SPIL

Topic A: Sources if International Law

[2] North Sea Continental Shelf

Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3.
Digested by: Abs

RECIT READY CASE SUMMARY: The Court held that Germany was not under a legal obligation to
accept the application of the Equidistance Principle because its practical convenience and certainty of
application are not enough to convert it into a rule of law. It ruled that the Convention was not binding on
Germany because although it was a signatory, it never ratified, and was consequently not a party.
Denmark and Netherlands contended that the regime of Art. 6 was binding on Germany because the
latter had assumed that obligations of the Convention by public statements, proclamations, and in other
ways. The Court held that only estoppel could give merit to Denmark and Netherland’s contention;
however, they showed no evidence of such prejudice so Art. 6 was not applicable to this case

FACTS:  Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have submitted to the Court certain differences
concerning 'the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea
which appertain to each of them. The Court is requested to decide what are the applicable 'principles and
rules of international law'. Germany proposed that delimitation of the continental shelf between the parties
is governed by the principle that each coastal State is entitled to a just and equitable share." Germany
contents that making use of the equidistance method of Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Continental Shelf
Convention, had not become customary international law and was not under the circumstances the
appropriate method. The equidistance method could not be used where it would not achieve a just and
equitable apportionment of the shelf. As for Denmark and the Netherlands, delimitation should be
governed by the principle of Art. 6, par. 2, and that where the parties were in disagreement as to the
boundary and special circumstances did not justify another boundary, then "the boundary between them
is to be determined by the application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured

ISSUES:
1) WON Germany was under the legal obligation to accept the application of the Equidistance Principle

2) WON Equidistance Principle was a rule of Customary International Law

RULING:
1) The Court held that Germany was not under a legal obligation to accept the application of the
Equidistance Principle because its practical convenience and certainty of application are not enough to
convert it into a rule of law. It ruled that the Convention was not binding on Germany because although it
was a signatory, it never ratified, and was consequently not a party. Denmark and Netherlands contended
that the regime of Art. 6 was binding on Germany because the latter had assumed that obligations of the
Convention by public statements, proclamations, and in other ways. The Court held that only estoppel
could give merit to Denmark and Netherland’s contention; however, they showed no evidence of such
prejudice so Art. 6 was not applicable to this case.

2) The Court also held that the Equidistance Principle was not a rule of Customary International Law. Its
non-exclusion from the faculty of reservation leads to the inference that it was not considered as reflective
of emergent customary law. Moreover, the number of ratifications and accessions was hardly sufficient to
make it a general rule of international law. As regards the time element, although the passage of only a
short period of time was not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international
law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, it was indispensable that state practice
during that period, including that of states whose interests were specially affected, should have been both
SPIL
Topic A: Sources if International Law

extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and should have occurred in such a
way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law was involved.

State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred
in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.