Problems, Understanding and Decision-Making

Introduction: contingency and determinism

It is explained here that the temptation of success as an inevitable consequence of superior
Allied strategy and material must be resisted in the same way that we must avoid using only
their inferior strategy and materials. We often attribute the successes and failures of
organizations, armies, and states to the role of individual leaders, often in terms of their
brilliant or flawed strategies, but the exact relationship between strategy and results is often
very unclear. That is, whether a strategy will work or not is rarely predictable and usually
uncertain. So if the strategy works, we'll think of it as a consequence of individual genius; if
it fails, it's because of stupidity. Yet there are many reasons for organizational success and
failure and to retrospectively attribute success or failure to individual leader roles is a step too
far: from correlation to causation - we know the outcome and retrospectively assume (without
solid evidence) that a particular course of action determine it. In short, it doesn't have to be
that way. However the contingent approach is not equivalent to micro-determinism that is
where the small chance factor determines what happens.
So to summarize, contingent or subjunctivist approaches such as complexity theory, imply
that managing dynamic conditions requires us to abandon mechanical strategic planning and
work flexibly with the chaos that emerges. And even when the Allies correctly identified
their foes, they almost always underestimated the skill and tenacity with which these foes
defended or counterattacked when their ground was lost. Strategic leadership failures are not
because junior leaders don't help their seniors but because there are many shortcomings in
senior leadership. The commander has a role to take decisive action needed to provide
answers to problems, not to involve processes (management) or ask questions (leadership).
These three forms of authority i.e. legitimate power – Command, Management and
Leadership, in turn, are another way of showing that the role of those responsible for decision
making is to find the appropriate Answers, Processes and Questions to address each other's
problems.
Etzioni distinguishes between coercive, calculative and normative compliance. Coercion or
physical power associated with total institutions, such as prisons or the army; Calculative
Compliance relates to 'rational' institutions, such as corporations; and Normative Compliance
relates to institutions or organizations based on shared values, such as professional clubs and
societies. This compliance typology fits perfectly into the problem typology: Critical Issues
are often associated with Coercive Compliance; Benign Problems are associated with
Calculating Compliance and Evil Problems are associated with Normative Compliance.that
authority and issue may be debated by others, but the model assumes that successful
problem-setting as Evil, Benign, or Critical provides a framework for a particular form of
authority.
In other words, a democratic competitor seeking elections on the basis of an approach to the
problem of global terrorism as the Evil Problem – which requires a long-term and
collaborative leadership process without easy solutions, and in which everyone must
participate and share responsibility. Hence the Irony of Leadership: often avoided where it
seems most necessary. Those who are unsure about what to do in a traffic accident should –
and usually do – make way for those who seem to know what they are doing, especially if
they wear the appropriate uniform. Therefore, we will usually allow ourselves to be ruled by
such professionals in a crisis.
The shift from Command through Management to Leadership is also concerned with the level
of refinement required for success. For example, a sergeant with a gun standing over a troop
of soldiers facing an attack need not be too subtle about his orders to stand up and fight.