Water Resources Development,

Vol. 20, No. 2, 177–192, June 2004

Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan

NASER I. FARUQUI
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada

ABSTRACT In recent years, Pakistan has suffered from severe water shortages, flooding
and declining water quality. The worsening water crisis must be resolved if the country
is ever to achieve stability and develop. Using water more efficiently is a necessary but
insufficient strategy. Far deeper changes are required, including cultural and social
paradigm shifts that will help the country evolve from a feudal society to a modern one.
A blueprint for managing the water crisis is suggested that includes slowing population
growth, increasing education, using less water in agriculture, and normalizing relations
with India.

Introduction
In recent months, Pakistan has found itself squarely in the glare of the inter-
national media, whether supporting the American ‘war on terror’, staging a
referendum to hand President Musharraf a five-year presidential term, or
trading harsh words and gunfire with India over Kashmir. Underlying these
large-scale political crises, however, are pervasive, on-going problems within
Pakistan itself, such as the continuing water crisis. This is a crucial issue that
must be resolved if the country is ever to achieve stability and raise its level of
development. This paper outlines the nature of this crisis, and proposes a
blueprint for dealing with it through profound changes in water management.

Water in Pakistan
The Indus River is one of the largest in South Asia, with a drainage basin
covering 1 million km2 and a length of 3000 km. The river and its major
tributaries originate in the Himalayan and Karakoram mountain ranges of Tibet
and India, and the Hindu Kush ranges of Afghanistan. The main stem of the
river flows through both Indian-controlled and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.
The Indus basin covers 70% of Pakistan’s territory—the provinces of Punjab,
Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the eastern portion of
Balochistan. The Karan desert and the arid Makran coast cover the rest of
Balochistan (Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1997).

Correspondence address: Naser I. Faruqui, 250 Albert Street, PO Box 8500, Ottawa, Canada K1G 3H9.
Email: nfaruqui@idrc.ca

0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 Online/04/020177-16  2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

DOI: 10.1080/0790062042000206138
178 N. I. Faruqui

Among the large nations of the world, perhaps only Egypt is more depen-
dent than Pakistan on a single river basin. Water from the Indus River plays a
vital role in Pakistan’s economy. Ninety per cent of the country’s agricultural
output, which represents about one-quarter of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and most of the export earnings, depends on irrigation water. Most of the
flow off the Upper Indus River originates from melting snow and ice, so more
than 80% of the annual flow volume occurs from May to September; for the rest
of the year, agricultural demand must primarily be met from stored water. The
Indus River is also the main source of domestic and industrial water. Approxi-
mately 80% of all the water consumed comes from the streams, canals, reservoirs
and wells recharged by the Indus River and its tributaries. About half of
Pakistan’s electrical energy is produced by hydroelectric generation (British
Columbia Hydro International (BCHIL), 1998).

Water Scarcity in Pakistan

Pakistan suffered a severe drought from 1998 to mid 2001. It decimated fishing
and parched farmland. Wheat production in the southern province of Sindh fell
40% and greatly reduced farmers’ incomes. Rioters smashed windows and
overturned cars in Karachi to protest at drinking water shortages (Grassroots
Information Co-ordination Centre (GICC), 2001). Yet, as devastating as it was,
this drought is only the most recent manifestation of an on-going, deep-rooted
water crisis.
Pakistan used to be rich in water resources. When it was created in 1947, it
had 35 million people and essentially the same annual renewable water avail-
ability as now, for a per capita availability of 5600 m3 per person. Pakistan now
has approximately 140 million people, and current water availability is 1000
m3/person per yr (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network (UN OCHA IRIN), 2002a).
Pakistan is experiencing ‘water stress’; below 1000 m3/person per year, a
country is likely to experience chronic water scarcity on a scale sufficient to
impede development and harm human health (Falkenmark & Lindh, 1974).
According to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s)
latest report, 12% of the population do not have access to improved water
sources and 39% are without access to adequate sanitation facilities (UNDP,
2001).1 UNDP projections suggest that the population will pass 204 million by
2015 (UNDP, 2001).2 By 2015, almost half of the population will be living in
urban areas, putting additional pressure on already-strained municipal facilities
(UNDP, 2001).3 In the absence of an adequate domestic water supply, people
will begin to dig their own wells and indiscriminate groundwater exploitation
will increase many-fold, leading to further pollution of natural aquifers. Lack of
sanitation and drainage facilities with no provision for sewage treatment will
lead to further pollution of freshwater drinking supplies. Without water-quality
monitoring and testing, incidence of waterborne diseases will continue to
increase and diseases like guinea worm, which had been eradicated from
Pakistan, will resurface (South Asia Regional Water Vision, 2000).
Pakistan’s forests are found mostly in the north, in mountain areas that are
catchments and watersheds. Yet, by 2025, there may hardly be any forests left in
the country. According to Pakistan’s Water Vision for 2025, deforestation is
occurring at a rate of 4% per year (South Asia Regional Water Vision, 2000).4
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 179

Reduction in forest resources could reduce carbon sinks in upland areas and
drive temperatures up. Increased temperatures from diminishing carbon sinks
and global warming could speed up snowmelt in the summer and increase flows
being discharged during short periods in the Indus River system. Increased
seasonal variability will increase drought during the winter and flooding during
the summer (South Asia Regional Water Vision, 2000).
Deforestation also leads to erosion, which increases the sediment levels in
rivers, further diminishing the storage capacity of the reservoirs. Already, the
storage capacity of the water reservoirs Tarbela and Mangla is slowly decreasing
due to siltation—according to the UN’s update on the drought situation in
September 2002, capacity at Tarbela has declined from 9.7 to 7.3 million acre feet
(MAF), and capacity at Mangla has fallen from 5.3 to 4.6 MAF (Resident
Coordinator of United Nations, Pakistan, 2002). Seepage from ageing canals and
flood irrigation, without adequate drainage, have caused massive water losses
and water logging, which reduces crop output (UN OCHA IRIN, 2002a).
Inadequate drainage has caused widespread salinization of soils, which are then
unfit for production. Projections of grain production in Pakistan’s Water Vision for
2025 show a shortfall of 11 million tons by 2010 and 16 million tons by 2020
(South Asia Regional Water Vision, 2000). By 2025, Pakistan will be short of
major food crops by 28 million tons and the government will be forced to import
edible oils and large quantities of wheat (South Asia Regional Water Vision,
2000). Yet, with growing external debt, little hard currency and an inadequate
industrial base, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the government to
finance the rising import bill. Food scarcity could create famine-like conditions
in the country.
There are serious political implications to the Pakistani water crisis as well.
It is already leading to tensions in both poor rural areas and urban centres. Most
of the refugees resulting from the US ‘War on Terrorism’ in Afghanistan are
staying in camps in arid Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province. Yet, the
fossil aquifers in Balochistan are being mined, resulting in a groundwater table
that is dropping by 15 feet/yr (UN OCHA IRIN, 2002a). This has led to
warnings that the fossil water reserves around the provincial capital of Quetta
could be depleted by 2025 (UN OCHA IRIN, 2002b). With over a million people
living there now, many of whom are Afghan refugees, the possibility of
confrontation over decreasing water resources, or even mass migration from the
city, is all too real. Such potentially destabilizing population movements are
already occurring elsewhere in the country. While dire pronouncements have
been made that the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water,
large-scale conflicts between nation states over water have been rare throughout
history and are unlikely in the future (Wolf, 1999). However, internal strife and
instability caused by declining natural resources such as water is a real possibil-
ity, and could then affect other nation states through the creation of refugees.
Declining Indus River flows into the Arabian Sea in Sindh Province have led
to seawater intrusion up the delta, causing land inundation and saline intrusion
of aquifers. This has resulted in the migration of thousands of farmers and
fishermen from the Indus Delta, where the water is salty and unfit to drink, to
Karachi and other cities. This urban migration has put additional pressure on
already over-stressed urban resources. Frustration over a lack of access to
services in poorer areas can lead to violence, as can the forced close proximity
of diverse and contending societal groups (Gizewski & Homer-Dixon, 1998).
180 N. I. Faruqui

Issues of water allocation have also caused on-going tensions, both between
and within provinces. It took about 8 years for India and Pakistan to agree on
the Indus Treaty, but over 30 years for the four Pakistani provinces to agree on
the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord, and they are still wrangling over it.5 The
Sindh provincial government has accused Punjab of using more water than had
been allocated to it under the 1991 agreement (UN OCHA IRIN, 2001). People
in Sindh also accuse the Punjabi-dominated army, which rules Pakistan, of being
biased against the province. Finally, fear of further seawater intrusion and
reduced flows have meant that the government of Sindh has opposed all new
dam developments, such as the Kalabagh dam,6 which it fears will benefit
Punjab to the detriment of Sindh. The water dispute between Punjab and Sindh
has even brought together warring ethnic groups within the latter province, such
as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, representing urban Urdu-speaking migrants
to Pakistan from India, and the Jeay Sindh, a militant Sindhi nationalist group. At
the same time, tensions within NWFP are growing over scarce water resources
being monopolized by a few families—whose entitlements date back to the
colonial period—leaving the majority to deal with persistent water shortages
(Matthew, 2001).

Responding to the Crisis—What Is Being Done

The Government of Pakistan is not blind to the water constraints currently
facing its country. Alone, and in concert with multi-lateral and bilateral agencies,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research groups, it has taken steps
to tackle various aspects of this complex issue. That these steps amount to a
comprehensive response to the water crisis is, however, uncertain.
In 1992, the government adopted a National Conservation Strategy (NCS),
with 14 core areas. Only two of these—‘increasing irrigation efficiency’ and
‘protecting watersheds’—specifically address water issues. More recently, in
February 2001, at the ninth meeting of the Pakistan Environmental Protection
Council, a National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was approved. It set out
four areas of focus, one of which is clean water (Government of Pakistan, 2001).
What must be kept in mind when considering any of these government plans
and statements, however, is the gap that often exists between rhetoric and
reality. Richard Matthew’s statement that the NWFP is constrained by
“[e]xternal pressures, population growth, and weak institutions [which] simul-
taneously enable destructive practices while also making it very difficult to
implement effective conservation management”, could almost certainly apply to
the rest of the country as well (Matthew, 2001, p. 23).
Nonetheless, some action is being undertaken. The government’s stated
water priorities are reflected in the projects of a number of international
organizations. For example, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have
both initiated projects to improve irrigation management and increase agricul-
tural production, while the UNDP is working to support water conservation
measures (World Bank in Pakistan, 2002). Meanwhile, the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI), a non-profit scientific research organization, is
investigating the economic and health repercussions of wastewater irrigation
(Ensink et al., 2002). Also, the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have
supported the Snow and Ice Hydrology Project, an operational flow forecasting
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 181

system that allows better prediction of the inflows into the Tarbela and Mangla
Reservoirs (Risvi, 2001).7
The government of Pakistan has itself tackled these problems through such
initiatives as the formation in 1997 of Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Author-
ities (PIDAs) in the Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP to improve irrigation
management. Under the auspices of the Water and Power Development Auth-
ority (WAPDA), the government is concentrating on building new canals and
dams, extending irrigation networks, increasing the amount of water in already-
existing networks, and reclaiming land damaged by waterlogging or salinity.
While these initiatives, and others like them, contribute to the improvement
of Pakistan’s irrigation system, the emphasis on augmenting the supply of water
available for agriculture has eclipsed any sustained efforts to conserve water,
reduce demand or change consumption patterns to lessen reliance on depleted
water resources. There is no indication of a long-term, comprehensive plan to
tackle the water crisis in a sustainable fashion. This can lead to potentially
damaging ad hoc crisis measures.
The repercussions of a limited water strategy were evident during the
country’s recent drought. In desperation, the Musharraf regime seriously pro-
posed throwing sediment on Pakistan’s northern glaciers to make them melt
faster—a move that would have had major and unexpected environmental
consequences. However, after normal rain during summer 2001 replenished
supplies, the crisis was averted and the government turned to other matters (UN
OCHA IRIN, 2002a). This prompted Sarwar Bari, co-ordinator of the Sindhi
NGO Pattan, to say: “The government has no clear cut water policy in place.
When they are in a crisis they manage it on an ad hoc basis. They don’t learn
from it. When the crisis is over they relax. Pakistan needs a cultural shift, and
this is not going to happen overnight …” (UN OCHA IRIN, 2001, p. 6).
In the meantime, in Balochistan’s capital of Quetta, the government has
responded to the on-going water crisis by digging an increasing number of tube
wells to extract fossil water from hard-rock aquifers. There is no certainty that
these deep reserves will recover quickly, if at all. Yet, in a frighteningly
short-sighted statement reported in a 17 May 2002 report by the UN Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Net-
work, Abdus Salam Khan, secretary of the Irrigation and Power Department of
Balochistan, reacting “to the doomsday scenario of Quetta being deserted by the
unavailability of water, … pointed out that there was an assessment that the
fossil water would last till 2025. ‘Maybe we will find some more locations by
then to explore,’ he added.” (UN OCHA IRIN, 2002b)
Instead of dreaming of discovering yet more water resources to tap, to avert
Pakistan’s looming water crisis its leaders must implement fundamental changes
in water management. To do so, they need to provide guidance, generate speed
and involve all stakeholders. Each of these three goals can be organized into a
series of concrete steps. This essay deals mainly with the most critical steps.8

Responding to the Crisis—What Should Be Done

Provide Guidance
Past efforts have focused on helping farmers irrigate more efficiently, using less
water. While this is necessary, Figure 1 shows that this is a superficial approach
182 N. I. Faruqui

Figure 1. Bringing about real change. Source: Adapted from Murray & Richardson (2002).

that will only have an incremental impact without other, more significant
changes. Serious strategic changes have not yet even been contemplated; ninety-
seven per cent of Pakistan’s water is used in irrigation, and some re-allocation
from agriculture to the domestic and industrial sectors—where water is worth
more economically—will be necessary (World Resources Institute (WRI) et al.,
2000–2001). This should be accompanied by collecting and treating as much
urban wastewater as possible and recycling it back into peri-urban agriculture.
But even strategic changes will be insufficient. What are really necessary are
cultural and paradigm changes. The adult literacy rate in Pakistan is only 43%,
far below India’s, at 57%, and the average in all developing countries, at 74%
(UNDP, 2001). Many efforts to encourage more water-efficient practices fail
because farmers are illiterate. Increasing literacy will also help Pakistan slow the
birthrate because more-educated women tend to put off having children longer.
Pakistan’s very high population growth rate of 2.5%,9 which will bring its
population to over 200 million by 2015, is partially responsible for its water
problems (UNDP, 2001). Part of the reluctance to practice family planning is
rooted in culture and religion. Many Pakistanis believe that Islam forbids family
planning and that selling water is against Islam. In fact Islam takes no such
position, but illiterate peasants cannot read the Quran for themselves to discover
this (Faruqui et al., 2001). Moreover, dramatic gains in family planning are
possible, even in Muslim countries. For example, Iran cut its population growth
rate by more than 50% (from 3 to 1.47%) in less than a decade by stressing to its
population that equity—a primary principle in Islam—was threatened by unre-
strained population growth (Peterson, 1999).
Pakistan needs a new vision, evolving from an irrigation-based feudal
society to an industrial one, or it will continue its backward slide (Quinn, 1996).10
All of its development indicators have been falling over the last 20 years. The
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 183

country has slipped on the UN human development index in the last 10 years,
while neighbours such as India, Sri Lanka and even Bangladesh have made
gains. See Table 1 for an indication of Pakistan’s regional standing, in terms of
key development and water indicators.
Pakistan will soon be unable to produce enough grain to feed its people,
and so it must embrace the concept of South Asian regional food sufficiency
instead of self-sufficiency. This will entail growing fewer water-intensive crops
such as wheat, rice, cotton and sugarcane. It takes about 1000 tons of water to
grow a ton of wheat and 2000 tons of water to grow a ton of rice,11 water that
could more strategically and sustainably be used in other areas (World Water
Vision Commission, 2000). Similarly, Pakistan could import sugarcane from
Cuba for less than half the cost of producing it (UN OCHA IRIN, 2002a). This
will also entail an economic shift away from agriculture, which currently
employs about 47% of the population, toward other sectors (UN Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 2000)).12 Policies aimed at
educating and training farmers and farm workers who will become unemployed
and integrating them into the national economy will therefore have to be
instituted.
Part of Pakistan’s re-invention should be through new regional co-operation
in trade and training deals, and this also means achieving peace with India.
Bringing an end to the on-going game of brinkmanship being played by the two
countries is only the most obvious reason for such a drastic step to be initiated.
Peace would also allow grain trade with the goal of regional food self-
sufficiency, joint research on more efficient water management and farming, and
co-operation on flow forecasting from the northern rivers. Funds could also be
diverted from arms budgets to education. According to the UNDP, in the
mid–late 1990s, public expenditure on education was only 2.7% of the GNP. In
contrast, in 2000, military expenditure was 4.5% of the GDP (UNDP, 2002).
Pakistan’s water problems are so profound that its leaders must take both
a directive approach to change—for example, by unilaterally imposing some
minor price for irrigation and drinking water—as well as a more consultative
approach—for example, by soliciting ideas at the local level for improved water
management practices (Beer & Nohria, 2000). The best plans for change ex-
plicitly confront the tension between the two approaches, set direction from the
top and engage people from below. Although General Musharraf’s military
dictatorship is bad for the country in other respects, it may be able to do what
a weak civilian government could not: implement the profound changes that
require cultural and paradigm shifts. Musharraf has already demonstrated that
he can hold on to power while implementing unpopular policy decisions,
including co-operating with America in its ‘War on Terrorism’, and abandoning
support for, and even jailing, individuals from extremist groups.

Generate Speed
The recent drought, which is still fresh in people’s minds, offers an opportunity
to emphasize the need for profound change. President Musharraf should say on
national television that the looming water crisis is a greater long-term threat to
Pakistan than is India, Islamic militancy or the war in Afghanistan. He should
also visit various government departments, the provincial governors and other
 Table 1. Regional comparison of key indicators

Population
below the
income
poverty
line—
184 N. I. Faruqui

Population Population Sectoral Adult $1 a day

using using Population freshwater literacy (1993
Annual improveda adequate employed with- Irrigated land as rate (% purchasing
population water sanitation in drawals a percentage age 15 and power parity
growth rate (%)* sources facilities agriculture (%) of cropland*** above) US$) (%)
(%) 2000 (%) 2000 (%) 1999 agriculture 2000 1983–2000b
1975-2000 2000-2015 * * ** *** 1987 1997 * *

Pakistan 2.8 2.5 88 61 47.25 97 78 81 43.2 31.0

India 1.9 1.3 88 31 61.6d 92 25 34 57.2 44.2
Nepal 2.2 2.2 81 27 77.9 99 36 38 41.8 37.7
Bangladesh 2.4 1.9 97 53 57.7e 86 24 45 41.3 29.1
Sri Lanka 1.3 0.8 83 83 35.3 96 28c 32c 91.6 6.6
China 1.3 0.7 75 38 50.1 77 35 38 84.1 18.8

a
Population using improved water sources is defined by the UNDP as “the percentage of the population with reasonable access to an adequate
amount of drinking water from improved sources. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least 20 litres per person per day from a source
within one kilometre of the user’s dwelling. Improved sources include household connections, public standpipes, boreholes with handpumps,
protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater collection. Not included are vendors, tanker trucks and unprotected wells and springs.”bData
refer to most recent year available during the period specified.cData refer to irrigated rice only.dData are for 1995.eData are for 1998.Sources: *UNDP
(2002); **UN ESCAP (2000); ***World Resources Institute in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations
Development Programme & the World Bank (2000).
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 185

Figure 2. How is the change process perceived? Source: Adapted from Richardson &
Nightingale (2000).

major stakeholders (see Figure 2), to personally explain the severity of the crisis
and the hard decisions that need to be made.
Senior Pakistani leadership needs to establish a clear goal—such as a
modern, industrialized Pakistan, with less than 30% of the population working
in agriculture by 2015—and outline the following four make-or-break challenges:
• slow population growth to 1.5% by 2015;
• increase literacy rate from 43 to 58% by 2015;
• decrease water usage in agriculture from 97 to 80% by 2015; and
• implement modest 25% cost recovery for irrigation water and full cost
recovery for water supplied in urban areas.
Once tactical plans for each objective are established, they must quickly be
implemented. This will include creating a cabinet-level position responsible for
water management, to whom the leaders of all departments responsible for
water management, such as the Agriculture or Water and Power Ministries,
report. One champion for each of the four initiatives must be appointed, with
sufficient resources to achieve the objectives, and the plans must be executed
using a wide range of communication tools, including TV, radio, newspapers
and discussions in Mosques.

Involve All Stakeholders

Table 2 outlines the main stakeholders (large landowners, small farmers, urban
citizens, sugar mill owners, industrial leaders, the army and religious leaders),
186 N. I. Faruqui

Table 2. How stakeholders are affected by change

Stakeholder How affected? Current Impact on

group perception outcome

Large Less water Negative No chance of change,

landowners Possibly less income Threatens their unless they are
Less able to dominate very livelihood neutralized. Few key
uneducated poor Could still grow landlords may
Higher costs if as much food or realize a better
irrigation water priced more by being educated workforce
forced to become and more efficient
more efficient techniques may
increase their wealth
Small farmers Less water Negative Are key to popular
Possibly less food Using less water groundswell of
production will decrease support, especially if
Higher costs if ability to grow they realize literacy
irrigation water priced food and population
Increased education Higher costs due planning are the key
More efficient farming to higher prices to escaping poverty
techniques Interference
with their religion
Having fewer
kids a threat to
manpower
Urban citizens More and better quality Both positive and Educated core of
water available for negative country key to
drinking More and better long-term
Higher water prices drinking water development
Higher water strategies
prices
Sugar mill Less water available for Negative If lobbying too
owners water-inefficient crops Will lobby powerful, will kill
politicians against increases to water
proposed increases prices
in prices, but will
welcome more
educated workforce

how they are affected, their current perception and their potential impact on the
outcome of any water management initiative. A small minority of the population
(10% or higher) will be very hostile to the proposed changes, and a large
proportion will sit on the fence, to see which way the wind blows. But it will be
possible to identify and mobilize 20% of the population from amongst the above
groups to actively lead, support and implement the changes, and influence the
fence sitters. These will include innovative farmers, advocates for the poor,
educated religious leaders and distinguished academics, for example, at the
Pakistan Council for Research in Water Resources.
Figure 2 demonstrates the severity of the challenge. Change is about power,
and in Pakistan’s feudal society that power is held by landlords and the owners
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 187

Table 2. (continued)

Stakeholder How affected? Current Impact on

group perception outcome

Other industry More water available Positive One of the few

for water- intensive Currently, almost supportive
industries (cooling, no water is stakeholders who
heating) available for want to see Pakistan
industry move from a feudal
Not enough society to an
educated workers industrial one
Even with
increases in
water prices, on
average, water
still be less than
2% of total costs

Army More educated Both positive and Support of rank and

population could be negative file is crucial. Some
less easily fooled by Army is the army officers (mostly
need to ‘crush’ India, premier, most Punjabi) are also
which could threaten educated landowners, but
army’s position institution in fewer landowners
country. Many within the army than
officers within the politicians
appreciate the
real long-term
threat facing
Pakistan

Religious Educated religious Both positive and Support of strong,

leaders leaders will benefit negative educated religious
Uneducated leaders, Educated religious leaders, who are not
who owe their leaders will seen as beholden to
position largely due to support focus on state, absolutely
illiteracy and equity, education, critical
ignorance of and sustainability,
population, will suffer all of which have
strong support in
Islam
More backward
leaders will be
against concepts of
family planning,
education for
women and paying
for water

of the sugar and cotton mills (especially in Sindh province), who will be
unwilling to give up any water because irrigated agriculture is the mainstay of
their power. Family planning and literacy also threaten their position, because
once the peasants become educated, they risk losing some of their workforce.
The uneducated, conservative clergy, who oppose family planning and edu-
cation for women, and who also believe that water is from God and thus should
188 N. I. Faruqui

be free, hold considerable influence over people, especially in rural areas. Many
small farmers will also oppose the proposed changes because they do not realize
that they could achieve equal or higher yields with half the water they currently
use, by irrigating with drip irrigators or sprinklers, instead of flood irrigation.
Much water is wasted by the practice of flood irrigation, yet farmers continue to
inundate their crops with water because it costs them nothing. Ironically, cutting
water usage may in some cases actually increase agriculture yields; during the
drought of the late 1990s, wheat yields actually increased in the Punjab because
the crop was over-watered in the past, literally drowning the root zone. Farmers
will also be likely to resist because they are not trained in the new methods, or
worry about affordability of drip irrigators or sprinklers.
The best way to deal with all of these entrenched interests is through
education. Educating the peasants will break the power of the landlords, and
will also enhance family planning, which could change Pakistan’s gloomy
population growth and water availability projections. Education is the best
means to generate new ideas for strategic and operational change, to transform
cultural misconceptions, and to create a new vision for the country.
Finally, the ‘opposing’ forces must not be completely discounted as poten-
tial sources of change. Not all landlords are actively opposed to education, and
some may realize that it is better to be part of the coming change than to be
swept away by it. However, most of the change will come from small farmers
(fighting for emancipation from large landowners), urban citizens, other indus-
try, enlightened religious leaders and the army—the strongest, best-educated
institution in the country. Many of its officers are astute enough to appreciate the
looming water crisis facing Pakistan.
Crucial to the four major initiatives will be reward and recognition systems
that motivate people. These can include charging a little for water so that people
will use less. Farmers with innovative, water-saving ideas can receive the gift of
food/trickle irrigation systems or sprinklers. Materials necessary for family
planning will have to be free, and villages that curb growth rates could receive
material compensation. Schooling, which is currently relatively very costly for
Pakistanis, must be heavily subsidized. A key non-economic incentive is recog-
nition within the community and the ultimate reward associated with being a
good Muslim. The influence of religion on people’s day-to-day behaviour in
rural Pakistan is duplicated in very few countries. To complement material
incentives, a major initiative, already practiced in Muslim countries such as
Jordan, Iran and Malaysia, could be to educate Imams about what the Quran
and Hadith say about education (including women’s education), family plan-
ning, equity and conserving water. They would then be encouraged to mention
these issues in their Friday sermons.

The Role of the International Community

To help Pakistan, and ensure regional stability, the international community
needs to do more of what it is already doing—providing funding for family
planning projects and particularly for education. However, the amounts cur-
rently being spent are too little to have any significant impact on literacy, and
every boy and girl, including those working as child labourers, should be able
to go to school. Innovative donor projects have demonstrated that it is possible
for children who are facing the reality of having to work to support their
families to still receive education. One of the key roles of the international
 Responding to the Water Crisis in Pakistan 189

community will be to support a massive programme of school building, training

and paying for teachers, and supplying materials. Donors also have an import-
ant role to play in subsidizing water prices while utility services are being
improved, after which consumers will be willing to pay full costs. Donors can
also fund the training of farmers to use water more efficiently and buy equip-
ment for water-saving devices such as trickle irrigators. Methods of decreasing
water use in agriculture should be a major priority for international aid, instead
of billion-dollar projects like large dams, which are focused on increasing water
supplies.
The international community also needs to take significant steps not taken
in the past. One important measure will be to lift tariffs on textiles and
footwear—two of Pakistan’s major exports. Industrialized countries do not have
a comparative advantage in producing these goods, but Pakistan does. Lifting
tariffs, particularly on textiles, could have a significant impact on poverty in
Pakistan, and allow farmers to maintain or increase incomes even with less
water. Finally, the international community needs to show some leadership on
Kashmir. The dispute will never be solved without mediation, and full peace in
the region will never be possible without settling the Kashmir conflict. India has
always resisted foreign mediation in the conflict, but in the long run mediation
will be as good for India as it is for Pakistan. Full, normal and productive
relations are important to both countries, but particularly to Pakistan, which
needs peace to better find a way out of its water crisis.

Conclusion
Pakistan is a feudal society dependent on irrigated agriculture. It faces grave
water management challenges, including rapidly declining water availability,
food insecurity, poor access to safe drinking water, pollution and political
instability. Past government initiatives to deal with the crisis have been ad hoc
and superficial. Fundamental change, consisting of three main elements, will be
necessary to adequately deal with the crisis. First, the depth of the necessary
change has to be accurately diagnosed. To avoid the realistic prospect of
large-scale famine and massive political instability, Pakistan must go through
cultural and paradigm shifts—dramatically lowering its population growth rate,
significantly increasing literacy, and using substantially less water in agriculture.
This means that the country must evolve from a feudal society mainly concerned
with being food self-sufficient, to an industrial one that recovers grain shortfalls
through trade and co-operation with India. The main opposing forces will be
large landlords (whose power and wealth depend on irrigated agriculture),
uneducated, conservative clergy and uneducated farmers. Agents of change
amongst these groups, capable of influencing their peers, must be identified.
Along with other stakeholders who view some or all of the proposed changes
favourably, such as social advocates, the army and industrial leaders, they must
lead and implement the agenda, supported by relevant rewards and recognition
systems.
Pakistan is more blessed with water resources than many other countries,
and the suggested changes have all been successfully implemented in countries
with similar socio-economic, cultural and religious contexts. Some of these
changes will likely come about with or without government intervention. For
example, farmers in arid parts of India already realize that it is more cost
effective to sell their water to urban consumers than to grow crops with it
190 N. I. Faruqui

However, the government cannot rely on such limited, reactionary initiatives. If

Pakistani leaders take immediate action, they may well be able to avert the crisis
and, at the same time, considerably raise Pakistan’s level of development. The
international community can significantly help Pakistan in this plan of action by
increasing funding for education and family planning projects, providing donor
aid for water conservation, mediating in the Kashmir conflict and, through the
World Trade Organization, lifting tariffs on textiles and footwear.

Acknowledgement
Research assistance for this essay was provided by Jessica Blitt.

Notes
1. Population using improved water sources is defined as “the percentage of the population with
reasonable access to an adequate amount of drinking water from improved sources. Reasonable
access is defined as the availability of at least 20 litres per person per day from a source within
1 km of the user’s dwelling. Improved sources include household connections, public stand-
pipes, boreholes with handpumps, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater
collection (not included are vendors, tanker trucks and unprotected wells and springs)” (UNDP,
2001)
2. This figure is based on medium-variant projections.
3. This figure is based on medium-variant projections.
4. The Water Vision figures are somewhat higher than those of the World Bank, which lists annual
deforestation (% of change) as 1.1% for 2000 (World Bank, 2002).
5. Why was Pakistan able to reach agreement on the Indus Basin Treaty with India, with which it
has fought three wars, while internally the provinces are still wrangling on water sharing?
Perhaps the incentives to refrain from conflict are weaker within state boundaries, since concepts
such as minority rights do not have the same persuasiveness as the concept of sovereignty,
which serves as a strong check on outwardly aggressive state behaviour, and has been a
long-accepted common norm (Ehrlich et al., 2000). Thus, in this sense, Pakistan had no good
unilateral recourse in its dispute with India, and therefore more incentive to agree more rapidly
to the Indus Treaty.
6. In fact, the Kalabagh dam is opposed by three of the four provinces, who argue that it will only
benefit Punjab. In September 2003, President Musharraf appealed on television for a national
consensus over the proposed dam. After the speech, politicians from Sindh and the NWFP
announced they had formed an anti-Kalabagh Dam Front, which also included opposing the
Thal Canal, which is targeted towards a central desert region in Punjab (UN OCHA IRIN, 2003).
There is no sign yet of any provincial compromise, as parliamentarians at a water resources
seminar in October 2003 remained divided over the issue (Kiani, 2003).
7. For more information on the Snow and Ice Hydrology Project, contact Naser Faruqui at the
IDRC: nfaruqui@idrc.ca
8. This is clearly just a broad outline of what needs to be done; the strategic plan upon which to
build the specific tactical details.
9. This figure is an estimated growth rate for 1999–2015.
10. For more discussion of individuals, organizations or countries that refuse to deal with necessary,
profound changes, see Quinn (1996).
11. Unlike in other South and Southeast Asian countries, rice is not considered a subsistence crop
in Pakistan. It is a cash crop grown for export. It is the third major crop, after wheat and cotton,
in the contribution to GDP originating from agriculture.
12. According to the CIA’s 2001 World Factbook (CIA, 2001), industry employs 17% of the labour
force, services 39% and agriculture 44%.

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