19-025928-0051 - Memorandum (Justitia v. Medialdea) Dated 19 January 2021 (Signed)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

BRANCH 84
QUEZON CITY
SPL Civil Case No. Q-19-12182-CV
JUSTITIA LEX MACHINA ASSOCIATION INC., GALELEO

P. ANGELES, RAUL TANEDO, RODELLO ORTIZ and
NICHOLAS BONDOC,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary of the Philippines, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION (DoTr), herein represented by Hon.
Secretary ARTHUR TUGADE, LAND TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE (LTO), Represented by Hon. Assistant Secretary
EDGAR C. GALVANTE,
Respondents.
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MEMORANDUM
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Solicitor General JOSE C. CALIDA

Assistant Solicitor General HENRY S. ANGELES
State Solicitor LOUIE BRIAN R. SZE
Associate Solicitor LISELLE ANGELA I. BASCARA
Associate Solicitor ALGIE KWILLON MARIACOS
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
134 Amorsolo Street, Legazpi Village
Makati City
For: Respondents
MEMORANDUM
Justitia Lex Machina Association, Inc., et. al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea, et.al.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 84
QUEZON CITY
JUSTITIA LEX MACHINA

ASSOCIATION INC., GALELEO P.
ANGELES, RAUL TANEDO,
RODELLO ORTIZ and NICHOLAS
BONDOC,
Petitioners,
R-QZN 19-12182-CV
-versus- SPL Civil Case No.
______
HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, in For: Declaratory Relief
his capacity as Executive Secretary
of the Philippines, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION (DoTr),
herein represented by Hon.
Secretary ARTHUR TUGADE,
LAND TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE (LTO), Represented by
Hon. Assistant Secretary EDGAR C.
GALVANTE,
Respondents,
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MEMORANDUM
Respondents HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA in his

capacity as Executive Secretary of the Philippines,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, represented by
Hon. Secretary ARTHUR TUGADE and LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, represented by Hon.
Assistant Secretary EDGAR C. GALVANTE, through the
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG), unto this
Honorable Court, respectfully submit their Memorandum in
connection with the Petition for Declaratory Relief of
Petitioners Justitia Lex Machina Association, Inc., Galeleo P.
Angeles, Raul Tanedo, Rodello Ortiz and Nicholas Bondoc
(“Petitioners”).
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MEMORANDUM
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ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
1. On 16 August 2019, the OSG received this

Honorable Court’s Summons and Notice of Raffle dated 13
August 2019, requiring respondents to file an Answer to the
Petition for Declaratory Relief (Under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) within fifteen (15) days
after service or until 31 August 2019.
2. On 28 August 2019, the OSG received a copy of the

Order and Notice of Hearing issued by the Honorable Court
on 23 August 2019, setting a hearing on 6 September 2019
for the application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
3. On 29 August 2019, the OSG filed a Motion for

Extension to File Answer, praying for an additional period of
thirty (30) days from 31 August 2019, or until 30 September
2019, within which to file the required Answer.
4. On 3 September 2019, the Honorable Court issued

an Order, granting the said Motion for Extension to File
Answer and allowing the OSG until 30 September 2019
within which to file the Answer.
5. On 6 September 2019, the respective counsels of

the parties appeared before the Honorable Court for the
hearing set for the application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. During the hearing, the OSG
manifested that there is no implementation of R.A. No.
11235 since the government agencies concerned are still in
the process of formulating the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (“IRR”) for the assailed law. It was also
manifested that public hearings on the formulation was
currently being conducted and that the public, including
Petitioners, were allowed to participate therein.
6. On even date, the Honorable Court issued an Order

on even date, where it resolved as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court

RESOLVES as follows:
1) GRANTS the continuance of the petitioner for the

Prayer of TRO.
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MEMORANDUM
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2) TAKES NOTE the manifestation of the petitioner that

Atty. Abing will be the lead counsel and will be the
one receiving all the pleadings from the Court and
with the obligation to inform his other counsels.
3) TAKES NOTE of the manifestation of the respondents

thru Atty. Sze that the government is still in the
process of formulating the IRR of Republic Act
11235.
4) ORDERS petitioners to participate in the joint

consultation hearing before the DOTC and LTO for
the formulation of IRR of R.A. 11235.
5) ORDERS the LTO thru the Executive Director Romeo

Vera Cruz to notify petitioners thru Atty. Abing of the
scheduled consultation hearings.
6) GRANTS Atty. Abing 20 days, or until October 28,

2019, after pre-marking to file Judicial Affidavits of
intended witnesses with the attached exhibits and to
furnish the OSG thru AS Liselle Angela Bascara and
Atty. Louie Brian Sze.
7) GRANTS the reservation of AS Bascara and Atty. Sze

10 days from receipt of the Judicial Affidavits to
submit Opposition to the Prayer of TRO and Answer
to the Petition.
8) Set the pre-marking of all documentary evidence of

both parties on October 9, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.
before the Branch Clerk of Court appointed as
Hearing Commissioner.
9) Set the continuation of the hearing for Prayer for

TRO on November 8, 2019 at 8:30 a.m.
10) MODIFIES the Order of September 3, 2019

granting the extension to file answer of the OSG on
September 30, 2019 to be filed on or before
November 8, 2019.
11) INFORMS the parties and their counsels that

the proceedings taken during the summary hearing
of the provisional remedy shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the main case.
SO ORDERED.”
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MEMORANDUM
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7. On 9 October 2019, the pre-marking of the

documentary evidence of the parties was conducted before
the Branch Clerk of Court.
8. On 10 October 2019, the OSG received a copy of

Petitioners’ Motion to Admit Amended Petition dated 1
October 2019, where it included ‘natural persons’ who are
members of the association as individual petitioners.
9. On the same date, the OSG likewise received a

copy of Petitioners’ Manifestation dated 1 October 2019,
where it manifested that, on 30 September 2019, Petitioners
received an invitation from the LTO for a consultation
meeting for the formulation of the IRR of R.A. No. 11235
scheduled on 1 October 2019. However, it stated that
Petitioners declined to participate in the crafting of the IRR
“[c]onsidering that the position of the petitioners is for the
nullification of the said law, a direct attack on its
constitutionality” and thus “no amount of IRR could cure the
inherent defects of the law.”
10. On 7 November 2019, Respondents, through the

OSG, filed the Judicial Affidavit of Atty. Algie Kwillon
Mariacos dated 29 October 2019.
11. On 8 November 2019, the respective counsels of

the parties appeared before the Honorable Court for the
continuation of the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. During the
hearing, the OSG made a reservation as to the filing of a
consolidated comment on both original and amended
petition within fifteen (15) days from 8 November 2019, or
until 23 November 2019.1
12. On even date, the Honorable Court issued an Order

where it resolved as follows:
1) GRANTS the Petitioner’s Motion to Admit

Amended Petition;
2) TAKES NOTE of the Manifestations of Atty. Sze on

submission of Judicial Affidavit of their witnesses
and filing of Consolidated Comment/Opposition to
both Original and Amended Petition within 15
1
Since 23 November 2019 falls on a Saturday, the Answer was filed on the next working day.
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MEMORANDUM
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days from today and to furnish Petitioner’s

counsel a copy thereof;
3) TAKES NOTE Manifestation of Petitioner thru Atty.

Abing on their non-participation of the hearing;
4) Set the pre-trial hearing be held on December 6,

2019, at 2:00 p.m., January 31 and March 4,
2020, all at 9:00 a.m. for petitioner’s
presentation of witnesses.
13. On 25 November 2019, Respondents, thru the OSG,

filed its Comment to the Petition for Declaratory Relief,
dated 22 November 2019. In its Comment, Respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for Declaratory Relief
and the denial of Petitioners’ application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.
14. On 2 December 2019, Respondents, thru the OSG,

filed its Pre-Trial Brief dated 29 November 2019.
15. On 16 December 2019, the OSG received

Petitioners’ Pre-Trial Brief dated 3 December 2019.
16. On 31 January 2020, the respective counsels of the

parties appeared before the Honorable Court for the pre-trial
hearing.
17. On 17 February 2020, Respondents, thru the OSG,

filed its Comment to the judicial affidavits of Petitioners’
witnesses dated 14 February 2020.
18. On 1 June 2020, the OSG received a Motion to Set

Case for Hearing dated 1 June 2020, filed by Petitioners,
praying that the Honorable Court set a hearing for its
application for issuance of temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction on 19 June 2020 at 9:00 in the
morning.
19. On 2 June 2020, the Respondents, thru the OSG,

filed a Manifestation dated 1 June 2020, informing the
Honorable Court that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 11235 has been signed by
Asst. Secretary Galvante of the LTO, received by the U.P.
Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register
and published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
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MEMORANDUM
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20. On 6 June 2020, the OSG received an Order dated

3 June 2020 from the Honorable Court setting the hearing
for Petitioners’ application for issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction on 19 June
2020 thru videoconferencing.
21. On 19 June 2020, the respective counsels of the

parties appeared before the Honorable Court via
videoconferencing for the hearing for Petitioners’ application
for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction.
22. During the hearing, Petitioners were given until 29

June 2020 to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence, while
Respondents were given until 3 July 2020 to submit their
Comment thereto. Likewise, respective counsels of the
parties also agreed to submit, on or before 6 July 2020, their
respective memorandum of authorities or position papers in
connection with the temporary restraining order.
23. On 23 June 2020, the OSG received Petitioners’

Formal Offer of Exhibits dated 23 June 2020.
24. On 3 July 2020, Respondents, through the OSG,

filed its Comment [Re: Formal Offer of Exhibits (For the
Petitioners) dated 23 June 2020] dated 2 July 2020.
25. On 6 July 2020, Respondents, through the OSG,

filed its Memorandum of Authorities dated 3 July 2020,
praying that the Honorable Court deny Petitioners’
application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction. On the same date, Respondents,
through the OSG, filed its Manifestation informing the
Honorable Court that the LTO issued a Memorandum
deferring the implementation of the IRR of R.A. No. 11235.
26. On 6 July 2020, the OSG received Petitioners’

Memorandum of Authorities dated 6 July 2020 in relation to
its application for injunctive relief.
27. On 8 July 2020, the Honorable Court issued an

Order submitting for resolution the Petitioners’ application
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MEMORANDUM
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for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary

injunction.
28. On 13 August 2020, the OSG received the

Honorable Court’s Order dated 12 August 2020, denying
Petitioners’ application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order. In its Order, the Honorable Court held that
there is “no urgency and paramount necessity to issue the
injunctive relief to prevent any serious damage to herein
petitioners.”
29. On 20 August 2020, the respective counsels of the

parties appeared before the Honorable Court via
videoconferencing for the hearing on the main petition.
During the said hearing, Petitioners adopted their evidence
with respect to their application for issuance of temporary
restraining order to the main case and then rested their
case.
30. On 24 September 2020, the respective counsels of
the parties appeared before the Honorable Court via
videoconferencing for the continuation of the hearing on the
main petition. During the said hearing, Atty. Algie Mariacos
was presented as a witness by Respondents, through the
OSG, and then was subsequently subject to cross-
examination by counsel for Petitioners.
31. On 16 October 2020, the respective counsels of the

parties appeared before the Honorable Court in-court for the
continuation of the hearing on the main case, wherein the
cross, re-direct and re-cross examination of Atty. Algie
Mariacos continued.
32. During the same hearing, Respondent, through the

OSG, was given until 31 October 2020 to file its Formal Offer
of Evidence, while Petitioners were given fifteen (15) days
from receipt of such to file their Comment thereto.
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MEMORANDUM
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33. On 30 October 2020, Respondents, through the

OSG, filed its Formal Offer of Evidence dated 30 October
2020.
34. On 19 November 2020, the respective counsels of

During the hearing, the Honorable Court granted the parties
thirty (30) days to submit their respective Memoranda.
35. On 15 December 2020, the OSG received a copy of

Petitioners’ Memorandum dated 14 December 2020.
36. On 16 December 2020, the respective counsels of

During the hearing, the Honorable Court allowed
Respondents to submit its Memorandum thirty (30) days
from the actual date of securing the transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN).
37. On 21 December 2020, the OSG was able to secure

a copy of the said TSN.
38. Thus, the instant Memorandum is timely filed.

ARGUMENTS
I.
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT DUE TO
ITS DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING.
II.
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS

PROCEDURALLY INFIRM IN VIEW OF THE
ABSENCE OF SOME ITS ESSENTIAL
REQUISITES.
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MEMORANDUM
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A.
PETITIONERS HAVE NO LEGAL
STANDING TO INSTITUTE THE
INSTANT PETITION.
B.
THERE IS NO JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY AND THE ISSUE
INVOKED IS NOT YET RIPE FOR
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
III.
R.A. NO. 11235, JUST LIKE EVERY OTHER

LAW, ENJOYS A PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY. AN ENACTED LAW CAN
NEITHER BE DISREGARDED NOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION RESTRAINED WITHOUT A
PRIOR SHOWING, BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT SAID LAW IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A.
R.A. NO. 11235 IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS’
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
1.) THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID

PUBLIC INTEREST OR PURPOSE
HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN
THIS CASE.
2.) THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO.

11235 ARE REASONABLY
NECESSARY FOR THE
ATTAINMENT OF ITS PURPOSES.
FURTHER, THE MEANS
EMPLOYED ARE NOT UNDULY
OPPRESSIVE.
B.
APPLYING THE RATIONAL BASIS
TEST TO THE CASE AT BAR, IT IS
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MEMORANDUM
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CLEAR THAT R.A. NO. 11235 DOES

NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
C.
R.A. NO. 11235 DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PROVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT DUE TO
ITS DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING.
39. At the outset, Petitioners must remember that

compliance with procedural rules should not be taken lightly.
The Supreme Court constantly reminds litigants and their
counsels alike that “[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled
or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.”2
40. More emphatically, the Supreme Court has been

adamant that the bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel the suspension of procedural rules.3
41. In this case, it must be pointed out that the

verification and certification portion of this Petition is
defective. As such, there is non-compliance with the
requirement that an initiatory pleading, such as this Petition
for Declaratory Relief, must contain a certification against
forum shopping that is properly sworn under oath.
42. In the case of Ramos v. Baldo (“Ramos”),4 the

Supreme Court held that a Verification and Certification of
2
Magsino v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014, citing Bergonia v. Court of Appeals (4th
Division), G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012.
3
Ibid.
4
G.R. No. 199196, 20 March 2012.
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MEMORANDUM
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non-forum shopping notarized by the same lawyer who

signed the Petition was improper as, “having prepared and
signed the instant Petition, [counsel] is disqualified
from notarizing the Verification portion of the said
Petition”.5 A notary public is disqualified from performing a
notarial act if he is a party to the instrument or document
that is to be notarized.6
43. Here, the verification and certification portion was

signed by Atty. Rolito A. Abing, the same lawyer who signed
the Petition for Declaratory Relief with prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Being the lawyer who prepared and
signed the pleading, he is prohibited by the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice7 to notarize the verification and certification
portion, the latter being an indispensable part of the Petition
for Declaratory Relief with prayer for injunctive relief. Thus,
following the ruling in Ramos, the Verification/Certification
signed by Atty. Abing is improper and defective.
44. It is well-settled that “when the rule requires a

document to be under oath, it goes with it the requirement
that the said document must properly be under oath.
Improper notarization is no compliance at all.”8 With
the foregoing defects relating to the notarization thereof, the
Verification/Certification cannot be considered as properly
notarized, sworn, and under oath.
45. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. —

The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
5
Ibid.; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
6
Id. citing 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Sec. 3 (a).
7
Rule II, Section 2 9a) and Rule IV, Section 2 (b).
8
See Phoenix Iron and Steel Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 112141, 16
May 1995, 244 SCRA 173, 175 citing Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 96425, 4 February 1992, 205 SCRA 802; underscoring supplied.
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MEMORANDUM
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should thereafter learn that the same or similar action

or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report
that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing

requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions. (n)” (Emphasis Supplied)
46. Since this Petition contains a defective certification

against forum shopping, the same should be dismissed
outright.
II.
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF IS
PROCEDURALLY INFIRM IN VIEW OF THE
ABSENCE OF SOME ITS ESSENTIAL
REQUISITES
A.
PETITIONERS HAVE NO LEGAL
STANDING TO INSTITUTE THE
INSTANT PETITION
47. Next, it is well-settled that for a petition for

declaratory relief to prosper, it must be shown that (a) there
is a justiciable controversy, (b) the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse, (c) the party seeking
the relief has a legal interest in the controversy, and (d) the
issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.9
48. Substantially similar requirements are prescribed

before the Courts exercise their power of judicial review, or
9
CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, et.al., G.R. No. 172457, 24 December
2008.
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MEMORANDUM
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specifically, before they entertain cases assailing the

constitutionality of a law. In the case of Francisco, Jr. v.
House of Representatives10, the Honorable Supreme Court
summarized the essential requisites for judicial review as
follows:
“As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,

the courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to
several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very list mota
of the case.”
49. Notably, the requirements that the person

challenging the act must have a legal standing or legal
interest in the controversy and that there must be an actual
case or controversy are present in both.
50. In the case of The Provincial Bus Operators

Association of the Philippines (PBOAP), et.al. v. Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), et.al. (hereinafter
referred to as “PBOAP case”), the Supreme Court
comprehensively explained the concept of legal standing as
follows:
“Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of

appearance in a court of justice on a given question."
To possess legal standing, parties must show "a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
[they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being
challenged." The requirement of direct injury
guarantees that the party who brings suit has
such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
10
G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, citing Angara v. Electoral Commission.
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MEMORANDUM
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Standing in private suits requires that actions be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest, interest being "material interest or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about
the question involved." Whether a suit is public or
private, the parties must have "a present
substantial interest,'' not a "mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest." Those who bring the suit must possess their
own right to the relief sought.”11 (Emphasis Supplied)
51. The requirement that a person bringing the suit

must have legal standing is not a mere procedural
technicality that can be dispensed with for expediency. It
cannot be relaxed by a naked claim that the issues involved
are of transcendental importance. It is respectfully
submitted that the requirement of standing must be given
the importance it truly deserves, for the same springs from
the concept of separation of powers- a principle highly
guarded and respected under our current setup of
government.
52. As clearly explained by the Honorable Supreme

Court in the PBOAP case, the requisite of legal standing,
among others, is "built on the principle of separation of
powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or
invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by
its co-equal branches of government."12
53. In addition to the above justification, the

Supreme Court also noted that economic reasons justify the
rule. Thus:
“A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening

the standing of persons who desire to litigate
constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the
sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to
render efficient judicial service to our people is severely
limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors
to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly
overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure,
this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary
today.”13
11
G.R. No. 202275, 18 July 2018.
12
Supra Note 3. Citation omitted.
13
Id. Citation omitted.
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MEMORANDUM
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54. Having shown the justification for, and importance

of, the rule on legal standing, Respondents respectfully
submit that upon proper showing that Petitioners herein
have no legal standing to file this Petition, then this Petition
should be dismissed.
55. It is respectfully submitted that Petitioners are

not sufficiently numerous or representative of the class to
which they belong. In other words, Petitioners’ legal
standing cannot be justified under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
56. Based on the arguments raised in this Petition,

Petitioners clearly seek to represent not only the lawyer-
motorcycle owners/riders, but also the entire
motorcycle-riding public, whether owners or passengers.
In fact, another argument in the Petition supports the
conclusion that herein Petitioners also seek to represent
motorcycle traders, manufacturers, and importers.
57. Unfortunately, Petitioners cannot be considered

as numerous and representative enough as to fully protect
the interests of all concerned. In fact, Petitioners’ interests
may be different from the interests of “motorcycle owners,
many of whom are low-income Filipinos who badly need the
motorcycles for transportation or for their livelihood”; or
from the interests of “lowly motorcycle owners who make
use of motorcycles as a living”; or from the interests of the
manufacturers or importers of motorcycles who are to be
allegedly affected by R.A. No. 11235.
58. Petitioners did not claim that they are

representative of the bulk of motorcycle owners and users
who make use of motorcycle as a means of transportation or
livelihood. What is apparent is that Petitioners are
motorcycle owners who make use of motorcycles for an
entirely different purpose.
59. Moreover, there is clearly no proof that Petitioners

were authorized by the bulk of motorcycle owners or users
to bring this suit on their behalf. This is evident from the
statement of Ms. Gloria Claire Patrimonio Lastimosa II in her
judicial affidavit. When asked why she was testifying, she
candidly admitted that she learned only of the filing of this
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MEMORANDUM
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Petition. Question No. 6 and Ms. Lastimosa’s answer thereto

is reproduced below, to wit:
T6: Maaari mo bang ibahagi sa amin kung bakit

nandito ka ngayon na nagbibigay ng salaysay na ito at
humaharap dito sa husgado ngayon?
A: Nabalitaan ko po kasi na may isang grupo

ng mga abogado na sumasakay ng motorsiklo, na
nagsampa po ng petisyon dito sa husgado upang
kwestyunin ang Republic Act No. 11235 o ang
Motorcycle Crime Prevention Act of 2019 na kilala po
namin sa tawag na Doble Plaka Law xxx. (Emphasis
supplied)
60. Obviously, she and her alleged companions were

not consulted by the Petitioners prior to the filing of this
Petition. Not having been previously consulted, it follows
that the consent of Ms. Lastimosa and the association of
Angkas drivers and riders, whom Petitioners seek to
represent in this Petition, was not obtained. Clearly,
therefore, Petitioners were not authorized to bring this
Petition on behalf of the motorcycle owners or riders who
use motorcycles for a living.
61. There likewise remains no authority coming from

the motorcycle traders/distributors or from other groups
who Petitioners claim to be mostly affected by the relevant
provisions of R.A. No. 11235.
62. It must be stressed that proof of such authority is

necessary considering that the interests claimed to be
clearly affected by the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 11235
apparently belong to the bulk of motorcycle owners or users
who use motorcycles as a means of livelihood or as a daily
means of transportation.
63. While Petitioners’ zeal for advancing the cause of

the bulk of motorcycle owners and users is commendable,
this alone is insufficient to justify the dispensation of the
requirement that litigations should be brought by persons
with legal standing to bring the suit, or those whose interest
is to be affected by the results of the action. Sadly, this
Petition is not brought by the very persons whose interests
are to be affected by the action, but by an association and
individuals who may have an interest different from those
17
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who comprise the majority. Consequently, this petition for

declaratory relief must fail on the ground that it was brought
by parties who have no legal standing to bring the instant
Petition.
64. Finally, the defect in Petitioners’ standing cannot

simply be saved by a bare claim that the issues raised in this
Petition are of transcendental importance.
65. As held in the PBOAP case, “[o]nly constitutional

rights shared by many and requiring a grounded level of
urgency can be transcendent.”14 As will be discussed below,
R.A. No. 11235 is a valid exercise of police power and as
such, it is neither violative of due process, nor equal
protection clause, nor social justice.
66. On a final note, the reminder of the Honorable

Court in the PBOAP case is worth quoting, thus:
“This Court is not a forum to appeal political and policy

choices made by the Executive, Legislative, and other
constitutional agencies and organs. This Court dilutes
its role in a democracy if it is asked to substitute
its political wisdom for the wisdom of accountable
and representative bodies where there is no
unmistakable democratic deficit. It cannot lose
this place in the constitutional order. Petitioners'
invocation of our jurisdiction and the justiciability
of their claims must be presented with rigor.
Transcendental interest is not a talisman to blur
the lines of authority drawn by our most
fundamental law.”15
B.
THERE IS NO JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY AND THE ISSUE
INVOKED IS NOT YET RIPE FOR
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION.
67. To reiterate, one of the essential requisites to

assail the constitutionality of a law and for the propriety of a
petition for declaratory relief is the existence of justiciable
controversy. Likewise, the issues raised in the Petition or
action must be ripe for judicial adjudication.
14
Supra Note 3.
15
Supra Note 3. Emphasis supplied.
18
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68. In the PBOAP case, an actual case or controversy

is defined as "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented
are "definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests." The conflict
must be ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's
decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning
legislative or executive action.”16
69. In the same PBOAP case, the Honorable Supreme

Court proceeded to explain that “[e]ven the expanded
jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does
not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory
opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or
hypothetical. In such cases, the conflict will not have
sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain
the discretion of this Court. After all, legal arguments from
concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties.
Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits.
They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind
the future parties who may have more motives to choose
specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a
real conflict between the parties, there must exist actual
facts from which courts can properly determine whether
there has been a breach of constitutional text.”17
70. As an illustration of cases where there are no

actual controversies, the Honorable Supreme Court cited in
the PBOAP case the cases of Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council18 and
Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio Harry Roque, et al.19
Relevant portion of the PBOAP Decision provides:
“The absence of actual facts caused the dismissal of the

petitions in Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council. In that case,
the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 93 72 or the Human Security Act of
2007 that defines and punishes the crime of terrorism.
16
Id. Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
17
Supra Note 3. Citation omitted.
18
G.R. No. 178552, 5 October 2010.
19
G.R. No. 204603, 24 September 2013.
19
MEMORANDUM
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They contended that since the enactment of the

statute, they had been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces" and branded as
"enemies of the State."
In dismissing the petitions, this Court said that there

were no "sufficient facts to enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues." Petitioners'
allegations of "sporadic 'surveillance' and ... being
tagged as 'communist fronts'" were not enough to
substantiate their claim of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents. Absent actual facts,
this Court said that the Southern Hemisphere
petitions operated in the "realm of the surreal
and merely imagined." "Allegations of abuse must
be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."
The petitioners in Republic of the Philippines v.

Herminio Harry Roque, et al. likewise challenged
provisions of the Human Security Act, this time, via a
petition for declaratory relief filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the
case, this Court decided Southern Hemisphere, where,
as just discussed, the challenge against the
constitutionality of the Human Security Act was
dismissed. Thus, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss
before the Regional Trial Court, arguing that the
declaratory relief case may no longer proceed.
The Regional Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss

on the ground that this Court in Southern Hemisphere
did not pass upon the constitutionality issue. However,
this Court, on certiorari, set aside the Regional Trial
Court's order and dismissed the declaratory relief
petitions because they did not properly allege a "state
of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation."
This Court said:
Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an

existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by "ripening
seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued
facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute
may be tried at its inception before it has
accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity,
passion, and violence of a full blown battle that
looms ahead. The concept describes a state of
facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation
20
MEMORANDUM
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provided that the issue is not settled and

stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.
A perusal of private respondents' petition for

declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in
immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of
RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the
Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only
assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and
infractions which the government could prospectively
commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain
untrammeled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were
addressed to the general public. They, however, failed
to show how these remarks tended towards any
prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards
the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other
words, there was no particular, real or imminent
threat to any of them.”20
71. In this case, the petition for declaratory relief is

improper due to the absence of a justiciable controversy and
the issues raised are not yet ripe for judicial determination.
This is so because, as admitted by Petitioners, the filing of
its Petition was “prior to its supposed implementation thru
an enabling Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).”
Since there was no “enabling” IRR yet during the time of the
filing of the action for declaratory relief, the present Petition
is clearly premature, and thus improper.
72. The case of Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. v.

Republic21 is also instructive. In said case, the Supreme
Court declared the action for declaratory relief filed by Bayan
Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) as improper on the
grounds that there is no justiciable controversy and that the
issue raised therein was not yet ripe for judicial
determination. As observed by the Supreme Court in said
case, there is no justiciable controversy considering that,
among others, there are yet no implementing rules or
guidelines issued by the National Telecommunication
Commission to implement or carry into effect the
20
Supra Note 3. Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.
21
G.R. No. 161140, 31 January 2007.
21
MEMORANDUM
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requirement imposed by the assailed provision of

Republic Act 7925.
73. In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully

submitted that this Petition is premature since it failed to
show that there is already an actual case or controversy at
the time of its filing. The subsequent passage of the IRR
does not serve as a curative effect to this defect. Otherwise,
this would open the floodgates to numerous suits grounded
on mere speculations.
74. Even assuming but not conceding that the facts

subsequent to the filing of the Petition should be considered
by the Honorable Court, there is no allegation in the Petition
that Petitioners have suffered any actual injury or that R.A.
No. 11235 has already been implemented. Accordingly, the
issue herein cannot be considered as ripe for adjudication.
75. In the case of Lozano v. Nograles22, the High

Court had occasion to explain the concept of “ripeness”, to
wit:
In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is

generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to
determine whether an action has already been
accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in.23
76. This is especially noteworthy in view of the

deferment of the implementation of the plate-related
provisions of the IRR of R.A. No. 11235, pursuant to the
Memorandum entitled “Deferment of Implementation of All
Plate Related Provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 11235 and
the Updating of Records under Section 4 of its Implementing
Rules and Regulations” dated 20 November 2020, as signed
by Assistant Secretary Edgar C. Galvante of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO).24
22
G.R. No. 187883, 16 June 2009.
23
Emphasis supplied.
24
A copy of the Memorandum dated 20 November 2020 is attached hereto as Annex “1”.
22
MEMORANDUM
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77. Under the said Memorandum, the LTO extended

its formal instructions to defer the implementation of the
“plate related provisions” of R.A. No. 11235, in view of the
“extended imposition of community quarantine nationwide
and to ensure adherence to health protocols at LTO offices
to mitigate the spread of Covid-19.”
78. Such deferment of the implementation of the

plate-related provisions of the IRR makes it even more
apparent that the present Petition cannot pass the test of
justiciability. In the case of Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner , the Court aptly held:
25
“. . . Without undertaking to survey the intricacies

of the ripeness doctrine, it is fair to say that its basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete
way by the challenging parties.”
III.
R.A. NO. 11235, JUST LIKE EVERY OTHER
LAW, ENJOYS A PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY. AN ENACTED LAW CAN
NEITHER BE DISREGARDED NOR ITS
IMPLEMENTATION RESTRAINED WITHOUT A
PRIOR SHOWING, BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT SAID LAW IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
79. As early as 1925, in the case of Yu Cong Eng v.

Trinidad26, the Supreme Court categorically declared that the
presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a
law, to wit:
“xxx the presumption is always in favor of

constitutionality. As the United States Supreme Court
in a case of Philippine origin said: ". . . The function
of the legislature is primary, its exercise fortified
by presumption of right and legality, and is not to
be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial
conception of its wisdom or propriety. . . ."
25
387 U.S. 136 (1967)
26
G.R. No. L-20479, 6 February 1925.
23
MEMORANDUM
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(Weems v. United States [1910], 217 U.S., 349.) This

presumption is especially strong in the case of
statutes enacted to promote a public purpose,
such as statutes relating to taxation. To doubt is to
sustain.27
80. In a subsequent case of Alba, et. al. vs.

Evangelista, et al. 28, the Supreme Court explained that “the
presumption is based upon the theory of separation of
powers which makes the enactment and repeal of
laws exclusively a legislative function.” 29
81. In yet another case, even the Honorable Supreme

Court reminded itself of its duty of “purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional”. This is the
declaration of the Supreme Court in the case of Drilon v.
Executive Secretary30, to wit:
“In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are

advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing
in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will
be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court
in the consideration of its validity, which is better
determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate
body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including
this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure
was first carefully studied by the executive and
the legislative departments and determined by
them to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to
sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty
27
Emphasis supplied.
28
G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433, 17 January 1957.
29
Emphasis supplied.
30
G.R. No. 112497, 4 August 1994, 253 SCRA 135.
24
MEMORANDUM
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it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be

struck down.”31
82. Of a more recent vintage, the case of Estrada v.

Sandiganbayan32 explains:
“Xxx the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to

the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in
harmony with the Constitution… This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its
bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the
duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the
legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of
the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment
of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.”33
83. In fact, jurisprudence abounds34 regarding the

topic on presumption of constitutionality of laws. It is
respectfully submitted that this presumption is among those
most upheld, settled, and reasonable presumptions,
31
Emphasis supplied.
32
G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
33
Emphasis supplied.
34
See La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Yaranon, G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA
828 where the Supreme Court held that “as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is
supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted.
Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other
available grounds.”; Garcia vs. Comelec, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993 where the Supreme Court held
that “every law enjoys the presumption of validity. The presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom,
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by
whom the law is approved, for upholding the Constitution is not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but
also the duty of the legislative and executive.”.
25
MEMORANDUM
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anchored, as it does, on the very concept of separation of

powers.
84. In view of the presumption of constitutionality

accorded to every piece of legislation, the burden to rebut
the said presumption rests upon those challenging the law’s
constitutionality.
85. In the case of Paredes, et. al. v. Executive

Secretary35, the Honorable Supreme Court clearly stated
that the “onerous task of proving [unconstitutionality of a
law] is on the party seeking to nullify the statute.”36
86. Likewise, in the case of Estrada v.

Sandiganbayan , the Honorable Supreme Court elaborated
37
on the nature of Petitioners’ obligation to prove their claim

that a law is unconstitutional, thus:
“Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the

presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there
is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for
absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality.”38
87. Having laid and discussed the basis of the

presumption of constitutionality of laws, and the burden of
Petitioners to rebut such presumption, the question now
shifts on the amount of evidence required to overcome or
rebut the presumption.
88. In previous cases39, the Supreme Court

consistently held that for a law to be nullified, “it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
35
G.R. No. 55628, 2 March 1984.
36
Citation omitted.
37
G.R. No. 148560, 10 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
38
Emphasis and underscoring supplied. Citation omitted.
39
See Aris (Phils), Inc. vs. NLRC, et. al., GR No. 90501, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 246, where the
Supreme Court held that “to justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication xxx”; Garcia vs. Comelec, 227 SCRA
100, October 5, 1993 where the Supreme Court held that “to strike down a law as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits. The
annulment cannot be decreed on a doubtful, and arguable implication. The universal rule of legal
hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.”
(citations omitted); David vs. Comelec, GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997, where the Supreme Court held
that “For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal (not just implied)
breach of the Constitution. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.”; among others.
26
MEMORANDUM
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the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal

one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear
and beyond reasonable doubt.”40
89. If the constitutionality of the law is doubtful, the

rule is always for the Courts to sustain the law’s validity. As
eloquently stated by the Honorable Court in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan41, “A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly
suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."42
90. Now, the foregoing premises considered, the

question left is this: Did Petitioners, by the evidence
presented, successfully rebut the presumption of
constitutionality accorded to R.A. No. 11235? It is
respectfully submitted that Petitioners did not. Necessarily,
the validity of R.A. No. 11235 must be sustained by the
Honorable Court.
91. To recall, during the hearing on the main Petition

held on 20 August 2020, the Petitioners adopted their
evidence with respect to their application for issuance of
temporary restraining order to the main case and thereafter
rested their case. In their application for injunctive writ,
which was denied by the Honorable Court, Petitioners
presented two witnesses namely, Atty. Galileo Angeles (Atty.
Angeles) and Ms. Lastimosa. Respondents respectfully
submit that the same are sorely insufficient to overcome the
presumption of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 11235.
Notably, only the following evidence were presented before
this Honorable Court by Petitioners, to wit:
A.) Testimony of Atty. Angeles
In his Judicial Affidavit, Atty. Angeles basically

offered his opinion why R.A. No. 11235 is
unconstitutional. He discussed, ‘on a legalist point
of view’, why he considers R.A. No. 11235 as
oppressive, an invalid exercise of police power,
and repugnant to the Constitution’s mandate of
Due Process and Equal Protection Clause.
40
Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
41
Supra Note
42
Emphasis supplied. Citation omitted.
27
MEMORANDUM
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B.) Testimony of Ms. Lastimosa
In her Judicial Affidavit, Ms. Lastimosa testified

essentially on the following matters namely, a.)
that she is a motorcycle operator of Angkas since
2018; b.) that she learned of this Petition filed by
Petitioners; c.) that she thereafter coordinated
with Petitioners and volunteered to help in
preventing the implementation of R.A. No. 11235;
d.) that she learned about the provisions of the
law and as a consequence, she was confused,
surprised, frightened, and felt sad; e.) that she is
driving a Yamaha SZ 150cc, photos of which were
attached to her Judicial Affidavit; f.) that she
wishes the enjoinment of the implementation of
R.A. No. 11235.
C.) Photos of Ms. Lastimosa’s alleged

motorcycle
This was offered to prove that “the design of the

motorcycle of the witness and all other
motorcycles in the Philippines have no provisions
for front plate”.
92. On the testimony of Atty. Angeles. It must be

stressed that Respondents strongly maintain that the
testimony of Atty. Angeles, save for his few preliminary
answers, is inadmissible for being a mere opinion. To recall,
Atty. Angeles was never presented as an expert witness.
Maintaining their earlier position that Atty. Angeles’
testimony is inadmissible, Respondents decided not to cross-
examine him.
93. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the

testimony of Atty. Angeles was validly admitted for the
purpose for which the same was offered, it is respectfully
submitted that the same has no weight or probative value. If
ever it has, certainly it cannot prevail over the collective
work of Congress and the Executive Department.
Precisely, the reason why the Supreme Court reminded itself
and other lower courts to exercise “purposeful hesitation”
before declaring a law unconstitutional is because of the
assumption that the law in question has been “studied by
the executive and the legislative departments and
28
MEMORANDUM
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determined by them to be in accordance with the

fundamental law before it was finally approved.”43 It is
respectfully submitted, therefore, that one lawyer’s opinion
about the law’s unconstitutionality, without evidence to back
up the same, cannot and should not prevail over the
collective work and effort of Congress and the President.
94. On the testimony of Ms. Lastimosa and the

photo of her alleged motorcycle. Again, Ms. Lastimosa’s
testimony is likewise insufficient to overturn the presumption
of constitutionality. She merely expressed her reactions,
emotions, and opinion about certain provisions of R.A. No.
11235. Certainly, this is not the evidence required by law to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality.
95. Likewise, even assuming, for the sake of

argument, that Ms. Lastimosa’s alleged motorcycle, as
shown in the photo, has no existing provision to
accommodate a front plate, the same does not prove the
allegation of Petitioners that all motorcycles in the
Philippines are similarly situated.
96. In any case, even if Ms. Lastimosa’s motorcycle

has no existing provision to accommodate a front plate, or
all motorcycles for that matter, if said motorcycles can be
reasonably modified to accommodate a front plate without
posing real and imminent risk to the safety of the driver and
the passenger, then the requirement of the law is not
unreasonable.
97. Based on the above, it is readily apparent that

Petitioners failed to discharge their burden to prove the
alleged unconstitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No.
11235. The totality of the evidence presented, assuming the
said pieces of evidence are admissible in accordance with
the Rules, are certainly not enough to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality. As mentioned above, the
Supreme Court consistently held that the grounds for nullity
of a law must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.44 In
43
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 10 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
44
See Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991; Aris (Phils), Inc. vs. NLRC, et. al., GR No.
90501, August 5, 1991; Garcia vs. Comelec, 227 SCRA 100, October 5, 1993; Peralta vs. COMELEC, L-
47771, 11 March 1978; Macalintal vs. Comelec, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003; The Executive Secretary
vs. Court of Appeals, 429 SCRA 81, May 25, 2004; Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235
SCRA 135; David vs. Comelec, GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997; Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
148560, November 19, 2001; Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, June 25, 2013.
29
MEMORANDUM
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this case, it is respectfully submitted that the totality of

evidence presented by Petitioners does not even come close
to the said degree of proof required to rebut the
presumption. In Morfe v. Mutuc45, the Supreme Court, in
upholding the constitutionality of the assailed law,
rationalized in this wise:
“In the absence of a factual foundation, or

evidence to rebut the presumption of validity of a law,
such presumption of validity must prevail. Plaintiff did
not present evidence to rebut the presumption of
validity. In the present case . . . there was no factual
foundation on which the nullification of this section of
the statute could be based. Hence as noted the decision
of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.”
98. Absent a clear and unequivocal showing by

Petitioners of any basis to invalidate the assailed law, the
Court is humbly implored to rule in favor of the presumption
of constitutionality and sustain the validity of R.A. No.
11235.
A.
R.A. NO. 11235 IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS’
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
The existence of a valid public

interest or purpose has been
established in this case.
99. The guarantees of due process and equal protection

of the laws are enshrined in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The said provision states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
100. Substantive due process requires that the exercise

of police power should have (1) lawful subject, and (2)
45
22 SCRA 424, 31 January 1968.
30
MEMORANDUM
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lawful means. Thus, in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.46,

the Court held that:
“[T]he State x x x may be considered as

having properly exercised [its] police power only
if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short,
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.”
101. In the instant case, there is no question that the

first requirement of the existence of a valid public interest or
purpose is met. R.A. No. 11235 is enacted precisely to
address the problem on criminality, a problem which is a
concern of all minded citizens.
102. In the Declaration of Policy of R.A. No. 11235, the

purpose and object of the legislation is clearly expressed as
follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – Article II, Section 5 of

the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure and safeguard
its citizenry from crimes committed with the use of
motorcycles through bigger, readable and color-coded
number plates and identification marks.
103. The intent behind the bill was likewise expressed

by Senator Richard J. Gordon in his sponsorship speech
during the deliberations of R.A. No. 11235. To note, Senator
Gordon “lamented that the riding-in-tandem criminals were
relentless in killing with impunity, regardless of their victims’
status in life and irrespective of their gender, noting that
every time the case goes unsolved, the confidence of the
people drops and the government loses its credibility.”47
Further, he “expressed hope that mandating such a change
might act as a deterrent and even solve such crimes since
46
G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008, 517 SCRA 657; emphasis supplied.
47
Senate Journal. Session No. 75. 17th Congress, 1st Regular Session, 15 March 2017, p. 1283.
31
MEMORANDUM
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criminals would have to think twice before carrying out their

schemes.”48
104. In the case of Taxicabs Operators of Metro Manila,

Inc. v. Board of Transportation49, the Supreme Court held
that, pursuant to the exercise of its police power, the State
can prescribe regulations that affects the general welfare:
“The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can

prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights. In the language of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded’.”
105. Promoting public security and safety by deterring

motorcycle-related crimes undoubtedly falls within the
interest of the public and constitutes a valid public purpose.
Surely, it is within the police power of the state to protect its
citizens from killings which are carried out through the use
of motorcycles.
106. Considering that the assailed law has a valid

public purpose, there is a presumption of validity accorded
to R.A. No. 11235 which Petitioners miserably failed to
overturn.
The provisions of R.A. No. 11235

are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of its purposes. Further,
the means employed are not unduly
oppressive.
107. In determining the validity of R.A. No. 11235, the

question to be addressed is whether the provisions of the
assailed law are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
its purposes, and whether such are unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
48
Id., p. 1284.
49
G.R. No. L-59234, 30 September 1982.
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MEMORANDUM
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108. In this case, the provisions of R.A. No. 11235

manifestly further the policy of the State to secure and
safeguard its citizenry from motorcycle-related crimes.
109. It should be highlighted that during the hearing,

Petitioners put in question the percentage of crimes
committed through the use of motorcycles, based on the
statistics on crimes perpetrated by motorcycle-riding
criminals, as appended to the judicial affidavit of Atty. Algie
Mariacos. Simply put, Petitioners’ argument was that the
number of motorcycle-related crimes committed is very
miniscule compared to the total number of registered
motorcycles in the country and accordingly, there is no
direct correlation between the means adopted in the law and
the purpose of such.
110. This argument is wholly unmeritorious.
111. Based on the statistics presented and as pointed

out by Respondents during the hearing, there exists,
however, a real and significant disparity between the
number of solved versus unsolved crimes which are
perpetrated through the use of motorcycles. As such, it
is not difficult to comprehend the connection between the
provisions of R.A. No. 11235 and the intent behind the
assailed law to further the policy of the State to secure and
safeguard its citizenry from motorcycle-related crimes.
112. Hence, requiring motorcycles to bear number

plates and/or identification marks which are readable and
color-coded is a means which is reasonably necessary for
the legislature’s purpose to address the issue of the growing
number of unsolved motorcycle-related crimes. Verily, the
provisions of R.A. No. 11235, such as requiring a front plate
for motorcycles, will aid police officers in identifying
perpetrators behind crimes committed through the use of
motorcycles.
113. As such, the number of motorcycle-related crimes

compared to the total number of registered motorcycles in
the country cannot be considered as the yardstick to
determine whether there is a reasonable necessity between
the means employed by R.A. No. 11235 and the purposes it
seeks to promote. To note, Algie Mariacos explained the
foregoing in his testimony, as follows:
33
MEMORANDUM
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(Re-Cross Examination of Atty. Algie Mariacos by Atty.

Rolito Abing)
Q: Do you have any data to show that the imposition

of the double plate on motorcycle will prevent these
crimes that you have mentioned?
XXX
A: There is no data, your Honor, but there is a

correlation if we use logic because it helps in the
identification of the motorcycle used in the commission
of the crime which will eventually lead to further
investigation on those who may have used the
motorcycle in committing the crime. And it helps
definitely and certainly in police investigations. So,
usually I think those unsolved cases were because they
cannot identify the motorcycle and stops the
investigation.50
114. In the early case of Fabie v. City of Manila51, the

Supreme Court upheld the validity of an ordinance relating
to the issuance of permits for the erection of buildings. In
ruling that the said ordinance was reasonably necessary to
accomplish its purpose to protect the health, lives and
property of the citizens of Manila against ravages of fire and
disease, the Court held as follows:
“There can be no question as to the intent and purpose

of the provision of the ordinance under discussion. It is
manifestly intended to subserve the public health and
safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was not
conceived in favor of any class or of particular
individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and
safety of the city deemed the enactment of the
ordinance necessary to secure these purposes, and it
cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably
necessary to that end it was and is a due and proper
exercise of the police power. We are of opinion that
the enforcement of its provisions cannot fail to
redound to the public good, and that it should be
sustained on the principle that "the welfare of the
people is the highest law" (salus populi suprema
est lex). Indeed having in mind the controlling
public necessity which demands the adoption of
proper measures to secure the ends sought to be
attained by the enactment of this provisions of
50
TSN, Re-Cross Examination of Mariacos, dated 16 October 2020, pp. 9-10.
51
G.R. No. L-6583, 16 February 1912.
34
MEMORANDUM
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the ordinances; and the large discretion

necessarily vested in the legislative authority to
determine not only what the interests of the
public require, but what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interest; we are
satisfied that we would not be justified in an
attempt to restrict or control the exercise of that
discretion even if the "reasonable necessity" for
its exercise in the particular form actually
adopted were much less apparent than it is in this
case.
That the ordinance is not "unduly oppressive upon

individuals" becomes very clear when the nature and
extent of the limitations imposed by its provisions upon
the use of private property are considered with relation
to the public interests, the public health and safety,
which the ordinance seeks to secure. Discussing this
question in his opinion to the Municipal Board relative
to the validity and constitutionality of this ordinance,
the Attorney-General well said: "Under the ordinance
before us rights in private property are not arbitrary
regulated. No person desiring to erect a building is
prohibited from doing so. He can, if necessary, lay out
a private street or the city can extend the public street
system. The property may thus be substantially
increased in value rather than the reverse, In brief, the
owner's right to the enjoyment of his property is only
interfered with in so far as it is necessary to protect the
rights of others."52
115. Requiring double plates and the imposition of

penalties constitute a valid exercise of police power, since it
will manifestly aid police officers in the easier identification
of motorcycles which are used to facilitate a crime.
Ultimately, the enforcement of the provisions of R.A. No.
11235 will redound to the general welfare or common good
to promote the safety and security of the citizenry against
motorcycle-related crimes. In his testimony, Atty. Algie
Mariacos clearly demonstrated the reasonable and direct
correlation between the means provided by the law and the
purpose of such, thus:
(Re-Cross Examination of Atty. Algie Mariacos by Atty.

Rolito Abing)
Court:
52
Emphasis supplied.
35
MEMORANDUM
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Q: Based on your publication, can you inform the

Court what was the delima [sic] encountered by the
PNP particularly in solving the crimes involving
motorcycle incidents?
A: The delima [sic] encountered by the PNP is usually

the fact that they stopped their investigation or they
cannot proceed with their investigation because of their
failure to identify the motorcycle which was used either
in facilitating the crime or as a means to escape from
the crime scene. So based also on the records of the
Senate, they see this as a remedy because if they can
identify the motorcycle which was used, they can trace
it to the owner.
Q: Are you telling to the Court, for instance,

considering all the CCTV’s in highway let’s say in EDSA
and all other scene considering that the motorcycle has
no front plate number the identification of the vehicle
can only be taken by the CCTV after it has fled already
several meters away after the scene of the crime or
after the consummation of the crime. Is that correct or
not?
A: It’s not accurate, YH. The CCTV can not get the
motorcycle even if its located at the back because first,
it [sic] small that’s why, the law is precisely
implemented or in acted [sic] to enlarge those plates
and . . . .
Q: The plate number?
A: The plate numbers
Q: It should be placed before and after?
A: Before and after. It may also help if one is placed

in front because while the motorcycle is fleeing from
the crime scene, the CCTV in front may get the plate
number in front of the motorcycle as opposed to when
it placed only at the back, it may be . . . the chances of
getting the identity of the motorcycle is low as opposed
to.53
116. It bears to note that it is common knowledge that

a motorcycle cannot, at present, be identified from the rear
view of another vehicle and can only be described by its
color, size or other generic features. Without question, such
characteristics of a motorcycle make it difficult for police
53
TSN, Re-Cross Examination of Mariacos, dated 16 October 2020, pp. 11-12.
36
MEMORANDUM
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officers to identify said vehicle when used as a means to

commit a crime. As such, the provisions of R.A. No. 11235
are intended to subserve public safety and there is nothing
arbitrary nor unreasonable in the means provided
thereunder to further such purpose.
117. Too, the validity of R.A. No. 11235 should be

upheld pursuant to the principle of salus populi suprema est
lex. In the case of JMM Promotion and Management v. Court
of Appeals54, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to shed
light on the said principle, to wit:
The latin maxim salus populi est surprema

lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum
of public laws aimed at promoting the general
welfare of the people under the State's police
power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which
virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least
limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide
panoply of instruments through which the state,
as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power,

Justice Malcolm, in the early case of Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro wrote:
"The police power of the State," one court has said... is

a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed "the law of overruling necessity." It may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried
onward by the current of legislature, the judiciary
rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law
do not go beyond the great principles that mean
security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily
interfere with the right of the individual.
Thus, police power concerns government enactments

which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the
common good. As the assailed Department Order
enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden
rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said
order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily
or unreasonably.”
54
G.R. No. 120095, 5 August 1996.
37
MEMORANDUM
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118. Likewise, Petitioners in the present case have not

shown that the provisions of R.A. No. 11235 constitute an
arbitrary interference on the rights of the public.
119. In their Petition, Petitioners specifically assail the

constitutionality of R.A. No. 11235 in its Petition for being
unjust and oppressive on the following grounds: (1) that
Section 19 penalizes those who fail to immediately register
and secure the required license plates within the given
period; (2) that the penalty provided under Section 12, i.e.
imprisonment, is not commensurate with the offense of
erasing, tampering, forging, imitating, covering or
concealing a number plate or readable number plate and
intentional use thereof; (3) that eradicating motorcycle-
aided killings in the country is unreasonable and oppressive
as the punishment to address the actions and intents of few
criminals should not be levied upon the majority; (4) no
criminal would ever use their own motorcycle and real plates
in the commission of crimes.
120. First. There is no merit in the argument that “[t]he

inclusion of prison terms is uncalled for since there are
various reasons that the citizenry may fail to register their
motorcycles on time for reasons beyond their control or by
sheer inadvertence.”55
121. The failure to register a motor vehicle, regardless

of the underlying reasons of such failure, is a serious matter
and should not be taken lightly. Section 5, Article I of R.A.
4136, otherwise known as the “Land Transportation Code”
provides that “[n]o motor vehicle shall be used or operated
on or upon any public highway of the Philippines unless the
same is properly registered for the current year in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Thus, the fact
that the owner of a motorcycle has “valid reasons” for not
registering such is of no moment.
122. The Supreme Court has lengthily discussed the

magnitude of importance of registration of motor vehicles in
the case of Villanueva v. Domingo56, to wit:
55
Amended Petition, p. 8.
56
G.R. No. 144274, 20 September 2004, 438 SCRA 485.
38
MEMORANDUM
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“The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as

amended) provides that no vehicle may be used or
operated upon any public highway unless the same is
property registered. It has been stated that the system
of licensing and the requirement that each machine
must carry a registration number, conspicuously
displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the
danger of injury to pedestrians and other travelers from
the careless management of automobiles. And to
furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons
violating the laws and ordinances, regulating the speed
and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R.C.L.
1176). Not only are vehicles to be registered and that
no motor vehicles are to be used or operated without
being properly registered for the current year, but that
dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish thee Motor
Vehicles Office a report showing the name and address
of each purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous
month and the manufacturers serial number and motor
number. (Section 5(c), Act No. 3992, as amended.)
Registration is required not to make said

registration the operative act by which ownership in
vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,
because the administrative proceeding of registration
does not bear any essential relation to the contract of
sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and
Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and
operation of the vehicle upon any public highway
(section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The main
aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public
highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways
caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is
to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or
injuries caused on public highways:
One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles

legislation is identification of the vehicle and of the
operator, in case of accident; and another is that the
knowledge that means of detection are always available
may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law
and of the rules of conservative and safe operation.
Whatever purpose there may be in these statutes, it is
39
MEMORANDUM
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subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of

rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the
rules of safety shall not escape because of lack of
means to discover him. The purpose of the statute is
thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a "share
and delusion," if courts would entertain such defenses
as that put forward by appellee in this case. No
responsible person or corporation could be held liable
for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they
should be allowed to pace a "middleman" between
them and the public, and escape liability by the manner
in which they recompense servants. (King vs. Brenham
Automobile Co., Inc. 145 S.W. 278, 279.)
123. Without a doubt, the imposition of strict penalties

under the law is a reasonable means to ensure that all
motorcycle owners will comply with the requirements under
the subject law. As a consequence, this will ensure that the
purpose of the law will not be defeated. Authorities will be
aided in identifying perpetrators of motorcycle-aided crimes,
thus deterring the increasing number of such crimes in the
country.
124. Second. Petitioners submit that Section 12 of R.A.

No. 11235 is absurd and unjust since “if a person who sells
or buys the number plate proves that he or she has no
knowledge that it was erased, tampered, altered, forged or
imitated, he or she will be punished by arresto mayor.”57
125. There is nothing absurd or unjust with the said

provision because the aforementioned prohibition under
Section 12 is in furtherance of the policy of the statute to
safeguard the citizenry from crimes committed through the
use of motorcycles. Surely, penalizing one who sells or
purchases a number plate which has been erased, tampered,
altered, forged or imitated number plate, even though
he/she had no knowledge of such fact of erasure, tampering,
alteration, forging or imitation, would serve as a deterrent
for illegal operations engaged in the sale of fake readable
number plates. This will likewise ensure that motorcycle
owners will be wary about purchasing number plates.
126. It bears to note that P.D. 1730 has already

declared the illegal printing, manufacture, distribution
and/or use of fake official Bureau of Land Transportation
57
Amended Petition, p. 8.
40
MEMORANDUM
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accountable forms and documents and of motor vehicle

number plates and stickers as offenses constituting
economic sabotage. Further, Section 31, Article II of R.A.
4136 provides:
Section 31. Imitation and false representations. - No

person shall make or use attempt to make or use a
driver's license, badge, certificate of registration,
number plate, tag, or permit in imitation or similitude
of those issued under this Act, or intended to be used
as or for a legal license, badge, certificate, plate, tag or
permit, or with intent to sell or otherwise dispose of the
same to another. No person shall falsely or fraudulently
represent as valid and in force any driver's license,
badge, certificate, plate, tag or permit issued under this
Act which is delinquent or which has been revoked or
suspended.
No person shall, knowingly and with intent to deceive,

make one or more false or fraudulent statements in an
application for the registration of vehicles, or for a
driver's license.
127. In any case, Respondents see no reason why one

buys or sells a number plate in the first place. If one needs a
number plate, he or she must obtain it from the LTO, not
from any other person or entity. One cannot also sell a
number plate with the end view that the same will be used
by the buyer since number plates are to be prepared and
issued by the LTO only.
128. The only apparent reason why one sells or buys a

number plate is to cause the transfer of said number plate
from one motorcycle to another. But as early as 1979, the
act of transferring a motor vehicle plate from one motor
vehicle to another is prohibited.
129. Under Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 43,

amending R.A. 4316, the mere act of transferring motor
vehicle plates from one motor vehicle to another without
permit from the Bureau of Land Transportation, regardless
of whether the actor knew that such plate is tampered or
not, is penalized. A portion of said provision is reproduced
below, to wit:
Section 17. Number Plates, preparation, and issuance

of. xxx The transfer of motor vehicle plates whether
temporary or regular, validating tags and/or stickers
41
MEMORANDUM
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from one motor vehicle to another without permit from

the Bureau of Land Transportation, except security
number plates on authorized vehicles, shall be
punishable with a fine of not less than Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six months
at the discretion of the Court.
130. The rationale behind this rule and of Paragraph 2

of Section 12 is not difficult to discern. If one is allowed to
sell or to buy a number plate with the end view that said
number plate will be transferred from one motorcycle to
another, then the purpose of the registration system cannot
be achieved. Ultimately, the aim of R.A. No. 11235 cannot
also be achieved.
131. It is very possible that without the assailed

provision- the prohibition of selling or buying number plates-
a criminal-minded individual can easily obtain a number
plate elsewhere and attach it to his or her motorcycle in
order to avoid identification. This is precisely what Section
12, par. 2 of R.A. No. 11235 aims to prevent- the possibility
of destroying the integrity of the registration system. It
cannot be denied that an uncompromised registration
system is an indispensable element in the identification of
criminals who use motorcycles in the commission of a crime.
132. Third. There is no basis for the statement of

Petitioners that eradicating motorcycle-aided killings in the
country is unreasonable and oppressive as the punishment
to address the actions and intents of few criminals should
not be levied upon the majority. It should be pointed out
that grave and overriding considerations of public interest
justify the provisions of R.A. No. 11235. This holds even
more true, considering that the use of motor vehicles, which
includes motorcycles, is a mere privilege that is subject to
police power regulation by the State.
133. Again, it is thus undeniable that a reasonable

necessity exists between the purpose of R.A. No. 11235 and
the means employed for its attainment.
134. In the case of Agustin v. Edu (“Agustin”)58 the

Supreme Court made a categorical pronouncement that it is
58
G.R. No. L-49112, 2 February 1979.
42
MEMORANDUM
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not within the province of courts to pass upon questions of

wisdom of legislation, thus:
“It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection

to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of
power, the justification for a finding of
unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say
negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That
approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that
is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears
repeating "that this Court, in the language of Justice
Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom justice
or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice
Tuason: 'It is not the province of the courts to
supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of
propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret
and apply them regardless of whether or not they are
wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice
Labrador, 'are not supposed to override legitimate
policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the
law.' It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,
that only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The
principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department
and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There
would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a
coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its
own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there
ought to be, the last offender should be courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise
insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and
cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained.”
135. “It is a settled rule that the fundamental duty of

the Court is to apply the law regardless of who may be
affected, even if the law is harsh - dura lex sed lex. The
remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislature.”59
59
Roldan, Jr. v. Madrona, G.R. No. 152989, 4 September 2002.
43
MEMORANDUM
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136. Fourth. Petitioners likewise claim that the

placement of a bigger, readable, and color-coded number
plates at the front and back of a motorcycle will not achieve
the purpose of R.A. No. 11235 because allegedly, “no
criminals will use their own motorcycle and real plates in the
commission of crimes.” The Petitioners proceeded to claim
that because of this scenario, R.A. No. 11235 is not intended
at crime prevention, but outright oppression.60 Respondents
beg to disagree.
137. With respect to this challenge, Petitioners are

already inquiring into the wisdom of the legislature. The
question of whether the placement of a bigger, readable,
and color-coded number plates at the front and back of a
motorcycle will effectively curb motorcycle-related crimes is
clearly one of policy. It is a question of whether the
legislature wisely adopted such measure to address rising
incidents of motorcycle-related crimes.
138. In any case, on the assumption that the question

raised by Petitioners does not concern with the wisdom of
the legislature, Petitioners’ argument, nonetheless, is
without merit.
139. The claim that no criminal will use his or her own
motorcycle and real plate in the commission of a crime,
making the law ineffective as a measure to address the
rising incidents of motorcycle-related crimes, is without
basis. This is a baseless assumption. Contrary to Petitioners’
assertion, it is without question that there are instances
wherein the apprehended suspects in motorcycle-related
crimes are likewise the registered owners of the same motor
vehicle used in the commission of the crime. Surely, the
identification of motorcycles is vital for the apprehension of
the culprits in motorcycle-related crimes, whether such
culprits are the registered owners of the motorcycle used in
such crimes or not.
140. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that

Petitioners’ assertion is true, the same will not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that R.A. No. 11235 is ineffective in
addressing the increasing incidents of motorcycle-related/
60
See par. 34 of the Amended Petition.
44
MEMORANDUM
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motorcycle-aided crimes. Petitioners may have failed to

appreciate the significance of the identification of the
motorcycle used in the commission of the crime.
141. A brief background of the measure may put the

discussion into perspective. During the deliberation of R.A.
11235, Senator Gordon informed the body that “34,906
motorcycle crimes had been reported over the last several
years, with such incidents rising steadily and averaging
between 4,000 to 6,000 annually. He lamented that many
criminals got away with such crimes as evidenced by the fact
that only 0.25% of cases of the 4,000 total number of
riding-in-tandem incidents in 2016 have been solved, while
3,000 are still under investigation.”61
142. It must be highlighted that the apparent reason

for the very disappointing success rate in solving
motorcycle-related crimes is the inability or failure of the
investigating authorities to identify the facility or the
motorcycle used in the commission of the crime. The
motorcycle, which can be the crucial lead to the culprits, is
difficult to identify because of its small and unreadable
number plate, or because it has no plate at all, courtesy of
the previously soft approach against those who fail or refuse
to register their motorcycles.
143. In relation to the above, it bears to stress that the

identification of the motorcycle used in the commission of a
crime is a big step in the investigation process. Even in
cases where the identification of the motorcycle does
not point to the registered owner as the culprit,
identification still provides the investigating
authorities with a very important lead in their
investigation. For instance, upon identification,
investigating authorities can trace the place where the
motorcycle is registered and consequently narrow the
possible areas where the motorcycle may have previously
traveled. Also, upon identification, investigating authorities
will be led to the registered owner of the motorcycle who
may be questioned why his or her motorcycle was used in
the commission of the crime. This is just two of the many
other benefits that identification can contribute to the
investigation process, the apprehension of the culprits, and
61
Senate Journal. Session No. 75. 17th Congress, 1st Regular Session, 15 March 2017, pp. 1283-1284.
45
MEMORANDUM
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ultimately in the prevention or reduction of motorcycle-

related crimes.
144. In fact, it may be said that the measures adopted

under R.A. No. 11235 are also preventive. Certainly, a more
effective identification system of motorcycles will deter
criminals from executing crimes through such means since it
would mean that it would be more difficult for them to
escape apprehension.
145. Clearly, based on the foregoing, the provisions of

R.A. No 11235 are necessary, if not essential, to the
attainment of the objectives of said law.
B.
APPLYING THE RATIONAL BASIS
TEST TO THE CASE AT BAR, IT IS
CLEAR THAT R.A. NO. 11235 DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
146. Equal protection is the constitutional guarantee

that “no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in like circumstances62”. It simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.63 In the case of Philippine Judges Association v.
Prado64, the Supreme Court expounded on the concept of
equal protection:
“The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the

concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a
more, specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
62
City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, 12 April 2005.
63
Garcia v. Hon. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013.
64
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 11 November 1993.
46
MEMORANDUM
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prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the

equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection

simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the

universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact
sometimes result in unequal protection, as where,
for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the
morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification.
By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.”65
147. A reading of the above shows that the equal

protection clause permits a valid classification. In
determining the validity of a classification, the Courts have
applied three levels of tests to determine tests namely,
rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny.
148. The rational basis scrutiny is the traditional test

which requires only that the government must not impose
differences in treatment except upon some reasonable
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.66
Elsewise stated, a classification will be upheld as
constitutional as long as the same bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.67
149. In the case of British American Tobacco v. Jose

Isidro N. Camacho68, the Supreme Court ruled that the
rational basis test applies when the law or measure in
question neither contains a suspect classification nor
65
Ibid. Emphasis supplied.
66
Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 583-584 (2004).
67
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 8 April 2010.
68
G.R. No. 163583, 20 August 2008.
47
MEMORANDUM
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impinges on a fundamental right. Under the rational basis

test, the Courts observe a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and will not thus declare a classification
invalid unless Petitioners clearly prove that the same
constitutes a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In other words, Petitioners have the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that the legislative
classification is without rational basis, thus:
In consonance thereto, we have held that "in our

jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal
protection challenges in the main have followed the
‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude
to legislative classifications and a reluctance to
invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution." Within the
present context of tax legislation on sin products which
neither contains a suspect classification nor impinges
on a fundamental right, the rational-basis test thus
finds application. Under this test, a legislative
classification, to survive an equal protection challenge,
must be shown to rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The classifications must be reasonable and
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. Since every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, the burden of proof is
on the one attacking the constitutionality of the law to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the legislative
classification is without rational basis. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile
and oppressive discrimination against particular
persons and classes, and that there is no conceivable
basis which might support it.69
150. In this case, the rational basis test applies

considering that the assailed law neither targets a suspect
class nor impinges upon fundamental rights. Necessarily,
Petitioners bear the burden of showing beyond reasonable
doubt that the classification contained in the assailed law is
without rational basis. Unfortunately, Petitioners failed to do
so. Therefore, the presumption of constitutionality stands.
151. To foreclose any doubt, herein Respondents

nonetheless proceed to discuss why the classification
contained in R.A. No. 11235 is valid and passes the rational
69
Ibid. Citations omitted.
48
MEMORANDUM
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basis test. The requisites of a valid classification are as

follows, to wit:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same

class.70
152. Here, Petitioners argue that no substantial

distinctions exist between motorcycles and cars which would
justify any difference in treatment and regulation between
the two. In particular, Petitioners state in its main Petition
that:
“In the instant case, R.A. 11235 has been issued

without a valid classification if its main purpose is to
curb criminality. Both motorcycles and cars use our
roads, so there is no substantial distinction to regulate
motorcycle use and ownership while excluding car
owners who are similarly situated. In fact, not only
motorcycle owners are being used in the commission of
assassinations but also four wheeled vehicles which are
more commonly used in the commission of heinous
crimes like kidnaping [sic] for ransom, drugs smuggling
and robbery with homicide, to name a few.”71
153. This argument deserves scant consideration. To

put it bluntly, motorcycles and cars are not identical nor
similarly situated, notwithstanding the fact that both are
used on roads. Moreover, even assuming arguendo, that the
two are similarly situated, there is no question that there are
real and substantive distinctions between motorcycles and
four-wheeled vehicles, such as cars, that justify a valid and
reasonable classification.
154. In the case of Mirasol v. Department of Public

Works and Highways72, the Supreme Court noted that
substantial distinctions exist between motorcycles and other
forms of motor vehicles, thus:
70
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, 17 February 1968.
71
Amended Petition, pp. 9-10.
72
G.R. No. 158793, 8 June 2006.
49
MEMORANDUM
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“We find that it is neither warranted nor

reasonable for petitioners to say that the only
justifiable classification among modes of transport is
the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler
truck is substantially different from other light vehicles.
The first may be denied access to some roads where
the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be
reasonably differentiated from newer models. We find
that real and substantial differences exist
between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.
Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is
obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite
different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most
obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.”
155. As the Supreme Court noted in the above-

mentioned case, it is clear that there are substantial physical
differences between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport.
156. In relation to the purpose of R.A. No. 11235, the

most pertinent difference between the two is that
motorcycles are more commonly used as a getaway vehicle
in the commission of crimes, especially in the context of the
traffic situation of the Philippines. Motorcycles easily weave
through tight spaces between cars with ease, under
conditions of heavy traffic and congestion. Due to its
compact size, motorcycles can also pass through narrow
alleys and by-ways which four-wheeled vehicles would not
normally be able to traverse. Further, motorcycles are
generally less costly than a four-wheeled vehicle thus
making it more readily accessible to perpetrators of crimes
who intend to use and dispose of it as an escape vehicle.
Further, the current size of number plates of motorcycles
results in the difficulty in the identification of number plates.
The same condition is not present in the case of number
plates of four-wheeled vehicles which have a larger standard
size.
157. Another important difference between a four-

wheeled vehicle and a motorcycle is highlighted during the
testimony of Atty. Algie Mariacos. This material difference
50
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
refers to the fact that there are more motorcycle-related

crimes than crimes related or associated with four-wheeled
vehicles. Worse, of the recorded motorcycle-related crimes,
only a very small percentage was labeled or considered
solved.
158. Lastly, based on the current requirement of laws

in relation to the current design of a motorcycle and a four-
wheeled vehicle, it is easier to identify the latter than the
former. This is so because a four-wheeled vehicle has a front
plate, while none for a motorcycle, thus:
Exchanges between Atty. Mariacos and this

Honorable Court:
Q: So are you telling to the Court, for instance,

considering all the CCTVs in highway let’s say in EDSA
and all other scene, considering that the motorcycle has
no front plate number, identification of the vehicle can
only be taken after it has fled already several meters
away after the scene of the crime or after the
consummation of the crime is that correct?
A: It’s not accurate, YH. The CCTV can not get the
motorcycle even if it’s located at the back because first,
it’s small. That’s why, the law is precisely implemented
or enacted to inlarge (sic) those plates and …
Q: The plate number?
A: the plate numbers.
Q: It should be placed before or after?
A: Before and after. It may also help if one is

placed in front because while the motorcycle is
fleeing from the crime scene, the CCTV in front
may get the plate number in front of the
motorcycle as opposed to when it is placed only
at the back, it may be … the chances of getting
the identity of the motorcycle is low as opposed
to …
Xxx
Q: So you can view the rear view mirror of a vehicle

while sitting in the vehicle, is that correct?
A: I can, your Honor.
51
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
Q: So you can identify a motorcycle coming from

the back of your vehicle for which you are riding?
At present situation?
A: I cannot, Your Honor.
Q: So, your can only describe the color or whether

it is a small motorcycle?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Which is very generic? Is it correct?
A: Yes, your Honor.
xxx73
159. Given these differences, Petitioners cannot

therefore conclude that no substantial distinction exists
between four-wheeled vehicles and motorcycles based on
the fact alone that “there is no data showing that killings are
not with commonly committed with the use of four wheeled
vehicle.”74
160. The case of Taxicab Operators v. Board of

Transportation75 is instructive. In the said case, the Supreme
Court held:
“In so far as the non-application of the assailed

Circulars to other transportation services is concerned,
it need only be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same treatment be
accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It
permits of classification of the object or subject of
the law provided classification is reasonable or
based on substantial distinction, which make for
real differences, and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. What is required under
the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by
legal means so that all persons under Identical or
similar circumstance would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed.76”
73
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the proceedings on 16 October 2020 (Testimony of Algie
Kwillon Mariacos); emphasis supplied.
74
Petition, p. 9.
75
G.R. No. L-59234, 30 September 1982.
76
Emphasis supplied.
52
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
161. Moreover, the classification between cars and

motorcycles is clearly germane to the purpose of the law,
which is to curb the commission of motorcycle-aided
crimes. Similarly, and contrary to Petitioners’ submissions,
R.A. No. 11235 applies equally to all members of the same
class, namely motorcycle users.
C.
R.A. NO. 11235 DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE SOCIAL JUSTICE PROVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
162. Lastly, Petitioners submit that R.A. No. 11235 is

unconstitutional for being repugnant to the principle of social
justice.77 To support this, Petitioners argue that the assailed
law is anti-poor because “the large majority of those who
make use of motorcycles belong to lower socioeconomic
classes who can ill afford such exorbitant fines”.78 This
argument deserves scant consideration.
163. Section 1 and 2, Article XIII of the Constitution

provides for the constitutional mandate to promote social
justice. The said provisions state:
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to

the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,

ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments. c
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include

the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
164. In the case of Calalang v. Williams,79 the Supreme

Court had occasion to describe the import of the foregoing
precept regarding the promotion of social justice under the
Constitution, to wit:
77
Petition, p. 11.
78
Id., p. 12.
79
G.R. No. 47800, 2 December 1940.
53
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
The promotion of social justice, however, is to be

achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards
any given group. Social justice is "neither communism,
nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least
be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the

recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended
to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest
number."
165. In this case, the provisions of the assailed law are

ultimately geared towards the promotion and protection of
the welfare of the Filipino people as a whole. Accordingly,
there is no merit in the argument of Petitioners that the
provisions of R.A. No. 11235 which impose fines and
penalties violate the principle of social justice. In fact, the
fines and penalties designated under the assailed law fall
squarely within the constitutional mandate to promote social
justice as it serves to protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity.
166. In any case, the determination of the propriety of

fines under R.A. No. 11235 lies within the discretion of the
legislature. In the case of People v. Muñoz80, the High Court
aptly pronounced that “[p]enalties are prescribed by statute
and are essentially and exclusively legislative.” Moreover, in
80
G.R. No. L-38969-70, 9 February 1989.
54
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
the case of United States v. Borromeo,81 it was held that

“[t]he fixing of penalties for the violation of statutes is
primarily a legislative function, and the courts hesitate to
interfere, unless the fine provided for is so far excessive as
to shock the sense of mankind."
167. Here, grave consequences are involved

considering that the assailed law is concerned with the
safety and the protection of the public at large from
criminality through the use of motorcycles. Thus, by
imposing strict penalties upon the violators of R.A. No.
11235, the legislature is merely ensuring that the
constitutional tenet under Article II, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. to maintain peace and order, to protect life,
liberty and property, and to promote the general welfare, be
upheld.
168. If Petitioners seriously think that the imposable

penalties are not commensurate with the offenses
committed, the remedy is not found in the courts. The court
cannot substitute its own wisdom for that of the Congress.
To do so will violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
169. At this point, the reminder of the Supreme Court

in the case of Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service82 is apropos:
“Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of

constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the
challenger must negate all possible bases; that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." 83
170. In view of the foregoing, the Honorable Court is

thus implored to deny the instant Petition for Declaratory
Relief for utter lack of merit.
81
G.R. No. 7150, 16 October 1912.
82
G.R. No. 197676, 4 February 2014, 715 SCRA 293.
83
Citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
55
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Respondents respectfully pray that this

Honorable Court DENY Petitioners’ Petition for Declaratory
Relief dated 9 August 2019, as amended, for UTTER LACK
OF MERIT.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are

likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Quezon City, 19 January 2021.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

134 Amorsolo Street, Legaspi Village,
1229 Makati City
Tel. No.: 8186301 to 09 (Trunkline)
Fax No.: 8176037
Website: www.osg.gov.ph
Email: docket@osg.gov.ph
JOSE C. CALIDA
Solicitor General
Roll No. 24852
IBP Lifetime No. 015360, 8/18/16
MCLE Exemption No. VII-OSG000228,
11/08/19
HENRY S. ANGELES
Assistant Solicitor General
Roll No. 45837
IBP Lifetime No. 016075, 4/21/17
MCLE Exemption No. VI-002494, 4/24/19
LOUIE BRIAN S. SZE

State Solicitor
Roll No. 59331
IBP Lifetime No. 013031, 12/03/14
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0023670, 03/27/19
56
MEMORANDUM
x-----------------------x
LISELLE ANGELA I. BASCARA

Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 66666
IBP O.R. No. 120508, 06/04/20
MCLE Compliance No. VI- 0021006, 03/26/19
ALGIE KWILLON B. MARIACOS

Associate Solicitor
Roll No. 72029
IBP O.R. No. 115171, 01/31/20
MCLE Compliance No. VI-0027599, 06/13/19
Copy furnished:
ATTY. ROLITO A. ABING

ATTY. MORGAN ROSALES NICANOR
ATTY. CECILIO M. JIMENO, JR.
ABING NICANOR JIMENO & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE
Counsel for Petitioners
2nd Floor, PNB Building 267 Real Street,
Pamplona 1740 Las Piñas City
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Malacañang Palace, Jose P. Laurel St.,
San Miguel, Manila and Gen. Solano St.,
San Miguel, Manila
SECRETARY ARTHUR TUGADE

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Apo Court along Sergio Osmeña, Sr.,
Clark Freeport Zone, Pampanga 2009
Columbia Tower Ortigas Avenue,
Brgy. Wack-Wack, Mandaluyong City
ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDGAR C. GALVANTE

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE
LTO Compound, East Avenue, Quezon City
57

19-025928-0051 - Memorandum (Justitia v. Medialdea) Dated 19 January 2021 (Signed)

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

SPL Civil Case No. Q-19-12182-CV

JUSTITIA LEX MACHINA ASSOCIATION INC., GALELEO

HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, in his capacity as

Solicitor General JOSE C. CALIDA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

JUSTITIA LEX MACHINA

Respondents HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA in his

1. On 16 August 2019, the OSG received this

2. On 28 August 2019, the OSG received a copy of the

3. On 29 August 2019, the OSG filed a Motion for

4. On 3 September 2019, the Honorable Court issued

5. On 6 September 2019, the respective counsels of

6. On even date, the Honorable Court issued an Order

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court

1) GRANTS the continuance of the petitioner for the

2) TAKES NOTE the manifestation of the petitioner that

3) TAKES NOTE of the manifestation of the respondents

4) ORDERS petitioners to participate in the joint

5) ORDERS the LTO thru the Executive Director Romeo

6) GRANTS Atty. Abing 20 days, or until October 28,

7) GRANTS the reservation of AS Bascara and Atty. Sze

8) Set the pre-marking of all documentary evidence of

9) Set the continuation of the hearing for Prayer for

10) MODIFIES the Order of September 3, 2019

11) INFORMS the parties and their counsels that

7. On 9 October 2019, the pre-marking of the

8. On 10 October 2019, the OSG received a copy of

9. On the same date, the OSG likewise received a

10. On 7 November 2019, Respondents, through the

11. On 8 November 2019, the respective counsels of

12. On even date, the Honorable Court issued an Order

1) GRANTS the Petitioner’s Motion to Admit

2) TAKES NOTE of the Manifestations of Atty. Sze on

days from today and to furnish Petitioner’s

3) TAKES NOTE Manifestation of Petitioner thru Atty.

4) Set the pre-trial hearing be held on December 6,

13. On 25 November 2019, Respondents, thru the OSG,

14. On 2 December 2019, Respondents, thru the OSG,

15. On 16 December 2019, the OSG received

16. On 31 January 2020, the respective counsels of the

17. On 17 February 2020, Respondents, thru the OSG,

18. On 1 June 2020, the OSG received a Motion to Set

19. On 2 June 2020, the Respondents, thru the OSG,

20. On 6 June 2020, the OSG received an Order dated

21. On 19 June 2020, the respective counsels of the

22. During the hearing, Petitioners were given until 29

23. On 23 June 2020, the OSG received Petitioners’

24. On 3 July 2020, Respondents, through the OSG,

25. On 6 July 2020, Respondents, through the OSG,

26. On 6 July 2020, the OSG received Petitioners’

27. On 8 July 2020, the Honorable Court issued an

for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary

28. On 13 August 2020, the OSG received the

29. On 20 August 2020, the respective counsels of the

31. On 16 October 2020, the respective counsels of the

32. During the same hearing, Respondent, through the

33. On 30 October 2020, Respondents, through the

34. On 19 November 2020, the respective counsels of

35. On 15 December 2020, the OSG received a copy of

36. On 16 December 2020, the respective counsels of

37. On 21 December 2020, the OSG was able to secure