Is (Merely) Stalking Sentient Animals Morally Wrong?

Author(s): JASON KAWALL

Source: Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2000), pp. 195-204
Published by: Wiley
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Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2000

Is (Merely) Stalking Sentient Animals Morally Wrong?

JASON RAW ALL

abstract Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently
presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally
problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans,
a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief
harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behaviour which it forces upon its victims.
Similar harms arise for both human and non-human victims of stalking; thus I argue that
stalking animals is a prima facie, but overridable wrong. Still, a significant disanalogy between
stalking humans and stalking animals can be seen in cases in which the victim is unaware of
being stalked. I argue that such stalking is generally acceptable with respect to animals, but
morally wrong with respect to humans. More generally, it is much harder to justify the stalking
of humans than the stalking of animals, given the greater human interest in privacy.

1. From Hunting to Stalking

Questions concerning the moral status of stalking sentient animals arise quite naturally
in considering the morality of hunting [1]. Theodore Vitali has recently argued that
hunting is morally justified in large part because it involves the exercise of several
valuable human skills [2]. He claims that the excellent exercise of human skills and
virtues involved in hunting is valuable enough to compensate for the harm inflicted
upon the hunted animal. Vitali then considers an objection to his position:

It may be objected that the same ends may be achieved, namely, the exercise
of predational skills to a heightened degree, without actually killing the animal.
If this were possible, would this not make the death as such unnecessary and
therefore uncompensated for by the gaining of pleasure from the acts of
killing? May not hunting with a camera or shooting animals with paint pellets
accomplish the same ends without the loss of life? I don't think so. The
hunting act is a killing act. [. . . ]
The camera enthusiasts are concerned with the aesthetics of the photograph
taken. [. . . ] The final purpose is the photograph, not the animal itself. Their
activity leaves the animal untouched, unaffected. The activity of the predator
[hunter], on the other hand, definitively and irrevocably affects the game.
[. . . ] No other human act, at least within the bounds of morality, can achieve
such definitiveness as an act of predation, the killing act of the hunter. [3]

My focus here is not on the morality of hunting; rather, it is on pursuits such as those
suggested as alternatives to hunting. But I would draw attention to the following
concerns with Vitali's response to the objection he poses. First, his response simply

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196 J. Kawall

explains the difference in goals between hunters and photographers. It does noth
show that there will be relevant differences in the skills required to achieve these
To capture an excellent picture a photographer will require tracking skills, p
and so on, just as much as the hunter. Thus, the valuable exercise of such sk
occur without the death of the animal. Second, Vitali notes that the hunter aims a
death of his prey. True, but this simply leads us to the question of the morality
goal. Why should we value (or even allow) an activity which aims at the destruct
innocent sentient life, particularly when there are similar activities (photography
do not require such killing? Vitali has described the difference between hun
photographers, but this does not yet justify the activity of hunting. Why not a
the predator's goals and take on those of the photographer? Finally, note that in
final sentence quoted above, Vitali already seems to presuppose that huntin
within the bounds of morality. But this is precisely what is at issue in discussions
morality of hunting. In sum, it seems Vitali's response is quite inadequate.
More generally, I believe that opponents of hunting have provided compelling
ments against the case put forward by hunting advocates. Pro-hunting argumen
rest on the claim that humans have a natural hunting instinct [4]. It has been su
fully argued that this claim is empirically false (given that most humans are not
and that many are repulsed by it), and that in any case, the mere existence of s
instinct would do nothing to justify hunting, anymore than a natural tendency
racism justifies racist activities [5]. It is beyond the scope of the present p
provide an adequate summary of this literature. In what follows I will assu
hunting is at least prima facie morally wrong, though it can perhaps be just
certain cases (e.g., when a person is in dire need of sustenance, or when a sp
become severely overpopulated in a region).
What I wish to focus on in this paper is the morality of the stalking activ
common to both hunters and photographers (amongst others). Tracking, wa
and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alterna
hunting [6], but could they themselves be morally problematic? Such activ
forms of, or frequently require, stalking. Recently the term 'stalking' has com
associated with the following and pursuit of one human being by another. Such
ing is considered morally wrong. The question thus arises whether the stal
animals is also (at least prima facie) morally wrong. Of course, there are dif
between stalking humans and stalking animals, and we will need to be sens
them in coming to proper conclusions. Still, I believe that a strong case can
for the prima facie wrongness of stalking animals.

2. What is stalking?

We can begin by considering some sample characterizations of interperson

ing [7]. Pathe and Mullen, in a study of the impact of interpersonal stalking on
suggest that

Stalking describes a constellation of behaviours in which one individual infli

on another repeated unwanted intrusions and communications. The intrusion
can involve following, loitering nearby, maintaining surveillance and makin
approaches. [8]

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 Stalking Sentient Animals 197

Note that nature enthusiasts can, and frequently do exhibit these behaviours towards
wildlife. Wright et al. define stalking as follows:

Stalking is the act of following, viewing, communicating with, or moving

threatening or menacingly toward another person. [9]

Again, such behaviour is commonly exhibited by humans with respect to animals.

When we bear in mind that almost all following or approaching by a large mammal can
be taken as threatening by creatures in the wild, the parallels between interpersonal
stalking and the stalking of animals are even clearer. Finally, consider the following
definition of a criminal stalker, taken from the state of California's 1990 anti-stalking
law, the first of its kind in the United States:

[A stalker is] any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to
place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or
her immediate family. [10]

Note that with this definition a possible difference arises between the stalking of
animals and the stalking of humans: in the latter, the motivation of the stalker often
seems malevolent, while in the former the stalker (such as a photographer or a biologist
performing a field study) does not generally intend her actions to be threatening. I will
consider this difference in section 4.

For the moment, I would like to examine a further possible disanalogy between the
stalking of humans and the stalking of animals. Note that in the first and third defin
tions of interpersonal stalking given above, there is reference to a pattern of repeated
following, etc. This is quite common in discussions of interpersonal stalking — a
Kienlen et al. note: "While there is no single definition of stalking, the common them
among both the legal and clinical descriptions of this behavior is a pattern of repeated
unwanted pursuit that the victim perceives as harassing or threatening" [11]. One may
suggest that the stalking of animals generally involves only isolated episodes of follow
ing. For example, a backpacker might simply happen across and follow a deer for
hour, but not repeatedly harass the deer. If this is correct, then perhaps the stalking
animals need not be seen as morally problematic, as it is a different phenomenon.
Two points speak strongly against this supposed disanalogy and the suggestion that
isolated incidents of stalking could be morally acceptable. First, we should note th
there are numerous examples of prolonged or repeated stalking of animals. Biologists
may track the same creature for months on end. Nature enthusiasts frequently keep a
keen eye on the nests and burrows (etc.) of local wildlife. Ecotourism operations allow
a continuous stream of tourists to track and sight various rare or beautiful creatures.
Thus, at the very least, we can see that many instances of humans stalking anima
involve prolonged or repeated stalking behaviours. There is no disanalogy in these case
Second, we can consider the moral status of isolated stalking episodes. Surely a man
who deliberately follows a woman along a dark, isolated street is committing a morally
wrong action to the extent that the woman can justifiably feel threatened by him. Note
that the second definition (from Wright et al.) would include such incidents as episode
of stalking. Isolated instances of following or watching can also be morally problemati
Thus, even if most stalking of animals by humans occurs as isolated events (like th
backpacker), these episodes could well be morally wrong.

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198 J. Kawall

Finally, we should modify the above definitions to account more explicitly for in
of stalking in which the person or creature stalked is quite unaware of being st
Thus, for example, we could modify the Pa the and Mullen definition as follows

Stalking describes a constellation of behaviours in which one individual inflic

on another repeated intrusions and communications which are unwanted, or
which would be unwanted, were the victim to become aware of them. The intrusio
can involve following, loitering nearby, maintaining surveillance and making
approaches.
The italicized additional clause clearly allows us to capture those instances of stal
in which the victim is unaware of the stalker's surveillance. Cases of this sort could be

quite common, so an adequate definition must account for them.

3. A Prima Facie Case for the Wrongness of Stalking Animals

It seems plausible to hold that of stalking humans is wrong because of the impact of
the stalking on its victims — because of the fear and disruption it causes. In the Pathe
and Mullen study, 83% of victims reported heightened anxiety levels (manifested in,
for example, panic attacks, and exaggerated startle response), 73% implemented secur
ity measures (unlisted phone numbers, home security systems, etc.), 37% changed
workplaces to avoid their stalkers, and 39% changed residences [12].
What then, of stalking animals? Here I will adapt an approach used by James
Rachels in arguing for animal rights. His method is as follows:

First, we select for discussion a right which we are confident that humans do
have. Then we ask whether there is a relevant difference between humans and
animals which would justify us in denying that right to humans while at the
same time granting it to humans. If not, then the right in question is a right
possessed by animals as well as by humans. [13]
Similarly, I believe that if we consider an action morally wrong when it is committed
against a human, then we should also consider it to be morally wrong when committed
against other animals, unless we can find a morally relevant difference which would
justify a different judgement in the case of other animals.
Animals stalked by humans frequently experience fear and may alter their long-term
behaviour. Most animals will flee when they encounter humans. Humans can thus
interfere with the normal behaviour of animals [14]. Nests and burrows are frequently
abandoned due to the prolonged presence of humans. These reactions parallel those of
human victims of stalking. A large body of literature shows that animals experience
stress, where this can be defined as "the prolonged inability to remove a source of potentia
danger, leading to activation of systems for coping with danger beyond their range of maximal
efficiency" [15]. Indeed, stress reactions in animals are quite similar in many ways to
those of humans:

the human stress response operates in terms of a legacy of psychological

and physiological mechanisms deriving from our animal past. [. . . ] what
man shares with other mammals is a largely identical set of behavioural and
psychological responses to such [stress-inducing] situations. Thus, animals in

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 Stalking Sentient Animals 199

stress-inducing situations can be used to study the types of responses found in

humans under stress. [16]

Given these similarities, animal stress seems morally relevant. To the extent that humans
are seen as a potential danger by an animal, their prolonged presence is potentially a
source of stress to the animal. This stress is sufficiently similar to that experienced by
humans that psychologists study it in attempting to understand stress in humans.
Given that it is the stress, fear, and forced alterations in behaviour which lead us to
consider the stalking of humans wrong, it seems that we should similarly consider the
stalking of animals wrong, unless we can find relevant differences.
A possible difference quickly springs to mind. The flight response of animals can be
triggered by mere chance encounters not involving stalking. For example, a photo
grapher may round a corner on a trail and startle a hare, causing it to flee. There is no
stalking here. But if a human merely startles (and thus frightens) another human the
action does not seem to be morally wrong — it is simply an accident. The difference
between humans and animals is that the flight reaction of animals can be triggered far
more easily, and without any stalking involved.
In response, note that we can still distinguish between merely encountering and
accidentally threatening an animal, and actively stalking an animal. The former is an
accident, and thus not morally culpable. Humans should be allowed to wander the
woods as much as any other creature, even if this means occasionally startling other
animals. But to deliberately engage in an activity which we know will be considered
threatening, and which will interfere with the behaviour of another sentient being
seems much more culpable. Thus, even if the animal flight response is easily triggered,
this does nothing to show that stalking animals is morally acceptable.
We can consider two further possible disanalogies. First, it could plausibly be held
that humans are capable of a more complex and perhaps more intense fear than other
sentient animals. We have powers of imagination and an emotional range which seem
to be unique amongst animals, and these could produce a more intense fear. Given
this, it could be argued that human fear is quite different from animal fear and thus we
need not consider animal fear as morally significant.
However, this difference in fear seems to be at most a difference in degree, not in
kind. Crucial physiological and behavioural similarities show us that our fear does not
significantly differ from that of other animals. Further, even if humans are capable of a
more intense fear or stress, this does not yet show that human fear or stress is always
different from that of other animals. What can plausibly be maintained is that often
humans will experience a more intense fear, which will make stalking a somewhat
worse prima facie wrong in the case of humans, but this does nothing to show that the
fear and stress of animals is not also morally relevant.
A second, related objection would draw on the fact that some animals can become used
to the presence of humans — consider the pigeons and squirrels who share our cities.
If animals can become used to being stalked by humans, then perhaps such stalking is
not morally wrong. In response, we should note that only some animals become used
to humans. Pigeons and squirrels are not the norm. Furthermore, it is clear that
animals will not become used to many forms of stalking — for example, it seems highly
unlikely that the grey whales off the Baja peninsula of Mexico will simply become used
to being chased by five or six boats of ecotourists at a time [17], Finally, even if some

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200 J. Kawall

animals would eventually become used to being stalked by humans, all of the st
of such animals which takes place prior to such a time would remain prima facie
To this point I have presented a basic, initial case for the prima facie wrongn
stalking animals. I have also attempted to dissolve certain basic objections that m
be raised. In the following sections I will distinguish more carefully between di
forms of stalking, and take into account certain relevant disanalogies between s
humans and stalking animals.

4. The Motivations of Stalkers

We can distinguish between various forms of stalking on the basis of (i) th

the stalker, and (ii) the consequences of the stalking behaviour. These diffe
of stalking have subtly and importantly different moral statuses. We c
distinguishing three general forms of stalking on the basis of the motives of
with respect to the victim: malevolent, neutral, and benevolent.
Malevolent Stalking: Stalking is malevolent in those cases where the stal
to cause physical or psychological harm upon the person or creature st
this harm is not intended as a means to a greater benefit to the person
stalked. Thus, chasing a person simply to cause him fear would be a case of
stalking, but if we chase a person and frighten him in order to get him aw
dangerous situation we are not malevolently stalking. In the case of pe
stalking which is intended to involve overt threats, vandalism, or physical
be clear examples of malevolent stalking. Note that an assault (for exam
actually occur — it is the intention of the stalker which determines the clas
the stalking on this axis. In the case of animals, the stalking involved in hu
most obvious example of malevolent stalking. It is clearly intended to b
physical harm (death) to the creature stalked, and not for the sake of a gre
to the animal stalked.
I take it that all forms of malevolent stalking are at least prima facie wrong, as i
intuitively plausible to hold that all actions which are intended to cause suffering o
harm to a sentient being are prima facie morally wrong. Of course, this prima
wrong can be overridden by other concerns; if, for example, it is intended to b
about a greater good, to preserve the integrity of an ecosystem, or to meet the dema
of justice, etc. The stalking involved in sport hunting is wrong insofar as its goal i
death of the creature stalked [18], and not any further good.
Neutral Stalking: Stalking is neutral when the stalker neither intends to harm
to benefit the victim or object of the stalking. Many cases of animal stalking will b
neutral. Photographers, birdwatchers, and others track or follow animals essentiall
benefits to themselves (seeing beauty, communing with nature, etc.), without thou
to harms or benefits to the animals they stalk. With respect to stalking human
"Peeping Toms" seem a quite clear case of neutral stalking — they derive pleasure f
observing the victim they stalk, without intending any harms or benefits to the vic
Benevolent Stalking: Stalking is benevolent when the stalker intends his or h
stalking to benefit the being stalked in some way. In the case of animals, this
include (for example) stalking by biologists studying an endangered population in o
to develop effective programmes to aid in preserving the population. The biolo

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 Stalking Sentient Animals 201

stalk the animals both for their own benefit (increased knowledge, etc.), and for the
benefit of the creatures stalked (by providing better protection).
Much stalking of humans involves misguided or deluded benevolent stalking. For
example, Wright et al. distinguish various forms of stalking, including domestic stalking:

Domestic stalking occurs when a former boy/girlfriend, family, or household

member threatens or harasses another member of the household. [ . . . ] The
domestic stalker is initially motivated by a desire to continue or reestablish a relationship
that can evolve into an attitude of "If I can't have her no one can." [19]

While the desire for a relationship to continue is largely based on self-interest, the
stalker will generally (though wrongly) believe that the relationship is also beneficial to
the victim. It is only after time that the stalking turns malevolent. Similarly with
clinically psychotic stalkers:

The psychopathology of obsessional following appears to be, in part, a

maladaptive response to social incompetence, social isolation, and loneliness.
[. . . ] A real event, such as acute or chronic rejection, challenges the com
pensatory narcissistic fantasy that the obsessional follower is special, loved,
idealized, admired, superior to, in some way linked, or destined to be with the
object of pursuit. Disturbance of this narcissistic fantasy, imbued with both
a sense of grandiosity and a feeling of pride, triggers feelings of shame or
humiliation that are defended against with rage. [20]

To the extent that the stalker believes herself to be linked with or destined to be with
the object of pursuit, she may well believe that a relationship would also be beneficial
to the victim of the stalking.
With these distinctions between malevolent, neutral, and benevolent stalking in
place we can respond to an objection which was noted earlier. The objection held that
the stalking of humans tended to be malevolently motivated, while the stalking of
animals was generally not intended to harm the animals, and thus that stalking animals
is not generally morally wrong. We can see that a great deal of the stalking of humans
is not malevolently motivated, though it may become so motivated over time. Further
more, these non-malevolently motivated stalkings still seem morally objectionable to
the extent that they cause fear and can alter the lifepatterns of the victims of such
stalking. Thus, (i) there is not a clear disanalogy between human and animal stalking,
and (ii) even nonmalevolent stalking can be morally problematic.

5. The Consequences and Moral Status of Stalking

In coming to a proper appraisal of stalking we must take into account its consequences
— the experiences of the person stalking, the experiences of the victim, the impact
upon the environment of the stalking (consider the effects of ecotourism), and so on.
In the case of malevolent stalking, I have already suggested that it is prima facie wrong,
insofar as it aims at harming the victim of the stalking, even if the stalker fails in his
attempts to harm the object of his stalking. It is morally wrong to intend to harm a
sentient animal — human or otherwise. Still, this wrongness can be overridden in some
cases where a much greater good is intended to result from the stalking. Thus, for

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202 J. Kawall

example, the stalking involved in hunting is prima facie wrong, but this can be ove
ridden if the hunting is intended to cull weakened members of an overpopulated sp
in a given region. Police stalking of a criminal or terrorist will generally be malevo
stalking of a human which can be justified by the greater good it produces.
The neutral or benevolent stalking of an animal or human is prima facie wron
the extent that the stalker has a negative impact upon the victim (causing fear, etc
This prima facie wrongness can sometimes be overridden, if the stalking brings abo
much greater good. Thus, a biologist's study of a group of wild animals can be mora
permissible despite the stress it causes the animals if, for example, the inform
gained can be used to help preserve the animals, or if it provides knowledge which co
help cure a horrible disease, etc. Still, a significant disanalogy can be discerned
between the stalking of humans and the stalking of animals. Consider a case in whi
a stalker has no impact upon the person or creature stalked — a case in which
stalker is silent, etc., and the object of his stalking is quite unaware of being stalke
There would be no fear or altered behaviour on the part of the person or animal stalk
In considering such cases we at last arrive at what I take to be a significant differe
between the stalking of humans and that of animals. In the case of animals, such stal
seems to be ideal. A photographer who follows an animal but interferes in no way
the animal's normal course of action seems to be acting in a praiseworthy fashion.
Still, we must qualify this endorsement somewhat. It is not enough that a stalker
animals merely happens not to interfere with the animals. Rather, we should main
that the stalker must be taking appropriate precautions in order to avoid interfere
Otherwise, the stalker is simply lucky not to cause to harm, despite engaging in negli
actions. Such potentially harmful action is morally wrong insofar as it could reason
be expected to lead to fear and stress on the part of the animals involved. Whe
consider cases of stalking of persons in which the victim is unaware of being stalk
the situation seems far from ideal — imagine a woman being watched and foll
for months by a former lover, though she is entirely unaware of the stalking There
two reasons for our negative reactions to stalking scenarios involving humans who
unaware of the stalking. First, we have justifiable worries that the stalking, even if n
(or benevolent) at this time, could well become malevolent in the face of repe
rejection or frustration [21]. The difference lies in the character of the stalkers. In
case of animals, the stalkers tend to be mentally healthy, with an appreciatio
nature. In the case of persons, stalkers are frequently clinically psychotic, and all s
stalkers have an unhealthy attachment to the person stalked. Note that this does n
itself, make such stalking morally wrong; it rather reflects our concern about pot
future malevolent actions. On the other hand, such benevolent or neutral sta
could be seen as morally wrong if it tends to reinforce a pattern of behaviour which
likely lead to future harms.
The second reason for our differing reactions is that persons have a greater inte
in privacy than do other animals. We allow others only certain information a
ourselves, depending on their relationship to us. We give spouses and friends signi
ant information about ourselves; we give only a bare sketch of ourselves to ne
quaintances, and so on. Indeed, the sharing of intimate information is part of
constitutes many special relationships. A stalker bypasses our controls and violates
interests. He gains information about us that we would not voluntarily give him —
takes information we would only wish to have shared (if at all) with our friends a

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 Stalking Sentient Animals 203

family [22]. This sort of control and sharing of intimate information is much more
important to humans than it is to other animals.
Thus we have arrived at a significant, morally relevant difference between stalking
humans and stalking animals. While it is quite permissible, morally, to stalk animals
insofar as it has no impact upon the animals, this is not the case with humans. Such
stalking, given the character of those who stalk humans seems potentially quite danger
ous. The stalking is wrong due to human interests in privacy. Even if there were a
stalker of a person who would always remain neutral or benevolent, without having any
direct impact on his victim, his stalking would be wrong insofar as it would violate the
privacy interests of his victim. Note that these privacy interests will also be relevant in
causes of malevolent stalking — violating these interests will concertute as additional
has against the pesas stalked.

6. Conclusions

What conclusions can we draw? All stalking — malevolent, neutral, and

is prima facie morally wrong insofar as it creates fear and forces altered
victims. Malevolent stalking is worse than the others, to the extent that
result in harm to the person or animal stalked. However, in many cases
to hold that the prima facie wrongness of stalking can be overridden by
which require the stalking.
On the other hand, there is a disanalogy between stalking humans
animals, one which becomes clear when we consider cases of stalking
victim is unaware of being stalked. With animals, neutral and benevo
which has no impact on the animal stalked seems to be perfectly accepta
no prima facie wrong, as there is no fear or forced changes in behaviou
such stalking remains unacceptable due to the stronger privacy interest
Thus, it is much harder to justify (overcome the prima facie wrongness o
stalking humans (be it malevolent, neutral, or benevolent) than to justif
ing of animals, because of the additional privacy interests of humans.
I have focused here on the stalking activities of ecotourists, photographers, and
others. But the considerations raised here are relevant to many other areas. For example,
consider the situation of animals in zoos. Most discussion of the harms involved in
zoos focus on the lack of natural environments and lack of space for the animal
in zoos [23]. However, it could plausibly be argued that the animals are also unde
a stress-inducing additional harm insofar as they are under surveillance (and occ
harassment) by zoo patrons. The considerations raised here also point to the harm
other forms of human interference with wildlife. For example, animals experienc
and fear as a result of low-flying aircraft, and other major sources of noise from
populations. These harms clearly parallel those associated with stalking.
More generally, I believe these conclusions fall within the realm of commonse
find the stalking of humans always to be morally disturbing. With animals, we
reduce our impact as far as possible. We must be aware of our interactions with
— we need to keep an appropriate distance from other animals, try not to disturb
and so on. Greater intrusions are only justifiable with greater overall benefits [2

Jason Kawall, Box 1918 Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA.

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204 J. Kawall

NOTES

[1] Hereafter, when I write of 'animals', sentient animals should be understood. I take it th
all mammals and birds are sentient. Readers, however, may consider the range of sentie
more narrow, or more broad, as they see fit.
[2] Theodore Vitali (1990) Sport hunting: moral or immoral?, Environmental Ethics 12
[3] Vitali, op. cit., pp. 78-79, emphasis added.
[4] To some extent Vitali's position can be cited here. See also Ann S. Causey (1989) On
hunting, Environmental Ethics 11, pp. 327-43.
[5] See Evelyn B. Pluhar (1991) The joy of killing, Between the Species: 121-8; Daniel D
A defense of Pluhar, Between the Species: 128-31; Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson (1991) Sport
hunting as an instinct: another evolutionary "Just-so-story"?, Environmental Ethics 13: 375-8; and Paul
Veatch Moriarty and Mark Woods (1997) Hunting predation, Environmental Ethics 18: 391-404.
[6] See, for example, Brian Luke (1997) A critical analysis of hunters' ethics, Environmental Ethics 19, p. 35;
Peter S. Wenz (1983) Ecology, morality, and hunting in Harlan B. Miller and Williams H. Williams
(eds) Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press), pp. 194-7; and Pluhar, op. cit., p. 125.
[7] That is, the stalking of humans by humans. For the purposes of this paper I will simply assume that all
humans are persons (where this requires certain mental abilities allowing one to be a moral agent).
[8] Michele Pathe and Paul E. Mullen (1997) The impact of stalkers on their victims, British Journal of
Psychiatry 170, p. 12.
[9] James A. Wright et al. (1996) A typology of interpersonal stalking, Journal of Interpersonal Violence 11,
p. 487.
[10] California Penal Code, §646.9.
[11] Kristine K. Keinlen et al. (1997) A comparative study of psychotic and nonpyschotic stalking, Journal
of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 25, p. 318.
[12] Pathe and Mullen, op. cit., p. 14. The study includes many other examples of the impact of stalking
upon victims.
[13] James Rachels (1989) Why animals have a right to liberty in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds),
Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd ed.) (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall), p. 123.
[14] See, for example, Patrick Bateson and Elizabeth Bradshan (1997) The Behavioural and Physiological
Effects of Culling Red Deer (London, The National Trust).
[15] John Archer (1979) Animals Under Stress (London, Edward Archer), pp. 3-4.
[16] Archer, op. cit., p. 5.
[17] See Molly Moore (1999) Eco-tourism excesses are endangering Baja's whales, The Toronto Star,
Saturday April 24, 1999, p. C6.
[18] There may be other goals to the activity — such as applying human skills and knowledge, communion
with nature, and so on. These factors will mitigate against the wrongness of the stalking, but as noted
earlier, I believe that they will not override the prima facie wrongness. The wrongness of causing the
death of an animal will override the Tightness or goodness of exercising human skills, especially given
that there are other outlets for human skills which do not require the death of sentient beings.
[19] Wright et al., op. cit., p. 499, italics added.
[20] J. Reid Meloy (1996) Stalking (obsessional following): a review of some preliminary studies, Aggression
and Violent Behavior 1, pp. 159-60, italics added.
[21] See for example Meloy, op. cit., pp. 159-61.
[22] See James Rachels (1975) Why privacy is important, Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, for a discussion of
this general view of the importance of privacy.
[23] See, for example, the papers in Bryan G. Norton, Michael Autching et al. (eds) (1995) Ethics on the
Ark: Zoos, animal welfare and wild life conservation (Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press).
[24] I've received a great deal of help on this paper from many sources. I would like to thank Stephen Clark,
Jeremy Fantl, Sam lam, Jennifer Lackey, Ernest Partridge, Baron Reed, and Thane Weedon for helpful
discussion and comments. Marc Bekoff, Monica Kawall, and Sarah Wright brought some excellent
materials to my attention. I am also indebted to audiences at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the APPE, the
1999 Pacific Division Meeting of the ISEE, and the 1999 Central Division APA Meeting for helpful
discussion of an earlier incarnation of this paper. Finally, I would especially like to thank my comment
ators at these latter meetings, William McKinney, and Simon Cushing for their insightful criticisms and
suggestions.

Society for Applied Philosophy, 2000

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