Precious Dianne P.

Ganzon

JD1-A

CASE DIGEST
1. Republic v. Facts:
Sandiganbayan,
Major-General • The Presidential Commission on Good Government filed a case
Josephus Q. Ramas against former major-general Josephus Q. Ramas and his alleged
mistress Elizabeth Dimaano on violating the “Anti-Graft and
and Elizabeth Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)” amended as “Forfeiture of
Dimaano, G.R No. unlawfully Acquired Property (RA 1379)” last of 1 August 1987.
104768, July 21, • The questionable properties are owned by Gen. Ramas in Cebu
2003 and Quezon City, as well as the found jewelries, 2, 870, 000
pesos and $50,000 in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
• Ramas was a former general of the late president Ferdinand
Marcos whom was accused of having an “ill-gotten wealth by the
PCGG which was the reason they filled a prima facie case.
• Dimaano worked as an assistant to Gen. Ramas on the years of
1978-1979 had no other source of income.
• The case was handled by the Sandiganbayan which dismissed the
case on the 25 March 1990; on the grounds of the petitioners had
no jurisdiction on the cases, similar to the ruling of the case of
Republic v. Migrino (1990).
• The PCGG’s responsibilities according to Sec. 2 of E.O.1 was (1)
first is the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of
all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship. And (2) the
second was the investigation of such cases of graft and
corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from
time to time. Basing from the responsibilities given to them, the
petitioners were not assigned by the president to handle Gen.
Ramas. And the plaintiffs as well failed to show that Gen. Ramas
had a close association with President Marcos. This is the reason
that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to the case. Another reason
why the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case is because the
petitioners’ illegal search and seizure of the items collected that
was presented as evidence.
• The Sandiganbayan referred the records of the case to the
Ombudsman who has the primary jurisdiction to the “Forfeiture of
unlawfully Acquired Property (RA 1379)”, the case records are
also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of Elizabeth
Dimaano. The petitioner then raised the case on the Supreme
Court and also questions the decision of the Sandiganbayan.

Issues/s:

• W/N the PCGG has the authority to investigate Ramas and

Dimaano?
 • W/N the properties and other belongings confiscated in
Dimaano’s house were illegally seized which will consequently
make it inadmissible?

Ruling/s:

Petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court supported the prior decision of
the Sandiganbayan, for the reason; the plaintiffs only showed the
enumeration of the properties Ramas allegedly owned, but did not show
Ramas’ close association with the late president Ferdinand Marcos. The
president did not single out Ramas to be investigated by the PCGG.

The Supreme Court also pointed out the illegal seizure of the money and
jewelries of Dimaano, as used by the plaintiffs as one of their pieces of
evidence. Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian, the head of the raiding team that
searched the house of Dimaano admitted in the tand that they were just
given a search warrant to only confiscate the firearms and not the money
and jewelries which was also used as evidence by the petitioners. The
plaintiff deemed that the search on the house of Dimaano coincides with
the 1973 constitution as the search occurred in 3 March 1986. But the
Supreme Court said that with the people toppling the previous
administration, they as well toppled the ruling constitution.

During these times the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is in effect,

for the reason the Philippines is one of the signatories of the Covenant and
Declaration.

Philosophical Reference:
Tinga, J., separate opinion:

Majority adheres to the legal positivist theory and on the other side is
Justice Puno’s espousal of the natural law. While the two philosophies are
poles apart in content, they somehow cognate. To illustrate, the Bill of
Rights in the Constitution has its origins from natural law. Likewise, a
natural law document is the Universal Declaration.

In the case at bar, the ultimate analysis both jurisprudential doctrines have
found application in the denouement of the case. The Bill of Rights in the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant,
great documents of liberty and human rights all, are founded on natural
law.

2. Peralta v. Director Facts:

of Prisons, G.R No.
L-49, Nov. 12, 1945 • Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was
sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act
No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the
Philippines.
• The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that
the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by
ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military
forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial
and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.
 Issue/s:

• W/N the creation of court by Ordinance No.7 Valid?

Ruling/s:

Yes, it is valid. There is no room for doubt to the validity of ordinance No.
7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely
from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. itis merely a
governmental agency.

Philosophical Reference:

Hegel said in the “Phenomenology of the Spirit,” according to

Kohler:
The statutes set up are corpses in stone, whence the
animating soul has flown; while the hymns of praise are words
from which all belief has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of
spiritual food and drink, and from his games and festivals, man no
more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being.
The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the Spirit
which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the
crushing ruin of goods and men. They are themselves now just
what they are for us --- beautiful fruit off the tree, a kindly fate has
passed on those works to us, as a maiden might offer such fruit off
tree. It is not their actual life as they exist, that is given us, not the
tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements, which
constituted their substance, nor the climate that determined their
constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled
the process of their growth. So, too, it is not their living world that
fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art, not the
spring and summer of that ethical life in which they bloomed and
ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality.
3. Estrada v. Escritor, Facts:
A.M No. P-02-1651,
August 4, 2003 • Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge Caoibes Jr.a
sworn letter-complaint requesting for an investigation of rumors
that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Piñas, is
living with a man not her husband
• Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, who stated that
“there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and
challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his
allegation in the proper court”.
• Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for
inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case.
• In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-
complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the
Revised Administrative Code against Escritor for that his frequent
visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is
cohabiting with another man not his husband.
• Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was
already a widow since1998. She admitted that she’s been living
 with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20
years and that they have a son.
• Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sect known as
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” (which allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten (10)
years of living together, her conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with her religious beliefs and has the approval of the
congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral
conduct.

Issue/s:

• W/N Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral

conduct?

Ruling/s:

Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent

neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not
offend compelling state interests.

The OSG must then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise clause is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case,
with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble
attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the
Solicitor General utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under
these distinct circumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized.

The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases

involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct
circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for there is
a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental right to
freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state

Philosophical Reference:

Law and morals are closely intertwined as a traditionally held belief, but
one must understand that a law without morality as not law at all but
naked power and that human beings not only have a legal but also the
moral obligation to obey the law. It suggests that where law clashes with
morality, it can impose no obligation, moral or otherwise, upon anyone to
obey it, one may actually be morally bound to disobey the law. Law and
morality man has come to know of his law and morals through human
soul, human conscience and the human mind. The selection has clearly
stated the implications of law and morals to each other, even though
absence of one of it. While not all laws are morally right or of morals, as
stated above, impose no obligation or moral to anyone who obey it, it is
safe to say that one may actually be morally bound to disobey the law.
This clash comes when the law such as death penalty arises, morally
speaking, it is wrong to kill someone, but the conflict grows even more if
the offense committed involves rape and murder, so is the judgment
 rendered to end someone’s life on the stated offenses valid? If not, will the
victim get justice if the offender suffers life imprisonment? Such a good
challenging question that has strong moral views in life. But I believe even
if it is morally or legally wrong there will be an exception. Take the case of
Richard Parker the cabin boy, who was eaten by his fellow in order to
survive the hunger in the middle of the ocean. The argument rises on this
case is, the consent given by the victim will acquit the offenders in this
case? This can really be hard to answer as we can’t find any moral
principles that will germane to the issue. In order to fully decide on the
morality of every action, think of it as if the simple things mean anything
to you, in a way that you weigh which of one of these has many right or
wrong?
4. Miranda v. Abaya Facts:
and COMELEC, G.R
No. 136351, July • Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City,
28, 1999 Isabela, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty
post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections.
• Private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy.
• The petition was granted by COMELEC and they further ruled to
disqualify Jose “Pempe” Miranda.
• On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate
of candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of
candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for
his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.
• During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private
respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering
22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got
only 20,336 votes.
• Private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
Substitution with Prayer for Issuance of writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. He prayed for the
nullification of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy of Jose
“Pempe” Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute,
had already been cancelled and denied due course.

Issue/s:

• W/N the petitioner who was beyond the deadline for filing a
certificate of candidacy be qualified to substitute a candidate
whose COC was cancelled and denied?
• W/N the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the
private respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?

Ruling/s:

No. The Court explicitly ruled that a “cancelled certificates does not give
rise to valid candidacy.” A person without a valid certificate of candidacy
cannot be considered a candidate in much the same was as any person
who was not by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid

certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified
candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of
candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a
candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code.
 Besides, if we were to allow the so-called ―substitute to file a ―new and
―original certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof,
it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act
abhorred by the Constitution

The law clearly provides: SECTION 79. Certificate of Candidacy- No person

shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely

mandatory. It is but logical to say that any person who attempts to run for
an elective office but does not file a certificate of candidacy, is not a
candidate at all. No number of votes would catapult him into office.

Philosophical Reference:

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. has aptly said, "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience", he pointed out the problem with
majority's position is that it totally terminates the result of the election for
the position of mayor and instead unceremoniously installs the elected vice
mayor to the said position. There is no doubt that the petitioner was the
people's choice for mayor. He garnered the highest number of votes in the
election for mayor in the City of Santiago. Why should this Court, in the
name of hair-splitting logic, obliterate the popular will and impose upon
the electorate person whom nobody voted for the position of mayor?
Experience and common-sense rebel against this proposition. Sometimes
we find the ruling or judgement rendered on the case opposed to what we
believe was right. We contemplate that there can’t be anyone who will
inflicts damage or injury in favoring the “right” thing that we believe. But
under circumstances, court decision isn’t like that. So, on what the court
has experience since its existence; the decision has been made even
before the trial has started? The thing is, Justice Holmes Jr. was right and
I couldn’t agree more to his statement. It can be disheartening sometimes
but what we must learn is that the thinking like a judge, taking no sides
unless the contrary is proven sufficiently and that conviction to suffer
penalty is proper as to the weight of offense.

5. Co Kim Cham v. Tan Facts:

Keh, et al, G.R No.
L-5, Sept. 17, 1945 • This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were
initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of
these Islands.
• The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue
the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation
issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had
the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation.

Issue/s:

• W/N the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General

Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the
 Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void
and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control," affects the proceedings in civil cases
pending in court under the so-called Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation?

Ruling/s:

No. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to
the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.

It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said
proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of principles of
international law.

The court ruled that the term “processes” does not refer to judicial processes but to
executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee, ordinances
promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines and
the constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same
class as the laws and regulations with which the word “processes” is
associated.

Philosophical Reference:

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, perhaps the wisest man who had ever sat
in the Supreme Court of the United States, the following: When the words
in their literal sense have a plain meaning, courts must be very cautious in
allowing their imagination to give them a different one. Upon questions of
construction when arbitrary rule is involved, it is always more important to
consider the words and the circumstances than even strong analogies
decisions. The successive neglect of a series of small distinctions, in the
effort to follow precedent, is very liable to end in perverting instruments
from their plain meaning. In no other branch of the law (trusts) is so much
discretion required in dealing with authority... There is a strong
presumption in favor of giving them words their natural meaning, and
against reading them as if they said something else, which they are not
fitted to express.
6. Regala v. Facts:
Sandiganbayan,
G.R No. 105938, • The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised
Sept. 20, 1996 a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA
law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which
includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case
No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines
versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."
• During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint on his undertaking
that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder.
• In the respondents answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
ACCRA lawyers requested that PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them as accorded Roco. The PCGG has offered to
the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco but
 the ACCRA lawyers have refused to disclose the identities of their
clients. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, invoking
that the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion:

1. In subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who acted to the

strict application of the law of agency
2. In not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as
similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
3. In not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and other information requested by
PCGG.
4. In not requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the
PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and with
due consideration to equal protection of the law.

Issue/s:

• W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA

lawyers from revealing the identity of their clients and the other
information requested by the PCGG?

Ruling/s:

Being “similarly situated” in that ACCRA LAWYERS’ and ROCO’s acts were
made in furtherance of “legitimate lawyering, PCGG must show that there
exist other conditions and circumstances which would warrant their
treating ROCO differently from ACCRA LAWYERS in the case at bench in
order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

To justify the dropping of ROCO from the case or the filing of the suit in
the Sandiganbayan without him, the PCGG should conclusively show that
Mr. Roco was treated as a species apart from the rest of the ACCRA
lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial distinctions
based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the
records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.

The condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the

petitioners for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33
violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Philosophical Reference:

Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyer’s vis-a-vis their clients
because the law, which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "as an exacting goddess, demanding of her
votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." the Court, no less is not
prepared to accept respondents' position that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize that spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life so share its passion its battles, its
despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? But that is not all. What a
subject is this in which we are united this abstraction called the Law,
wherein as in a magic mirror; we see reflected, not only in our lives, but
 the lives of all men that have been. When I think on this majestic theme
my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who are
here to know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and
lonely passion only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is
likened to God.
7. Primicias v. Fugoso, Facts:
G.R No. L-1800,
January 27, 1948 • Petitioner asked for a permit from the City Mayor to hold a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances but the respondent Mayor
refused to grant such permit.
• The reason alleged by the respondent (Mayor) in his defense for
refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to
believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order.
“Under the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila (Sections
844, 1119, 1262) Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor,
"any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to
disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet
any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."

Issue/s:

• W/N the Mayor is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places?

Ruling/s:

No. The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and

petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of
democratic countries. The ordinance does not confer upon the mayor the power
to refuse to grant the permit, but only the reasonable discretion, in issuing the
permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession
may pass or the meeting may be held.

As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public
meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that
it was to be a lawful a s s e m b l a g e , t h e r e a s o n g i v e n
for the refusal of the permit cannot be given any
consideration. "It is only when political, religious, social, or other
demonstrations create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or
create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief, that the law
interferes.

The reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given any consideration. Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
 Philosophical Reference:

Justice Holmes:
As representatives of the public it (legislature) may and does exercise
control over the use which the public may make of such places (public
parks and streets and it may and does delegate more or less of such
control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of the member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no
proprietary right interferes, the legislature may end the right of the public
to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public
uses. So, it may take the lesser step to limiting the public use to certain
purposes.
8. Estrada v. Facts:
Sandiganbayan, • In 2001, following the impeachment trial of then President Joseph
G.R No. 148560, Estrada, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight
Informations against him, including one for the violation of RA
Nov. 19, 2001 7080, as amended by RA 7659, or the Plunder Law.
• Estrada assailed the constitutionality of the said law, arguing that:
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of men’s rea in crimes already
punishable under the RPC, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

Issue/s:

• W/N a facial review of the validity of the Plunder Law is proper?

• W/N the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague?
• W/N the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of
the accused to due process?
• W/N the crime of plunder, as defined in RA 7080, is a malum
prohibitum?

Ruling/s:

NO. The allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states
that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

NO. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and

well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the
nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of
the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long
as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
 those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge
in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation;
and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct.

NO. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the

accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.

NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.

Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se, the element of
mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder.

Any person who participated with a public officer in the commission of an

offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation
and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the RPC, shall be considered by the court. The application of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the RPC to prosecutions under
the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that men’s rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent.

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se

must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision
of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion Perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death
as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659

Philosophical Reference:

Holmes's test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the
Law, Holmes said:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience. I do agree with his statements. I also think law is harsh, who
only thinks of punishments, penalties, compensatory damages,
imprisonments, nullities, contempt, limitations, and does not seek to be
inviolable. Law may be a stern instrument of justice to secure the rights of
the people to ensure happiness in living a crimeless world. But whether or
not the laws provide vaguer sanctions of conscience, the law shall be
remained inviolable.

9. League of Cities, et Facts:

al v. COMELEC, G.R
No. 176951, June • This is a motion for consideration of the case, League of Cities of
28, 2011 the Phil. rep by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. Vs.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No.178056.
• These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for
prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP),
City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the
 constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the
municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood
Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject
laws. Arguing therein that a determination of the issue of
constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the
Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate opinion of then
Chief Justice Reynato S.Puno in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections.
• It appears that the petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court
in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that
the decision herein had long become final and executory. They
state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the
principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments.

Issue/s:

• W/N the Supreme Court violate the rules of procedure, the

principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments?

Ruling/s:

No. The Court disagrees with the petitioners. It is worth repeating that the
actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in
accordance with the Rules of Court and its internal procedures.

There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings. It is

also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself
under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in
order to render just and equitable relief. On whether the principle of
immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it
to state that the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that
the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved
with finality.

As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not

yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of
res judicata not yet warranted, especially considering that the precedential
ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and
finality.

Philosophical Reference:

Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court expounded on

the objectives of uniformity and predictability of judicial decisions, to wit:
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of
establishing as soon as possible a clear, general principal decision:
predictability. Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded as
incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those
subject to the law must have the means of knowing what it prescribes. It
is said that one of emperor Nero’s nasty practices was to post his edicts
high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and easier to
transgress. As laws have become more numerous, and as people have
become increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the courts, we
can less and less afford protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may
mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, reckon ability, is a needful
 characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a
bad rule is better than no rule at all.

10. Padua v. Robles, et Facts:

al, G.R No. L-
40486, August 29, • A taxicab operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Robles struck
1975 Normandy Padua, as a result of which he died. Normandy's
parents filed a complaint for damages against the driver and
the Bay Taxi Cab.
• The city Fiscal filed with the same court an information for
homicide through reckless imprudence (criminal case). The court
in the civil case ordered the driver to pay actual, moral,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
• On the other hand, in the criminal case, the driver is convicted
of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
court in its dispositive portion stated that “the civil liability of the
accused has already been determined and assessed in the civil
case.
• “The Paduas sought execution of the judgment. This proved
futile. They instituted an action against Robles to enforce his
subsidiary responsibility under Article 103, RPC.
• Robles filed motion to dismiss which was granted on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action.
Issue/s:

• W/N the judgment in the criminal case includes a determination

and adjudication of Punzalan civil liability arising from his criminal
act upon which Robles’ subsidiary civil responsibility may be
based?

Ruling/s:

Yes. Paduas' complaint in civil case states a cause of action against

Robles whose concomitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in
criminal case, subsists.

The said judgment states no civil liability arising from the offense charged
against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question,
the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, the
court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the
Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan
and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefore.

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the

offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on Culp criminal under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code.

The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section
1 of Rule111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate
application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however,
precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission.
It is immaterial that the Padua’s chose, in the first instance, an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176,2177,
and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved ineffectual. \

Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription

against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or
omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the
court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against
Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Padua’s in the
civil case.
The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to
which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably
clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the
Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against
Pozzolan in the criminal case. Indeed, by including such statement
in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to
adopt the same adjudication and award it made in the civil cases
Punzalan’s civil liability in the criminal case. Court a quo decision set aside.
Case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

Philosophical Reference:

The more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an
apparent gap in the law and settled principles of adjudication may not
clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an argument
of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the
sociological school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I
hope I may be able to indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision
reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural law
thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral
justice, I am comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not
insurmountable; the decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint
of law as logic, justice or social control. I am moved by the way Prof.
Ronald Dworkin explains this part. He made see how the judge can render
his decision and on which way he shall resolve the issue raised in the case.
And that decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as
logic, justice or social control, in which I could not agree more. And I
presumed that the philosophical principles behind every court decision are
deemed logically and practically correct.