2022 IEEE PES/IAS PowerAfrica
MATRIX-BASED MODEL FOR ASSESSING
THE LEVEL OF POWER SYSTEM RESILIENCE
Y. Butandaa, M. Edimua, J. Serugundaa, A. A. Orwothob
aDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Makerere University
Kampala, Uganda
bUmeme Limited, Kampala, Uganda
Abstract— Sustained large scale outages caused from Low
Probability High Impact (LPHI) events have become common
in the recent past. Therefore, there is a need to reinforce the
power system network so that it can absorb or withstand and
adapt to the impacts of LPHI interruptions. . This paper
presents a model for assessing the level of resilience and the
contribution that Distributed Generators (DGs) have on
improving the power networks resilience. The assessment is
applied on Uganda’s power network considering both existing
and future DGs. Results from DIgSILENT software Simulations
revealed a significant reduction in the Resilience Quotient (RQ)
at each LPHI event upon addition of DGs on the network. These
findings conclude that reconfiguring the network to
accommodate the DGs improves network resilience by reducing
the demand curtailed during LPHI events and also improves
reliability through reduction of customers affected and thus
increasing energy sales.
Keywords—Distributed Generation (DG); Low Probability
- High Impact (LPHI); network resilience; power system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uganda electricity sector, particularly its network, is
divided into Generation, Transmission, and Distribution.
Generation has 45 plants managed by Uganda Electricity
Generation Company Limited (UEGCL), segregated into 27
hydro, 2 thermal, 6 solar, 2 biomass, 5 cogeneration, and 2
diesel [1]. The power through a Single Buyer model by
Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETCL)
[2].
In 2005, low rainfall levels resulted in a significant
deficiency in Generation compared to demand. Government
policy thus prioritized the development of new plants and the
diversification of Generation to reduce the country's
dependence on Nalubaale power station which opened new
and attractive opportunities for decentralized energy resources
onto the national grid [3].
Distributed Generation, also known as embedded or
dispersed or on-site or decentralized Generation, describes the
Generation of electricity at or near where it will be used (on-
site/customer side), rather than transmitting energy over the
electric grid from a large, centralized facility (such as a
hydropower plant) [4]. The generating plant is therefore
applied at the distribution level rather than the transmission
network playing a significant role in optimizing the
performance of the overall electricity system. The insertion of
DGs in distribution systems has several benefits where they
have been known to supplement Generation, reduce cost and
losses related to power distribution and transmission, reduce
carbon pollution, improve voltages on low voltage networks,
and improve the reliability and resilience of power systems
[5], [6], [7]. On the negative front, however, if installed
978-1-6654-6639-4/22/$31.00 ©2022 IEEE
improperly, DGs increase short circuit levels, lower the
energy quality, introduce voltage transients, and produce
harmonics, among others [8], [9], [10].
With a surplus of 42% of power generated [11], the
Government of Uganda, through Vision 2040 and the National
Development Plan (NDP) (2015/16-2019/20), has prioritized
investment in the transmission and distribution network to
facilitate an increase in power demand [12], [13]. This has
made the network very extensive, and its robustness has
continuously been questioned mainly because industrial
customers demand high-quality and reliable power supply
with limited interruptions [14].
According to the IEEE, power systems interruptions that
affect power systems can be categorized as momentary or
sustained [15]. Momentary interruptions have high probability
of occurrence while sustanained has low probability of
occurrence but high impact [16], [17], [15]. In Uganda, events
such as loss of synchronism at transmission-level with Kenya,
the collapse of transmission towers due to vandalism, are
some of the events that led to sustained faults and manifested
as national blackouts. Such events are not common. Their
occurrence, however, has a widespread impact. They can thus
be considered as Low Probability High Impact events.
Power systems resilience is defined as the ability of a
power system to reduce the likelihood of a blackout or wide
power outage [18]. A network that can predict a rare disastrous
event, absorb, or withstand it, adapt to its impacts, and then
recover to an acceptable level of operation promptly with
minimum human intervention is resilient [19]. Resilience
varies from reliability in such a way that it considers low-
probability high-impact events that require complex
restoration strategies that aim not only to resist disasters but
also to re-establish supply promptly [20]. On the other hand,
the widely used reliability metrics like SAIFI, SAIDI, and
CAIDI do not usually consider outages caused by these
events. Therefore, an exceptionally reliable power system is
not automatically resilient [21].
Power system resilience metrics are used to measure the
resilience of energy distribution systems. Resilience metrics
can be categorized into attribute-based and performance-
based metrics [22]. Attribute-based metrics tend to be
relatively simple in mathematics than for performance-based
metrics. However, they do not provide confidence in how
resilient the system is or how effective an enhancement would
be in case of disruption like the performance-based metrics
[23]. DGs would cater to both needs of resilience by providing
an alternative energy source (diversity) while ensuring
redundancy by giving an alternative generation point to ensure
that sections of the power grid maintain operational strength
and robustness in the face of a disaster, e.g., keeping all or
some customers connected.
2022 IEEE PES/IAS PowerAfrica
In this paper, the idea of employing the numerous TABLE I. STATISTICS FOR LPHI EVENTS OVER THE 5-YEAR PERIOD
Distributed Generators (DGs) connected to the existing grid to Frequ Average outage Impact on the
reduce the impact of the LPHI events on the network was Fault
ency duration (hrs.) network
applied to Uganda’s Power grid. The study considered the
transmission and 33kV distribution networks. Comparative Fault at Owen Falls
11 41.19 Total blackout
analysis was carried out using a resilience model based on substation
Fault on Owen Partial
performance-based metrics to quantify the level of exposure Falls - Lugogo 2
6 2.77
blackout
of the network to LPHI events with the network as is and with
Kenya decoupled 5 0.36 Total blackout
the DGs utilized. This was done to confirm the contribution of
DGs in improving network resilience. The associated benefits Fault on
Partial
Kabulasoke - 5 12.78
in the distribution network performance in terms of unserved Masaka
blackout
energy and reliability were also established. DIgSILENT Fault on
Power Factory software 15.1 was applied to the study. Partial
Kabulasoke - 4 6.4
blackout
Nkenda
II. MODEL OF UGANDA POWER NETWORK Partial
Fault on Opuyo 4 11.37
blackout
A demonstrative model of the Uganda transmission and
distribution network was modelled. The model considered all
For the distributed generation plants connected to the grid,
the existing generation plants and those to be commissioned
28 with a total installed capacity of 414.8 MW were
by 2025. All the substations with shared transmission (HV)
considered. These were assumed to have a utilization capacity
and distribution (MV) equipment were considered because
of 70% and, therefore total Generation of 290.4 MW [1].
these are the main infeed points from the main generating
Additional 14 plants with an installed capacity of 283.8 MW
plants to the distribution network.
are expected to be commissioned before 2025. All these plants
A. Network equipment data together provided a total generation output of 489MW.
The network model constitutes 82 substations; 59 Umeme
TABLE II. DGS CONSIDERED
owned, 20 UETCL owned and 3 privately owned. Of these
substations, 19 have shared transmission and distribution Generation Installed capacity Output generated
equipment. The transmission HV network comprises 67 plants (MW) (MW)
overhead transmission lines of voltage levels 66kV, 132kV Current 414.8 290.4
and 220kV with a total route length of 3412.5 km. Future 283.8 198.7
The 33kV distribution network comprises 162 distribution Total 698.6 489.1
lines with a total route length of 9000km and 61km of
overhead and underground lines, respectively, with both spot III. MATRIX-BASED NETWORK RESILIENCE MODEL
and distributed loads. The network has over 5000 33kV/LV Quantifying network resilience required a measure of the
distribution transformers with a total installed capacity of 688 network's ability to endure external causes of component
MVA, several shunt capacitors to improve voltage stability failure and the ability of the network to restore performance.
and reduce losses on lines, and single-phase voltage regulators Some authors have suggested focusing on the network's
to maintain a good performance voltage profile on the performance as perceived by the customers, measuring
respective distribution feeders. availability as the metric for resilience [24], [25]. A recent
Network parameters like line capacities, conductor types study by P. Milorad et al. suggested that quantifying nearby
and lengths, generator and substation data were obtained from unscheduled outage clusters would improve the response
the distribution and transmission utilities (Umeme limited and times for operators to readjust the system and provide better
Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited - resilience [26]. To compare the power network's resilience
UETCL). level before and after reconfiguration, load flow and reliability
analyses were considered before and after an LPHI event. This
B. Network performance statistics work presents a mathematical model that computes a
Failure data for the period 2015 to 2020 was considered. resilience quotient. This quotient is further applied in a
The data corresponding to failure events that caused partial or resilience matrix to map out the improvement in network
total blackouts on the power system network was extracted for resilience due to specific intervention and utilization of DGs
use in the assessment. It was noted that the qualifying events for the case of this research.
occurred or affected specific transmission and generation A. Resilience Quotient (RQ)
infrastructure. For the research, the LPHI events with the
highest frequencies over the 5-year analysis period were The initial approach considered in this work was to
considered as they had the most impact on the network, as compute the level of network resilience using an index termed
shown in Table I. Resilience Quotient (RQ). The RQ was defined using the
product of two parameters:
 Total system demand curtailed in MW (Dc) and,
 Total outage duration or restoration time (Rt).

RQ was expressed as a product of the two parameters, as

in:
RQ (MWh) = Rt (hrs) * Dc (MW) (1)
2022 IEEE PES/IAS PowerAfrica
Using this approach, a resilient network minimized RQ. LPHI event could be determined in terms of resilience. To
The approach is a good quantification index for resilience facilitate full utilization of the nearby distributed generators
since a value could be attached to the outcome of mitigation per region, the network was reconfigured by interconnection,
measures targeting either demand curtailed or restoration. sectionalizing or load transfers. Considering 70% utilization,
the existing DGs availed 290.4 MW, and the planned DGs
B. Resilience matrix (RM) provided an additional 200 MW.
With RQ defined, a Resilience Matrix (RM) was further
developed to characterize the level of resilience. It could be A. Scenario 1
considered as a visual mapping of resilience levels. Utilizing  Scenario 1a: Deriving limits of the 2x2 matrix
only RQ would not guide whether traction is being achieved
on reducing restoration time or curtailed demand. Consider: The results in Table III provided the baseline and the limits
for the resilience matrix shown in Figure 2. This is an
RQ1 = Rt1 * Δ Dc (2) indication of the status of the network before any interruptions
RQ2 = Δ Rt * Dc2 (3) occur.
TABLE III. NETWORK PERFORMANCE AS-IS
Total system Total system Outage duration RQ
RQ1 and RQ2 are derived from changes in the demand demand- Dc grid losses SAIDI-Rt (hrs.) (MW
curtailed and the restoration time, respectively. If RQ1 = RQ2, (MW) (MVA) h)
one would assume the power network has the same level of 758.76 106.6593 162.838 123,5
55
resilience. RM helps map any movement in resilience such that
even for the case where RQ1 ≠ RQ2, a distinct level of
resilience can be applied. A simplified 2 x 2 matrix was
developed and used to illustrate the additional information that
an RM provides. Judgment is made after the two chosen
variables, restoration time and demand curtailed, are plotted
against each other, as shown in Fig 1 below.

Figure 2: BASE RESILIENCE MATRIX

 Scenario 1b: Baseline Resilience

Assuming that only one high-impact event can occur at
any one given time, Table IV displays the impact of these
Figure 1: Resilience matrix model
events on the distribution network as-is, without any network
reconfigurations. Mapping the events on the matrix clearly
When a load flow and reliability analysis is carried out on shows the network's resilience level after a specific LPHI
the power system, values for total demand curtailed, and event occurs.
restoration time is obtained. These values are used not only to From Figure 3, faults at Owen Falls substation and the
compute the resultant RQ in MWh but also to characterize the decoupling of Kenya from Uganda fall under low resilience,
resilience level. The limits (minimum and maximum levels) while faults on Owen Falls - Lugogo 2 and on Kabulasoke –
of Rt and Dc are derived from the simulations that consider no Nkenda fall under medium resilience and Fault on Kabulasoke
LPHI events. – Masaka and Opuyo have the network at high resilience but
inching towards medium resilience.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Three scenarios were considered in the analysis:
Scenario 1 did not consider the presence of DGs on the
grid. In this scenario, the Dc and Rt values were derived for
two cases; one with no LPHI events and the other with LPHI
events. The case with no LPHI event provided the limits of the
2X2 resilience matrix model. The case with LPHI events
provided the baseline resilience level of the power grid. In
scenario 2, only the existing DGs connected to the grid were
considered on the grid. Scenario 3 considered both the existing
and planned DGs. In scenarios 2 and 3, the RQ value was
computed for each LPHI event and mapped onto the 2X2
resilience matrix. From this, the level of exposure to each Figure 3: Resilience of the existing network after LPHI events occur
2022 IEEE PES/IAS PowerAfrica

TABLE IV. NETWORK PERFORMANCE IN SCENARIO 1 AFTER LPHI EVENTS OCCUR

Index Fault System demand (MW) Dc/MW Rt/ hrs. RQ/ MWh Resilience level
F1 Fault at Owen Falls substation 0.00 758.76 162.84 123,554.96 Low
F2 Fault on Owen Falls - Lugogo 2 497.33 261.43 175.45 45,866.85 Medium
F3 Kenya decoupled 0.00 758.76 162.84 123,554.96 Low
F4 Fault on Kabulasoke - Masaka 695.41 63.35 159.33 10,093.81 High
F5 Fault on Kabulasoke - Nkenda 706.48 52.28 177.69 9,289.74 Medium
F6 Fault on Opuyo 729.37 29.39 161.27 4,739.67 High

It is clear from Table IV that no distinction would be made has the resilience level shifting from medium to high. This is
regarding the level of network resilience between faults F2, attributed to the DGs that were added to the network and
F4, F5 and F6 if single parameter values (Dc, Rt or RQ) are resulted in a decrease in the demand curtailed.
used.
B. Scenario 2: Existing DGs considered
In this scenario, the network's resilience is seen to be
moderately improving, as shown in Table V below. Fig. 4
illustrates the resilience of the network for each event that
occurs. Fault at Owen Falls substation and Kenya decoupled
events remain under the low resilience category. Still, their RQ
value reduces, thus moving the impact of these faults towards
the medium resilience category. This is due to the decrease in
demand curtailed after adding the DGs. Fault at Opuyo and on
Kabulasoke – Masaka had the RQ values at high resilience
even before the distributed generators were introduced.
Addition of DGs, however, further lowers the RQ value of Figure 4: Performance of the network during scenario 2
these events, increasing the network's resilience when these
events occur. The fault event on Kabulasoke – Nkenda line
TABLE V. PERFORMANCE OF THE NETWORK IN SCENARIO 2
Index Fault System demand (MW) Dc/MW Rt /hrs. RQ /MWh Resilience level
F1 Fault at Owen Falls substation 370.38 388.38 185.74 72,138.48 Low
F2 Fault on Owen Falls - Lugogo 2 497.33 261.43 175.45 45,866.85 Medium
F3 Kenya decoupled 370.38 388.38 185.74 72,138.48 Low
F4 Fault on Kabulasoke - Masaka 708.42 50.34 160.58 8,083.40 High
F5 Fault on Kabulasoke - Nkenda 738.68 20.08 132.58 2,662.19 High
F6 Fault on Opuyo 732.54 26.22 145.21 3,807.35 High

with the addition of the future DGs. Fig. 5 below shows the
C. Scenario 3: Both existing and future plans considered new resilience levels of the network for each occurring event.
Significant improvement in the resilience of the network
is demonstrated in this scenario. The RQ values for the events
are displayed in Table VI. The resilience level for fault at
Opuyo and on Kabulasoke – Masaka line is maintained at high
with the addition of the future distributed generators lowering
the RQ value even further. Similarly, the fault event on
Kabulasoke – Nkenda line is maintained at high resilience, but
a reduction in the RQ value is realized, meaning an increase in
resilience of the network. Fault on Owen Falls – Lugogo 2 is
maintained at a medium resilience level.
It should be noted that the demand curtailed remains
constant. However, the RQ value reduces due to the reduction
in the restoration time of the network. The resilience level for
Fault at Owen Falls substation and when Kenya is decoupled Figure 5: Performance of the network during scenario
shifts from low to medium as the RQ values reduce even more
2022 IEEE PES/IAS PowerAfrica

TABLE VI. PERFORMANCE OF THE NETWORK IN SCENARIO 3

Index Fault System demand (MW) Dc/MW Rt /hrs. RQ /MWh Resilience level
F1 Fault at Owen Falls substation 457.51 301.25 173.03 52,125.59 Medium
F2 Fault on Owen Falls - Lugogo 2 497.33 261.43 145.45 38,023.95 Medium
F3 Kenya decoupled 457.51 301.25 173.03 52,125.59 Medium
F4 Fault on Kabulasoke - Masaka 716.7 42.06 150.06 6,311.65 High
F5 Fault on Kabulasoke - Nkenda 751.51 7.25 122.58 888.70 High
F6 Fault on Opuyo 743.54 15.22 135.21 2,057.87 High

Proceedings of the ASME 2013 Power Conference, Boston,

V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a matrix-based model for assessing
the resilience levels of a given power network. It applied the
model to analyze distributed generators' benefits in improving
network resilience.
With the reconfiguration of the network to accommodate
the DGs, simulation results showed that, in the event of an
LPHI, the demand curtailed and the restoration time are both
reduced if distributed generators are in place to facilitate
reconfiguration of the network and provision of alternative
supply to other sections of the network. It is easy to assume
that consideration of the location of the DGs during network
planning could provide further improvement. Using the
matrix model, it was possible to easily tag and track the level
of resilience to distinct LPHI events.
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