Counterfactuals in Branching Time: An overview

By Daniil Khaitovich

Counterfactuals: basic theory Basic logic P How can we add counterfactuals here?
Coutnerfactuals are subjunctive conditionals with false ante- If we define w just as strict partial ordering without further The main question is:
cedent. For example: constrains, then the minimal system P may be presented
If I were 3 meters high, then I would be good at basketball (Completeness proof: (Burgess [et al.], 1981)). Should we speak of similarity between histories or mo-
ment/history pairs? Or both options make sense?
It is impossible to adequately formalize these expressions (PL) All tautologies of classic propositional logic
using any simple boolean function, since they are not compo- (MP) φ, φ → ψ ` ψ The most basic case:
sitional. Moreover, φ ψ does not entail (φ ∧ χ) ψ. So (CI) φ φ M = hM, ≤, H, {m/h }m/h∈(M ×H) , νi, where
that, (φ → ψ) is not a good candidate too. (CC) ((φ ψ) ∧ (φ χ)) → (φ (ψ ∧ χ)) {m/h } is a set of strict partial orderings for every mo-
(CW) (φ ψ) → (φ (ψ ∨ χ)) ment/history pair, defined on all model, i.e. we think of all
The most common framework to define formal semantics for (SA) ((φ ψ) ∧ (ψ χ)) → ((φ ∧ ψ) χ) of the points in the model as of comparable to one another.
counterfactuals was presented by David Lewis (Lewis, 1973) (AD) ((φ χ) ∧ (ψ χ)) → ((φ ∨ ψ) χ) Since we have aLsimple fusion of models, the proper logic we
and Robert Stalnaker (Stalnaker, 1968): (REA) If ` φ ↔ ψ then (φ χ) ↔ (ψ χ) get is just LBT P.
(REC) If ` φ ↔ ψ then (χ φ) ↔ (χ ψ)
dIf it were the case that φ, then it would be ψe is true Comparing histories via instants: we can add a constraint,
iff the possible φ-world(s), which is(are) the most similar to according to which moment/history pairs are comparable only
the actual one, is(are) ψ-world(s) Adding branching time if they occur at the same time, being the different versions
of the same moment even if they are historically inaccessible.
Let us briefly define BT models: Then we will compare how similar histories are and evaluate
Models counterfactuals in regard with points of the same instant.
M = hM, ≤, H, νi
Formally we can define it using the next model. Given some One of the version presented in ibid.:
M = {m1 , m2 , ..., mn } – non-empty set of moments
countable set of propositional variables Φ = {p, q, r...}:
≤⊆ M × M – strict-preorder with backward linearity, represen-
ting flow of time; treeee M = hM, m0 , H, succ, ≤, {h }h∈H , f, νi
M = hW, f, {w }w∈W , R, νi
H = {h1 , h2 , ..., hn } – a set ofKhaitovich
Daniil histories, where each history is where mo ∈ M is a root of the tree – the unique ”first”moment.
a maximal ≤-linear subset ofApril M2021
. succ : (M ×H) → (M ×H) – a function, which assigns a unique
W 6= ∅ – non-empty set of possible worlds; ν : Φ → 2M ×H – evaluation function, ascribing a set of his- immediate successor to every moment/history pair. It implies
R ⊆ W × W – accessibility relation tory/pair moments to every proposition;
1 Introduction treeee
that ≤ is discrete. h ⊆ H × H – comparative similarity rela-
w ⊆ W × W – strict partial ordering on W , representing tion, defined on the set of histories.
h1 h2 h3 h4
comparative similarity relation: v w u means that v is more In that frame a set of Daniil
instantsKhaitovich
are defined in the next manner:
similar to w than u. Worth noticing that w is defined on the
set of worlds, which are accessible from w; Inst = {succnApril
(m0 /h) | n ∈ N, h ∈ H}
2021
f : W → {w } – a function, which assigns a comparative m2 m3

similarity relation to every possible world; where succn is just an iterated usage of succ n times. Given
{w }w∈W is a set of comparative similarity relations, defined any moment m ∈ M , we will denote the instant to which m
for every world in W ; m1
1 Introduction
belongs as tm .
ν : Φ → 2W – standard evaluation function; Figure 1: :

h1 h2
Some strange cases h3 h4

m3 m4 m5 m6
Semantics Lets think of the next case. A person named Ann used to
have spare 20 dollars. Yesterday she have spent 1 dollar on a
M, w |= p iff w ∈ ν(p)
chewing gum. Now a friend of her, George, is asking to borrow
M, w |= ¬φ iff M, w 6|= φ m1 m2
him 20 dollars. So that, Ann is saying:
M, w |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= φ or M, w |= ψ
M, w |= φ ψ iff
for every v ∈ R(w), such that v ∈ |φ|, exists u0 ∈ |φ| such that If today were yesterday, I would be able to borrow you 20
u0 w u and M, v |= ψ for every v, such that v ∈ |φ| and dollars m0
v w u0 1

We can interpret her answer in 2 different fashions: 1) Yester-

day Ann was able to borrow 20 dollars to George. 2) in some
alternative history, where time flows in a deviant way, so that
today is actually yesterday there, Ann is able to borrow 20
dollars to George; The first interpretation is close to the ba-
sic variant of logic we have presented, while the second one is
closer to the logic presented by (Canavotto [et al.], 2020).
Then we can define a semantics for counterfactuals:
M, m/h |= φ ψ iff
1) for no h0 ∈ H it is true that M, tm /h0 |= φ;
2) There is a history h0 ∈ H, such that M, tm /h0 |= φ ∧ ψ
and there is no h00 ∈ H, such that M, tm /h00 |= φ ∧ ¬ψ and
h00 h h0 ;
Axioms will depend on the way we define properties of {h }.
Still, when it comes to proper axiomatics, even in the basic case
it turns out a bit tricky.
Referências
Burgess J. P. [et al.] (1981). Quick completeness proofs for some logics of conditionals. // Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. — V. 22, n. 1. — P. 76–84.
Canavotto I. [et al.] (2020). Where responsibility takes you: Logics of agency, counterfactuals and norms.
Lewis D. (1973). Counterfactuals. — Blackwell.
Stalnaker R. C. (1968). A Theory of Conditionals // Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2) / ed. por N. Rescher. — Oxford: Blackwell. — P. 98–112.