Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections

Author(s): KURNIAWATI HASTUTI DEWI

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia , August 2020, Vol. 42, No. 2 (August 2020), pp.
224-250
Published by: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26937801

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 Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 42, No. 2 (2020), pp. 224–50 DOI: 10.1355/cs42-2d
© 2020 ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Motherhood Identity in the

2019 Indonesian Presidential
Elections: Populism and
Political Division in the
National Women’s Movement
KURNIAWATI HASTUTI DEWI

Motherhood identity was intensively deployed during campaigns for the

2019 Indonesian presidential elections. Based on interviews conducted
with women’s activists in Jakarta and surrounding areas from September
2018 to April 2019, this article analyses the contestation of ideas about
motherhood identity expressed in the campaign rhetoric of the “power
of emak-emak” (ordinary, working-class mothers) and “Ibu Bangsa”
(Mothers of the Nation). It argues that the “power of emak-emak”, used
by the Prabowo-Sandi campaign, is a populist narrative that sought to
empower ordinary mothers and was similar to the use of motherhood
identity as a populist narrative in Latin America. Meanwhile, the Jokowi-
Ma’ruf slate advanced the idea of Ibu Bangsa, which is less related to
ordinary women’s daily problems. This article reveals how the debate
among women’s activists over the two contending terms signifies the
political division of the women’s movement, including in its support for
the two presidential candidates. This article not only seeks to enrich
the discourse on gender and populism in Indonesia, but also provides
a current portrait of the Indonesian women’s movement.

Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for

Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta. Postal
address: Widya Graha 3rd Floor, Jl. Gatot Subroto No. 10, Jakarta
Selatan 12710, Indonesia; email: kurn001@lipi.go.id.

224

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 225

Keywords: motherhood identity, gender, populism, Indonesian women’s movement,

political division.

Approximately 193 million Indonesian voters went to the polls on

17 April 2019 as the third largest democracy and the biggest Muslim-
majority country successfully held one of the most complex elections
in the world. The general elections of 2019 were the first concurrent
elections in Indonesia as both the legislative and presidential elections
were conducted simultaneously. In the presidential race, the incumbent
Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) was seeking re-election
and had chosen as his running mate Ma’ruf Amin, a well-known
Muslim cleric and the head of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (a council
of Indonesian ulama/Islamic religious leaders founded by President
Suharto in 1975). The Jokowi-Ma’ruf slate was challenged by Prabowo
Subianto and Sandiaga Uno. Prabowo is a retired general who had
previously contested the 2014 presidential elections against Jokowi,
while Sandiaga Uno is a successful businessman who was serving
as the deputy governor of Jakarta before joining Prabowo as his vice
presidential candidate.1
Numerous studies on the 2019 elections have been published,
with some describing the potential erosion of Indonesian democracy.2
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the elections were conducted
in a relatively safe and peaceful manner. Other studies have
focused on the candidates’ use of religion, particularly the so-called
“Islamic card”;3 the widening electoral cleavage based on religious
identity;4 issues of women’s representation;5 and the evolution of
Indonesia’s foreign policy in the wake of the election.6 Unlike these
previous studies, however, this article focuses on women voters
and the discursive contestation over motherhood identities in the
presidential race. Women voters formed a significant voting bloc in
the 2019 elections, with the General Election Commission reporting
that female voters represented 50.06 per cent of voters.7 Moreover,
because many women were reported to be undecided voters, their
votes were particularly coveted by both presidential campaigns.8
This article analyses the contestation and debate among Indonesian
women’s activists that emerged in response to the campaign rhetoric
of the “power of emak-emak” (a term used to describe ordinary,
working-class mothers) and Ibu Bangsa (Mothers of the Nation).
The “power of emak-emak” was the slogan used by the Prabowo-
Sandi camp in order to target ordinary working-class mothers. This
article argues that the “power of emak-emak” represented a populist

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 226 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

narrative which sought to empower ordinary working-class mothers

in a manner reminiscent of how motherhood identity is harnessed as
a populist narrative in Latin America. In contrast, the Jokowi-Ma’ruf
camp advanced the idea of Ibu Bangsa which is less related to daily
ordinary women’s problems. This article explores how Indonesian
women’s activists responded to the two different campaign slogans
and how their reactions reflected the division within the national
women’s movement. This article, therefore, not only seeks to enrich
the discourse on gender and populism in Indonesia (which has so
far received insufficient attention) but also provides a portrait of
the contemporary women’s movement in Indonesia.
Following Elizabeth Martyn’s definition of the women’s movement
as “female-membership groups plus individual women who seek to
represent women’s interests, including practical and strategic gender
issues, as well as nationalist, class, ideological, religious and other
identity issues”,9 this article includes in its research scope the role
of informal groups, formal associations and individual activists.10
The qualitative research in this article uses primary data obtained
from interviews with women’s activists who were either members
of the two presidential campaigns—Jokowi’s National Campaign
Team (Tim Kampanye Nasional) and Prabowo’s National Winning
Body (Badan Pemenangan Nasional)—or showed support for
either candidate on an individual or collective basis without being
officially affiliated with their respective campaign teams.11 The author
interviewed eleven persons in Jakarta and surrounding areas during
the election campaign period from September 2018 to April 2019.
All the interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. The article
also relies on secondary data derived from newspapers, videos and
related written materials.

The Indonesian Women’s Movement from the New Order to

post-Reformasi
The Indonesian women’s movement has a long history dating back
to the colonial era. Various scholarly works have examined the
movement during the colonial12 and post-colonial periods,13 including
its evolution during the New Order (1966–98) and post-reformasi
years. This article identifies four distinct phases in the development
of the Indonesian women’s movement following the establishment
of the New Order: first, the passive-depoliticized phase of the New
Order era; second, the rise of the contemporary women’s movement
between 1998 and 2013; third, the early division of the movement

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 227

in the 2014 presidential elections; and fourth, the reinforcement of

divisions during the 2019 presidential elections.
During the New Order era, President Suharto developed “state
ibuism” as a gender ideology that demanded the total devotion and
commitment of Indonesian women in their roles as mothers (ibu) and
wives.14 As part of Suharto’s nation-building efforts, “state ibuism”
was channelled through Dharma Wanita, a women’s organization
founded in 1974, and the Family Welfare Guidance (Pembinaan
Kesejahteraan Keluarga, or PKK). Membership in Dharma Wanita
was mandatory for the wives of civil servants, while the PKK was
established in 1972 for mothers and wives living in both urban
and rural areas.15 This period can be characterized as a passive-
depoliticized phase because these two organizations were primarily
oriented towards supporting the political development of the New
Order and did not advocate for gender equality.16
In 1995, three years before the fall of the New Order, the
Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan, a non-governmental organization (NGO)
seeking to promote feminist thought, was established. In 1996, it
published the country’s first feminist journal, Jurnal Perempuan
(Women’s Journal). In the lead-up to the 1998 mass demonstrations
that led to the overthrow of Suharto, the Indonesian women’s
movement continued to expand. Gadis Arivia and Nur Iman Subono
have highlighted the significant role of Suara Ibu Peduli (SIP, or
the Voice of a Caring Mother) in consolidating women’s advocacy
efforts.17 Several scholars have since critically analysed the role of SIP,
including Monika Doxey, Susan Blackburn and Kathyrn Robinson.18
Since the early 2000s, there have also been various initiatives to
increase women’s representation in parliament. These include, for
instance, the establishment of the feminist-based educational NGO
Institut Kapal Perempuan in 2000,19 and the publication of the
Afirmasi journal in 2002 by the Women Research Institute (WRI).20
In the lead up to the 2004 and 2009 general elections, women’s
activists, NGOs and female politicians from both outside and inside
parliament also collaborated to push for the adoption of an affirmative
action policy.21 Moreover, during this period, women’s organizations
were instrumental in shepherding the passage of various gender-
responsive laws by parliament, including Law No. 23/2004 on Anti-
Domestic Violence, Law No. 12/2006 on Citizenship and Law No.
21/2007 on the Elimination of Human Trafficking.22 Some of these
organizations, such as LBH APIK (the Legal Aid Institute of the
Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice),23 LBH Jakarta (the Legal

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 228 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

Aid Institute of  Jakarta)24 and Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI,

or Indonesian Women Coalition),25 were part of the same network
that had provided help to victims of sexual violence during the
May 1998 riots. These groups also actively lobbied for changes to
the drafts of Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography and Pornographic
Acts and Law No. 8/2012 on the Election of Members of National
Parliaments, out of concern that these laws could be potentially
biased against women and female candidates in the 2014 general
elections.26 These are some of the significant milestones that marked
the rise of the contemporary Indonesian women’s movement during
the period from 1998 to 2013.
The 2014 presidential elections, however, resulted in a division
in the women’s movement. Those elections marked the first time
that Jokowi, who was the governor of Jakarta between 2012 and
2014, had to face off against Prabowo for the presidency. At least
fourteen prominent women’s activists met with Jokowi during the
election period to persuade him to include important women’s
issues in his campaign. 27 TR, a prominent women’s activist,
described how an embryonic political division among women’s
activists, especially those in Jakarta, began to emerge during the
2014 presidential elections.28 TR narrated how a fellow activist
from a leading Indonesian organization had asked her to join a
group of women who were helping to create special programmes
for one of the presidential candidates; TR, however, declined this
invitation.29 TR said that this incipient rift persisted into the 2017
Jakarta gubernatorial elections. Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (popularly
known as Ahok) was Jokowi’s deputy when he was governor of
Jakarta from 2012 to 2014. Ahok took over his position in 2014
when Jokowi won the 2014 presidential election. In the 2017 Jakarta
gubernatorial elections, Jokowi’s political party, the Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan,
or PDI-P), nominated Ahok and his running mate Djarot Saiful
Hidayat as candidates for governor and vice-governor. This put them
in competition with Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno, who were
candidates from Gerindra—Prabowo’s political party—and Prosperous
Justice Party (Partai Keadikan Sejahtera, or PKS). As Ahok is an
ethnic Chinese and a Christian, the use of identity politics along the
lines of ethnicity and religion was markedly pronounced during that
election.30 TR reported that she was accused by Ahok’s supporters
of being part of the Anies-Sandi team.31 Similarly, SO, a senior
women’s activist, revealed that other women’s activists accused

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 229

her of being a Prabowo supporter after she criticized the Jokowi

campaign in the 2014 presidential elections.32 SO further affirmed
that the political split in the women’s movement grew wider in the
wake of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections, as she described
how she was viewed as being pro-Anies by women’s activists who,
having thrown their support behind Jokowi in the 2014 elections,
had by then been firmly in the Ahok camp.33
This early political division in the Indonesian women’s movement
became more stark during the 2019 presidential elections, which
marked the fourth phase of the women’s movement. Dyah Ayu
Kartika has discussed how the terms emak-emak and Ibu Bangsa
were used by the two presidential candidates to promote their
campaigns, but her article was primarily framed around women’s
roles as mothers and housewives and did not explore the political
rift in the Indonesian women’s movement.34 This article seeks to fill
this scholarly gap by analysing the use of motherhood identity in
Indonesia’s contemporary electoral politics and its impacts on the
national women’s movement in the post-reformasi period.

Gender and Populism

Since 1998, populism has been on the rise following electoral victories
of populist politicians in Latin America, the United States and Asia.
While the literature on populism is predominantly concerned with
the distinction between right-wing populism in Europe and left-wing
populism in Latin America,35 populist politics in Asia in the twenty-
first century have also enriched the discourse.36 Kosuke Mizuno and
Pasuk Phongpaichit have broadly defined populism as a term “to
describe challenges to established authority that lay claim to represent
the desire and interests of ‘the people’”.37 Furthermore, according to
Susi Meret, one of the most enduring features of populist politics
is the concept of leadership charisma which is achieved “at least
in part, through proficient use of a powerful rhetoric that appeals
to ‘ordinary people’”.38 Populism is thus often couched in terms
of a narrative involving a political party (or politician) fighting to
represent and serve the needs and interests of the “ordinary people”
vis-à-vis the elite.
Despite the growth in studies on populism, Tuija Saresma39
and Kurt Weyland40 have observed that the dimension of gender in
populism remains underexplored. Valentine Moghadam notes that
little has been written about non-Western populist movements and
its attendant gender dynamics, including how such populist regimes

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 230 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

appeal to women voters and the gendered social consequences.41 Cas

Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser found that populist parties
in northern Europe did not assign much importance to the issue
of gender equality and instead stressed the importance of families,
which is different from the populist forces in Latin America that
emphasized support for gender equality.42 Meanwhile, Sahar Abi-
Hassan argues that populist leaders in Europe and Latin America
consistently framed the role of women in politics as an extension
of their domestic gender roles.43
In Argentina, during the Peronist period (1946–55), women and
their motherhood identity were identified as a key component of
nation-building, in which motherhood was seen as a militant subject.44
The Peronist government viewed the role of women, especially
mothers, in taking care of the family, managing household finances
and serving the needs of their husbands and children, as crucial in
creating a healthy working-class and a strong nation.45 According to
Karin Grammatico, populist politics in Argentina tend to make the
lines between women’s private work as a mother and their public
role in protecting the nation blur or overlap with each other.46
Kurt Weyland reflected on the “macho nature” of Latin America’s
populist leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, such as Carlos Menem of
Argentina and Fernando de Collor of Brazil, both of whom tried
to project a very masculine image. According to Weyland, while
Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando de Collor of Brazil
promoted “feminine” issues including practical improvements for
women (such as decreasing the price of staple foods), they avoided
“feminist” issues that sought to guarantee women’s autonomy and
equality. 47 Gioconda Espina and Cathy Rakowski explore how
President Hugo Chavez’s populism in Venezuela relied on the
concept of “revolutionary motherhood” that elevates mothers into
“revolutionaries” who advance social change.48 This reinforces the
traditional role of women as wives, as well as their unpaid work
as volunteers in their communities.49
The above cases illustrate how populist regimes in Latin America
deploy motherhood identities as populist narratives to win popular
support, especially during elections. They therefore lead one to expect
motherhood identities to play a role in electoral politics elsewhere,
especially in countries where populism is employed by politicians
as a strategy to win votes from women voters. The following section
will provide an analysis of how motherhood identities were deployed
in electoral politics in Indonesia, focusing on the 2019 presidential
elections as a case study.

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 231

The Power of Emak-Emak: Gender and Populism in Indonesia

According to Eva Kusuma Sundari, a female politician from PDI-P,
before the 2019 presidential elections, the term emak-emak had been
used by Ahok’s supporters during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial
elections and during his blasphemy trial in 2018.50 This shows an
emerging trend among Indonesian politicians at both the local and
national levels to exploit women’s voices to advance their own
electoral agendas. This article, however, will focus on how the term
“the power of emak-emak”, which was coined by Sandiaga Uno,
was employed to advance electoral goals in the 2019 presidential
elections.
According to Marcus Mietzner, both Prabowo and Jokowi adopted
a populist strategy in the 2014 presidential elections: Prabowo relied
on the narrative of “ultra-populism” while Jokowi represented the
idea of “technocratic populism”.51 In the 2019 elections, Fossati
and Mietzner note that Prabowo, who had again adopted a classic
populist style, was successful in attracting urban, affluent and highly
educated voters.52 Notably, Prabowo and Sandi are part of Indonesia’s
elite. Prabowo was born into an aristocratic family, educated at a
prestigious military academy and was President Suharto’s son-in-law,
while Sandi was born into a rich family. Despite their backgrounds,
however, the Prabowo-Sandi team pursued a populist agenda in the
2019 presidential elections, promoting themselves as defenders of
ordinary people, including promising Indonesian farmers happiness
and prosperity.53 Their campaign also employed the term Gerakan
Emas, an acronym for Gerakan Emak-emak dan Anak-anak Minum
Susu (Movement of Mothers and Children Drinking Milk), which
aimed to boost the health of mothers, women and children.54
The power of emak-emak is a populist narrative that fitted into
the wider Prabowo-Sandi populist strategy. According to AL, the
chairperson of the women’s affairs and family resilience section of
the PKS in a district in Jakarta, the power of emak-emak was based
on the Anies-Sandi team’s successful electoral strategy in the 2017
Jakarta gubernatorial elections.55 In those elections, the Anies-Sandi
campaign targeted the support of women because they believed
that women could influence their husband’s and children's voting
behaviour.56 The exit poll from Indikator Politik Indonesia lends
some credence to this strategy as it indicated that the Anies-Sandi
camp secured 54 per cent of the votes from housewives (with the
remaining 46 per cent voting for the Ahok-Djarot slate) in the second
round of the gubernatorial elections.57

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 232 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

In the 2019 presidential elections, Sandi actively used the term

the “power of emak-emak” at religious, social and sporting events.58
The narrative was also propagated through social media, women’s
religious groups and Sandi’s visits to women working in traditional
markets. On 10 August 2018, the first day of registration for the
presidential race, for example, Sandi said that Prabowo and he would
fight for affordable food prices for the emak-emak.59 In introducing
the term the “power of emak-emak”, Sandi insisted that mothers,
who are usually only seen as political objects, can now become
political subjects who occupy the centre-stage, and whose concerns
about the stability of basic prices, rising living costs and education
could thus become political priorities.60 Significantly, the Prabowo-
Sandi team prefixed the term “the power of” to “emak-emak” to
show their interest in empowering ordinary female voters to bring
about political change. Furthermore, the “power of emak-emak”, in
emphasizing the concrete issues that confront Indonesian mothers
such as employment opportunities and the price of staple foods,
reflects what Maxine Molyneux calls “practical gender interests”
as it seeks to meet the needs and optimize the role of women
in certain contexts and goals.61 This is in contrast to “strategic
gender interests”, which are more concerned with overcoming the
underdevelopment of women in society through the creation of more
gender-equal structures and more equitable power relations between
men and women.62
As noted by Fossati and Mietzner, social media was an important
medium for the populists to connect with their followers.63 On
8 December 2018, Sandi promoted a musical campaign titled “the
power of emak-emak” on his Twitter account, which featured the
term in white text overlaid on a black background, followed by the
statement “sebesar apapun rintangan yang menghadang, the power
of emak-emak siap menerjang” (no matter how big the obstacle is,
the power of emak-emak is ready to hit).64 Sandi’s team followed
this up by uploading the campaign material on Twitter promoting
populist programmes for emak-emak in small-scale businesses on
25 December 2018. He then met with women involved in small
businesses in Sidoarjo on 2 January 2019, promising them assistance
with distributing their products. Sandi also held a dialogue session
in Babakan Village Bekasi to discuss the emak-emak small-scale
businesses on 22 January 2019.65 He also pledged to expand the
OK OCE (One District One Center of Entrepreneurship) programme,
first introduced by the Anies-Sandi campaign during the 2017
Jakarta gubernatorial elections, to help women and housewives in

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 233

small-scale businesses learn the skills and secure the capital to

be entrepreneurs.66 He also committed himself to providing greater
employment opportunities to women and decreasing the price of
staple foods,67 as well as increasing the welfare of emak-emak who
are cadres of Posyandu, the integrated care system in rural areas
that provides basic healthcare to young children.68 Throughout the
campaign, Sandi also met with housewives at traditional markets
in various cities, including Medan, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Malang
and Bali.69
The power of emak-emak was also actively promoted by religious-
based women’s groups supporting the Prabowo-Sandi campaign.
PU, a female cadre of the PKS in Jakarta, described a meeting she
attended on 29 September 2018, in which many groups of emak-emak
under the Aliansi Perempuan Peduli Indonesia (APPI, or Women
Alliance for Care Indonesia) officially declared themselves as emak-
emak in support of Prabowo-Sandi.70 The meeting was attended by
approximately 500 people, both men and women, mostly the leaders
of majelis taklim (Islamic religious study groups). Also present at
the meeting was Sandi’s wife, Nur Asia Uno, who highlighted rising
food prices and thus the need for the emak-emak to vote for the
Prabowo-Sandi slate.71
There were also various emak-emak volunteer groups formed
in support of the Prabowo-Sandi campaign, including Pepes (Partai
Emak-Emak Pendukung Prabowo Sandi, or the Party of Emak-Emak
Supporters for Prabowo-Sandi),72 Permak Bodi (Persatuan Emak-Emak
Prabowo Sandi, or the Association of Emak-Emak for Prabowo-Sandi),
Paspampres (Pasukan Pengawal Prabowo Presiden, or the Prabowo
Presidential Escort Forces).73 The formation of these groups suggests
that Stephanie Rousseau was correct in describing how “women”
can function in populism as “a generic political category often
used to enhance popular identification with the leader”.74 Sandi’s
use of the term the “power of emak-emak” appeals to women as
ordinary mothers, as it gave them a sense of being “empowered” as
subjects in the 2019 presidential elections and national programmes
to enhance their social and political status.
Habiburokhman, the chairman of Prabowo’s party Gerindra,
explained how the Prabowo-Sandi campaign was supported by Emak-
emak Peduli Negeri (Emak-emak Who Care for the Nation), a group
comprising emak-emak from across Indonesia who were concerned
about high food prices and the lack of educational opportunities for
their children.75 The Prabowo-Sandi team was also greatly helped
by the women’s group in the Inter-Recitation Communication Forum

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 234 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

(Forum Silaturahmi Antar Pengajian, or FORSAP).76 NA, who led

FORSAP, revealed that she gathered hundreds of ustadzah (female
preachers) and emak-emak in Jakarta on 14 August 2018 to declare
themselves as Ustazah Peduli Negeri (Female Preachers Who Care
for the Nation) in support of Prabowo and Sandi. The group, which
had previously supported the Anies-Sandi team in the 2017 Jakarta
gubernatorial elections, reiterated the familiar theme of emak-emak
being concerned about the affordability of basic foods.77
On the part of the Jokowi camp, Meutya Hafid, the vice-director
of political communication for the Jokowi National Campaign Team,
stated in a television interview on 12 September 2018 that the
Jokowi-Ma’ruf campaign wanted to avoid politicizing the emak-emak
and would rather extol the various successes and achievements of
the Jokowi administration.78 Nevertheless, recognizing the Prabowo-
Sandi campaign’s efforts to cultivate the support of the emak-emak,
the Jokowi team also began to gradually focus on women’s groups.
For instance, Erick Thohir, the chairman of the Jokowi National
Campaign Team, attended the inauguration ceremony of Perempuan
Indonesian untuk Kemenangan Jokowi-Ma’ruf (Indonesian Women for
the Victory of Jokowi-Ma’ruf) on 15 November 2018 in Yogyakarta.79
The Jokowi campaign did not officially use the term emak-emak.
IN, a senior female lawmaker from the Nahdlatul Ulama-affiliated
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB), a
coalition of political parties which nominated Jokowi as a presidential
candidate in the 2019 election, said that while the Jokowi camp
sought to target women voters regardless of their political party
affiliation, they avoided using the term emak-emak in favour of the
more generic term perempuan (women).80 The Jokowi campaign sought
to appeal to all women, including young mothers and millennials,
with the tagline “perempuan KEREN”, which stands for Kreatif,
Energik, Religius, Nasionalis (Creative, Energetic, Religious and
Nationalist).81
IN said she did not support the use of the term emak-emak
since it limited the campaign’s outreach to mothers only, adding
that it is not a universal word for mother (some prefer the term
mamah or ibu). According to IN, the Jokowi campaign targeted
women voters not only as an electoral strategy, but also to position
women as active political subjects and agents. The campaign did
this by promoting the participation of women in political parties
and legislative elections, which reflects Jokowi’s vision of promoting
justice, gender equality and women’s empowerment.82

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 235

IN also helped to consolidate women’s support for the Jokowi

camp by serving as the national coordinator of Super Jokowi (Suara
Perempuan Jokowi, or Women Voices for Jokowi), which comprises
mothers as well as married and unmarried women.83 Another
women’s movement lending support to the Jokowi team was PIJMA
(Perempuan Indonesia untuk Jokowi Mar’ruf Amin, or the Indonesian
Women for Jokowi and Ma’ruf Amin). PIJMA is composed of female
politicians, from both inside and outside parliament, who belong to
political parties supporting Jokowi.84 However, although the official
Jokowi campaign avoided the term emak-emak, this did not stop
his female supporters from creating groups such as the Emak-Emak
Militan Jokowi Indonesia (EMJI, or Indonesian Militant Emak-Emak
for Jokowi).85

The Political Division of the Women’s Movement

After exploring in the previous section how the populist narratives
were employed in the 2019 presidential elections, the article will
now analyse how they deepened the political divisions within the
Indonesian women’s movement.
The usage of the term “power of emak-emak” garnered considerable
attention from women’s activists and academics. For example, Sita
Aripurnami, a prominent activist from WRI, wrote about the “Gerakan
Politik Kaum ‘Emak’” (The Political Movement of the Mothers) in
the newspaper Kompas on 4 September 2018.86 In exploring the
emergence of the terms “politik emak-emak” and emak-emak, Sita
asserted that as the emak is the first to be affected by inadequacies
in public policy and the provision of public services, such that the
politically-active emak is in a way the manifestation of the well-
known feminist slogan “the personal is the political”.
This was followed by an 8 September 2018 article in Kompas
by Anie Soetjipto, a senior lecturer at the University of Indonesia
and an expert in gender and politics. In “Politik Emak-Emak Sebuah
Renungan” (A Reflection on the Politics of the Emak-Emak),87 Anie
discussed two different groups of emak-emak. The first was the
Barisan Emak-Emak Militan Indonesia (BEMI, or Indonesia Militant
Mothers), which had called for Jokowi’s resignation as a result
of his failure to control rising food prices. The second was the
aforementioned EMJI, which supported Jokowi and was opposed
to BEMI. For Anie, both emak-emak groups merely reflected the
subordination of women politics within masculine political parties

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 236 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

and contributed to the marginalization of women as the main object

of electoral politics.
Kompas published a third opinion piece on 15 September
2018, this time by Dian Kartikasari, the General Secretary of the
Indonesian Women Coalition.88 Similar to Anie, Dian opposed the
use of the term emak-emak during the 2019 presidential elections
for two reasons. First, she argued that the slogan “the power of emak-
emak” was nothing more than a political tool that instrumentalizes
women in order to garner votes, thus undermining the credibility
of the women’s political movement (“pendangkalan makna gerakan
politik perempuan”). Secondly, she argued that the term emak-emak,
in privileging only married women who are mothers, is not suitable
to represent the national women’s movement since the movement
should seek to include all women, regardless of their marital status.
Dian’s opinion was countered by Nursyahbani Katjasungkana,
a senior activist and a founder of LBH APIK, in Kompas on
19 September 2018. Nursyahbani wrote that the rise of the emak-
emak narrative signifies the achievement of the Indonesian women’s
movement in instilling and promoting gender awareness among
ordinary lower-class women.89 She cited how an ordinary emak, as
a cadre of LBH APIK, was able to take legal action to defend her
rights in her community. She argued that the term emak-emak should
be seen as a symbol of success and progress for the Indonesian
women’s movement since the fight against patriarchy can only be
won if women from all social classes—from women academics and
activists to ordinary working-class women and mothers—are united.
In the author’s interview with Nursyahbani, she attested that the
emak-emak represent a symbol of resistance; it indicates the political
consciousness and involvement of ordinary mothers in the politics
of the everyday, particularly issues pertaining to their daily lives
such as food prices. She also mentioned how emak-emak, being
a term of address in the local languages of the Betawi, Javanese
and Madurese people, reflect the diversity of the everyday lives of
ordinary mothers across Indonesia.90
As previously mentioned, the Jokowi campaign avoided using
the term emak-emak. LK, a spokesperson for Jokowi’s presidential
campaign, told this author that the campaign neither used nor
approved of the term emak-emak, instead preferring perempuan as
the more appropriate word as it refers to both mothers and young
women.91 As LK believes that all women should be involved in the
policy-making process, she found the term emak-emak unsuitable.
She argued that it not only addresses a specific group of women,

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 237

emak-emak also defined women in terms of being a marginal or

second-class group, or as housewives who are mostly preoccupied
with domestic chores. The emak-emak are therefore seen as lacking
in political awareness and participation, and are mainly perceived as
the object of development rather than as active political subjects.92
A clearer opposition to the rhetoric of “the power of emak-
emak” was expressed by Giwo Rubianto, the head of Kongres Wanita
Indonesia (KOWANI, or the Indonesian Women’s Congress), a women’s
organization founded in 1928. She introduced the concept of Ibu
Bangsa (Mothers of the Nation) in her opening remarks to the 35th
General Assembly of the International Council of Women, which
was attended by President Jokowi, in Yogyakarta on 14 September
2018.93 Rubianto said:
… [The term “the power of emak-emak”] immediately made me
shocked and surprised because Indonesian women since 1935 have
adopted the concept of Ibu Bangsa. Emak-emak is derived from a
local language. … We as Indonesian women have power, which is
the power of the Ibu Bangsa, not the power of emak-emak. We
have to correct it. As the head of KOWANI, I could not stay silent
when we women are called emak-emak. … I think emak-emak is
more [related] to domestic matters. Ibu plays a bigger role than
emak-emak. First, we know that emak comes from a local language,
while ibu comes from the Indonesian language… As women, we
do not want our role to be domesticated, underestimated and
diminished, right? We must play our roles to the fullest. … We
women must advance and can determine the fate of the nation
and state.94

KOWANI’s stance on Ibu Bangsa, as explained by Giwo, received

the support of another prominent senior activist, SM, who is also a
member of the special advisory board of KOWANI. According to SM:
The term emak-emak looks down on women [in] assuming that
women are only good at becoming mothers. The term implies
that women should be housewives and give birth … Emak-emak
perceives women as a mother taking care of her children and
as a second-class citizen ... Emak-emak refers to women with
children or housewives.95

A KOWANI official publication revealed that the term Ibu Bangsa

was initially introduced during the 2nd Indonesian Women’s Congress
in 1935.96 In order to boost their movement, Indonesian women
were expected to fulfil their main duty as Ibu Bangsa, which is to
foster the growth of future generations who are more conscious of

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 238 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

their nationality.97 KOWANI said that while the main role for the
Ibu Bangsa during the colonial era was to serve as dutiful mothers
and wives within their families, the contemporary role of the Ibu
Bangsa spreads over a wider scope and includes collaborating with
one another across organizations to nurture younger generations of
Indonesians. KOWANI highlights the strategic role that mothers play
in transferring moral values and maintaining local wisdom.98
The term Ibu Bangsa was officially included in the Presidential
Instruction No. 88/2002 on the National Action Plan for the Elimination
of Trafficking of Women and Children.99 At that time, the use of the
concept in the document was focused on highlighting women’s primary
duty of raising their children as future generations for Indonesia.
Now, however, based on the explanations from Giwo and SM, the
concept has been infused with a more progressive narrative, in which
the Ibu Bangsa is not only perceived as a mother mainly concerned
with household duties, but also as a politically active figure. Here,
the idea underlying Ibu Bangsa is similar to the Peronist use of
motherhood identity to construct the ideal of women contributing
to nation-building through their roles as wives and mothers.
Jokowi shared similar thoughts when he stated at the 35th
General Assembly of the International Council of Women that he
supported the term Ibu Bangsa and rejected the term emak-emak.100
Since then, Ibu Bangsa has become a popular term to encapsulate
Jokowi’s narrative on women. The endorsement for the term Ibu Bangsa
was a way for Jokowi, as the incumbent president, to demonstrate
his track record of promoting women’s progress and to counter the
power of emak-emak narrative promoted by the Prabowo-Sandi camp.
Table 1 summarizes key points in the debates around the
“power of emak-emak” and Ibu Bangsa narratives. The contestation
of the motherhood identities employed by the two rival presidential
campaigns in the 2019 elections highlights a few salient aspects
about the current state of the women’s movement in Indonesia.
First, supporters of the “power of emak-emak” narrative believe
the slogan describes the political power of ordinary, working-class
mothers who constitute the majority of Indonesian women. It is
a unifying term meant to encourage these ordinary mothers to be
conscious of, and actively participate in, politics, especially in their
local communities, because their private lives—including those of
their families—are inherently political. In contrast, the proponents
of Ibu Bangsa believe that their term affords more dignity to women
by representing them as an active political subject, rather than as
mothers (or emak-emak) who are second-class citizens with little

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 239

Table 1
Debates about the Power of Emak-Emak and Ibu Bangsa

The Power of Emak-Emak Ibu Bangsa

Introduced by Sandiaga Uno, the vice-
presidential candidate of
Prabowo Subianto
In support of Prabowo–Sandi campaign
Main concept Term for ordinary, working-
class mothers, who face
difficulties in fulfilling
basic household needs and
are severely affected by
daily problems such as the
increasing price of staple
foods.
Similarities • Motherhood identity • Motherhood identity
• Emphasizes that • Emphasizes the
ordinary mothers have
to be aware of, and
involved in, politics to
ensure that their needs
are met by policymakers.
Giwo Rubianto, the head
of the Indonesia Women’s
Congress
Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin
campaign
Term for modest mother,
which identifies with the
middle class, less related
to ordinary women’s daily
problems.
role of women as
educated, progressive
and politically active
subjects.

or no role in politics. Ibu Bangsa implies that mothers, or women

more generally, have the same opportunities and roles as men in
both the private and public spheres. Here, Ibu Bangsa represents
a narrative of women’s progress, particularly given its proponents’
argument that the term emak-emak belittles the status of Indonesian
women. Significantly, however, both the rhetoric of emak-emak and
Ibu Bangsa no longer accept the domestication of women, insisting
instead that women have to be politically conscious and active.
Second, women’s activists were politically involved in the
campaigns of both presidential candidates. However, this did not result
in any substantive dialogue or discussion between them; instead, the
two camps were dragged into a divisive and antagonistic confrontation.
While the Indonesian women’s movement was united against Suharto
during the reformasi era, the movement was effectively divided
during the 2019 presidential elections as women’s activists held
mutual suspicious views of one another as a result of their different

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 240 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

political allegiances. The rift in the women’s movement was evident

in the number of prominent activists who went their separate ways
in joining either of the two presidential campaigns, or choosing to
support (publicly or otherwise) one particular presidential candidate.
Hence, the political division of the women’s movement, which began
in the 2014 presidential elections and persisted during the Jakarta
elections of 2017, became worse during the 2019 elections. This
was a major cause for concern for many women’s activists. TR, for
example, mentioned that: “I am so concerned with the situation as
there is no dialogue whatsoever. … We are now working separately
and I regret why we could not do the same thing we did in 1998,
when we worked together to get the President [Suharto] to step
down, for the public good.”101
BT, an activist with LBH APIK Jakarta, similarly lamented the
division in the women’s movement as a result of the 2019 elections
while recalling the unity of women’s activists in pushing for increased
women’s representation in the parliament during the 2009 elections.102
BT further added that although many women’s activists and groups
remain politically divided (as evidenced in the various WhatsApp
groups she had joined since the Jakarta gubernatorial elections in
2017), she hoped they could renew their cooperation to advocate
for legislation that protect and advance women’s interests, including
the bills to eliminate sexual violence and promote gender equality
and justice.103
Third, there is no unifying figure who can reconcile the various
groups of women’s activists. This is because the movement’s division
is deeply cross-generational—both young activists and senior figures
in the women’s movement are divided according to their respective
political loyalties to Jokowi and Prabowo.104
Fourth, the electoral framework regulating the selection of
presidential candidates has contributed to the political division
of the movement. Article 222 of the Law No. 7/2017 on General
Elections stipulates the minimum threshold a candidate must cross
in order to run in a presidential election: the aspiring presidential
candidate must either command the support of political parties who
collectively hold at least 20 per cent of the seats in the National
House of Representatives, or have secured at least 25 per cent of
the national votes in the previous election.105 Given this high bar,
only Jokowi and Prabowo emerged as viable candidates for the 2019
presidential elections. The rematch of the 2014 elections thus only
deepened the existing political divisions, including among women’s
activists.

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 241

Moreover, the 2019 contest witnessed the first time that

presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently. This
compelled political parties and their legislative candidates to choose
between the two presidential camps. Women’s activists who ran for
the legislature thus found themselves involved in the presidential
election as well. One example was Edriana Noerdin, the director
for research at WRI, who ran for a House of Representatives seat
in the West Sumatera-1 constituency under the banner of Gerinda,
Prabowo’s party. Following the lead of the Prabowo-Sandi campaign,
her tagline was “Perjuangan Politik Emak-Emak” (The Political
Struggle of the emak-emak).106 Another example involves LK, who,
in addition to serving as a spokesperson for Jokowi’s presidential
campaign, was also running as a United Development Party (Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan, or PPP) legislative candidate in the Jakarta-2
constituency.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the extent of the current
political division within the Indonesian women’s movement. In the
past, however, the movement was also divided. During the colonial
era, for example, a division emerged over polygamy. Áisyiyah, a
women’s wing of Muhammadiyah, endorsed polygamy at the 1928
Women’s Congress, and again in 1932 during an Áisyiyah congress in
Bukittinggi, much to the opposition of the radical organization Isteri
Sedar (Aware Wives) based in Jakarta.107 There was another rift over
women’s suffrage. Since the 1930s, most members of the movement
had advocated for suffrage for all Indonesian women through a
series of Indonesian Women’s Congresses. These efforts, however,
encountered opposition from the Minangkabau women of Sumatra,
with the disagreement coming to light during the 4th Indonesian
Women’s Congress in Semarang in July 1941.108 Furthermore, even
in the late 1940s, Vreede-De Stuers observed that the class cleavage
in the local women’s movement—between the noble or upper-class
women (such as RA Kartini and Dewi Sartika) and their lower or
working-class peers—had long been apparent.109 During the early
period of independence, the Government Regulation No. 19/1952
on the Provision of Pension to Widows and Benefits to Orphans
of Civil Servants also created tensions between women’s groups as
it permitted male employees to identify either one or more wives
who were entitled to their retirement pensions upon their deaths.
Nineteen women’s organizations, including Persatuan Intersi Tentara
(Persit), Wanita Katolik, Persatuan Wanita Kristen Indonesia, Rukun
Isteri PKK and Puteri Budi Sejati, registered their opposition to the
regulations out of concern that it would encourage public servants

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 242 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

to have more than one wife. In contrast, some Islamic women’s

organizations, such as Muslimat Masyumi, GPII Puteri and Muslimat
Nahdlatul Ulama, supported the regulations.110 Against this historical
backdrop, the current division in the Indonesian women’s movement
and among women’s activists is not a novel development. However,
the current division is driven less by specific issues but more by
a broader political split over allegiances to Jokowi and Prabowo
among women’s activists.

Conclusion
This article has examined how populist politics and motherhood
identities intersected in the 2019 Indonesian presidential elections.
While the Jokowi-Ma’ruf camp advanced the idea of Ibu Bangsa
which identifies more with middle-class women, the Probowo-Sandi
campaign advanced “the power of emak-emak” narrative which
sought to empower ordinary, working-class mothers. Through this
strategy, Prabowo and Sandi aimed to win support from ordinary
mothers by sympathizing with their daily challenges. “The power
of emak-emak” works by addressing “feminine” women’s issues that
are of “practical gender interest”, such as being able to buy better
and cheaper food for the family, or creating greater employment
opportunities for women and housewives. This narrative is reminiscent
of the populism of Juan Peron in Argentina or Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela.
The article has also shown that the debate among women’s
activists over the two terms—the “power of emak-emak” and Ibu
Bangsa­­—is related to the polarization of the women’s movement caused
by their members’ divided loyalties to Jokowi and Prabowo. This
political division, which first emerged during the 2014 presidential
elections and persisted in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial elections,
continued to widen during the 2019 elections. The 2019 contest, in
which the presidential and legislative elections were held concurrently
for the first time, made divisions within the movement even more
entrenched as its members were subject to not only the intensified
political rivalry between the Jokowi and Prabowo camps but also
the competition among themselves for legislative seats.
Motherhood identity has indeed become an important discursive
tool for parties and politicians to rally political support in Indonesia.
The electoral importance of mothers, and women more generally, has
encouraged politicians to adopt populist narratives that ostensibly
promise to empower ordinary women. Consequently, in the absence

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 243

of a common agenda, the women’s movement in Indonesia will be

susceptible to discords arising from its members’ divided loyalties
to different presidential candidates. Certain electoral rules and
mechanisms, such as the threshold requirements for presidential
candidates and the conduct of concurrent elections, only exacerbate
this political division and make it more intractable.

NOTES
Acknowledgements: An earlier version of this paper entitled “Contestation Idea of
Motherhood Identity and Political Cleavages of Indonesian Women’s Movement in
the 2019 Presidential Election” was presented at the Women in Asia Conference
(WIA), University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, 21–23 June 2019, and was
sponsored by a Travel Award for International Seminar by the Deputy of Social
Sciences and Humanities LIPI.
1
Ihsanuddin, “KPU Tetapkan Jokowi-Ma’ruf dan Prabowo-Sandi sebagai Capres-
Cawapres” [KPU Declared Jokowi-Mar’ruf and Prabowo-Sandi as Presidential
and Vice Presidential Candidates], Kompas.com, 20 September 2018, https://
nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/09/20/17022411/kpu-tetapkan-jokowi-maruf-dan-
prabowo-sandi-sebagai-capres-cawapres.
2
Eve Warburton and Edward Aspinall, “Explaining Indonesia’s Democratic
Regression: Structure, Agency and Popular Opinion”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 41, no. 2 (2019): 255–85. See also Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian
Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic
Studies 54, no. 3 (2018): 307–38.
3
Nadirsyah Hosen, “God in the Indonesian Elections”, Inside Indonesia, 8 March
2019, https://www.insideindonesia.org/god-in-the-indonesian-elections.
4
Thomas Pepinsky, “Islam and Indonesia’s 2019 Presidential Election”, Asia
Policy 14, no. 4 (October 2019): 54–62.
5
Ella S. Prihatini, “Electoral (in) Equity”, Inside Indonesia, 8 March 2019, https://
www.insideindonesia.org/electoral-in-equity.
6
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Regional Foreign Policy After the 2019
Election”, Asia Policy 14, no. 4 (October 2019): 72–87.
7
“Partisipasi Perempuan jadi Penentu Hasil Pilpres 2019” [Women’s Participation
Determines 2019 Presidential Election Results], Medcom.id, 29 October 2018,
https://www.medcom.id/pemilu/news-pemilu/VNnDaJ7k-partisipasi-perempuan-
jadi-penentu-hasil-pilpres-2019.
8
Rosie Campbell and Sarah Childs, “All Aboard the Pink Battle Bus? Women
Voters, Women’s Issues, Candidates and Party Leaders”, Parliamentary Affairs
68, no. 1 (2015): 206–23.
9
Elizabeth Martyn, The Women’s Movement in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Gender
and Nation in a New Democracy (London and New York: Routledge, 2005),
p. 12.
10
Ibid., p. 11.

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 244 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

11
Although I explained that I was an impartial researcher, some activists subtly
declined by either not responding or citing a lack of time due to election
campaigning.
12
For example, Sukanti Soeryocondro, Potret Pergerakan Wanita di Indonesia [The
Portrait of Women’s Movement in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1984); Sukanti
Suryochondro, “Perkembangan Gerakan Wanita di Indonesia” [Development
of the Women’s Movement in Indonesia], in Perempuan Indonesia: Dulu dan
Kini [Indonesian Women: Past and Present], edited by Mayling Oey-Gardiner
(Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1996), pp. 291–92; Cora Vreede-de
Stuers, Sejarah Perempuan Indonesia, Gerakan dan Pencapaian [Indonesian
Women’s History: Movement and Achievement] (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu,
2008); Susan Blackburn, Kongres Perempuan Pertama: Tinjauan Ulang [First
Women’s Congress: A Review], (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia and KITLV
Jakarta, 2007); Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, “Indonesian: Local Advocacy for
Suffrage”, in The Palgrave Handbook of Women’s Political Rights, edited by
Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook, and Netina Tan (London, United Kingdom:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
13
Saskia Wieringa, Penghancuran Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia [Destruction
of the Women’s Movement in Indonesia] (Jakarta: Yayasan Kalyanamitra, 1999);
Marilyn Porter, “Indonesian Women and Current Politics: The Contemporary
Indonesian Women’s Movement and the Long Journey Ahead”, in Indonesian
Women in a Changing Society, edited by Kristi Poerwandari (Seoul, South
Korea: Ewha Womans University Press, 2005).
14
Julia I. Suryakusuma, “The State and Sexuality in New Order Indonesia”, in
Fantasizing the Feminine in Indonesia, edited by Laurie J. Sears (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 96.
15
For the transformation of the organizations (Dharma Wanita and PKK) since
1998, see Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, Indonesian Women and Local Politics:
Islam, Gender and Network in Post-Suharto Indonesia (Singapore: NUS Press
and Kyoto University Press, 2015), pp. 44–45.
16
See KOWANI, Sejarah Setengah Abad Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia [History of
a Half Century of Indonesian Women’s Movement] (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1978);
Tim Penggerak PKK Pusat, Sejarah Singkat Gerakan PKK [A Short History of
the PKK Movement] (Jakarta: Tim Penggerak PKK Pusat, nd), p. 1; Kathryin
Robinson, “Indonesian Women from Orde Baru to Reformasi”, in Women in
Asia: Tradition, Modernity and Globalisation, edited by Louise Edwards and
Mina Roces (Sydney, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2000), p. 150.
17
Gadis Arivia and Nur Iman Subono, A Hundred Years of Feminism in Indonesia:
An Analysis of Actors, Debates, and Strategies (Jakarta: FES Indonesia, 2017),
p. 16.
18
Monika S.W. Doxey, “The ‘Motherhood’ Strategy of Indonesia’s Suara Ibu Peduli”,
in Building Feminist Movement and Organizations: Global Perspectives, edited by
Lydia Alpizar Duran, Noel D. Payne, and Anahi Russo (London and New York:
Zed Books, 2007); Susan Blackburn, Women and the State in Modern Indonesia
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kathryn Robinson, Gender,
Islam and Democracy in Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
19
Arivia and Subono, A Hundred Years of Feminism in Indonesia, p. 18.

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 245

20
The Women Research Institute (WRI), established in 2002 by women’s activists,
is an independent research institution that employs feminist methodology and
analysis by placing women and men in an equitable position in the social,
political, economic and cultural realms, especially to address the marginalization
of women in decision making.
21
Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, “Refleksi dan Proyeksi Sepuluh Tahun (1999–2009):
Affirmative Action dan Keterwakilan Perempuan di Parlemen” [Ten Years
of Reflections and Projections (1999–2009): Affirmative Action and Women’s
Representation in Parliament], Year Book P2P LIPI 2007 (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian
Politik LIPI, 2007), pp. 27–41.
22
Edriana Noerdin, “Women’s Organizations Amidst Political Openness”, in
Indonesian Women’s Movements: Making Democracy Gender Responsive, edited
by Ayu Anastasia, Edriana Noerdin, Frisca Anindhita, Rahayuningtyas, and Sita
Aripurnami (Jakarta: Women Research Institute, 2013), p. 43.
23
LBH APIK, or the Indonesian Women’s Association for Justice (APIK), was
established by seven women lawyers in Jakarta in 1995. LBH members from
various regions established APIK’s Legal Aid Institution (LBH) which currently
operates sixteen offices throughout Indonesia. See https://lbhapik.or.id/#tentang.
24
LBH Jakarta, or the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, was founded on the ideas presented
at the 3rd Indonesian Advocates Association in 1969. The establishment of LBH
Jakarta, which was supported by the DKI Jakarta Government, was intended
to provide legal assistance to people who were unable to fight for their rights,
especially the poor, marginalized and victims of human rights abuses. See
https://www.bantuanhukum.or.id/web/tentang-kami/.
25
Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI) was established on 18 May 1998 in Jakarta
as part of the movement comprising women, students and other pro-democracy
groups that were opposed to the New Order regime. Today KPI has secretariats
all over Indonesia: 14 chapters at the provincial level, 120 branches at the city/
municipal level and 917 balai perempuan (women’s halls) at the village level.
See “Sejarah Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan dan Demokrasi”
[History of the Indonesian Women’s Coalition for Justice and Democracy], http://
www.koalisiperempuan.or.id/tentang/sejarah/.
26
Ibid.
27
“Ini Masukan 14 Aktivis Perempuan untuk Jokowi” [These are Recommendations
from 14 Women’s Activists for Jokowi], detikNews, 27 March 2014, https://news.
detik.com/berita/d-2538951/ini-masukan-14-aktivis-perempuan-untuk-jokowi.
28
Author interview with TR, Jakarta, 18 February 2019.
29
Ibid.
30
Wahyu Prasetyawan, “Populism or Identity Politics: Explaining Electoral Politics
in Indonesia”, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, May 2018. https://kyotoreview.
org/yav/populism-identity-electoral-politics-indonesia/.
31
Author interview with TR, Jakarta, 18 February 2019. She said she did not
support Ahok because of his arrogance in evicting the Aquarium village in
April 2016.
32
Author interview with SO, Jakarta, 31 January 2019.
33
Ibid.

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 246 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

34
Dyah Ayu Kartika, “What Will Indonesian Women Win This Election?”,
New Mandala, 4 March 2019, https://www.newmandala.org/will-women-win-
indonesia-2019/.
35
Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Vox Populi or Vox Masculine?
Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America”, Patterns of
Prejudice 49, nos. 1–2 (2015): 16–36.
36
Kosuke Mizuno and Pasuk Phongpaichit, eds., Populism in Asia (Singapore:
NUS Press, 2009); Marcus Mietzner, “Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s
Rise, Democracy and Political Contestation in Indonesia”, Policy Studies: An
East-West Centre Series 72 (2015), https:// www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/
private/ps072.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35018; Ehito Kimura, “Populist Politics
in Indonesia”, Asia Pacific Bulletin 407 (7 December 2017): 1 –2, https://www.
eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb407.pdf.
37
Mizuno and Pasuk, eds., Populism in Asia, p. 2.
38
Susi Meret, “Charismatic Female Leadership and Gender: Pia Kjærsgaard and
the Danish People’s Party”, Patterns of Prejudice 49, no. 1–2 (2015): 82.
39
Tuija Saresma, “Gender Populism: Three Cases of Finns Party Actors’ Traditionalist
Antifeminism”, in Populism on the Loose, edited by U. Kovala, E. Palonen, M.
Ruotsalainen, and T. Saresma (Jyväskylä, Finland: Nykykulttuurin tutkimuskeskus,
2018), pp. 177–200.
40
Kurt Weyland, “Foreword”, in Gender and Populism in Latin America Passionate
Politics, edited by Karen Kampwirth (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2010), p. viii.
41
Valentine M. Moghadam, “Gendering the New Right-Wing Populism: A Research
Note”, Journal of World-System Research 24, no. 2 (2018): 294–303.
42
Mudde and Kaltwasser, “Vox Populi or Vox Masculine?”, pp. 19–20.
43
Sahar Abi-Hassan, “Populism and Gender”, in The Oxford Handbook of Populism,
edited by Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and
Pierre Ostiguy, November 2017, DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.16.
44
Karin Grammatico, “Populist Continuities in ‘Revolutionary’ Peronism? A
Comparative Analysis of the Gender Discourses of the First Peronism (1946–1955)
and the Montoneros”, in Gender and Populism in Latin America Passionate
Politics, edited by Karen Kampwirth. (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2010), pp. 127–28.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., pp. 129–30.
47
Weyland, “Foreword”, in Gender and Populism, p. xi.
48
Gioconda Espina and Cathy A. Rakowski, “Waking Women Up? Hugo Chavez,
Populism, and Venezuela’s ‘Popular’ Women”, in Gender and Populism, pp.
182, 194–95.
49
Ibid.
50
Bagus Prihantoro Nugroho, “PDIP: ‘The Power of Emak-Emak’ Dulu Dibentuk Pro
Ahok” [PDIP: The Power of Emak-Emak was Formed by Pro Ahok], detikNews,
16 September 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/4213916/pdip-the-power-of-
emak-emak-dulu-dibentuk-pro-ahok.

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 247

51
Mietzner, “Reinventing Asian Populism”.
52
Diego Fossati and Marcus Mietzner, “Analyzing Indonesia’s Populist Electorate:
Demographic, Ideological, and Attitudinal Trends”, Asian Survey 59, no. 5
(2019): 776.
53
“Prabowo: Kalian Semua Dianggap Bodoh oleh Elite” [Prabowo: All of You are
Considered Stupid by the Elite], CNN Indonesia, 1 April 2019, https://www.
cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190401143803-32-382585/prabowo-kalian-semua-
dianggap-bodoh-oleh-elite; Enggran Eko Budianto, “Sumpah Prabowo: Saya Tak
akan Istirahat Sebelum Petani Tersenyum” [The Promise of Prabowo: I Will Not
Take a Rest Until All Peasants Smile], detikNews, 24 February 2019, https://
news.detik.com/berita-jawa-timur/d-4441577/sumpah-prabowo-saya-tak-akan-
istirahat-sebelum-petani-tersenyum; Fikri Muhammad, “Jika Menang Pilpres, Ini
5 Program Kerja Prabowo-Sandi” [Here’s the Five Programs of Prabowo-Sandi
When They Win the Presidential Election], CNBC Indonesia, 14 January 2019,
https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20190114210807-4-50643/jika-menang-
pilpres-ini-5-program-kerja-prabowo-sandi.
54
Budiarti Utami Putri, “Emak-emak Berebut Susu di Deklarasi Gerakan Emas
Prabowo” [Mother Fighting for Milk in Declaration of Prabowo’s Emas Movement],
Tempo, 24 October 2018, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1139461/emak-emak-
berebut-susu-di-deklarasi-gerakan-emas-prabowo/.
55
Author interview with AL, Jakarta, 26 November 2018.
56
Nibras Nada Nailufar, “Sandiaga Uno Bidik Dukungan Perempuan dalam
Pilkada DKI” [Sandiaga Uno Targeting Women’s Support in the Jakarta
Gubernatorial Election], Kompas, 17 March 2016, https://megapolitan.kompas.
com/read/2016/03/17/16470451/Sandiaga.Uno.Bidik.Dukungan.Perempuan.dalam.
Pilkada.DKI.
57
Aqwam Fiazmi Hanifan, “The Power of Emak-Emak dalam Politik Jakarta” [The
Power of Emak-Emak in Jakarta’s Politics], tirto.id, 20 May 2017, https://tirto.
id/the-power-of-emak-emak-dalam-politik-jakarta-coui.
58
Author interview with AL, Jakarta, 26 November 2018.
59
Bimo Wiwoho, “Sandiaga: Kami Berjuang untuk Partai Emak-Emak” [Sandiaga:
We Fight for Party of Emak-Emak], CNN Indonesia, 10 August 2018, https://
www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180810145520-32-321261/sandiaga-kami-
berjuang-untuk-partai-emak-emak.
60
Pertiwi, “Dituding Manfaatkan Emak-emak, Sandi: Sebelah Juga Mulai Garap”
[Accused of Using Emak-Emak, Sandi: The Other Camp Also Started to
Use It], detikNews, 18 November 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-
tengah/d-4307135/dituding-manfaatkan-emak-emak-sandi-sebelah-juga-mulai-garap.
61
Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the
State, and Revolution in Nicaragua”, Feminist Studies 11, no. 2 (1985): 232–33.
62
Ibid.
63
Fossati and Mietzner, “Analyzing Indonesia’s Populist Electorate”, p. 769.
64
Author observation on Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno’s Twitter profile, 8 December
2018.
65
Author observation on Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno’s Twitter during the campaign
period, especially on 25 December 2018, 2 January 2019 and 22 January 2019.

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66
Fadhly Fauzi Rachman, “Sandiaga Sebut Banyak Emak-emak Ingin Dilatih Jadi
Pengusaha” [Sandiaga said Many Emak-Emak Want to be Trained to Become
Entrepreneur], detikNews, 13 April 2019, https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-
bisnis/d-4509493/sandiaga-sebut-banyak-emak-emak-ingin-dilatih-jadi-pengusaha;
Saugi Riyandi, “Sandi Janji Permudah Entrepreneur Emak-Emak Ciptakan Lapangan
Kerja” [Sandi Promises to Support Emak-Emak Entrepreneurs to Create Jobs],
Jawapos, 13 April 2019, https://www.jawapos.com/ekonomi/bisnis/13/04/2019/
sandi-janji-permudah-enterpreneur-emak-emak-ciptakan-lapangan-kerja/.
67
Syahrizal Sidik and Iswari Anggit, “Sandi Janji Buka Lapangan Kerja & Turunkan
Harga Bahan Pokok” [Sandi Promises to Create Jobs and Reduce Prices of
Staple Foods], CNBC Indonesia, 13 April 2019, https://www.cnbcindonesia.
com/news/20190413204740-4-66545/sandi-janji-buka-lapangan-kerja-turunkan-
harga-bahan-pokok.
68
Dadang Hermansyah, “Kunjungi Ciamis, Sandi Janji Sejahterakan Emak-emak
Posyandu” [Visiting Ciamis, Sandi Promises to Improve Welfare of Emak-Emak
Posyandu], detikNews, 9 March 2019, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-
barat/d-4459859/kunjungi-ciamis-sandi-janji-sejahterakan-emak-emak-posyandu.
69
“5 Momen saat Sandi Dikelilingi Emak-Emak” [The Five Moments when
Sandi was Surrounded by Emak-Emak], Kumparan, 16 September 2018,
https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/5-momen-saat-sandi-dikelilingi-emak-
emak-1537081735128128272/full.
70
Author interview with PU, South Tangerang, 7 October 2018.
71
Ibid.
72
Rio Apinino, “Mengenal Pepes, Partai Emak-Emak Pendukung Prabowo Sandi”
[Get to Know Pepes, Supporter of Prabowo Sandi’s Party of Emak-Emak], Tirto,
26 February 2019, https://tirto.id/mengenal-pepes-partai-emak-emak-pendukung-
prabowo-sandi-dhNA.
73
“Sandiaga Beberkan Singkatan Permak Bodi dan Paspampres” [Sandiaga Explains
the Abbreviations of Permak Bodi and Paspampres], Viva, 3 September 2018,
https://www.viva.co.id/berita/politik/1071346-sandiaga-beberkan-singkatan-
permak-bodi-dan-paspampres.
74
Stéphanie Rousseau, “Populism from Above, Populism from Below: Gender
Politics under Alberto Fujimori and Evo Morales”, in Gender and Populism
in Latin America Passionate Politics, p. 141.
75
“Emak-emak Prabowo Sandi: Seribu Majelis Taklim Bergabung dengan Kami”
[Emak-Emak Prabowo Sandi: Thousands of Religious Groups Joined Us], Kumparan,
20 August 2018, https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/emak-emak-prabowo-
sandi-seribu-majelis-taklim-bergabung-dengan-kami-1534741250693884005.
76
There are thousands of FORSAP members across Indonesia, who communicate
and organize through WhatsApp groups.
77
Author interview with NA, Jakarta, 5 November 2018.
78
“Timses Jokowi-Ma’ruf Hindari Politisasi Emak-emak” [The National Team of
Jokowi-Ma’ruf Avoids Politicization of Emak-Emak], Medcom.id, 12 September
2018, https://video.medcom.id/primetime-news/yNLdmjWN-timses-jokowi-ma-
ruf-hindari-politisasi-emak-emak.

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 Motherhood Identity in the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Elections 249

79
Usman Hadi, “Erick Thohir Hadiri Deklarasi Relawan ‘Emak-emak Jokowi’ di Yogya”
[Erick Thohir Attends the Launch of ‘Emak-Emak Jokowi’ in Yogya], detikNews,
16 November 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-4305221/erick-
thohir-hadiri-deklarasi-relawan-emak-emak-jokowi-di-yogya.
80
Author interview with IN, Jakarta, 29 November 2018.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Robi Ardianto, “Super Jokowi Deklarasikan Dukungan Perempuan Pada Jokowi”
[Super Jokowi Declared Women’s Full Support for Jokowi], alinea.id, 23
August 2018, https://www.alinea.id/politik/super-jokowi-deklarasikan-dukungan-
perempuan-pada-jokowi-b1U4k9ds0.
84
Samsudhuha Wildansyah, “Perempuan IJMA, Wadah Perempuan Anggota Partai
untuk Dukung Jokowi” [Women of IJMA, a Venue for Female Party Members
to Support Jokowi], detikNews, 10 September 2018, https://news.detik.com/
berita/4206221/perempuan-ijma-wadah-perempuan-anggota-partai-untuk-dukung-
jokowi.
85
“Sambut Hari Ibu Relawan Emak Militan Jokowi Gelar Papsmear Gratis” [To
Welcome Mother’s Day, Volunteer of Emak Militant Jokowi Provided Free Papsmear
Service], mediaindonesiaraya.id, 22 December 2018, http://mediaindonesiaraya.
id/2018/12/22/sambut-hari-ibu-relawan-emak-militan-jokowi-gelar-papsmear-gratis/.
86
Sita Aripurnami, “Gerakan Politik Kaum ‘emak’” [The Political Movement of the
Mothers], Kompas, 4 September 2018, https://kompas.id/baca/opini/2018/09/04/
gerakan-politik-kaum-emak/.
87
Anie Soetjipto, “Politik Emak-emak Sebuah Renungan” [Reflections on the
Politics of the Emak-Emak], Kompas, 8 September 2018, https://kompas.id/baca/
opini/2018/09/08/politik-emak-emaksebuah-renungan/.
88
Dian Kartikasari, “Pendangkalan Gerakan Politik Perempuan” [Undermining the
Standing of the Women’s Political Movement], Kompas, 15 September 2018, https://
kompas.id/baca/opini/2018/09/15/pendangkalan-gerakan-politik-perempuan/.
89
Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, “Politik Emak-emak dari Solidaritas ke Afinitas”
[Politics of Emak-Emak from Solidarity to Affinity], Kompas, 19 September
2018, https://kompas.id/baca/opini/2018/09/19/politik-emak-emak-dari-solidaritas-
ke-afinitas/.
90
Author interview with Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Jakarta, 31 January 2019.
91
Author interview with LK, Depok, West Java, 25 October 2018.
92
Ibid.
93
Budi Setiawanto, “Ketua Umum Kowani Tolak Istilah ‘the power of emak-emak’”
[The Head of Kowani Rejected the Term “the Power of Emak-Emak”], Antaranews.
com, 14 September 2018, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/748247/ketua-
umum-kowani-tolak-istilah-the-power-of-emak-emak; “Tak Sekedar Menyiapkan
Generasi Penerus, Perempuan Indonesia Ibu Bangsa” [Indonesian Women of Ibu
Bangsa Are Not Merely Preparing the Future Generation], Kedaulatan Rakyat,
15 September 2018.
94
Author interview with Giwo Rubianto, Jakarta, 6 February 2019; KOWANI,
“Press Release Konferensi Pers IBU BANGSA” [Press Conference of Ibu Bangsa],
26 September 2018.

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 250 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi

95
Author interview with SM, Jakarta, 1 February 2019.
96
Tim Kowani, Sebelas Windu KOWANI Mengukir Bakti [88 Years of KOWANI’s
Devotion] (Jakarta: KOWANI, 2016), p. 21.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid., pp. 21–23.
99
Ibid., p. 21.
100
“The Power of Emak-Emak? Sorry Ya!”, Radar Jogja, 15 September 2018. https://
radarjogja.jawapos.com/2018/09/15/the-power-of-emak-emak-sorry-ya/; see also
Joko Widodo’s Twitter on 15 September 2018 which said “Jadilah Ibu Bangsa
Perempuan Indonesia” [Indonesian Women, be the Mothers of the Nations].
101
Author interview with TR, Jakarta,18 February 2019.
102
Author interview with BT, Jakarta, 11 February 2019.
103
Ibid.
104
“Ini Alasan Alumni UI Dukung Jokowi” [This is the Reason Why Alumni of
University of Indonesia Supported Jokowi], BeritaSatu.com, 12 January 2019,
https://www.beritasatu.com/politik/532200/ini-alasan-alumni-ui-dukung-jokowi.
105
Rakhmat Nur Hakim, “Presidential Threshold 20 Persen, Gerindra Tetap Usung
Prabowo di Pilpres 2019” [Presidential Threshold of 20 percent, Gerindra to
Nominate Prabowo in the 2019 Presidential Election], Kompas, 11 January 2018,
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/01/11/12433711/presidential-threshold-20-
persen-gerindra-tetap-usung-prabowo-di-pilpres.
106
Faisal Budiman, “Perjuangan Politik Emak-Emak Oleh: Edriana Noerdin Direktur
Women Research Institute (WRI)” [The Political Struggle of Emak-Emak: By
Edriana Noerdin, Director of Women Research Institute], Padang-today, 16 July
2019, http://www.padang-today.com/perjuangan-politik-emak-emak-oleh-edriana-
noerdin-direktur-women-research-institute-wri/.
107
Cora Vreede-De Stuers, Sejarah Perempuan Indonesia Gerakan dan Pencapaian
[The Indonesian Women: Struggle and Achievement], 2nd ed. (Depok, Indonesia:
Komunitas Bambu, 2017), pp. 146–49.
108
Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, “Indonesia: Local Advocacy for Suffrage”, in The
Palgrave Handbook of Women’s Political Rights, edited by Susan Franceschet,
Mona Lena Krook, and Netina Tan (London, Palgrave Macmillan: UK, 2019),
pp. 317–30.
109
Vreede-De Stuers, Sejarah Perempuan Indonesia Gerakan dan Pencapaian, p. 137.
110
Soeryocondro, “Potret Pergerakan Wanita di Indonesia”, p. 101.

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