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College of Law

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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

 FROM ITS PLAIN TEXT, THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEFINE OR RESTRICT
MARRIAGE ON THE BASIS OF SEX, GENDER, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR
GENDER IDENTITY OR EXPRESSION.

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL

G.R. No. 217910; September 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III filed pro se a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to
"declare Arts. 1 and 2 of the Family Code (FC) as unconstitutional and, as a consequence,
nullify Arts. 46(4) and 55(6) of the FC."

Falcis, "an open and self-identified homosexual," argues that the issues he raised were
of such transcendental importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties. He
alleges that the FC has a "normative impact" on the status of same-sex relationships in the
country. He was allegedly injured by the supposed "prohibition against the right to marry
the same-sex" which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. According to Falcis,
a facial challenge on Arts. 1 and 2 is permitted as these provisions regulate fundamental rights
such as "the right to due process and equal protection, right to decisional and marital privacy,
and the right to found a family in accordance with religious convictions." He further alleges
that there is a violation of the equal protection clause since there is no substantial distinction
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. He argues that like opposite-sex couples, same-
sex couples are equally capable of founding their own families and fulfilling essential marital
obligations. He claims that contrary to Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, procreation is not an essential
marital obligation. Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only between
a man and a woman, Arts. 1 and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly unconstitutional for
depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without substantive due process of law. Finally, Falcis
claims that Arts. 1 and 2 of the FC deny the existence of "individuals belonging to religious
denominations that believe in same-sex marriage" and that they have a "right to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions." He claims that the religious weddings
conducted by these denominations have been denied civil recognition "unlike the religious
convictions of Catholics and Muslims."

The Solicitor General notes that the Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but
was instead personal only to Falcis. Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show injury-
in-fact and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that
this Court cannot issue.

ISSUE:
Does the Constitution prohibit same-sex marriage?
RULING:
No. From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict marriage on the
basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression.

Article XV of the 1987 Constitution concerns the family and operates in conjunction
with Article II, Section 12. Article XV, Section 1 pertains to the family in general, identifying
it "as the foundation of the nation[,]" and articulates the State's overarching commitment to
"strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development." Article XV, Section 2
concerns marriage, in particular, and articulates a broad commitment to protecting its
inviolability as a social institution.

Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the Constitution is

capable of accommodating a contemporaneous understanding of sexual orientation, gender
identity and expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). The plain text and meaning of
our constitutional provisions do not prohibit SOGIESC. These constitutional provisions in
particular, and the Constitution in general, should be read through the lens of "a holistic
approach in legal interpretation."

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the

complementarity of the sexes is to perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether
opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold. It renders invisible the lived realities
of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples, families formed by
couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations.
Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.

Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is not the case that
presents the clearest actual factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment our
Constitution requires. Perhaps, even before that actual case arrives, our democratically-
elected representatives in Congress will have seen the wisdom of acting with dispatch to
address the suffering of many of those who choose to love distinctively, uniquely, but no less
genuinely and passionately.
 THE WORDS OF OUR MOST FUNDAMENTAL LAW CANNOT BE READ SO AS
TO CALLOUSLY EXCLUDE ALL FOUNDLINGS FROM PUBLIC SERVICE. WHEN
THE NAMES OF THE PARENTS OF A FOUNDLING CANNOT BE DISCOVERED
DESPITE A DILIGENT SEARCH, BUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED TO
SUSTAIN A REASONABLE INFERENCE THAT SATISFIES THE QUANTUM OF
PROOF REQUIRED TO CONCLUDE THAT AT LEAST ONE OR BOTH OF HIS OR
HER PARENTS IS FILIPINO, THEN THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT HE OR SHE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN.

RIZALITO Y. DAVID vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 221538; September 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This petition for certiorari by Rizalito Y. David seeks to nullify the Decision of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) dismissing the Petition for Quo Warranto against Mary Grace
Poe-Llamanzares as Senator for allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and, therefore, not being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution.

Senator Poe is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an infant, she
was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo and was found inside such church by
Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968. When such fact was reported to the Local Civil
Registrar, a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate was issued stating the aforesaid
facts. In 1974, Senator Poe was adopted by Spouses Poe.
Senator Poe married and had three children. They lived in the United States and
consequently, Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship. In 2005,
Senator Poe returned to the Philippines. She took the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and filed a petition for retention and/or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
through RA. NO. 9225 thereafter. In 2010, she was appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB.
Afterwards, Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States. On May 16, 2013, she won a seat in the Senate. David, a losing candidate in the
2013 Senatorial Elections, filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto contesting the election of Senator Poe for failing to comply with the citizenship
and resident requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution. The SET found Senator Poe
to be a natural-born citizen and therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator. Hence, this
petition.

David argues that as a foundling whose parents are unknown, Senator Poe failed to
establish her Filipino “blood line,” which is supposedly the essence of the Constitution’s
determination of who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. He insists that as Poe was
never a natural-born citizen, she could never have reverted to natural-born status despite the
performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act No. 9225. David’s case hinges
on the primacy he places over Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its
enumeration of who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2), which identifies
as citizens “those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.”
ISSUE:
Is Senator Poe, a foundling, qualified to hold office as Senator?

RULING:
Yes, Senator Poe, a foundling, is qualified to hold office as Senator.
According to Section 2, Article 4 of the 1987 Constitution, “Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
merely gives an enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines “natural-born citizens.”
Therefore, David’s restrictive reliance on Section 1 and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. To determine whether Poe is a natural-born citizen, we must look into whether
she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. At no point has it been substantiated that
Poe went through the actual naturalization process. The statutory mechanisms for
naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The investiture of citizenship on
foundlings benefits children, individuals whose capacity to act is restricted. It is a glaring
mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the relevant authorities a sworn petition
seeking to become a Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he or she
must himself or herself adduce.

Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human thoroughbred. Section

1(2) only stipulates that to be a citizen, either one’s father or one’s mother must be a Filipino
citizen. Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship. Section 1(2) does not require one’s parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens,
but only requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The citizenship of
everyone else in one’s ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline. Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity.
Though her parents are unknown, Poe is a Philippine citizen without the need for an
express statement in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but the logical
consequence of a reasonable reading of the Constitution within its plain text. On an initial
level, a plain textual reading readily identifies the specific provision, which principally
governs: the Constitution’s actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of “natural-born
citizens.” This definition must be harmonized with Section 1’s enumeration, which includes
a reference to parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in relation to the factual
milieu of this case. The pieces of evidence before the SET, admitted facts, and uncontroverted
circumstances adequately justify the conclusion of Poe’s Filipino parentage. On another level,
the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born unless there is substantial
evidence to the contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the
whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship. This includes its mandate of
defending the well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the law, equal access
to opportunities for public service, and respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for
requiring natural- born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is a reading validated
by contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive
and administrative actions, and international instruments.
Senator Poe was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status’ commencement from birth
means that private respondent never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-
born status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.
Accordingly, Senator Poe, a foundling, is qualified to hold office as Senator.
 THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANDED POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
CONTRASTS WITH THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65, WHICH
IS LIMITED TO THE REVIEW OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS.
NONETHELESS, THE SUPREME COURT, BY ITS OWN POWER TO RELAX ITS
RULES, ALLOWED RULE 65 TO BE USED FOR PETITIONS INVOKING THE
COURTS' EXPANDED JURISDICTION.

GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, etc. vs. SEC. CESAR VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210773; January 23, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
GSIS Family Bank Employees Union filed for Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus praying that GSIS Family Bank be declared outside the coverage of RA 10149 and
be directed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with its employees.

President Aquino signed into law RA 10149 or the GOCC Governance Act of 2011
which created the Governance Commission for GOCC. The Governance Commission
clarified that GSIS Family Bank was classified as a government financial institution under
Republic Act No. 10149. Thus, it was unauthorized to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with its employees and that the right to strike of its employees was not guaranteed
by the Constitution, as they were government officers and employees.

GSIS Union alleged that RA 10149 does not apply to GSIS Family Bank, as it was a
private bank created and established under the Corporation Code and that the change in
ownership of shares did not automatically place the bank under the operation of RA 10149.
Therefore, the provisions of the Labor Code are applicable, and not the Civil Service Law.

Respondents pointed out that the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
was fatally defective since respondents do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Further, they alleged that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy and violated the rule on
judicial hierarchy by directly filing its Petition before this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the correct remedy.

RULING:
No. The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately expanded this Court’s power of
judicial review to prevent courts from seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine
and turning a blind eye to abuses committed by the other branches of government. This
Court’s expanded power of judicial review requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion by any government branch or instrumentality. This broad grant of power contrasts
with the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, which is limited to the review of judicial and
quasi-judicial acts. Nonetheless, this Court, by its own power to relax its rules, allowed Rule
65 to be used for petitions invoking the courts’ expanded jurisdiction.
 The Governance Commission was created under RA 10149. It is attached to the Office
of the President and is the “central advisory, monitoring, and oversight body with authority
to formulate, implement, and coordinate policies” relative to GOCC. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial authority, as evidenced by its powers and functions under the law. The
Governance Commission possesses neither judicial nor quasi-judicial powers; thus, it cannot
review or settle actual controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce
legally demandable rights. It is not a tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions that may properly be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

A writ of certiorari may only be issued when the following are alleged in the petition
and proven:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2)such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

Further, petitioner failed to prove that it had no other “plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law” aside from its present Petition. The Governance
Commission is an attached agency of the Office of the President; hence, petitioner could have
elevated the advisories to the Office of the President to question the Governance
Commission’s legal opinion.

Lastly, the Petitioners failed to implead all the members of the Governance
Commission. The non-inclusion is debilitating since this Court cannot exercise its juridical
power when an indispensable party is not impleaded.

Hence, the Petition is DENIED.

 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE WILL BE PASSED ON ONLY IF, AND
TO THE EXTENT THAT, IT IS DIRECTLY AND NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED. A CONTROVERSY IS SAID TO BE
JUSTICIABLE IF: FIRST, THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
INVOLVING LEGAL RIGHTS THAT ARE CAPABLE OF JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION; SECOND, THE PARTIES RAISING THE ISSUE MUST HAVE
STANDING OR LOCUS STANDI TO RAISE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE;
THIRD, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY; AND FOURTH, RESOLVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST
BE ESSENTIAL TO THE DISPOSITION OF THE CASE.

THE PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

(PBOAP) vs. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE)
G.R. No. 202275; July 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 1 on January 4, 2012, requiring "all
Public Utility Bus (PUB) operators…to secure Labor Standards Compliance Certificates" under
pain of revocation of their existing certificates of public convenience or denial of an
application for a new certificate. Five (5) days later or on January 9, 2012, the DOLE issued
Department Order No. 118-12, elaborating on the part-fixed-part-performance-based
compensation system referred to in the LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.
Department Order No. 118-12, among others, provides for the rule for computing the fixed
and the performance-based component of a public utility bus driver's or conductor's wage.

On July 4, 2012, petitioners filed before the Court a Petition with Urgent Request for
Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, impleading the DOLE and the LTFRB as respondents. They pray that this Court
enjoin the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 for being violative of their right to due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of obligation of contracts.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition presented actual case or controversy.

RULING:
No, petition presented no actual case or controversy.

As a rule, "the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent
that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned." A controversy is said to be justiciable if:
first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable of judicial
determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to
raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and fourth, resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition
of the case.

An actual case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the
issues presented are "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests." The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion
concerning legislative or executive action.

According to petitioners, implementing Department Order No. 118-12 and

Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 "may [result] in [the] diminution of the income of . . .
bus drivers and conductors." The allegation is obviously based on speculation with the use of
the word "may." There was even no showing of how granting bus drivers' and conductors'
minimum wage and social welfare benefits would result in lower income for them.

Not only was the Petition not justiciable for failing to present an actual controversy.
Petitioners did not possess the requisite legal standing to file this suit.

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees
that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and,
in effect, assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

This Court summarized the requirements for granting legal standing to "non-
traditional suitors" in Funa v. Villar, thus: 1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 2.) For voters, there
must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 3.) For
concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and 4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators. Another exception is
the concept of third-party standing. Under this concept, actions may be brought on behalf of
third parties provided the following criteria are met: first, "the [party bringing suit] must
have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a 'sufficiently concrete interest' in
the outcome of the issue in dispute"; second, "the party must have a close relation to the
third party"; and third, "there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect
his or her own interests."

As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have standing to bring this
suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their members are and if these members
allowed them to sue on their behalf. While alleging that they are composed of public utility
bus operators who will be directly injured by the implementation of Department Order No.
118-12 and Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof, such
as board resolutions of their alleged members or their own articles of incorporation
authorizing them to act as their members' representatives in suits involving their members'
individual rights. Some of the petitioners here are not even persons or entities authorized by
law or by the Rules allowed to file a suit in court.
 UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THE JUDICIARY IS MANDATED TO INTERPRET
LAWS. IT CANNOT SPECULATE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OR
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A BILL THAT CONGRESS MAY OR MAY NOT
PASS.

IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT vs. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY
UDK-15143; January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to
compel this court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the
perceived hostility of the Congress.

Following the promulgation of the decision of the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos.
208566 and Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinas
filed a bill that would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections
to national treasury and Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. filed a bill entitled “The Act
Creating Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1949 (Judiciary Development Fund)”.

On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed the nation with
a message directed to the Supreme Court:

“xxx To the honorable justices of the Supreme Court: Help us help our countrymen.
We ask that you review your decision, this time taking into consideration the points I have
raised tonight. The nation hopes for your careful deliberation and response.”

According to the Petitioner, the Congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant
usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court.” Petitioner
further argued that Congress should not act as “wreckers of the law” by threatening “to clip
the powers if the High Tribunal.” Thus, he prays that this Court exercise its powers to
"REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing
laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the
Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people."

ISSUE:
May the Court stop Congress from passing laws that will abolish the Judiciary
Development Fund?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court has explained in a number of cases that the filing of bills is
within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint[.]" A
proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the
Judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere
speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.

The petition, therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe
for this court’s determination.
 THE COURT WILL NOT RULE ON ANY MATTER OR CAUSE OF THE
INVALIDATION OF ANY ACT, LAW OR REGULATION WITHOUT ACTUAL OR
IMMINENT BREACH OR INJURY TO A RIGHT

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

G.R. No. 210500, April 02, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno together with representatives from recognized labor centers,
labor federations, party-list groups, and Social Security System members filed the case against
respondent government officials and agencies involved in issuing the assailed issuances.

Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition questioning
the validity of the issuances issued by the Social Security Commission. The issuances increase
in contribution rate and maximum monthly salary credit. Maintaining that a majority of them
are Social Security System members directly affected by the premium hike. The increase was
made subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. After respondent President
Benigno Aquino III approved the same, the Social Security Commission issued another
resolution approved, among others, the increase in contribution rate and maximum monthly
salary credit.

Petitioners claim that the assailed issuances were issued per an unlawful delegation
of power to respondent Social Security Commission; that the increase in contributions is an
invalid exercise of police power for not being reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
purpose sought, as well as for being unduly oppressive on the labor sector.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court can validly rule upon the SSS issuances in the exercise of its power
of judicial review.

RULING:
No. Kilusang Mayo Uno failed to comply with all the requisites for the exercise of the
judicial power of review.

In seeking redress from the court, the requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review must concur: (1) there must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before
this Court; (2) the question before this Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the case.

(1) Actual Case or Controversy

Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of an actual case or

controversy. There is an actual case or controversy if there is a "conflict of legal right, an
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." Courts, thus, cannot decide on
theoretical circumstances. They are neither advisory bodies, nor are they tasked with taking
measures to prevent imagined possibilities of abuse.

In this case, petitioners failed to prove how the assailed issuances violated workers'
constitutional rights such that it would warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely
cite and rely on the Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to being
legally entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security System contributions.

(2) Ripe for Adjudication

A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental act is a completed
action such that there is a direct, concrete, and adverse effect on the petitioner. In connection
with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy if the
petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to it under the law. Here, nothing in the
records shows that petitioners filed a case before the Social Security Commission or asked
for a reconsideration of the assailed issuances.
The petitioners failed to Petitioners have prematurely invoked this Court's power of
judicial review in violation of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. They
failed to abide by the principle of primary administrative jurisdiction.

(3) Mootness

Moot cases prevent the actual case or controversy from becoming justiciable. Courts
cannot render judgment after the issue has already been resolved by or through external
developments. This is consistent with this Court's deference to the powers of the other
branches of government. This Court must be wary that it is ruling on existing facts before it
invalidates any act or rule. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic provided
, an issue raising a grave violation of the Constitution, involving an exceptional situation of
paramount public interest that is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Here, since respondent Social Security Commission is set to issue new resolutions for
the Social Security System members' contributions, the issue on the assailed issuances'
validity may be rendered moot. Nonetheless, all the discussed exceptions are present: (1)
petitioners raise violations of constitutional rights; (2) the situation is of paramount public
interest; (3) there is a need to guide the bench, the bar, and the public on the power of
respondent Social Security Commission to increase the contributions; and (4) the matter is
capable of repetition yet evading review, as it involves a question of law that can recur. Thus,
this Court may rule on this case.

(4) Legal Standing

Legal standing is the personal and substantial interest of a party in a case "such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. Not all petitioners have
shown the requisite legal standing to bring the case before this Court. While this is true, the
Court took a liberal approach and relaxed the requirement of legal standing because the issue
of the validity of increase in contributions is of transcendental importance. Here, the assailed
issuances set the new contribution rate and its date of effectivity. The increase in
contributions has been in effect since January 2014. As such, the issue of the validity of
increase in contributions is of transcendental importance.
 THE COURT’S JURISDICTION TO REVIEW HRET’S DECISIONS AND ORDERS IS
EXERCISED ONLY UPON SHOWING THAT HRET ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
OTHERWISE, THE COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH AN ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL’S EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION OR JURISDICTION.

MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN

vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 204123; March 19, 2013
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 65 petition filed by Maria Lourdes Locsin prays that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET) dismissal of Locsin’s election protest be set
aside.

Locsin and Lagdameo vied for the position to represent the First Legislative District
of Makati in the 2010 national elections. Lagdameo was proclaimed winner and Locsin came
in second with a losing margin of 242 votes. Locsin instituted an election protest before the
HRET alleging that the results were tainted by election fraud, anomalies, and irregularities.
After the revision and appreciation of ballots, the margin rose to 335 votes.

Locsin filed the present petition on the ground that the HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ignored the presence of 2,457
invalid, irregular, and rejectable ballots for Lagdameo and 663 bona fide claimed ballots for
Locsin. The HRET argued that under the Constitution, the HRET alone shall have the
authority to determine the form, manner, and conduct by which an election controversy is
settled and decided with no further appeal.

ISSUE:
Does the Court have jurisdiction to review HRET’s decisions and orders?

RULING:
Yes, but the Court's jurisdiction to review HRET’s decisions and orders is exercised
only upon showing that the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members." The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature." Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm "as full, clear and complete." Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the
Electoral Commission. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

Thus, this Court's jurisdiction to review HRET’s decisions and orders is exercised only
upon showing that the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, this Court shall not interfere with the HRET’s exercise of
its discretion or jurisdiction. The Court find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of HRET
when it dismissed Locsin's election protest.
 A HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION MAY REGULATE PASSAGE INTO A
SUBDIVISION FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF ITS RESIDENTS, EVEN IF
ITS ROADS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DONATED TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT

WILLIAM G. KWONG MANAGEMENT, INC.

vs. DIAMOND HOMEOWNERS & RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 211353, June 10, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Court of Appeals’ Decision which
found the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy valid and issued within the authority of the
homeowners' association.

Diamond Subdivision is a residential subdivision with several commercial

establishments, including drinking joints operating within it. Because of these, people freely
come in and out of the same, which exposed its residents to unwanted criminal activities
affecting their lives, security, and property. As a result, the Angeles City Council reclassified
Diamond Subdivision as exclusively residential. However, the peace, order, and security
situation in the subdivision did not improve.

Thereafter, Diamond Homeowners approved the "No Sticker, No ID, No Entry" Policy
(the Policy). Under the Policy, visitors on vehicles who sought to enter the premises must
leave with the subdivision guards their identification cards, which they may reclaim upon
leaving the subdivision. residents with vehicles may obtain stickers to identify themselves so
that they did not need to surrender any identification card.

William G. Kwong, a resident who runs motels in the subdivision under his company,
William G. Kwong Management, Inc., however, contested the Policy, alleging that the
subdivision roads, being public roads, are for public use, and outside the commerce of man,
having been donated to the Angeles City government, thus, only the government has the
power to regulate the use of such public roads; and that the Diamond Homeowners, through
the contested policy, unduly converted the said roads to private ones, and pursuant thereto,
usurped the local government’s authority.

The respondent argues that while the local government units own the lots, their
enjoyment, possession, and management are retained by the homeowners and their
association.

ISSUE:
May a homeowners' association regulate passage into a subdivision for the safety and
security of its residents, even if its roads have already been donated to the local government?

RULING:
Yes, Diamond Subdivision was authorized in enacting the Policy.
 Under Section 16 of the Local Government Code or the General Welfare Clause, local
governments have the power to govern the welfare of those within its territorial jurisdiction.
This includes the power to close and open roads, whether permanently or temporarily. More
relevantly, local governments may also enact ordinances to regulate and control the use of
the roads, to wit:

SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The

Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section
17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, shall:
xxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges,
parks and other public places and approve the construction,
improvement, repair and maintenance of the same.

Nonetheless, homeowners' associations are not entirely powerless in protecting the

interests of homeowners and residents. Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957 recognizes
the need for a homeowners' association to promote and protect their mutual interest and
assist in community development:

SECTION 30. Organization of Homeowners Association. - The owner or

developer of a subdivision project or condominium project shall initiate the
organization of a homeowners association among the buyers and residents of
the projects for the purpose of promoting and protecting their mutual interest
and assist in their community development.

Further, the Court, in its long line of decisions, acknowledged the right of
homeowners' associations to set goals for the promotion of safety and security, peace,
comfort, and the general welfare of their residents. In Spouses Anonuevo v. Court of Appeals,
the Court affirmed that ownership of public spaces is with the local government, while
enjoyment, possession, and control are with the residents and homeowners.

Here, the Policy maintains the public nature of the subdivision roads. It neither
prohibits nor impairs the use of the roads. It does not prevent the public from using the roads,
as all are entitled to enter, exit, and pass through them. The Policy, likewise, neither denies
nor impairs any of the local government's rights of ownership. It still has the power to
temporarily close, permanently open, or generally regulate the subdivision roads.
Furthermore, Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended, on the donation of
subdivision roads to the local government, was enacted to remedy the situation prevalent at
that time where owners/developers fail to keep up with their obligation of providing and
maintaining the subdivision roads, alleys, and sidewalks. Evidently, the donation was for the
benefit of the subdivision's homeowners, and residents.

Thus, the donation of the roads to the local government should not be interpreted in
a way contrary to the legislative intent of benefiting the residents. Conversely, residents
should not be disempowered from taking measures for the proper maintenance of their
residential area. To rule against it would be contrary to the intention of the law to protect
their rights. A homeowners' association may regulate passage into a subdivision for the safety
and security of its residents, even if its roads have already been donated to the local
government. It has the right to set goals for the promotion of safety and security, peace,
comfort, and the general welfare of its residents.
 THE FINAL DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS VESTED IN
COURTS. COURTS MAY DEVIATE FROM THE BASIC FORMULA PROVIDED BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IF IT FINDS, IN ITS DISCRETION, THAT OTHER
FACTORS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DETERMINATION OF
JUST COMPENSATION. DEVIATION, HOWEVER, MUST BE GROUNDED ON A
REASONED EXPLANATION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. ABSENT
THIS, THE DEVIATION WILL BE CONSIDERED AS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUCY GRACE AND ELMA GLORIA
FRANCO, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT VICENTE GUSTILLO, JR.,
G.R. No. 203242; March 12, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari is filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines,
assailing the CA decision which affirmed the Special Agrarian Court’s (SAC) fixing of the
value of just compensation of the lands at P1,024,115.49.

Lucy Grace and Elma Gloria Franco (the Francos) were registered owners of parcels
of agricultural land in Brgy. Maquina, Dumangas, Iloilo. They offered the parcels of land for
sale to the DAR under the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the CARP. Out of the 14.444 hectares,
the 12.5977 were acquired and distributed to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries.

The Francos did not agree to the initial valuation of the land but they withdrew the
amount from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Dissatisfied by the amount, the Francos
filed a complaint for determination of just compensation with the SAC. SAC fixed the just
compensation in the amount of P1,024,115.49.

LBP argues that in determining just compensation, the SAC expanded the basic
general formula in Administrative Order No. 5 by taking the average between its valuation
and the market value of the properties based on its respective tax declarations. The CA
affirmed the just compensation determined by the SAC. LBP filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
May the Courts deviate from the basic formula provided by administrative agencies
in determining just compensation?

RULING:
Yes, Courts may deviate from the basic formula provided by administrative agencies
in determining just compensation.

This Court has long held that settlement of the value of just compensation is judicial
in nature. while the formula prescribed by the Department of Agrarian Reform requires due
consideration, the determination of just compensation shall still be subject to the final
decision of the special agrarian court.
 As this Court held in Alfonso v. Land Bank, any deviation to the basic formula made
in the exercise of judicial discretion must be "supported by a reasoned explanation grounded
on the evidence on record." A computation by a court made in "utter and blatant disregard of
the factors spelled out by law and by the implementing rules" amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. It must be struck down.

The special agrarian court sitting in a condemnation action may adopt the value
computed using the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In its
exercise of original jurisdiction, the special agrarian court may deviate from the formulas if
it can show that the value is not equivalent to the fair market value at the time of the taking.
However, an allegation is not enough. The landowner must allege and prove why the formula
provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform does not suffice.

Here, the Special Agrarian Court's computation of just compensation resulted in a

"double take up" (averaging the price of the land, as computed based on the Department
guidelines, and the land's market value as appearing in the tax declaration) of the market
value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already been
considered in Palmares as a departure from the mandate of law and basic administrative
guidelines because it destroys the affordability of the land to the farmer-beneficiaries. A
computation by a court made in “utter and blatant disregard of the factors spelled out by law
and by the implementing rules” amounts to grave abuse of discretion, hence, must be struck
down.

Therefore, the petition is granted and the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the SAC is reversed and set aside.
 AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS STANDING TO APPEAL THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION'S REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION. IN SUCH INSTANCES, IT IS INCLUDED IN THE CONCEPT OF A
"PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED" BY A DECISION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION GRANTED THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs. AURORA A. SALVAÑA

G.R. No. 192074; June 10, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review filed by the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a
government-owned and -controlled corporation, to modify the Civil Service Commission's
finding that respondent was guilty only of simple dishonesty.

The Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), Melquiades Robles,
issued an Office Order revoking respondent Atty. Aurora A. Salvaña's designation as Officer-
in-Charge (OIC) of the LRTA Administrative Department. It "directed her instead to handle
special projects and perform such other duties and functions as may be assigned to her" by
the Administrator. Instead of complying, Salvaña questioned the order with the Office of the
President. Salvaña applied for sick leave of absence and submitted a medical certificate. But
later on, LRTA discovered that Salvaña submitted a falsified medical certificate

After the investigation, the LRTA’s Fact-finding Committee issued a resolution

"finding Salvaña guilty of all the charges against her and imposed on her the penalty of
dismissal from service with all the accessory penalties." Salvaña appealed with the Civil
Service Commission. In her appeal, she claimed that she was denied due process and that
there was no substantial evidence to support the charges against her. The Civil Service
Commission modified the decision and found that Salvaña was guilty only of simple
dishonesty. She was meted a penalty of suspension for three months. LRTA moved for
reconsideration of the resolution which was denied. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and affirmed the Civil Service Commission's findings. Hence, LRTA filed this present
petition.

ISSUE:
Does LRTA have the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission?

RULING:
Yes, the LRTA has the right to appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission.

It is settled that "[t]he right to appeal is not a natural right [or] a part of due process;
it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law." If it is not granted by the Constitution, it can only be availed
of when a statute provides for it. When made available by law or regulation, however, a
person cannot be deprived of that right to appeal. Otherwise, there will be a violation of the
constitutional requirement of due process of law.
 Article IX (B), Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that the Civil Service
Commission shall be "the central personnel agency of the Government." In line with the
constitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a public trust, the Commission was
tasked with the duty "to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the
selection, utilization, training, and discipline of civil servants." Civil servants enjoy security
of tenure, and "[n]o officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed
except for cause as provided by law and after due process."

In this case, petitioner already decided to dismiss respondent for dishonesty.

Dishonesty is a serious offense that challenges the integrity of the public servant charged. To
bar a government office from appealing a decision that lowers the penalty of the disciplined
employee prevents it from ensuring its mandate that the civil service employs only those
with the utmost sense of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Thus, the Supreme
Court hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who
may appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee
was either overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission.
 NOTICE AND HEARING ARE NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY ACTS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE-MAKING POWER. FOR ITS RULES
AND REGULATIONS TO BE VALID, PUBLICATION IS NOT REQUIRED, BUT
ONLY THE FILING OF THREE (3) CERTIFIED COPIES THEREOF BEFORE THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER.

QUEZON CITY PTCA FEDERATION, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and Prohibition prays that respondent
Department of Education’s Department Order (DO) No. 54, Series of 2009 be nullified for
being unconstitutional and contrary to law, and that a writ of prohibition permanently
enjoining the Department of Education and all persons acting on its behalf from enforcing
the assailed Department Order be issued. The Petition also prays that, in the interim, a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued, restraining the
enforcement of the DO.

The Department of Education (DepEd) issued the assailed DO entitled “Revised

Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the School Level” in response
to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs. The DO provides,
among others, that the approval of the school head is a prerequisite for PTAs to be organized;
that the elected presidents of the Homeroom PTAs shall elect the Board of Directors, who
shall elect from among themselves the executive officers of the PTA; that the term of office
of the Board of Directors shall only be for 1 year; and, that the Board Director shall serve not
more than 2 consecutive terms.

Aggrieved, herein petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation invoked, among others,
that the DO was issued without prior public consultation and publication, thus violative of
its right to due process.

ISSUE:
Is the implementation of the said DO violative of the petitioner’s right to due process
for the supposed lack of public consultations and non-publication?

RULING:
No, the issuance of the DO is not violative of the petitioners’ right to due process.

As to the supposed lack of public consultations, it is settled that notice and hearing
are not essential when an administrative agency acts pursuant to its rule-making power. In
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Cloribel, the Court ruled that previous notice and hearing,
as elements of due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested
property rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or event which
has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of persons or enterprises, unless
the law provides otherwise. Further, it cited 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and
Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453 which provides:

xxx It may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential
to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in
the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its
acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing.

In any case, petitioner’s claim that no consultations were held is belied by the
Department of Education’s detailed recollection of the actions it took before the adoption of
the assailed Department Order: (1) DepEd created a task force to review, revise, or modify
D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 (the existing guidelines), in order to address numerous complaints
involving PTAs and PTCAs. The task force came up with draft guidelines after consultations
with parents, teachers and students; (2) the reconstituted task force, after soliciting
comments, suggestions and recommendations from school heads and presidents of PTAs or
PTCAs, submitted a draft of the "Revised Guidelines governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School
Level”; (3) the draft was submitted for comments and suggestions to the participants,
composed of regional education supervisors, presidents of regional federations of Supreme
Student Governments (SSG), and representatives from the SSG advisers to the Third National
Federation Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG) Conference; and (4) the draft was
subjected to further review and consultations, which resulted in the final draft of D.O. No.
54, s. 2009.

Likewise, the alleged non-publication does not invalidate the Department Order. As
is evident from the Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code, all that is required for
the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified
copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. To wit:

SECTION 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.
xxx

Further, the Administrative Code provides that within 15 days of filing, the
administrative rules become effective:

SECTION 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements

provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a
different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent
danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. xxx

Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

 DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT NECESSARILY
REQUIRE A TRIAL TYPE OF HEARING

MARIA THERESA G. GUTIERREZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 200628; January 13, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
withholding order and the COA’s decision holding petitioner Maria Theresa G. Gutierrez
(Gutierrez) liable for the P10,105,687.25 that was lost through robbery.

Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer at National Food Authority. At some time,

armed men took the undeposited collections under her care, which were stored inside
“pearless” boxes inside a cabinet. The COA demanded that Gutierrez produce the missing
funds. Thereafter, the COA directed the directed the withholding of Gutierrez's salaries so
these could be applied to the satisfaction of the shortage. Gutierrez requested relief from
money accountability for the loss of the collections. In response to the withholding order,
Gutierrez explained that she had to store them in such a way because of the volume of money.
Following such, COA’s Director upheld the withholding order, prompting Gutierrez to file a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that she was not given chance to file a
memorandum of appeal.

The COA denied her request and found her negligent in safekeeping her collections.
Petitioner then argued that she was first assisted by counsel only when she filed a notice of
appeal and that her right to due process was violated when a decision was rendered against
her without giving her a chance to file an appeal memorandum in accordance with Section 5
of Rule V of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. COA countered that Gutierrez was
not deprived of due process because her affidavit was a sufficient platform to raise her
defenses.

ISSUE:
Are petitioner’s due process rights violated when the COA Director failed to require
her to submit an appeal memorandum before deciding her appeal?

RULING:
No, the COA was correct in ruling that petitioner’s due process rights were not
violated and that petitioner was negligent in safekeeping her collections.

With respect to the right to counsel, the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of the
Civil Service Act provide that a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel
or not. As such, the right to counsel under Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution
applies in criminal proceedings, but not in administrative proceedings. It is a right given to
persons accused of an offense during criminal investigation. Any proceeding conducted by
an administrative body is not part of the criminal investigation or prosecution.
 Petitioner herein is not being accused of or investigated for a crime. The COA has no
jurisdiction to investigate a crime or to make a finding of criminal liability.

It should be noted as well that the right to appeal is not part of due process. Neither
is it a natural right. Therefore, petitioner’s due process rights were not violated when the
COA Director had failed to require her to submit an appeal memorandum before he decided
her appeal of the State Auditor’s issuance of a withholding order. There was also no violation
of due process rights when the COA issued its decision denying her request for relief from
accountability, without a petition for review of the COA Director’s decision.

With regard to petitioner’s due process rights in the course of the proceedings before
the COA, the SC provided that due process in administrative proceedings does not necessarily
require a trial type of hearing. Neither does it require an exchange of pleadings between or
among the parties. Due process is satisfied if the party who is properly notified of allegations
against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those
allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own
independent conclusions.

Here, petitioner’s arguments and the issues she raised are sufficiently expressed in
her affidavit submitted to the COA, her motion for reconsideration of the COA Director’s
decision, and her petition and memorandum submitted to this court. Even though petitioner
was not able to file an appeal memorandum, she was able to state her substantive defenses
in the pleadings she filed before the COA and this court.

The test of negligence in Picart v. Smith, Jr. may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what would
be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.

Petitioner is negligent because she failed to use “that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.” A cashier in her
position would have used the vault to keep her collections. Petitioner failed to do this. Her
negligence is made more pronounced by the fact that the collections kept in the vault were
not taken by the robbers.

For the reasons provided, petitioner cannot say that her due process rights were
violated for the lack of order to file an appeal memorandum, and petitioner cannot be relieved
from liability.
 AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS IS THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST
HIM OR HER. ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS IS COMPLIED WITH "IF THE
PARTY WHO IS PROPERLY NOTIFIED OF ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HIM OR
HER IS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF OR HERSELF
AGAINST THOSE ALLEGATIONS, AND SUCH DEFENSE WAS CONSIDERED BY
THE TRIBUNAL IN ARRIVING AT ITS OWN INDEPENDENT CONCLUSIONS".

ALBERTA DE JOYA IGLESIAS vs. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 180745; August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition filed by Alberta De Joya Iglesias (Iglesias) prays that the
decisions of the CA affirming the Office of the Ombudsman Resolution and the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Joint Order dismissing Iglesias from service be set aside.

Iglesias was the Acting District Collector of the Bureau of Customs. The Department
of Finance, through Atty. Leon L. Acuña and Troy Francis C. Pizarro, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit against Iglesias before the Office of the Ombudsman for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and falsification.

The. complaint alleged that Iglesias failed to file her Statements of Assets, Liabilities,
and Net Worth prior to the year 2000; she has made false entries in her 2000, 2001, and 2002
SALNs with respect to her properties’ mode of acquisition; she has undeclared real properties
and has acquired properties amounting to over 15 million pesos, disproportionate to her
lawful source of income; she has made false representations with regard her educational
attainment; and she falsified her Personal Data Sheet.

Iglesias responded that she has filed her annual SALNs since 1989, copies of which
she attached in her Counter-Affidavit; she did not falsify her 2000-2002 SALNs; she acquired
the alleged illegally acquired properties either by purchase or inheritance through loans; her
educational attainment was correctly stated in her resume; and lastly, the false date on her
Personal Data Sheet was a typographical error.

On February 7, 2005, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) held

that Iglesias failed to justify the substantial increase in her net worth from 1989 to 1990. She
also acquired the Baguio, Parañaque, and Novaliches properties from 1994 to 2000.
Ombudsman Marcelo found that she obtained housing loans amounting to millions which
were not supported by evidence. Hence, Ombudsman Marcelo considered them "spurious or
non-existent, meant only to cover up the rapidly increasing assets of [Iglesias]."

Iglesias was found guilty of the administrative offense of DISHONESTY and GRAVE
MISCONDUCT. Thus, she is ordered DISMISSED from the service. Moreover, Iglesias was
found liable for violation of Art. 171 (Falsification) and Art. 183 (Perjury) of the Revised Penal
Code.
 Iglesias insists that the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was based on new
accusations that were not included in the Complaint Affidavit.

ISSUES:
1. May the Ombudsman base its Resolution on new accusations that were not included in
the Complaint Affidavit?
2. Was the petitioner denied of her right to due process?

RULING:
1. No. This Court sternly reminds the Ombudsman that he cannot add new findings which
were not part of the original complaint. To do so would violate the right of the accused
to due process. An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the charges against him or her. A proper appraisal of the
accusations would give the accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his or her
defense. Otherwise, substantial justice would be undermined.

2. No. Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an
opportunity to be heard. Due process is complied with "if the party who is properly
notified of allegations against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or
herself against those allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in
arriving at its own independent conclusions."

Considering the above, this Court finds that there was a violation of due process with
respect to the other charges which were not in the original complaint. However, a reading
of the Office of the Ombudsman Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from service
not solely on the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of
anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs, which she was informed of and was given
the opportunity to refute.

Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999 SALNs were disregarded,
petitioner would still be liable for the discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs. These
discrepancies were stated in the Complaint Affidavit and were given clarification by
petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move
for reconsideration of the Office of the Ombudsman February 7, 2005 Resolution. These
circumstances preclude petitioner from claiming that she was denied her right to due
process.
 AN OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION SUCH AS A POLICE SHOW-UP IS
INADMISSIBLE IF IT IS TAINTED WITH IMPROPER SUGGESTIONS BY POLICE
OFFICERS

MELKY CONCHA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 208114; October 3, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition filed by Melky Concha (Concha) prays that the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cabagan, Isabela, finding Concha and Romeo Managuelod (Managuelod)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping be reversed and set aside.

Two criminal Informations was filed against Marlon Caliguiran, Alvin Tamang,
Concha, and Managuelod, charging them with two counts of carnapping for allegedly holding
up and robbing Michael Macutay taking his motorcycle, Seiko watch, t-shirt, and wallet. At
the police station, the police presented to Macutay five (4) persons to be identified. Macutay
pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and Caliguiran as the persons who robbed him. The RTC
found Concha and Managuelod guilty of carnapping on the sole basis of Macutay’s out-of-
court identification.

Concha and Managuelod filed an appeal arguing that the out-of-court identification
was not valid as it was conducted through a police show-up, not a lineup, since only the four
suspects were presented to Macutay for identification. However, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC.

Concha argues that the procedure conducted by the police officers in identifying the
perpetrators of the crime charged is seriously flawed and gravely violated the petitioners'
right to due process, as it denied them their right to a fair trial to the extent that their in-
court identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible suggestions.

ISSUE:
Whether due process was observed when the RTC found Concha guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged, on the basis of Macutay’s out-of-court identification.

RULING:
NO. Due process was not afforded to Concha as the RTC found them guilty on the
sole basis of Macutay’s out-of-court identification. Due process was not complied in the out-
of-court identification of the sole witness as it did not pass the totality of circumstances test.
Further, due process was not complied when the RTC found Concha guilty without proof
beyond reasonable doubt, as the basis of the judgment is the identification which did not pass
the totality of circumstances test.

The court citing People v. Teehankee, jr., stated that out-of-court identification is
conducted by the police in various ways. Courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.

The Court ruled that the identification did not pass the totality of circumstances test
to comply with due process for the following reasons: Macutay failed to provide descriptions
of his attackers; Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of
attention; It was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of petitioners; and,
the out-of-court identification was tainted with improper suggestion.

The Court found that the identification was tainted with improper suggestion for the
following reasons: Macutay was invited by the police to identify his assailants knowing that
he would meet his assailants; The police showed four people which is the same number of
people that attacked him; and, there was no prior description of his assailants, it was highly
likely that Macutay's identification was tainted with apparent suggestiveness.

Furthermore, the Court stated that an accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process
clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal.
 WITH THE BEARING OF ARMS BEING A MERE PRIVILEGE GRANTED BY THE
STATE, THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONERS'
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN REQUIRING A LICENSE FOR THE POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS.

ERIC F. ACOSTA, et. al. vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al.

G.R. No. 211559, 211567, 212570, 215634; October 15, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Court resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the IRR for allegedly violating
petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to privacy.

On March 25, 2014, licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta) and Nathaniel G.
Dela Paz (Dela Paz) filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the
constitutionality of the some of the provisions of the law and the IRR for allegedly violating
petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to privacy. Acosta and Dela Paz's
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 211559.

On December 23, 2014, PROGUN filed another Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus, still with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction. Docketed as G.R. No. 215634, the Petition was brought on the ground that the
PNP exceeded its rule-making power by (a.) making additional and more restrictive
regulations for gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders, gunsmithing, competitions, and
indentors; (b.) charging numerous and unreasonable licensing fees under the IRR; and (c.)
adding penal provisions in the IRR.

ISSUE:
Is the requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm a valid exercise of police
power and, therefore, not violative of the right to due process?

RULING:
Yes, requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm a valid exercise of police
power.

With the bearing of arms being a mere privilege granted by the State, there could not
have been a deprivation of petitioners' right to due process in requiring a license for the
possession of firearms. This Court has held that "laws regulating the acquisition or possession
of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power."

Republic Act No. 10591, which regulates the use of firearms, is a valid police power
measure. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection of people from violence are
not only for the good of the general public; they are fundamental duties of the State, the
fulfillment of which strengthens its legitimacy. The means employed to fulfill these State
duties-requiring a license for the ownership and possession of firearms and a permit to carry
the weapon outside of residence-are reasonably necessary. Licenses to operate firearms have
been required under the old firearms laws. For Congress, stricter gun laws are effective in
reducing gun-related violence.
 IT IS THE POLICE OFFICER WHO SHOULD OBSERVE FACTS THAT WOULD
LEAD TO A REASONABLE DEGREE OF SUSPICION OF A PERSON. THE POLICE
OFFICER SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE SUSPICION INITIATED BY ANOTHER
PERSON.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA

G.R. No. 200334; July 30, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This appeal to the decisions of the RTC and the CA was filed by Victor Cogaed after
both courts found him guilty for violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).

Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan "received a text message from an unidentified
civilian informer" that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would]be
transporting marijuana." The police senior inspector organized checkpoints to intercept the
suspect. A passenger jeepney arrived at one of the checkpoints and the jeepney driver
signaled to the police, pointing at Cogaed and one Dayao. When asked about the contents of
their bag, the two immediately answered that they didn’t know as they were transporting
the bags as a favor for their barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the
bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers.

The trial court initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that Cogaed at that
time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was
about to do so or that had just done so. However, the trial court stated that notwithstanding
the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed waived his right to object to such irregularity when he did
not protest when the police asked him to open his bag. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this appeal was filed.

ISSUE:
Is the stop and frisk search valid?

RULING:
No. The search involved in this case was a kind of a warrantless search and seizure
known as “Stop and Frisk” (sometimes referred to as Terry searches). In this kind of search
and seizure, law enforcers are given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses.
However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in.
A basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree
of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably
searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security
of one’s person and effects.

It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a
"genuine reason" to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception.

Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be
"presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a
reasonable inference of criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures." Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not
result in a reasonable search.

Here, there was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case. The person searched
was not even the person mentioned by the informant. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. Moreover, the assessment of
suspicion in the present case was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver.
Clearly, the police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person.
 ROUTINE BAGGAGE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED BY PORT AUTHORITIES,
ALTHOUGH DONE WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANTS, ARE NOT
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES PER SE. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
PROTECTING PRIVACY SHOULD NOT BE SO LITERALLY UNDERSTOOD SO AS
TO DENY REASONABLE SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE
TRAVELING PUBLIC.

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209387; January 11, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the decisions of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court’s Judgment finding Erwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possessing
unlicensed firearms.

Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. Dela
Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he
allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. He left his baggage unattended for 15 minutes.
Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray
scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela
Cruz’s bag. She called the attention of the port personnel who was the baggage inspector
then. When asked if the bag was his, Dela Cruz answered in the affirmative and consented
to port personnel’s manual inspection. The bag was then inspected and inside were 3
revolvers and four 4 live ammunition placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had
the proper documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was
then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also
informed of his constitutional rights. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act
No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms. Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to the charge
during arraignment.

The trial court held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable.
when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunition, the accused
is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a
warrant. The CA affirmed.

Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. He
had no actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. Respondent
argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure,
thus warranting his conviction. The firearms were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at
the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure. According to respondent, this case
is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted by airport personnel pursuant
to routine airport security procedures.

ISSUE:
Is the search and seizure valid?
RULING:
Yes, the search and seizure is valid in this case.

The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and

seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays
down the exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle;
(4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.

The first point of intrusion occurred when the petitioner presented his bag for
inspection to port personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning
the x-ray machine station. The evidence obtained against the accused was not procured by
the state acting through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of
Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the
acts of private individuals. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant
must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in this case, and without the intervention of police authorities,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. The protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Searches pursuant
to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.
There is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of
travel.

The second point of intrusion was when the baggage inspector opened the petitioner's
bag and called the attention of the port police officer. The Court ruled that the search at this
point is also not unreasonable. The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and
policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. The presentation of the
petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to
present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or
inspected. Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects
for port security measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the
possible harm to society caused by lawless persons.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred during petitioner’s

submission to port security measures. After detection of the firearms through the x-ray
scanning machine and inspection by the baggage inspector, port officer was called to inspect
the petitioner's bag. It was after the port personnel’s inspection that port officer’s attention
was called and the bag was inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.

Therefore, the Court finds respondent’s argument that the present petition falls under
a valid consented search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search
conducted on the petitioner's bag is valid.
 FOR A "STOP AND FRISK" SEARCH TO BE VALID, IT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE SUCH THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE SUSPICIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES OBSERVED BY THE ARRESTING OFFICER LED HIM OR HER
TO BELIEVE THAT AN ACCUSED WAS COMMITTING AN ILLICIT ACT

GREGORIO TELEN Y YCHON V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 228107, October 9, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari against CA’s decision upholding RTC’s
judgment finding Gregorio Telen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

At 2:30pm, PO3 Mazo was at Petron Gas Station waiting for his turn to gas up his
motorcycle behind Telen. After filling up his motorcycle's gas tank, Telen drew out his wallet
from his right back pocket. This caused his shirt to be pulled up, revealing a part of his waist.
PO3 Mazo saw a metal part of what appeared to be a hand grenade tucked in Telen's right
waistband. PO3 Mazo then called his superior to report and ask for back-up.

As instructed by his superior, PO3 Mazo tailed Telen. At around 5:00pm, he received
a call informing him that his back-up was already positioned in the area. When Telen
returned to his motorcycle, PO3 Mazo approached him. The officer placed his arm around
Telen's shoulder and patted his right waist. He introduced himself as a police officer and
warned Telen not to make any untoward movement. He then pulled out the metal object
from Telen's waist and confirmed that it was indeed a hand grenade.

PO3 Mazo arrested Telen and apprised him of his constitutional rights. He then
frisked Telen and recovered three (3) small plastic sachets of white crystalline substance from
him. The substance seized was later confirmed to be shabu. Criminal charges were then filed
against Telen.

RTC found Telen guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ruled that the warrantless arrest
against Telen was lawful since he was caught in flagrante delicto with a hand grenade. It
maintained that since a lawful warrantless arrest took place, the warrantless search incidental
to the arrest was also lawful. CA affirmed the conviction on appeal. Hence, this petition
wherein Telen contends that he was unlawfully searched and arrested.

ISSUE:
Was the stop-and-frisk search valid?

RULING:
No, the stop-and-frisk search was not valid.

The fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is guaranteed by no

less than the Constitution. Stop and frisk search, although necessary for law enforcement and
to deter crime, should always be balanced with a citizen's right to privacy. While probable
cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate
it. For a valid stop and frisk search, this Court instructed in Manibog v. People that the
arresting officer should have personally observed at least two (2) or more suspicious
circumstances.

In this case, PO3 Mazo's testimony demonstrates his lack of personal knowledge of
suspicious circumstances that would have created the suspicion of a crime being committed
or about to be committed. Without any other reason, PO3 Mazo had a sense of foreboding
due solely to the sight of a metal object on petitioner's waist. This lone circumstance is clearly
inadequate to lead him to a genuine reason to justify the search. Such insufficiency is even
bolstered by the fact that PO3 Mazo had to tail petitioner and pat his right waist before he
could confirm his suspicion. Suspicion alone is not sufficient to defeat petitioner's
constitutional right to privacy. PO3 Mazo's mere hunch, in the absence of any other
circumstance of which he had personal knowledge, does not satisfy the requirements for a
valid stop and frisk search.

Thus, the warrantless search is rendered illegal and, concomitantly, the seized sachets
of illegal drugs are inadmissible. Their inadmissibility as evidence precludes conviction and
constrains this Court to acquit petitioner.
 COMELEC DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE
ENJOYMENT OF THE PREFERRED RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
EXERCISED BY A NON-CANDIDATE.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205728; January 21, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
In a petition for certiorari and prohibition, Diocese of Bacolod as represented by Most
Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra prays that the questioned orders of respondent Comelec and
Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon as Election Officer of Bacolod City in removing the tarpaulin posted
by petitioners be declared as unconstitutional and void, and permanently restraining
respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted tarpaulins with approximately six feet by ten
feet in size on the front walls of the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod within public view.
The tarpaulin in question contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro- RH) Team Patay” with an “X”
mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. The next day, respondent
Majarucon, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials within three days from receipt
for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two
feet by three feet. On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering
the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against petitioners. Thus, concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for
their exercise of free speech petitioners initiated the present case.

The Supreme Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed
notice and letter. Respondents argued that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under the Constitution. Hence, the
issuances are valid and constitutional. Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.

ISSUE:
1. Can the Comelec regulate the tarpaulin posted by petitioner?
2. Does the notice and order by Election Officer Majarucon and Comelec Law Department
as well as the posting by petitioners of its tarpaulin violates the principle of separation of
church and state?

RULING:
1. No, COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Petitioners invoke their “constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and
beliefs about issues and candidates.” The court has held free speech and other intellectual
freedoms as “highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.” These rights enjoy
 precedence and primacy. A similar idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969,
which was Justice Barredo’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC:

In the language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, “The Philippines is a

republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them” (Section 1, Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the
Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only
by officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is on this
cornerstone that I hold it to be self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and
peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or
as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute
and timeless. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo
exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is
only in this way that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people.

Also, While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates
and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate,
political party, or party list group. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within
the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for
consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. It is clear that this paragraph
suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

2. No, Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech.

Article II of the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. As discussed
in Estrada v. Escritor a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. In the case at bar where it may be said that petitioners’
reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression on the tarpaulin
is an ecclesiastical matter, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding
upon the court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH
Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and
not religious speech.
 INORDINATE DELAY IN THE RESOLUTION AND TERMINATION OF A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WILL RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED. DELAY, HOWEVER, IS NOT DETERMINED
THROUGH MERE MATHEMATICAL RECKONING BUT THROUGH THE
EXAMINATION OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING EACH
CASE. NONETHELESS, THE ACCUSED MUST INVOKE HIS OR HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE FAILURE TO DO SO
COULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURTS AS A WAIVER OF RIGHT.

CESAR MATAS CAGANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 206438; July 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
These Petitions for Certiorari question the Sandiganbayan's denial to quash the
Informations and Order of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman's
alleged inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.

On February 10, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous

complaint alleging that Cagang committed graft and corruption by diverting public funds
given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as "dummies." On August 11,
2004 the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Cagang with Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. This
Resolution, however, was modified by the Resolution dated October 18, 2004, which ordered
the conduct of further fact-finding investigation against some of the other respondents in the
case. This further fact-finding was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12,
2005. On August 8, 2011, or six (6) years after the recommendation to file informations against
Cagang was approved by Tanodbayan, Assistant Special Prosecutor submitted the
informations for Ombudsman's review. Informations against Cagang were filed on November
17, 2011.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of
Arrest arguing that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motions to
Quash/Dismiss. Cagang argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him
violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor alleges that Cagang, should have invoked his right to speedy
disposition of cases when the case was still pending before the Office of the Ombudsman, not
when the Information was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Is there inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary
investigation which violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of
cases, that should result in the dismissal of the case against the accused
RULING:
No, while there was delay, the accused has not shown that he asserted his rights
during the pendency of the case since 2003 and only invoked his right to speedy disposition
of cases when the informations were filed in 2011.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary

investigation violates the accused's right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases,
and may result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay
depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules.
If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the
respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that
the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.

The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere
mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case. Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of
how much time a competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the
complexity of a given case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to
satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional rights must also be
examined on a case-to-case basis.

Here, six (6) years is beyond the reasonable period of fact-finding of ninety (90) days.
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency of the case since 2003, Cagang only
invoked his right to speedy disposition of cases when the informations were filed on
November 17, 2011. Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he
asserted his rights during this period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed
against him with the Sandiganbayan.

This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition
of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely,
granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the State.
 THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE AN ADVERSE WITNESS IS
A BASIC FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. HOWEVER, THIS IS
PERSONAL TO THE ACCUSED, WHO CAN WAIVE THE RIGHT.

KIM LIONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200630; June 04, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition assails the decisions of the Court of Appeals finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the orders by the RTC declaring that Kim Liong (Liong)
to have waived his right to cross-examine prosecution witness Antonio Dela Rama (Dela
Rama).

Liong was charged with estafa for allegedly failing to return to Equitable PCI Bank,
despite demand, a total of US$50,955.70, which was erroneously deposited in his dollar
account.

Antonio Dela Rama was presented as prosecution witness after several resetting of
the case. his cross-examination was set on March 15, 2007. On March 15, 2007, Atty. Banares
appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Ponon, Liong's counsel of record. Atty. Banares
moved for the resetting of the hearing to April 19, 2007. On April 19, 2007, the hearing was
again reset on the instance of Liong because he terminated the services of Atty. Ponon who
was allegedly a fraternity brother of the private prosecutor.

Atty. Banares failed to appear on different occasions, thus, the private prosecutor
moved that Liong be declared to have waived his right to cross-examine Dela Rama. The
Motion was granted by the trial court.

Liong Alleges that to allow Dela Rama’s testimony to remain on record without Liong
having to cross-examine him would be extremely damaging to the defense. He claims that
the cross-examination of Dela Rama was reset 13 times of which only four (4) are attributable
to him while the rest are due to reasons beyond his control, such as witness Dela Rama's
stroke and the absence of the public prosecutor.

ISSUE:
Did the accused waive his right to cross-examine the witness?

RULING:
Yes, the accused waived his right to cross-examine the witness.

Like any right, the right to cross-examine may be waived. It is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right
of cross-examination. When an accused is given the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
but fails to avail of it, the accused shall be deemed to have waived this right.
 Here, Liong was given more than enough opportunity to cross-examine witness Dela
Rama. Contrary to his allegation, five (5) of the cancellations are attributable to him. Further,
no gross negligence is attributable to petitioner's counsel. Ordinary diligence and prudence
could have prevented the cancellation of the hearings. If there is any negligence in this case,
it is that of petitioner himself. For failure to avail himself of the several opportunities given
to him, he is deemed to have waived his right to confront and cross-examine witness Dela
Rama.
 THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES IS A RELATIVE AND
FLEXIBLE CONCEPT. IT IS ALSO WAIVABLE AND MUST BE SEASONABLY
RAISED. WHEN CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, THE ASSERTION OF THE
RIGHT ULTIMATELY DEPENDS ON THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE; HENCE, CITING TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN WILL NOT
AUTOMATICALLY RESULT IN A DISMISSAL ON THE GROUND OF
INORDINATE DELAY.

IGNACIO C. BAYA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION)

G.R. Nos. 204978-83; July 6, 2020
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Certiorari filed by Ignacio C. Baya (Board Member Baya) alleges
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying his Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and eventually issuing a warrant for his arrest.

In 2001, the "Aid to the Poor" program, which grants financial assistance to its poor
constituents, was implemented by the provincial government of Zamboanga.

In 2003, complaints were filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao criminal and administrative complaints against the Governor, Vice-Governor, and
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan alleging irregularities in the implementation of
the "Aid to the Poor." in March 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman requested the
Commission on Audit (COA) to conduct an audit investigation. On February 19, 2004, the
COA, reported that there were anomalies in the implementation of the "Aid to the Poor"
program. The Ombudsman docketed the COA report as a formal charge.

On July 10, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Board
Member Baya, together with 31 other co-respondents, of malversation of public funds
through falsification of public documents and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

On September 22, 2010, three (3) Informations for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act along with three (3) Informations for Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Public Documents were filed before the Sandiganbayan against Board
Member Baya, as well as some members of his staff.

On October 6, 2010, Board Member Baya filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with prayer for dismissal of the cases against him. He maintained, among
others, that his right to speedy disposition of cases was seriously violated when it took the
Office of the Ombudsman almost seven (7) years to finish the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of cases was violated.
RULING:
No, his right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.

The right to speedy disposition of cases protects citizens from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays in the conduct of any case filed against them, whether the case be
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative.

Violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases has a serious consequence: it

results in the dismissal of the case. Particularly for criminal cases, the dismissal is with
prejudice, and the accused may no longer be indicted for the same offense on the ground of
right against double jeopardy. Thus, dismissal on speedy disposition grounds has been
characterized as a "radical relief." What constitutes "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive"
delay is determined not by mere mathematical reckoning but in an ad hoc, case-to-case basis.

Courts, therefore, perform a delicate balancing act in determining whether or not a

person's right to speedy disposition of cases is violated. The four (4) factors — (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the respondent's assertion of the right; and (4)
prejudice to the respondent — are to be considered together, not in isolation. The interplay
of these factors determine whether the delay was inordinate. Thus, it said that the right to
speedy disposition of cases is a relative and flexible concept. This fluidity, however, gives rise
to possible subjectivity and inconsistency in determining whether a case was disposed within
an acceptable period of time.

Addressing this, this Court in Cagang directed the Office of the Ombudsman to
promulgate specific time periods for resolving complaints for preliminary investigation. The
party with the burden of justifying the delay would then depend on when the delay occurred,
that is, before or after the lapse of the time periods set. If the perceived delay occurred within
the time periods, the defense has the burden of proving that the delay was inordinate. If the
delay occurred after the time periods set, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the
delay. Courts are now mandated to apply Cagang on the mode of analysis for resolving claims
of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, we find no violation of petitioner's right to

speedy disposition of cases. The preliminary investigation lasted six (6) years, six (6) months,
and three (3) days, beginning on February 19, 2004, when the Ombudsman docketed the
Commission on Audit's audit report as a formal charge, up to September 22, 2010, when the
Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The time the Commission on Audit took
to conduct its audit investigation from March 2003 to February 19, 2004, which was about 11
months, is not considered part of the proceedings for preliminary investigation but only for
fact-finding purposes. The audit investigation was merely preparatory for the filing of the
formal complaint before the Ombudsman should the Commission on Audit find anomalies in
the transactions.

The six-and-a-half years it took the Ombudsman to resolve the criminal complaints
was not vexatious, capricious, or oppressive. These reasons — (1) number of persons charged;
(2) the degree of review needed to unravel the scheme; (3) the numerous pleadings filed; (4)
the voluminous documents and testimonies for review; and (5) the participation of petitioner
— justify the time it took the Ombudsman to finally file the information in court.
 A CORPORATION, WHETHER WITH OR WITHOUT AN ORIGINAL CHARTER,
IS UNDER THE AUDIT JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT SO
LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT OWNS OR HAS CONTROLLING INTEREST IN IT.

ADELAIDO ORIONDO, et.al. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 211293; June 4, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition under Rule 64 filed by petitioners who had received honoraria and cash
gifts for concurrently rendering services to Corregidor Foundation, Inc., assails the
Commission on Audit (COA) Decision and Resolution disallowing the payment of the
honoraria and cash gifts to them for being contrary to DBM Budget Circular on the payment
of honoraria and Article IX-B, Section 8 of the Constitution prohibiting the payment of
additional or double compensation.

The Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) approved the creation of Corregidor

Foundation, Inc. (CFI), a foundation for the development of Corregidor. CFI was incorporated
under SEC. The PTA executed a MOA with CFI which required that the disbursements of the
PTA's funds by CFI shall be subject to the audit of the Internal Auditor of the PTA and the
COA. Thereafter, the Audit Team noted personnel of the PTA who were concurrently
rendering services in CFI received honoraria and cash gifts in 2003. The COA issued Notice
of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the honoraria and cash gift paid to the petitioners.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Notice of Disallowance which

was denied by the Legal Adjudication Office-Corporate of the COA, holding that CFI is a
government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). The appeal was likewise denied. The
Commission Proper held that CFI is a GOCC subject to Budget Circular and Article IX-B,
Section 8 of the Constitution.

Petitioners argue that the COA has no power to determine whether an entity is a
GOCC. Petitioners maintain that the COA had no jurisdiction to conduct a post-audit of
Corregidor Foundation, Inc.'s disbursements on the basis of its own determination of
Corregidor Foundation's status as a GOCC. The COA argues that it has the competence to
make such determination. Pursuant to its constitutional duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and expenditures of the government, including GOCCs,
COA maintains that the determination of the status of an entity as a GOCC is but a "necessary
incident to the performance of its duties and the discharge of its functions.”

ISSUE:
Is the Corregidor Foundation, Inc. a GOCC under the audit jurisdiction of the COA?

RULING:
Yes, CFI is a GOCC under the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

The Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines define the powers of the COA. Based on the foregoing provisions,
the COA generally has audit jurisdiction over public entities. In the Administrative Code's
Introductory Provisions, the COA is even allowed to categorize GOCCs for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of its powers, functions, and responsibilities with respect to such
corporations. The extent of the COA’s audit authority even extends to non-governmental
entities that receive subsidy or equity from or through the government.

This Court upheld the competence of the COA to determine the status of an entity as
a GOCC. Even a cursory reading of the statutory definitions of "government owned-or
controlled corporation" readily reveals that a non-stock corporation may be government-
owned or controlled. These definitions begin with “a government-owned or controlled
corporation” and refers to a “stock or non-stock corporation. . .” Furthermore, there is nothing
in the law which provides that government-owned or controlled corporations are always
created under an original charter or special law.

It is immaterial whether a corporation is private or public for purposes of exercising

the audit jurisdiction of the COA. So long as the government owns or controls the
corporation, as in this case, the COA may audit the corporation's accounts. Just because the
employees of CFI are not under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission does not
mean that CFI is not government-owned or controlled. Article IX-B, Section 2(1) of the
Constitution is clear that the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission is over GOCCs
with original charters, not over those without original charters like CFI. Lastly, while it is
true that just like any other corporation organized under the Corporation Code, CFI may
determine voluntarily and solely the successors of its members in accordance with its own
by-laws, this does not change the public character of its functions and the control the
government has over it. the promotion and development of tourism is a public function and,
as provided in its Articles of Incorporation, the members of CFI must be government officials
who shall hold their membership by reason of their office.

In sum, CFI is a GOCC. Thus, it is under the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit.
 INDIVIDUALS BELONGING TO INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES WHO
ARE CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL OFFENSES CANNOT INVOKE IPRA OF 1997
TO EVADE PROSECUTION AND LIABILITY UNDER COURTS OF LAW

HA DATU TAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA) vs. LAPINID

G.R. NO. 221139; March 20, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Mandamus filed by petitioner Roderick D. Sumatra (Sumatra), also
known as Ha Datu Tawahig and tribal leader of the Higaonon Tribe, prays that respondent
Judge Estela Alma Singco (Judge Singco) and her co-respondents, all public prosecutors from
Cebu City, be compelled to honor a Resolution issued by the "Dadantulan Tribal Court"
absolving Sumatra of liability for charges of rape, and be required to put an end to Sumatra's
criminal prosecution.

Lorriane Fe P. Igot (Igot) filed a Complaint- Affidavit charging Sumatra with rape. The
prosecutor finding probable cause filed the corresponding information. a warrant for
Sumatra’s arrest was issued.

Following his arrest, Sumatra filed a Motion to Quash and Supplemental Motion to
Quash. Invoking the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), he argues lack of jurisdiction
because the controversy is purely a dispute involving indigenous cultural communities over
which customary laws must apply in accordance with their tribal justice system and under
the jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. The motion was denied
by Judge Singco reasoning that “IPRA does not apply [to] the prosecution of a "dispute" such
as this case as it does not involve claims over ancestral domain nor it relates (sic) to the rights
of indigenous communities/people which would require the application of customary laws
and practices to resolve the "dispute" between the parties herein.”

Sumatra notes that Igot had already brought her accusations against him before the
concerned Council of Elders and that the Dadantulan Tribal Court was subsequently formed
which cleared him from criminal, civil[,] and administrative liability.

ISSUE:
Does the IPRA prohibit the courts from taking cognizance of criminal cases involving
indigenous peoples?

RULING:
No, IPRA does not compel courts of law to desist from taking cognizance of criminal
cases involving indigenous peoples.

Petitioner anchors his plea on Section 65 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, which
reads:
 SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes
involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the
dispute.

Among the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's provisions on self- governance and
empowerment is Section 15:

SECTION 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions, and Peace

Building Processes. — The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own
commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace
building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices
within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the
national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Section 15 limits indigenous peoples' "right to use their own commonly accepted
justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and
other customary laws and practices[.]" It explicitly states that this right is applicable only
"within their respective communities" and only for as long as it is "compatible with the
national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights."

Section 65 ought not be read as an all-encompassing, unqualified authorization.

Rather, it must be viewed within the confines of how it is a component of a larger mechanism
for self-governance. Section 65 is qualified by Section 15. With respect to dispensing justice,
resolving conflicts, and peace-building, the application of customary laws and practices is
permissible only to the extent that it is in harmony with the national legal system. A set of
customary laws and practices is effective only within the confines of the specific indigenous
cultural community that adopted and adheres to it.

The impetus for preservation does not exist in a vacuum. The 1987 Constitution
qualifies the State's duty of "recogniz[ing] and promot[ing] the rights of indigenous cultural
communities" as necessarily operating "within the framework of national unity and
development." This reference to "national unity" is as much an articulation of an ideal as it is
a legal formulation. Thus, it entails the imperative of legal harmony. Customary laws and
practices are valid and viable only to the extent that they do not undermine the proper scope
and application of legislative enactments, including criminal statutes.

The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not compel courts of law to desist from
taking cognizance of criminal cases involving indigenous peoples. It expresses no correlative
rights and duties in support of petitioner's cause. Thus, a writ of mandamus cannot be issued.
 REASSIGNMENTS DIFFER FROM TRANSFERS, AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES WITH
APPOINTMENTS THAT ARE NOT STATION-SPECIFIC MAY BE REASSIGNED
TO ANOTHER STATION IN THE EXIGENCY OF PUBLIC SERVICE

MARILYN R. YANGSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

G.R. No. 200170; June 3, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition assails the CA Decisions which affirmed Marilyn R. Yangson’s
reassignment as valid and consistent with law and jurisprudence.

Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson), Principal III, was personally served a Memorandum

issued by then Asst. Schools Division Superintendent O.I.C Fidela Rosas (Rosas) reassigning
her from Surigao National High School (Surigao National) to Toledo S. Plantilo Memorial
National High School (Toledo Memorial). Yangson filed before the RTC a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for TRO and Damages alleging that the Memorandum violated DEPED
Circular No. 02, series of 2005, as it failed to specify the duration of her reassignment and
was issued without her prior consultation. Moreover, the reassignment would cause
diminution in her rank.

The RTC denied Yangson’s petition ruling that she did not have a vested right over
her position at Surigao National because her appointment as Principal III was not station-
specific. The DepEd Regional and Central Offices ruled that Yangson could be assigned to
any school as her appointment was not station-specific, and her reassignment was within the
prerogative of the head of office for the exigency of service. On appeal, The CSC reversed
and ruled in favor of Yangson and found that her reassignment did not comply with the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which provides that no teacher shall be transferred
without his consent from one station to another.

The DEPED appealed to the CA, which ruled that Yangson’s reassignment did not
violate the Magna Carta and that since her appointment was not station-specific, she could
be assigned to any school.

ISSUE:
Is Yangson’s reassignment valid?

RULING:
Yes, Yangson’s reassignment is valid.

When an employee’s appointment is station-specific, his or her reassignment may not

exceed a maximum of one (1) year. This is not the case for appointments that are not station-
specific. In such instances, the reassignment may be indefinite and exceed one (1) year.
 The legal concept of reassignment differs from transfer. Most notably, a transfer
involves the issuance of another appointment, while a reassignment does not. In Sec. 24 (c)
of the Civil Service Law, transfer is defined as a movement from one position to another
which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance
of an appointment. Reassignment, on the other hand, is defined in Sec. 24 (d) of the same law
as a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same agency;
Provided, that such reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status, or salary.
Furthermore, Sec. 26, paragraph 7 of the Administrative Code allows any government
department or agency that is embraced in the civil service prerogative to reassign employees.
Accordingly, in Department of Education, Culture, and Sports v. CA, this Court affirmed the
reshuffling of principals in the exigencies of service.

In the case at bar, the RTC, DEPED, and the CA all found that petitioner’s
appointment was not station-specific. It is settled that factual findings of the lower tribunals
are entitled to great weight and respect absent any showing that they were not supported by
evidence, or the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. Accordingly, Yangson’s
appointment was not station-specific. Her reassignment may be indefinite and exceed one (1)
year.

Furthermore, Yangson’s reliance on Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers does not apply here. Verily, Section 6 of the Magna Carta applies to transfers, not
reassignments. As can be seen from the Memorandum, Yangson was being reassigned in the
exigency of service. Accordingly, her movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial
was a simple reassignment, not a transfer. Finally, it bears noting that Yangson’s position at
Toledo Memorial is still Principal III. She retains the same rank, status, and salary, and is
expected to exercise the same duties and responsibilities. She was not given a menial job as
to constitute constructive dismissal or diminution in her rank and status.

Hence, Marilyn Yangson’s reassignment from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial

is valid and in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
 NEXT-IN-RANK RULE DOES NOT GIVE EMPLOYEES A VESTED RIGHT TO THE
POSITION NEXT HIGHER TO THEIRS SINCE APPOINTMENT IS
DISCRETIONARY AND SO LONG AS THE APPOINTEE POSSESSES THE
QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY LAW, AN APPOINTMENT IS VALID.

ANGEL ABAD v. HERMINIO DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 207422; March 18, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Angel Abad assails the CA decision
which affirmed the CSC Resolution affirming the permanent appointment of Herminio Dela
Cruz as City Government Department Head III.

Dela Cruz was appointed as the City Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa
with the item of City Government Department Head III. The appointment was concurred by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod and the CSC granted the appointment through a resolution.

Abad, the Local Assessment Operations Officer V requested for the disapproval of the
said appointment to the CSC. He alleged that the position of City Government Department
Head III (SG 27) was nine salary grades higher than Dela Cruz’s former position (SG 18). He
contends that this violated Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No.
3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than three
(3) salary grades above his or her former position. He also added that he, the next-in-rank in
the position and other three other qualified applicants were excluded from the selection
process.

The CSC-NCR invalidated Dela Cruz’s appointment in violation of the three-salary-

grade rule. On Dela Cruz’s appeal, the CSC reversed the CSC-NCR’s decision. According to
the CSC, Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection process rendering his appointment “very
meritorious.” Abad filed for a reconsideration but was denied by the CSC. A Petition for
Review was filed before the CA, but was also dismissed. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
Is Dela Cruz’s promotion void because it violated the next-in-rank rule?

RULING:
No. Dela Cruz’s promotion is valid.

The Constitution adopt the merit system to ensure that those appointed in the civil
service are competent. This is to "eradicate the system of appointment to public office based
on political considerations and to eliminate . . . the element of partisanship and personal
favoritism in making appointments." An appointive local government employee must possess
the qualifications provided by law for the positions they hold.

The next-in-rank rule is there to maintain the policy of merit and rewards in the civil
service. Since appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed
that the appointments of employees next-in-rank are equally meritorious. Appointments that
consider rank, salary grades, and seniority promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil
service.

Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion.
The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to
theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the
appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law,
the appointment is valid. Who to appoint is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

Since Dela Cruz possesses the minimum qualifications for the position of City
Government Department Head III, his appointment is valid. Moreover, his promotion from a
Salary Grade 18 to a Salary Grade 27 position was a "very meritorious case" since he has gone
through a deep selection process.

Therefore, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is denied.

 CONDUCT UNBECOMING A PUBLIC OFFICER AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL
TO THE BEST INTEREST OF SERVICE, WHILE SIMILAR IN NATURE, ARE
DEFINED AND PENALIZED AS TWO DISTINCT OFFENSES UNDER LAW AND
CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS.

AMADEL C. ABOS vs. SALVADOR A. BORROMEO IV,

CLERK III, BRANCH 45, RTC of SAN JOSE
A.M. No. P-15-3347; July 29, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint for grave misconduct and “conduct unbecoming
a public employee” against Salvador A. Borromeo IV, Clerk III, Branch 45, RTC of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.

Amadel C. Abos (Abos) filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). She alleged that she was the daughter of Leticia Abos, the shared
tenant of an 8-hectare agricultural land. When the ownership of the said property was
transferred to Elsa Aguirre, owner’s daughter, Elsa allegedly refused to recognize Abos or the
members of her family as tenants of the land.

Abos alleged that Salvador A. Borromeo (Borromeo), together with a member of the
Philippine Army known only as “July”, and a certain Elvie Magbanua, arrived in the property
and uprooted 150 coconut seedlings. She alleged that July threatened to kill her and her family
if they did not leave the property. In his Comment, Borromeo alleged that his mother, Elsa
Aguirre, was the absolute owner of the property and that he was only exercising his mother’s
legal right over it. He insisted that the previous owner of the property only had paid laborers,
not tenants, before the land was transferred to her mother.

The OCA recommended that Borromeo be found guilty only of conduct unbecoming
a public official. According to the OCA, where the misconduct committed was not in
connection to the performance of duty, the proper offense is conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, not grave misconduct. It further found that Borromeo should not have
acted in a scandalous manner but instead should have sought judicial remedies to assert his
right over the property.

ISSUE:
Is conduct unbecoming a public officer and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service pertains to one and the same offense?

RULING:
No, conduct unbecoming a public officer and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service are two distinct offenses. While these offenses are similar in nature, law and
jurisprudence, however, impose a different penalty for each.

“Public service is a public trust”. In line with the constitutional mandate for
accountability in public servants, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713) was enacted. Sec. 4(a) of the law outlines the norm
of conduct expected of public officials and employees, namely, commitment to public interest,
professionalism, justness and sincerity, political neutrality, responsiveness to the public,
nationalism and patriotism, commitment to democracy, and simple living. Any violation of
these norms of conduct holds the offender liable for conduct unbecoming a public officer.

Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, is defined by
Largo v. CA as any misconduct “which need not be related or connected to the public officers’
official functions but tends to tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office.” This
court has previously characterized certain acts as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
service: seeking the assistance of an elite police force for a purely personal matter; changing
the Internet Protocol (IP) address on a work computer to gain access to restricted websites;
and fencing in a litigated property in order to assert ownership.

Here, Borromeo admitted to uprooting Abos’ coconut seedlings. He argues that even
assuming that he did utter threats to Abos, he only did so in order to assert his family’s rights
over the disputed property. Borromeo carried with him the title and status of his office as he
supported and defended one of the parties in a dispute that had not yet even been resolved
in the proper manner. As a court employee, he should have been aware that there was a
judicial remedy. Least of all, he should have accorded each of the parties a modicum of
fairness. While Borromeo’s acts are not connected to his official functions as a Clerk III of
the RTC of San Jose, he is bound by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6713 to exhibit the highest
degree of professionalism not only in his official duties but also in his personal endeavors.
As a court employee, he is expected to uphold the image of the judiciary not only within the
confines of the Hall of Justice but also in his personal dealings with the public

In this case, Borromeo is guilty of both conduct unbecoming a public officer and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
 THE PENDENCY OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OF
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DOES NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE
EXECUTION OF THE PENALTY OF THE DISMISSAL IMPOSED UPON A PUBLIC
OFFICE

ELMER P. LEE vs. ESTELA V. SALES

G.R. No. 205294; July 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition assails the decision of the RTC dismissing the petition for
injunction and/or prohibition and damages filed by petitioner Elmer Lee against Sales, et al.

Lee and his wife (Sps. Lee), both Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Officer I,
was found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman of dishonesty and grave misconduct for
failing to disclose their interest in four (4) corporations in their 2001 to 2006 Statement of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The complaint alleged that Sps. Lee’s acquired
wealth was disproportionate to their legitimate incomes. The Ombudsman held that they had
the willful intent to violate Sec. 7 of RA 3019, in relation to Sec. 8 of RA 1379, when they
failed to declare their true, detailed, and sworn statements of their business and financial
interests.

While Lee’s motion for reconsideration was pending, he was directed to return all
government assets and documents, to transfer all his accountabilities, and to surrender his
Identification Card. Lee informed BIR of his pending motions for reconsideration, but Sales,
the Deputy Commissioner of the Legal Inspection Group, insisted on petitioner Lee’s
dismissal.

ISSUE:
Does a pending motion for reconsideration stay the execution of a decision of the
Ombudsman dismissing a public officer from service?

RULING:
No, a pending motion for reconsideration does not stays the execution of the
Ombudsman.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of
the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions. Only a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, stays the
immediate implementation of the said Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.

Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the integrity of public

service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its independence, this Court has adopted
a general policy of non-interference with the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial
and investigatory powers. Hence, the Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of
2006, which provides that "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course," shall govern the resolution of this case.

Furthermore, the immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective

measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to prevent public
officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence witnesses or tamper with
records.
 THE PROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENT ONLY APPLY TO
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND NOT TO APPOINTMENTS MADE BY
LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA v. HILARIO M. MARCO

G.R. No. 202331, April 22, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition filed by the Province of Aurora assails the CA decision affirming
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) resolution granting the permanent appointment of
Hilario Marco’s as Cooperative Development Specialist II.

Governor Ramoncita Ong permanently appointed Hilario M. Marco as Cooperative

Development Specialist II five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the Province.
Then, Bellaflor Angara-Castillo was elected as Governor replacing Ong. During the executive
meeting the Provincial Budget Officer Clemente manifested that no funds are available to
pay for the salaries of Ong’s appointees including Marco. She issued a Letter recalling the
previously issued certification of the availability of funds.

Due to the recall of the certification, Marco’s appointment was disapproved CSC
Regional Office. Marco, thereafter, was advised to refrain from reporting for work. Marco
wrote the CSC Regional Office to reconsider the disapproval of his appointment which was
denied. Marco appealed before the CSC. The CSC granted Marco’s appeal ruling that Marco’s
appointment was valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds. As
to the Letter withdrawing the certification, the CSC ruled that it did not affect the validity of
Marco's appointment because the Province "failed to submit documentary evidence to
support its claim [that it had no funds to pay for the services of Governor Ong's appointees."

The case was appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). the Province argued that
Marco was a midnight appointee, therefore, his appointment was void. The CA affirmed the
CSC’s Resolution.

ISSUE:
Is Marco's appointment void on the ground that he was a midnight appointee?

RULING:
No, Marco's appointment was valid.

A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months

immediately prior to the next presidential election." Midnight appointments are prohibited
under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. Midnight appointments are prohibited
because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority
to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts which he [or she] ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her] successor."116 An outgoing
President should not "deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments."
 However, the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments only applies to
presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made by local chief executives.
In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that "there is no law that prohibits local
elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure."
Nonetheless, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, may "establish
rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service."

Here, Resolution No. 030918 was effective at the time Governor Ong issued the 26
appointments. The said resolution provides that appointments issued by elective appointing
officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved, except if the appointee is fully
qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election
Ban as shown in the Promotion and Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.
Although his appointment was made five (5) days before the end of Governor Ong's term,
Marco was fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes
before the election ban. As the Civil Service Commission found, Marco "applied for the
[position of Cooperative Development Specialist II] [and] passed the screening conducted by
the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) on February 12 & 13, 2004. Considering that Marco had
already accepted his appointment by the time the Province prevented him from assuming his
office, his appointment remains effective up to the present.

Hence, Marco's appointment was valid. The Civil Service Commission correctly
approved his appointment.
 THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
REQUIRES RECOURSE TO THE PERTINENT ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
BEFORE RESORTING TO COURT ACTION

INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 185622; October 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition filed by International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
assails the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) decision affirming the decisions of
the CTA Second Division which found that the City of Manila committed direct double
taxation when it imposed a local business tax under Section 21 (A) of Manila Ordinance No.
7794, as amended, in addition to the business tax already imposed under Section 18 of Manila
Ordinance No. 7794, as amended.

ICTSI was assessed for two (2) business taxes pursuant to Secs. 18 and 21(A) of Manila
Ordinance No. 7794, as amended. It paid under protest before the City Treasurer of Manila.
When the City Treasurer failed to decide ICTSI’s protest within 60 days, ICTSI filed before
the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. While the Petition was pending, the City
of Manila continued to impose the additional business tax, on ICTSI so that it would be issued
business permits. On June 17, 2003, ICTSI requested for a refund of its payments "in
accordance with Section 196 of the Local Government Code."

The RTC dismissed the petition ruling that when the City Treasurer continued to
collect, that means that the protest was denied and ITCSI should have appealed. By failing to
avail of the proper remedy, the assessments made against it became conclusive and
unappealable.

Meanwhile, ITCSI sent respondent several letters claiming for refund in years 2003,
2005, and 2007 to which the City Treasurer letter that it could not act favorably on petitioner's
claim for refund until there would have been a final judicial determination of the invalidity
of Section 21 (A).

ICTSI filed a Petition for Review before the CTA. The CTA Second Division set aside
the RTC Decision and partially granted ICTSI’s prayer for a refund. ICTSI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) arguing Sec.196 of LGC, not Sec. 195 applies to its claim. Its MR having
denied, ITCSI filed a Petition for Review before the CTA En Banc. The CTA En Banc found
that Secs. 195 and 196 of the LGC are two (2) separate and distinct remedies granted to
taxpayers, with different requirements and conditions. ICTSI cannot merely claim that by
complying with the reglementary period of protesting an assessment under Sec. 195, it had
already complied with the two (2)-year period stated in Sec. 196.
 ITCSI claims that there was no longer a need to make separate written claims for the
taxes paid but not covered by these claims for refund because it would have been an exercise
in futility since the claims were based on common grounds that the taxing authority had
already rejected. Since its basis for its claims for refund is a pure question of law, there is no
need for it to exhaust its administrative remedies.

City of Manila argues that ICTSI did not comply with Sec. 196 of the LGC since it
failed to comply with the requirement of filing a written claim prior to the institution of its
action with the RTC since it already filed the case for refund even before it paid the taxes
owed to respondents beginning the fourth quarter of 1999.

ISSUE:
Did ICTSI violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:
No, ICTSI did not violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires recourse to the

pertinent administrative agency before resorting to court action. When there is an adequate
remedy available with the administrative remedy, then courts will decline to interfere when
the party refuses, or fails, to avail of it. Nonetheless, the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is not always fatal to a party’s cause This Court has admitted of several exceptions
to the doctrine: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body
is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need
for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage
will be suffered; 7) when there is [no] other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8)when
strong public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and
10) in quo warranto proceedings.

In this case, the issue at the core of ICTSI’s claims for refund, the validity of Section
21(A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Section 1(G) of Manila Ordinance No.
7807, is a question of law. When the issue raised by the taxpayer is purely legal and there is
no question concerning the reasonableness of the amount assessed, then there is no need to
exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, petitioner’s failure to file written claims of refund for
all of the taxes under Section 21(A) with respondent City Treasurer is warranted under the
circumstances.
 THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES WILL BE
SET ASIDE WHEN REQUIRING IT WOULD ONLY BE UNREASONABLE UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

vs. CMC/MONARK/PACIFIC/HI-TRI JOINT VENTURE
G.R. No.179732; September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition seeks to assail the CA’s decision in affirming the award of the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) directing the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) to pay the CMC/Monark/Pacific/Hi-Tri J.V. (Joint Venture)
its money claims plus legal interest arising from their contract agreement.

The DPWH and the Joint Venture executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of the Pagadian-Buug Section, Zamboanga del Sur, road project. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint Venture's truck and equipment were set on fire. Few months
after, a bomb exploded at Joint Venture's batching plant. the bombing incident was reported
to be caused by members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Thereafter, the Joint Venture made several written demands for extension and
payment of the foreign component of the Contract. According to its letter, the project was
80% complete when it was halted. Subsequently, the Joint Venture filed a Complaint against
DPWH before CIAC.

According to petitioner, the filing of the claim before CIAC was premature, since
under CIAC rules, there must be an exhaustion of administrative remedies first before
government contracts are brought to it for arbitration. The Joint Venture claims that it sent
at least 17 demand letters to DPWH, four (4) of which were sent to the DPWH Secretary
directly.

ISSUE:
Is the case premature due to Joint Venture's non-compliance with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies?

RULING:
No, the case is not premature.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the concerned

administrative agency must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction
before an action is brought before the courts, otherwise, the action will be declared
premature.

Here, the Joint Venture had duly complied with the contractual obligation to exhaust
administrative remedies. A total of 17 demand letters were sent to the petitioner to no avail.
To require respondent to wait for the DPWH Secretary's response while respondent
continued to suffer financially would be to condone the petitioner's avoidance of its
obligations to respondent. In addition, the case would also fall within the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies since strict application of the doctrine will
be set aside when requiring it would only be unreasonable under the circumstances.
 DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT REQUIRE THE
SUBMISSION OF PLEADINGS OR A TRIAL-TYPE OF HEARING; HOWEVER,
REQUIRES THAT A PARTY IS DULY NOTIFIED OF THE ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST HIM OR HER AND IS GIVEN A CHANCE TO PRESENT HIS OR HER
DEFENSE

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 213581; September 19, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This reviews the decisions of the Commission on Audit (COA) finding Evelyn T. Yap
and Perry B. Dequita and other officers of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), Cotabato
Branch jointly and solidarily liable for cash shortage.

Mariam Gayak, Bank Officer III of the BSP, Cotabato Branch was assigned to the
Davao Regional Office. In light of Gayak's transfer, Verlina Silo and Yap were designated as
Acting Bank Officer III and Bank Officer II, respectively. Silo transferred her cash
accountabilities to Yap. Six months later, Gayak returned to the Cotabato Branch and Yap
had to turn over her cash accountability back to Silo. The COA upon examination found
shortages in Yap’s accountability. Silo admitted to Dequita, Manager of BSP, Cotabato
Branch, via text message that she misappropriated a portion of Yap's accountability when she
still had custody over it. Dequita immediately informed the Audit Team of Silo's admission,
which prompted the conduct of a piece-by-piece cash count. Silo executed an affidavit where
she admitted repeatedly stealing cash from her accountabilities for a period of about five
years. The COA directed Yap to explain and return the cash shortage. Yap denied
responsibility over the cash shortage and attached Silo's affidavit where she admitted sole
liability over the missing cash. The COA filed administrative charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, and criminal charges of malversation and violation of Section 3 (E) of Republic
Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against Dequita, Silo, and Yap before
the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found Silo liable of the administrative charge
against her but dismissed the administrative charges against Dequita and Yap. COA’s partial
motion for reconsideration (MR) was denied. COA did not appeal.

Meanwhile, BSP sent the COA a request for an evaluation of the status of Yap's
liability, considering the dismissal of the administrative case against her. The COA issued a
Decision denying the request to extinguish Yap's liability. The COA also held Dequita liable.
Its MR having been denied, BSP filed a Petition for Certiorari. It reiterates that it never filed
a case against Yap before the COA, neither did COA require the filing of any pleadings or
motions before it rendered the assailed Decision.

Petitioner maintains that it was only allowed an opportunity to be heard when it filed
its Motion for Reconsideration, which respondent denied, while Yap, Dequita, and the other
bank officers were never given the opportunity to present their own evidence. COA contends
that its review and evaluation of the counter-affidavits filed by Yap and Dequita before the
Office of the Ombudsman already satisfied the requirements of due process.
ISSUE:
Does COA’s review and evaluation of the counter-affidavits filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman already satisfied the requirements of due process in COA’s separate audit
proceedings?

RULING:
No, it is beyond dispute that Yap, Dequita, and the other bank officials of the BSP
Cotabato Branch were denied due process with the issuance of the assailed COA Decision.

Even though due process in administrative proceedings does not require the
submission of pleadings or a trial-type of hearing, due process is satisfied if the party is duly
notified of the allegations against him or her and is given a chance to present his or her
defense. Furthermore, due process requires that the proffered defense should have been
considered by the tribunal in arriving at its decision. This finds basis in Ang Tibay vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, which ruled that administrative due process only requires the
following:

(a) The party should be allowed to present his or her own case and submit supporting
evidence;
(b) The deciding tribunal must consider the party's evidence;
(c) There is evidence to support the tribunal's decision;
(d) The evidence supporting the tribunal's decision must be substantial or such
"relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion";
(e) The tribunal's decision was based on the evidence presented or the records of the
case disclosed to the parties;
(f) The tribunal's decision must be based on the judges' independent consideration of
the facts and law governing the case; and
(g) The tribunal's decision must be rendered such that the issues of the case and the
reasons for the decisions are known to the parties.

Respondent rendered its assailed Decision in blatant disregard to its own rules,
treating the request for opinion as a request for relief from accountability even if the former
did not include the required documents and comments or recommendations needed under
either the 1997 Rules or 2009 Rules. Furthermore, the request for opinion was filed by
petitioner alone, yet the assailed Decision found Yap, Dequita, and other bank officers of the
Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily liable, even if they were never parties to the request
for opinion or request for relief from accountability.

Thus, the assailed Decision violated the basic tenets of due process and must be
annulled and set aside. It was an error amounting to grave abuse of discretion to hold Yap
liable, and Dequita and the other bank officers of the Cotabato Branch jointly and solidarily
liable with Yap for the cash shortage without an actual complaint being filed and without
giving them the chance to defend themselves. However, in the absence of a complaint, this
Court cannot grant petitioner's prayer for this Court to render judgment relieving Yap,
Dequita, and the other bank officers from accountability over the cash shortage. Nonetheless,
the Office of the Ombudsman has already rendered judgment on Yap and Dequita's liability
by dismissing the administrative and criminal charges against them.
 THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY, WHEN
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, SHALL BE BINDING ON THE
COURTS. AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODY WITH JURISDICTION OVER
DISPUTES RELATIVE TO MINING RIGHTS, THE MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH DEFERENCE IN
RECOGNITION OF ITS EXPERTISE AND TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OVER
SUCH MATTERS

NAREDICO, INC. v. KROMINCO, INC.

G.R. No. 196892; December 05, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition filed by Naredico, Inc. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversing the decision of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). It asserts that the CA
erred in failing to take judicial notice of the factual findings of the DENR and for not giving
due credence to the findings of the MAB.

Krominco, Inc. entered into an Operating Contract with the DENR to explore, develop,
exploit, and use the chromite deposits within the Surigao Mineral Reservation. Naredico, Inc.
also applied for an Exploration Contract with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). The
MGB Director informed Naredico, Inc. that the area sought to be covered by its proposed
mineral production sharing agreement (PSA) overlapped with a portion of Krominco's final
operating area. Thus, Naredico filed a Petition before the DENR to cancel Krominco's
Operating Contract and declare its Survey Plan as void. The DENR Secretary declared the
Survey Plan as void.

Krominco filed before the MGB Panel of Arbitrators a Petition against Naredico. The
Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favor of Krominco. Naredico appealed before the MAB and the
latter awarded the area occupied with Krominco's structures to Krominco, and the free area
to Naredico. Acting on Krominco's Appeal, the CA reversed the MAB Decision. Naredico
claims that the CA erred in failing to take judicial notice of the findings of the involved quasi-
agencies.

ISSUE:
Are the findings of fact made by a quasi-judicial agency like the MAB binding on the
Courts?

RULING:
Yes, the findings of fact by the MAB, when supported by substantial evidence, are
binding on the courts.

In deference to its technical knowledge and expertise on matters falling within its
jurisdiction, the findings of a quasi-judicial body like the Mines Adjudication Board, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the courts. Chapter XIII of Republic Act
No. 7942 provides that the Panel of Arbitrators has exclusive and original jurisdiction on: (1)
disputes involving rights to mining areas; (2) disputes on mineral agreements or permit; (3)
disputes among surface owners, occupants, and claimholders/concessionaires; and (4)
disputes pending before the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and Department of Environment
and Natural Resources when the law was passed. Similarly, the Mines Adjudication Board
has appellate jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Panel of Arbitrators, while also
possessing specific powers and functions related to its quasi-judicial functions. As the
administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes relative to mining rights, the Mines
Adjudication Board's findings should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise
and technical knowledge over such matters. Accordingly, the Supreme Court grants the
present petition and reinstates the findings of the Mines Adjudication Board.
 DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY REMAINS LIMITED TO
PRESIDENT’S EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND OTHER CABINET SECRETARIES
AND DOES NOT EXTEND TO DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES OR
ASSISTANT DEPUTY SECRETARIES.

PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 212022; August 20,2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari challenging the Decision of Commission on Audit
(COA) that disallowed the Philippine Institute for Development Studies’ (PIDS) procurement
of group healthcare maintenance.

Administrative Order No. 402 authorized government agencies and government-

owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) to establish an annual medical checkup program.
The PIDS requested that it be authorized to establish a health maintenance program through
their membership in a private health maintenance organization, in lieu of the annual medical
checkup under AO 402. Initially, the request was approved by the Office of the President,
through the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary. Thus, PIDS entered into Health Care
Agreement with Philamcare. However, COA disallowed the amount which represented the
annual membership fees of PDIS employees under the Health Care Agreement. Again, PIDS
sought approval from the Office of the President. This time, the Executive Secretary granted
the request. Thus, PIDS continued to implement its health maintenance program and
executed various healthcare agreements. The Audit Team issued Disallowance Notice,
contending that program was violative of COA Resolution No. 2005-001, which prohibits the
procurement of healthcare insurance from private agencies and ultimately violative of AO
402. The COA upheld the Disallowance Notice.

Arguing that the President, through its Senior Deputy Executive Secretary and then
the Executive Secretary, allowed and granted the PDIS to avail of medical benefits and
continue to implement its annual and medical checkup program, the PDIS filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary have authority to exempt an agency from
the application of an administrative order?

RULING:
No, the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary has no authority to exempt an agency from
the application of an administrative order.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, each head of a department is, and
must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority. The doctrine remains limited to the President's
executive secretary and other Cabinet secretaries. It does not extend to deputy executive
secretaries or assistant deputy secretaries.
 It must be stressed that the Administrative Code explicitly grants the power to sign
papers by authority of the president to the executive secretary. It grants no similar authority
to a senior deputy executive secretary. In addition, while the executive secretary is likened
to a Cabinet secretary, a deputy executive secretary is equated to an undersecretary.
 DUAL CITIZENS ARE DISQUALIFIED FROM RUNNING FOR ANY ELECTIVE
LOCAL POSITION. THEY CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY RUN AND ASSUME OFFICE
BECAUSE THEIR INELIGIBILITY IS INHERENT IN THEM, EXISTING PRIOR TO
THE FILING OF THEIR CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY. THEIR CERTIFICATES
OF CANDIDACY ARE VOID AB INITIO, AND VOTES CAST FOR THEM WILL BE
DISREGARDED. CONSEQUENTLY, WHOEVER GARNERS THE NEXT HIGHEST
NUMBER OF VOTES AMONG THE ELIGIBLE CANDIDATES IS THE PERSON
LEGALLY ENTITLED TO THE POSITION.

ARLENE LLENA EMPAYNADO CHUA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 216607; April 5, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition assails the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) Resolutions directing the Board of Canvassers (BoC) to reconvene and proclaim
Krystle Marie C. Bacani (Bacani) as Councilor for having garnered the next highest number
of votes in the 2013 National and Local Election.

Arlene Llena Empaynado Chua (Chua) filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
Councilor. After the conduct of elections, Chua garnered the sixth highest number of votes.
She was proclaimed by the BoC. However, Imelda E. Fragata (Fragata) filed a petition to deny
due course and/or cancel Chua’s Candidacy. She specifically alleged that Chua is not a
Filipino citizen and prior to the filing of her candidacy he has been living in the United States
of America (USA) for at least 33 years and is a Green Card holder.

The Comelec 2nd Division annulled the proclamation of Chua on the basis that she
was a dual citizen and was disqualified to run for Councilor pursuant to Sec 40 of the LGC.
It found that although Chua reacquired her Filipino citizenship in 2011 by taking an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, she failed to take a sworn and personal
renunciation of her American citizenship required under Section 5(2) of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Comelec En Banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Is Chua qualified to run for the position of Councilor?

RULING:
No, Chua is disqualified to run for Councilor. Under Sec 40 of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
under Section 5 (2) of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, a sworn and
personal renunciation of foreign citizenship, in addition to oath of allegiance, is particularly
required of those seeking elective public office.
 Here, while Chua took an oath of allegiance, she failed to execute a sworn and
personal renunciation of her foreign citizenship.

Thus, Chua is a dual citizen correctly disqualified from running for the position of
Councilor in the Fourth District of Manila during the 2013 National and Local elections. with
her dual citizenship existing prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy, her Certificate
of Candidacy was void ab initio. She was correctly considered a non-candidate. All votes
casted for her were stray, and the person legally entitled to the position is Bacani, the
candidate with the next highest number of votes among the eligible candidates.
 DIVISOR USED IN COMPUTING SEATS FOR THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM SHALL
INCLUDE INVALID VOTES FOR PARTY-LISTS THAT ARE SUBSEQUENTLY
DISQUALIFIED. VOTES FOR PARTY-LISTS WHICH ATTAINED FINALITY IN
REGARD TO ITS DISQUALIFICATION PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS ARE NOT
INCLUDED IN THE DIVISOR

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192803; December 10, 2013
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
ARARO filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) ranked fiftieth (50th)
but did not obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. The result was based on the
Commission on Elections’ count of 29,750,041 votes for the Party-List System.

ARARO argues that the correct interpretation of the Party-list Law does not
distinguish between valid and invalid votes, such that votes for specific party lists are not the
same as votes for the party-list system. Thus, people whose votes were spoiled, or did not
vote for any party-list at all are still voters for the party-list system. The votes for the party-
list system include all those people who voted whether their votes were counted or not as
long as the mechanism for the selection of party-list is in place.

ISSUE:
Should “all” of the votes, valid or invalid, be included in the divisor to determine the
2% threshold?

RULING:
No, not all votes, valid or invalid, should be included in the divisor to determine the
2% threshold.

Votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified
should be counted as part of the divisor. However, following this rationale, party-list groups
listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Comelec to the voters prior to
such elections should not be included in the divisor.

Further, not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. The total
votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the determination of the
denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from the following:
improper shading or having no shade at all; existence of stray or ambiguous marks; tears in
the ballot; and/or ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under
the paper-based automated election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for
that vote that can be attributable to the voter’s action.
 In summary, the total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for
party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their motions for
reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases. However, votes made for those party-list groups whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections should be excluded if the electorate is
notified of the finality of their disqualification by the Commission on Elections. The divisor
also shall not include invalid votes.
 IN MULTI-SLOT OFFICE WHERE THERE IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE, THE
VOTES FOR NUISANCE CANDIDATE ALONE SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR
OF LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE; IF THERE ARE VOTES FOR BOTH NUISANCE
AND LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE IN THE SAME BALLOT, ONLY ONE VOTE
SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE.

REYNALDO S. ZAPANTA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 233016; March 5, 2019
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
In a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, Reynaldo S. Zapanta (Reynaldo) prays the
reversal of the resolutions of the Comelec declaring him a nuisance candidate and which
ordered that the votes he received be added to the votes received by private respondent Alfred
J. Zapanta (Alfred) pursuant to Dela Cruz v. Comelec where the Supreme Court held that the
votes for the nuisance candidate should be added to the votes for the bona fide candidate.

For the 2016 national and local elections, Reynaldo a member of Lakas-CMD, and
Alfred filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for city councilor of the Second District of
Antipolo City which is entitled to 8 seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Subsequently
Alfred filed before the Comelec a Verified Petition To Deny Due Course and/or To Cancel
COC of Reynaldo as Nuisance Candidate because Reynaldo indicated the name "Alfred" both
as his nickname in his COC and as his name in the official ballots, that it was designed to
mislead the voters to steal the votes intended for Alfred and that Reynaldo has no bona fide
intention to run for the office. Reynaldo in his counter submits affidavits showing that
“Alfred” has been long known as his nickname. The preferred name of the parties to appear
in the official ballot is “ZAPANTA ALFRED J.” for Alfred and “ZAPANTA ALFRED LAKAS”
for Reynaldo.

Subsequently, the Comelec En Banc declared Reynaldo a nuisance candidate and ruled
that according to Dela Cruz v. Comelec, the possibility of confusion in the names of
candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day,
cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system and pursuant
to the same case the votes in favor of Reynaldo should be credited to Alfred.

Reynaldo argues that if the votes he garnered will be added to the votes of Alfred,
then the electorate will be disenfranchised. The OSG commented that the votes Reynaldo
received should not be automatically credited in Alfred’s favor. Since voters can cast more
than 1 vote for the position of city councilor, the nuisance candidate and the bona fide
candidate may each receive a vote from a single voter. Thus, to add the votes cast for the
nuisance candidate to the votes cast for the bona fide candidate would be erroneous, as this
may result in the latter receiving 2 votes from the same voter.

ISSUE:
Is Reynaldo a nuisance candidate and if so, should all the votes pertaining to him be
credited to Alfred?
RULING:
Yes, Reynaldo is a nuisance candidate but not all the votes pertaining to him can be
credited to Alfred.

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the present case, the law

contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2)
candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the
attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a
strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate
will be considered stray and not counted for either of them.

Here, association to a political party per se does not necessarily equate to a candidate's
bona fide intent; instead, he or she must show that he or she is serious in running for office.
This, petitioner failed to demonstrate. Additionally, considering the names “ZAPANTA
ALFRED J.” and “ZAPANTA ALFRED LAKAS” the only way to distinguish Reynaldo from
Alfred is their number on the ballot and their affiliations. Other than that, a voter who wanted
to vote for "Alfred Zapanta," but only knows the name "Alfred" or surname "Zapanta," would
be confused on which oval to shade to reflect his or her choice. No other candidate for the
position of city councilor has either the name "Alfred" or "Zapanta." Reynaldo was not able
to sufficiently show that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname pertains only
to him. The affidavits he presented are not enough to show that he had been using the name
"Alfred" or that he is publicly known by that name. Alfred is more recognized by his
constituents as "Alfred Zapanta," being an incumbent city councilor who was running for
another term.

In crediting the votes in favor of Reynaldo to Alfred, the Dante ruling will not apply
since the said case only involves a single slot office where only one candidate can win for the
position. The recent promulgation of Santos clarified how the votes of nuisance candidates
in a multi-slot office should be treated. In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter may vote for more than one candidate.
Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple mathematical
formula of adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate with the
similar name. To apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting of votes
because there may be ballots containing votes for both nuisance and legitimate candidates.
Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for Reynaldo alone should be counted in
favor of Alfred; if there are votes for both Reynaldo and Alfred in the same ballot, then only
one vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not only discourage nuisance
candidates, but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters. Thus, to ascertain that the
votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of the legitimate candidate
with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the ballots. In those ballots that
contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one count of vote must be
credited to the legitimate candidate.
 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE PROVIDES THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS SHALL BE ENTITLED TO A 40% SHARE IN THE GROSS COLLECTION
THE STATE DERIVES FROM THE UTILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THESE NATURAL RESOURCES "WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION." IT IS CLEAR FROM THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS DEFINING
A LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT'S "RESPECTIVE AREA" THAT THE
REQUIREMENT OF CONTIGUITY SHALL NOT APPLY IF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT IS COMPRISED OF ISLANDS. WHEN THE TERRITORY
CONSISTS OF ONE (1) OR MORE ISLANDS, TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION CAN
ALSO BE EXERCISED OVER ALL WATERS FOUND INLAND, OR IN ANY AREA
THAT IS PART OF ITS SEABED, SUBSOIL, OR CONTINENTAL MARGIN, "IN THE
MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW[.]"

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN
G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941; January 21, 2020
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Provincial Government of Palawan asks this Court to reconsider its Decision which
declared that the Province was not entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas Project.

The Republic, through the Department of Energy, entered into Service Contract with
Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, for the drilling of the natural
gas reservoirs in the Camago-Malampaya area, about 80 kilometers from mainland Palawan.

Palawan filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief seeking a judicial
determination of its rights under Administrative Order (AO) No. 381, Republic Act No. 7611
and Section 290 of the Local Government Code (LGC). It seeks, in particular, for a judicial
declaration that it has territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
reservoirs, entitling it to an equitable share in the proceeds from the Natural Gas Project. AO
381, issued by President Ramos provided that the Province of Palawan was "expected to
receive about US$2.1 billion from the total government share of US$8.1 billion. RA 7611 or
the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act defines the coordinates of “Palawan”,
which when plotted, show that the Malampaya reservoirs are within the area known as
"Palawan."

Palawan argues that the area is located within the continental shelf of the
Municipality of Kalayaan, over which the province exercises territorial jurisdiction under
Presidential Decree No. 1596. since the Municipality of Kalayaan has territorial jurisdiction
over its continental shelf, which goes up to 200 nautical miles, its territorial jurisdiction
necessarily extends to the Camago-Malampaya area, which is barely 51 nautical miles from
the municipality. Moreover, both RA 7611 and AO 381 recognize Malampaya as part of
Palawan 's continental shelf.
 The Republic counters that while the Municipality of Kalayaan is within Palawan's
territory, there is nonetheless no law granting the province territorial jurisdiction over the
continental shelf between these areas, where Camago-Malampaya is located. It also
maintained that the area is beyond the boundaries designated by Presidential Decree No. 1596
and Act No. 422, as shown in the maps plotted by the National Mapping and Resource
Information Authority. It insists that any continental margin or shelf outside the metes and
bounds described in Presidential Decree No. 1596 does not form part of the Municipality of
Kalayaan and, thus, is beyond Palawan's territorial jurisdiction. It asserted that a local
government unit's territory only pertains to its land area and not to its waters.

ISSUE:
Does Province of Palawan have territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya
natural gas reservoirs entitling it, under Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution and Section
290 of the LGC, to a 40% equitable share in the proceeds from the Camago-Malampaya
Natural Gas Project.

RULING:
No, the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoirs are outside Palawan’s territorial
jurisdiction.

The LGC provides that local government units shall be entitled to a 40% share in the
gross collection the state derives from the utilization and development of these natural
resources "within their territorial jurisdiction." it is clear from the laws and regulations
defining a local government unit's "respective area" that the requirement of contiguity shall
not apply if the local government unit is comprised of islands. When the territory consists of
one (1) or more islands, territorial jurisdiction can also be exercised over all waters found
inland, or in any area that is part of its seabed, subsoil, or continental margin, "in the manner
provided by law[.]"

Here, none of the maps on record or the relevant laws could conclusively prove that
the Province of Palawan has territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
reservoirs.

The area is beyond the province's territory when the 15-kilometer boundary of the
Local Government Code and the Philippine Fisheries Code is applied. The area is also beyond
the Province of Palawan's territory when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Republic Act No. 9522, and the 1898 Treaty of Paris are applied. Likewise, the area is
beyond the province's territory when Presidential Decree No. 1596 is applied. Strictly
applying Republic Act No. 7611 to determine the Province of Palawan's territory poses a
problem: it excludes several municipalities that have always been part of the province,
namely Balabac, Cagayancillo, Busuanga, Coron, Agutaya, Magsaysay, Cuyo, Araceli,
Linapacan, and Dumaran. This results in a substantial alteration of its boundaries, an act that
can only be done through a plebiscite called for that purpose. Thus, Republic Act No. 7611
cannot be the basis to prove that the Camago-Malampaya reservoirs are within the Province
of Palawan.

The Court is, thus, constrained to uphold the ruling that the area remains under the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law. Therefore, Province
of Palawan was not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
project.
 NO REVERSAL OF THE RULING IN SERRANO DECLARING THE 3-MONTH CAP
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THE ISSUANCE OF BSP CIRCULAR NO. 799 DOES NOT
HAVE THE EFFECT OF CHANGING THE INTEREST ON AWARDS FOR
REIMBURSEMENT OF PLACEMENT FEES FROM 12% TO 6%

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY vs. JOY C. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139; August 5, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission's resolution dated March 31, 2004, declaring respondent's dismissal illegal,
directing petitioner to pay respondent's three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar
(NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and
pay her NT$300.00 attorney's fees.

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., (Sameer) is a recruitment and

placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles (Joy),
submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. Joy’s application was accepted.
She was then asked to sign a contract with a salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that she was
asked by Sameer to pay a placement fee of P70,000.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. LTD. (Wacoal), and agreed to work as quality control however, she was asked
to work as a cutter when she arrived.

On July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang asked Joy to get her salary and passport and
be prepared for immediate repatriation. Joy was informed that she only earned NT$9,000
because the amount of NT$3,000 was deducted for her plane ticket.

Joy filed a complaint on October 15, 1997 with the National Labor Relations
Commission against petitioner and Wacoal for illegal dismissal. She asked for the return of
her placement fee, repatriation costs , salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages.

Sameer alleged that the termination of Joy was due to her inefficiency, negligence,
and failure to comply with the work requirements. It also denied that it asked for a placement
fee of 70,000.00. Sameer also added that Wacoal’s accreditation with Joy was already
transferred to Pacific Manpower, to which the latter denied. It alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them.

ISSUE
1. Was Joy illegally dismissed?
2. Is Joy entitled to her salary for the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract?
3. Does the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the
interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation, applies
in this case?

HELD:

1. YES. Joy was illegally dismissed.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing
Joy's dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with
these standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly,
employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts
that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight
and vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or self-destruction of
the employer.” Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s
right to security of tenure.” Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid
or just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a
different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow
the principle of lex loci contractus.By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may
only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after compliance with procedural
due process requirements.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
a. The employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the
employee will be judged;
b. The standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and
c. The communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.

This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on regularization of probationary employees.

Assessing an employee’s work performance, however, does not stop after regularization.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or
she meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met
are set for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be
expected to meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not
communicated to him or her.

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown
to support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements
were not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of
respondent constituted inefficiency.
 There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as
to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title
was not clear.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements.
Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on
July 14, 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month from her first workday. She
was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The
abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified and
given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was
violated.

2. Yes. Since Joy started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, she
is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998, or for the entire unexpired
period.

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the
reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of
respondent’s termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was
amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

The clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No.
10022 in 2010. However, the Supreme Court is confronted with a unique situation. The
law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional, without
any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

The Supreme Court reiterated its finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting
wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months
is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

3. Yes. The interest demandable is only 6% per annum, following the BSP Circular.

Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates, these interest rates
do not apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. “A
Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.”

Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, the Supreme Court laid down the
guidelines in computing legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:

With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and

compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:

a. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
 extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
b. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
c. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers
are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per
annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No. 8042,
the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on
awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of
Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.

The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799
because the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
 GENERAL RULE ON INTEGRATION; ALL ALLOWANCES ARE GENERALLY
INTEGRATED INTO THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE'S STANDARDIZED
SALARY RATES, SUBJECT TO 7 ENUMERATED EXCEPTIONS

NAPOLEON S. RONQUILLO, ET AL.

vs. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 172593; April 20, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Petition is an offshoot of the Regional Trial Court's disposition of Special
Civil Action for Mandamus for the payment of Cost of Living Allowance (COLA).

Petitioners Napoleon S. Ronquillo, Jr., Edna G. Raña, Romeo Refruto, Ponciano T.

Antegro, and 151 others are former employees of National Electrification Administration
(NEA). Before July 1, 1989, NEA paid its employees their COLA, which was equivalent to 40%
of their basic pay, in addition to their basic pay and other allowances. On July 1, 1989, RA
No. 6758 or the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, became the new salary
standardization law applicable to all government officials and employees providing that, as a
general rule, all allowances are already included in the new standardized salary rates. Thus,
NEA discontinued paying the COLA of its employees from July 1, 1989. The Department of
Bureau and Management issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 which states that
allowances given on top of basic salary shall be "discontinued without qualification”.
However, it was eventually struck down for lack of publication. Thereafter, NEA paid the
COLA of its employees from July 1, 1989 to July 15, 1999. Circular 10 was then reissued.
Eventually, The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted providing
for a framework to restructure the power industry, reorganizing NEA. Ronquillo, Jr., et al.
were given separation pay, excluding their COLA, from July 16, 1999 until their separation
from service on November 7 or December 31, 2003. They demanded the pay for their COLA
but was refused. Ronquillo Jr., et al. filed a Special Civil Action for Mandamus before the
Regional Trial Court which was denied. The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied.
They appealed directly before this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

Ronquillo, Jr., et al. argued that the second sentence of Section 12 of Republic Act No.
6758 which states that "Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized." serves as the basis for their entitlement to the COLA.
They argue that they are still entitled to the balance of their COLA benefits from July 16, 1999
up to November 7 or December 31, 2003, the date of their separation from service. They claim
that the COLA was not integrated into their standardized salary rate. According to them, the
non-payment of their COLA is a diminution of compensation.

NEA, et al. argued that the publication of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
terminated Ronquillo, Jr., et al.'s entitlement to COLA. The lack of legal basis for their COLA
claims means that mandamus cannot compel NEA, et al. to release payment for such claims.
They claim that there is no diminution of benefits, and that Ronquillo, Jr., et al. failed to show
that the COLA was not yet integrated into their salaries. They state that if they released funds
for the payment of the COLA, they would be at risk of violating Technical Malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE
Are petitioners Ronquillo, Jr., et al. entitled to the payment of the COLA?

HELD
NO. Ronquillo, Jr. et. al. are not entitled to COLA.

Republic Act No. 6758 and its implementing rules, Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10, have already included the COLA in the government worker's standardized salary
rates. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758 states the general rule on integration. That is to
say, all allowances are generally integrated into the government employee's standardized
salary rates.

By exception, Section 12 provides for seven (7) types of allowances that do not form
part of basic pay, or non-integrated allowances. All other allowances, save for these items,
are deemed included in the government employee's standardized salary. These are as follows:
1. Representation and transportation allowances (RATA);
2. Clothing and laundry allowances;
3. Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5. Hazard pay;
6. Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
7. Such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may
be determined by the Department of Budget and Management

The six (6) non-integrated allowances have clearly omitted the COLA. This is because
the COLA is not an allowance that seeks to reimburse expenses incurred in the fulfillment of
the government worker's official functions. Rather, as this Court has ruled in Gutierrez, et al.
v. Department of Budget and Management, et al., the COLA is meant to cover for the
government employee's rising cost of living.

The COLA is absent in the list of the Department of Budget and Management's
determined non-integrated allowances. Therefore, based on a clear reading of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6758, vis-à-vis Sections 5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.
10, the COLA has already formed part of petitioners' standardized salary rates on July 1, 1989,
the date of effectivity of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

The COLA falls under "all allowances'' referred to in the first sentence of Section 12:
"All allowances . . . shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein
prescribed." Nothing in the exceptions found in Section 12 mentions the COLA.

Furthermore, Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 specifically includes the

COLA granted to employees of government-owned and controlled corporations as part of
their basic salary beginning July 1, 1989. Under Presidential Decree No. 269, NEA is a
government-owned and controlled corporation.
 Thus, the applicable laws and jurisprudence establish that the former NEA employees
are not entitled to COLA back pays for two (2) reasons: Republic Act No. 6758 does not
mention the COLA as an exception to the general rule on integration; and Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 provides that a public corporation such as NEA has already
incorporated the COLA in its employees' basic pay.

No law mandates respondents to give NEA's former employees their COLA back pays.
Expressly forming part of a government employee's salary under Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10, and not expressly excluded by Republic Act No. 6758, the COLA is considered
integrated into the standardized salary rates of petitioners effective July 1, 1989.

Thus, respondents have no legal authority to give the claimed balance of petitioners'
COLA benefits. The payment of allowances or fringe benefits integrated in the basic salary,
whether in cash or in kind, is considered an "illegal disbursement of public funds.”
 LABOR CONTRACTOR'S CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION WITH DOLE NOT
A CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF ITS STATUS AS A LEGITIMATE LABOR
CONTRACTING ENTITY

MANILA CORDAGE COMPANY-EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-ORGANIZED

LABOR UNION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE (MCC-ELU-OLALIA)
and MANCO SYNTHETIC, INC., EMPLOYEE LABOR UNION-ORGANIZED LABOR
UNION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE (MSI-ELU-OLALIA)
vs. MANILA CORDAGE COMPANY (MCC) AND MANCO SYNTHETIC, INC. (MSI)
G.R. Nos. 242495-96; September 16, 2020.
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Manila Cordage Company-
Employees Labor Union-Organized Labor Union in Line Industries and Agriculture (MCC-
ELU-OLALIA) and Manco Synthetic, Inc.- Employees Labor Union-Organized Labor Union
in Line Industries and Agriculture (MSI-ELU-OLALIA) assail the decision of the CA which
ruled in favor of respondents that ANRUMPC and WMSC were legitimate job contractors
providing manpower services to them.

The Organized Labor Union in Line Industries and Agriculture (OLALIA) is a

legitimate labor organization that established local chapters in companies engaged in rope
manufacturing. MCC-ELU-OLALIA and MSI-ELU-OLALIA were its local chapters in Manila
Cordage and Manco Synthetic, respectively. Considering that Manila Cordage and Manco
Synthetic were unorganized and had no exclusive bargaining agent, OLALIA filed Petitions
for Certification Election before the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office
IV.

Manila Cordage and Manco Synthetic opposed this, asserting that members of the
subject labor unions are employees of their labor contractors, Alternative Network Resources
Unlimited Multi-Purpose Cooperative (ANRUMPC) and Worktrusted Manpower Services
Cooperative (WMSC). The petitions were granted despite the opposition and certification
elections were conducted in Manila Cordage and Manco Synthetic.

Petitioners allege that the two contractors do not provide a specific service to
respondents and merely supply manpower. They further assert that ANRUMPC's and WMSC'
substantial capital is not sufficient to prove that they complied with the requirements
provided for in D.O. No. 18-A. Petitioners maintain that respondents should have submitted
evidence that the two contractors own tools, equipment, and machineries used in the main
business of respondents, which is rope production.

Respondents argued that ANRUMPC and WMSC are legitimate job contractors as
supported by the Certificates of Registration awarded to them by the DOLE at the time the
events of this case occurred.

ISSUE
Are ANRUMPC and WMSC legitimate labor contractors?
RULING
NO. ANRUM PC and WMSC are not legitimate labor contractors, hence, employer-
employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondents.

To protect the workforce, a contractor is generally presumed to be engaged in labor-

only contracting, unless it proves otherwise by having substantial capital, investment, tools
and the like. · However, the burden of proving the legitimacy of the contractor shifts to the
principal when it is the one claiming that status, such as in this case.

Although the arguments of respondent may be a badge of legitimate job contracting,

it does not automatically convert a labor-only contractor to a legitimate job contractor
because in the issue of labor-only contracting, "the totality of the facts and the surrounding
circumstances of the case" must be considered. A Certificate of Registration is not conclusive
evidence of being a legitimate independent contractor. It merely prevents the presumption
of labor-only contracting and gives rise to a disputable presumption that the contractor is
legitimate.

In this case, it is worth noting that respondents entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement with ANRUMPC and WMSC even before these contractors were issued
Certificates of Registration by the DOLE. This indicates that they supplied manpower to
various clients even without the stamp of imprimatur from the DOLE.

In addition, Section 5 of D.O. No. 18-02 provides that if at least one of the following
conditions are present, then an entity would be considered a labor-only contractor:
(i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment
which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees
recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing
activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
(ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the
work of the contractual employee.

Here, both conditions are present. While both ANRUMPC and WMSC have the
required paid-up capital as seen in their Articles of Incorporation, Annual Income Tax and
Audited Financial Statements, records show that they do not have substantial investment in
the form of tools, equipment, and machineries necessary to carry out the functions of their
alleged employees who perform activities directly related to the business of respondents.
Instead, their alleged employees, herein petitioners, use respondents' equipment and
machinery to carry out jobs related to rope manufacturing.

Despite ANRUMPC and WMSC' role in the hiring, disciplining and paying of wages
of petitioners, it is still respondents who exercised control over petitioners' work
performance and output. Records show that petitioners are assigned in departments tasked
to accomplish the main business of respondents in the manufacturing of rope.

Similarly, the employees for Manco Synthetic were assigned to following departments
with the same functions as enumerated above: engineering, production, matting, and facility.
While working in these departments, petitioners' manner and method of work were closely
supervised and monitored by regular employees of Manila Cordage and Manco Synthetic.
This negates respondents' contention that they did not exercise control over the work of
petitioners as the supervisors deployed by ANRUMPC and WMSC merely dealt with
administrative matters such as checking attendance and distributing payslips.

It is likewise clear that petitioners perform functions necessary and directly related to
the main business of respondents as they are involved in the core operations for the
manufacturing and export of respondents' rope products. Further, petitioners have been
performing these functions with respondents even before ANRUMPC and WMSC were
registered as legitimate labor contractors with the DOLE. Thus, ''the repeated and continuing
need for the performance of the job is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of the activity to the business."

Considering the foregoing, the findings of the CA cannot stand. In labor-only

contracting, there is no principal and contractor; ''there is only the employer's representative
who gathers and supplies people for the employer." Here, ANRUMPC and WMSC merely
supplied manpower for respondents. Thus, petitioners are considered employees of
respondents and the votes they casted during the Certification Elections held on January 27,
2016 are valid.
 EXERCISE OF RETRENCHMENT IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND MUST COMPLY WITH
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

AM-PHIL FOOD CONCEPTS, INC. vs. PADILLA

G.R. No. 188753; October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Am-Phil Food Concepts, Inc. (Am-
Phil) assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the NLRC that
Paolo Jesus Padilla was illegally dismissed.

Private respondent Padilla was hired on April 1, 2002 as Marketing Associate by

petitioner Am-Phil, a corporation engaged in the restaurant business. Sometime in 2004,
Padilla was informed that Am-Phil would be implementing a retrenchment program and that
he would be affected. The retrenchment program was allegedly on account of serious and
adverse business conditions, i.e. lack of demand in the market, stiffer competition,
devaluation of the Philippine peso, and escalating operation costs. Padilla questioned Am-
Phil's choice to retrench him, noting that Am-Phil’s sales have not been lower relative to the
previous year. In response, Padilla was given two options: (1) be retrenched with severance
pay; or (2) be transferred as a waiter in Am-Phil’s restaurant, a move that entailed demotion.
Am-Phil sent Padilla a memorandum notifying him of his retrenchment and was paid his
separation pay. Padilla, on the other hand, executed a quitclaim and release in favor of Am-
Phil. Subsequently, Padilla filed the complaint for illegal dismissal.

For its defense, Am-Phil claimed that Padilla was not illegally terminated and that it
validly exercised a management prerogative. It asserted that Padilla was hired merely as part
of an experimental marketing program. Further, Am-Phil suffered from serious adverse
business losses, so it was compelled to retrench employees to avoid further losses. Finally,
Am-Phil underscored that Padilla executed a quitclaim and release in its favor.

ISSUE
Was Paolo Jesus T. Padilla dismissed through a valid retrenchment?

HELD
No, the retrenchment implemented by Am-Phil was invalid, and that Padilla was
illegally dismissed.

In Andrada v. NLRC, It was held that retrenchment entails an exercise of management

prerogative, however, it was also emphasized that such exercise is not absolute.

The Supreme Court has outlined the substantive and procedural requirements for a
valid retrenchment, each of which must be shown by clear and convincing evidence as
follows:
 1. That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business
losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer;
2. That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the DOLE
at least 1 month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
3. That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to 1
month pay or at least ½ month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher:
4. That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith
for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’
right to security of tenure; and
5. That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers.

Am-Phil’s audited financial statements, the sole proof upon which Am-Phil relies on
to establish its claim that it suffered business losses, have been deemed unworthy of
consideration. They were mere annexes to the motion for leave to admit supplemental
rejoinder which the Labor Arbiter validly disregarded. It follows that there is no clear
convincing evidence to sustain substantive ground on which the supposed validity of
Padilla’s retrenchment rest.

Am-Phil did not serve a written notice to the DOLE, 1 month before the intended date
of Padilla’s retrenchment as required by Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

Hence, the retrenchment implemented by Am-Phil is invalid.

As for the quitclaim, it was held in the case of F.F. Marine Corp. v. NLRC, where the
retrenchment is declared illegal and of no effect. The quitclaims executed by the retrenched
employees were therefore, not voluntarily entered into by them. As a rule, deeds of release
or quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled
or from contesting the legality of their dismissal.
 INVOLUNTARY RESIGNATION DUE TO HARSH, HOSTILE, AND
UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS TANTAMOUNT TO
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) vs. REBESENCIO

G.R. No. 198587; January 14, 2015
Leonen, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) filed a petition for Review on Certiorari
under rule 45 praying that judgment rendered finding the illegal dismissal of the respondents
be set aside.

Saudia is foreign corporation established under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It has an office located in the Philippines. Respondents: Ma. Jopette Resbesencio,
Montassah Sacar-Adiong, Rouen Ruth Cristobal, and Loraine Schneider-Cruz, were recruited
and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of
POEA. Later, they became Permanent Flight Attendants. Respondents continued their
employment until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. In 2007,
respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal before the
labor arbiter.

Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal, for
being based solely because they were pregnant. They alleged that after they had informed
Saudia of their respective pregnancies to process their maternity leaves, they were
disapproved and were required to file their resignation, otherwise, they shall be terminated
without benefits. They attempted to appeal, however, they were rejected. Faced with this
dilemma, they all resigned. It must be noted that when some of them resigned they were
given a blank form with a letterhead which already had the word “RESIGNATION.”

Saudia anchored their actions on its “Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin
Attendants” which stipulates that “… if the Air Hostess becomes pregnant at any time during
the term of the contract, this shall render her employment contract as void and she will be
terminated due to lack of medical fitness”. It added that respondents had no cause of action
as they resigned voluntarily.

ISSUE
Are respondents constructively dismissed?

HELD
Yes. Respondents were constructively dismissed.

In Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, the Supreme Court defined voluntary resignation
as "the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal
reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other
choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment." Thus, essential to the act of resignation is voluntariness. It must
be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will.

In the same case of Bilbao, this court advanced a means for determining whether an
employee resigned voluntarily:

As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended, to sever his or her employment.

On the other hand, constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work
because 'continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits."

In Penaflor v. Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, constructive dismissal has

been described as tantamount to "involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer." In the same case, it was noted that "the gauge
for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would
feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances."

It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. All they did
was avail of their maternity leaves. Evidently, the very nature of a maternity leave means
that a pregnant employee will not report for work only temporarily and that she will resume
the performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance expires.

It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia.
Each of them repeatedly filed appeal letters (as much as five [5] letters in the case of
Rebesencio) asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be terminated
along with the forfeiture of their benefits. Some of them even went to Saudia's office to
personally seek reconsideration.

The respondents' resignation letters were supposedly made in their own handwriting,
fails to surmount all the other indications negating any voluntariness on respondents' part.
If at all, these same resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation did not
arise from respondents' own initiative. As earlier pointed out, respondents' resignations were
executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. These letterheads already
had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of their respective headings
when these were handed to respondents.

Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes, such as the completion of

their exit interviews, neither negates compulsion nor indicates voluntariness.

Therefore, their resignations being involuntary, respondents are deemed

constructively dismissed.
 EMPLOYER’S FAILURE TO PROVE VALID AND AUTHORIZED CAUSE OF
DISMISSAL MAKES THE DISMISSAL ILLEGAL

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. DAWAL

GR. No. 173921; February 24, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari, challenging
the decision of the Court of Appeals Sixth Division, which reversed the judgment of the
National Labor Relations Commission and reinstating the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to
the effect that PAL's dismissal of Isagani Dawal, et al.'s services was illegal,

During PAL’s privatization in 1993, the new owners acquired PAL’s alleged aging fleet
and overly manned workforce. PAL then implemented a re-fleeting and massive
retrenchment program, then filed for a corporate rehabilitation before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The plan stated that PAL’s non-core activities have the
potential to be sold off and these included the catering, maintenance, and engineering
departments. Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. (Lufthansa) expressed its desire to purchase
PAL’s maintenance and engineering department, which was approved by the SEC.

Under the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement and MOA, “in case PAL
deems it necessary to reorganize its corporate structure for the viability of its operations by
forming joint ventures and spin-offs, PAL shall do so only after proper consultation with
PALEA within 45 days before implementation of said reorganization.” However, no
consultation was made. PAL also allegedly conducted ugnayan sessions with its employees
to inform them of the spin-off.

On September 1, 2000, PAL severed the employment of Isagani Dawal, Lorna

Concepcion, and Bonifacio Sinobago (Dawal, et. al.), who served as chief storekeeper, master
avionics mechanic A, and aircraft master “A” mechanic respectively. Until their dismissal
from work, they were regular rank-and-file employees of PAL and “bona fide members” of
the Philippine Airlines Employees’ Association (PALEA). Petitioners filed a complaint before
the labor arbiter for unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal. Dawal, et al. allege that PAL
violated PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions on security of tenure,
procedures for a valid spin-off, and seniority. There was also union busting, as "nearly half
of the union membership was terminated from work."

PAL posits that the spin-off was "impelled by compelling economic factors which
endangered its existence and stability. It blames the Asian Financial Crisis and the strike for
the heavy losses it incurred. To prevent serious business losses, PAL spun off its Maintenance
and Engineering Department to Lufthansa, resulting in the retrenchment of Dawal et al.'s
employment based on an authorized cause under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.

ISSUES
Is the termination of employment of petitioners due to an authorized cause?
HELD
No. The employees were illegally terminated.

For either redundancy or retrenchment, the law requires that the employer give
separation pay to the affected employees. The employer must also serve a written notice on
both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month
before the intended date of redundancy or retrenchment.

PAL sent a Notice of Separation dated July 14, 2000 to Concepcion, which she received
on July 22, 2000, and to Sinobago, which he received on July 24, 2000. Meanwhile, the
Department of Labor and Employment received the Notice of Termination and PAL's list of
affected employees on July 24, 2000. The termination of their services was effective on
September 1, 2000, thereby fulfilling the 30-day prior notice. The same is not true for Dawal.
The records show that Dawal received the Notice of Separation only on August 31, 2000, 29
days short of what the law requires.

As a rule, hearing is an unnecessary condition in determining the legality of dismissal

due to redundancy or retrenchment. There is no right to be heard in dismissal for an
authorized cause. In terminating the employees' services due to the installment of labor-
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, or closure of business, the
employer has no obligation to provide the employees the opportunity to disprove the
business and financial reasons for termination. However, the employer has the burden to
prove the factual and legal basis for the termination of its employees. PAL has the duty to
establish, clearly and satisfactorily, all the elements for a valid retrenchment.

There are several guidelines that PAL should observe to validly dismiss Dawal, et al.
due to retrenchment. Among others, the following are the four (4) criteria that the employer
must meet:
1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent;
2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such
imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
3. It must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected
losses;
4. Alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be
forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.

Redundancy requires good faith in abolishing the redundant position. To establish

good faith, the company must provide substantial proof that it is overmanned. This is absent
here. When PAL spun off the engineering and maintenance facilities, it also created a new
engineering department called the Technical Services Department. Moreover, after it fired
the affected employees, PAL offered to rehire the same retrenched personnel as new
employees.

PAL's claim of management prerogative does not automatically absolve it of liability.

Management prerogative is not unbridled and limitless. Where abusive and oppressive, the
alleged business decision must be tempered to safeguard the constitutional guarantee of
providing "full protection to labor." Management prerogative cannot justify violation of law
or the pursuit of any arbitrary or malicious motive.
 Here, there is no showing that PAL "resorted to less drastic and less permanent cost-
cutting measures" prior to the so-called retrenchment. In 1998, PAL already retrenched about
5,000 employees. Two years later, it again turned to cutting off its employees' livelihood.

In sum, Dawal, et. al. were illegally dismissed, there being no valid retrenchment.
 MERGER IS NOT ONE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE EMPLOYEES
MAY CLAIM SEPARATION PAY

PHILIPPINE GEOTHERMAL, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION

vs. UNOCAL PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 190187; September 28, 2016
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a petition for review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court where Philippine
Geothermal Employees Union (Union) assails the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals granting Unocal Philippines’ appeal, reversing the Secretary of Labor’s award of
separation benefits to the Union.

Petitioner, Philippine Geothermal, Inc. Employees Union is a legitimate labor union

of the rank-and-file employees of Unocal Philippines. On the other hand, respondent Unocal
Philippines, formerly known as Philippine Geothermal, Inc., is a foreign corporation licensed
to do business in the Philippines for the "exploration and development of geothermal
resources as alternative sources of energy."

Unocal Corporation executed a Merger Agreement with Chevron Texaco Corporation

(Chevron) and its subsidiary, Blue Merger, Inc. (Blue Merger). Unocal Corporation merged
with Blue Merger, and the latter became the surviving corporation. After the merger, Blue
Merger, as the surviving corporation, changed its name to Unocal Corporation.

Unocal Philippines executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the

Union. However, the Union wrote Unocal asking for the separation benefits provided under
the CBA. According to the Union, the Merger Agreement resulted in the closure and cessation
of operations of Unocal Philippines and the implied dismissal of its employees.

Unocal refused the Union’s request and asserted that the employee-members were
not terminated and that the merger did not result in its closure. The matter was submitted to
the DOLE’s Intervention for Dispute Avoidance Program, but they did not arrive at a
mutually acceptable agreement. Union claimed that Unocal Philippines is guilty of Unfair
Labor Practice and filed a notice of strike, but the notice was later withdrawn.

ISSUE
Is the Merger Agreement executed by Unocal Corporation, Blue Merger, and Chevron
resulted in the termination of the employment of petitioner's members?

HELD
NO. There is no implied dismissal of its employees as a consequence of the merger.

A merger is a consolidation of two or more corporations, which results in one or more

corporations being absorbed into one surviving corporation. The separate existence of the
absorbed corporation ceases, and the surviving corporation "retains its identity and takes
over the rights, privileges, franchises, properties, claims, liabilities and obligations of the
absorbed corporations."

As held by the Court in the case of Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI Employees
Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, the surviving corporation
automatically assumes the employment contracts of the absorbed corporation, such that the
absorbed corporation's employees become part of the manpower complement of the
surviving corporation.

The rationale for this ruling is anchored on the nature and effects of a merger as
provided under Section 80 of the Corporation Code, as well as the policies on work and labor
enshrined in the Constitution. The acquisition of all assets, interests, and liabilities of the
absorbed corporation necessarily includes the rights and obligations of the absorbed
corporation under its employment contracts. Consequently, the surviving corporation
becomes bound by the employment contracts entered into by the absorbed corporation.
These employment contracts are not terminated. They subsist unless their termination is
allowed by law.

Merger is not one of the circumstances where the employees may claim separation
pay. The only instances where separation pay may be awarded to petitioner are: (a) reduction
in workforce as a result of redundancy; (b) retrenchment or installation of labor-saving
devices; or (c) closure and cessation of operations. None of these instances are present here.
The terms do not provide that a merger is one of the instances where petitioner may claim
separation benefits for its members. Neither can these circumstances be interpreted as to
contemplate a merger with another corporation.

Given these circumstances, petitioner is not entitled to separation pay. Although the
policy of the state is to rule in favor of labor in light of the social justice provisions under the
Constitution, the Court held that it cannot unduly trample upon the rights of management,
which are likewise entitled to respect in the interest of fair play.
 STRONG WORDS MAY SOMETIMES BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN EMPLOYERS
AND EMPLOYEES, THE SAME CANNOT JUSTIFY FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE
DISMISSAL IN THE ABSENCE OF SHOWING OF BAD FAITH OR MALICIOUS
DESIGN BY THE EMPLOYER THAT WOULD MAKE WORK CONDITIONS
UNBEARABLE

LOURDES C. RODRIGUEZ vs. PARK N RIDE, INC.

G.R. No. 222980; March 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals finding that there was no constructive dismissal, but rather the petitioner voluntarily
resigned from her employment.

Lourdes Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was originally hired by spouses Vicente & Estelita B.
Javier as Restaurant Supervisor for their restaurant at Vicest Phils. Later, when the restaurant
closed, she was transferred to do office work and became an Administrative and Finance
assistant to Estelita Javier. As the spouses ventured into other businesses, establishing more
companies, petitioner’s duties extended to handling personnel, finance and administrative
matters of these companies without additional compensation. Even substituting as cashier at
their Park N Ride business when the Head Cashier would be on day-off. She was also tasked
to take care of the household concerns of the Javier spouses, such as preparing payrolls for
drivers and helpers, shopping for household needs, and looking after the spouses’ house
whenever they travelled abroad. Tasked with so many duties and responsibilities and unable
to bear the spouses’ treatment of her, she filed a resignation letter effective April 25, 2009,
however the spouses did not accept her resignation and convinced her to stay on. On
September 29, 2009, when she was late in opening the Makati office after going on her usual
“pamalengke” for the spouses, Estelita called her on the phone and scolded her for it. Thus,
on the same day, she wrote a letter to the spouses expressing her grievances at them. She
intimated that they were always finding fault with her to push her to resign. On October 6,
2009, the Javier spouses replied to her letter, allegedly accepting her resignation.

On October 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal,

non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, including claims for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Park N Ride, Vicest Phils., Grand Leisure,
and the Javier Spouses. On their defense, Spouses Javier asserted that on September 23, 2009,
Rodriguez did not report for work. On September 26, 2009, when she still has not reported
for work after three days, a letter was sent to her citing her continued and unauthorized
absence. "She was told that her resignation could not be processed because she had not
completed her employment clearance and she was unable to properly turnover her tasks to
her assistant." She was asked to report on September 30, 2009 or, at the very least, to reply in
writing on or before October 7, 2009. Rodriguez neither reported for work on September 30,
2009 nor submitted any reply to the letter sent to her.

ISSUE/S
Is Lourdes constructively dismissed?
RULING
No, the petitioner is not constructively dismissed because there was no showing of
bad faith or malicious design by the respondents that would make her work conditions
unbearable.

There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination,

insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose
any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. It exists where there is
involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the
employer. The unreasonably harsh conditions that compel resignation on the part of an
employee must be way beyond the occasional discomforts brought about by the
misunderstandings between the employer and employee. Strong words may sometimes be
exchanged as the employer describes her expectations or as the employee narrates the
conditions of her work environment and the obstacles she encounters as she accomplishes
her assigned tasks. As in every human relationship, there are bound to be disagreements.

The affidavits of petitioner's former co-workers were mere narrations of petitioner's

various duties. Far from showing the alleged harsh treatment that petitioner suffered, the
affidavits rather reveal the full trust and confidence reposed by respondents on petitioner.
Petitioner was entrusted with respondents' assets, the care and safeguarding of their house
during their trips abroad, custody of company files and papers, and delicate matters such as
the release, deposit, and withdrawals of checks from their personal accounts as well as
accounts of their companies. Indeed, it was alleged that petitioner was treated by the
respondents as part of the family. Petitioner was neither terminated on September 22, 2009
nor was she constructively dismissed. There was no showing of bad faith or malicious design
by the respondents that would make her work conditions unbearable. On the other hand, it
is a fact that petitioner enjoyed the privilege of working closely with the Javier Spouses and
having their full trust and confidence. Spontaneous expressions of an employer do not
automatically render a hostile work atmosphere. The circumstances in this case negate its
presence.

Based on the foregoing, the petitioner is not constructively dismissed by the

respondents.
 EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO WAGE INCREASE AS A RESULT OF AN
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION vs. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.

G.R. No. 220383; July 5, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a Motion for Partial Reconsideration assailing the Supreme Court’s Order
denying the wage increase for the year 2009 to Southern Negros Development Corporation
(SONEDCO) Workers Free Labor Union.

In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in effect,

Universal Robina Corporation, Sugar Division-Southern Negros Development Corporation
(URC-SONEDCO) offered a a P16.00/day wage increase to their employees, however, to
receive the benefits, employees had to sign a waiver that said that in the event that a
subsequent CBA is negotiated between the Management and Union, the new CBA shall only
be effective on January 1, 2008. The alleged purpose of the waivers was to prevent double
compensation. Some members of the Union refused to sign the waiver as they assumed that
it was an unfair labor practice.

URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008, which extended an additional

P16.00/day wage increase to employees who would agree that any Collective Bargaining
Agreement negotiated for that year would only be effective on January 1, 2009. Several
members of the Union again refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they did not receive
the wage increase.

A certification election was conducted and SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union
won again and proceeded to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement (2009 Collective
Bargaining Agreement). The union members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers
filed a complaint for unfair labor practices against URC-SONEDCO, arguing that the
requirements of a waiver prior to the release of wage increase constituted interference to the
employees’ right to self-organization, collective bargaining and concerted action. Petitioners
aver that the P16.00 wage increases granted in 2007 and 2008 were integrated in the salary of
the employees who signed the waiver. Thus, since the start of 2009, employees who signed
the waiver have been receiving P32.00/day more than petitioners.

Respondent claimed that when the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement expired on
December 31, 2006, it had no bargaining agent to deal with and it was only on September 25,
2008 that SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union was certified by the Department of Labor
and Employment as the exclusive bargaining agent of respondent's rank-and-file employees.
Further, since the 2009 wage increase was not included in the 2009 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, it cannot be demanded.

ISSUE
Is URC-SONEDCO guilty of unfair labor practice?
RULING
Yes. URC-SONEDCO committed unfair labor practice.

Even though there had been a pending petition for certiorari questioning the election
results, no temporary restraining order was issued to preclude respondent from bargaining
with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the declared incumbent union. Hence,
respondent’s refusal to bargain is unfounded.

Substitutionary doctrine states that if, as a result of the certification election,

respondent union or a union other than petitioner union which executed the interim
agreement is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of respondent company, then, such union may adopt the interim collective
bargaining agreement or negotiate with management for a new collective bargaining
agreement

The wording of the waivers shows a clear attempt to limit petitioners' bargaining
power by making them waive the negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the
collective bargaining agreement that would be entered into would only be effective the year
following the 2008 waiver, respondent limited when the collective bargaining agreement
could be deemed effective. In other words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any
benefits they might have received under a collective bargaining agreement in exchange for
the company-granted benefits.

Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the wage increase that
was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To rule otherwise will perpetuate the
discrimination against petitioners. By granting this increase to petitioners, the Court
eliminates the discrimination against them, which was a result of respondent's unfair labor
practice.

Generally, a wage increase not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement is

not demandable. However, if it was withheld by the employer as part of its unfair labor
practice against the union members, this benefit should be granted.
 PERIOD OF TEMPORARY OFF-DETAIL MUST NOT EXCEED (6) MONTHS,
OTHERWISE THERE IS CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL; ASSIGNMENT MUST BE
TO A SPECIFIC OR PARTICULAR CLIENT, "A GENERAL RETURN-TO-WORK
ORDER DOES NOT SUFFICE

MACARIO S. PADILLA vs. AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICE, INC

G.R. No. 210080; November 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Macario S. Padilla
challenges the decision and resolution of the CA dismissing Padilla’s complaint for illegal
dismissal.

Macario Padilla (Padilla) was hired by respondent Airborne Security Service, Inc.
(Airborne) as a security guard. Padilla allegedly rendered continuous service until June 15,
2009, when he was relieved from his post and was advised to wait for his reassignment order.
On July 27, 2009, he allegedly received a letter from Airborne directing him to report for
assignment and deployment. He called Airborne’s office but he was told that he had no
assignment yet. On September 9, 2009, he received another letter from Airborne asking him
to report to its office. He sent his reply letter on September 22, 2009 and personally reported
to the office to inquire on the status of his deployment with respondent’s Director for
Operations, wherein he was told that they are having a hard time finding an assignment for
him since he was already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was advised by Airborneto
resign but was refused. In Dec 2009, when he reported to the office to collect his 13th month
pay, he was again persuaded to hand in his resignation letter.

Still not having been deployed or re-assigned, Padilla filed his complaint for illegal
dismissal. Respondents countered that Padilla was the one who abandoned his work.
Respondents presented a series of letters requiring petitioner to report to respondent
Airborne's head office but to no avail

ISSUE
Whether petitioner Macario S. Padilla was constructively dismissed from his
employment?

HELD
Yes. Padilla was constructively dismissed.

The practice of placing security guards on "floating status" or "temporary off-detail"

is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Jurisprudence has settled that the period of
temporary off-detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond this, a security guard's floating
status shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal. Therefore, a security guard's employer
must give a new assignment to the employee within six (6) months. This assignment must be
to a specific or particular client. "A general return-to-work order does not suffice."
 In this case, to prove that petitioner was offered a new assignment, respondents
presented a series of letters requiring petitioner to report to respondent Airborne's head
office.These letters merely required petitioner to report to work and to explain why he had
failed to report to the office. These letters did not identify any specific client to which
petitioner was to be re-assigned. The letters were, at best, nothing more than general return-
to-work orders.

For an employee to be considered to have abandoned his work, two (2) requisites must
concur. First, the employee must have failed to report for work or have been absent without
a valid or justifiable reason. Second, the employee must have had a "clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship." This Court has emphasized that "the second element
is the more determinative factor." This second element, too, must be "manifested by some
overt acts." Petitioner's conduct belies any intent to abandon his work. To the contrary, it
demonstrates how he took every effort to retain his employment. Right after he received the
first letter dated July 27, 2009, he called Airborne's head office, only to be told that he had no
assignment yet. Equally belying petitioner's intent to abandon his work is his immediate
filing of a Complaint for illegal dismissal on February 23, 2010. This was only eight (8) months
after he was placed on floating status.

Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration, the Supreme Court is unable
to conclude that Padilla abandoned his work. Rather, this Court finds that he was placed on
floating status for more than six (6) months. Thus, he was constructively dismissed.
 INVESTIGATION OF ANOMALIES DOES NOT EQUATE TO ABUSE OR
HARASSMENT WHICH MAY WARRANT FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE
DISMISSAL

PHILIPPINE SPAN ASIA CARRIERS CORPORATION vs. HEIDI PELAYO

G.R. No. 212003; February 28, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Philippine Span Asia Carriers Corporation (formerly Sulpicio Lines)
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC which held that respondent Pelayo was not constructively dismissed.

Pelayo was employed by Sulpicio Lines as an accounting clerk at its Davao City
branch office. As accounting clerk, her main duties were receiving statements and billings
for processing of payments, preparing vouchers and checks for the approval and signature of
the branch manager, and releasing checks for payment. Sulpicio Lines uncovered several
anomalous transactions in its Davao City branch office. Most notably, a check issued to a
certain "J. Josol” had been altered from its original amount of P20,804.58 to P820,804.58. There
were also apparent double disbursements, and discrepancies in the amount reflected in
vouchers and checks.

Sulpicio Lines' Cebu-based management team went to Davao to investigate the

matter. Pelayo was interviewed by members of the management team as "she was the one
who personally prepared the cash vouchers and checks for approval by Tan and Sobiaco.”
She was then asked to go to the company’s Cebu main office for another interview. In the
midst of a panel interview, Pelayo walked out. She later claimed that she was being coerced
to admit complicity with Tan and Sobiaco. Pelayo then returned to Davao City, where she
was admitted to a hospital "because of depression and a nervous breakdown." She eventually
filed for leave of absence and ultimately stopped reporting for work.

Sulpicio Lines served on Pelayo a memorandum requiring her to submit a written

explanation concerning the anomalies. Sulpicio Lines also placed Pelayo on preventive
suspension for 30 days, and it likewise sought the assistance of the NBI which asked Pelayo
to appear before it. However, instead of responding to Sulpicio Lines' memorandum or
appearing before the NBI, Pelayo filed a Complaint against Sulpicio Lines charging it with
constructive dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) held that Sulpicio Lines constructively dismissed Pelayo. The
NLRC however reversed the LA’s Decision. It explained that the matter of disciplining
employees was a management prerogative and that complainant's involvement in the
investigation did not necessarily amount to harassment. The CA found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC in reversing LA’s Decision.

ISSUE
Is there constructive dismissal?
RULING
No. This Court fails to see how the petitioner's investigation amounted to
respondent's constructive dismissal. What is certain is that there were several anomalies in
petitioner's Davao branch. It made sense for petitioner to investigate these anomalies. It also
made sense for respondent to be involved in the investigation. The standards for ascertaining
constructive dismissal are settled:

There is constructive dismissal when an employer's act of clear discrimination,

insensibility or disdain becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to foreclose
any choice on his part except to resign from such employment. It exists where there is
involuntary resignation because of the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the
employer. We have held that the standard for constructive dismissal is "whether a reasonable
person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his employment
under the circumstances."

Resolving allegations of constructive dismissal is not a one-sided affair impelled by

romanticized sentiment for a preconceived underdog. Rather, it is a question of justice that
"hinges on whether, given the circumstances, the employer acted fairly in exercising a
prerogative." It involves the weighing of evidence and a consideration of the “totality of
circumstances.”

There was no objective proof demonstrating how the interview in Cebu actually
proceeded. Other than respondent's bare allegation, there is nothing to support the claim that
her interviewers were hostile, distrusting, and censorious, or that the interview was a mere
pretext to pin her down. Likewise, respondent's subsequent hospitalization does not prove
harassment or coercion to make an admission either. The mere fact of its occurrence is not
an attestation that respondent's interview proceeded in the manner that she claimed it did.
Different individuals react to stress differently "and some people react to stress by getting
sick."

It was only logical for petitioner to inquire into how multiple vouchers and checks
could have passed the scrutiny of the officer tasked to prepare them. Given her direct
interactions with Tan and Sobiaco and her role in the workflow for payments and
disbursements, it was wise, if not imperative, to invoke respondent as a witness.

As to management prerogative

An employer who conducts investigations following the discovery of misdeeds by its

employees is not being abusive when it seeks information from an employee involved in the
workflow which occasioned the misdeed. An employee's involvement in such an
investigation will naturally entail difficulty. This difficulty does not mean that the employer
is creating an inhospitable employment atmosphere so as to ease out the employee involved
in the investigation. While adopted with a view "to give maximum aid and protection to
labor," labor laws are not to be applied in a manner that undermines valid exercise of
management prerogative. Disciplining employees does not only entail the demarcation of
permissible and impermissible conduct through company rules and regulations, and the
imposition of appropriate sanctions. It also involves intervening mechanisms "to assure that
[employers' rules] would be complied with." Employers are free to adopt different
mechanisms such as interviews, written statements, or probes by specially designated panels
of officers.
 THE COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH
APPLIES TO ALL GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS,
CHARTERED OR NON-CHARTERED, PROVIDES THAT THEY MAY NOT
NEGOTIATE WITH THEIR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES THE ECONOMIC
TERMS OF THEIR CBA

GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 210773; January 23, 2019.
Leonen, J.

FACTS
The Supreme Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus
filed by the petitioner GSIS Family Bank Employees Union (GSIS Union), praying that
respondent GSIS Family Bank be declared outside the coverage of Republic Act No. 10149
and, therefore, be directed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with its
employees.

Royal Savings Bank was organized and incorporated as a thrift bank.

Royal Savings Bank filed an application with the Central Bank of the Philippines
(Central Bank) for the appointment of a conservator which was denied and prohibited it from
doing business and placed it under receivership.

The Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. offered to reopen and rehabilitate
Royal Savings Bank if it would drop all its complaints against the Central Bank and transfer
all its shares of stock to Commercial Bank of Manila, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
Government Service Insurance System. Royal Savings Bank and Commercial Bank of Manila
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement to rehabilitate and infuse capital into Royal
Savings Bank.

Royal Savings Bank was renamed Comsavings Bank. The Government Service
Insurance System transferred its holdings from Commercial Bank of Manila to Boston Bank.
Comsavings Bank was not included in the transfer. Due to Boston Bank's acquisition of
Commercial Bank of Manila, the Government Service Insurance System took over the control
and management of Comsavings Bank.After the infusion of funds, the Government Service
Insurance System effectively owned 99.55% of Comsavings Bank's outstanding shares of
stocks. Comsavings Bank changed its name to GSIS Family Bank.

President Aquino signed into law Republic Act No. 10149, or the GOCC Governance
Act of 2011.

The Governance Commission which was created under said act classified GSIS Family
Bank as a government financial institution and was unauthorized to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with its employees "based on the principle that the compensation and
position classification system is provided for by law and not subject to private bargaining"
under Republic Act No. 10149.
 Petitioner GSIS Union alleged that Republic Act No. 10149 does not apply to GSIS
Family Bank, as it was a private bank created and established under the Corporation Code. It
asserted that even if the Government Service Insurance System owned a majority of GSIS
Family Bank's outstanding capital stock, the change in ownership of shares did not
automatically place the bank under the operation of Republic Act No. 10149

Respondent Villanueva rejects petitioner's argument that Republic Act No. 10149 only
applies to corporations with original charters. He emphasizes that the law does not
distinguish between chartered and non-chartered corporations. Villanueva explains that
Republic Act No. 10149 aimed to standardize or rationalize the compensation framework of
government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions to
remedy the "severe pay imbalance between personnel of these special entities and the rest of
the bureaucracy following the Salary Standardization Law."

ISSUE
Can the GSIS Family Bank, a non-chartered government-owned or controlled
corporation, enter into a collective bargaining agreement with its employees?

HELD
No, GSIS Family Bank cannot enter into a CBA with its employees.

Republic Act No. 10149 does not differentiate chartered and non-chartered GOCC and
under Executive Order No. 203, 109 which approved the compensation and classification
standards stated under the said act, that GOCCs may not negotiate with their officers and
employees the economic terms of their collective bargaining agreement.

While the right to self-organization is absolute, the right of government employees to

collective bargaining and negotiation is subject to limitations. Collective bargaining is a series
of negotiations between an employer and a representative of the employees to regulate the
various aspects of the employer-employee relationship such as working hours, working
conditions, benefits, economic provisions, and others. Relations between private employers
and their employees are subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws, labor, and
welfare legislation. Beyond these requirements, private employers and their employees are
at liberty to establish the terms and conditions of their employment relationship. In contrast
with the private sector, the terms and conditions of employment of government workers are
fixed by the legislature; thus, the negotiable matters in the public sector are limited to terms
and conditions of employment that are not fixed by law.

Republic Act No. 10149 directed the Governance Commission to develop a

Compensation and Position Classification System. President Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 203, which approved the compensation and classification standards and the Index of
Occupational Services Framework developed and submitted by the Governance Commission.
When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in
government-owned or controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated
that while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their
employers, "the Governing Boards of all covered government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their officers and
employees the economic terms of their collective bargaining agreements.

Thus, considering the existing law at the time, GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted
for refusing to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with petitioner as it lacked
the authority to negotiate economic terms with its employees. Unless directly challenged in
the appropriate case and with a proper actual controversy, the constitutionality and validity
of Republic Act No. 10149, as it applies to fully government-owned and controlled non-
chartered corporations, prevail.
 RECKONING POINT OF A REINSTATED EMPLOYEE’S PERIOD OF SERVICE IS
ON THE DAY HE FIRST STARTED WORKING FOR EMPLOYER, NOT WHEN HE
RETURNED FOR WORK

MELCHOR A. CUADRA, MELENCIO TRINIDAD, and SERAFIN TRINIDAD

vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 194467; July 13, 2020
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners assail the decision of the Court of
Appeals declaring that the length of service of petitioners must be reckoned from the time
they were declared regular employees on December 15, 1994 and not when they first started
working in San Miguel in 1985 for Melchor and 1988 for Melencio and Serafin.

Petitioners Melchor, Melencio, and Serafin were among the 60 complainants who filed
an illegal dismissal case before the NLRC against Lippercon Services Inc. and San Miguel back
in 1991. In the December 15, 1994 Decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Lippercon Services
was a mere labor-only contractor and that San Miguel was the true employer of complainants.
Therefore, it was San Miguel who was ordered to reinstate the complainants to their former
positions as regular employees, their regular status "effective as of the date of the Labor
Arbiter's decision."

During the execution proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise. Petitioners
received P550,000 "as full, complete, absolute, and final settlement and satisfaction" of each
of their money claims and benefits as well as "any and all claims" connected with the illegal
dismissal case filed before the NLRC.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, petitioners were reinstated on July 1, 2003.

However, as reflected in their newly issued identification cards, San Miguel reckoned the
date of their employment from July 1, 2003 — not from the time they were first hired to work
in San Miguel.

Thus, petitioners submitted their grievance to the Voluntary Arbitrator which ruled
in favor of them that the length of their service should be reckoned from the date when they
were first hired. However, the Court of Appeals held that the date should be reckoned from
December 15, 1994: the date when they were officially declared as regular employees of San
Miguel. The reason was that reinstatement is "a right accorded to an illegally dismissed
regular employee” and that they were initially hired as contractual employees through
“labor-only” contractor Lippercon Services when they first started working in San Miguel.

ISSUE
Is the reckoning date of an employee’s length of service on the date the employee first
began working for the employer, and not when he or she returned for work?
RULING

YES, the reckoning date of an employee’s length of service on the date the employee
first began working for the employer, and not when he or she returned for work.

In the cases of Carandang vs Dulay, Sta. Catalina Colleges vs. NLRC, and Philippine
Village Hotel vs. NLRC, the prior employment of the employees were all validly terminated,
either voluntarily or under any of the just and authorized causes provided in the Labor Code.
Therefore, the reckoning point of the length of service, for purposes of security of tenure,
begins on the date the employee was re-hired.

However, if an employee returns to work upon an order of reinstatement, he or she

is not considered a new hire. Because reinstatement presupposes the illegality of the
dismissal, the employee is deemed to have remained under the employ of the employer from
the date of illegal dismissal to actual reinstatement. Further, there is no "prior employment"
to speak of, and the payment of backwages is compensation for the time the employee was
illegally deprived of work. In the latter case, the reckoning point of the length of service must
be the date the employee first began working for the employer, not when he or she returned
for work.

Here, petitioners were found to have been illegally dismissed and only returned to
work upon an order of reinstatement. Further, they were not new hires when they returned
in San Miguel. Under the law, they remained under the employ of respondent from the time
they were illegally dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Hence, the
reckoning point of their length of service must be the date they first started working in San
Miguel, i.e., 1985 for Melchor, and 1988 for Melencio. However, since petitioner Serafin had
waived his claims against respondent, the Petition is moot and academic as to him only.
 THE REQUIREMENT OF RENDERING “AT LEAST ONE YEAR OF SERVICE,”
BEFORE AN EMPLOYEE IS DEEMED TO HAVE ATTAINED REGULAR STATUS,
ONLY APPLIES TO CASUAL EMPLOYEES

PARAGELE vs. GMA NETWORK, INC.

G.R. No. 235315; July 13, 2020.
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari under rule 45 filed by petitioners praying that the
assailed Decision of the CA affirming NLRC’s Decision that “an employer employee
relationship existed between petitioners and GMA. However, it explained that the existence
of an employer-employee relationship does not automatically confer regular employment
status on employees who were merely employed as "relievers for aggregate periods of less
than a year each” be reversed and set aside.

Petitioners Henry T. Paragele and 29 others were employed as cameramen and

assistant cameramen by respondent GMA Network Inc. They filed a consolidated complaint
against respondent GMA for regularization, for regularization, which was subsequently
converted into one for "illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary/wages, and regularization"
filed by petitioners and other co-complainants against respondent GMA Network, Inc.
(GMA).

Petitioners assert that as camera operators, they performed functions that were
necessary and desirable to GMA’s usual business as a television and broadcasting company.
They emphasized that their employment was continuous despite the end of shooting and
recording for its television program in which they were assigned. On the other hand, GMA
refutes the existence of employer-employee relationship, it maintains that petitioners were
mere "pinchhitters or relievers" who were engaged to augment its regular crew whenever
there is a need for substitute or additional workforce.

ISSUE
Were the petitioners regular employees of GMA?

RULING
Yes. Petitioners are regular employees of GMA.

From the plain language of the second paragraph of Article 295 of the Labor Code, it
is clear that the requirement of rendering “at least one year of service,” before an employee
is deemed to have attained regular status, only applies to casual employees. An employee is
regarded as a casual employee if he or she was engaged to perform functions which are not
necessary and desirable to the usual business and trade of the employer. Thus, when one is
engaged to perform functions which are necessary and desirable to the usual business and
trade of the employer, engagement for a year-long duration is not a controlling consideration.
GMA’s claim that petitioners were required to render at least one year of service before they
may be considered regular employees finds no basis in law. Petitioners were never casual
employees precisely because they performed functions that were necessary and desirable to
the usual business of GMA. They did not need to render a year’s worth of service to be
considered regular employees.

In this case, GMA repeatedly engaged petitioners as camera operators for its
television programs. As camera operators, petitioners performed activities which are: (1)
within the regular and usual business of GMA; and (2) not identifiably distinct or separate
from the other undertakings of GMA. It would be absurd to consider the nature of their work
of operating cameras as distinct or separate from the business of GMA, a broadcasting
company that produces, records and airs television programs. From this alone, the petitioners
cannot be considered project employees for there is no distinctive “project” to even speak of.

Neither should GMA’s assertion that petitioners were merely engaged as pinch-
hitters or substitutes, whose employment is for a specific duration or period, prevent them
from being regular employees. GMA is primarily engaged in the business of broadcasting,
which encompasses the production of television programs. Following the nature of its
business, GMA is naturally and logically expected to engage the service of camera operators
such as petitioners, in case it ceases business by failing to shoot and record any television
program.

Being regular employees, petitioners were therefore illegally dismissed and were
ordered reinstated.
 MARO CERTIFICATIONS ARE LIMITED TO FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS
SUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF ACTUAL TILLERS. IT CANNOT MAKE LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS ON THE EXISTENCE OF A TENANCY AGREEMENT; WORKING
ON ANOTHER’S LANDHOLDING RAISES NO PRESUMPTION OF AN
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY

AUTOMAT REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, LITO CECILIA

AND LEONOR LIM vs. SPOUSES MARCIANO DELA CRUZ, SR.
AND OFELIA DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 192026; October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals when it
affirmed the decision of Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
finding Spouses Maciano and Ofelia Dela Cruz to be lawful tenants, and its resolution
denying reconsideration.

Petitioner Automat Realty and Development Corporation (Automat) is the registered

owner of two parcels of land located in Barangay Malitlit, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Petitioner
Leonor Lim was the real estate broker behind the purchase of Automat. The purchased land
was not occupied in 1990 resulting in respondent Ofelia dela Cruz volunteering herself as
caretaker of the property. Petitioner Lim agreed with the condition that as caretakers, they
would vacate the premises upon Automat’s demand. They stayed as rent-paying tenants of
the property and shared the produced palsy through Automat’s agent petitioner Lito Cecilia.

Sometime in August 2000, the spouses were asked to vacate the property for the
preparation of the groundwork however, they refused to vacate such property. They
contended that they are entitled to compensation as agricultural tenants. Therefore, the
spouses filed a petition for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order against Automat before the
PARAD for Laguna.

Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region IV-A CALABARZON

issued two orders, both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the property from coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Respondent spouses argue that an implied contract of tenancy was created when they
were allowed to till the land for 10 years. Consequently, they are entitled to security of tenure
as tenants. They add that the subsequent reclassification of agricultural lands into non-
agricultural land after the effectivity of the (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) CARL
does not automatically remove the land from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as a valid certificate of exemption or exclusion, or a duly approved
conversion order, must first be secured.
ISSUES
Does agricultural tenancy relationship exist between Automat and respondent
spouses?

HELD
No agricultural tenancy relationship exists between Automat and respondent spouses.

The elements to constitute a tenancy relationship are the following:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
3. There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

The spouses are the actual tillers of the land as proved by three farmers of adjacent
lands to the subject property and upon finding of the original MARO certification. However,
MARO certifications are limited to factual determinations such as the presence of actual
tillers. It cannot make legal conclusions on the existence of a tenancy agreement.

The subject land is not an agricultural land. It is undisputed that the DAR Region IV-
A CALABARZON had already issued two orders, both dated March 30, 2010, exempting the
property from CARP coverage. These orders clearly provide that the lands were classified to
non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL. While the earlier Republic Act No. 3844,
otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, focuses on actual use of the land
when it defines “agricultural land” as “land devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18
and 19 of this Section, respectively, this must be read with the later Republic Act No. 6675
(CARL) that qualifies the definition with land classifications.

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land but is also a legal relationship. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
The allegation of its existence must be proven by evidence, and working on another’s
landholding raises no presumption of an agricultural tenancy. Consequently, the
landowner’s consent to an agricultural tenancy relationship must be shown. While the court
finds that Automat consented to a relationship with respondent spouses, Automat is
considered to have consented merely to a civil lease. Petitioners’ acceptance of rental
payments may be considered as ratification of an unwritten lease agreement whose period
depends on their agreed frequency of rental payments.

Respondents also failed to substantiate that they introduced agricultural

improvements on the land.

Hence, no agricultural tenancy relationship for failing to comply with the elements
of a tenancy relationship.

The DAR exemption orders have determined with certainty that the lands were
reclassified as non-agricultural prior to June 15, 1988. Consequently, the petition filed by
respondent spouses in 2000 before PARAD did not involve "lands devoted to agriculture" and,
necessarily, it could not have involved any controversy relating to such land. Absent an
"agrarian dispute," the instant case cannot fall under the limited jurisdiction of the DARAB
as a quasi-judicial body.
 NON-REMITTANCE OF GSIS AND PAG-IBIG FUND PREMIUMS IS CRIMINALLY
PUNISHABLE; THE NON-REMITTANCE OF GSIS AND PAG-IBIG FUND
PREMIUMS IS MALUM PROHIBITUM. WHAT THE RELEVANT LAWS PUNISH
IS THE FAILURE, REFUSAL, OR DELAY WITHOUT LAWFUL OR JUSTIFIABLE
CAUSE IN REMITTING OR PAYING THE REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS OR
ACCOUNTS

DATU GUMID P. MATALAM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 221849-50; April 4, 2016
LEONEN, J.

FACTS
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Joint Decision dated
April 28, 2015 and Resolution dated November 2, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26707 involving violation of Sec. 52(g) of RA 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997 and criminal
case No. 26708 involving violation of Sec. 1, Rule XIII of the IRR of RA 7742 finding Matalam
guilty of the crimes charged.

In in Criminal Case No. 26707, Datu Gumid P. Matalam who was the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform-Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
(DAR-ARMM), Ansarry Lawi and Naimah Unte who were the cashier and accountant of the
office respectively, failed or refused to remit the employer’s share in the amount of
P2,418,577.33 without justifiable cause despite repeated demands. In the joint decision, the
Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of the crime charged.

In criminal case No. 26708, Matalam failed to remit the amount of P149,100.00 despite
having been sent a Notice of Underpayment. Based on the definition of the term "employer"
under the law, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it is the head of the office or the agency that has
the obligation to remit the contributions. the Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of non-
remittance of the employer's share of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.

Matalam argued that testimonies of the witnesses showed that the funds for the
remittances due to GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund were released to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the ARMM and not to DAR-ARMM. Even if the funds were, indeed, released to
DAR-ARMM, "Matalam as the Regional Secretary could not be held accountable for the non-
payment or remittance, since as a matter of procedure, he merely acts as a signatory to
whatever document is necessary for the payment of the employer's share to both GSIS and
Pag-IBIG [Fund]." It is the Office of the Regional Governor that has the duty to release the
funds. Matalam insists that his duty to affix his signature as head of the office was only
ministerial.

He also argues that the billing statements were not addressed to him as they were
sent to the Accounting Division of DAR; hence, it should have been Unte's duty as accountant
to deal with the statements or to bring them to Matalam's attention
ISSUE
Is Datu Guimid P. Matalam guilty of non-remittance of the employer's share of the
GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums?

HELD
Yes, Matalam, as head of DAR-ARMM, is criminally liable for non-remittance of GSIS
and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.

We cannot accept the petitioner's argument that the duty to remit the required
amounts falls to his co-accused. Republic Act No. 8291, Section 52 (g) clearly provides that
heads of agencies or branches of government shall be criminally liable for the failure, refusal,
or delay in the payment, turnover, and remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS.

Similarly, the refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7742, with respect to the collection and
remittance of employee savings as well as the required employer contributions to the Pag-
IBIG Fund, subjects the employer to criminal liabilities such as the payment of a fine,
imprisonment, or both.

Indeed, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is criminally

punishable.

The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum.

What the relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable
cause in remitting or paying the required contributions or accounts

In Saguin v. People, we have said that non-remittance of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums

without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent is punishable under the penal clause of Section
23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752. However, the petitioners in Saguin were justified in not
remitting the premiums on time as the hospital they were working in devolved to the
provincial government and there was confusion as to who had the duty to remit.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to prove a justifiable cause for his failure to
remit the premiums. We cannot subscribe to petitioner's defense that the funds for the
remittances were not directly credited to DAR-ARMM but to the account of the Office of the
Regional Governor of the ARMM, which had the obligation to remit to the various line
agencies of the ARMM the specific amounts provided to them.

As the Sandiganbayan found from the testimonies of the witnesses and evidence on
record, the amounts meant for remittance to GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund were indeed deposited
into the bank account maintained by DARARMM for its Fund. It is settled that factual
findings of the trial court are entitled to respect and finality unless it is shown that such
findings are patently misplaced or without any basis. Hence, petitioner's duty to ensure the
remittance of the amounts to GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund was triggered by the availability of the
funds in DAR-ARMM's account.
 ILLNESSES NOT LISTED AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ARE DISPUTABLY
PRESUMED TO BE WORK-RELATED; A PRE-EMPLOYMENT MEDICAL
EXAMINATION CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO REFLECT A "SEAFARER'S TRUE
STATE OF HEALTH" SINCE IT IS NOT EXPLORATORY AND MAY JUST
DISCLOSE ENOUGH FOR EMPLOYERS TO DECIDE WHETHER A "SEAFARER IS
FIT FOR OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.

MADRIDEJOS vs. NYK-FIL SHIP MANAGEMENT

GR. No. 204262l June 7, 2017
LEONEN, J.

FACTS
Petitioner Mario Madridejos (Madridejos) was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent
NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. (NYK-FIL), a registered local manning agency operating by
virtue of Philippine laws for its foreign principal, International Cruise Services, Limited. He
signed an employment contract as a Demi Chef for the vessel “Crystal Symphony/Serenity,”
effective for 10 months.

On April 10, 2010, Madridejos began working aboard the vessel and two weeks later,
he claimed that while carrying kitchen equipment, he suddenly slipped on a metal stairway
and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal pipe. He was brought to the ship
doctor and was diagnosed to have a “sebaceous cyst to the right of the umbilicus.” He was
then treated at the Spire Southampton Hospital in England, and his cyst was removed and
was closed with 3 stitches. After 2 months, his contract was terminated because of the
employment agreement. He was eventually repatriated to the Philippines, and he insisted
that he did not finish his employment contract because of his unwanted health condition.

NYK-FIL insists that it has terminated Madridejos' services pursuant to his

Employment Agreement and not because of his illness. He was repatriated 3 months after his
cyst was removed due to a valid termination of his probationary employment.

On the other hand, Madridejos denies that the termination of his probationary
contract caused his repatriation. Madridejos insists that he could not be on probationary
status because he was merely "re-engaged" as evinced by his Overseas Filipino Worker
Information. Madridejos insists that his Pre-Employment Medical Examination showed that
he was "fit to work" before he commenced employment. This proves that he incurred his
illness during his service and was only aggravated when he was on board. He claims that due
to his sebaceous cyst, "he could no longer effectively perform" his job as a Demi Chef; thus,
he was terminated.

ISSUE
Is Madridejos entitled to disability benefits?

HELD

No. The Court held that Madridejos cannot claim disability benefits since he was not
medically repatriated.
 The excision was merely a minor operation done under a local anesthesia.If he was
really medically repatriated, then he should have been immediately sent back to the
Philippines after his operation. However, he only disembarked from the vessel almost three
(3) months after such operation.

The employment of seafarers and its incidents are governed by the contracts they sign
every time they are hired or re-hired. These contracts have the force of law between the
parties as long as their stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public
policy. Given that Madridejos submitted himself with the terms of his contract, NYK-FIL may
validly terminate his services pursuant to their agreed terms.

A sebaceous cyst is not included inthe list of Occupational Diseases under Section 32
or 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment
Contract. However, the guidelines expressly provide that those illnesses not listed in Section
32 "are disputably presumed as work[-]related."

Similarly, for an illness to be compensable, “it is not necessary that the nature of the
employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is enough
that there is a reasonable linkage between the diseases suffered by the employee and his work
to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment
or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had.

The disputable presumption implies "that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable
diseases/illnesses does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits."
Similarly, "the disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation
and/or benefits claim." There is still a need for the claimant to establish, through substantial
evidence, that his illness is work-related.

Madridejos cannot solely rely on the disputable presumption. For his failure to
substantiate his claim that his cyst was either work-related or work-aggravated, the Supreme
Court cannot grant him relief.

A Pre-Employment Medical Examination cannot be relied upon to reflect a "seafarer's

true state of health" since it is not exploratory and may just disclose enough for employers
to decide whether a "seafarer is fit for overseas employment." Due to the nature of a Pre-
Employment Medical Examination, it is possible that Madridejos' sebaceous cyst was not
detected prior to his employment.
 THE 3-DAY MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENT MUST BE STRICTLY
OBSERVED. FAILURE TO COMPLY SHALL RESULT IN THE FORFEITURE OF
THE RIGHT TO CLAIM DISABILITY BENEFITS

EBUENGA vs. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES

G.R. NO. 208396; MARCH 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the NLRC’s Decision, dismissing Ebuenga’s
complaint for permanent disability benefits.

Ebuenga was hired by Southfield Agencies, Inc. (Southfield) as a chief cook aboard
Wilhemsen vessel. About two months into his engagement, Ebuenga wrote a letter to the
respondents asking that he be repatriated as soon as possible "to attend to a family problem”,
to which the respondents acted favorably.

Without consulting Southfield's designated physician, Ebuenga had himself checked

at St. Luke's Medical Center where he underwent MRI. The test revealed that he was afflicted
with "Multilevel Disk Dessication, and was advised to undergo physical therapy. Ebuenga
went back to his hometown to undergo physical therapy sessions. Thereafter, he consulted
Dr. Ticman, who issued a Disability Report, finding him to be permanently disabled and no
longer fit to work as a seafarer. Consequently, Ebuenga filed a complaint for permanent
disability benefits.

In his position paper, Ebuenga denied that he voluntarily sought repatriation. He

averred that he reported a crew member’s death due to overfatigue to the International
Transport Workers' Federation, but the latter took no action. He also averred that because of
such report, the captain of the vessel coerced him to sign the letter seeking immediate
repatriation, and that when he complained that he was suffering intense back pain, he was
ignored because of the animosity between them. He added that upon repatriation, he sought
medical assistance from the company-designated physician, but was refused. Thus, he was
forced to seek treatment on his own.

In their defense, respondents denied that there was ever an incident where Ebuenga
encountered medical problems while on board the vessel. However, they noted that Ebuenga
had been a delinquent crew member and added that Ebuenga's claim for disability benefits
could not be entertained as he failed to undergo the requisite post-employment medical
examination with the company-designated physician.

ISSUE
Is Ebuenga entitled to permanent disability benefits?
RULING
No. Section 20(B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) established the procedures for assessing claims for
disability benefits. It mandates seafarers to see a company-designated physician for a post-
employment medical examination, which must be done within three working days from their
arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to claim disability benefits

The Court explained in Manota v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation that the 3-day
mandatory reporting requirement must be strictly observed since within 3 days from
repatriation, it would be fairly manageable for the physician to identify whether the disease
was contracted during the term of his employment or that his working conditions increased
the risk of contracting the ailment. However, it was clarified that the conduct of post-
employment medical examination is not a unilateral burden on the part of the seafarer.
Rather, it is a reciprocal obligation where the seafarer is obliged to submit to an examination
within three working days from his or her arrival, and the employer is correspondingly
obliged "to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer." In cases where the
employer refuses to have the seafarer examined, the seafarer's claim for disability benefits is
not hindered by his or her reliance on a physician of his or her own choosing.

The Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of
Appeals are consistent in finding that petitioner's claim of presenting himself for examination
is direly unsupported by evidence. Hence, the Petition was denied.
 FAILURE OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN TO RENDER A FINAL
AND DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT OF A SEAFARER'S CONDITION WITHIN THE
240-DAY EXTENDED PERIOD TRANSFORMS THE SEAFARER'S TEMPORARY
AND TOTAL DISABILITY TO PERMANENT AND TOTAL DISABILITY

ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. AND/OR ZEO MARINE CORPORATION

vs. MICHAEL E. JARA
G.R. No. 204307; June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul the CA decision and Resolution.
The CA reversed the NLRC decision and granted the respondent Michael E. Jara (Jara)
permanent and total disability benefits of US$60,000.00 and 10% attorney's fees.

Jara was hired by Orient Hope, on behalf of its foreign principal, Zeo Marine, as
engine cadet on board M/V Orchid Sun. On its way to Oman, M/V Orchid Sun sank off Muscat
during which Jara sustained leg injuries. He was treated at Khoula Hospital in Oman and
thereafter repatriated and admitted on August 3, 2007 at the Metropolitan Hospital in Manila.
Jara was diagnosed to have suffered from "fracture, shaft of left ulna and left fibula." On
August 28, 2007 and January 9, 2008, he underwent knee operations. He did not return to the
company-designated doctor after his check up on March 17, 2008. Meanwhile, on March 6,
2008, 13 Jara filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter, insisting that he was entitled to total
permanent disability benefits amounting to US$60,000.00.

Petitioners aver that respondent's complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action. For one, respondent was given a disability grading before the expiration of the 240-
day period.

Respondent counters that the assessment of the company-designated physician was

issued only after nine (9) months or more than 120 days from his medical repatriation.
Furthermore, having an injured and fragile knee would make it impossible for him to meet
the demands of a seafaring job.

ISSUE
Is the respondent entitled to permanent and total disability benefits?

HELD
Yes. Respondent Jara is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

The facts of this case show respondent's inability to perform his customary sea duties
and the company-designated physician's failure to declare his fitness or unfitness to work,
despite the lapse of 240 days. This entitles respondent, under the law, to permanent and total
disability compensation.

The POEA-SEC clearly provides the primary responsibility of a company-designated

physician to determine the disability grading or fitness to work of seafarers. To be conclusive,
however, company-designated physicians' medical assessments or reports must be complete
and definite to give the proper disability benefits to seafarers. As explained by this Court: A
final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to truly reflect the true extent of
the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to resume work as such.
Otherwise, the corresponding disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate with
the prolonged effects of the injuries suffered.

Aside from the belated assessment of respondent's injury, the medical report dated
May 29, 2008 did not contain any definitive declaration as to the seafarer's fitness to work.
On the contrary, the report stated that as of his last check up on March 17, 2008, respondent
was still complaining of left knee pain especially upon doing left knee flexion. Under the
circumstances of this case, it would be improbable to expect that by March 30, 2008, or the
last day of the 240-day period, respondent would have fully recovered from his injury or
regained his pre-injury capacity as to be able to go back to his sea duty.

The standard provisions in the 2000 POEA-SEC is a regulatory attempt to balance the
constitutional protection to labor with the need for shipping and manning agencies to have
an efficient basis for the resolution of claims against them. Hence, the 120- and 240-day
periods within which a company designated physician should make a full, complete, and
definitive assessment are accommodations for them. Generally, between companies and an
ordinary Filipino seafarer, it is the former that has the better capability to comply with the
requirements for determining disabilities of a claimant. Certainly, the period given to them
is more than sufficient and it would be the height of inequity for this Court to grant them
more at the expense of the seafarer.

Therefore without a valid final and definitive assessment from the company
designated physician, respondent's temporary and total disability, by operation of law,
became permanent and total
 MENTAL TRAUMA OR PTSD MAY JUSTIFY FINDING OF CONSTRUCTIVE
DISMISSAL AND GRANT OF DISABILITY BENEFITS

RICHARD LAWRENCE DAZ TOLIONGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 231748; July 08, 2020
Leonen, J.

FACTS
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Motion to Allow Petitioner to Litigate as
an Indigent or a Pauper Litigant, Richard Lawrence Daz Toliongco assailed the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Manila, denying his Motion for Reconsideration of said
Court’s Dismissal of his appeal from the NLRC Decision which held that Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder or PTSD is not a compensable work-related disability and does not justify
Toliongco’s claim of constructive dismissal.

Richard Lawrence Daz Toliongco is a seafarer who was sexually harassed twice
during the course of his employment on board the M/V Mineral Water. His resistance to the
repeated demands of his CO to masturbate him and suck his penis led to his filing of a
Complaint for "Physical Abuse and Sexual Abuse under Alcohol Intake" against Chief Officer
Korolenko Oleksiy before the Captain. In turn, his complaint was met with violent reaction
by his superior. After the incident, Toliongco opted for voluntary repatriation. He failed to
comply with the three-day reportorial requirement. However, a week after his repatriation,
he filed a complaint before the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Several months
later, he filed a complaint "for constructive dismissal, sexual harassment and maltreatment
with prayer for the payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees" claiming that
he is rendered permanently and totally disabled due to his post-traumatic stress disorder
caused by his unfortunate experience onboard the vessel.

Toliongco claimed that he suffered from PTSD because he was sexually harassed.
Allegedly, "his illness [was] analogous to the traumatic head injuries under Section 32 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)" which reads:

“6. Severe mental disorder or Severe Complex Cerebral function disturbance or post-
traumatic psychoneurosis which require regular aid and attendance as to render worker
permanently unable to perform any work.”

Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Phil., Inc. claimed that Toliongco was not illegally
dismissed as he was actually the one who asked for the early termination of his employment
contract. They also insisted that Toliongco cannot claim disability benefits because: (1) he
was not repatriated on a medical ground; (2) he did not comply with the mandatory
requirement for post-employment medical examination within three days from his arrival;
and (3) there is no declaration from the company-designated physician as to his fitness for
sea duty.

ISSUE
Is there constructive dismissal?
HELD
Yes. Toliongco was left with no recourse but to opt for repatriation to avoid his
harasser and protect himself from further sexual advances or unwanted sexual contact.

In cases like these, it is possible that the seafarer's fear is heightened because there is
no way to escape from the environment where sexual harassment occurred. Being out at sea,
the seafarer has to wait for the ship to dock at the nearest port before the seafarer can
disembark and be repatriated. Thus, from the time the incident of sexual harassment occurred
until the time the seafarer is able to disembark, it is probable that the seafarer is cowered by
fear. In addition, the sexual predator, knowing there is no room for the victim to escape, is
capable of continuously committing such acts of sexual harassment. The unique condition of
working on board a ship empowers the harassment. The unique condition of working on
board a ship empowers the sexual predator and leaves the victim feeling helpless because
they are in the same enclosed space.

It is established that petitioner suffered some form of injury, but the pieces of evidence
he submitted are not sufficient to convince this Court that he has been rendered permanently
and totally disabled. Thus, this Court is precluded from awarding disability benefits, not
because of his non-compliance with the 3-day reportorial requirement, but because there is
barely any evidence to support the claim for disability benefits.

We must change the notion that injuries refer to only the physical kind. Injuries can
come in many forms—physical, emotional, or psychological. It is high-time that we recognize
sexual harassment on board vessels as a risk faced by our seafarers. We also cannot disregard
the possibility that Toliongco felt shame over what had happened. Victims of sexual abuse
usually take time before reporting to the proper authorities. Perhaps, more so if they are male
as society has made it hard for male victims of sexual harassment to come out and report. At
its core, sexual harassment is not an issue of gender but an issue of power and it may take
time to find solutions.

Therefore, by no means can petitioner's repatriation be considered as voluntary, for

he had been pushed against the wall with no other recourse. Hence, he is entitled to his salary
for the unexpired portion of his contract.