Professional Documents
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MANUAL
PTS 31.40.60.11
SEPTEMBER 2002
PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication,
of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
1.2 DISTRIBUTION, INTENDED USE AND REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS
1.3 DEFINITIONS
1.4 ABBREVIATIONS
1.5 CROSS-REFERENCES
1.6 SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS EDITION
2. REQUIREMENT FOR LEAK DETECTION
3. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION
3.1 SENSITIVITY
3.2 RELIABILITY
3.3 ACCURACY
3.4 LEAK LOCATION CAPABILITY
3.5 ROBUSTNESS
3.6 COST
4. SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM
4.1 PRIMARY FUNCTIONALITY
4.2 SECONDARY FUNCTIONALITY
4.3 ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONALITY
5. IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 RESPONSIBILITY
5.2 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION
5.4 FACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING
5.5 DATA SAMPLING RATE
5.6 ALARMS
5.7 OPERATOR DISPLAYS
5.8 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5.9 REMOTE MAINTENANCE
5.10 LEAK SENSITIVITY / TUNING
5.11 TRAINING
5.12 DOCUMENTATION
6. LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES
6.1 GENERAL
6.2 BALANCING OF MASS OR VOLUME INPUT VERSUS OUTPUT
6.3 PRESSURE AND/OR FLOW ANALYSIS
6.4 DYNAMIC MODELS
6.5 MONITORING OF CHARACTERISTIC SIGNALS GENERATED BY A LEAK
6.6 OFF-LINE LEAK DETECTION
7. REFERENCES
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK
DETECTION TECHNIQUES
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
This PTS specifies requirements and gives recommendations for the application of Leak
Detection Systems and gives an overview of available pipeline leak detection techniques
and their effectiveness for pipeline applications. This PTS is primarily aimed at continuous
on-line leak detection systems. Discrete off-line systems are only briefly discussed.
This PTS provides guidance on the following:
- when to specify a leak detection system;
- how to specify performance parameters;
- what system to select;
- how to implement a system.
This PTS is a revision of the previous publication of the same number and title, dated
September 1994. A summary of changes from the previous edition is given in (1.6).
Although applicable to onsite lines, this PTS is intended for use with long, cross-country or
subsea transportation pipelines that are outside facility battery limits.
1.3 DEFINITIONS
1.4 ABBREVIATIONS
ALARP - As Low as Reasonably Practicable
DCS - Distributed Control System
FAT - Factory Acceptance Testing
ISDN - Integrated Service Digital Network
LBV - Line Block Valve
LDS - Leak Detection System
MAOP - Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
OPC - OLE (Object Linked Editing) for Process Control
PC - Personal Computer
PSTN - Public Subscriber Telephone Network
SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SPLD - Statistical Pipeline Leak Detection
1.5 CROSS-REFERENCES
Where cross-references to other parts of this PTS are made, the referenced section
number is shown in brackets. Other documents referenced in this PTS are listed in (7).
Bibliography references are listed in (8).
Group and public awareness of safety and environmental issues puts increasing emphasis
on the potential consequences of a pipeline leak for human safety and pollution of the
environment. Proper pipeline management should ensure technical integrity of a pipeline in
order to prevent failures and fluid releases and to limit the consequences if a leak occurs.
An LDS reduces the consequences of failure by enabling fast emergency response. These
consequences comprise economic consequences, safety consequences, environmental
consequences and the more intangible socio-political consequences. Pipeline leaks can
result in bad publicity and penalties, both of which can be reduced by having a proper
pipeline integrity management and emergency response system in place including an LDS.
Other measures should be in place to prevent and monitor degradation of the pipeline that
in the end may lead to failure, and to consequently reduce the probability of a leak to as low
as is reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle).
Most authorities do not specify an LDS for pipelines as part of the pipeline management
system. However, most countries have some form of legislation and regulations regarding
pipeline safety, and installing an LDS may help to obtain appropriate authorisations. In
recent years, governments have tended to move from specific rules to performance-based
regulations. The risk management concept has now been introduced in both Europe and
the USA. Because an LDS may help pipeline operators reduce the loss of containment and
hence risks, it should be considered as part of the risk management programme.
As a consequence of the above, an LDS for a new pipeline should be specified in the
following cases:
- If leak detection is required by applicable mandatory legalisation. All mandatory
legislation and local codes shall be complied with in full, concessions notwithstanding. If
the requirements of said legislation and codes are less than those that could be
provided by use of SCADA based leak detection, then the latter should be provided as
long as the former are still satisfied. (SCADA based leak detection means leak detection
methods using pipeline data provided by SCADA or DCS systems).
- If a single phase pipeline is provided with remote monitoring and control using
telemetry/SCADA facilities. Most pipelines, especially those with high potential
consequences resulting from a pipeline failure (leak event), should be provided with
telemetry/SCADA to provide operational monitoring and control. If telemetry/SCADA
facilities are available, a SCADA based LDS should also be provided. The LDS may be
fully integrated with the SCADA or stand-alone with appropriate real time
communications with the SCADA system.
- If leak detection is required as an outcome of a Quantitative Risk Assessment, hence if
it would significantly reduce the failure risk. The safety consequence of a pipeline leak is
directly related to population density, product toxicity, volatility and explosiveness. In
general, the safety consequence is reduced to the greatest extent for volatile and toxic
products such as LPG, NGL, mogas, ethylene, ethylene oxide and gas with a high
hydrogen sulfide content. Important features enabling an LDS to limit the safety
consequences are fast response time, high reliability (low false alarm rate) and
robustness. The environmental consequence of a pipeline leak is directly related to the
environment itself, the persistence and density of the product, and the potential leak
volume. Generally important features enabling an LDS to limit the environmental
consequences are high localisation accuracy and high sensitivity.
In all other cases, an LDS should only be specified on an exception basis.
3. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR LEAK DETECTION
3.1 SENSITIVITY
Sensitivity is defined as a composite measure of the size of leak that a system is capable of
detecting, and the time required for the system to issue an alarm in the event that a leak of
that size should occur. Some LDSs have a wide variation in the response time as a function
of leak size; for others the response time is relatively independent of leak size.
Leak detection performance is usually defined in terms of detecting a particular leak flow
rate within a specified minimum period of time. Adjustments made to improve sensitivity
can have a negative effect on other aspects of performance. For example, if the minimum
leak detectable is set too low with a specified time period, then false alarms will occur more
frequently.
Sensitivity is generally insufficient to detect corrosion pinhole leaks.
3.2 RELIABILITY
Reliability is defined as a measure of an LDS’s ability to make accurate decisions about the
possible existence of a leak in the pipeline. Reliability is directly related to the probability of
declaring a leak incorrectly, i.e., if none has occurred. A system is considered to be
unreliable if it tends to declare leaks incorrectly.
Reliability pertains only to the functionality of the leak detection software without regard to
SCADA system performance, availability of the pipeline instrumentation and communication
equipment, or any other factor beyond the control of the LDS vendor. Such factors involve a
separate category of performance, namely robustness.
System reliability is directly affected by factors such as instrument reliability/drift in signals,
etc. Model based systems require periodic tuning to ensure the best results.
Poor telemetry performance and inaccurate or malfunctioning instrumentation will result in
degraded system performance with the likelihood of false alarms, whatever LDS technique
is employed.
Many systems make automated adjustments to decision thresholds and other parameters
in order to reduce the likelihood of generating alarms during defined operating conditions.
When such adjustments are made, a corresponding penalty is normally incurred in some
other aspect of performance. For example, decisions based on a higher alarm threshold
might make a system less sensitive to changes by normal pipeline transients, but this
performance gain is achieved at the expense of longer response time and the risk of
greater fluid loss if a leak should occur.
3.3 ACCURACY
In addition to detecting and announcing a leak, some software-based LDSs can provide
estimates of leak flow rate or total volume/mass lost and leak location. Different techniques
can provide different estimates with varying accuracy. For example, mass balance or
compensated mass balance methods can provide an estimate of leak rate but not of leak
location. A compensated method generally provides more accurate leak rate estimates.
3.6 COST
Cost is an important parameter of an LDS. The cost includes capital expenditure and on-
going operating costs. When an LDS is selected, it is necessary to estimate the total life
cycle cost including the following items:
- initial project cost of the leak detection software;
- cost of instrumentation, e.g., additional pressure or density meters and SCADA system;
- cost of continuous support for tuning and troubleshooting in case of false alarms;
- cost of personnel for maintaining the instrumentation and leak detection system;
- cost of training operations and maintenance personnel.
4. SELECTION OF A LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM
5.1 RESPONSIBILITY
The LDS should be designed and engineered in association with the SCADA system.
Ideally the supply of the LDS and the SCADA system should be a single responsibility.
Typically the SCADA system Supplier should be responsible for supplying the LDS as this
will provide seamless factory acceptance testing, installation and commissioning.
Depending upon the contract philosophy, the choice of LDS type and Manufacturer may be
selected by the responsible Supplier. However, regardless of the method used, the
Principal should be fully involved in the process and should be the approving authority in
order to ensure that the system will meet the performance specification.
5.3 INSTRUMENTATION
The accuracy, repeatability and positioning of the instrumentation required for the operation
of the LDS should be reviewed with the LDS Manufacturer. For maximum performance,
instrumented measurements should be made as accurate and repeatable as possible. This
requirement may be relaxed if a lower LDS performance is acceptable. Analogue to digital
conversions implemented as part of the SCADA/Telemetry should be 12-bit as a minimum.
Temperature measurement should be conducted sub-surface, or appropriate insulation
should be provided to mitigate any heat-up by the sun.
5.6 ALARMS
Any alarms generated by the LDS and handed over to the SCADA system should be
considered as advisory only. Automatic control actions, e.g., shutdowns, etc., should not be
generated by the declaration of a leak alarm by the LDS unless LBVs are used. Manual
intervention by the operator, in conjunction with the appropriate operating procedure,
should be the normal response to a leak alarm.
5.11 TRAINING
Training courses with different content and duration are required for engineers and
operators. Operator training should be finalised during the commissioning phase of the
pipeline.
Course notes are essential and should be reviewed and approved.
5.12 DOCUMENTATION
In conjunction with the SCADA Functional Design Specification, the following
documentation shall also be provided as a minimum for the LDS:
- Basis of design and operation, the system performance document;
- Factory Acceptance Test procedures;
- Site Acceptance Test procedures;
- LDS Tuning procedures;
- Operations and Maintenance manual(s).
All documentation should be submitted for review, comment, and approval.
6. LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES
6.1 GENERAL
Leak detection techniques are based on either continuous or intermittent measurements of
specific parameters. Intermittent leak detection methods are often able to detect smaller
leak rates than continuous leak detection techniques can.
Some continuous techniques can only detect transient pipeline conditions during the onset
of a leak, and will not be able to identify the presence of a leak at a later time.
For some intermittent techniques, fluid transportation through the pipeline needs to be
interrupted. With intermittent techniques, the detection time of a leak will be completely
dependent on the frequency of inspection.
Generally, LDSs work in single-phase pipelines only. Techniques for detection of leaks in
liquid lines generally perform better than those for gas pipelines. LDS performance is
limited in two-phase pipelines.
The conflicting balance of sensitivity to leaks and false alarms will determine the sensitivity
setting of the LDS. Large leaks can normally be detected more rapidly than small ones. To
maintain the user's confidence in the system and the effectiveness of the operator’s
response, avoiding false alarms should have a higher priority than attempting to shorten the
leak detection time or reducing the minimum detectable leak rate.
The performance of pipeline leak detection techniques is dependent on fluid type, operating
pressure including fluctuations, batch or continuous operation, pipeline length and size,
metering accuracy and repeatability, etc.
The technique to be adopted should be determined by detailed evaluation. Generally, the
corrected mass or volume balance method or the SPLD method should be used. It may be
necessary to deploy more than one leak detection technique in order to achieve the overall
leak detection performance that is required.
LDSs are categorised into the following groups according to their inherent principle of leak
detection:
1. Balancing of pipeline mass or volume input versus output;
2. Pressure and/or flow analysis;
3. Dynamic Models;
4. Monitoring of characteristic signals generated by a leak;
5. Off-line leak detection.
A summary of the capabilities and application of the various leak detection techniques
follows. Additional information may be found in report SIEP 97-5527.
6.2.1 General
These LDSs rely on the fact that in a leak-free pipeline the fluid mass or volume flow into
the pipeline equals the flow out. Using this flow balance principle, the flow-in and flow-out
measurements are continuously monitored for any variations over a time interval. Volume
flow readings should be corrected for pressure and temperature variations to reference
conditions, i.e., 1 bar (abs) and 0 °C or 15 °C. To eliminate the effect of flow variations
during normal operation, the flow readings should be statistically processed or totalled over
discrete time periods.
6.3.1 General
The operation of a pipeline can be characterised by the flow of the fluid and the pressure
gradient along the pipeline. Pressure drop and flow along a pipeline are related to the flow
resistance of the pipeline. A leak will alter the pressure drop profile of a pipeline and
therefore affect the 'normal' pressure and flow relationships. Detection of such alterations
can be used to indicate the occurrence of a leak.
PETRONAS STANDARDS
Index to PTS publications and standard specifications PTS 00.00.05.05
Hydrostatic pressure testing of new pipelines PTS 31.40.40.38
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE: The following documents are for information only and do not form an integral part of this PTS:
Jansen, H J M., “Pipeline Leak Detection; State of the Art SIEP 97-5527
Review as of May 1997”. September 1997.
APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY OF THE CAPABILITIES AND APPLICATION OF LEAK DETECTION TECHNIQUES
LEAK LEAK TYPE MODE OF RESPONSE TIME LEAK LOCATION ROBUSTNESS RELIABILITY COST REMARKS
DETECTION OPERATION CAPABILITY
METHOD
Low Pressure gas: full bore ruptures any seconds to minutes good poor low high thresholds
liquid: major leaks required to avoid
false alarms
Change in gas: major leak steady state seconds to minutes Offshore: None good poor low
pressure / flow liquid: large leaks Onshore: Between
block valves if
pressure readings
available
Wave alert gas: medium to large leaks steady and seconds to minutes within 1 km, good poor medium detects only the
liquid: small to medium transient state depending on onset of a leak
leaks transducer spacing
Mass or volume gas and liquid: medium to steady state minutes to hours none good poor low
balance large leaks
Corrected mass or gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours Offshore: None good medium medium
volume balance medium and large leaks transient state Onshore: Between
block valves
Statistical pipeline gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours at best within 5 % of good good medium low probability of
leak detection medium and large leaks transient state, distance between false alarm
(SPLD) shut in pressure meters
Dynamic gas and liquid: small, steady and minutes to hours at best within 10 % of poor poor high high false alarm rate
simulation model medium and large leaks transient state, pipeline length
shut in
Acoustic liquids: large leaks (on- steady state depends on within 1 km good medium high hard liquids only
techniques line), small to medium leaks monitoring
(shut-in) frequency
Static pressure test hard liquids: small leaks during shut in hours to days none, between block good poor low capabilities depend
soft liquids: medium leaks valves on length and
gas: large leaks temperature effects
Sniffer tube, all fluids, including any hours within 100 m for good good high short lines only
hydrocarbon multiphase: small leaks hydrocarbon sensing
sensing-cables cables