RAMIREZ V CA

G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay
RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the
instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes.  Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
FACTS: Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of Songco, and others, on
the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During the hearing, the parties agreed that the
sole issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay due. The salesmen received monthly
salaries of at least P400.00 and commission for every sale they made.

The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the union of which Songco, et al. were
members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is separated from employment
due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off, not due to the fault of said employee, shall
receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary
per year of service."

The Labor Arbiter ordered Zuelig to pay Songco et al., separation pay equivalent to their one month
salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service with the company.

The National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the monthly
salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their separation pay.

RULING:

In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of the basic
salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and emergency living allowances.

Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that the salesman
would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly assigned to them, still these
commissions are direct remunerations for services rendered which contributed to the increase of
income of the employee. Commission is the recompense compensation or reward of an agent,
salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a
percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the
work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate
that commissions are part of Songco, et al's wage or salary.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any basic salary, but
depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee
relationships exists.

If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage or salary, then in
effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and, therefore, not
entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. This narrow interpretation is
not in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor laws, and considering the purpose of separation pay
which is, to alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to
face the harsh necessities of life.

In Soriano vs. NLRC (155 SCRA 124), we held that the commissions also claimed by the employee
(override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since
such commissions must be earned by actual market transactions attributable to the petitioner
[salesman]. Since the commissions in the present case were earned by actual transactions
attributable to Song, et al., these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation
thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commission earned during their last year
of employment.
Songco vs. NLRC [G.R. No. L-50999 March 23, 1990]

Post under case digests, labor law at Monday, April 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts:

Zuellig (M) Inc. filed with the Department of Labor (Regional Office No. 4) a clearance to
terminatethe services of petitioners Jose Songco, Romeo Cipres and Amancio Manuel due to alleged
financial losses.However, the petitioners argued that the company is not suffering any losses and the
real reason for theirtermination was their membership in the union. At the last hearing of the case,
the petitioner manifested thatthey no longer contesting their dismissal, however, they argued that
they should be granted a separation pay.Each of the petitioners was receiving a monthly salary of
P40, 000.00 plus commissions for every sale theymade. Under the CBA entered by the Zuellig Inc.
and the petitioners, in Article XIV, Section 1(a), Anyemployee, who is separated from employment
due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off not due tothe fault of said employee shall
receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to

one month’s salary per year of servi

ce. One month of salary as used in this paragraph shall be deemedequivalent to the salary at date of
retirement; years of service shall be deemed equivalent to total servicecredits, a fraction of at least
six months being considered one year, including probationary employment. Other

basis for petitioners’ contention are Article 284 of the

Labor Code with regards to reduction of personnel andSections 9(b) and 10 of Rule 1, Book VI of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter renderedhis decision directing the company
to pay the complainants separation pay equivalent to their one monthsalary (exclusive of
commissions,allowances, etc.) for every year of service that they have worked with thecompany. The
petitioners appealed to the NLRC but it was denied. Petitioner Romeo Cipres filed a Notice
ofVoluntary Abandonment and Withdrawal of petition contending that he had received, to his full
and completesatisfaction, his separation pay. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowancesshould be included in the monthly salary
ofpetitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.

Held:

The petition is granted. Petitioners’ contention that in arriving at the correct and legal amount of

separation pay due to them, whether under the Labor Code or the CBA, their basic salary, earned
salescommissions and allowances should be added together. Insofar as whether the allowances
should be includedin the monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their
separation pay is concerned, thishas been settled in the case of Santos vs. NLRC, 76721, in the
computation of backwages and separation pay,account must be taken not only of the basic salary of
petitioner but also of her transportation and emergencylivingallowances. In the issue of whether
commission should be included in the computation of their

separation pay, it is proper to define first commission. Black’s

 Law Dictionary defined commission as therecompensed, compensation or reward of an agent,
salesman, executor, trustees, receiver, factor, broker orbailee, when the same is calculated as a
percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to theprincipal. The nature of the work
of a salesman and the reason for such type of remunerationfor services

rendered demonstrate clearly that the commission are part of petitioners’ wage and salary. Some

salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commission and allowances or commissions
alone,are part of petitioners

’ wage and salary. Some salesman do not received any basic salary but depend on

commission andallowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship

exist. InSoriano v. NLRC, it is ruled then that, the commissions also claimed by petitioner (override
commission plusnet deposit incentive) are not properly includible in such base figure since such
commissions must be earnedby actual market transactions attributable to petitioner. Applying this
by analogy, since the commissions in thepresent case were earned by actual market transactions
attributable to petitioners, these should be includedin their separation pay. In the computation
thereof, what should be taken into account is the averagecommissions earned during their last year
of employment.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,

respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit
their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However,
PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in
disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make
recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even
arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation;

The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;

The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the
power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.

It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.