widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in
ELECTION LAWS interest.
CASE PRINCIPLES
2005 CASES
1. P.E.T. CASE No. 002, March 29, 2005
RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant
who died during the pendency of the latter’s protest
case?
The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election
protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,
Rule 14. Election Protest.–Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)
days after the proclamation of the winner.
Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd
placers, may contest the election. By this express
enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined
the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election
contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared
winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate,
the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a
successful election contest.
This Tribunal, however, does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the
electoral tribunals.
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of
Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal
representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this
rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this
Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late
protestant prescribed by said Section. However, in our
application of this rule to an election contest, we have
every time ruled that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs
upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by
the widow or the heirs in election contests where the
protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda.
de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the
death of the protestee but denied substitution by the
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive
to the public officer, an election protest is not purely
personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the
protestee such that the death of either would oust the
court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.
Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but
only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is
the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the
suit. In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias and Lomugdang v.
Javier, we permitted substitution by the vice-mayor since
the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if
the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the
vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that
becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot assume
office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ,
herself denies any claim to the august office of President.
Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can
conclude that protestant’s widow is not a real party in
interest to this election protest.
A contest before election tribunals has two aspects:
1. First, it is in pursuit of one’s right to a public office,
and
2. Second, it is imbued with public interest.
2. G.R. No. 164922, October 11, 2005
RAYMOND P. ESPIDOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
WILFREDO TABAG & THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF RAMON ISABELA
A pre-proclamation controversy is defined as referring
"to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings
of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition
of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.”
Issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy are as follows:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in another authentic copies
thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
Page 1
 (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controversy polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing
of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
It bears reiterating, at this point, that the Court has given
its imprimatur on the principle that the COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally
made. The fact that a candidate illegally proclaimed has
assumed office is not a bar to the exercise of such power.
General Rule: It is also true that as a general rule, the
proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested would be to file a
regular election protest or quo warranto.
Exception/s: This rule, however, admits of exceptions and
one of those is where the proclamation was null and void.
In such a case, i.e., where the proclamation is null and void,
the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity.
2006 CASES
1. G.R. Nos. 166388 and 166652, January 23, 2006
ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, MA. SALVACION BUAC and ANTONIO
BAUTISTA
We held that the controversy on the conduct of the Taguig
plebiscite "is a matter that involves the enforcement and
administration of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls
under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2 (1),
Article IX (C) of the Constitution authorizing it ‘to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.’" Thus, we directed the COMELEC "to reinstate
the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig
plebiscite and to decide it without delay."
The factual findings of the COMELEC supported by
evidence, are accorded, not only respect, but finality. This
is so because "the conduct of plebiscite and determination
of its result have always been the business of the
COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves
the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in
the field of election and related laws." Its acts, therefore,
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
2. G.R. No. 169393, April 7, 2006
TONY L. BENWAREN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and EDWIN CRISOLOGO
The Board of Canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate
as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the
latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the
losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof
shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not
adversely affect the results of the election.
The proclamation of private respondent Crisologo was
proper because the contested returns would not adversely
affect the results of the election.
A decision becomes binding only after it is validly
promulgated. Consequently, if at the time of the
promulgation of a decision or resolution, a member of the
collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his
vote has vacated his office, his vote is automatically
withdrawn or cancelled.
3. G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006
HENRY P. LANOT, substituted by MARIO S. RAYMUNDO,
CHARMIE Q. BENAVIDES vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and VICENTE P. EUSEBIO
A disqualification case may have two aspects:
1. Administrative – It determines whether the
offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate
may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a preliminary
investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-
versa.
2. Criminal – It determines whether there is
probable cause to charge a candidate for an
election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines
whether probable cause exists. If there is probable
cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department,
files the criminal information before the proper
court. Proceedings before the proper court
demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the
offender, which may even include disqualification
from holding a future public office.
The disqualification of the elected candidate does not
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to occupy the office vacated because of
the disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes, against whom a
Page 2
petition for disqualification was filed before the election,
are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was
qualified. For this reason, the second placer cannot be
declared elected.
The exception to this rule rests on two assumptions:
1. First, the one who obtained the highest number of
votes is disqualified.
2. Second, the voters are so fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate’s disqualification to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but
nonetheless the voters still cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate.
Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the exception
applies in the present case.
The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the
election and proclamation of the winning candidate
because an outright dismissal will unduly reward the
challenged candidate and may even encourage him to
employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the
disqualification case until after he has been proclaimed.
The exception to the rule of retention of jurisdiction after
proclamation applies when the challenged candidate
becomes a member of the House of Representatives or of
the Senate, where the appropriate electoral tribunal would
have jurisdiction. There is no law or jurisprudence which
says that intervention or substitution may only be done
prior to the proclamation of the winning candidate. A
substitution is not barred by prescription because the
action was filed on time by the person who died and who is
being substituted. The same rationale applies to a petition-
in-intervention.
2007 CASES
1. G.R. No. 174551, March 7, 2007
MAYOR SALIP ALOY JAINAL vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, JULHATAB J. TALIB, and HUSSIN AHAJAN,
CALLEJO, SR.
Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining
to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the
board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns.
The general rule is that a pre-proclamation case before
the COMELEC is, logically, no longer viable after a
proclamation has been made. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, as when the proclamation is null and void.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
It is a well-entrenched rule in jurisprudence that in a pre-
proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the
COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic
returns.
2. G.R. No. 171248, April 2, 2007
DR. MAHID M. MUTILAN vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ZALDY UY AMPATUAN
Under Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
must be heard and decided by a division of the COMELEC.
Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),
jurisdiction over postponements, failure of elections and
special elections vests in the COMELEC En Banc.
A petition to declare a failure of elections is neither a pre-
proclamation controversy nor an election case. A prayer to
annul election results and a prayer to declare failure of
elections based on allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence
or analogous causes are actually of the same nature and
are denominated similarly in the Omnibus Election Code.
Thus, the COMELEC Second Division has no jurisdiction
over the petition to annul the elections.
There is nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to
prevent the COMELEC Second Division from referring the
petition to annul the elections to the COMELEC En Banc.
There are three instances where a failure of elections
may be declared, thus:
(a) The election in any polling place has not been held
on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes;
(b) The election in any polling place has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or
(c) After the voting and during the preparation and
transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In
the first instance, the election has not been held. In the
second instance, the election has been suspended. In the
third instance, the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect;
the third instance is interpreted to mean that nobody
emerged as a winner.
Page 3
To warrant a declaration of failure of election on the
ground of fraud, the fraud must prevent or suspend the
holding of an election, or mar fatally the preparation,
transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns.
The conditions for the declaration of failure of election are
stringent. Otherwise, elections will never end for losers
will always cry fraud and terrorism.
The allegations of massive substitution of voters, multiple
voting, and other electoral anomalies should be resolved in
a proper election protest in the absence of any of three
instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. In
an election protest, the election is not set aside, and there
is only a revision or recount of the ballots cast to
determine the real winner.
The nullification of elections or declaration of failure of
elections is an extraordinary remedy. The party who seeks
the nullification of an election has the burden of proving
entitlement to this remedy. It is not enough that a verified
petition is filed. The allegations in the petition must make
out a prima facie case for declaration of failure of election,
and convincing evidence must substantiate the allegations.
3. G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RENATO J. UNICO
The phrase "election, returns, and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if
it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election"
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of votes; "returns" to the canvass of
the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns;
and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of
his certificate of candidacy.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in
another manner, where the candidate has already been
proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the
remedy of the petitioner is to file an electoral protest with
the HRET.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
4. G.R. No. 171882, April 4, 2007
CORNELIO EWOC, EDDIE PUGAO, DAVID TOLLINO,
ESTEBAN ULLALIM AND AGUINALDO SICNAUA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE NEW MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF TANUDAN, KALINGA,
MARCIMADA CAWI, LINO GACADAN, JULIO
TOMMONGAO AND AMADO CALSIYAO
It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that
the Board of Canvassers is without jurisdiction to go
beyond what appears on the face of the election return.
The rationale is that a full reception of evidence aliunde
and the meticulous examination of voluminous election
documents would run counter to the summary nature of a
pre-proclamation controversy.
However, this rule is not without any exception. Where
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not
genuine, several entries having been omitted in the
questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.
The COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there
is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.
While the summary nature of pre-proclamation
controversies is intended to ensure that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible so as not to
create a vacuum in elective positions, in our view, the
Board of Canvassers cannot close its eyes to patently
dubious entries that would put a reasonable person on
notice that something is wrong or irregular.
While this Court has already stressed that public policy
frowns on "grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest"
attempts, this policy however, has to be balanced against
the clear and present dangers created by a lengthy period
of non-proclamation of winners, a period commonly
fraught with tension and danger for the public at large.
5. G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007
REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION), COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (EN BANC), and THOMAS R. PALILENG, SR.
Although there is nothing in Resolution No. 6452 which
mentions the need to pay a fee for filing a motion for
reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 40 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure imposes a fee of P300 for
filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order, or
resolution. The succeeding section further provides that
the COMELEC may refuse to take action until it is paid.
Cayat’s motion for reconsideration is merely pro forma
because Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee within
the prescribed period. This brings us to the conclusion that
it is as if no motion for reconsideration had been filed,
resulting in the 12 April 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC’s First Division attaining finality.
Page 4
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified  shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election  the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
Applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer have one common essential condition — the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final
before the elections.
6. G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007
JOY CHRISMA B. LUNA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
TOMAS LAYAO, SOLOMON LALUGAN III, NELIA LAZAGA,
ANTHONY LAYAO, CIPRIANO LAPEZ, JR., VICTORIA
LAYAO, MODERNO LAPEZ, RODRIGO PARIÑAS, and
EUGENIO CABER DONATO
Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice. The
law mandates that the candidates must be notified of the
petition against them and should be given the opportunity
to present evidence on their behalf. This is the essence of
due process.
The Election Code allows a person who has filed a
certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the
election by submitting a written declaration under oath.
There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate
from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the
election.
The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for
non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate
of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of
the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election
Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of
candidacy has committed false material representation, a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any
time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his
date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
eligibility may only be impugned through a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.
7. G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented
by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN
POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by
MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
No national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups in question. Doubtless, the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate
demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the
party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the
people have the right to elect their representatives on the
basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters
to be informed about matters that have a bearing on their
choice. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups
named in the herein petitions.
8. G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007
NELSON T. LLUZ and CATALINO C. ALDEOSA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CAESAR O. VICENCIO
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein
pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed
by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion
is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed
upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave
— to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws.
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In
other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.
Page 5
From these two cases several conclusions follow:
 First, a misrepresentation in a certificate of
candidacy is material when it refers to a
qualification for elective office and affects the
candidate’s eligibility.
 Second, when a candidate commits a material
misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded
against through a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78,
or through criminal prosecution under Section
262 for violation of Section 74.
 Third, a misrepresentation of a non-material fact,
or a non-material misrepresentation, is not a
ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
In other words, for a candidate’s certificate of candidacy to
be denied due course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact
misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the
office sought by the candidate.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for
elective office, misrepresentation of such does not
constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a
situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her
profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the
candidate may not be disqualified from running for office
under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy
cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground.
9. G.R. No. 175121, June 8, 2007
ADELINA TAMAYO-REYES, M.D. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FERNANDO R. CABITAC
A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition or political
parties before the board or directly with the COMELEC, or
any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of
the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns. It is limited to an examination of the
election returns on their face and the COMELEC, as a
general rule, need not go beyond the face of the returns
and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them
and investigate the alleged election irregularities.
The correction of manifest errors has reference to errors
in the election returns, in the entries in the Statement of
Votes (SOV) by precinct per municipality or in the
certificate of canvass. For errors to be manifest, they must
appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election
returns sought to be corrected, and objections thereto
must have been made before the Board of Canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings. This Court defined "manifest" as evident to
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
the eye and understanding; visible to the eye; that which is
open, palpable, and incontrovertible; needing no evidence
to make it more clear; not obscure or hidden.
According to Section 5, Rule 27 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, there are only two (2) instances
where a pre-proclamation controversy may be filed
directly with the COMELEC, namely:
(1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers; and
(2) Correction of manifest errors.
2008 CASES
1. P.E.T. Case No. 003, January 18, 2008
LOREN B. LEGARDA vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO
The pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the
certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin
of the protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in
addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by
reason of protestant's candidacy for, election to and
assumption of the office of Senator of the Philippines.
2. G.R. No. 178456, January 30, 2008
RANDY C. CAMBE vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LASAM,
CAGAYAN; and DOMINADOR M. GO
The Commission en banc does not have jurisdiction in the
first instance, whether original or appellate, over election
cases, pre-proclamation controversies, and incidents
thereof. When such disputes are filed before or elevated to
the Commission, they should be heard and adjudicated
first at the division level. This doctrine is anchored on
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution which
established the two-tiered organizational and functional
structure of the COMELEC. The provision requires that
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies,
should be heard and decided first at the division level.
It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases
relating to election laws filed before the COMELEC are
required to be first heard by a division. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative
and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative
powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial
powers is involved that the COMELEC is mandated to
decide cases first in division, and then, upon motion for
reconsideration, en banc.
Page 6
3. G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008
FLORANTE S. QUIZON vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (SECOND DIVISION), MANILA, ATTY.
ARNULFO H. PIOQUINTO (ELECTION OFFICER,
ANTIPOLO CITY) and ROBERTO VILLANUEVA PUNO
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that
petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of
candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the
candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment to be
disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in Section 78 for
deciding the petition is merely directory.
As to the alleged irregularity in the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, it is important to note that this Court has
repeatedly held that provisions of the election law
regarding certificates of candidacy, such as signing and
swearing on the same, as well as the information required
to be stated therein, are considered mandatory prior to the
elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely
directory to give effect to the will of the people. In the
instant case, Puno won by an overwhelming number of
votes. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the
intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case.
Petitioner has other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. After a resolution on the
petition for disqualification, a motion for reconsideration
may be filed before the COMELEC En Banc as what was
done by petitioner. Only then can petitioner come before
this Court via a petition for certiorari. These rules of
procedure are not without reason. They are meant to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
petitioner cannot take a judicial shortcut without violating
the rule on hierarchy of courts.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
4. G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008
AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC SITTING AS THE NATIONAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR MAGUINDANAO CHAIRED
BY ATTY. EMILIO S. SANTOS, and JUAN MIGUEL F.
ZUBIRI
A pre-proclamation controversy is any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission,
or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236
in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appearance of the election returns.
Under Republic Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized
national and local elections, pre-proclamation
controversies refer to matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of election
returns and certificates of canvass.
The following shall be proper issues that may be
raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
1) Illegal composition or proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers;
2) The canvassed election returns/certificates of
canvass are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain
discrepancies in the same returns/certificates or
in the other authentic copies thereof as mentioned
in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
3) The election returns/certificates of canvass were
prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured
or not authentic; and
4) When substitute or fraudulent election
return/certificates of canvass were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
5. G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008
FEDERICO T. MONTEBON and ELEANOR M. ONDOY vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION and SESINANDO F.
POTENCIOSO, JR.
Two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur:
1) That the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
2) That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
The term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
Page 7
same elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to
apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected
three consecutive times; he must also have served three
consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which he was elected.’ The
clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term
in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service.
6. G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL
Residence, in contemplation of election laws, is
synonymous to domicile. Domicile is the place where one
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return (animus revertendi) and
remain (animus manendi). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
Domicile is classified into:
(1) Domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
person at birth;
(2) Domicile of choice, which is acquired upon
abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
(3) Domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention.
In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the
parties' naturally conflicting perspectives on domicile, we
are guided by three basic rules, namely:
(1) A man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere;
(2) Domicile, once established, remains until a new
one is validly acquired; and
(3) A man can have but one residence or domicile at
any given time.
The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily
lost; it is lost only when there is an actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts
which correspond with such purpose.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a
lawful permanent resident status in the United States
amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his
status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a
change from his domicile of origin, which was
Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is
the USA.
7. G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The Court holds that direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is justified in this case
since the Resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity.
Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing.
However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the
offender should be disqualified from office can be
determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summary in character.
The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether the offender should be disqualified from being a
candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable
cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect
may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and
vice versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines
whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for
an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC,
through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the
COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before
the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require
proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal
conviction shall result in the disqualification of the
Page 8
offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office.
8. G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
The power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives.
Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts,
and not through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a
national law passed by Congress.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to
Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of
the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would
be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when
its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory.
The office of a district representative is maintained by
national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of
national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on
the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative
body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside
the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section
20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers
"[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x."
A representative district may come into existence:
(a) Indirectly, through the creation of a province —
for "each province shall have at least one member"
in the House of Representatives; or
(b) By direct creation of several representative
districts within a province.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
The requirements concerning the apportionment of
representative districts and the territory thereof refer only
to the second method of creation of representative
districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the
creation of provinces, under the first method. This is
deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision
above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is
made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative
district, comes into existence neither by authority of that
statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution,
without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when,
territory of, or other conditions under which a province
may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence
thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120
representative districts prescribed in the Constitution,
which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been
created or subdivided into other provinces, with the
consequent creation of additional representative districts,
without complying with the aforementioned requirements.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article
X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover,
the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating
a national office like the office of a district representative
of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM
Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by
the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
9. G.R. No. 179413, November 28, 2008
PRISCILA R. JUSTIMBASTE vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RUSTICO B. BALDERIAN
At all events, the use of a name other than that stated in
the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation,
as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to
Page 9
"qualifications for elective office." It need not be
emphasized that there is no showing that there was an
intent to deceive the electorate as to private respondent’s
identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting
public was thereby deceived.
2009 CASES
1. G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HERMINIO G. TEVES
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.
Corrupt practices of public officers; The essential
elements of the violation of said provision are as
follows:
1) The accused is a public officer;
2) He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction;
3) He either:
a. intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with such interest,
or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by
the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who
has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in
any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section
3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is
when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law.
While possession of business and pecuniary interest in a
cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly
prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does
not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral
turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently
immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public
officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among
the prohibitions.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local
parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture
and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.
While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the
wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. Gambling
is not illegal per se.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
2. G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR
Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for
election offenses only upon the start of the campaign
period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that "any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only
be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and
clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period."
3. G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009
MANUEL B. JAPZON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JAIME S. TY
It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire
or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and
liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of
said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on
the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes
no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold,
at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships,
he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in
the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when
the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to
run for public office.
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or
retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, to run for public office, he must:
(1) Meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and
(2) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,
Page 10
that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi)."
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice).
Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.
4. G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to
the House of Representatives should be a resident of the
district in which he seeks election for a period of not less
than one (l) year prior to the elections.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
While property ownership is not and should never be an
indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that
petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in
Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he
claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati
(and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that
the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" is not to acquire's new residence or domicile
"but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second District of Makati City." The absence of clear
and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of
identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with
the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which
the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must
prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
5. G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009
GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING
Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship
Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth.
Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a
naturalized American citizen.
We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that
Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for
Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to
acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS
Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed
dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of
candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that
Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.
Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire
to run for public office
Dual citizenship is not a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s
volition.
Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized
citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to
run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
Page 11
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath"
aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in
Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon
v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born Filipinos
who later became naturalized citizens of another country
and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In
the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another
country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do
not apply to him.
6. G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009
NICASIO BOLOS, JR. vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong
Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member
and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office.
In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a
vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his
office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he
won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of
Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of
the Office of Punong Barangay.
7. G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009
HARLIN CASTILLO ABAYON vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RAUL A. DAZA
The "petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation,"
which Section 248 refers to, and which suspends the
running of the period within which to file the election
protest or quo warranto proceedings, must be a pre-
proclamation controversy. A petition for the declaration of
failure of election was not a pre-proclamation controversy
and, therefore, did not suspend the running of the
reglementary period within which to file an election
protest or quo warranto proceedings.
Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a
petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one
seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend
the ten-day period for filing an election protest. It is
required that the issues raised in such a petition be
restricted to those that may be properly included therein.
Not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation
suspend the running of the period for filing an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto. For it is not the
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under
[Section] 248 from an election protest or quo warranto
proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based.
8. G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MELQUIADES A. ROBLES
The terms "electioneering" and "partisan political
activity" have well-established meanings in the Omnibus
Election Code, to wit:
Section 79. x x x
(b) The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political
activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees, or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public
office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or
support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the
purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nominations for candidacy to a public office by a political
party, agreement, or coalition of parties shall not be
considered as election campaign or partisan election
activity.
Public expression of opinions or discussions of probable
issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be
nominated in a forth coming political party convention
shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or
partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
Page 12
9. G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009
EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and LILIA G. PINEDA
The remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the
COMELEC in Division, which allegedly was issued with
grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of
jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently reads:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. –
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by
the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall
be resolved by the Division which issued the
order.
In Repol, the Court held that since the COMELEC’s Division
issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC
Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of
the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to
file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the
COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that
the COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of "decisions" of a Division, meaning
those acts having a final character. Here, the assailed
Second Division order did not completely dispose of the
case, as there was something more to be done, which was
to decide the election protest. Being interlocutory, the
assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by
the COMELEC En Banc.
10. G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F.
VILLANDO
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised
by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizen’s descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or
lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-
born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any
tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the
law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and
due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not
only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the
House of Representative but her constituents would also
be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust
on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the
foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has
not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of government.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity
of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's
mandate.
11. G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009
HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR. vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES
Power of HRET to Deny the Motion To
Withdraw/Abandon Counter-Protest
The meaning of Rule 88 is plain. The HRET could continue
or discontinue the revision proceedings ex proprio motu,
that is, of its own accord. Thus, even if we were to adopt
petitioner’s view that he ought to have been allowed by
HRET to withdraw his counter-protest, there was nothing
to prevent the HRET from continuing the revision of its
own accord by authority of Rule 88.
The only prerequisite to the exercise by the HRET of its
prerogative under Rule 88 was its own determination that
the evidence thus far presented could affect the officially
proclaimed results. Much like the appreciation of
contested ballots and election documents, the
determination of whether the evidence could influence the
officially proclaimed results was a highly technical
undertaking, a function best left to the specialized
expertise of the HRET. In Abubakar v. HRET, this Court
declined to review the ruling of the HRET on a matter that
was discretionary and technical. The same sense of respect
for and deference to the constitutional mandate of the
HRET should now animate the Court in resolving this case.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive
prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election
Page 13
contests involving its members, the Court cannot
substitute its own sense or judgment for that of the HRET
on the issues of whether the evidence presented during
the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed
results and whether the continuation of the revision
proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will
of the electorate. Regrettably, that is what petitioner
actually wants the Court to do. But in the exercise of its
checking function, the Court should merely test whether or
not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or had a different view.
The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the
remaining uncontested precincts, without any action on
the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest
the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties
but continues until the case is terminated.
Discretion of HRET to Use Its Own Funds In Revision
Proceedings
When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or
tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise provided
by law, is deemed to have the authority to employ all writs,
processes and other means to make its power effective.
Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or
the performance of the other is also conferred. Since the
HRET possessed the authority to motu proprio continue a
revision of ballots, it also had the wherewithal to carry it
out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own funds for
the revision of the ballots in the remaining counter-
protested precincts. We hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET
Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive control,
direction and supervision of its functions. The HRET’s
order was but one aspect of its power.
12. G.R. No. 139357, May 5, 2000
ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing
of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to the
abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the
COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon
the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
The reason is that once the competent tribunal has
acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding.
This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of
authority. Conformably, we have ruled in a number of
cases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-
proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longer viable.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where:
(1) The board of canvassers was improperly
constituted;
(2) Quo warranto was not the proper remedy;
(3) What was filed was not really a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest but a petition to
annul a proclamation;
(4) The filing of a quo warranto petition or an election
protest was expressly made without prejudice to
the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad
cautelam; and
(5) The proclamation was null and void.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss
and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests
or quo warranto cases pending before regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a
rule prohibiting the filing of a certain pleading in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested in
the Supreme Court.
13. G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT)
PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
R.A. No. 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI
of the Constitution
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a
practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of a law does
not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the
matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other
and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is
sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act
need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending
Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and
in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and
Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166
and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes.’" Clearly, the subject
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matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act No. 7166
(RA 7166),16 and other related election laws to achieve its
purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness,
and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369
assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific
provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1)
Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA
7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends
Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to
amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President,
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates
of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules,
there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition,
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions
affecting the composition or proceeding of the board of
canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and
due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369.
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do
not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the
PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different
occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other
hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en
banc shall determine only the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the
COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential,
and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of
the Constitution
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the
Constitution gave the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election
laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC the power to "investigate and, where
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices." This was an important
innovation introduced by the Constitution because this
provision was not in the 193522 or 197323 Constitutions.
The phrase "[w]here appropriate" leaves to the legislature
the power to determine the kind of election offenses that
the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently
with other prosecuting arms of the government.
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the
COMELEC the "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary
investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise
authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of
other prosecuting arms of the government.
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to
investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP
881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers
of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election
offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the
Constitution. They did not.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them
be established by the State, but all such regulations must
be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.
Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section
34 would still be constitutional because the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
promote the general welfare of the people. We agree with
the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested
with public interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that
poll watchers not only guard the votes of their respective
candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the
votes are properly counted. Ultimately, poll watchers aid
in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that
the elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate.
The regulation of the per diem of the poll watchers of the
dominant majority and minority parties promotes the
general welfare of the community and is a valid exercise of
police power.
14. G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR
More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of
election campaign or partisan political activity, falling
squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the
Page 15
Omnibus Election Code, on "[h]olding political caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate[.]" A motorcade is a procession or parade of
automobiles or other motor vehicles. The conduct thereof
during election periods by the candidates and their
supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its
widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose
of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the
candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible
so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their
names in the minds of the voters come election time.
Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other
purpose than to promote the election of a particular
candidate or candidates.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her
COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior
to the start of the campaign period), can already commit
the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, only after said person officially becomes
a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can
said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the
campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for
acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is
only at the start of the campaign period, when the person
officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and
iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting
premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had
previously engaged in premature campaigning already
enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.
15. G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS vs. CONRADO CRUZ, ET
AL.
Local Government Code of 1991, SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a)
The term of office of all local elective officials elected after
the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting
from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided
for by law, except that of elective barangay officials:
Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local
elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years,
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987
Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the
Constitution to determine by legislation not only the
duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the
application to them of a consecutive term limit.
From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of
Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify
the length of term of barangay officials. Recall that under
RA No. 6679, the term of office of barangay officials was
five (5) years. The real concern was how Section 43 would
interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical
statement on the length of the term of office of barangay
officials, a general three-year term for all local elective
officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not
readily and completely erase doubts on the intended
abrogation of the 5-year term for barangay officials under
RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which
provided a categorical three-year term for these officials.
History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal provision
of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an issue on what is the
exact term of office of barangay officials was still brought
to us via a petition filed by no less than the President of the
Liga ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved the issue
in the cited David v. COMELEC.
Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this
context and not in the sense that it intended to provide the
complete rule for the election of barangay officials, so that
in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this
subsection, no term limitation applies to barangay officials.
That Congress had the LGC’s three-term limit in mind
when it enacted RA No. 9164
The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that
the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials,
and the challenged proviso is its way of addressing any
confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in
the law.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the
qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot
complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can
contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying
them from SK membership or from voting in the SK
elections. SK membership is not a property right protected
by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
Page 16
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law
to change or even withdraw the statutory right.
A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a public trust." No one
has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested
right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo
v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
Again, for this petition to come under the due
process of law prohibition, it would be necessary
to consider an office a "property." It is, however,
well settled x x x that a public office is not
property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public
trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the
government x x x is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being
mere agents and not rulers of the people, one
where no one man or set of men has a proprietary
or contractual right to an office, but where every
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of
the law and holds the office as a trust for the
people he represents.
16. G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers)
The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not
mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats
depends on the number of participants in the party-list
election. If only ten parties participated in the 2007 party-
list election, then, despite the availability of 54 seats, the
maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats
would only be 30 because of the three-seat cap. In such a
case, the three-seat cap prevents the mandatory allocation
of all the 54 available seats.
The phrase "legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires that legislative
districts shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation. However, this principle of proportional
representation applies only to legislative districts, not to
the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of Section
5(1), which states that the party-list representatives shall
be "those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system," giving the Legislature wide discretion
in formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly,
there is no constitutional requirement for absolute
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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proportional representation in the allocation of party-list
seats in the House of Representatives.
To summarize, there are four parameters in a
Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the
membership of the House of Representatives is
the maximum number of seats available to party-
list organizations, such that there is automatically
one party-list seat for every four existing
legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the
party-list elections guarantees a party-list
organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall
be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to
parties receiving at least two percent of the total
party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats
after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be
distributed to the party-list organizations
including those that received less than two
percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it
applies to the allocation of the additional seats is
now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling
up of the available party-list seats. The additional
seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second
round of seat allocation according to the two-step
procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April
2009 as clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-
seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent
any party from dominating the party-list system.
There is no violation of the Constitution because
the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute
proportionality for the party-list system. The well-
settled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not
violative of the Constitution.
These four parameters allow the mathematical and
practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that
party-list representatives shall comprise twenty percent of
the members of the House of Representatives. At the same
time, these four parameters uphold as much as possible
the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the
Party-List Act that could not be reconciled anymore with
the 1987 Constitution.
17. G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND
FERDINAND N. TALABONG vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective official’s stay in
Page 17
office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the
first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period
of time – three years – during which an official has title to
office and can serve.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and
definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term
of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is
authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the
law of public officers, the most and natural frequent
method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or
appointed.
The second branch relates to the provision’s express
initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation
through voluntary severance of ties with the public office;
it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office
"shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected." This declaration complements the term limitation
mandated by the first branch.
A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not
textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only
actual interruption of service that does not affect
"continuity of service for a full term" for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement of
what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full
term, but the phrase "voluntary renunciation," by itself, is
not without significance in determining constitutional
intent.
The word "renunciation" carries the dictionary meaning of
abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline,
or resign. It is an act that emanates from its author, as
contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read
with the definition of a "term" in mind, renunciation, as
mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional
provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting
short the term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive
word "voluntary" linked together with "renunciation"
signifies an act of surrender based on the surenderee’s
own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to
office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term
limit rule, such loss of title is not considered an
interruption because it is presumed to be purposely
sought to avoid the application of the term limitation.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation
of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of
service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the
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other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss
of title to office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because
the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and
cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The
latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he
retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the term "failure
to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service
can be rendered so that none is really lost.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule
demands that preventive suspension should not be
considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s
stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension
cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is
barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of
the office within the suspension period. The best
indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of
the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by
operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the
part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense
that he may have voluntarily committed the act that
became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the
element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation
embodies. Neither does it contain the element of
renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves
the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive
suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of
voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary,
and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the
title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they
are, by nature, different and non-comparable.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and
the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the
Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the
three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an
effective interruption of a term and should therefore not
be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose
Page 18
as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be
noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake
than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time.
It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative
charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a
term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly
disallows as an interruption.
18. G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R.
BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T.
ANDRES, IMMACULADA D. GARCIA, ERLINDA T.
MERCADO, FRANCISCO A. ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P.
MACEDA, and ALVIN A. PETERS vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN JOSE
MELO, COMELEC SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS
COMMITTEE, represented by its CHAIRMAN HON.
FERDINAND RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT, represented by HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, TOTAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and SMARTMATIC INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION
From the practical viewpoint, the pilot testing of the
technology in question in an actual, scheduled electoral
exercise under harsh conditions would have been the ideal
norm in computerized system implementation. The
underscored proviso of Sec. 6 of RA 8436 is not, however,
an authority for the proposition that the pilot testing of the
PCOS in the 2007 national elections in the areas thus
specified is an absolute must for the machines’ use in the
2010 national/local elections. The Court can concede that
said proviso, with respect to the May 2007 elections,
commands the Comelec to automate in at least 12 defined
areas of the country. But the bottom line is that the
required 2007 automation, be it viewed in the concept of a
pilot test or not, is not a mandatory requirement for the
choice of system in, or a prerequisite for, the full
automation of the May 2010 elections.
As may be noted, Sec. 6 of RA 8436 may be broken into
three essential parts:
 The first partaking of the nature of a general
policy declaration: that Comelec is authorized to
automate the entire elections.
 The second part states that for the regular
national and local elections that shall be held in
May 2007, Comelec shall use the AES, with an
option, however, to undertake automation,
regardless of the technology to be selected, in a
limited area or, to be more precise, in at least two
highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao to be chosen by the
Comelec.
 On the other hand, the last part, phrased sans
reference to the May 2007 elections, commands
thus: "[I]n succeeding regular national or local
elections, the [automated election system] shall be
implemented." Taken in its proper context, the
last part is indicative of the legislative intent for
the May 2010 electoral exercise to be fully
automated, regardless of whether or not pilot
testing was run in the 2007 polls.
To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full
automation in 2010 would doubtless undermine the
purpose of RA 9369. For, as aptly observed during the oral
arguments, if there was no political exercise in May 2007,
the country would theoretically be barred forever from
having full automation.
19. G.R. No. 176364, September 18, 2009
JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and NORMA O. MAGNO
A perusal of Section 261 (s) in its entirety would show
that, as a rule, the bearing of arms by a member of
security or police organization of a government office or of
a privately owned security agency outside the immediate
vicinity of one’s place of work is prohibited. Implicitly, the
bearing of arms by such person within the immediate
vicinity of his place of work is not prohibited and does not
require prior written approval from the Commission.
However, Section 261 (s) also lays down exceptions to
this rule and states that the general prohibition shall
not apply in three instances:
(a) When any of the persons enumerated therein is in
pursuit of another person who has committed or
is committing a crime in the premises the former
is guarding;
(b) When such person is escorting or providing
security for the transport of payrolls, deposits, or
other valuables; and
(c) When he is guarding private residences, buildings
or offices. It is only in the case of the third
exception that it is provided that prior written
approval from the comelec shall be obtained.
In the case at bar, the cause of the confusion appears to be
the fact that the security guards who were being charged
with violation of the election gun ban were bearing
firearms within the immediate vicinity of their place of
work, but their place of work happened to be a residential
subdivision where they were guarding the residences of
private persons.
Indeed, this seeming conflict between the general rule
(which allows the bearing of arms within the immediate
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vicinity of the security personnel’s place of work) and the
exception (which states that prior written approval from
the COMELEC is necessary when security personnel are
guarding private residences or offices) can be harmonized
if we interpret the exceptions as pertaining to instances
where the security personnel are outside the immediate
vicinity of their place of work or where the boundaries of
their place of work cannot be easily determined. Applying
this interpretation to the case at bar, prior written
approval from the COMELEC is only required when a
member of a security agency is guarding private
residences outside the immediate vicinity of his place of
work, or where the exact area of his assignment is not
readily determinable.
To reiterate, under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election
Code, the punishable act is the bearing of arms outside the
immediate vicinity of one’s place of work during the
election period and not the failure of the head or
responsible officer of the security agency to obtain prior
written COMELEC approval.
2010 CASES
1. G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR
JESSE ROBREDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this
Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that
there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld.
To doubt is to sustain.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes
a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate
the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each
province" point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
2. G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962, April 7, 2010
MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, JOCELYN RICARDO, ARNEL TARUC,
MARLENE CATAN, MARIA THERESA MENDOZA COSTA,
FIDELA ROFOLS CASTILLO, DOMINADOR BASSI,
ROBERTO MALABANAN HERNANDEZ, NERISSA
MANZANO, LEONIDEZ MAGLABE HERNANDEZ,
TAGUMPAY REYES, and ELINO FAJARDO
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud
or irregularities in the counting of votes justifies the
examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This
process of examination is the revision of the ballots
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, to wit:
Section 6. Revision of Ballots. – When the
allegations in a protest or counter-protest so
warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the
Commission or Division the interest of justice so
demands, it shall immediately order the ballot
boxes containing ballots and their keys, list of voters
with voting records, book of voters, and other
documents used in the election to be brought before
the Commission, and shall order the revision of the
ballots.
The COMELEC does not lose jurisdiction over the
provincial election contest by reason of the transmittal of
the provincial ballot boxes and other election materials to
the SET, because its jurisdiction over provincial election
contest exists side by side with the jurisdiction of the SET,
with each tribunal being supreme in its respective areas of
concern, with neither being higher than the other in terms
of precedence; hence, the jurisdiction of one must yield to
the other.
In an election protest, the electoral tribunal has an
imperative duty to promptly ascertain by all means within
its command the candidates the electorate have chosen. It
bears stressing that in the exercise of the plenitude of its
powers to protect the integrity of the elections, the
COMELEC should not and must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes. Thus, the
Division’s adoption of measures that especially respond to
or address unique situations, like these cases, was
Page 20
incidental to the COMELEC’s general authority to adopt all
the means to effect its powers and exercise its jurisdiction.
Such adoption is even warranted under Section 4 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure:
Section 4. Means to Effect Jurisdiction. – All
auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry into effect its powers or
jurisdiction may be employed by the Commission;
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such power or jurisdiction is not specifically
provided for by law or these rules, any suitable
process or proceeding may be adopted.
3. G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO,
JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have "a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand."
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled
to a legislative district only in the "immediately following
election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000
population, and thereafter, in the immediately following
election, such city shall have a district representative.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be
issued only if such projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second,
certifications based on demographic projections can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections
must be as of the middle of every year.
4. G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and
AGUSTIN C. DOROGA
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him or
her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organization—in the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to
Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all
belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.8
But where an allegation is made that the party or
organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with
the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its
hand.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives
are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the
party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
5. G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010
ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Firearm shall refer to the "firearm" as defined in existing
laws, rules and regulations. The term also includes airgun,
airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form
that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are
real.
Only regular members or officers of the Philippine
National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
other law enforcement agencies of the Government who
are duly deputized in writing by the Commission for
election duty may be authorized to carry and possess
firearms during the election period: Provided, That, when
in the possession of firearms, the deputized law
enforcement officer must be:
(a) in full uniform showing clearly and legibly his
name, rank and serial number, which shall remain
visible at all times; and
(b) in the actual performance of his election duty in
the specific area designated by the Commission.
PNP Circular No. 11 classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a
special type of air gun, which is restricted in its use only to
sporting activities, such as war game simulation. Any
person who desires to possess an airsoft rifle/pistol needs
a license from the PNP, and he shall file his application in
accordance with PNP Standard Operating Procedure No.
13, which prescribes the procedure to be followed in the
licensing of firearms. The minimum age limit of the
applicant is 18 years old. The Circular also requires a
Permit to Transport an airsoft rifle/pistol from the place of
residence to any game or exhibition site.
Page 21
A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised
under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed.
The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term
"firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun
ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction,
the objective of which is to ensure the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns and airguns from the term "firearm" under
Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any
regulation, unlike airsoft guns.
The Court holds that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the
term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the
gun ban during the election period, with the apparent
objective of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credible
elections this year. However, the replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term
"firearm" in Resolution No. 8714.
6. G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President Manuel
A. Roxas II and Secretary General Joseph Emilio A.
Abaya vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA
PARTY, represented by its President Manuel B. Villar
and NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, allegedly
represented by its Chairman Faustino S. Dy, Jr.
The registration of political parties, their accreditation as
dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions
provide – particularly, the on-line real time electronic
transmission of election results from the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election
results; the per diems from the government that watchers
of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the
printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the
dominant-party status brings – constitute distinct
advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms
of the ready information enabling them to react faster to
developing situations. The value of these advantages
exponentially rises in an election under an automated
system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late
stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the
proper registration and the accreditation of dominant
parties are evidence of equitable party representation at
the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small
measure to transparency and to the election’s credibility.
The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a
dominant minority party are two separate matters that are
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the
act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to
the privileged participation that our election laws grant to
qualified registered parties.
While the registration of political parties is a special
proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for handling
under the COMELEC Rules, no similar clear-cut rule is
available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant
party. We thus make no statement on this point, as it is not
a matter in issue.
In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered
political parties are well within their right to coalesce; and
that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the
COMELEC, rendering registration a mere recognition of an
operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.
7. G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS
BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine
who between them has actually obtained the majority of
the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can
only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding
elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions
of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, but not to install the
petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action,
which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties
strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be
seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
8. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V. GONZALES, and ORLANDO R.
BALBON, JR.
The false representation that these provisions mention
must necessarily pertain to a material fact. The critical
material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s
qualifications for elective office, such as his or her
citizenship and residence. The candidate’s status as a
registered voter in the political unit where he or she is a
candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a
requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code),
Page 22
must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is
obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and
represent the political unit where he or she ran as a
candidate.
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise
be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus,
the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be
the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in
a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent,
or where no deception on the electorate results. The
deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily
follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in
both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the
election laws.
Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa
City. For him to qualify as Governor – in light of the
relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City
from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose
residents can no longer vote for provincial officials – he
had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new
one within the local government unit where he intended to
run; this would be his domicile of choice.
To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which
the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the
following:
(1) Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
(2) An intention to remain there; and
(3) An intention to abandon the old domicile.
In considering the residency issue, the COMELEC
practically focused solely on its consideration of Mitra’s
residence at Maligaya Feedmill, on the basis of mere
photographs of the premises. In the COMELEC’s view
(expressly voiced out by the Division and fully concurred
in by the En Banc), the Maligaya Feedmill building could
not have been Mitra’s residence because it is cold and
utterly devoid of any indication of Mitra’s personality and
that it lacks loving attention and details inherent in every
home to make it one’s residence. This was the main reason
that the COMELEC relied upon for its conclusion.
Such assessment, in our view, based on the interior design
and furnishings of a dwelling as shown by and examined
only through photographs, is far from reasonable; the
COMELEC thereby determined the fitness of a dwelling as
a person’s residence based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is replete
with standards that can be used. Where a dwelling
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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qualifies as a residence – i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain – his or
her capacity or inclination to decorate the place, or the lack
of it, is immaterial
2011 CASES
1. G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011
FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RENO G. LIM, STEPHEN C. BICHARA and
THE SPECIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS constituted per
Res. dated July 23, 2010 of the Commission on
Elections En Banc
In order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to
a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate – the right to run for the elective post for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does
not specify what would be considered as a "material
representation", the Court concluded that this refers to
qualifications for elective office. Section 78 contemplates
statements regarding age, residence and citizenship or
non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality,
the false representation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it
must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to one’s qualification for public office.
The only instance where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for elective office can be filed
before election is when the petition is filed under Section
78 of the OEC.
The exception to the second placer rule is predicated
on the concurrence of the following:
(1) The one who obtained the highest number of
votes is disqualified; and
(2) The electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate.
2. G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed
by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential
Page 23
elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect.
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow
independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to
undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests
involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in
accordance with the process outlined by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the
concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional
duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court.
This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary
powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the
budget allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task,
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under
the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the
explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our
abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
2012 CASES
1. G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO SABILI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and FLORENCIO LIBREA
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in
the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the
intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of
abode. As in all administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there
is nothing "wrong in an individual changing residences so
he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to
prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law."
2. G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos
arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a
material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the
start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was
never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos
were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number
of votes for the position of Mayor.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his
certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A
candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public
office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is
barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running
for public office, and he still states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public
office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78.
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility
that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.
3. G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012
EFREN RACEL ARATEA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly
refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign
country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to
election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to
violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing
in the language of Section 68 that would justify including
violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised
Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered
under Section 68.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates
is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are
beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are
criminal and not administrative in nature.
4. G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA vs.COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA
The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing
of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are,
namely:
(a) To enable the voters to know, at least 60 days
prior to the regular election, the candidates from
among whom they are to make the choice; and
(b) To avoid confusion and inconvenience in the
tabulation of the votes cast.
If the law does not confine to the duly-registered
candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many
Page 24
persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be
cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to
identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office
in the same election.
There are two remedies available to prevent a
candidate from running in an electoral race. One is
through a petition for disqualification and the other
through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy.
A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be
premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the
other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result
of a prolonged stay in the same office."
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take
the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when
two requisites concur, namely:
(a) The candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is disqualified; and
(b) The electorate was fully aware in fact and in law
of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate.
Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to
have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the
second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.
5. G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOHN LLOYD M. PACETE
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to
a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes
cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC
was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a COC.
Since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was not yet final on election day, this
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
Court also considered those factual circumstances showing
that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to
only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista)
and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We
further noted that the voters had constructive as well as
actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting
Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of
determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly,
it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper
releases and other forms of notification, the voters were
informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin
Bautista a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to
consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but
to count them in favor of the bona fide candidate
notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such
was issued only after the elections.
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering
the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in
a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance
candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate
candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter,
remains a good law. As earlier discussed, a petition to
cancel or deny a COC under Section 69 of the OEC should
be distinguished from a petition to disqualify under
Section 68. Hence, the legal effect of such cancellation of a
COC of a nuisance candidate cannot be equated with a
candidate disqualified on grounds provided in the OEC and
Local Government Code.
2013 CASES
1. G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and
ADELIO R. CAPCO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory
power to cancel the registration of a party-list group,
the law imposes only two (2) conditions:
(1) Due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list
group concerned; and
(2) Any of the enumerated grounds for
disqualification in section 6 exists.
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The
COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
Page 25
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek
its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of
its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
Section 6 clearly does not require that an opposition to the
petition for registration be previously interposed so that a
complaint for cancellation can be entertained. Since the
law does not impose such a condition, the COMELEC,
notwithstanding its delegated administrative authority to
promulgate rules for the implementation of election laws,
cannot read into the law that which it does not provide.
The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer
election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or
amend them.
Moreover, an opposition can be reasonably expected only
during the petition for registration proceedings which
involve the COMELEC’s power to register a party-list
group, as distinguished from the entirely separate power
invoked by the complaint, which is the power to cancel.
The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately
apparent from their basic definitions. To refuse is to
decline or to turn down, while to cancel is to annul or
remove.25 Adopting such meanings within the context of
Section 6, refusal of registration happens during the
inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into
the roster of COMELEC-registered party-list organizations
through a petition for registration. Cancellation on the
other hand, takes place after the fact of registration when
an inquiry is done by the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a
verified complaint, on whether a registered party-list
organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law.
Refusal is handed down to a petition for registration while
cancellation is decreed on the registration itself after the
petition has been approved.
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
2. G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to
register under the party-list system are not required to
submit evidence of their track record; they are merely
required to attach to their verified petitions their
"constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information as may be required by the COMELEC."
Track record is not the same as the submission or
presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information as may be required by the
COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of documentary
evidence intended to establish that the group exists and is
a going concern. The said documentary evidence presents
an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations seek to achieve.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still
required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show
a track record since there would be no reason for them to
feign representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as they can just register as a national or
regional party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong
Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the
party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy
of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they
represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence
to insist that groups seeking registration under the party-
list system still comply with the track record requirement.
Indeed, nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that
groups seeking registration thereunder must submit
evidence to show their track record as a group.
3. G.R. No. 204828, December 3, 2013
JAIME C. REGIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONNIE C. CO
The doctrine in Rosal v. COMELEC and considering the
results of the revision vis-à-vis the results reflected in the
official canvassing in Rosal, this Court summarized the
standards to be observed in an election contest predicated
on the theory that the election returns do not accurately
reflect the will of the voters due to alleged irregularities in
the appreciation and counting of ballots.
These guiding standards are:
(1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official
count as reflected in the election returns unless it
is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have
Page 26
 been preserved with a care which precludes the
opportunity of tampering and suspicion of change,
abstraction or substitution;
(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on
the protestant;
(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is
enjoined by law, proof must be made of such
substantial compliance with the requirements of
that mode as would provide assurance that the
ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding
slight deviations from the precise mode of
achieving that end;
(4) It is only when the protestant has shown
substantial compliance with the provisions of law
on the preservation of ballots that the burden of
proving actual tampering or likelihood thereof
shifts to the protestee; and
(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of
COMELEC that the integrity of the ballots has been
preserved should it adopt the result as shown by
the recount and not as reflected in the election
returns. In the same case, the Court referred to
various provisions in the Omnibus Election Code
providing for the safe-keeping and preservation of
the ballots, more specifically Secs. 160, 217, 219,
and 220 of the Code.
The duty of the protestee in an election contest to provide
evidence of actual tampering or any likelihood arises only
when the protestant has first successfully discharge the
burden or providing that the ballots have been secured to
prevent tampering or susceptibility of charge, abstraction
or substitution. Such need to present proof of tampering
did not arise since protestant himself failed to provide
evidence of the integrity of the ballots.
4. G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO
PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7941. BANAT overturned Veterans’
interpretation of the phrase in proportion to their total
number of votes. We clarified that the interpretation that
only those that obtained at least 2% of the votes may get
additional seats will not result in proportional
representation because it will make it impossible for the
party-list seats to be filled completely. As demonstrated in
BANAT, the 20% share may never be filled if the 2%
threshold is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct
percentage of representation of party-list groups as
intended by the law. This is part of the index of
proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
House of Representatives. It measures the relation
between the share of the total seats and the share of the
total votes of the party-list. In Veterans, where the 20%
requirement in the Constitution was treated only as a
ceiling, the mandate for proportional representation was
not achieved, and thus, was held void by this Court.
The formula in determining the winning party-list groups,
as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC,
is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes of party-list
Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates
= Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for
the party-list system including votes cast for party-list
groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently
disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the
Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such
elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor
shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or
invalid.
2014 CASES
1. G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE
Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in
the contents of the COC required under Section 74 must
refer to material matters in order to justify the cancellation
of the COC.
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s]
to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this
provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed
upon a candidate guilty of having made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave —
to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political
right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous mistake.
Page 27
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a
"deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In
other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.
The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or
deceive the public as to one's identity is not within the
scope of the provision.
2. G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014
OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid COC and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion.
Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates18
and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under
Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the COMELEC has
the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
COCs.
The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed
in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the
COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may
not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus
beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is
candidate or, in case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B. P. Blg. 881, not
just any person, but only "an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party" may be
substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official
nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly
substituted.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt.
Section 74 of the Election Code provides that the certificate
of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of
the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election
Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate of
candidacy has committed false material representation, a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
3. G.R. No. 149638, December 10, 2014
MONCAYO INTEGRATED SMALL-SCALE MINERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [MISSMA] vs. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP., JB. MGT. MINING
CORP., PICOP RESOURCES, INC., MT. DIWATA UPPER
ULIP MANDAYA TRIBAL COUNCIL, INC. AND BALITE
INTEGRATED SMALL-SCALE MINING CORP., (BISSMICO)
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7076 reiterates the DENR
Secretary’s power of control over "the program and the
activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s
small-scale mining area."
The Secretary through his representative shall exercise
direct supervision and control over the program and
activities of the small-scale miners within the people’s
small-scale mining area. The Secretary shall within ninety
(90) days from the effectivity of this Act promulgate rules
and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of
the same. Priority shall be given to such rules and
regulations that will ensure the least disruption in the
operations of the small-scale miners.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
2015 CASE
1. G.R. No. 216098, April 21, 2015
BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO, DD, PABLO R.
MANALASTAS, JR., PHD, MARIA CORAZON AKOL,
CONCEPCION B. REGALADO, HECTOR A. BARRIOS, LEO
Y. QUERUBIN, AUGUSTO C. LAGMAN, FELIX P. MUGA, II,
PHD, ATTY. GREGORIO T. FABROS, EVITA L. JIMENEZ,
AND JAIME DL CARO, PHD vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, EN BANC, REPRESENTED BY ACTING
CHAIRPERSON CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, AND
SMARTMATIC-TIM CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY
SMARTMATIC ASIA-PACIFIC PRESIDENT CESAR
FLORES
Indeed, the conduct of the upcoming 2016 Elections is
dependent on the functional state of the existing PCOS
machines purchased by the COMELEC.
PCOS means “a technology wherein an optical ballot
scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by
Page 28
hand by the voter are inserted to be counted, is located in
every precinct.” As the AES’s groundwork mechanism, it is
imperative that the PCOS machines, come election day, are
of optimal utility. Following the CAC’s recommendation to
re-use the existing technology for the said elections, the
COMELEC proceeded to procure services for the repair and
refurbishment of the PCOS machines. The COMELEC,
however, through its Resolution No. 9922, decided to
pursue a direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-
TIM, which has now resulted in the execution of the
Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1). Petitioners
assail the validity of the foregoing courses of action mainly
for violating the GPRA. Thus, if only to ensure that the
upcoming elections is not mired with illegality at this basic,
initial front, this Court, pursuant to its unyielding duty as
final arbiter of the laws, deems it proper to thresh out the
above-stated substantive issues, reasonably unfettered by
the rigors of procedure.
General Rule: The Procuring Entities shall adopt public
bidding as the general mode of procurement and shall see
to it that the procurement program allows sufficient lead
time for such public bidding.
Exception: Alternative methods shall be resorted to only
in the highly exceptional cases provided for in this Rule.
By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public
interest by giving the public the best possible advantages
through open competition. Under Section 5 (e), Article I of
the GPRA, public bidding is referred to as “Competitive
Bidding,” which is defined as “a method of procurement
which is open to participation by any interested party and
which consists of the following processes: advertisement,
pre-bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective
bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluations of bids,
post-qualification, and award of contract, the specific
requirements and mechanics of which shall be defined in
the [GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)].”
Case law states that competition requires not only bidding
upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same
thing, the same subject matter, and the same undertaking,
but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and not
designed to injure or defraud the government. The essence
of competition in public bidding is that the bidders are
placed on equal footing which means that all qualified
bidders have an equal chance of winning the auction
through their bids. Another self-evident purpose of
competitive bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of
favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public
contracts.
Section 48. Alternative Methods of Procurement,
Article XVI of the GPRA:
a. Limited Source Bidding, otherwise known as
Selective Bidding - a method of Procurement that
APRIL LYNN L. URSAL LLB-4
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU – COLLEGE OF LAW
involves direct invitation to bid by the Procuring
Entity from a set of pre-selected suppliers or
consultants with known experience and proven
capability relative to the requirements of a
particular contract;
b. Direct Contracting, otherwise known as Single
Source Procurement - a method of Procurement
that does not require elaborate Bidding
Documents because the supplier is simply asked
to submit a price quotation or a pro-forma invoice
together with the conditions of sale, which offer
may be accepted immediately or after some
negotiations;
c. Repeat Order - a method of Procurement that
involves a direct Procurement of Goods from the
previous winning bidder, whenever there is a
need to replenish Goods procured under a
contract previously awarded through Competitive
Bidding;
d. Shopping - a method of Procurement whereby the
Procuring Entity simply requests for the
submission of price quotations for readily
available off-the-shelf Goods or ordinary/regular
equipment to be procured directly from suppliers
of known qualification; or
e. Negotiated Procurement - a method of
Procurement that may be resorted under the
extraordinary circumstances provided for in
Section 53 of this Act and other instances that
shall be specified in the IRR, whereby the
Procuring Entity directly negotiates a contract
with a technically, legally and financially capable
supplier, contractor or consultant.
In all instances, the Procuring Entity shall ensure that the
most advantageous price for the government is obtained.
Direct contracting, otherwise known as “Single Source
Procurement,” refers to “a method of Procurement that
does not require elaborate Bidding Documents because the
supplier is simply asked to submit a price quotation or a
pro-forma invoice together with the conditions of sale,
which offer may be accepted immediately or after some
negotiations.
Direct Contracting may be resorted to only in any of
the following conditions:
a) Procurement of Goods of proprietary nature,
which can be obtained only from the proprietary
source, i.e. when patents, trade secrets and
copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing
the same item;
b) When the Procurement of critical components
from a specific manufacturer, supplier or
distributor is a condition precedent to hold a
contractor to guarantee its project performance,
Page 29
 in accordance with the provisions of this contract;
or,
c) Those sold by an exclusive dealer or
manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers
selling at lower prices and for which no suitable
substitute can be obtained at more advantageous
terms to the Government.

While compliance with only one condition is enough to

justify the COMELEC’s resort to direct contracting (as
evinced by the disjunctive “or”, but provided that the other
requisites of approval of the Head of the Procuring Entity,
promotion of economy and efficiency, and most
advantageous price to the government are equally
complied with), respondents are insistent that all of the
foregoing conditions attend in these cases.

Under Section 50 (a), Article XVI of the GPRA, direct

contracting may be allowed when the procurement
involves goods of proprietary nature, which can be
obtained only from the proprietary source – that is, when
patents, trade secrets, and copyrights prohibit others from
manufacturing the same item.

Goods are considered to be of “proprietary nature” when

they are owned by a person who has a protectable interest
in them or an interest protected by intellectual property
laws.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW I (S.Y. 2015-2016)
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