethnic
states. Schematically speaking, the nature of Serbian and Croatian ethnopolitics can be described as particular and decentralized, and
Bosniak as integralist. Issues with today's integralist politics arise because the Bosniak point of view does not show the equal political
grounding of others' demands, that is, the possibility of winning others over to the integralist concept. One of the constants of the history is
the aspiration for social, political, and cultural domination of one of the groups over the others. Crises of political zero-pointed
disagreements between the ruling group and the opposition party group do not occur as in other parliamentary democracies - "in BiH, it is a
matter of disagreements over the development of the state as a whole." (Pejanović, 2011)
One of the collective management methods is consociation. According to the model of consociational democracy, the basic function in state
bodies of religiously, linguistically or ethnically divided societies is the division and joint exercise of state power. According to L Phart,
consociational democracy, in order to enable the coexistence of plural social segments, consists of four characteristics, where the
accommodator considers the essence of consociational stability in the interests of all segments. Therefore, the government is made up of a
grand coalition, as in this way, the political demands of all significant segments of plural society are represented. Overvoting smaller
segments prevents the establishment of a veto institution to which each of the segments has the right to invoke. The principle of segment
proportionality has been revived in the institutional division by ensuring the distribution of positions and resources. Moreover, finally, the
autonomy of the segments ensures that the minority is its authority in matters concerning its survival. Therefore, in the states of
consociational democracy, institutional arrangements have been established that guarantee the influence and independence of each important
segment (through, for example, the federal or decentralized system, the proportional electoral system).
The fact is that most ex-Yu countries have included regulating the position and integration of ethnocultural minorities among the political
priority issues. There is no entirely successful model, as relations between majorities and minorities in the region are burdened by past
events, mutual animosities, and prejudices. However, with the development of democratic institutions and procedures, gradual changes in
value systems through media, cultural and educational policies, tensions in interethnic relations are easing. “They are less and less
burdensome for relations between citizens and states. The countries of Southeast Europe use various means of nation-building to protect and
spread the dominant culture. In some cases, nation-building is much broader, more exclusive, and more prone to coercion than in the West.“
(Stanković-Pejnović, 2010:478)
7
The most common comparison and description of BiH, i.e., Sarajevo, is like European Jerusalem, with a mosque, a cathedral, a church, and
a synagogue in one block. However, in essence, BiH's multiculturalism is a very controversial and complex concept, both in discussions
within BiH and in the representation of BiH in the world. For centuries, the multiculturalism and multiethnicity of BiH have been affirmed
and challenged both externally and internally. It is argued and challenged ideologically, historically, politically, by coexistence, wars,
conflicts, and urbanism. At the same time, with its thousand-year coexistence, tolerance, and multiethnicity, BiH is a survival model in
Europe. It confirms this with its survival, centuries before the declarations on human rights of both the EU and its institutions. Hasanovič,
A.,2018.,http://avdijahasanovic.blogger.ba/arhiva/2018/12/07/4124757
8
Išerič H.,Judgments of the European Court for Human Rights in Cases Sejdić and Finci, Zornić, Šlaku and Pilav – nudum ius in BiH,(2019)
It is the fact that ethnic divisions are more difficult to overcome than religious, social or cultural divisions within a nation. "Kasapović claims
that "it is logical that first and foremost socially homogenized model non-ethnic consociational democracies, for example in the Netherlands
and Austria." (Kasapović,2007:141). In this way, none of the constituent groups in the state is excluded. Ethnic divisions are true, which
would be the case if the democratic model of majority rule were applied. We can problematize the idea of building a new model of social
identity. However, instead of standard consociation, we can suggest the need for a mixed model, i.e., responsible consociations, corrected,
civic models. No pure model can succeed in a complex and divided country, but patiently building a mixed model that will respect both
national and civic.
2.The culture of fear
The history of Western European societies can be read as a sequence of dominant lines of conflict, starting with the contradictions of
Catholicism and Protestantism, the periphery and the center, the agrarian economy, and the industry. When lines of conflict lose clarity, old
antagonisms do not disappear completely. They still exist and are reflected in party systems. Thus, the 20th century was a century of class
struggle between capital and labor. In the beginning, the two irreconcilable camps stood facing each other, radicalizing political divisions,
bringing political systems sometimes to the point of breaking down, and helping the rise of fascism. After the Second World War, this
conflict became institutionalized and civilized, at least in the democratic countries of Western Europe and North America. Furedi believes
that one of the important developments that befell us, as a result of great political and cultural events in the 60s, 70s and early 80s, is the
fragile sense of humanity and the disappearance of action, as well as the disappearance of the idea that people can create history and
transform the world in which they live. Objective reality seems to have taken on a threatening character, routine experiences have taken on
frightening features, and in this context, fear has gained importance in many different ways. (Furedi, 2008)
A "protective-obedient axiom" elaborated in the mainstream political theory of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Schmitt. All of them refer to fear as
a representative and powerful force. Machiavelli puts the idea of power and passion at the center of his political thought. Schmit in the
"Concept of Political" focused on Hobbes's 9 central question, namely, his protective-obedient axiom, which, with modifications, made him
his own: protector and protected. No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy, and legality can exist without protection and obedience. A
political theory that does not become systematically aware of this sentence remains a short fragment.
The complex political, social and economic realities and changing expectations stability of states) prolonged the aspirations of individual
countries for the process of democratization and integration into the EU and NATO, resulting in processes characterized by lack of
transformation, cooperation, security and general disorganization at the regional and international levels. Approaching NATO is treated as a
taboo subject due to the 1999 bombing of Serbia to stop the conflict in Kosovo. This relationship is also reflected in BiH politics. There is
also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean the
burden of Serbian politics with the belief that joining the EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the demands of the EU
for better functioning of BiH are read in the RS. In the relations between BiH and Kosovo, no aspect can be singled out to function at a
satisfactory level. Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric10, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is
directly linked to the problem of asymmetric and scarce economic co-operation. It created attempts to isolate the Western Balkans from the
rest of the political, economic, and even "geographical" Europe as a particular entity that generates only violence and instability. The long-
term absence of a political will, which manifested itself through institutional vacuums after ethnoreligious conflicts, created a strategic basis
for the development of a fragile state of security, systemic corruption and the criminalization of societies. (Hadžić,2020)
In Europe, politics leans extremely strongly on differences, whether they are religious, linguistic, ethnic, or cultural. What about policies in
the Balkans? The absence of identity between the borders of nations and the states' borders led to the state that Istvan Bibo defines as the
notion of existential fear of small nations and schizophrenic political culture, which prevented the formation of stable political orders
creating a form of permanent fragmentation. The special key of formal principles (citizenship, nationality, sovereignty) dominates the type of
relationship that directs the formal properties of nationalism to the principle of sovereignty, which legitimately gives rise to states of conflict,
mistrust, war, and instability that are still present in this area. Broad terms such as „peace“ and „conflict“ are free to understand, and the
definitions are very different for different individuals and groups. However, if we agree that peace is more than just the absence of conflict,
what creates sustainable, functional, and inclusive societies in post-conflict environments? Although formal, international peace agreements,
such as the Dayton Accords11 in the case of BiH, was the first step in creating stability, elements of sustainability and tolerance must
undoubtedly come from a local source, with the community's support. However, Dayton has failed to fulfill its intention to reintegrate the
BiH, ethnonationalism as a mobilizing political ideology have created an explosive environment, with a climate of socio-political exclusivity
(Sejdić-Finci-Pilav-Zornić).12 BiH is home to the world's most complex13 public administration and Constitution based on "ethnoreligious
principles.14 In BiH, all three ethnopolitical structures pursue containment policies, so "hybrid wars" prevent their necessary transition into
three political communities.(Hadžić,2020)
In the ex-Yu, or a semantically neutral name, the Balkans, the ambitions of some, especially more abundant ethnic nationalisms, often
stimulated the imagination to unite the whole area under one self-proclaimed people and denomination, which in turn would lead to war,
9 Hobbes,T.(1991), Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge University Press

10 n RS, Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has threatened to secede from BiH if Kosovo becomes independent. On February 20, 2008, the
president of the non-governmental organization Serbian People's Movement (SNP), "The Choice is Ours," Dane Camkovic, called on Prime
Minister Dodik to organize the adoption of a declaration on the declaration of independence of RS. Hina,
https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/banja-luka-poziv-dodiku-da-proglasi-neovisnost-rs.html 2008
11
https://www.osce.org/bih/126173
12
Išerič H.,Judgments of the European Court for Human Rights in Cases Sejdić and Finci, Zornić, Šlaku and Pilav – nudum ius in BiH,2019
13
240,000 employees in administration and public companies, 14 governments, 180 ministers, 3 languages, 3 presidents, 2 entities, 1 district,
10 cantons, and 207 active political parties
14
Šetka H.,http://kliker.info/prof-dr-besim-spahic-mi-smo-se-uvijek-tukli-za-racun-drugih-a-nikada-za-sopstvenu-domovinu/ 2012
ethnic cleansing and destruction. We can say that nationalists in the former Yugoslavia are prone to the historical soil of their ancestors who
witnessed the flourishing of the nation (Durkheim,1996:81) - a defined and limited area with which members can identify and to whom they
feel they belong. The existence of a "minority and majority" or "friend and enemy" relationship (the enemy is always that of another culture)
is the foundation of the symbiosis of the political, religious, and ethnonational in the ex-Yugoslav communities, filling part of the personal
space of human intimacy, becoming the dominant form of behavior that marked new generations. The constant fabrication of dangers (a
stimulant) that threatens an ethnic group's alleged survival creates a psychosis of fear and uncertainty, defensive internal cohesiveness,
making it impossible to discern the danger to peoples' existence. It is rapidly transferred from one religious group (nation) to another in
which the same processes take place, creating a chain of imagined interethnic threats. Thus, parallel policies of memory and revisionist
historical narrative within the politics of fear spread influence among young people where ethnopolitical indoctrination has reception and is
left to chance, creating solid preconditions for hostilities in future generations escalate into violence in specific political-economic
circumstances.15
The Western Balkans as a whole, especially BiH within the region, is a victim of its misconceptions and European prejudices about the need
to impose on the Balkans the access of a closed society that must deserve to be unlocked. No formula has simply been found according to
which the individual systemic weakness of each of the countries in the fight against crime, corruption, and antagonisms will be overcome by
joint regional action in which borders and national pride will be briefly forgotten. The European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee
expressed concern over heightened tensions and belligerent tones in the Western Balkans region, focusing on Serbia-Kosovo relations.
However, other relative hotspots were also mentioned: Montenegro, Republika Srpska 16 in BiH, Macedonia, Greece, and the Serbia-Croatia
relationship. In the relations between BiH and Kosovo, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. Relations remain in
the realm of political rhetoric17, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and Kosovo is directly linked to the problem of
asymmetric and scarce economic co-operation. After Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, Serbia and BiH imposed a ban on
imports of Kosovo products due to the inadmissibility of a customs stamp that read "Republic of Kosovo."
Fear of becoming a minority, therefore, is a strong determinant of political strategies that an ethnic group can choose. Therefore, it is better
to be a majority in a smaller state than to become a minority within a larger state. In the case of BiH, the Dayton Peace Agreement aimed to
prevent such fears by introducing a veto for all three constituent ethnic groups. However, in the nationalist environment that developed
during the war and institutionalized by the implementation of the Agreement, the fear did not disappear. On the contrary, it has led to two
groups, relative minorities, Serbs, and Croats, blocking all attempts by the state to introduce political measures aimed at creating unity and
loyalty to the state. Also, it should be openly said that the fear of minorities does not stem from the fact that nationalist leaders have
indoctrinated ethnopolitical ideologies and orientations. Secondly, it is wrong to say that minorities enjoy full rights: only minorities can
assess this, and it is not permissible to deny them rights because of crimes committed in the 1990s. The problem of separatism is returning to
the region, and power is currently on the side of the revisionists. One of the key issues concerning ideologies of reconciliation seems to be
that there is no longer an alternative - because the question arises as to who should be reconciled to one who has not participated in the
violence. Furthermore, the second question is whether the Balkan conflict with others is a conflict with real others or a conflict with the idea
that some have. It is, in fact, a trauma of internal conflict.
Political projects started by war, segregation among ethnic groups continues only through education, within the discriminated educational
phenomenon of "Two schools under one roof.18"in BiH. "There are those borders, we don't agree, and we don't want to be in touch," says a
high school student from Mostar, adding that he was never on the Old Bridge 19 out of fear, because, as he says, "someone will recognize that
he is a Croat and get into trouble.". "Four students express such an opinion in the same first sentence. The same student states that he can
recognize a "Muslim" crossing the Bridge by "speech, movement, clothing, facial texture, and darker skin." 20 These phenomena show
obvious indoctrination with elements of „culture of fear“ that produce antagonism and violence, creating clones of ethnoreligious
primogenitors and preventing young people's development into moral citizens-individuals. In this way, ethnopolitics takes care of its
reproduction by cultivating new generations of future xenophobes where young Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats learn to see objects in others to
maintain their Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, rather than independent and full human beings. Thus an extremist model of the domination of
ethnic discourse over the entire social life of people emerges. In political life, ethnocracy takes the place of democracy, special ethnopolitical
totalitarianism takes the place of national (state) political orientation, and ethnopolitics, biopolitics, and populism grow unstoppably against
democratic politics. The most important feature of this approach is certainly the creation of a discourse of "naturalness", supported by
different, mostly pseudo-scientific, or mythopoetic narratives of a particular nation. The goal of the discourse of naturalness is to devalue
alternative discursive patterns as "utopian" or "abnormal." It is a kind of naturalistic delusion of the dominant ethnopolitical discourse.
15
For Croatia, the military action "Storm" in 1995 (The last major battle of the Croatian War of Independence was a significant factor in
the Bosnian War outcome, against the self-declared proto-state Republic of Serbian Krajina) is a magnificent victory; for Serbia is ethnic
cleansing. The attitudes of ordinary citizens, Serbs, and Croats, have not changed significantly. Many believe that the relations between the
two states on the anniversary date of "Storm" are becoming tenser each year. https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/oluja-potpuno-suprotni-
stavovi-i-poslije-21-godine/27896141.html ,2016. The fight against revisionism is an ongoing process. This is evident in the example of the
Holocaust. In the case of BiH, that story intensified in 2006 and continues to this day. However, now these agents of revisionism have
organized and strengthened institutionally.
16
Entity within BiH (other is Federation of BiH, and 1 District-Brčko Disctrict)
17
In RS, Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has threatened to secede from BiH if Kosovo becomes independent. On February 20, 2008, the
president of the non-governmental organization Serbian People's Movement (SNP), "The Choice is Ours," Dane Camkovic, called on Prime
Minister Dodik to organize the adoption of a declaration on the declaration of independence of RS. Hina,
https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/banja-luka-poziv-dodiku-da-proglasi-neovisnost-rs.html 2008
18
Term for schools in BiH based on the ethnic segregation. Students from two ethnic groups, Bosniaks and Croats, attend classes in the same
building, but physically separated from each other and taught separate curricula.
19
Unesco's 16th-century Ottoman bridge (rebuilt after war destruction) in the city of Mostar in BiH crosses the river Neretva and connects
the two parts of the city.
20
Perspektiva, Radio Free Europe in cooperation with The National Endowment for Democracy,TV-series,(2015)
The fundamental question in psychoanalysis is the conditions that trigger anxiety as a signal of external or internal danger. Freud considers
the fear associated with truly traumatic situations such as war, major accidents, and Freud's formulation of the "grenade shock" that afflicted
World War I returnees later became known as a post-traumatic stress disorder. We cannot be prepared for traumatic neuroses in our psychic
dynamics, and that is why they are so painful. At the individual level, in addition to increasing the likelihood of survival, fear has even more
positive consequences - we become more sensitive to other potentially dangerous situations. We are informed about them in more detail and
more often, and we become less prone to risky decisions. In the political sphere, we are more inclined to be guided by current events, and
less by party affiliations and ideology; the consequence of which is taking into account the 'other side', which we are not inclined to in
everyday politics. At the individual level, we can develop various anxiety disorders or (irrational) phobias. However, the more dangerous
consequences of fear, in the long run, are those at the community level. When we as a community face fear, whether that threat is dangerous
to all or only a part of the community, we tend to feel fear more intensely, feel threatened by collective identity, and consequently tend to
behave or support the behavior of others aimed at protecting collective and collective identity.
The search for identity in a post-conflict society is still with little awareness that hatred of the other is nothing but self-hatred in the other and
that there is no search for identity without settling the conflict within oneself. However, collective fear and sense of threat to the collective
identity occurs when events are interpreted in this way in public discourse, and particularly when political actors instrumentalize it. Once
such an interpretation is adopted - that we should be afraid because we are physically and identically endangered - a culture of fear can
occur. Therefore, it is a situation when social actors consciously discursively shape a certain situation as terrible, as threatening to the
collective. Given the above psychological mechanisms, if this process is successful, i.e., if citizens internalize fear, they will tend to “close”
within the security of their group and support the repression of dangerous others or even deny their freedoms in order to resolve the danger.
However, it is crucial for a culture of fear that this fear persists even after the threat itself has disappeared; fear is constantly renewed through
the discourse of the rulers, aided by the mass media. According to the Integrated treat theory, an intergroup threat is experienced when
members of one group perceive that another group is in a position to cause them some form of harm. It is an ambitious vision stimulating
negative emotions, such as fear, and negative attitudes, in the form of prejudice. Social identity and the internalization of group values and
the perception of the external group as a threat, and in the political aspect, the acceptance of more conservative political ideologies that
propagate the protection of these same group values, are the primary sociopsychological mechanisms of prejudice. Ingroup members who are
relatively unfamiliar with outgroup tend to be prone to experience threats than who knows each other (Stephan, Stephan, 2016). Ingroup
members who have less personal contact with outgroups also tend to experience threats compared with those who have more contact.
Because of all of the above, national identity is an essential component of integrated threat theory. The greater the fear and insecurity in
society, the more people are dependent on the government and less instructed in measuring its objective results. The most dangerous practice
is the gross spread of ethnic intolerance that borders on hate speech. It is a continuation of the conduct of war policy by media, a typical
example of post-war propaganda that has significant social consequences. The 2018 Freedom House reports for all ex-Yu countries 21 show
that some indicators such as national democratic governance, the electoral process, civil society, and media independence have deteriorated
since 2014. The reasons are precisely in the authoritarian political leadership and the dominance of one political option. The consequences of
spreading a culture of fear for society are tragic: there is no assessment of existing policies, consideration of various alternatives, or planning
for the future. The government that manipulates society by instilling fear in it deprives it of the possibility of reasoning, but also of
elementary dignity.
In the research "Extreme speech in the media”: How to generate a culture of fear in Serbia" in 2017., 16 print, electronic and online media,
and agencies were analyzed. 36,960 media releases were collected, of which 9,436 texts contained some element of extreme speech. Of the
total number of news items with extreme content, misogyny is present in 25 percent of the texts, and the spread of intolerance in 15 percent
of the texts included in the analysis. The topics about Croatia and Kosovo use the terms “Ustashas” 22 and “Shiptars”23, which spread
intolerance anf “fear” towards others through chauvinistic reporting and emphasizing the national pride of Serbs. When it comes to topics
related to Kosovo, Croatia, and USA, there were texts that spread intolerance in two ways - either through chauvinistic reporting or through
emphasizing national pride. These are two divisions - anti-American and pro-Russian reporting, which is especially intertwined when it
comes to mentioning USA, NATO, or the CIA (Vehovec, 2017).
The inherent fear and abuse rooted in social and political institutions remain even in the climate "Legitimate authorities" and "a well-
organized political society." It is a central part of Schklar's political theory and its stimulating study, “The Liberalism of Fear” (1998). She
argued that there are two types of political scientists: those who would like to have power and those who study it because they are afraid of
it, those who would like to ride the horse of power, and those who fear that he will overthrow them. The methodology of spreading fear is
still seen in every part of the Balkans and has several levels. In Croatia and BiH, there is a fear of "Chetniks24" in Serbia of "Ustashas and
Albanian terrorists." In Montenegro - the scarecrow is called "Greater Serbian hegemony." In Macedonia - on the one hand, "Serbian spies
are conquering parliament" on the other hand, some are afraid of Albanians, others of Macedonians, and both of them - of Greek and Serbian
hegemony. Post-war times are "ideal" for spreading fear. Memories of the dead, destruction, blood, and horrors are still fresh so that the
"elites" always encourage the danger that the time of wars may return In fear, it is easier for people to choose one leader. "If it were not for
21
Freedom House, 2018., 2017., 2016., Nation in Transit Bosnia and Herzegovina https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/2018/bosnia-and-herzegovina
Freedom House, 2018., 2017., 2016., Nation in Transit Croatia, https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/croatia,
Freedom House, 2018., 2017., 2016., Nation in Transit Kosovo https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/kosovo
Freedom House, 2018., 2017., 2016.,Nation in Transit Serbia https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/
22
Ustasha is a term colloquially used to describe members of the Croatian fascist movement founded in 1929 by Ante Pavelić under the
name Ustasha - Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UHRO), which Nazi Germany appointed the ruling party in 1941 after the founding of
the Independent State of Croatia. Ustasha - Croatian Liberation Movement (UHOP)
23
Shiptar is a Slovenized form of the Albanian ethnonym Shqiptar (Šćiptar), or Shqipëtar (Šćipetar), which Albanians call themselves. Due
to the negative connotation, the term "Shiptars" is considered offensive in Serbian , Macedonian, and other South Slavic languages.In Serbia,
the politically incorrect term "Shiptar" is used today by nationalist authors.
24
Members of a Serbian military organization with a distinctly nationalist chauvinistic Greater Serbia goal.
Đukanović25, the blood of warring gangs would flow in streams in Montenegro, and in the end, Serbia would take the state from the
Montenegrins again." "Without Izetbegović26, the Chetniks would have killed all Muslims." "Without Vučić, the Albanians would have
kidnapped Kosovo, carried out a 'storm in the north' and ethnically cleansed Kosovo and Metohija." "Without Thaci 27, there is no Kosovo."
These are the conclusions that are imposed on the citizens by the daily media poisoning. The message is - while we rule, there will be no
war, so let us “steal” as much as we can. (Mijahlović,2019) Delumeaux, an excellent researcher of the history of fear (in the West), finding
that "groups that history has not particularly cared about ... are becoming dangerous to society," he writes: " or loss of critical spirit, decline
or disappearance of a sense of personal responsibility, underestimation of the opponent's strength, its tendency to abrupt transition from a
state of fear to a state of elation and approving cries of death threats. (Lovrenović,2019) One of the most severe problems of this region
(particularly multhietnic BiH) it is not always capable of political self-reflection, of realizing one's division - its historical origin, nature,
modern typology, and the possibilities of democracy in this type of societies. Although essential battles with fear are disputable, in the ex-Yu
spaces, fear is institutionalized (especially politically) by exploiting destructive and irrational fears. It, as a problem and a process, is not
taken seriously politically.
Moreover, security is a basic need and an important requirement. However, the discussion of the politics of fear should be extended to the
overall value and normative framework, to the discursive and social conditions that enable it, to the politics of identity, the combination of
knowledge and power. The thesis - that the most vulnerable groups show well where we stand as a society - is an opening discourse of
solidarity as a critical concept. Society is possible only when people consider many cases from the same aspect; when they have the same
opinion about a large number of cases when the same facts give rise to the same impressions and thoughts. "(Tocqueville, 1999: 368) Even
for Habermas, in every democratic community, one must find the embodiment of the media of state integration and supranational solidarity
necessary to form a collective political will for the legitimacy of power. Thus, the state must exist with a human and social fabric consistent
with it, as a political entity, within the established factors of solidarity.
Conclusion
A common feature of all countries in the Balkans is their multiculturalism, which should be considered an advantage, not a disadvantage,
because each culture is enriched by contact with another culture, without violating their own identity. The fact that 30 years after the wars,
discourse on political society as if war leaders are still present, is just another reflection of multiculturalism stalemate syndrome. However,
democratic consolidation will be doomed in advance, or the process will remain permanently unfinished if it persists, as before, in the
widespread tendency to discredit the issue of culture. No pure model can succeed in multiple and divided countries, but patiently building a
mixed model that will respect both national and civic. A special kind of division between nationalism and liberalism, in which nationalism is
the basic form of shaping collective identity, and liberal universalism in shaping individual autonomies and constitutionalization of political
power, has never taken root in this region. The process of founding modern states left open the question of the territorial scope of nations and
who belongs to them. Moreover, in the whole region, people live with the consequences of ambitious modernization projects that have been
carried out superficially and incompletely. Moreover, the freedom that liberalism wants to provide is the freedom from abuse of power and
harassment of the helpless that this difference calls. In this neglected problem set, political culture occupies a particularly important place,
understood as a time-changing set of beliefs, values, knowledge, feelings, and attitudes of members of society towards political objects,
processes, and goals the actions of historical tradition are intertwined, the structure of political institutions, and the principles of functioning
of the political system. So, quite specifically, it is an urgent task of building a civic or democratic political culture, which is inconceivable
without a built civil society. By expanding the definition of policy, the infantilized public is seemingly offered the idea of engaging in ever
new spheres of activism - even though the connection between protest and politics of change has become more complicated. Although the
trend of democratization is a reality, there are still great antagonisms and oppositions towards adapting the nation-state to different forms of
diversity, be they ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, or cultural. Ethnopolitics and religious exclusivism as hegemonic projects conducted
under the auspices of "one people, one state, one religion", lead directly to conflicts between ethnic groups, as an inapplicable rule in the
former Yugoslavia. Giroux (2015) points out, “if we want politics to return to the center of individual and social action, social/public life
must not be motivated by a culture of fear, but by a passion for public action, ethical responsibility and the promise of substantial
democracy.” In the ex-Yu, so far, there have been almost no comparative insights, no objectification of the problem in the broader
international context, which would allow to move away from fatalism in perceiving the phenomenon, and notice its historicity, logic, and
causality of occurrence. Instead of facing society's division as an intellectual and political challenge, the ruling national political parties are at
work, which feel this state and process as their "natural" state and use it as political fuel in a partnership-antagonistic relationship with other
parties of the same provenance. And to their ethnic corps/electorate.
Regardless of the origin of fear and how "objectively" it is grounded or not, national collectives affected by fear are - dangerous collectives,
potentially destructive and self-destructive. Acute fear is the most common form of social control, and fear liberalism is a response to these
undeniable actualities and therefore concentrates on harm control. In an atmosphere marked by fear, the potential for critical thinking and
action is dramatically reduced, and the demagogic mobilization of the public is facilitated mainly in the direction desired by the current
political elites. However, this collective fear and sense of threat to the collective identity occurs when events are interpreted in public
discourse, especially when political actors do it. The search for identity in a post-conflict societies are still with little awareness that hatred of
the other is nothing but self-hatred in the other and that there is no search for identity without settling the conflict within oneself. Such an
anti-intellectual environment and an anti-individualistic climate open space for various pseudo-narrations, including the tabloid interpretation
of the world with a flood of the culture of fear and sensationalism. Any future joint work on mutual respect and coexistence of members of
25
Montenegrin politician who has served as the president of Montenegro since 20 May 2018. He served as prime minister of Montenegro in
three governments from 1991 to 1998, as the president of Montenegro from 1998 to 2002, and as prime minister again from 2003 to 2006,
from 2008 to 2010, and from 2012 to 2016. Đukanović is also the long-term president of the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro,
originally the Montenegrin branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which has governed Montenegro since the introduction of
multi-party politics.
26
Bosnian politician who is the current President of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and member of the House of Peoples since 25
February 2019.
27
Kosovar politician who has been the President of Kosovo since April 2016
different cultures, i.e., ethnoreligious communities, especially in BiH, must fully take into account the existence of an indisputable political
dimension in the religious traditions. Besides, the concept of "constituent peoples" in BiH shows the core of ethnopolitics hypostasizing the
collectivist political mentality and rigidly removes the civic order in which the ideal is a citizen with rights, dignity, and freedoms, deepening
indoctrination and exclusions. In the search for their own identity, citizens across the region have turned to religion, and many today seek
authority in religious leaders and religious communities. It is a world process; it is not only in the Balkans. At the same time, the discourse of
denial of crime has always existed in the Balkans and is constantly being modified. The construction of post-traumatic parallel memory
politics and revisionist historical narratives create the preconditions for the hostilities of future generations that may escalate into violence in
specific socio-political-economic circumstances. Social and political institutions play a huge role in this and should abandon their traditional
populist rhetoric and paranoia and open up communication with other sections of society. One could learn the lesson of ideologies of internal
discord and destruction as an inapplicable historical fact in this region: the fear of the other (minority/majority discourse) is the greatest
enemy of all communities. On the other hand, the creation of three nation-states in BiH, while multiple trans-nationalizations and
socialization are taking place in the EU, is a counterproductive, irrational, anachronistic phenomenon. However, questioning the existing
ethnicity/nation is not a reasonable option for anyone who wants the best for their country. In order for plural societies to survive without
separatism, it is possible to either assimilate minorities or conflicts among social ones, segments institutionalized through consociational
democracy. It recognizes and respects the existence of social segments and divisions between them, striving to establish a stable and
functional democracy in the political process by including plural social segments. Successful Europeanization is not possible without
successful regional cooperation between the Balkan countries and peoples. The best option would be a gradual approach, led by international
power centers that would steer the region toward the desired outcome.
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