North Korea Nuclear Issue

North Korea has described itself as a “nuclear weapons state both in name and reality “and experts warn
that by 2020 it could have anywhere from 20 to 100 weapons capable of hitting its neighbors or even the United
States. How did we get there?2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016 have been the years of North Korea that conducted four
successful nuclear explosive devices and DPRK has been developing in active nuclear weapons and programs.

How North Korea went Nuclear? Under leader Kim Jong II, at times the North accepted inspection by the
International Atomic Energy Agency; took part in Six-Party Talks with the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan and
Russia; and even agreed to roll-back parts of its nuclear program in return for the lifting of economic sanctions. Kim
Jong Un's regime however, has behaved entirely differently to that of his father's. The younger Kim inherited a
program that had already conducted two apparently successful nuclear tests, and would go on to carry out a third. At
the beginning of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, North Korea was a proliferation risk, believed to be seeking nuclear
weapons but a long way from achieving that goal. Today, Pyongyang is a self described "nuclear weapons state",
with an arsenal capable of at the very least wiping out its southerly neighbor. Another 12 years of talks may only
strengthen Kim's hand further. Analysts agree that the Kim regime may already have around a dozen nuclear
warheads, and according to Chinese nuclear experts, that number as may be as high as 20.

In 2005, North Korea agreed to a landmark deal to give up its nuclear ambitions in return for economic aid
and political concessions. On October 9, 2006, conduction of first nuclear test was successfully announced by North
Korea and on January 6, 2007 was the year of North Korea Government further confirmed that it had nuclear
weapons. But implementing it proved difficult and talks stalled in 2009. Then in 2012, North Korea suddenly
announced it would suspend nuclear activities and place a moratorium on missile tests in exchange for US food aid,.
But this came to nothing when Pyongyang tried to launch a rocket in April that year. The UN further tightened
sanctions after the 2013 test. In March 2013, after a war of words with the US and with new UN sanctions over the
North's third nuclear test, Pyongyang vowed to restart all facilities at Yongbyon. The US, Russia, China, Japan and
South Korea have engaged the North in multiple rounds of negotiations known as six-party talks, but none of this
has ultimately deterred Pyongyang.On February 12, 2013, monitors in Asia picked up unusual seismic activity at a
North Korean facility at 11:57am (02:57 GMT), later determined to be an artificial quake. With an initial magnitude
4.9 (later revised to 5.1). The Korean Central News agency subsequently said that the country had detonated a
miniaturized nuclear device with "greater explosive force" in an underground test. According to the Korea Institute
of Geosciences and Mineral Resources, the estimated yield was 7.7–7.8 kilotons. In December 2015, Kim suggested
that the country had the capacity to launch a Hydrogen bomb; a device of considerably more power than
conventional atomic bomb used in previous tests.The remark was met with skepticism from the White House and
the South Korean officials.

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The 2016 test brought another round of universal international condemnation, including from China, the
North's main ally. On January 6, 2016 in Korea, the United States Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1
seismic disturbance, reported to be a fourth underground nuclear test North Korea claimed that this test involved a
hydrogen bomb. This claim has not been verified. Within hours, many nations and organizations had condemned the
test. Expert U.S. analysts do not believe that a hydrogen bomb was detonated. Seismic data collected so far suggests
a 6-9 kiloton yield and that magnitude is not consistent with the power that would be generated by a hydrogen bomb
explosion. "What we're speculating is they tried to do a boosted nuclear device, which is an atomic bomb that has a
little bit of hydrogen, an isotope in it called tritium," said Joseph Cirincione, president of the global security firm.
On February 7, 2016, roughly a month after the alleged hydrogen bomb test, North Korea claimed to have put a
satellite into orbit around the Earth. Japanese Prime Minister “Shinzo Abe”had warned the North to not launch the
rocket, and if it did and the rocket violated Japanese territory, it would be shot down. Nevertheless, North Korea
launched the rocket anyway, claiming the satellite was purely intended for peaceful, scientific purposes. A South
Korean spy expert suggested that it may have been an atomic bomb and not a hydrogen bomb. Experts in several
countries, including South Korea have expressed doubts about the claimed technology because of the relatively
small size of the explosion. Senior Defense Analyst Bruce W. Bennett of research organization RAND told the BBC
that "... Kim Jong-un is either lying, saying they did a hydrogen test when they didn't, they just used a little bit more
efficient fission weapon – or the hydrogen part of the test really didn't work very well or the fission part didn't work
very well." Nations across the world, as well as NATO and the United Nations, have spoken out against the testing
as destabilizing, as a danger to international security and as a breach of UN Security Council resolutions. China, one
of North Korea's only allies, also denounced the test.

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Several nations, including the United States, Japan, and South Korea, have criticized the launch, and despite North
Korean claims that the rocket was for peaceful purposes, it has been heavily criticized as an attempt to perform an
ICBM test under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch. China also criticized the launch, however urged "the
relevant parties" to "refrain from taking actions that may further escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula".

At present, North Korea is believed to have one satellite in orbit, the Kwangmyongsong 3-2, though doubts
have been raised about whether it is functioning. U.S. officials have said the same type of rocket used to launch
today's satellite could deliver a nuclear warhead.China, the Soviet Union and the United States have all used
intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, to launch satellites in the past. During the Cold War era of the 1950s,
ICBMs were used by both the United States and the Soviet Union as warhead delivery systems, as well as in the
early development of both countries' space programs.The Unha rocket used to launch North Korea's last satellite is
believed to be based upon the Taepodong long-range ballistic missile, which has an estimated range of around
5,600miles. That would put Australia, much of Western Europe, and the U.S. West Coast in range of a North Korean
warhead. According to multiple experts, North Korea has at least a dozen and perhaps as many as 100 nuclear
weapons, though at present it lacks sophisticated delivery mechanisms.

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How North Korea creates a pressure on China?

Here are the some point that China said "Sanctions are definitely not the aim," an editorial published Sunday by
Chinese state news agency Xinhua said. It did, however, note that foreign minister Wang Yi would "continue to
exercise strategic composure and play a constructive role in helping seek a solution to the peninsular conundrum."

Chinese companies helped supply the equipment for the world-class Masikryong Ski Resort in North
Korea, which opened in 2013, according to the New York Times, Chinese customs data showed that North Korea
imported $2.09 billion in luxury goods between 2012 and 2014, including Mercedes Benz cars and luxury yachts.

China's position stands at odds with stronger measures the United States and South Korea are pushing for.
"The only route to have North Korea give up its nuclear program is by having North Korea voluntarily abandon its
nuclear (development) by coming up with effective and strong U.N. Security Council sanction, South Korean
presidential security adviser Cho Tae-yong said in response to the launch.

North Korea and Nuclear Future: strategy in 2020

Position of Nuclear Weapons State” appears to at least posit the expansion of the role of nuclear weapons beyond
deterring high-end attacks to also deter and repel lower levels of aggression using its nuclear weapons as a future
objective. It states: “The DPRK shall take practical steps to bolster up the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory
strike power both in quality and quantity to cope with the gravity of the escalating danger of hostile forces’
aggression and attack.”

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Logically, it may make sense for Pyongyang to move beyond relying on assured retaliation to a posture that
threatens the limited early use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks by superior conventional forces. Just like NATO
was confronted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Pakistan faces a superior India today, Pyongyang is
confronted by more capable American and South Korean conventional forces. However, if the North evolves in this
direction, it will have to address some difficult issues, particularly the reality that such a strategy will require a much
more sophisticated command and control system with some pre-delegated authority to commanders to use those
weapons as well as integration of nuclear weapons into its broader military doctrine.
Aside from technological challenges, an additional factor to consider in predicting the future of
Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy is unique national circumstances. North Koreans often argue that military hardware
has to be adapted to Korean circumstances and realities, an argument that probably also applies to nuclear weapons
and seems particularly relevant given Kim Il Sung’s past skepticism about the use of these weapons. To the extent
Pyongyang’s war plans are based on the expectation of actually winning and inheriting South Korea’s wealth,
avoiding widespread or indiscriminate and unnecessary damage would seem to be very important, once again
driving the North in this direction. However, even in the context of building a force of more accurate, owner yield
nuclear weapons, there also may be a significant political/psychological barrier to their use by North Korean leaders
on the peninsula, namely they would be used against their own people.
How can the experts say that North Korea strategies evolve under the three scenarios prostulated out in those
papers?

Low-end Scenario: A North Korea armed with 20 nuclear weapons and only minor improvements in its current
force of delivery systems seems likely to continue to rely on a policy of assured retaliation, threatening the use of
these weapons in response to a nuclear attack by the United States. That threat may be somewhat strengthened by
limited deployments of more survivable sea-launched systems and the emergency operational status of the
Taepodong ICBM. In that context, if necessary, the use of these weapons against targets in South Korea will be
allowed only under extreme conditions.
The threshold for use against targets in Japan will be lower.

Medium Scenario: With a nuclear deterrent of 50 nuclear weapons, a growing range of yields, additional mobile
theater-range delivery systems possibly including greater numbers based at sea, and an emerging intercontinental
force, Pyongyang will possess a more survivable and robust assured retaliatory capability able to more credibly
threaten the United States. Pyongyang’s greater assured retaliatory capability may allow the development of some
limited options for the use of these weapons in a conflict against theater targets, particularly in Japan. Still, the
limitations on nuclear use on the Korean peninsula will remain significant.

High-end Scenario: A North Korea armed with 100 low, medium and high-yield nuclear weapons that can be
mounted on an array of battlefield, theater and intercontinental delivery systems would certainly have an even more
robust assured retaliatory capability.
In addition, because of the size of the force as well as its variety of delivery systems and nuclear devices, the North
could consider a further evolution in its nuclear strategy beyond assured retaliation to allow for threatening “first
use,” but only under certain conditions. In that context, battlefield nuclear weapons would be integrated into
Pyongyang’s war plans and the limited use of these weapons on the peninsula would be provided for under certain
conditions. The threshold for use against Japan would be lowered as well.

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References
North Korea’s Nuclear Future: Technology and Strategy by JOEL S. WIT SUN YOUNG AH

http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/nuclear_program/index.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699

http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/05/asia/north-korea-nuclear-program-explainer/index.html

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