11.

Salvador v. Chua (Bersamin, J.)

B. Who must prosecute (Sections 5, 16)

FACTS: The Petitioner, Horacio Salvador, and his wife were charged with estafa. On
the scheduled day of promulgation of judgment of conviction, the counsel of petitioner
moved for deferment on the ground that his client is suffering hypertension. The RTC
was unconvinced of the reason and proceeded to promulgate the judgment. The RTC
then issued a warrant of arrest. Thereafter the petitioner was apprehended 8 days after
the promulgation of the judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file notice of
appeal.  RTC denied the petitioner's Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the
ground of noncompliance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The CA granted the petition and nullified the assailed order of the second judge. The
Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was also denied. Hence, this appeal, whereby
the petitioner contends that the CA erred in rendering its December 12, 2013 decision
because: (1) the respondent had no legal personality to challenge the assailed orders of
the RTC because only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) could appeal in a
criminal case in behalf of the State; (2) she had no legal personality to file the petition
for certiorari in the CA because her Motion for Execution in respect of the civil aspect of
the criminal case had already been granted by the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal case had the legal
personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders of the RTC
despite the lack of consent of the OSG.

RULING: YES. The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings
pending in this Court and in the CA. This is explicitly provided in Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. The Court has stressed that the
People of the Philippines, being the real party in interest in every criminal proceedings,
can be represented only by the OSG in criminal proceedings in the CA or in this Court.
Yet, this rule admits of exceptions, for as pronounced in Rodriguez v. Gadiane: A
special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. In a
long line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State
and the private offended party or complainant.

We affirm the CA's holding on the respondent's legal standing to institute the special
civil action for certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC. For sure,
her interest in the criminal case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for
Execution because the questioned orders opened the possibility of defeating the
judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify his conviction. She remained an
aggrieved party like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she had as much right
as anyone else in the criminal proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary
procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her
substantial interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it
wanted to, she would be reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate
proceedings. Moreover, we would violate her fundamental right to due process of law if
we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set aside the improperly resurrected
appeal of the petitioner.

12.
Burgos v. Naval, 8 June 2016 (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
B. Who must prosecute (Sections 5, 16)

FACTS: BURGOS filed Information against SPOUSES ELADIO AND ARLINA NAVAL
AND THEIR DAUGHTER, AMALIA NAVAL (SPS. NAVAL ET AL.) of the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground
of prescription. Aggrieved, BURGOS moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Thus, BURGOS elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 138203. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2015, the CA dismissed the
petition for failure of BURGOS to join the People in his certiorari petition as required by
the Administrative Code of 1987. Unstirred, BURGOS moved for reconsideration, which
was likewise denied. The CA observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition hence, this petition before the
Court.

ISSUE: Whether the CA is correct in denying BURGOS’ motion for reconsideration on

the ground that the OSG has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition?

RULING: YES. In this case, records show that BURGOS’ petition for certiorari in CA
G.R. SP No. 138203 sought for the reinstatement of the Information and/or a ruling that
the crime has not yet prescribed. Accordingly, the same was not intended to merely
preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the case. Thus, as his certiorari petition was
filed seeking for relief/s in relation to the criminal aspect of the case, it is necessary that
the same be filed with the authorization of the OSG, which, by law, is the proper
representative of the People, the real party in interest in the criminal proceedings. As
the CA aptly noted, "[t]o this date, the [OSG] as appellant's counsel of the [People] has
not consented to the filing of the present suit." There being no authorization given - as
his request to the OSG filed on April 10, 2015 was not shown to have been granted -
the certiorari petition was rightfully dismissed. It must, however, be clarified that the
CA's dismissal of BURGOS’ certiorari petition is without prejudice to his filing of the
appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with. (Burgos, Jr. v. Spouses Eladio Sj.
Naval, et al., G.R. No. 219468, June 8, 2016).

13.
People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, 18 February 2015, 750 SCRA 677
A. Complaint and Information (Sections 2-4, 6-13)
FACTS: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the
Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new
entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and
Orientation Period,” which was set from 2May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May
2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to
hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan
quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case
against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material
averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before
this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

ISSUES: 1. WON the accused can assail the information at any time before entering a
plea.

2. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of accomplice to hazing can
proceed in spite of the dismissal with finality of the case against the principal accused

3. Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments
for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law

RULING: 1. YES. Yes. At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the
information filed with the courtbased on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court, one of which is theclaim that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. In assessing whether an information mustbe quashed on that ground, the
basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish thepresence of th essential
elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examine without
consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly
provenor controverted during the trial. In the appraisal of the information, matters
aliunde are not taken intoaccount.

2. Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against respondents, on

the sole ground that the case against the purported principals had already been
dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of
the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence
of the crime has in fact been established. In People v. Rafael, 343 SCRA 97 (2000), the
Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: “The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven, the
trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal liability can proceed
independently of that of the alleged principal.
3. YES. Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation
of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging
persons with an offense be “sufficient.” One of the key components of a “sufficient
information” is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged,
subject of the complaint. The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary
and concise enough to enable persons of common understanding to know the offense
being charged against them. This approach is intended to allow them to suitably
prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. The information
need not be in the same kind of language used in the law relied upon.

We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the Information was
warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts were not covered by the
exemption relating to the duly recommended and approved "testing and training
procedure and practices" for... prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP.
This exemption is an affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of
accomplice to hazing.
14.
Lasoy, et al. v. Zeñarosa, G.R. No. 129472, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 360
A. Complaint and Information (Sections 2-4, 6-13)

FACTS: The accused were arrested fro possession and transport of marijuana leaves
(in bricks). They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
with the information containing the fact that they were in possession of and were
transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. The
accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they applied
for probation. Thereafter the prosecutor’s office filed two motions to admit amended
information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos, not grams) and to
set aside the arraignment of the accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion
raising the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.

RULING: NO. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must
be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the
case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or
acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the

offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is
stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what
is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable
conclusion is that the information is valid. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the
first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the
crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of
the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.

Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial

Courts to exclusively try and decide cases of … violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)

15.
People v. Puig, G.R. No. 173654-765, 28 August 2008, 563 SCRA 564
A. Complaint and Information (Sections 2-4, 6-13)

FACTS: Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office filed before the RTC 112 cases of Qualified
Theft against respondents Puig & Porras who were cashier and bookkeeper of private
complainant Rural Bank. As per the information filed before the RTC, above named
respondents, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent to gain, as the Cashier and
Bookkeeper of the said bank, stole P15,000. RTC did not find the existence of probable
cause that is necessary to issue a warrant of arrest because of “taking without the
consent of owners” was missing on the ground that it is the depositors-clents, not the
bank, which filed the complaint o information are bereft of the phrase “dependence,
guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the offended party that would
have created a high degree of confidence between them which the respondents could
have abused.” Violative of Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint sufficiently established that accused are liable for
qualified theft.

RULING: YES. RTC Judge based his conclusion that there was no probable cause
simple on the insufficiency of the allegations in the Informations.  Based on Section 9,
Rule 110 of RoC, the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in
alleging the acts or omissions complained of. What is important is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly.

To fall under the crime of Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur: 1. Taking
of personal property o That the said property belongs to another; 2. That the said taking
be done with intent to gain; 3. That it be done without the owner’s consent; 4. That it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; 5. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence. It is beyond doubt that
tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a Bank who come into
possession of the monies deposited enjoy the confidence reposed in them by their
employer. Banks where monies are deposited are considered the owners thereof. The
relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and
debtor as stated in Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code.

People v Locson & People v Sison, as to the nature of possession by the Bank: o The
money in this case was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the
bank, and the possession of the defendant was the possession of the Bank. o The
Court held therein that wen the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the
money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the Bank, there was
taking as contemplated in the crime of Qualified Theft. The Bank acquires ownership of
the money deposited by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are entrusted
with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in them,
occupy positions of confidence.