to experience both and to discover which one Is actually more preferred than the other" There is no’ other way of determining which of the two pleasures is preferable except by appealing to the actual preferences.and experiences, What Mill discovers anthropologically Is that actual choices of knowledgeable persons point that higher intellectual pleasures are preferable than purely sensual appetites.” In defending further the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial pleasures, Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human person would prefer to accept the highly pleasurable fife of an animal while at the same time being denied of everything that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any, would give up human qualities of higher reasen for the pleasures of a pig. In the mast famous quote in Mill's Utititarienism, we read: Its better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satistied. And if the fool, or the pig, 1 of 2 different opinion, It's because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.” While itis difficult to understand how Mill was able to. compare sv with humanones, we-can presume that it woule be b pig satisfied, Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme typesof pleasures asin the case af pigs and humans. bur it is difficult ta compare pleasures deeply integrated in aur way of life. The pleasures oF an Ilonggo eating chicken inasat and an igorot eating pinikpikon ts an example. This cannot be done by simply tasting inasat or pinikpikan. In the same way, some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the music of Eraserteads than that of the APO Hiking Society. nish pleasures ter to be Socrates dissatisfied than @ PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian morat agent alone and independently fiom others. This ss not only about our Individual pleasures. regardless of how high, intellectual, oF in other ways noble it is, but itis also about the pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions. Mill explaiNs: {have divelt an this point, asbetngpartafa perfectly just conception of unity arhappiness: considered as the directive rule of human canduet. But itt: by ne means an indispensable condition to theaicce ptance of the wtlltarian standard for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount af happiness attogether: and Ht mY Possibly be doubted whether setae Is Always Une Bh there con be ne doubt that If makes Other pecpleshapples, and tht the ward im generat ls immediately a gainer by It, Utihtarianism, therefore, coutd aniy attain its end by SHE Eeneral cultivation of nablencss of others, and his-vn, so far as were a sheer deduetion fromthe benefit, Gut the bare entinciation of such am abswrdlY. a5 this last, renders refutations superfluous" lor for its noblenesss ipiness is concernedUtilitarianism cannot tead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor ‘happiness alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the anly ones satisfied by our actions, it does not constitute a moral good. If we are the only ones who are made happy by our actions, then we cannat be morally gaod. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive of sacrifices that procure more happiness for others. ‘Therefore, itis necessary for us toconsider everyone's happiness, including ourown, as thestandard by which to evaluate whatis moral. Also, itimplies that utilitarianismisnotat allseparate from liberal social practices that aim taimprove the quality of life forall persons. LUtilitarianismis interested with everyone's happiness, in fact, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill identifies the eradication of disease, using technology, and other practical ways as examples of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the ‘total amount of pleasure over displeasure for the greatest number. Because of the premium .given to the consequences of actions, Mill pushes for the moral irrelevance of motive in evaluating action: He who saves 2 fellow creature from drowning does what Is morally right, whether his mative be duty or the hope of being pald for his trouble: he who betrays the felend tha trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even If his abject be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from the motive of duty, and indirect obedience to principle: it a misapprehension of the untanan mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fre thelr minds upon s0 widle a generality as the world, oF society at large. The great majority of good actions are intended, nat for the benetit of the world, but far that of individuals, of which the good ‘of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need nat on these ‘occasions travel beyond the particular persans concerned, except so far asismecessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights—that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations —of anyone else.” Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of peaple. tis not interested with the intention of the agent. Moralvalue cannot be discernible in the intention or motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely and exclusively on the difference it makes on the world’s total amount of pleasure and pain. This leads us to question utilitarianism’s take of moral rights. If actions are based only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, ble to let go of some rights for the sake of the benefit of the majority? 34 _kthicesFoundtions of Moral YalaationJUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS: pect for rights directed toward What is a right? Mill understands justice as 0 rest mber, For him, rights area valid society's pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest nu claim on society and are justified by utility. He explains: 1c idea of a right residing in the injured person, and violated tthe njury.not as aseparate elementin thecamposition of te Idee red sentiment Bes ne In whch the other two elements clothe themselves, These efements is on the one hand, and a demand for Ihave, throughout, treated the as one of the for are, » hurt to come assignable person oF person punishment, on the other. An examination of our mins, | think, wi! show wat West rea things include all that we mean when we speakof violation of 2 right. When we cal crying © person's right, we mean that he has 2 valid claim en saciety te protect Rin in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and opinion. Ire hes what we consicer a sufficient faim, on whatcver account, to have something _guaranteed 10 him by sockety, wa say that he fas aright to it referred are related to the interests the right to free speech or religion, ood. This means that Mill expounds thot the abovementioned rights that serve general happiness, The right to due process, ond others are justified because they contribute to the genera) a society is made happier if its citizens are able to lve their lives knowing that their interests see protected and that society {as a whole} defends it. Extending this €o neept to animals. they have rights because of the effect of such principles on the sum total of happiness that vere os a consequence of instituting and protecting their interests. Its Tt accidental, nico the staunchest defenders of animal rights. A Fight is therefore, that utilitarians are roduce an overall happiness that is justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they P' Sgreater than the unhappiness resulting from thelr implementation. tissues ofustice carry e very strong emotional import because eeocinted with the inclividual’s most vital interests. All of a's right to life, Mill describes: Utilitarians argue that the category of rights is directly these rights are predicated on the perso’ to have something which society ought to defend 19 ask why Ht ought, I con give him no sufficient, ‘To have a right, then is, | conceive, ime in the possession of. If the abjector goes on t Teneral uitlity. if that expression does not sen to Convey ® cccount for the peculiar energy of the not a rational only other reason thang feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor t0 a ‘there goes to the composition of the sentiment tiation; and this thirse derives its intensity, eel a ts marat justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind involved is that of security, to everyone’s feeling, its because but also an animal element, the thirst for ret of utility which is eancerned. The interest | feelings the most vital ofall interests." iment and social interactions can be In this context, our participation in gover by Mill's consequentialism, Mill farther explained by the principle of utility and be clarified aap ciates utlitarianismn with the pessession of legal and moral rightsWeare treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill enumerates different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected by law. May understands that lego! rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are subject to some exceptions: <= tis mostly considered unjust ta-deprive any one of his personal lberty, his property, ‘ar any other thing whuch belongs to him by law. Mere, therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in 9 pesfeetly definite sense, namely, that it i Just to respect, unjust te violate, the legal rights of anyone. But this judement adits Of several exceptions, arising from the other forms In which the notions of justice and Injustice present themselves. For example, the person who suffers the deprivation may {as the phrose is) have forfeited the rights which he Is sadeprived af aeaze to whlch we shall return presently. Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out that when legal rights are not maraly justified in accordance to the grentest happiness | principle, then these rights need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like saying that there are instances when the law is not morally justified and, in this case, even objectionable. —-Thelegal rights of which he isdeprivedmay be rights whichought otto have botonped | to him; in ether words, the Iaw which confers an him these rights may bea sad low. ‘When it isso, orwhen (which ts the same thing for aur purpose} its supposed to be So, opinions will ciffer a¢ to the justice er injustice of infringing. Some moineaia that NO law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed ty an indivieual einzen; that his apposition to It If shown at all, should only be shown in endeavoring to gett altered by competent authrity: This opinion (which condemns many of the mort iuctrious benefactors of mankind, and would often protect perniciaus institutions against the enly weapons which, in the state of things existing at the time, have any hance of succeeding against them) is defended, by thase who hold it. an graunds of expecioncy; principally an that of the Impertance, to the common interest of mankind, of maintaming invialate tHe sentiment of submission to faw., When, however [aw bs thought to be wnjust, it seems always to be regarded 3s being san the same vraysin which a broach of lave is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which, as it cannot wn this ease be a Hegal right. receives a different appellation, and is calleda moral right. We may say, thereface, that 8 second case on Injustice consists In taking oF withhoting from any person tsat to whieh the has a moral right. Mill seems tobe suggesting that it s morally permissible to not fallow, even wiolet® an unjust jaw, The implication is that those who protest over poltical policies of a morally ‘objectionable government act ina morally abligatory way. AWhile this not always preferedMill thinks that itis commendable to-endure legal punishments foracts of civil disobedience far the sake of promatinga higher moral good. Atan instance of conflict between moral and. legal rights, Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over legal rights. While it can be justified why thers violate legal rights, itis an act of injustice to violate an individual's moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating circumstances in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater general happiness. Going hack to the case of wiretapping, it seems that one’s right to privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This means that moral rights are only justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies moral rights in this way: Al persons are deemed to have-a right to equality of treatment, except when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simple Inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequatitios under an equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they haveat least learnt to.condern.”? In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and the like. We say “theoretically” because this merely canstitutes a thought experiment and need not be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of what wedals the resultant happiness, then anything may be justified for the sake of producing the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. ‘Thus, to save a life, t may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal or take by force, the necessary foot or medicine, oF tokinap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified ‘medieal practitioner. In such cases, a we do not call Justice which is nat a virtue, we ‘usually say, not that justice must give way to semecther moral principle, but that whats justin ordinary eases is, by reason af that ather principle, not just in the particular case. [By this useful accommadation of language, the character of indefeasibility attributed to Justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of maintaining that there can be laudable injustice.” While there is ino such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill appeals to the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest happiness Principle. There is no right to violate where utility is not served by the social protection of Individual interests. While he recognizes how utilitarian principles can sometimes obligate Us to perfarm acts that would regularly be understood as disregarding individual rights, he argues that thisis only possible fit is judged to produce more happiness than unhappiness. Cuapteemutitarnntin 37In short, Mills moral rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but are only Justified by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest number, With these understanding of rights in place, Mill explains his understanding of justice and itis with this that we end this section. For Mil justice can be interpreted in terms ‘of moral rights because justice promotes the greater social good, He explains: the idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule, The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and Intended for thelr goad, ‘The other fsentimenth is. a desire that punishment nay be suffered by those who infringe the rule. There is invalved, in addition, the conception af same definite person who suffers bythe infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropriated to the case) are wolated by ItAnd the sentiment of justice appears to me ta be, the anima desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to onesel, oF to those with whom one sympathies, widened so as to lnclude al persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of inteligent selFinterest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the former its peculiar impressiveness, and energy of seltassertion.” SUMMARY — Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but also the greatest happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number ‘of people. We are compelled to do whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to the ‘most number of persons, counting each as one and none as more than ane. In determining the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, there sno distinction between Bentham and Mill Bentham suggestshifecie calculus a framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill provides a criterion for comparative pleasures, He thinks that persons who experience two diferent types of pleasures generally prefer higher intellectual pleasuresto base sensual ones Mil provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued to be the weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected interests that are justified by thelr contribution to the greatest happiness principle, However, he also Claims that in extreme circumstances, respect far individual rights can be overridden to promote the better welfare especially in cicumstances of conflict valuation. 38