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Judicial Review
Review Notes 1

JUDICIAL POWER & JUDICIAL REVIEW

IN GENERAL

Judicial power defined

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
(Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Judicial review defined

It is the power of the Supreme Court to declare a law, treaty, international or

executive agreement, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction
ordinance or regulation unconstitutional. (Bernas)

The power of judicial review is the power to declare a law, treaty,

international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation. (see Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp., 14 March
2008; Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 44.
)

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the
ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national
government. If the government oversteps these limitations, there must be some
authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and
thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the
Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of
the theory of judicial review. (See David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo 489 SCRA 163)

Judicial review v. Judicial power

Judicial review is merely an aspect of judicial power. (Guingona v. Court of

Appeals, July 10, 1998, G.R. No. 125532; Andal v. People, 26 May 1999, G.R. Nos.
138268-69)
1 By Atty. Alexis F. Medina. AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman;
Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College,
Manila, Institute of Law; Senior Associate, Ponce Enrile Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices
(“Pecabar”)
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Judicial supremacy means the power of judicial review

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)

Judicial power is a duty

The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.

The courts will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality
or department of the government. (Tanada v. Angara, 02 May 1997)

Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
(Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 10 November 2003)

Purpose of judicial review: To check, not supplant the

executive/legislative dept

The exercise of the power of judicial review is merely to check–not supplant–

the Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. (See Constantino v. Cuisia, 13 October 2005; Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Zamora, 15 August 2000)

Lower courts may exercise the power of judicial review

The RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,

presidential decree or an executive order. This is clear from Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides, among others, that the Supreme Court shall
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have the powers to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (see Planters Products Inc. v.
Fertiphil Corp., 14 March 2008)

The Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the Supreme
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. (see Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp.,
14 March 2008; Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001, 351
SCRA 44)

JUDICIAL REVIEW REQUIREMENTS

Requirements for the exercise of the power of Judicial Review

The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely:

(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

(See Francisco vs. House of Representatives, 10 November 2003; Senate v.

Ermita, 20 April 2006; Funa v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R. No.
184740)

Courts may exercise the power of judicial review only when the following
requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second,
petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo 489 SCRA 163)

a. Actual Case or Controversy

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There must be before a court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power. (Guingona v. Court of Appeals, July 10, 1998, G.R. No. 125532)

Actual case defined

Actual cases mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial

determination. (see Garcillano v. House of Representatives, 23 December
2008; La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, January 27, 2004, G.R. No.
127882)

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of

legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be
resolved on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former
involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable
controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Guingona v. Court
of Appeals, July 10, 1998, G.R. No. 125532; See also Garcia v.
Executive Secretary, 02 April 2009, G.R. No. 157584)

There is no actual case if the question is conjectural, anticipatory,

hypothetical, moot or academic

The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to

a) conjectural or anticipatory case, for otherwise the decision of the

Court will amount to an advisory opinion;

b) hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could

only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities;

c) moot questions in a case in which no practical relief can be

granted.
(see Garcillano v. House of Representatives, 23 December 2008; see
also La Bugal B’laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, January 27, 2004, G.R. No.
127882)

The “case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding

“abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest the court give opinions
in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. (Lozano v.
Nograles, 16 June 2009, G.R. No. 187883)
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Courts do not render advisory opinions

Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory

opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits
collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. (Guingona v. Court of Appeals, July 10,
1998, G.R. No. 125532)

Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury.

(Lozano v. Nograles, 16 June 2009, G.R. No. 187883)

Moot and Academic Principle

GENERAL RULE: The courts will not exercise the power of

judicial review if the case has become moot.
As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness. (see David v. Arroyo, 03 May 2006; Gunsi v.
Commissioners, 23 February 2009; Gunsi v. Commissioners, Comelec, 23
February 2009)
Where the issue has become moot and academic, an adjudication thereof
would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
(Mattel v. Francisco, 30 July 2008, G.R. No. 166886)

When is a case moot and academic?

A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is

unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a
moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal
effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. (Garcillano v.
House of Representatives, 23 December 2008)

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. (David v.
Arroyo, 03 May 2006; Gunsi v. Commissioners, 23 February 2009 ; Funa
v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R. No. 184740)

Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is

no justiciable controversy. (Mattel v. Francisco, 30 July 2008, G.R. No.
166886)

EXCEPTIONS to the Moot and Academic Principle:

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However, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and

academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
(David v. Arroyo, 03 May 2006; Mattel v. Francisco, 30 July 2008,
G.R. No. 166886; Gunsi v. Commissioners, 23 February 2009; Gunsi v.
Commissioners, Comelec, 23 February 2009)

b. Standing to Sue/Locus Standi

Another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or
standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he
can demonstrate that

(1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of

the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and

(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.

(Lozano v. Nograles, 16 June 2009, G.R. No. 187883; Social Justice

Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 03 November 2008, G.R. No. 157870;
Funa v. Executive Secretary, 11 February 2010, G.R. No. 184740)

Locus standi defined

Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial

interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act.

(see Garcillano v. House of Representatives, December 23, 2008;

Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives 10 November 2003; IBP v. Zamora,
15 August 2000)

Who has locus standi/legal standing?

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Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded

standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of

public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the

validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. (David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo 489 SCRA 163)

A citizen has legal standing to enforce a public right

The plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly

illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general
public.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both “citizen” and

“taxpayer” standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s
suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public
funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel
Case v. Collins: “In matter of mere public right, however…the people
are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.” (David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 03 May 2006)

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for

challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or
legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the
public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely
affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough
that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to
protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
(De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 17 May 2010)
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit to
enforce his constitutional right to information because the petition
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seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are
two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to
information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of
a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution
of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens.

Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down

by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule
that the petition at bar should be allowed.” (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, 09 July 2002, G.R. No. 133250)

Minors and unborn generations have standing to sue on the

basis of “intergenerational responsibility”

The personality (of minors) to sue in behalf of the succeeding

generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come. (see Oposa v. Factoran, July 30, 1993, G.R. No. 101083)

How to determine locus standi: The direct injury test

[F]or a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the

validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. The
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result." (See David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 163)

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or

statute must show “not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or in is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way.” He must show that he has been, or is about to be,
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of. (Bayan v. Zamora, 10 October 2000)
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As early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct

injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus
standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of
a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” (De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council, 17 May 2010)

Examples: Recent rulings on locus standi

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, the Court ruled that the status of

Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the requisite
personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue
as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor
can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it
has suffered.

In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.

v. Comelec, the Court reiterated the “direct injury” test with respect to
concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that “there
must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.”

In Lacson v. Perez, the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not
demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that only the

petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim
that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the
emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative
powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice
Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them
with the LDP in Lacson. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 06 May 2006)

The Transcendental Importance Principle

GENERAL RULE: Locus standi is required for judicial review

The person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he

must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

EXCEPTION:
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The locus standi requirement may be waived, in cases of

transcendental importance to the public

Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi

may be waived or brushed aside by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
discretion in cases of transcendental importance to the people or when the
issues are of paramount importance to the public. (see David vs. Macapagal-
Arroyo 489 SCRA 163; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., Bayan v. Zamora; IBP v.
Zamora, 15 August 2000)

The Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of

legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has
transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the
requirement. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 17 March 2010)

Even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have
been allowed to sue under the principle of “transcendental importance.”
Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, where the Court ruled that the
enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable
diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which
clothe the petitioner with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, wherein the Court held

that “given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court
may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the
lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review” of the Visiting
Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary, while the Court noted that the
petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing
that “Balikatan 02-01” involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. (David v.
Macapagl-Arroyo, 03 May 2006)

Recognizing that a strict application of the “direct injury” test may

hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in cases of
“transcendental importance” or with “far reaching implications.” (Planters
Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corp., 14 March 2008)

c. Raised at the Earliest Opportunity

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When is the earliest opportunity to raise the constitutional issue?

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in

the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that,
"if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if
not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal." (Matibag v.
Benipayo, 02 April 2002, G.R. No. 149036; Estarija v. Ranada, 26 June 2006,
G. R. No. 159314)

Furthermore, the Supreme Court may determine, in the exercise of

sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.
(see Matibag v. Benipayo, 02 April 2002, G.R. No. 149036)

In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Shemberg Biotech Corporation, (11

August 2010, G.R. No. 162291), the Supreme Court rejected a challenge on
the constitutionality of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation for being a “a new and belated theory” that was not raised
before the Court of Appeals.

In Umali v. Guingona, Jr., the constitutionality of the creation of the

Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption was raised in the
motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision. The Supreme Court also
Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was belatedly
raised at the Regional Trial Court.

d. Lis Mota

Constitutional question must be the crux of the controversy

Lis Mota – the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake
judicial review – means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law . The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. (Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, 02 April 2009, G.R. No. 157584; See also People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1938])

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly

unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy. (Francisco Jr. v.
House of Representatives, 10 November 2003)
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THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

Political Question Doctrine

Judicial review does not extend to political questions

Political questions are non-justiciable/not subject to judicial review.

The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of legislation. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)

The courts cannot inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the
acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments --
provided that such acts, measures or decision are within the area allocated thereto
by the Constitution. (See Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87,
March 31, 1973)

Political questions defined

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. (see
Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 453; Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives
10 November 2003; IBP v. Zamora, 15 August 2000)

Basis of the political question doctrine: Separation of powers

One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political

questions is the principle of separation of powers -- characteristic of the presidential
system of government -- the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason
of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of
laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly
with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or
interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights,
duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are
apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere -- but only within such
sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned
to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon
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the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions

made by the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or decision
are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution.

Political questions v. Legal questions

When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the

issue of whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or
the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being
one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. (See Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, 84, 87, March 31, 1973; Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, 18 November 1998; IBP v. Zamora, 15 August 2000)

Under its “expanded power of judicial review,” the judiciary may decide
political questions

The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of the courts not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. (see Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 453)

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the

determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. (IBP v. Zamora, 15 August 2000)

Expanded power of judicial review under the 1987 Constitution

The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by
law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
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Even if the issue is political in nature, the judiciary would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. (see Oposa v.
Factoran, 30 July 1993)
When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being
one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. (IBP v. Zamora, 15 August 2000)

Meaning of grave abuse of discretion

An act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or

executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias constitutes grave abuse of discretion. (Doromal v. Biron, G.R.
No. 181809, 10 February 2010; Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 464 Phil. 173, 190 [2004])

Political Questions: Examples

1) The Wisdom, justice or expediency statutes or legislation

The judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency
of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments not only because the Legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
(Angara v. Electoral Commission, 15 July 1936)
One of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts
do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That
is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the
validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. (See Farinas v. Comelec, 10 December 2003)
2) The wisdom of the President’s decision to enlist the Philippines in the
World Trade Organization or enter into the WTO Agreement. (See Tanada v. Angara,
02 May 1997)
3) The wisdom of the Senate’s act in ratifying the WTO Agreement. (See
Tanada v. Angara, 02 May 1997)
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4) The propriety of the government’s economic policy of removing tariffs,

taxes, subsidies, etc.
The Supreme Court will not rule on propriety of the government’s economic
policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and
other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to
determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes. (See Tanada v. Angara, 02 May 1997)

5) The propriety of adopting a system of partial deregulation of the oil

industry.

What petitioner Garcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately and

fully deregulating the oil industry. Such determination essentially dwells on the
soundness or wisdom of the timing and manner of the deregulation Congress wants
to implement through R.A. No. 8497. Quite clearly, the issue is not for us to resolve;
we cannot rule on when and to what extent deregulation should take place without
passing upon the wisdom of the policy of deregulation that Congress has decided
upon. (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 02 April 2009, G.R. No. 157584)

6) The propriety and wisdom of the enactment of an election law

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code (under which an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he
is holding is considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy). The legislators found Section 67 as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive
department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines signed
the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government
policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It
is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based
on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature,
and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance. (See Farinas v. Comelec, 10 December 2003)

7) The wisdom of the President’s exercise of his calling out powers

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
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There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the

President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. fThe full discretionary power of the
President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is
also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII. (See IBP v.
Zamora)

8) The acts or judgment calls of the President in entering into a treaty

The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or international

agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds
vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation and ratification of
treaties and/or international agreements are exclusive acts which pertain solely to
the President. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President involving a
treaty - may not be validly struck down, in the absence of clear showing of grave
abuse of power or discretion. (see Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449, 10 October
2000)

9) The legitimacy of a revolutionary government

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs

to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And
the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that
it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to
uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution
of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs.
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy
of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 24
October 1986 G.R. No. 7618)

EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and

EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is
intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are
subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of
the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
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grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate. (Estrada vs. Desierto, 353 SCRA 453)