Controlled Freedom

Cognitive Economy versus Hierarchical Organisation

in Jazz Improvisation

__________________________

Artur C. Jaschke
 Controlled Freedom

Cognitive Economy versus Hierarchical Organization in Jazz

improvisation

Artur C. Jaschke
No.: 6268013

Amsterdam, 2011

Supervision: Dr. Wim van der Meer (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Prof. Dr. Eric Scherder (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

A dissertation submitted to the Universiteit van Amsterdam in accordance with the

requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Humanities

i
 ABSBRACT

This study demonstrates that one cannot speak of freedom in jazz improvisation.
Analyzing music as a stimulus and thus improvisation with all its different
characteristics in a cognitive and neurological framework, one cannot view
improvisation as ultimately free. Nonetheless, it is generally believed that
improvisation is the most ultimate form of freedom in music.
This paper however, will show through the application of cognitive economy,
hierarchical organization and the analysis of neurological imaging data, that
improvisation is based on pre-learned parameters, which define the way a
musician performs.
Combining these scientific findings with a philosophical, musicological and
cultural framework, allows me to create the hypothesis of controlled freedom.

The interdisciplinary observations, theories and suggestions elaborated in this

dissertation are based on extensive literature and experiment reviews,
conducted interviews and my own experience as a jazz musician.

Throughout the paper I argue that there is no freedom in improvisation, only the
freedom to choose freedom. Improvisation always works within a framework and
therefore is the improviser merely able to negotiate the boundaries in which to
operate.

ii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to all researches who have paved the way to make this research
possible.

At the Universiteit van Amsterdam, I would like to thank Prof. Rokus de Groot
for his positive attitude both in his teaching and encouragement to follow this
research.
I regard myself as extremely lucky to have had Dr. Wim van der Meer as
personal advisor. His devotion, support, encouragement and inspiration have
had an immense influence on me and my work.

At the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, my utmost special thanks go to Prof. Erik

Scherder.
Without sharing his passion, devotion, inspiration and support, this work would
have not been possible. Had he not taken upon the effort to co-supervise this
research, I would have not written this thesis.

I would like to thank my parents, Danuta and Marek (to whom I dedicate this
dissertation), my sister Agnieszka and her husband Ronny and Dina for their
constant support and believe, even though from far away.
Special thanks go to my niece Sophie, who has always been a shining light
through the course of this work.
Further I would like to thank Mirjam and Rene Rauch, for their believe in this
research.

Finally, my very special thanks go to Elte Rauch, whose love and support has
carried me through the most difficult moments while writing this paper.

Nevertheless, the content of this piece of work is my sole responsibility.

iii
 DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the
Regulations of the Universiteit van Amsterdam. The work is original except
where indicated by special references in the text and no part of the text has
been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and in no way
represent those of the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination
either in the Netherlands or abroad.

Signed:____________________ Date:____________________

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page i

Abstract ii

Acknowledgement iii

Declaration iv

Table of contents v

List of abbreviations vii

1. Introduction 1

2. Methods and Methodologies 5

3. Music in the cognitive context 7

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The terminology of music as stimulus

3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing 10

4. Improvisation 16

4.1 Introduction

4.2 The Hindustani and Western educational model of improvisation

4.3 Different characteristics of musical improvisation 19

4.4 Neural circuitry of improvisation 23

5. Cognitive Economy 25

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Cognitive economy until now

5.3The effortful nature of skill learning 28

5.4 Episodic auditory memory in the event of improvisation 30

5.5 The role of working memory 33

v
6. Hierarchical organization 36

6.1 Introduction

6.2 First steps in understanding hierarchical organization

6.3 Hierarchies of stability in music 38

6.4 Hierarchical organization and the sensory register 40

7. The freedom to choose freedom 42

7.1 Introduction

7.2 A short introduction to the philosophy of free will 43

7.2.1 The neurology and cognition of improvisation versus free will 44

7.3 Tonality versus atonality in improvisation 47

7.4 The negotiation of freedom in the jazz improvisation idiom 49

8. Conclusion 52

9. Bibliography 56

10. Appendices a-c

vi
 LIST OF ABREVIATIONS

CE cognitive economy

DLPFC dorsolateral preforntal cortex

EAM episodic auditory memory

EEG Electroencephalography

fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging

GTTM generative theory of tonal music

HO hierarchical organization

MCM motor control memory

PET positron emission tomography

PFC prefrontal cortex

PMC premotor cortex

vii
 CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Motivation of the study

Improvisation has its roots in the Latin term

improvisus, which means „unforeseen‟, and is meant to
be the production of music without the aid of
manuscript sketches or memory

(Harvard Dictionary of Music, 2003).

But is improvisation really creatio ex nihilo

– the creation out of nothing?

Improvisation seems to be one of the most researched, but

simultaneously the most incomprehensible phenomenon in music.
To my surprise, however not unexpected, I came across a notion of
controlled freedom in a publication about freedom and limits of jazz
improvisation, by Aart van Bergen (Journal of the Indian Musicological
Society, 2007). As a musician and musicologist, he draws alternative
conclusions about the freedom and limitations in jazz, namely the
musicians‟ sensitivity to “each others‟ interpretation of the framework
and therefore the creation of something new” (van Bergen, 2007: 42).
Nonetheless, I will propose an extension to this conclusion,
incorporating the neurological and cognitive side, to strengthen the
hypothesis of this paper of improvisation not being a form of free
musical expression.
The cognitive approach therefore, questions the creation out of
nothing; the creation of something new.
It is the combination of underlying neurological, cognitive and
musicological aspects in improvisation, which serve as a motivation for
this research.
Even though this topic as such, has not been researched, I undertook
an extensive literature review for this paper, which will attempt to re-

1
visit and re-define the terminology and the involved processes of
improvisation.

It is not only a question of (re-) production of a musical event, but the

ability of creating something out of thin air in the required situation.
Although this seems as improvisation being an ever evolving process
(Hamilton, 2000), this process is based on pre-learned parameters and
thus not the ceatio ex nihilo (Benson, 2006).
But what is improvisation and how can it be analysed? To answer these
questions, I will attempt to give a glimpse of the term music, which
through centuries remained unresolved throughout different domains
of musical research. Music seems to be more than just a great human
invention. It enhances our lives, evokes emotions, has the ability to
enrich our well-being or allows us to visit different states of our
emotional being (Levitin, 2006). However, I will only elaborate on
different views of what music can be, without trying to solve the
meaning of music. The different comprehensions of music shall serve
as a starting point to apply them to human cognition. The
understanding of how an auditory signal „travels‟ and is perceived in
the brain will give a basic framework in which the discussion of
improvisation will take place.

With a basic definition of music and an analysis of different forms of

improvisation, in an educational as well as through different
characteristics of improvisation (Benson, 2006), I will apply two
concepts related mostly to music cognition and memory (Berkowitz,
2010; Eyseneck and Keane, 2005, Murphy, 2002 and Lerdahl and
Jackendoff, 1983), namely cognitive economy and hierarchical
organization.
These concepts are two prime elements in the event of improvisational
performance (Engel et al., 2011 and Berkowitz, 2010); how and why

2
does a performer choose particular notes during improvisation? These
questions will be discussed in relation to cerebral activity during the
event of improvisation. Different parts of the brain are active while
improvising. It is a global cerebral event, which originates in listening,
processing and reproducing, of musical material „on the spot‟ (Ball,
2010). The analysis of these active cerebral areas during
improvisation, will further contribute to the understanding and acting
of cognitive economy (Murphy, 2002) and hierarchical organization
(Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983).

Cognitive economy, is understood as information (patterns, notes,

rhythms, the general comprehension of music), which is „stored‟ in our
memory ready to be accessed in real-time (Berkowitz, 2010). It
decreases the amount of information we need to learn, perceive,
remember and recognize during a perceptual event (Eysenck and
Keane, 2005). This perceptual support is originating in the
hippocampus, which is associated amongst other cerebral areas as the
main memory centre in the brain. Therefore allowing pre-learned
responses to newly perceived material, like for example during working
memory tasks (Murphy, 2002).
However, one can see cognitive economy as a subordinate of
hierarchical organization, thus only playing a minor role in the
perceptual process of musical information.
Yet, it is difficult to say, if hierarchical organization can take place at
all, without a memory (i.e. cognitive economy) to base it upon.

This essay will elaborate on the concept of cognitive economy

(developing this model) and apply hierarchical organization as a trigger
of pre-learned cognitive information. Hierarchical organization assists
cognitive economy in finding the best suitable representation in the
improvisational moment.

3
Consequently, one has to regard more than just the plain cognitive
influences in improvisation.
Through reviewing different teaching methods of improvisation and the
evidence of memory being a key aspect of musical performance, the
question of „freedom‟ during improvisation has to be asked.
Improvisation is generally regarded by musicians and listeners, as the
ultimate form of „free‟ expression in a musical moment (Bailey, 1992).
However, it is based on pre-learned motives and phrases; to learn how
to improvise, one has to copy the great masters‟ improvisations and
learn their musical expressions first (Vosloo, 2010). Although it seems
credible to copy the great masters to then develop the own „musical
voice‟, as will be further discussed in chapter four, I argue that one
cannot speak of ultimate „freedom‟ within the context of improvisation.
By transcribing the masters‟ soli, one incorporates this knowledge as
cognitive economy, „ready to be used‟, therefore operating in a context
of previously learned conventions and practices.

This essay will elucidate the „freedom‟ to choose freedom within a

given form. This controlled freedom will be discussed from a
neurological, cognitive, cultural, musicological and philosophical view
in the case of jazz improvisation.

4
 CHAPTER TWO

Methodologies and research methods

Improvisation has been researched in many different ways throughout

the years. Nonetheless, has the discussion of combining systematic,
historical and cognitive musicology been one of the key questions in
cross-domain music research (Krumhansl, 1995; Louhivuori, 1997 and
Leman and Schneider, 1997).
Coming across a vast amount of literature, discussing philosophical,
cultural, cognitive, neurological and musicological aspects, it is very
difficult to march on with the hypothesis of this thesis under one
methodological banner (Krumhansl, 1995).
The timeframe given and the lack of funding to conduct own neuro-
cognitive empirical studies, I have to rely on the analysis and
interpretation of existing experiments.
Nonetheless, I will propose extensions to existing models, which will
contribute to the discourse of this research.
Through my approach of incorporating self-conducted interviews with
musicians from different cultural backgrounds, and the analysis of
literature and experiments, I am attempting to connect different views
and findings. This interdisciplinary connection serves as the foundation
for the understanding of this paper.

Within the literature reviews I have conducted, there has been a

missing interdisciplinary comprehension, which was advocated by
Krumhansl (1995) amongst others in the field of systematic and
cognitive musicology.
For example, anthropologists regarded the cultural backgrounds, which
appear to serve as one candidate in the understanding of
improvisation, whereas fields like cognitive and neuro-sciences do not
seem to regard these influences as primary to the results of the

5
research. One cannot view brain functions while improvising, without
taking into account the understanding of the socio-cultural
backgrounds in which the musician learned to improvise or the
parameters of generally acquiring improvisational methods. Thus
speaking of freedom within improvisation has to be analysed out of
two approaches, namely the ontological and the epistemological1.
The hypothesis of controlled freedom in jazz improvisation, is clearly
posing on the understanding of freedom as a whole. The discussion
about freedom has fuelled heated debates over centuries and it is not
my intension to solve this issue in this paper. It is more a question of
the ontological understanding of freedom within improvisation, hence
the question, if freedom can at all exist in this context.
Leading up to the discussion about freedom in improvisation, it is
important to review improvisation in an epistemological context. It is
crucial within interdisciplinary practises to analyse how knowledge is
acquired and what this knowledge consists of and entails (see chapter
seven).
At this juncture one has to note qualitative and quantitative research
methods in the field of improvisation, which I consult in this paper.
Addressing improvisation and its analysis I draw back on the review of
the wide range of literature, which discusses this issue out of the
above mentioned aspects. This literature incorporated a variety of
musicians‟ testimonies, which appear to be one of the main
approaches in understanding improvisation within the qualitative
research domain. The combination of investigating these testimonies,
gives insight into the epistemological understanding of educational
methods of improvisation and more so the parameters of improvisation
in a performing context.

1
Ontological assumptions concern the very nature of the social world investigated. It poses the
question of being, existence or reality out of a philosophical view. Epistemological assumptions
refer to the “grounds of knowledge”, i.e. what is knowledge, how do we acquire knowledge and
how do we know what we know (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

6
The re-evaluation of psychological and neurological experiments,
further contributes to the key question of freedom in improvisation. By
reviewing this quantitative data, obtained through functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, Electroencephalography and Positron Emission
Tomography scans, as well as music psychological experiments, the
hypothesis proposed in this paper is supported with empirical
evidence.
Due to the scope of this paper, it is impossible to analyse all possible
methodologies, which can be applied in this field. However it is my
intension to continue the interdisciplinary research approach within the
field of improvisation. This appears to me as a fruitful ground for
research on any topic related to the appreciation of music generally.

The following chapters will apply the above mentioned research

methods and methodologies from an interdisciplinary point of view, to
outline the complexity of controlled freedom in jazz improvisation.

7
 CHAPTER THREE

Improvisation in the cognitive context

3.1 Introduction

What is improvisation and what are the underlying cognitive functions

that allow a performer to create a new „master piece‟ by midnight,
every night (Burns, 2000)? Improvisation holds different influencing
factors, e.g. cultural and the ability to master an instrument and the
necessary theory (Monson, 1996). However, before one can elaborate
on these different aspects of improvisation, it is important to review
different definitions of music and its stimulating factor. On that
account, a basic neurological comprehension of music processing will
support the cerebral process involved during improvisation.

3.2 The terminology of music as stimulus

Different theories were created and contributed to an understanding of

music. However there is still no ultimate answer to what music really is
and therefore there are different uses for its meanings.
For example, somebody in the orchestra is asking for the „music‟,
which here would mean the score or instrumental part; or people are
proud of their „music‟ collection, which refers to the actual quantity of
their CD‟s, MP3‟s etc. Music can also be seen as an agent of social
interaction and/or identification with a certain group, and so can
improvisation be seen as the constant dialogue with other musicians or
the composers‟ notation.
Babbitt (1965: 79) proposed a view of psychological music
representation, derived from the acoustic (or physical), the auditory
(or perceived) or the graphemic (or notated) domain. None of these
however, describes music in total.

8
A complex stimulus like music consists of different layers (Ball, 2010).
In the physical sense (and the one mostly applicable for this paper), it
consists of waves which are the key factor in understanding
frequencies. Here music is composed of different dimensions and
therefore frequencies (MacDonald and Henson, 1977) Thus one can
speak of music as organised sound. This comprehension can go as far
as micro tonality2, which can arguably have significant influence on the
perception of timbre and therefore the overall perception of music3 and
musicality in general (Krumhansl, 1979).
Although this approach is only one level of understanding music and is
in no sense complete, it shall serve as the initial argument for
cognitive comprehension. It is the ability to analyse musical data in a
neurological framework, which supports this view of music.
In this approach the aspect of tonality or atonality does not apply and
therefore classifies everything (incorporating „on the spot free‟
improvisation) that has been created with „sonic waves‟ (here in
musical terms: rhythm, pitch, melody, timbre, etc.) as a
representation of music.
Henceforth the concept of music as organised sound and the scientific
approach of music as a combination of waves and frequencies will be
used and therefore enable its application in a neurological sense.

2
Micro tonality is seen as the underlying physical concept, of which individual tones consist of.
3
The musical Thalamus, research proposal. There is still a lack of literature and research on the
effect of micro tonality and its’ perception. It is likely that micro tones, which are only perceived
passively, could give a deeper insight into how music is perceived. Through the passive
perception of micro tones, the pathways of the thalamus and its effect on our neuro-circuitry, a
key question of musicality could be answered.

9
 3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing

The way auditory sound is processed in the brain has fuelled heated
debates for over more than twenty years. Patel (2009) and Peretz
(2009), have both created two different hypotheses, which attempt to
explain this issue. Patel posed the recourse sharing hypothesis, in
which he argues that every perceived auditory information (e.g.
language or music), shares similar to the same neural bases (Patel,
2009).
He further argues that through these shared components music and
language must have a common origin in their evolution. Peretz on the
other hand, poses the modularity hypothesis and argues that auditory
information must have different neural foundations, therefore being
processed in different parts of the brain (Peretz, 2009). Both of these
hypotheses are based on case-studies around the cerebral processing
of language and music. Key words are aphasia and amusia developed
after major cerebral strokes. At this point, I will not discuss aphasia
and amusia further due to their secondary importance to this paper
(see Patel, 2009 and Peretz, 2009 for clinical experiments and results).
For the soundness of cognitive processes in improvisation and
further how music is perceived and processed, it is important to re-
view both these hypotheses. Through my experience as a jazz
musician, I understand that one has to first listen and process the
music around oneself, before being able to musically react on it (read:
improvise).
Analysing the presented theories by Peretz (2009) and Patel (2009), I
would like to propose an extension to these, based on their conducted
case studies. Regarding both, modularity and resource sharing, which
in themselves are valid theories, I want to suggest a combination of
both. Although I am aware of the missing empirical evidence for the
synthesis of both these theories, my suggested combination is to be

10
regarded as an approach to explore the missing link in music
processing and perception. I am supporting this approach with existing
literature, discussing the problematic of the missing fragment in music
processing and perception (Ball, 2010; Rose, 2010; Peretz, 2009;
Patel, 2009; Trepel, 2008; Sherman and Guillery, 2006; Fletcher et al.,
1992 and Cowan, 1988). Therefore in my view, are Peretz‟s and
Patel‟s hypotheses interlinked and can be divided into two stages,
namely stage 1) resource sharing and stage 2) modularity in the event
of sound perception and processing (see Figure I). Here the thalamus4
serves as crucial link between both theories. The thalamus has through
the centuries been regarded as a sole relay station of incoming
information (Kandel et al., 1993). Recent research however, suggests
that the thalamus is more than just a relay station and thus
contributes to the perception and processing of incoming information
(Barraud and Berthat, 2009 and Sherman and Guillery, 2006).

Significant evidence on this last point is currently not

available, possibly because it has not been looked for in
the past.
(Sherman and Guillery, 2006: 363)

Nonetheless, in stage 1 an auditory signal (i.e language or music) is

perceived by the auris interna, sent via the thalamus to the auditory
cortex and then back to the thalamus. During this stage the brain is
sharing resources, in generally perceiving the signal. Here it perceives
the signal as auditory without interpreting the signal as either music,
language or any other sound. After the signal reached the thalamus for
further processing, the modularity hypothesis (stage 2) comes into
place to finally process the signal in different hemispheres for either
language or music. Regarding both hypotheses as inter-dependent

4
See appendix page a, Figure II, main functions of the thalamus include relay sensation, spatial
sense and motor signal to the cortex, together with the regulation of consciousness, sleep and
alertness.

11
rather than two individual approaches, one can now regard the specific
functions during music perception and processing.

Figure I: Extension of the modularity (Peretz, 2009) and resource sharing (Patel, 2009)
hypothesis in the event of processing auditory information

When sound (here: music) is sent to the ear, the cochlea (or auris
interna) sends this information through the thalamus which is part of
the brain stem, to the primary auditory cortex. The cochlea is equipped
with different sensory receptors, or „hair cells‟, which vibrate
accordingly to different frequencies. These hair cells react to auditory
information and generate fluid waves in the cochlea through the
vibrations of the conductive apparatus (Kandel et al., 1991). To
translate these vibrations into neural signals, the cochlea identifies the
pressure of the fluid waves of each individual hair cell. Each hair cell is
responsible for identifying one frequency. These stimuli are achieved

12
through mechanical and electrical response. But how is the electrical
response achieved? While using pressure and therefore movement in
the cochlea (mechanical stimulus), it further...

[...] increases and decreases the amplitude of the

spontaneous oscillation of electrical currents, namely
and [positive Calcium and Cilium ions].

(Kandel et al, 1991: 488)

This translation of mechanical into electrical responses is sent to the

thalamus, which already serves as an initial sound processor (Rose,
2010). Neuronal axons send this information to the relevant parts of
the brain for processing. However, it is not known yet how auditory
pathways in the thalamus are precisely linked with the cortex and
therefore contribute to the perception and processing of auditory
information (Ball, 2010; Trepel, 2008 and Sherman and Guillery,
2006). Once the auditory cortex has identified the signal as being a set
of organised frequencies (with layers specialised in individual
frequency perception5) it is sent back via the thalamus, to different
hemispheres of the brain.
Music listening and performing is a global cerebral process activating
different parts, like for example the Heschl‟s gyrus in the temporal
lobe, dealing with pitch perception (pitch intervals and melody), the
planum temporale, dealing with timbre and spatial location of sound
and the anterior superior temporal gyrus which identifies streams of
sound (Levitin, 2006).
The processing stage after having identified the signal in the auditory
cortex activates the „primitive‟ sub cortical brain, identifying this signal
as auditory information (see Figure IV). The cerebellum and basal
ganglia proceed with the identification of the timing circuits to pick the
rhythm. The thalamus, in communication with the amygdalae, is
checking the information for danger signals, hence evoking an
5
See appendix page a, Figure III

13
emotional response in the amygdalae6 (MacDonald Critchley and
Henson, 1977). The hippocampus starts to compare the new signal
with previously memorised information (believed to be the starting
point of cognitive economy) and is than sent to the prefrontal cortex7,
where a series of anticipations and expectations of the music are
triggered (Levitin, 2006). Additionally the Broca‟s area, which is mainly
associated with the processing of language, serves as a further
interpreter and finally the signal is sent to the motor cortex, resulting
in a motor response, i.e. foot tapping, dancing or the application to the
instrument (Ball, 2010).

Figure IV: Music processing; description of step 5 in preceding Figure I.

6
This process however, is still an enigma to scientists. One knows that the emotional response is
triggered in the amygdale, being the emotional centre of the brain, however there are more
aspects influencing the emotional choice.
7
Is mainly considered to be active during “decision making” processes and individual expression.

14
All of this information processing is happening instantly as soon as
musical information is sent to our ears and moreover consolidates the
idea of musical perception as global cerebral phenomenon. However, it
is believed that there are more neurological functions involved other
than the above mentioned (Ball, 2010; Rose, 2010 and Levitin, 2006).
Here again, ongoing research will help deciphering the enigma of
music perception and will give a deeper insight into the development of
our neurology and cognition.

15
 CHAPTER FOUR

Improvisation

4.1 Introduction

Having created a comprehension of music and its neurological circuitry,

one can now branch off to improvisation. This discussion is based on
the above mentioned fundamental concepts with its extensions on the
cognitive processes.
Improvisation consists of different aspects and appears in
different forms. Influential aspects of improvisation are varying
educational concepts based on cultural as well as different
improvisational characteristics (Benson, 2006).
At this stage I will give a brief overview of two different educational
methods, which will show how an improvisational proficiency is
acquired before outlining the different characteristics of improvisation.

4.2 The educational model of Hindustani and Jazz improvisation

Every musical culture holds a tradition of improvisation; it reaches as

far as early European baroque or Spanish flamenco music (Bailey,
1992). Here however, I will review two educational models, which hold
improvisation as an important aspect in the creation of these; the
Hindustani (through an interview with young sitar player Farhan Khan)
and the conservatorium jazz-curriculum (through an interview with
educator and jazz-double bassist Riaan Vosloo). Both methods rely on
the importance in knowing the instrument and being able to utilise
technical proficiencies on it.

Farhan Khan, son of renowned Sitar player Ustad Rais Khan received
his education on the Sitar in the traditional Hindustani sense.

16
Although, Hindustani music appears to be more experimental, tolerant
of change and with a broad interest of development in comparison with
other Indian music traditions, improvisation is a central aspect of all
Indian music (Ibid.). More so, does Hindustani improvisation shift away
from traditional texts towards a more adventurous attitude,
comparable to the western jazz-tradition (Ibid.). The performance of
music as well as acquiring ultimate proficiency on the instrument and
the theoretical knowledge are indistinguishable from a book of religious
instruction and has therefore a great effect on the spiritual experience
of the musician (Ibid.).

I was asked to sit in-front of my father and copy

everything he was playing. He would not say if I was
doing it correctly or not, so I had to develop a feeling
for what was allowed and what was not.

(Khan, 2011)

Here one can already see that by having to copy the master and
therefore develop a „feeling‟ for the music, certain parameters of the
music were given in-which one can perform. Here there is little space,
as well as in the jazz-tradition, for the development or lack thereof, of
a „free voice‟ on the instrument. In the Hindustani tradition, one has to
understand the masters‟ way first, which was handed down over
generations, to be able to create their own voice. Only once the
framework, in terms of sruti8, svara9, tala10, laya11, raga12, alapa13 and

8
Smallest interval used. It is considered the single most important element of Indian music.
9
Is selected and regarded as the central point around which melodic activity takes place. It
stands in a “non-harmonic” relationship to the sruti.
10
Rhythmic cycle of the second part of the raga with variations of fixed lengths, e.g. 16, 12, or 8
matra.
11
The pulse of the music. It is regarded as the forward motion, the feel, of the rhythm.
12
Is the framework of the whole piece and the context of improvisation of the musicians. It is
unformed until the performance.
13
Slow introduction to the raga

17
gat14 is established, one was allowed to develop these into a musical
conversation with the fellow musicians (Khan, 2011 and Bailey, 1992).
A similar phenomenon appears in the conservatorium jazz tradition;

you have to transcribe as many soli as possible, of all

the great jazz masters, so you know what you are
allowed to play and what sounds good. You have to
stick to these boundaries otherwise they will not call
you again for the next gig.

(Vosloo, 2010)

The conservatorium tradition thus demands the „novice‟ to memorise

important gradations of so-called „important soli‟. Therefore, are these
transcriptions incorporated into the memory of the novice jazz
musician. The following example will help to clarify this statement.
If the eager jazz musician is asked to transcribe a solo by Charles
Mingus, Mingus‟ style and choice of notes will become part of the
novices‟ improvisational vocabulary. However, what appears less
obvious is that the predecessors who had influence on Mingus‟ playing,
will passively become part of the students understanding of
improvisation, hence memorising a tradition, which can be applied in
musical situations of improvisation.
Therefore, it is believed that for the development of a musical voice it
is crucial to know these parameters and to have them memorised to
be able to perform successfully (Berkowitz, 2010). In this tradition it is
important for the musician to know the limitations of the musical
discourse (Benson, 2006).
However through this way of teaching, the information is stored in the
memory as cognitive economy (see chapter five) and is ready to be
used at any given moment in the future (Berkowitz, 2010). This might
appear as a valid approach to professionalism in music, however
simultaneously strengthens the hypothesis that there is no truly free

14
Treatment of the raga in various standard ways.

18
improvisation; only improvisation which is based on pre-learned
musical fragments. It appears like there is no alternative to be able to
learn how to improvise without having to „copy somebody else‟s ideas‟
and therefore the convention and framework in which they operate
(Hall, 1992). In chapter seven I will discuss this issue further based on
these educational methods and the cognitive evidence of acquired
contexts.

4.3 Different characteristics of musical improvisation

Throughout different literature on the topic of improvisation, there

appears to be only one method to capture it; musicians testimonies. In
thinking jazz; the ultimate art of improvisation (1994), Berliner has
written “one of the most thorough defences of jazz” (DeVeaux, 1998:
404) and improvisation. He explores the tradition of musical creativity
(i.e. improvisation), from as many angles as possible. His ethno-
musicological view on the subject puts the musician and therefore the
socio-cultural aspects to the forefront. This analysis however, only
supports the hypothesis argued in this paper (see chapter seven) that
improvisation is based on pre-learned concepts and parameters, which
are applied in a given context. Consequently improvisation can never
be an expression of ultimate freedom, but the choice of it in a given
tradition.

Jazz is not just, “well, man, this is what I feel like

playing.” It‟s a very structured thing that comes down
from a tradition and requires a lot of thought and
study.

(Wynton Marsalis in Berliner, 1994: 63)

Even if analysed out of a music theoretical point of view, as

demonstrated in Monson‟s, Saying something (1996) the hypothesis is
strengthened. Monson chose musical examples in combination with

19
musicians‟ testimonies, to create an understanding of the individual
parts of an improvising jazz band. She divides these into their different
roles within the band, e.g. the rhythm section (piano, drums and bass)
and the front line or melody line (brass, wind and vocals). Although
she deconstructs each individual instrument in terms of the chosen
musical examples, she comes to the same conclusion as Berliner does;
namely that successful improvisation can only happen, when musicians
have acquired a thorough knowledge of harmonic, rhythmic, dynamic
and melodic relationships.
Therefore one can define improvisation as the acquired knowledge of
elements, utilised in a musical context.
Benson (2006), in The improvisation of musical dialogue, a
phenomenology of music, develops this definition further.
He states different possible distinctions with a variety of types and
degrees. Despite the fact that his list of examples is in no way
complete, he presents eleven different types of improvisation. These
variations of improvisation reach in the first stage from minimalistic
changes in tempi, attack, dynamics and to some extend
instrumentation to expected (by the composer) additions of notes and
cadenzas. Benson refers to this changes as a necessity in Baroque and
classical music, to be able to perform these graphemic representations
of music. Breaking away from the Baroque and classical tradition he
mentions several other forms of improvisation, which give the
performer more and more influence on the actual compositional
process. Benson goes as far as putting the performer on the same
level as the composer in stating that by working in the same tradition
the line between composer and performer vanishes (Ibid.).
Consequently one can argue that by becoming part of the musical
tradition (as composer and performer) the rules and expectations of
this tradition are modified and therefore improvised upon within the
tradition itself (Ibid.).

20
Taking these different developments into account, one can argue that
jazz improvisation is a combination of all those variations. With regard
to the model of improvisation, which is most commonly found in jazz
with the influences of the above mentioned developments, he specifies
this further. Jazz musicians chose several degrees of alterations.
Considering melody, they either change the melody slightly so the
original is still recognisable, the melody line is strongly changed, so the
connection to the original is very difficult to grasp, or the melody is
completely disregarded and replaced with an alternative (Ibid.). On the
one hand, are chord changes altered enough to create a new sounding
chord, while sticking close enough to the original harmony of the
chord.
On the other hand, chords can be severely changed, but will still
correspond to the basic chord structure.
Each act of improvisation therefore requires a...

[...] kind of reworking of something that already exists

and is therefore not something created on the spur of
the moment out of nothing.

(Ibid.: 30)

The above quote confirms the hypothesis that improvisation is

operating within a context of cognitive and neurological memory
systems as will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

21
 4.4 Neural circuitry of improvisation

Having shown the main characteristics of improvisation, one can now

regard the neural circuitry underlying these.
Nonetheless, I will only show the cerebral pathways and elaborate on
the cortical areas involved in improvisation. Having presented these
cortical principles I will amplify on the fundamental cognitive functions
in chapters five and six (cognitive economy and hierarchical
organisation) in the event of improvisation.

Based on the knowledge from the preceding chapter 3.2.1 Neurological

comprehension of music processing, the question arises; what are the
cerebral principles involved in improvisation15 in addition to basic
music processing? Improvisation usually happens within a musical
context and therefore is a combination of listening to the music
surrounding the performer and choosing the notes for the
improvisational framework.

When jazz musicians […] improvise, they suppress their

limbic systems, notably their amygdalae, and they
activate their frontal cortices while deactivating their
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices.

(Limb and Braun, 2008: 7)

Limb and Braun (2008)16 noticed a strong change of pattern activity in

the prefrontal cortices. More so, they found strong deactivations of
lateral portions and focal activation of the medial prefrontal cortex17
(Ibid.). Knowing that these brain areas are mostly associated with

15
Cerebral motor circuitries are left out at this point, due to their minor importance to this paper.
However, one should note that motor control (hand, finger, leg, etc. movements) is the visible
result of the underlying neural circuitries in the event of improvisation.
16
neuronal functions were recorded of 6 professional jazz musicians during the event of
improvisation. This experiment was conducted, while the participants were undergoing a
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan. See Limb and Braun (2008) for experiment
set-up.
17
See appendix page b, Figure V

22
decision making and the process of personal expression, the conclusion
of improvisation as expression “of one‟s own musical voice” (Ibid.: 7)
is not farfetched. Therefore do activations in the frontal polar cortex
(part of the medial prefrontal cortex) support the necessary
requirements for improvisation. As stated by Limb and Braun (2008),
these requirements are characterised as sets of rules of progressive
behaviour whilst performing different behavioural subroutines. Lateral
prefrontal regions, which assess and monitor goal-directed behaviours
were deactivated and therefore allow a “free-floating attention that
permits spontaneous unplanned associations” (Ibid.: 7). Improvisation
is therefore often compared with intuitive decision making and
creativity (Pressing, 1984). Thus can improvisation be seen as an
“emergence of unconscious or random thoughts and sensations” (Limb
and Braun, 2008: 7).
Analysing the findings concerning the limbic system, Limb and Braun
reported both activity decrease and increase, which they linked to the
relationship of creativity and emotional response. However, the
deactivation of the amygdalae (emotion centre of the brain), can be
traced back to positive emotional associations with improvisation
(Ibid.).

Bengsston18 et al. (2007) as-well as Limb and Braun (2008), agree

that memory systems and mechanisms play an important role in
improvisation. In spite of this, as discussed in the preceding chapters
4.2 and 4.3 of this paper, one has to acquire a certain musical
knowledge to be able to improvise at all (Hall, 1992). Therefore one
can never fully eliminate the influences of memory systems and
notably an involvement of hippocampal activity (Limb and Braun,
2008).

18
Conducted a similar study to the one of Limb and Braun, with classically trained pianists,
however, differed in several parameters. See Bengtsson et al. (2007), cortical regions involved in
the generation of musical structures during improvisation in pianists.

23
Based on this evidence, the following chapters will further discuss the
hypothesis of controlled freedom, out of the view of memory systems
(cognitive economy) and its trigger (hierarchical organisation).

24
 CHAPTER FIVE

Cognitive Economy

5.1 Introduction

As discussed in the preceding chapter, improvisation is a series of

listening, copying and reproducing. With this understanding of
improvisation and its characteristics and both the educational and
neurological understanding, one can now analyse the underlying
complex cognitive functions of memory. In this context I will elaborate
on the concept of cognitive economy, which plays a central role in
improvisation (Berkowitz, 2009). Cognitive economy is an application
to the human memory system and allows the brain to retrieve pre-
learned information for active support of perception, processing and
production (Murphy, 2002; Eyseneck and Keane, 2005 and Zbikowski,
2002). At this point one has to take the function of working memory
into consideration, which appears to be linked to the above mentioned
retrieval.
Although there are still unclear elements in the neurophysiology of
memory systems, this chapter will consult case-studies to consolidate
the opinion that improvisation is constricted by a „learned‟ framework
and can therefore never be totally free.

5.2 Cognitive economy until now

Chapter 3.2.1 Neurological comprehension of music processing, has

asserted that music „travels‟ through the hippocampus. Understanding
the learning methods of improvisation, which rest on the idea of
constant copying and reproduction procedures and therefore
intensifying neural pathways (note chapter 5.3), one can view this
process as retrieving information from this memory system.

25
As discussed by Berkowitz (2010), it is this retrieval which is based on
a rationalisation and categorisation of hippocampal working processes,
and is known as the concept of cognitive economy (henceforth, CE).
The model of CE is defined as a...

[...] mental representation of classes of objects or

other entities [including music]. It allows abstracting
away from our experiences to develop by dividing the
world into classes of things to decrease the amount of
information we need to perceive, remember and
recognize.

(Eysenck and Keane, 2005: 294)

This statement entails that „stored‟ information in the memory system

is approached, to be able to easier understand and react upon specific
groups or events. In the event of improvisation, the musicians‟
cognition would fall back onto the stored information, hence applying
them in the musical moment. Zbikowski (2002) and Murphy (2002)
have further sub-divided this definition into conceptualizing categories
of music; namely the prototype approach and the exemplar approach.
According to the prototype approach;

the prototype is either a collection of characteristic

attributes or the best example(s) of the concept.

(Zbikowski, 2002: 216)

Therefore, the musician is able to retrieve certain musical phrases

from his/her extensive acquired library. By finding the „best example‟
(read: cognitive representation), which is suitable for the musical
framework in which the improvisational process is taking place, the
performer is falling back onto pre-learned musical relationships. Here
however, it would be seen as one overall attribute, without a
subdivision into more specific - and to improvisation more important -
aspects.

26
At this juncture, the exemplar approach once more augments the
notion of relying on pre-learned musical concepts, more suitable for
individual aspects in improvisation. This approach suggests no overall
collection of characteristics, which define the action, but individual
groupings of all stored...

[...] instances, encountered in the past. Therefore one

would search the memory for instances that have
occurred similar to this concept.

(Murphy, 2002: 48)

This elaboration on CE shows that through constant repetition, not only

do the neural pathways for improvisation get consolidated, but are also
supported through a cognitive retrieval mechanism.
While the definition appears to be satisfactory in the general event of
the initial cognitive aim of perception and (re-)production, musical
improvisation suggests more underlying mechanisms (Berkowitz,
2010).
Under these circumstances, I will propose an extension to the so far
understood concept of CE in the event of musical improvisation. This
extension will suggest the effortful learning of skills, motor (or muscle)
memory, working memory and episodic auditory memory (see Figure
VI). All of which appear to contribute to the comprehension of CE in
the event of improvisation.

27
Figure VI: The extended process of cognitive economy
- acquiring and retrieving musical information in the event of improvisation

5.3 The effortful nature of skill learning

With regard to the educational approach of improvisation in chapter

4.2 of this paper, I will embellish on the underlying cognitive aspects
important for the extended theory of CE. Against this backdrop, I will
discuss the basic19 concepts of motor memory and skill learning, which

19
A detailed elaboration would exceed the scope of this paper.

28
play an important role in the event of improvisation before moving on
to memory retrieval systems during improvisation. This discussion will
be based around an extended model of CE.

As discussed in chapter 4.2, the novice has to copy and reproduce

compositions and soli of the „great masters‟ to be able to learn how to
improvise. Through this constant repetition of repertoire, the human
memory system incorporates these into the long-term memory
(Cowan, 1988). Thus, will this information become part of the sub-
conscious human cognition, ready to be retrieved in real time when
required.
However, there is another level to the effortful nature of skill learning,
which appears to be important in musical performance. The above
mentioned repetition, does not only incorporate this information into
the human long-term memory (see below for further discussion), but
triggers systems of motor control memory; commonly known as
muscle memory (Altenmueller; 2003 and Sudnow, 1993). This form of
memory has to be included into the extended theory of CE, due to its
connection to the basic definition of CE; “decreasing the amount of
information we have to remember” (Eysenck and Keane, 2005: 294).
The phenomenon of motor control memory, allows the muscles to
remember certain fingering or diaphragm positions, which are
connected to the knowledge of producing sound. Through constant
practise and association processes between finger placement and
sound, the skilled musician is able to „trust‟ this finger-movement, to
achieve a perfect intonation on the instrument. Through this so-called
trust-principle, is the musician able to focus better on other elements
of musical production, e.g. the score, timbre and/or the possible
interaction with fellow musicians (Wiesendanger, 2010; Altenmueller;
2003 and Sudnow, 1993).

29
This connection is created passively as sub-category of skill learning.
But how does human cognition actively acquire information to be
stored in long-term memory (Fletcher et al., 1994 and Grasby et al.
1992)?
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) have proposed a memory model, which is
still valid today (see appendix page b, Figure VII). This model has
three stages of processing, namely the sensory register, working or
short-term memory and long-term memory. Synthesising the event of
learning how to improvise and the Atkinson and Shiffrin model, the
„novice‟ is perceiving the stimulus (here: music) and records it in the
sensory register (origin of hierarchical organization as trigger of CE,
see chapter six). Here, the sensory register conducts a „quick‟ scan for
importance and certain pre-coding processes, which are than as a
result sent to the working or short-term memory. At this stage of
memory, main coding, rehearsal and recoding processes take place,
which serve as initiation to the long-term memory system (Atkinson
and Shiffrin, 1968). Once the information has been transferred to the
long-term memory, the mind can further process, store and is able to
recall this information. In the event of learning how to improvise, the
novice would be constantly repeating (read: rehearsing) a certain
fragment in the working or short-term memory, hence reinforcing the
coding process, which is important for long-term memory storing
(Ibid.).
Through this constant repetition process the acquired knowledge is
becoming part of the episodic auditory memory20; a main aspect of CE
(Muonz-Lopez et al., 2010 and Eysenck and Keane, 2005).

20
EAM is also known as episodic musical memory, which is part of EAM

30
 5.4 Episodic auditory memory in the event of improvisation

Episodic auditory memory (EAM) can be understood as a sub-conscious

recollection and retrieval system of the „what, where and when‟
(Munoz-Lopez et al., 2010: 3) involving the long-term memory. It does
not require specific training and is most often happening automatically,
based on triggering factors of our surrounding (Ibid.).
Based on the automatic recollection and retrieval mechanisms and its
innate quality to our cognition, the term „sub-conscious‟ can in a broad
sense be connected to the term automatic21. The human mind has only
little influence on what is stored in the sub-conscious. However, one
can through constant repetition incorporate certain actions,
movements or comprehensions into the sub-conscious, and
consequently these actions become automatic recollection and retrieval
processes (Ibid.).
In the event of improvisation the mind has already „remembered‟ the
framework and structures of improvisational methods and can
therefore „automatically‟ apply those on a new event, due to them
being part of the sub-conscious (read: episodic auditory memory).

Once acquired, a pattern will remain stored [...] like an

electrical field, holding and forming anything entering
its sphere of influence. Acquired information is so basic
and so fundamental that it is almost inevitably equated
with the self, and its patterns are automatic and totally
out of awareness.

(Hall, 1992: 225)

21
This link shows that we have only little influence over our sub-conscious and thus are certain
actions performed without actually being consciously aware of them. As an example one can look
at a rather simple action; cycling. While we cycle, we are consciously aware which direction we
are going, observing the traffic, road signs and lights. We are however not consciously aware of
keeping balance on the bicycle. At this stage our sub-conscious mind retrieves the parameters to
be able to keep balance and performs them as automated processes.

31
Here, cerebral functions of episodic auditory memory will contribute
through its inter-dependence with auditory processing and the
neurology of improvisation to the understanding that improvisation is
based on pre-learned and memorised parameters (Limb and Braun,
2008 and Bengsston et al., 2007).
As well as in fMRI studies of auditory processing and improvisation,
EAM shows a strong activation in the hippocampal areas of the brain
(Munoz-Lopez et al., 2010). Activations in the hippocampus appear
less surprising in this context. The interesting link here is that in the
event of memory retrieval this particular area is active in exchange
with the prefrontal cortices. This neural trade combination is
furthermore found during improvisation (see chapter 4.4). Therefore,
this relation does additionally consolidate the conception of controlled
freedom in jazz improvisation, which leads to the comprehension of
memory activation during performance.
Against this backdrop, the question arises, which hippocampal areas
are activated during episodic auditory memory retrieval and their
connection to the prefrontal cortex?
The ability to store and retrieve context-rich information depends on
the hippocampal formation (Ibid.). Munoz-Lopez and colleagues have
analysed EAM streams, which showed an increase in direct connections
of the auditory association areas of the parahippocampal region and
the PFC. They concluded out of this connection that the storage and
retrieval of information can only happen on a multimodal level. The
theory of multimodality, suggest the above mentioned direct
connections of the auditory association areas and the prefrontal cortex
on a multi-synaptic level with the memory system of the medial
temporal lobe22 (Ibid.). This interaction allows a direct retrieval of

22
The medial temporal lobe memory system is believed to be the main storage space of long-
term memory, incorporating the hippocampus, the perirhinal-, postrhinal- and entorhinal-
cortices.

32
information in the event of prefrontal cortex activation, which is
strongly present during improvisation.
Including this retrieval system into the concept of CE, one can
conclude that the connection of memory systems and the constant
decision making process during jazz improvisation only allow a
reinterpretation of previously learned musical concepts (Limb and
Braun, 2008). Therefore one will „search‟ for similar events, or the best
representation of this event, to fit into the existing context (Eysenck
and Keane, 2005). Consequently, improvisation cannot be regarded as
creatio ex nihilo.

5.5 The role of working memory

Although working memory (WM) plays a crucial role when learning

improvisational methods, the role during the actual performance still
seems unclear.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, working memory or short-term
memory is one stage in the human learning procedure of new
information, being responsible for coding, rehearsal and recoding.
Smith (2000) has discovered that the processes of WM are originating
in different parts of the prefrontal cortex.
WM allows the human mind to...

[...] maintain information briefly in an active state.

Sometimes we keep information active until we
externalize it, as when we hold on to a phone number
until we dial it.

(Ibid.: 45)

This statement confirms the above mentioned learning processes,

which through constant repetition of certain information, humans are
able to exceed the loop in WM and transfer this information to long-
term storage. However, looking at the neural bases of human

33
workingmemory in more detail, a paradox to the neural bases during
improvisation occurs.
Smith (2000) showed in his study that during a WM task,
predominantly the premotor cortex (PMC) and the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) are active. Applying this finding on cerebral
functions during improvisation, the same activation in the premotor
cortex occurs, which links working memory tasks and improvisation in
terms of motor responses. These PMC functions coincide with the
above mentioned acquired muscle memory systems (Wiesendeger,
2010 and Sudnow, 1993), contributing to the ability to perform music.
However, activations in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during
working memory tasks stand against a deactivation of the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex during improvisation, hence the paradox. The DLPFC
is mainly responsible for motor planning, organization and regulation.
It also plays an important role in the integration of sensory and
mnemonic information (Kandel et al., 1991). Here however, I would
like to suggest the bypass hypothesis, which is based on the findings
of Smith (2000), Limb and Braun (2008) and the theory of the above
mentioned higher level episodic auditory memory system.
Based on the obtained knowledge of improvisation and therefore
incorporating this information into the EAM system, the DLPFC in
working memory is bypassed in the event of improvisation. Having this
information stored in long-term memory on „standby‟, the brain does
not have to recode or rehearse this information again and can directly
retrieve it from memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968). Therefore, the
mind does not have to organise or regulate this information in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The neuronal pathways between
decision making and memory got consolidated to an extent23, which

23
Note appendix page c, Figure VIII. The connection of white matter between the PFC and the
Hippocampus is an anatomical strong structure, which links our ability of decision making to the
human memory retrieval system. By acquiring improvisational skills, this ‘bridge’ is strengthened,
which makes memory retrieval in the event of performing, a more ‘natural’ process.

34
eliminates the regulation of this information, consequently becoming a
„natural‟ recall and application process (Altenmueller, 2010).
[An] attenuated DLPFC no longer regulates the contents
of consciousness, allowing unfiltered, sub-conscious, or
random thoughts and sensations to emerge.

(Limb and Braun, 2008: 7)

Nonetheless, working memory regulates the organisation of motor

planning in the context of improvisation.
This hypothesis however, would require further research in the field of
neuro-cognitive imaging during improvisation.

Therefore, one can regard episodic auditory memory or long-term

memory, the sensory register and active connections to the PFC as
fundamental for the retrieval of information in human cognition.

35
 CHAPTER SIX

Hierarchical Organisation

6.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the sensory register does

appear to be the origin of hierarchical organization, which quickly
scans the external stimulus for importance. Hierarchical organisation
(henceforth, HO), will be regarded as a cognitive function, part of the
sensory register, to allow to pick out the more important information
of the perceived stimulus. This triggers the episodic auditory memory
system for a matching response applied during improvisation.

6.2 First steps in understanding hierarchical organisation

Lehrdal and Jackendoff (1983) have posed one of the most thorough
concepts of Hierarchical organization in the event of perceiving music.
Their theory is based on the so-called „grouping‟ system, which find
their origin in language analysis. This analysis, proposes that certain
words in language or melodic, rhythmic or harmonic figures in music,
have a higher importance in perceiving and understanding of these.
Both scientists based their theory of „grouping‟ on Gestalt psychological
principles, which show that similar „forms‟ can be summarised under a
specific group (Leman, 1997).
Through this understanding, a listener is able to comprehend the
phenomenon of tonal centres in music and anticipates a musical
phrase to resolve in the tonic (Justus et al., 2002). For example, a
musical phrase is written in the key of C major, therefore C would be
perceived as the „strongest‟ point within that phrase. The composition
around this tonal centre will be perceived in different levels of
hierarchy, with the 5th (G in the scale of C) as the second highest in

36
the scale. Other notes involved in the melody and within the scale will
therefore fall under these two strong hierarchical points, but will
nevertheless contribute to the resolution to the tonic (Ibid.). This
perceptual attribute can be also applied on rhythmical structures and
further on the combination of phrases, which show, higher and lower
points of hierarchical groupings24.

The principal influence the performer has on grouping

perception is in his [/her] execution of local details,
which affect the choice of small-level grouping
boundaries […] and of larger boundaries […].

(Lehrdal and Jackendoff, 1983.: 63)

Although this grammar appears to be a powerful instrument by which

certain criteria can have a partial control of the whole listening
structure (Baroni, 2010), it lacks in two additional and thus
fundamental parameters reviewing the above statement about the
performer. Having agreed above that improvisation is a combination of
listening and the application of musical knowledge in a context, these
influencing parameters have to be included into the understanding of
HO. One aspect is the presence and function of sound structures and
the other are „primary‟ and „secondary‟ parameters of music (Meyer,
1989).
Sound structures have to be incorporated into the equation, due to
their fundamental role in the production of music. Therefore are sound
structures part of the production and thus the perception of music
(Baroni, 2010).
Meyer (1989) proposed two parameters, which play an integral part in
the production of sound structures. He divides these parameters in
„primary‟ and „secondary‟, whereby „primary‟ parameters include
discrete units as pitch and duration and „secondary‟ parameters such
as dynamics, tempo, texture and timbre.

24
See Lehrdal and Jackendoff (1983), GTTM, for an extensive discussion of this theory.

37
These three parameters have also to be seen as fundamentally
important to the „musical grammar‟ as proposed by Lehrdahl and
Jackendoff, which where however not fully included in the construction
of the generative theory of tonal music.

Based on the understanding discussed in this paragraph, the following

will use and extend this knowledge on hierarchies of stability in music.

6.3 Hierarchies of stability in music

Event hierarchies refer to temporal organization of a

specific piece of music, with more important musical
events represented higher in the hierarchy, while tonal
hierarchies refer to the organization of categories of
pitch events, with some pitch classes being regarded as
more stable in the context. A tonal hierarchy plays a
role in organization of an event hierarchy.

(Justus et al., 2002: 16)

The perception of pitch can be considered by two dimensions, namely

pitch height as varying from high to low and pitch class, which is the
perceived similarity of tones (Schenker, 1935 and Deutsch, 1999).
These two dimensions were further divided into Dowling‟s (1978) four
levels in musical scales. Dowling states that the most abstract level is
perceived as the psychophysical scale, which transmits pitch on a
logarithmic manner to frequency. Secondly, tonal material divides
pitch categories within the octave. Finally, Dowling added tuning
systems and mode, which establish a hierarchy within a musical
context. This entails that certain musical notes within the system, are
more stable than others (Justus et al., 2002). Therefore the perception
of a musical fragment is build upon the stability of related notes in the
context. Applying this knowledge onto chords and harmonic structures
a similar event occurs. Chords and harmonic structures are
constructed from individual tones, which were already identified in
terms of stability. Using this principle, chords follow a hierarchy of

38
stability with the tonic (I), dominant (V) and subdominant (IV) as most
stable chords, which consequently create a perceptual expectancy
(Ibid.). This statement is supported by Krumhansl‟s et al (1979, 1990)
probe tone experiment.
In this experiment, the researchers have presented probates with
descending or ascending major scales, which were followed by one of
the chromatic notes of the scale, which are referred to as the probe
tone. The participants were asked to rate the contribution of this tone,
to the completeness of the musical context. Based on their finding,
Krumhansl and colleagues have shown that certain tones out of the
presented scale (I, V and IV as the strongest) contribute stronger to
the stability of a musical fragment. Similar experiments were
conducted in the event of chord stability (Bharucha et al., 1982).
Applying the findings described in the preceding chapter on cognitive
economy, one can find convincing relationships between tones and
chords, contributing to a „musical event hierarchy‟. Regarding musical
events, which are constructed out of tone and chord hierarchies, one
can conclude that these fragments will inevitably follow a hierarchy of
stability. This principle represents a modification of tones and chords in
three ways (Krumhansl and Bharucha, 1983; Krumhansl, 1990);
contextual identity, contextual distance and contextual asymmetry.
First, an important event in the hierarchy of stability is
considered more similar to other instances of itself than
is a less important event (contextual identity). Second,
two important events in the hierarchy of stability are
considered more similar to each other than are less
important events (contextual distance). Third, the
asymmetry in a pair of similarity judgements is largest
when the first event is less important in the hierarchy
and the second event is more important (contextual
asymmetry).

(Ibid., in Justus et al. 2002: 11)

39
This shows that stable tones and chords in a musical event serve as
cognitive reference points (Rosch, 1975), thus can HO be regarded as
a trigger of CE; the representation from memory.

6.4 Hierarchical organization and the sensory register

At this stage one is now able to apply HO to the above mentioned

memory retrieval system.
Out of the three stages of memory (see chapter five), the sensory
register appears to utilize HO in the event of „scanning‟ for importance
in the perceived stimulus. As argued above does HO allow categorise
music into more „stable‟ units, which contribute to the overall
perception (Justus et al., 2002, Leman, 1997). Furthermore, the
memory retrieval system, is finding a suitable auditory representation
or reaction to the perceived stimulus.
In the event of improvisation, the sensory register, being the first
stage in the memory system, will search for stable events in music.
This initial „search‟ or „scan‟, allows to perceive points of hierarchical
stability, which appear to be crucial for the first step of pre-coding
(Fletcher et al., 1992 and Grasby et al., 1992). Through this
„recognition‟ process, the sensory register is identifying stable musical
points and based on this judgement, is evoking a response in the EAM.
Against this backdrop are perceived stable events in music related to
similar events in memory. Therefore, hierarchies in the music trigger
previously learned phrases and structures, which correspond with the
performers‟ musical knowledge.
This however, poses the question of how this link is established, which
is crucial in understanding the cognitive processes involved. Arguing
HO as a triggering system of CE, human cognition must have through
the pre-coding process in the sensory register, already created
relations to hierarchal stable sounds (Justus et al., 2002). This

40
knowledge seems to be evidence from self-organizing networks
suggesting implicit musical knowledge, which was learned passively
when rehearsing the contexts and conventions of improvisation
(Tillmann et al., 2000). Thus will this learned HO process analyse the
music based on existing knowledge to find the best representation in
the event of performance (Eysenck and Keane, 2005).
Musical events however, are not only processed in terms of hierarchic
stability in the sensory register. Another contributing factor is melodic
contour, which allows the listener (read: improviser), to discriminate
between the shape of the melody‟s „ups and downs‟ (Dowling and
Fujitani, 1971). This entails that an improvisation within an atonal25
context, will rely on the contour of the musical line. Nonetheless is the
perception of musical contour part of the HO. Although a tone, chord,
or harmonic hierarchy would be difficult to establish within an atonal
context, HO would fall back onto the above discussed scheme of
analysing musical phrases and place these into a hierarchical order.
This would consequently trigger memory, based on hierarchies of
musical phrases (Ibid.).
HO does trigger certain episodic musical memories, which support the
performer in the event of improvisation (Justus et al., 2002).
The following example will bring the above mentioned factors in line.
My experience as a jazz musician showed me that when a performer
improvises, s/he firstly perceives the musical context around him/her.
Based on this framework, s/he picks out either tonal/chord/harmonic
hierarchies or phrase hierarchies, which triggers an appropriate EAM
response. Therefore does this response find the best representation in
this moment and thus combines suitable pre-learned structures by
applying the concept of cognitive economy. Finally this results in a
musical (re-) production, thus a seemingly free improvisation
(Berkowitz, 2010; Eysenck and Keane, 2005 and Murphy, 2002).

25
Either difficult to pinpoint a hierarchical stability or there is none at all.

41
 CHAPTER SEVEN

The freedom to choose freedom

The illusion of free will is itself an illusion.

(Harris, 2010)

7.1 Introduction

Having presented the neurological, cognitive and musicological views

of improvisation, one can now merge these findings to pose the
question of freedom.
The following chapter will discuss the discourse of „freedom‟ or „free
will’ and the lack thereof in jazz improvisation. However, it is not my
intension to solve the philosophical question of freedom, but discuss
freedom in the context of improvisation. The above mentioned
discourse about acquiring improvisational skill, in relation with
cognitive mechanisms of memory and the neurology of music
perception and improvisation, will serve as the foundation to this
discussion.
However, the question arises, which attributes define „freedom‟ and
how they can be applied to musical improvisation?

The aspect of „freedom of will‟ has been argued and discussed by

philosophers for more than two millennia. The question however, what
free will entails, still remains. At this junction, I will give an
understanding of what can be incorporated into the notion of free will,
most suitable for the discussion of freedom in jazz improvisation.

42
 7.2 A short introduction to the philosophy of free will

The belief of „free will‟ is understood as the decision-making process

free of all constraints (Pereboom, 2003). Philosophy however, has
regarded freedom out of an abstract understanding of determining the
future based on past and present events. This entails that there are
different views to the conception of free will. One of these views is the
religious concept, which takes an omnipresent divinity into account.
Consequently, the choices are made based on the knowledge of a
„higher being‟ influencing them (Harris, 2010). Another implication to
the terminology of free will is an ethical comprehension, which argues
the view, if individuals can be held morally responsible for their actions
(Ibid.)26.
The interesting, hence most applicable conception to this paper is the
scientific belief.
Science in general abnegates the notion of free will. However, the
illusion of free will is created, based on the comprehension of finite
rules and parameters (Kenricke et al., 2003 and Epstein et al., 1996).
These create a framework in-which freedom of will is executed.
Although an ontological entity appears not to be valid in this debate,
the perception and thus illusion of free will can be achieved within a
deterministic framework.
This belief is based on this philosophical thesis of determinism. The
proposal encompasses the view that an action can only have a certain
outcome in relation to given circumstances in the moment. As stated
by Harris (2010) this concept is more so understood in the context of
human cognition (decision-making, perception and behaviour) as the
underlying theory of every event being based on a previous event.
Furthermore, philosophy divides this conception into two sub-

26
These views are mentioned at this stage for the soundness of the philosophical view of free will
and will be not taken into further account, due to their irrelevance for this paper.

43
categories, which try to explain the notion of determinism, namely
incompatibilism and compatibilism. These sub-groups argue the
existence of free will within the idiom of determinism, whereas
compatibilism argues the point of existence and incompatibilism the
point of non-existence of free will (Epstein et al., 1996; Kenricke et al.,
2003 and Harris, 2010).

As shown in the preceding chapters on improvisation, cognitive

economy and hierarchical organisation, the concept of incompatibilism
strengthens the chain of thought proposed. These notions, state that
through pre-learned conceptions of improvisation and neuro-cognitive
human dispositions, an improvisational outcome, can only be created
on preceding parameters, hence an event is based on a previous
event27. Therefore the notion of free will operates in an
incompatibilistic framework of determinism.

7.2.1 The neurology and cognition of improvisation

and free will

Recent research in the realm of neuro-cognitive behaviour of free will,

shows that the brain has the ability to trigger a decision up to six
seconds before humans are consciously aware of this decision (Haynes
et al., 2008).
Haynes and colleagues, created an experimental design in which
subjects had to execute motor task. These motor tasks consisted of
pressing a button with either their right or left hand, while their brain
function was measured with an fMRI scanner (Ibid.). The scientists
were able to record strong activities in the prefrontal cortex, the
thalamus and hippocampus during these tasks, which were supposed
to show the process of free will; the freedom to make a choice. The

27
Incorporating, learning, rehearsing and performing

44
analysis of this data showed next to the active cerebral areas that a
decision is made sub-consciously, before actually being consciously
aware of this decision. This however, does not mean that sub-
conscious brain activity rules over our decision-making process (Ibid.).
It is more an interaction of the conscious decision-making, memory
and based on this pre-learned parameters and triggers, which support
humans in the decision. It is a delicate balance of difference and unity,
which can still not be fully described. However, how can the brain
areas active during a „free‟ decision-making process be linked to the
notion of incompatibilistic understanding in improvisation?
Taking Haynes et al. (2006, 2008) findings and the neuro-cognitive
mechanisms described above in this paper into consideration, one can
find similarities between those functions. During improvisation, the PFC
is active. This activity is similarly recorded during a free decision-
making process regardless of the stimulus. Improvisation being a
continuous process of decisions, it appears not to be surprising in this
context hence one is free to make the decision. However, having the
DLPFC deactivated during improvisation, sub-conscious, unfiltered or
random thoughts have the ability to emerge (note chapter 5.5, Limb
and Braun, 2008). This deactivation of the DLPFC shows that the sub-
conscious decision, which was recorded during the „free-will‟
experiment described above (Haynes et al, 2008) and the „decision-
making‟ during improvisation (Limb and Braun, 2008) correlate with
the notion of the non-existence of freedom of choice during
improvisation. Furthermore one can compare the activation of the
hippocampus and the thalamus in this context. As shown in chapter
5.5 there is an anatomically strong connection between the PFC and
the hippocampus. In both experiments conducted by Haynes et al.
(2006, 2008) and Limb and Braun (2008), this connection shows that
decisions are based on the inter-dependence of pre-learned structures,
parameters and conventions (Haynes et al., 2008; Limb and Braun,

45
2008; Bengsston et al., 2007; Harris, 1992). These factors became
part of the sub-conscious understanding of the world or in this case
improvisation and are therefore, through cognitive functions available
within the decision-making process. This statement can be further
consolidated with the similarities of thalamo-cortical activation during
both processes.
As mentioned in chapter 3.2.1, the thalamus has been understood
throughout the history of neuro-science as a sole relay station, where
information is transferred to the relevant cerebral areas (Kandel et al.,
1993). As mentioned above, it appears that the thalamus is more than
just a relay station. Assumptions go as far as it being an initial
interpreter of incoming stimuli to be able to further process them
(Ibid.). This discussion however, will exceed the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, does the thalamus play a crucial role in the decision-
making process during improvisation, by linking the incoming stimulus
with the relevant areas of the PFC, hippocampus and motor cortex, as
presented in the extension of Peretz and Patel‟s theory in chapter
3.2.1.
Furthermore, do aspects as CE triggered by HO allow this ongoing
decision-making on a sub-conscious level, within a thalamo-cortical
loop (Haynes et al., 2008, 2006), which continuously engages the
necessary areas involved in improvisation. Thus can the activity in the
thalamus be regarded as the interpreter of the incoming signal, the
supporter in finding a HO triggered and relevant CE representation in
the hippocampus, to support a decision in the prefrontal cortex. Due to
the constant repetition in the initial stage of learning how to improvise,
this information became part of the sub-conscious cerebral systems
and does therefore not require the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to be
triggered by the thalamus. This however, is assumed on the base of
existing literature and will require further empirical research.

46
Conclusively, one can say that the „choice of notes‟ during the event of
improvisation, is based on the sub-conscious knowledge of the
parameters available for this specific context, hence is triggered in
memory and negotiated in a new environment.

7.3 Tonality versus atonality in improvisation

It is important to learn as much about jazz as possible.

But once you have learned it, forget it and use the tools
to create something free.

John Coltrane, 1966

Taking the above mentioned discussions into consideration, one could

argue that hierarchies in the perception of music, which trigger CE, can
be only applied on tonal improvisations in jazz. However as argued in
chapter 6.4, do hierarchical stabilities appear in a broader sense,
namely melodic contour (Dowling and Fujitani, 1971). This statement
entails that tonality is not important in the triggering process of EAM
and thus a representation in the performing context.
Nonetheless, it is worth to briefly explore atonal improvisation in this
framework, based on an example.
Analysing one of the pioneers of Free Jazz, John Coltrane, the listener
hears a „structure less‟ and „seemingly free‟ performance. However
regarding the creation process of his music, it was always based on
previously acquired musical knowledge (Berendt, 1989).
Looking at Ascensions (1966), Coltrane gave only bare indications of
the music to be played. He asked his fellow musicians to end their
improvisations on a crescendo, and left them to explore their own
musical limits. Nevertheless, one has to understand that the ability of
playing was among all participants of the Avant-Garde movement
originating in tonal jazz (Lewis, 2008). Therefore, where the musicians‟
abilities already developed with a certain knowledge of “what was
possible” (Vosloo, 2010). The opening fragment of Ascensions

47
however, was based on variations of a previous motif, recorded by
Coltrane; A love Supreme (1965). This shows that there was a starting
point from which the musicians could expand on their improvisational
ideas. Against this backdrop and regarding the soli performed on this
Album, one can hear different mode progressions. Based on these
mode progressions, one could establish a modal hierarchy, which
would allow the musicians to identify a point of disembarkment for
their improvisation.
By applying this hierarchy on the modal changes and structures of this
seemingly free performance, the musicians still executed their
improvisation within a framework, which allowed them to apply their
acquired musical knowledge. This application can be seen as the
stimulus which is organised in terms of event hierarchies and thus
triggers the above argued functions of episodic auditory memory in CE.
This constant triggering of different structures within the established
hierarchy, leads to the constant neuro-cognitive decision-making
process about the following notes, which are sub-consciously retrieved
from the EAM.
Furthermore, can the drum groove be seen as an extension of the HO
process. It is known by musicians that comping, is a common way to
articulate or accentuate certain rhythmical figures on the drum kit.
These accentuations can support a certain melodic structure
rhythmically or initiate a change in melodic contour. Taking this into
consideration, the hypothesis, of operating in a structured framework,
which allows the musicians to take different cues from each other so
they can apply their previously learned musical skills in the context, is
strengthened.

Hence is the aspect of tonality or atonality not important in the

production of improvisation. In either context, it is based on the
knowledge which was previously acquired. The musical context is

48
hierarchically analysed in a broader senses than just individual notes
and chord progressions. It is expanded on the organisation of modal
and rhythmical fragments and more so on melodic contour, which is
than able to trigger CE through the above mentioned thalamo-cortical
loop of decision-making (Haynes et al. 2008, 2006).
Consequently it is the self-negotiation of freedom in the
improvisational context.

7.4 The negotiation of freedom in the jazz improvisation idiom

Staying in the neuro-cognitive and musicological discourse, it appears

as improvisation is deprived of every possible nuance of freedom. The
decision-making about musical structures, the interaction with musical
fragments and their application, propose a view in which a performer
relies on his acquired musical memory.
Based on the above given arguments, this has to be appreciated in the
moment of the performance.
The complex notion of freedom in improvisation however, shines a
light at the end of the tunnel and ignites a broader discussion.
This spark allows the performer to define the boarders in which s/he
improvises. It is the choice to choose freedom and its negotiation of
expanding this framework. It has to be taken into account that even
though an improviser will stay within the framework of his/her own
musical knowledge the context in which it can take place is
expandable.
Piet Mondriaan‟s (1872-1944), Compositie met gele lijnen28 (1933),
shall serve as an illustration, for what is meant by having the choice to
choose freedom within a framework, hence creating the illusion of
freedom (Harris, 2010).

28
Translation: Composition with yellow lines

49
When looking at this painting, the first thing that presents itself in-
front of the observer is a plain white space, which is framed by four
yellow lines. Applying this illustration on jazz improvisation, one can
regard the plain white insight of the painting as the freedom, in which
everything is possible, according to the tradition of improvisation in
jazz and the ability to break free from this tradition. However, the
space is framed by four yellow lines, which indicates that even when
breaking away from „traditional29‟ improvisation it will always be
perceived within a given context. This frame can be regarded as the
pre-learned improvisational knowledge and the neuro-cognitive
functions behind the performance. On a closer look at the yellow lines
however, one begins to see that each of them has a different width.
Furthermore, can the lines be expanded or narrowed around the plain
space, which allows an increase or decrease of the space. In terms of
improvisation, one can see the ability to expand or narrow this space,
as the negotiation of personal freedom.
The difficulty in laying out this view is the definition of personal
freedom. The question, which until today cannot be answered,
requests the existence of „ultimate‟ freedom: a freedom without
boundaries and consequences. Improvisation cannot be seen as this
sort of freedom, due to the educational aspect, of how one acquires
those methods and the neuro-cognitive retrieval systems.
Even though, one cannot speak of a freedom of choice, when
retrieving a suitable representation in improvisation, the performer has
the ability to expand the tradition s/he is performing in. This can be
illustrated through the different line width in Mondriaan‟s painting. It is
up to the performer to incorporate different musical genres outside the
own tradition, incorporating different cultural understandings and

29
Traditional improvisation would be mostly understood as the improvisation within a tonal
context

50
expand on the constructive ability to explore the own instrument or
voice.
It is therefore the negotiation, with the own neuro-cognitive functions
in combination with the ability to develop a wider framework. The
construction of this wider framework can thus be seen as the self-
negotiation of the context in which the improvisation takes place. It is
looking beyond the illusion of „freedom‟ and appreciate the possibility
to choose to expand the contextual boundaries.
Jazz improvisation is controlled freedom, which poses a framework in
which the mind and performance takes place, with the ability to
expand it.

51
 CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

Are we just our brain during improvisation and has the notion of
freedom to be taken out of it?
Through the course of this essay, I proposed different schemata
showing the lack of freedom in improvisation; an aspect of music,
which is believed to be the highest form of ultimate freedom.
However, how is music understood? Music is regarded from a physical
point of view, due to its application to neurological and cognitive data
analysis. Although I have shown different meanings to the terminology
of music, the answer to what ultimate music is, still remains unclear.
To be able to understand the cognitive and neurological function
involved in improvisation, it is crucial to look at proposed theories of
musical perception. These theories I attempted to extend, to lay the
foundation for the understanding of music and thus improvisation
processing by inter-depending the proposed resource sharing and
modularity hypotheses. Although the complex mechanical and
electrical mechanisms of the inner ear, which translate sonic waves
into a conception of music, trigger certain cortical areas via the
thalamus for the interpretation of music, it is still believed that there
are more areas involved in this process.
Throughout different musical disciplines, which have
improvisation as a key element, acquiring the knowledge of how to
improvise is shared. Different educational models, like the Hindustani
and the jazz conservatorium tradition, have both the same approach in
teaching students how to improvise. In both cases, the student is
required to copy the master or the masters‟ soli to be able to develop
her/his own voice on the instrument. Through this approach however,
does the student, through constant repetition incorporate musical
phrases into the sub-conscious, which eliminate the notion of free

52
creation in the context of later performances. At this stage different
characteristics of improvisation give only an idea about alternative
forms of improvisation. These changes, which can alter between slight
changes in a melody, to completely replacing a given melody with
another, are based on previously acquired knowledge during rehearsal
and therefore it is a reproduction of something which already exists.
Against this back-drop, are important cerebral activations and
deactivations supporting the hypothesis of controlled freedom.
Cerebral areas, which are mainly associated with decision-making,
personal expression and memory centres are active during
improvisation. These activations and deactivations, especially in the
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex allow sub-conscious thoughts to emerge.
These neurological functions are further supported by cognitive
functions and its triggers. Here Cognitive Economy allows the human
mind to decrease the amount of information, one has to perceive,
remember and recognise. Applying cognitive economy on
improvisation however, I proposed an extension to this concept, by
adding skill learning, motor memory, working memory and episodic
auditory memory.
Through the constant repetition during skill learning, information is
stored in long-term memory, which contributes to the episodic auditory
memory system. During EAM, the hippocampus and the PFC are
active, which coincide with cerebral activations during improvisation.
Therefore, is improvisation based on the memory retrieval of pre-
learned structures; thus one cannot view the creatio ex nihilo in
improvisation.
By having introduced the Bypass hypothesis during activated working
memory in improvisation, I have shown that the DLPFC is not relating
to the retrieval of the information from the EAM system.
Therefore does a deactivated DLPFC allow sub-conscious thoughts to
emerge. Working memory however, remains important for the process

53
of motor planning. Nonetheless, will this hypothesis require more in-
depth research.
Having shown the different contributing factors of cognitive economy
during improvisation, the trigger of the memory retrieval system has
to be taken into consideration. Hierarchical organisation allows
establishing hierarchically more stable notes and forms in the sensory
register, to trigger a memory response.
Therefore is the EAM system triggered by the incoming stimulus, which
was hierarchically analysed and thus retrieving a suitable memory
representation of the event.
Connecting those functions on the notion of freedom an additional level
of complexity is added to the discussion.
Science generally abnegates the notion of freedom and free will.
Through the analysis of experiments, I have shown that similar
cerebral activities occur during improvisation and experiments
researching „free will‟ and are mainly found in the deactivation of the
DLPFC. These similarities are further found in the thalamo-cortical
activity, which places the thalamus in the middle of the understanding
of freedom and improvisation in a neurological and cognitive context.
The thalamus has to be seen as an individually operating system,
which is more than just a relay station. This furthermore, will require
more specialised research.
In any case of neurological and cognitive functions, it is not important
if the improvisation operates in a tonal or atonal context, due to the
cognitive and neurological mechanisms applied.

Consequently, there is no freedom within the process of improvisation.

The data presented in this research, suggests that improvisation is
based on pre-learned parameters, which operate in a given framework.
More so are these pre-learned parameters retrieved from memory,

54
through complex cognitive mechanisms, namely cognitive economy
and hierarchical organisation.
However, it is the performers‟ ability to expand the operating
framework and thus the negotiation of personal freedom in the musical
context.
Improvisation is controlled freedom: controlled by a framework with
the freedom of choosing to expand this structure.

55
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 APPENDIX

Figure III, (no name/date) the primary auditory cortex

Figure II, (no name/ no date), the thalamus and its location in the human brain.

a
Figure V, Limb and Braun (2008) axial slice renderings of mean activations (red/yellow
scale bar) and deactivations (blue/green scale bar) associated with improvisation during
Scale and Jazz paradigms.

Figure VII, Attkinson and Shiffrin (1968) Model of Memory Systems

b
 PFC

Hippocampus

Anatomical strong connection

between the PFC and the hippocampus

Figure VIII, Schlaug (2009), Neural wiring with indication to the anatomically strong
connection between the PFC and the hippocampus