CLASS MOOT

Before
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSLAND

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

MS. ABEEDA WASIM ZOHRI

V.

UNION OF INDUSLAND

Filed Under Article 32 Of The Constitution Of Indusland

Counsels for Petitioner:

1. SNITA ROSE BENJAMIN- 47418551123

2. DEEPIKA S- 47418551041

3. SINDHU S - 47418551120

MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT OF INDUSLAND

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS]

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No. CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

1. TABLE OF ABBREVIATION 3-4

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5-6

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-11

5. ISSUES PRESENTED 12

6. WRITTEN PLEADINGS 13-19

7. PRAYER 20

2
 TABLE OF ABBREVIATION

& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another’s
Art. Article
Cal. Calcutta
Can’t Can not
Ed. Edition
HC The High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e. That is
Ker. Kerala
ILR Indian Law Reporter
Ltd. Limited
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
MANU Manupatra
No. Number
Ors. Others
O. Order
P. Page
Pat. Patna
Para. Paragraph
S. Section
SC The Supreme Court of India
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter

3
ss. Sections
u/s Under section
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Vol Volume

4
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

● Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala ,2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690
● Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Shirur Mutt(1954) SCR 1005.
● Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1964) 1 SC 1638 SCR
561
● Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (U.S)
● State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84
● Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 S.C.C. 1
● Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 2018 (8) SCALE 72
● Sardar Sydena Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853
● Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 282
● Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1964) 1 SC 1638 SCR
561
● S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvanathapuram & Ors
AIR 1993 Ker 42.
● Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others
(2004) 12 SCC 770

5
STATUTES

● Constitution of India

BOOKS/JOURNALS/REFERENCES

● D.D.Basu, Shorter Constitution Of India, Lexis Nexis Wadhwa Nagpur, 14th Edn. (2009).
● M. P Jain, Indian Constitutional law, 8 th edition.
● V N Shukla, Constitution of India, 12th edition.

WEBSITES

1. www.indiankanoon.org
2. www.livelaw.in
3. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/

6
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner submits to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India.

“Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution.”

7
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

The Union of Indusland is one of the progressive economies in the world today with a divergent
demography comprising of approximately 17% of the world's population. It was in 1992 that
women were first inducted in the Indusland Army and as the Supreme Court noted, their entry
ever since has had a "chequered history." Initially, under the Army Act of 1950, women were
ineligible for employment in the regular army except in such corps, departments or branches
which the central government may specify by way of notifications. This was lifted almost after
42 years of the Act, by way of a government notification in January 1992, making women
eligible for appointment as officers in five branches.After the apex court's directive, within three
months all serving SSC women officers will have to be considered for Permanent Commissions
(PCs) irrespective of them having crossed 14 years or, as the case may be, 20 years of service.

In the backdrop of this; the following developments have taken place in Indusland recently:

PART A

The Supreme Court on 7 February, 2020 upheld a 2010 Sohli High Court ruling and directed the
Centre to ensure that women officers are given permanent commissions in the Indusland Army
on a par with male officers, including for command posting. In compliance with the Sohli High
Court order, the Centre had issued a notification in February granting permanent commissions to
the Short Service Commission of Women Officers (SSCWOs), in eight streams, including Army
Aviation, Army Service Corps, Army Ordnance Corps and Intelligence. It said the order must be
complied with within three months. “Despite a policy decision, the Centre submitted a note to
the Supreme Court that perpetuates sex stereotypes. Arguments by the Centre founded on
physical strength of men and women and grounds of motherhood, and family violate equality," it
observed. The Centre, along with key political parties, welcomed the judgment. The bench also
took on record the statement of policy submitted by the Union government in its letter dated 25
February 2019 and issued a slew of directions imposing conditions in favour of equality of

8
women in the army. It held that terms of appointment of women officers in the army shall
henceforth be the same as their male counterparts.

PART B

In 1990 a petition was filed in the Devalaya High Court seeking a ban on entry of women inside
the Rudrivala temple. In 1991 the Devalaya High Court had upheld the restriction of women of
certain age from entering inside the holy shrine of the Divine Lord. By 2008 this matter was
referred to a three-judge bench. In January 2016 the court had questioned this ban. The
government of Devalaya led by its Chief Minister informed the Supreme Court in April 2016
that it is bound to protect the right to practice the religion of Rudrivala devotees but on
November 7, 2016 the Devalaya Government told the Supreme Court that it was in favour of
allowing women inside the sanctum sanctorum of the temple. Ultimately, in September 2018 a
five-judge bench of Supreme Court allowed the entry of women of all ages in the revered shrine.
The state government sought time to implement the verdict. However, even after the entry was
allowed a large number of followers camped outside the shrine to prevent the entry of women of
all ages in this revered shrine. Thereafter, a review plea was filed regarding which recently, in
November 2019, the Court stated that this review is to be carried out by a larger bench of the
Supreme Court.

PART C

In April 2019, a Dhule based woman, Aafreen Usaid Ali, and her husband, Usaid Ali, moved the
Supreme Court seeking directions to the governments and Muslim bodies to allow Muslim
women to enter mosques through the main door, and to have the “Islamic right to visual and
auditory access to the ‘musalla’ (main prayer area).” The petition contended that “there is
nothing in the Quran and the Hadith that requires gender segregation” and added that “the act of
prohibition of females from entering Mosque is void and unconstitutional as such practices are
not only repugnant to the basic dignity of a woman as an individual but also violative of the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Constitution”. The matter
was last heard on November 5, 2019 whereby it was remarked that Muslim women should be
permitted to enter through the main door of mosques and have an Islamic right to visual and
auditory access to the musalla (main sanctuary). It also stated that "any fatwa" of Muslim bodies

9
restraining women from entering into mosques should be set aside. It also said that the alleged
customary tradition be held as "unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 (right to equality),
15 (gender justice) and 21 (right to life and liberty) of the Constitution. Referring to
constitutional provisions, the petitioners said there should not be any discrimination against any
citizen of the country on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. They added
that a life of dignity and equality is the most sacrosanct fundamental right and a Muslim woman
cannot be prohibited from entering a mosque. While issuing the notice, the Supreme Court had
earlier said that it would hear the PIL only because of its judgment in the Rudrivala temple case.

PART D
On September 24, 2018, a three-judge bench of the Apex Court had referred the matter in ‘Babita
Kumari v. Union of Indusland and Ors’ to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. The petition,
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, had questioned the constitutionality of the practice of
female genital mutilation (FGM) or ‘khatna’, or female circumcision (FC) or ‘khafd’, which the
petitioner said was carried out on every girl child in the Aabaadi community. The “archaic ritual”
of FGM, the petition argued, was carried out without any scientific medical reason, and without
any reference in the Quran, and inflicted “atrocity, bodily pain, inhumanness, and mental torture”
on innocent girls and women, the burden of which they were forced to carry for the rest of their
lives.

PART E

The Special Leave Petition in ‘Noor Mehtab v. Zulfi Darrivala’ arose out of a judgment passed
by the Mukhbaad High Court in 2012. The High Court had upheld the Valsad Parsi Anjuman’s
right to stop a Parsi woman from visiting the Tower of Silence to perform her father’s last rites in
the event of his death. The High Court upheld the Parsi Anjuman’s contention that having
married a non-Parsi under The Special Marriage Act, 1954, a woman was no longer a Parsi, and
was instead deemed to have become Hindu. The petitioner was Noor Mehtab, who had moved
the High Court in 2010 after her friend Gulbaar Darvin who too, like her, was a Parsi married to
a Hindu, was denied entry to the Tower of Silence during Darvin’s mother’s last rites some years
previously.

10
In the Supreme Court, it was argued that the question was, “in the case of marriage between an
Hindu and Parsi, does it result in automatic conversion of religion?” In December 2017, a
Constitution Bench observed that “DNA does not evaporate” after marrying outside one’s
religion”, and that by marrying outside her religion, a woman does not “surrender her affection to
her father”. Marrying under the Special Marriage Act was “only for the retention of original
identity” the court said.

PRESENT DAY SCENARIO

In the matter of The Indusland Promising Advocates Association in November 2019, the
majority of the bench said: “It is our considered view that the issues arising in the pending cases
regarding entry of Muslim Women in Durgah/Mosque (being Writ Petition (Civil) No.472 of
2019); of Parsi Women married to a non-Parsi in the Agyari (being Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 18889/2012); and including the practice of female genital mutilation in Aabaadi community
(being Writ Petition (Civil) No.286 of 2017) may be overlapping and covered by the judgment
under review. The prospect of the issues arising in those cases being referred to larger bench
cannot be ruled out.”

Post this order and the judgement regarding permanent commission for women in the armed
forces, a Public Interest Litigation has been filed by Ms. Abeeda Wasim Zohri, a student of law
challenging the clubbing of distinctive cases under review for a particular matter. The petitioner
draws the attention on the interplay between the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of
the Constitution and other provisions in Part III, particularly Article 14.

11
 ISSUES PRESENTED

ISSUE -I
WHAT WOULD BE THE PERMISSIBLE EXTENT OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION TO PILS
IN MATTERS CALLING INTO QUESTION RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF A
DENOMINATION OR A SECTION THEREOF AT THE INSTANCE OF PERSONS WHO DO
NOT BELONG TO SUCH RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION?

ISSUE -II
WHETHER DENIAL TO A PARTICULAR CLASS OF WOMEN TO RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATES ARTICLE
25? WOULD THE SAID DISCRIMINATION BE COVERED UNDER LIMITATIONS
PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 25(1)?

ISSUE- III
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COURT CAN ENQUIRE INTO THE ISSUE OF A
PARTICULAR PRACTICE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RELIGION OR RELIGIOUS
PRACTICE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION OR SHOULD THAT BE
LEFT EXCLUSIVELY TO BE DETERMINED BY THE HEAD OF THE SECTION OF THE
RELIGIOUS GROUP?

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 WRITTEN PLEADINGS

(I) WHAT WOULD BE THE PERMISSIBLE EXTENT OF JUDICIAL

RECOGNITION TO PILS IN MATTERS CALLING INTO QUESTION
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES OF A DENOMINATION OR A SECTION
THEREOF AT THE INSTANCE OF PERSONS WHO DO NOT BELONG TO
SUCH RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that judicial intervention or recognition to PIL
in matter calling into question of religious practices of a denomination or a section thereof at the
instance of persons who do not belong to such religious denomination shall be exercised with
caution.
The religious denomination has a fundamental right under Article 26 to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion and if the Court would interfere in this respect, would amount to violation of
the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 26. A law which takes away the right of
administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other
authority would amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 26.

It was also held by Justice Indu Malhotra that to entertain a public-interest litigation at the behest
of persons who are not worshippers at Sabarimala temple would open the floodgates of petitions
to be filed questioning the validity of religious beliefs and practices followed by other religious
sects. 1 In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Shirur Mutt2 it was held that what are essential religious practices of a particular
religious denomination should be left to be determined by the denomination itself. The

1
Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala ,2018 SCC OnLine SC 1690
2
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Shri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt(1954)
SCR 1005.

13
expression “religious denomination” as interpreted in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt3 was “a collection
of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common
faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name”. The Court held that each of the
sects or sub-sects of the Hindu religion could be called a religious denomination, as such sects or
sub-sects, had a distinctive name. The practises followed by this religious denomination, or sect
thereof, as the case maybe, constitute a code of conduct, which is a part of the essential spiritual
discipline related to this pilgrimage. As per the customs and usages practised in the Sabarimala
Temple, the 100-day ‘Karvatam’ is a condition precedent for undertaking the pilgrimage to the
Sabarimala Temple. That in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,4
it was held that while enquiring whether the practise in question is religious in character, and if it
is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, the finding of the
Court on such an issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the
conscience of the community and the tenets of its religion. Therefore, judicial review of religious
practises ought not to be done in a narrow sense as the Court cannot impose its morality or
rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity. Doing so would negate the freedom to
practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs and it would amount to rationalising
religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of Courts.5

3
Ibid.
4
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1964) 1 SC 1638 SCR 561
5
Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (U.S)

14
(II) WHETHER DENIAL TO A PARTICULAR CLASS OF WOMEN TO RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATES
ARTICLE 25? WOULD THE SAID DISCRIMINATION BE COVERED UNDER
LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED IN ARTICLE 25(1)?
It is humbly submitted that denial to a particular class of women to religious institutions would
amount to discrimination and would violate their Article 25. Article 25 begins with the opening
words “Subject to public order, morality, health and other provisions of this Part.” The word
morality has been construed to mean morality as understood by the Constitution.6 It is submitted
that gender justice, that is non-discrimination at the very least, is part of the constitutional
morality of India. The Impugned Rule of not allowing women in places of public worship is not
only ultra vires but also offends Article 25 of the Constitution itself. It is submitted that the right
to manage the affairs of religion must be exercised in a non discriminatory manner and such right
does not permit the prevention of entry into places of worship of women alone.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the expression “public order, morality and
health” is to be construed not narrowly to cover within its ambit the notion of interference into
other’s religion also. The whole society in a country like India is governed by morals and values.
Each person is governed by their choices and morals but what the society collectively feels as
morality is to be considered. A practice or value can be brought under the concept of morality
only when the majority of the society or public put forward such a practice or value as a code
which is to be followed. Such a code has to prudent and should have rationale behind it for it to
be practiced. Merely setting forth the code does not suffice, the code should be recognised and
followed. What is considered wrong by the society is not necessarily legally wrong and vice
versa. Thus, the question arises on how public morality is to be treated when taken into
consideration. The definition of morality is not definite, giving a wide connotation. The
term morality occurring in Art. 25(1)of the Constitution cannot be viewed with a narrow lens so

6
Manoj Narula v. Union of India, 2014 (9) SCC 1.

15
as to confine the sphere of definition of morality to what an individual, a section or religious sect
may perceive the term to mean.
In the case of State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali7 it was held that: A sharp distinction must be
drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the state protects is
religious faith and belief. If the religious practices run to counter to public order, morality or
health or a policy of social welfare upon which the state has embarked, then the religious
practices must give away before the good of people of the state as whole.
With changing trends on society and concept of public morality the courts have adopted the
concept of constitutional morality. This concept of constitutional morality was discussed in the
case of Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation 8, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners
argued that the 2 judge bench had been guided by social morality leaning on majoritarian
perception whereas the issue, in actuality, needed to be debated upon in the backdrop of
constitutional morality. It must be remembered that when there is a violation of the fundamental
rights, the term morality naturally implies constitutional morality and any view that is ultimately
taken by the Constitutional Courts must be in conformity with the principles and basic tenets of
the concept of this constitutional morality that gets support from the Constitution. Constitutional
morality in a pluralistic society and secular polity would reflect that the followers of various
sects have the freedom to practice their faith in accordance with the tenets of their religion. The
Preambular goals of our Constitution which contain the noble objectives of Justice, Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity can only be achieved through the commitment and loyalty of the organs
of the State to the principle of constitutional morality.9 In Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union
of India10, it was observed:- "Constitutional morality, appositely understood, means the morality
that has inherent elements in the constitutional norms and the conscience of the Constitution.
With this changing trend in understanding the concept of morality by the judiciary, there has
been a huge evolution in the cases of Religion and the constitutionality of particular practices. It
is pertinent to note thatreform made by the state legislature should not change the entire acts or
practices in pursuance of religion.It is a clause which provides that where there is a conflict
between religious practice and the need for social reform, religion must yield. The state has to

7
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 84
8
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 S.C.C. 1
9
Ibid.
10
Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 2018 (8) SCALE 72

16
ensure that in the name of social reform should not affect the very essence of any religion. Social
reforms mean eradication of practices which should not form the essence of religion or a practice
which recognizes their existence or identity. The Supreme Court in the case of Sardar Sydena
Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay11 observed that the exception carved in Art. 25 (2) of
the Constitution of India to the Freedom of Religion enabling the state to enact laws providing
for social welfare and reform was not intended to enable the legislature to reform a religion out
of its existence or identity. It was also stated that even while bringing in such a social reform it is
not permissible to change the entire practice or acts done in pursuance of such religion.
Art. 25(2)(b) sanctions only social and not religious reform. Hence it is the duty of the court to
ensure that in the name of effecting social reform, the legislature does not efface a religion
altogether, by doing away with its basic or essential doctrines or practices.The concept of social
reforms was inherited by the Indian constitution under Article 25(2)(b) without impairing the
freedom of religion.

That, in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay12, the Supreme Court held that it was not
open to the secular authority of state to say what essential part of religion is and what is not. The
State had no power to restrict or prohibit any religious practice under the guise of its power to
administer secular practices. That a secular Judge is bound to accept the belief of the community,
it is not for him to sit in judgment on that belief and if the belief is genuinely and conscientiously
held, it attracts the protection of Article 25.

11
 Sardar Sydena Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853
12
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 282

17
(III) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COURT CAN ENQUIRE INTO THE ISSUE OF A
PARTICULAR PRACTICE AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE RELIGION OR
RELIGIOUS PRACTICE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION OR
SHOULD THAT BE LEFT EXCLUSIVELY TO BE DETERMINED BY THE HEAD OF
THE SECTION OF THE RELIGIOUS GROUP?

Religious denomination enjoys complete authority

The expression “religious denomination” as interpreted in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious

Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt13 was “a collection
of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common
faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name”. The Court held that each of the
sects or sub-sects of the Hindu religion could be called a religious denomination, as such sects or
sub-sects, had a distinctive name. The practises followed by this religious denomination, or sect
thereof, as the case maybe, constitute a code of conduct, which is a part of the essential spiritual
discipline related to this pilgrimage. As per the customs and usages practised in the Sabarimala
Temple, the 100-day ‘Karvatam’ is a condition precedent for undertaking the pilgrimage to the
Sabarimala Temple.

That in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan &Ors.,14 it was held that
while enquiring whether the practise in question is religious in character, and if it is, whether it
can be regarded as an integral or essential part of the religion, the finding of the Court on such an
issue will always depend upon the evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the
community and the tenets of its religion.

13
Ibid.
14
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (1964) 1 SC 1638 SCR 561

18
The High Court in the case of S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board,
Thiruvanathapuram & Ors.15 recorded that a vital reason for imposing this restriction on young
women as deposed by the Thanthri of the Temple, as well as other witnesses, was that the deity
at the Sabarimala Temple was in the form of a ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’ which means a student
who has to live in the house of his preceptor, and studies the Vedas, living the life of utmost
austerity and discipline. The deity is in the form of a ‘Yogi’ or ‘Naishtik Brahmachari’. The High
Court noted that this practise of restricting the entry of women is admitted to have been prevalent
since the past several centuries.

Therefore, judicial review of religious practises ought not to be done in a narrow sense as the
Court cannot impose its morality or rationality with respect to the form of worship of a deity.
Doing so would negate the freedom to practise one’s religion according to one’s faith and beliefs
and it would amount to rationalising religion, faith and beliefs, which is outside the ken of
Courts.16

In Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and other17 , the
Court laid down that “the integral or essential part of religion has to be determined with
reference to its doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background etc. of the given religion.
Essential practice means those fundamental practices upon which the superstructure of a religion
is built, without which a religion will be no religion. Therefore, a religious denomination enjoys
complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere
with their decision in such matters.

15
S. Mahendran v. The Secretary, Travancore Devaswom Board, Thiruvanathapuram & Ors AIR 1993 Ker 42
16
Robert L. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (U.S)
17
Commissioner of Police and others v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and others (2004) 12 SCC 770

19
 PRAYER

In the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and pleadings advanced, the

Counsel for the Petitioners humbly prays that Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge, hold and

declare:

● That judicial intervention or recognition to PIL in matter calling into question of religious

practices of a denomination or a section thereof at the instance of persons who do not

belong to such religious denomination shall be exercised with caution.

● That the religious denomisation enjoys complete autonomy.

● The judiciary has no power to restrict or prohibit any religious practice under the guise of

its power to administer secular practices.

Any other order as it deems fit in the interest of equity, justice and good conscience.

For This Act of Kindness, the Petitioners shall be Duty Bound Forever Pray.

Sd/-

(Counsel for Petitioners)

20
21