DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Under THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION, courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

SIA V. PEOPLE

-Petitioners Ruben and Josephine Sia were charged before the RTC of Naga for Violation of Section 17 of PD 957
otherwise known as The Subdivision and condominium Buyers Protection protective Decree.

Oct. 15, 2001 – Petitioners filed a consolidated motion to quash alleging that (1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged (2) the City Prosecutors Office of Naga has no authority to file the information.
Oct 18, 2001 – RTC denied the motion holding that it has jurisdiction over the case
Oct. 29, 2001 – arraignment was scheduled
Oct 23, 2001 – Petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve the other ground raised in the motion to quash on the
Authority of the Prosecutor to file the information.
Oct 24, 2001 – RTC denied the motion stating that the Prosecutor was authorized to file the information. Motion
for reconsideration was filed and subsequently denied and scheduled Arraignment on November 21, 2001.
Motion for postponement of arraignment was also denied.
November 21, 2001 – RTC appointed a counsel de oficio for the petitioner and proceeded with the arraignment.
Before CA – petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with application of Temporary Restraining Order and writ of
Preliminary Injunction, claimed that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the offenses charged and the prosecutor
being unauthorized to file such information, that only ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS under Executive Order No. 71
are authorized to investigate and enforce laws pertaining to subdivision.

CA dismissed the petition and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC for the following reasons:
1. The information stated that petitioners violated Sec. 17 of P.D. 957 by failing to register with the ROD of
Naga City the CTS they executed in favor of respondent Teresita Lee over several subdivision lots she
purchased
2. The acts complained of is within the trials courts territorial jurisdiction
3. The penalty provided for by law for the violation, i.e. imprisonment of not more than ten years is within
the trial courts jurisdiction. Similarly, the appellate court sustained the city prosecutor’s authority to file
information conformably with Sec. 5 Rule 110 of Rules of Court. And that the RTC did not transgress on
the petitioner right to counsel since the preference in the choice of counsel is expressed in Sec. 12, Art.
III of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues:
1. Did the charges in the informations constitute violation of P.D. 957?
2. Does the City Prosecutor of Naga City have authority to file the informations?
3. Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel when a counsel de oficio assisted him during his
arraignment?
 (1) Yes. P.D. 957 provides that when a registered owner of a parcel of land wishes to convert the same
into a subdivision project, he must register the subdivision plan with the HLURB. Should he decides
to sell the lots, he must also register the subdivision with the HLURB and the subdivision plan to
ROD (Sec. 17 Par 2) thereafter, a registration Certificate is issued to the subdivision owner and he
may then apply for a License to Sell the lots in the subdivision project. And whenever lots are sold
owner is required to register the CTS, Deed of Sale and other similar instruments with the ROD.
Hence, a violation of Sec 17 of P.D. 957.
(2) Yes. Sec 3 of E.O. No. 71 provides that:
SEC. 3 – Without prejudice to the boards overall monitoring, enforcement and visitorial powers,
local chief executives shall designate appropriate local who meets or posses the qualifications,
standards and criteria set by the HLURB as enforcement officers who shall have full power to
monitor, investigate and enforce compliance with these provisions of national laws and standards
whose implementation have been devolved to the local government in accordance with this Order.
Clearly, the Enforcement Officers of LGU shall only have full power to monitor, investigate and
enforce compliance with the provisions of national laws and standards whose implementation has
been devolved to LGU:

a) Approval of preliminary as well as final subdivision schemes and development plans of all subdivisions,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes of the public and private sectors, in accordance
with the provisions of P.D. No. 957 as amended and its implementing standards, rules and regulations
concerning approval of subdivision plans;

(b) Approval of preliminary and final subdivision schemes and development plans of all economic and
socialized housing projects as well as individual or group building and occupancy permits covered by BP
220 and its implementing standards, rules and regulations;

(c) Evaluation and resolution of opposition against the issuance of development permits for any of the
said projects, in accordance with the said laws and the Rules of Procedure promulgated by HLURB incident
thereto;
(d) Monitoring the nature and progress of land development of projects it has approved, as well as housing
construction in the case of house and lot packages, to ensure their faithfulness to the approved plans and
specifications thereof, and, imposition of appropriate measures to enforce compliance therewith.

Noteworthy, the prosecution for the violation of Section 17 of P.D. No. 957 is not included in the
foregoing functions. Hence, it follows logically that it remained with the City Prosecutors' Office of Naga City
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court or agency is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It cannot be
made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to Dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant. 12 The informations rest the cause of action on the
petitioners' failure to register the Contracts to Sell in accordance with Section 17 of P.D. No. 957. The penalty imposable is a
fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years. 13 Once again, clearly, the
offense charged is well within the jurisdiction of the trial court.

(3) No. We agree with herein respondent Lee when she said that petitioners were given ample time by
the trial court to get a counsel of their choice, but did not. Through the course of the proceedings,
the petitioners filed several motions. In its Orders dated November 21, 2001, 14 the trial court noted
 that although the informations were filed on August 7, 2000, the petitioners have not yet been
arraigned as of that day. The delay could no longer be countenanced

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution assuring an accused of counsel of his choice pertains
specifically to a person under investigation. Even if we were to extend the choice of a counsel to an accused in
a criminal prosecution, the matter of the accused getting a lawyer of his preference cannot be so absolute and
arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused. 15 In Amion
v. Chiongson this Court stated:

Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then,
the tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay,
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the charter.16

In our view, petitioners' dilatory tactics should no longer be allowed to trump the progress of the judicial process.

CABRAL V. UY, G.R. NO. 174584

This case is about the power of courts to hear criminal violations of the law that protects subdivision
buyers against developers selling lots before they are issued licenses to sell and the effect of the subsequent
issuance of such licenses to sales that land developers make before the issuance of their licenses

On April 28, 2003 the public prosecutor’s office filed a criminal information before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City5 in Criminal Case Q-03-116823 against respondent Uy and the other Moldex officers, namely,
respondents Michael Uy, Marilyn O. Uy, Richard O. Uy, Rey Ignacio Diaz, Jose Po, and Juanito Malto for selling
subdivision lots to a certain Josefa C. Yanga without a license from the HLURB

Subsequently, however, or on September 17, 2003 the HLURB issued Moldex the license to sell that it
needed.7
Respondents Uy, et al. filed a motion to quash the information and motion for judicial determination of
probable cause8 claiming that the office of the prosecutor and the trial court had no jurisdiction over violations
of P.D. 957, such jurisdiction being with the HLURB alone and, granting that they could take cognizance of the
case, respondents Uy, et al. could not be held criminally liable because the HLURB subsequently issued them a
license to sell.9
On May 20, 2004 the trial court denied the motions of respondents Uy, et al. 10 On June 15, 2005 it also
denied their motion for reconsideration, 11 prompting them to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
90468, which court granted their prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. 12 On June 2, 2006 the
latter court rendered a decision, 13 upholding the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject case but ordaining its
dismissal, given that the subsequent issuance of a license to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et al.’s criminal
liability. Petitioner Cabral filed a motion for reconsideration but the appeals court denied 14 it, hence, this
petition.

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the office of the public prosecutor and the trial court have jurisdiction over criminal actions
for violation of P.D. 957; and
2. Whether or not HLURB’s subsequent issuance to Moldex of a license to sell extinguished respondents Uy, et
al.’s criminal liability for selling subdivision lots prior to the issuance of such license.

HELD:

(1) First. Conformably with what this Court ruled in Sia v. People, 16 the CA correctly upheld the public
prosecutor’s authority to file the criminal information for violation of P.D. 957 and the trial court’s
power to hear and adjudicate the action, the penalty being a ₱20,000.00 fine and imprisonment of not
exceeding 10 years or both such fine and imprisonment. This penalty brings the offense within the
jurisdiction of that court.

. (2) Second - P.D. 957 has been enacted to regulate for the public good the sale of subdivision lots and
condominiums. Its Section 5 prohibits such sale without the prior issuance of an HLURB license 17 and punishes
those who engage in such selling. 18 The crime is regarded as malum prohibitum since P.D. 957 is a special law
designed to protect the welfare of society and ensure the carrying on of the purposes of civil life. 19 It is the
commission of that act as defined by law, not its character or effect that determines whether or not its provision
has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is immaterial in such crime. 20 In crimes that are mala prohibita, the
forbidden acts might not be inherently immoral. Still they are punished because the law says they are forbidden.
With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 211avvphi1
Since the Information in this case sufficiently alleged that Moldex sold a subdivision lot when it did not
yet have a license to do so, the crime was done. Assuming the allegations to be true, the subsequent issuance of
the license and the invocation of good faith cannot reach back to erase the offense and extinguish respondents
Uy, et al.’s criminal liability.

In the case of BAVIERA V. PAGLINAWAN – petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed
his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Where it is a matter of procedure that cases such as this should be
filed before the administrative tribunal concerned for purposes of the interruption of the period of prescription

Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations, Injunctions and
Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to "make such
investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any
provision of the law. After a finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the
case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution."

The Court added that while the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially
similar duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply be disregarded.
The Court further ruled that a criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized
dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence

The Securities Regulation code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence,
all complaints for any violation of the code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the
SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation and prosecution as provided in Sec. 53.1

Petitioner committed a fatal procedural lapse when he filed his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ.

BAVIERA V. PAGLINAWAN

July 15, 2003 - a Syndicated Estafa vs. Standard Charetered Bank Board
Feb. 7, 2004 – Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Sec. 8.1 of the Securities Regulation Code
docketed as I.S. No. 2004-229
February 23, 2004 - the DOJ rendered its Joint Resolution 10 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for syndicated
estafa in I.S. No. 2003-1059; private respondents’ complaint for blackmail and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A;
private respondents’ complaint for blackmail and perjury in I.S. No. 2003-1278; and petitioner’s complaint for
perjury against private respondents Morris and Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
April 4, 2004 – DOJ dismissed the complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of Securities Regulation Code),
holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.

Filed with CA a petition for Certiorari under CA G.R. SP No. 85078. He alleged that DOJ acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in dismissing. In holding that the complaint should have been
filed with SEC.
He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ Resolution dismissing
I.S. No. 2004-229 for violation of the Securities Regulation Code. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
87328. Petitioner claimed that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in holding that the complaint should have been filed with the SEC.
Jan 7, 2005 – CA dismissed the petition. It sustained the ruling of DOJ. Insisting that case should have been filed
initially with the SEC.
May 27, 2005 – Petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078
(involving petitioner’s charges and respondents’ counter charges) dismissing the petition on the ground that the
purpose of a petition for certiorari is not to evaluate and weigh the parties’ evidence but to determine whether
the assailed Resolution of the DOJ was issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Again, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution of November 22, 2005.

ISSUE:
 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing petitioner’s complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation Code and his complaint
in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa.

HELD:

For violation of the Securities Regulation Code

Sec. 53 INVESTIGATIONS, INJUNCTIONS AND PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Sec 53.1 – the commission may in its discretion, make such investigation as it deems necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provisions of this code, any rule, regulation or order,
thereunder or any rule of an exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency other self-regulatory
organization and may require or permit any person to file with a statement in writing, under oath or otherwise,
as the commission shall determine, as to all facts and circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated.

The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for violation of any law or rule
administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause,
then it should refer the case to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural
requirement, the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must
first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.12 The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC.
Hence, all complaints for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed
with the SEC. Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.

ADHERENCE TO JURISDICTION
When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal.

Once Jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although the
event is of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance . once
jurisdiction has been acquired by the court, it retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case (Baritua
v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, 2001).

Exceptions:
1. When the law expressly provides for retroactive application
 2. When the change in jurisdiction is curative in character (Vda. De Ballesteros v. Rural Bank of Canaman,
G.R. No. 176250, 2010)

The facts alleged in the complaint

People v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 154557, February 13, 2008

.Feb 24, 1992 – private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were indicted and pleaded not guilty to violation of
Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277 under criminal case No. 551.

In violation of;
P.D. 705 - FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Sec. 68 – Cutting, gathering and or collecting timber or other products without license.
E.O. 277 Sec. 1 - Cutting, gathering and or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products without License
The offense is punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, as provided under
Section 68 of P.D. 705.

Art. 309. Penalties – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by

(2.) penalty of Prision Correccional in it medium and maximum period if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but not to excedd 12,000.
Prision correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months while prision correctional in its maximum period from 4 years to 2 months and 1 day to 6 years.

April 15, 1994 – R.A. 7691 took effect expanding the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, MTC, MCTC in criminal cases

Facts Alleged in the Complaint and the law in force at the time of the commencement of action determine the
jurisdiction

The statute in force at the time of the institution of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter and not at the time of its commission even if the penalty that may be imposed at the
time of its commission is less and does not fall under the court's jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegation in the information, not the result of
the evidence presented during the trial, it will be governed by the allegation in the information. LACSON V.
Executive Secretary – it is not determined by the evidence presented during trial, it is determined by the penalty
imposable, not the penalty actually imposed.
BP 129 as amended by RA 7691-

It is determined by the law at the commencement of the criminal action, not the law in effect at the time of
the commission of an offense.

Subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the commencement of the action not in the law at the time of the
commission of the offense

Exception: that the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense is not determined at the commencement
of the action, rather it is determined at the time of the commission of the offense. Those cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the SANDIGANBAYAN. Because it is determined at the time of the commission of an offense.

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN (Rolando Plaza)G.R. NO. 169004

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time
relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash
advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00)

The Information reads:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash
advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his office, for which he is
duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to
gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of
₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which
the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its
Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the
proper court.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and
employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and
8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only
for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines